OFF

X

U.S-Japan Alliance is strong, but fragileGlosserman 15 — Panel of Experts: Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, James Miller is Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy for National Security Council policy-making and crisis management, Catherine Kelleher is a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, Kori Schake is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, 2015, ("Reassurance: What Should Allies Expect?”, Carnegie Endowment, March 23rd, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/files/07-Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

On the operational level we’re seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South Koreans . We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like Ambassador Ho-young

this morning, the news today that there’s a deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out, so we’re seeing a stepping up of the presence . It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that that’s what the allies are looking for. We get the fact that there’s a demand for more. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need to be expecting, is a demand for the U nited S tates for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, the alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides, a receptiveness to the needs. Finally, I think, we’re seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the

legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic connection between the three countries.

Plan creates a perception of weakened commitment to Japan – cause prolif and East Asian arms racingChanlett-Avery 2/19/9 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf JJH)

U.S. Security Commitment Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuc lear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan ’s security . Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore

full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S.

extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are

nervous that if the U nited S tates develops a closer relationship with China , the gap between Tokyo ’s

and Washington ’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment . 28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s

strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence . Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness

platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the

U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in

order to allay concerns of alliance drift . Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the

sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic

ambiguity.30 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race .33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel So uth Ko rea to develop its own program ; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal ; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons . This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect —or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing . The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However,

most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors . US China Relations The course of the relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan . If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff

develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their

views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.

Especially true of space coopMoltz 15 (James Clay, an advisor to the NASA-Ames Research Center and to the U.S. Department of Energy and has provided expert testimony on space and nuclear issues before the U.S. Congress. “It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race” 1/17/15 The Daily Beast http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/17/why-china-will-win-the-next-space-race.html-LP)

The general public in the West largely views the exploration of space as dominated by the United States and perhaps Russia. Sometimes, as in the case of the Rosetta mission, they may give thought to Europe’s capabilities. Few people think of India when it comes to missions to Mars, but popular joy erupted across India in September 2014 after itsMangalyaan scientific spacecraft successfully achieved orbit around the red planet. One Indian reader responded to the story on a major online news outlet by posting: “It is [a] moment of pride as India becomes [the] 1st Asian nation to reach Mars.” And understood to all Indian readers was the point that China had—after a series of Asian firsts in space—finally been surpassed. Since China’s first human spaceflight in 2003 and its threatening anti-satellite test in 2007, Asia has seen a surge in space activity, with budgets increasing rapidly across the region. While few officials admit to the term, a “space race” is emerging in Asia. The surge of Asian countries joining the ranks of major space powers mirrors the rise of Asian economies and their militaries more generally since the end of the Cold War. But following the political drivers of these trends leads most often to regional rivalries, not a desire to compete with the United States or Russia. Being first in Asia to do anything in space brings prestige, lends credibility to governments in power, and helps stimulate Asia’s young population to study science and technology, which has other benefits for their national

economies. The responses to China’s rise have included the sudden development of military space programs by two countries that previously shunned such activities—Japan and India—and dynamic new activities in countries ranging from Australia to Singapore to Vietnam . On the Korean Peninsula, both North and South have orbited satellites in the past three years and both have pledged to develop much larger rockets. Many of these countries realize that they can’t “win” Asia’s space race, but they also know that they cannot afford to

lose. China’s rapid expansion in space activity has also raised serious concerns within U.S. military circles and in NASA. But these developments pose an existential threat to China’s neighbors , some of whom see Beijing’s space program as yet another threatening dimension to their deep-seated historical, economic, and geo-political rivalries for status and influence within the Asian pecking order. Even more, space achievements affect the self-perceptions of their national populations, challenging their governments to do more. How this competition will play out and whether it can be managed, or channeled into more positive directions, will have a major impact on the future of international relations in space. The U.S. government has thus far responded with a two-track strategy, seeking a bilateral space security dialogue with Beijing, while quietly expanding space partnerships with U.S. friends and allies in the region, adding a space dimension to the U.S. “pivot” to

Asia. Although shocking to some, China’s space efforts have actually been long in coming. Beijing has gradually built up a range of scientific, commercial, and military space capabilities since the 1980s that have now put it in a position to

compete favorably with any country in Asia—even technologically advanced Japan —while presenting an asymmetric threat to the United States. Over the past decade China has launched a spacecraft that mapped the Moon (Chang’e 1), conducted a lunar rover mission (Chang’e 2), and orbited and visited a small space station (Tiangong 1), with plans for a much larger station within a decade. It is building a new launch site on Hainan Island with plans for a heavy-left booster. In the military realm, the People’s Liberation Army has demonstrated the capability of putting critical U.S. space assets at risk in a crisis, forcing Washington to think twice about the surety of its space-enhanced military capabilities. The sheer size of China’s young scientific and engineering cadre, its steadily expanding satellite network (including a newly operational commercial and military GPS system called Beidou), its increasing space budget, and its investment in military counter-space technologies—with recent tests of possible offensive systems in 2010, 2013, and 2014—presage a broad and formidable set of capabilities. Experts are divided over whether China has set itself on a course for space dominance or not. Its

policies are likely to be influenced—for better or for worse—by its economic status and its evolving relationship with the United States. But Asian countries are not taking the threat lying down. Unlike in Europe, where all of the major powers (except Russia) are members of the European Space Agency and share a cooperative approach to space (including highly integrated cost sharing), Asia’s space arrangements are highly nationalistic, sometimes secretive, and mostly competitive. There are no space security talks currently ongoing among the major powers, no history of arms control talks linking space and nuclear deterrence (unlike in the U.S.-Soviet case), and no civil space cooperation in its key political dyads : China-Japan, India-China, and North-South Korea. At the regional level, China and Japan have sponsored rival space organizations in an effort to “organize” smaller countries in this broader competition and draw them to their side. China has formed an ESA-like body called the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which now includes Bangladesh, Thailand, and Mongolia among its dues-paying members. APSCO benefits include access to Chinese space training, ground stations, and satellite development projects. Others in the region have opted to participate in the less formal, Japanese-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, maintaining greater flexibility. At the domestic level, Japan, long Asia’s technological leader, has also reacted with a range of new activities. In 2008, the Japanese Diet pushed through revolutionary legislation that ended Japan’s previous ban on military activities in space. Despite the high costs of recovery after the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, Tokyo has doubled down on its space efforts with a new launcher and renewed efforts in high-prestige space science and human spaceflight, including an active program of research on its Kibo module on the International Space Station (ISS). Japan’s H-II Transfer Vehicle spacecraft now provides the only non-U.S. and non-Russian service module able to ferry supplies to the ISS. In December 2014, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency launched the ambitiousHayabusa 2 mission, which aims to put four landers on an asteroid by 2018 and then return soil samples to Earth. Japanese officials see a n intimate connection between their space

accomplishments and the ability of its economy to export advanced technologies. They fear that

China’s space accomplishments might put Japan’s technological reputation into doubt. Therefore,

they believe they cannot fall behind their rapidly advancing neighbor.

Prolif causes nuke warTan 15 — Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma , in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict , thereby destroying the very security that

arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between

North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, lead ing to an arms race on the Korean peninsula . The situation is compounded by

the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost

brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on

reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas . Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan,

however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific ,

will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long . In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

X

Clinton wins – but coattail strategy keyCasselman, 7-22 – Ben Casselman, senior editor and the chief economics writer for FiveThirtyEight, 7-22-2016, “The Economy Will Probably Be Pretty Good On Election Day”, FiveThirtyEight, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-economy-will-probably-be-pretty-good-on-election-day/

That silence stands in stark contrast to the primary campaign, which was often dominated by economic issues such as trade, immigration and the stagnation of middle-class incomes. But maybe it shouldn’t come as a surprise that Republicans are looking to shift the campaign’s focus to other issues: It looks increasingly likely that when voters go to the polls in November, the economy will look relatively strong . As recently as a month ago, that was far from clear. The surprise

“Brexit” decision sent financial markets into a tailspin. A weak jobs report sparked fears of a slowdown in hiring. Recession fears, which had died down since early this year, began to re-emerge. It was not hard to imagine Trump’s team excitedly

pulling clips of all the times Clinton praised President Obama’s stewardship of the economy. This week, though, it was probably

Clinton who was applauding as Republican convention speakers repeatedly said she would represent a

continuation of Obama’s presidency . The stock market has regained all its post- Brexit losses and is setting record highs. The job market rebounded strongly in June . Other economic measures, such as

consumer spending, are strong. In his acceptance speech Wednesday night, GOP vice presidential nominee Mike Pence called Clinton “the secretary of the status quo .” Economically, at least, that might not be such a bad thing .

Plan flips the electionHe, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

U.S. Election and Its Impact on China The United States presidential election is now in full swing , with both parties going all out

in a feverish effort to gain the upper hand. The 2016 vote is watched very closely all over the world,

because whoever occupies the White House next January is going to face a fast-changing world with multiple challenges crying out for active American involvement and a more isolationist and inward-looking America unwilling to take on the role of “world policeman”. Before we delve deeper into the impact of the election on China and US-China relations for the coming years,

there is a need to offer a brief analysis of what insight this election process has brought us into the American

phyche . First and foremost , it has laid bare the rising populist sentiments that are oozing out every

pore of American politics both domestic and international. One example is the Republican candidate Donald Trump whose fiery words on immigration and Muslims has won him high approval ratings even though those words are obviously on the extreme end of populism. Three Republican candidates, Trump, Cruz and Carlson, are considered politically extreme but have consistently won as a group over 50% support among Republican voters based on recent polls. It shows that voters are rejecting traditional candidates. What it reveals is that men-on-the-street in America are simply tired of

traditional politics and politicians. The fact that Jeb Bush falls behind Trump therefore comes as no surprise. Populist sentiments reflect the unhappiness

ordinary people have harbored against status quo where American economy is still under the shadow of financial crisis and slow recovery as well as enfeebled responses of the American government in the face of global challenges. To put it in perspective, they represent the frustration and anxiety of American people feel

about the changed and still fast changing world they live in. The American supremacy and sense of safety

both physical and economic is threatened . That’s the essence of what people fear. Here comes

China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents , to

American people , a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the

rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place

simultaneously. “ Scapegoating” China is inevitable . “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the S outh C hina S ea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific ”. The list of complaints can go on and

on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American

politicians and voters as long as they have “ election value ”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since

2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is

common and “cost-free” in US elections . This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to

the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation

between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters

“ dangerous waters” in 2016.

Trump causes extinction Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against

climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn

Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement “, end US funding for U nited Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the “stupid” Obama administration

regulations to cut power plant emissions . The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his

campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses

an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted

climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises , creating global turmoil

that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad . Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory

in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President

Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress . In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults,

spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and “criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will

provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump ’s bravado and reckless unpredictability , his vow to renegotiate trade deals

and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe , risking financial

collapse and military conflict . In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact

agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher .

X

“Increase” requires pre-existenceBuckley 6 (Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf)

First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that

an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater ,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium , to which Edo’s

actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin-ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance.

Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term

“increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy . See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88,

101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

Plan creates new types of engagement --- voting issue:

1. Limits --- they can create anything, the entire range becomes topical --- overstretches Neg research burdens --- we allow a fair number of existing types

2. Ground --- best links assume existing policies, they change the debate from improving engagement to creating new forms --- undermines core ground and fairness

X

Next is the Track 2 CP

The United States should establish a Track Two U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue and should request that Track Two efforts assess the desirability or undesirability of the United States Federal Government increasing its diplomatic engagement with the People's Republic of China via a joint space exploration program, including removing the Wolf Amendment and increasing Mars colonization efforts.

Track 2 spurs best policy and spills up while avoiding elections – CP overcomes opposition to answer say noGraham 9 - Sarah Ellen Graham and John Robert Kelley Center for International Studies/Annenberg Center for Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, “US Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 1, Winter 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465772

Track Two as Policy-Related International Dialogue Events notwithstanding, track two literature identifies dialogue as the chief mode for reconciliation in conflict settings. In no other modern conflict has this proven more evident than in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has been punctuated by series of orchestrated and unofficial peace settlement talks dating from the mid-1970s. ‘Academic conferences,’ arranged under the auspices of third-parties, have provided Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian intellectuals

with opportunities to contemplate solutions in a neutral, non-attribution atmosphere. The meetings served as the basis for security dialogues since

1990 that have sought to establish networks, incorporating Israel, Palestine as well as the Arab League, Iran and Turkey, for cooperation on issues including regional security, arms control, confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), and the monitoring of borders and seas. The goal is to sustain communication over the long-term, on the basis that emerging ideas will ‘filter’ throughout representative groups and socialize respective constituencies into new behavioral norms and perceptions One of track

two diplomacy’s chief theorists, Harold Saunders, once termed it a “ policy-related, problem-solving dialogue ,” thus extending the notion of

good relations as an end unto itself. Saunders argued that by capitalizing on open communication for a policy-relevant purpose, track two dialogues extend diplomatic relationships to include a broader range of policy actors, and brings them together without the trappings and constraints of protocol . At the same time, to guarantee both

credibility and influence track two participants must have experience within the policy milieu and wield connections to the official domain. In the conflict management arena, track two figures primarily act as intermediaries facilitating communications between disputing parties. But in the absence of conflict is there a raison d’etre for track two dialogues? Our assessment of the prospects for track two in Northeast Asia challenges the conventional

notion that opening dialogue channels is necessary only in the context of conflict resolution. There are three key ways in which track two

dialogue can facilitate policy coordination in non-conflict settings: by shaping elite perceptions ; by

maintaining open communication channels; and by enabling the pursuit of joint projects . As stated earlier,

elites embedded in the policy-process play a vital role in track two arrangements because they

represent credible agents of change . The efficacy of track two initiatives depends on elite participation

in two ways. On the one hand, the ‘second’ track provides political cover so elites do not feel obliged to recite

government policy or have to bear the political costs endemic to traditional diplomatic interactions .

At the same time, track two processes are contingent on the fact that elites have access at the policymaking level . This dichotomy

demonstrates the balance to be struck in crafting track two initiatives: relative independence of thought must be guaranteed without forsaking connections to power. By virtue of their

respective social positioning, elites gathered in a track two atmosphere constitute an ad hoc epistemic community actively and collectively reflecting on policy issues. Whether track two solutions catalyze policy change depends partially on the access of elites to

political leaders and partially on socialization, whereby ideas gain the acceptance of a broader segment of society. In conflict scenarios, socialization entails changing

prevailing attitudes toward an adversary; in our conceptualization of track two the function of socialization is to build political

support for policy collaboration at bilateral or multilateral levels. One part of the world where this

approach has gained widespread acceptance is Southeast Asia, where Association of South East Asian Nations has encouraged regional

security dialogue in track two settings. Between 1993 and 1995 there were at least 93 non-official meetings stemming from ASEAN convened to discuss regional security issues. In 2003 alone that number increased to 149 and surged further to 217 by 2005.

X

Next is the Advantage CP

Text: The United States Federal Government should

-ratify the draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,

-fully fund its unilateral efforts to colonize Mars,

-propose to cooperate with Japan and Russia.

Last two planks solve colonization – NRC is in the context of general cooperation, even if it cites China specifically. Full funding folds in Russia, which is otherwise sufficient as per Tiezzi.

First plank solves space militarization Jaramillo 9 (Cesar Jaramillo, graduated with a BA and an MA in political science and global governance, 12/1/09, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a Space Weapons Ban” Space Security, Volume 30, Issue 4, http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/, JSO)

The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies are being developed seems to be widening the gap between military applications that may affect space assets and the precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and congested each year underscores the need for a comprehensive space security treaty that builds on what little i nternational law exists in this realm and not only reflects current threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain .¶ The PPWT —while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons-free outer space in i nternational treaty law . It is true that the 1967 O uter S pace T reaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and calls for the

peaceful exploration of outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the placement or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the use of earth - based weapons against space targets —activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.¶ It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state , and considerable efforts are being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental circles to ensure that

this delicate threshold is preserved. To be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of satellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty .

COLONIZATIONExtinction not inevitable – intervening actors, tech advances and human adaption solve

Even if extinction is coming, colonization doesn’t solve Williams 10 (Lynda, Physics Professor at Santa Rosa Junior College, "Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization", Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402650903539828#.V4jq8bgrLn0)

The Destruction of Earth Threat¶ According to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About five billion¶ years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will expand in size and¶ envelope the inner planets, including the Earth, and burn them into oblivion. So yes, we¶ are doomed, but we have 5 billion years, plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our ¶ extraterrestrial escape. The need to colonize the Moon or Mars to guarantee our survival ¶ based on this fact is not pressing. There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids ¶ and comets, though none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial ¶ colonization. There are many Earth-based tech nological strategies that can be developed ¶ in time to mediate such astronomical threats such as gravitational tugboats that drag the ¶ objects out of range. The solar system could also potentially be exposed to galactic¶ sources of high-

energy gamma ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth, but any Moon or ¶ Mars base would face a similar fate. Thus, Moon or Mars human based colonies would ¶ not protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future. ¶ The Destruction of Earth’s Biosphere¶ Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere and its life¶ sustaining habitat due environmental catastrophes such as climate change, ocean¶ acidification, disruption of

the food chain, bio-warfare, nuclear war, nuclear winter, and¶ myriads of other man-made doomsday prophesies. If we accept these threats as ¶ inevitabilities on par with real astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual,¶ political and

technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, ¶ will we playing into a self-fulfilling prophesy of our own planetary doom? Seeking space ¶ based solutions to our Earthly problems may indeed exacerbate the planetary threats we face . This is the core of the ethical dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put¶ our recourses and bets on developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural¶ and man-made catastrophes or should we focus all of our energies on solving the¶ problems that create these threats on Earth?¶ Human Life on The Moon and Mars¶ What do the prospects of colonies or bases on the Moon and Mars offer? Both the Moon ¶ and Mars host extreme environments that are uninhabitable to humans without very¶ sophisticated technological life supporting systems beyond any that are feasible now or¶ will be available in the near future. Both bodies are subjected to deadly levels of solar¶ radiation and are void of atmospheres that could sustain oxygen-based life forms such as¶ humans. Terra-forming either body is not feasible with current technologies or within any ¶ reasonable time frames so any colony or base would be restricted to living in space ¶ capsules or trailer park like structures which could not support a sufficient number of ¶ humans to perpetuate and sustain the species in any long term manner.

Aff fails – doesn’t increase US funding for NASA, which cut human spaceflight and hasn’t been fully supported since sequestration – conceded in their Dickerson evidence

Space col is impossiblePiersma 10 (November 10, 2010; Theunis Piersma is a Dutch professor of Global Flyway Ecology at the University of Groningen; “Why space is the impossible frontier”; https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827860-100-why-space-is-the-impossible-frontier/) //JM

AT A news conference before his first experience of weightlessness in 2007, theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking said that he hoped his zero-gravity flight would encourage public interest in space exploration. He argued that with an ever-increasing risk of wiping ourselves out on Earth, humans would need to colonise space. Hawking has since argued that we must do this within two centuries or else face extinction. He was no doubt encouraged by US President Barack Obama’s announcement in April this year of a new initiative to send people to Mars by 2030. Hawking, Obama and other proponents of long-term space travel are making a grave error. Humans cannot leave Earth for the several years that it takes to travel to Mars and back, for the simple reason that our biology is intimately connected to Earth . To function properly, we need gravity. Without it, the environment is less demanding on the human body in several ways, and this shows upon the return to Earth. Remember the sight of weakened astronauts emerging after the Apollo missions? That is as nothing compared with what would happen to astronauts returning from Mars. One of the first things to be affected is the heart , which shrinks by as much as a quarter after just one week in orbit (The New England Journal of Medicine, vol 358, p 1370). Heart atrophy leads to decreases in blood pressure and the amount of blood pushed out by the heart. In this way heart atrophy leads to reduced exercise capacity. Astronauts returning to Earth after several months in the International Space Station experience dizziness and blackouts because blood does not reach their brains in sufficient quantities. Six weeks in bed leads to about as much atrophy of the heart as one week in space , suggesting that the atrophy is caused by both

weightlessness and the concomitant reduction in exercise. Other muscle tissue suffers too. The effects of weightlessness on the

muscles of the limbs are easy to verify experimentally. Because they bear the body’s weight, the “anti-gravity” muscles of the thighs and calves degenerate significantly when they are made redundant during space flight. Despite the best attempts to give replacement exercise to crew members on the I nternational S pace S tation, after six months they had still lost 13 percent of their calf muscle volume and 32 per cent of the maximum power that their leg muscles could deliver (Journal of Applied Physiology, vol 106, p 1159). Various metabolic changes also occur, including a decreased capacity for fat oxidation, which can lead to the build-up of fat in atrophied muscle. Space travellers also suffer deterioration of immune function both during and after their missions (Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine,

vol 79, p 835). Arguably the most fearsome effect on bodies is bone loss (The Lancet, vol 355, p 1569). Although the hardness

and strength of bone, and the relative ease with which it fossilises, give it an appearance of permanence, bone is actually a living and remarkably flexible tissue. In the late 19th century, the German anatomist Julius Wolff discovered that bones adjust to the loads that

they are placed under. A decrease in load leads to the loss of bone material, while an increase leads to thicker bone. It is no

surprise, then, that in the microgravity of space bones demineralise, especially those which normally bear the greatest load.

Cosmonauts who spe nt half a year in space lost up to a quarter of the material in their shin bones , despite intensive exercise (The Lancet, vol 355, p 1607). Although experiments on chicken embryos on the International Space Station have established that bone formation does continue in microgravity, formation rates are overtaken by bone loss. What is of greatest concern here is that, unlike muscle loss which levels off with time, bone loss seems to continue at a steady rate of 1 to 2 per cent for every month of weightlessness . During a three-year mission to Mars , space travellers could lose around 50 per cent of their bone material , which would make it extremely difficult to return to Earth and its gravitational forces. Bone loss during space travel certainly brings home the maxim “use it or lose it”. “Losing 50 per cent of bone material would make it extremely difficult to return to Earth’s gravity” Bone loss is not permanent. Within six months of their return to Earth, those cosmonauts who spent half a year in space did show partial recovery of bone mass. However, even after a year of recovery, men who had been experimentally exposed to three months of total bed rest had not fully regained all the lost bone , though their calf muscles had recovered much earlier (Bone, vol 44, p 214). Space agencies will have to become very creative in addressing the issue of bone loss during flights to Mars. There are concepts in development for spacecraft with artificial gravity, but nobody even knows what gravitational force is needed to avoid the problems. So far, boneless creatures such as jellyfish are much more likely than people to be able to return safely to Earth after multi-year space trips. For humans, gravity is a Mars bar. The impossibility of an escape to space is just one of many examples of how our bodies, and those of our fellow organisms, are inseparable from the environments in which we live. In our futuristic ambitions we should not forget that our minds and bodies are connected to Earth as by an umbilical cord.

China says noDaniels 16 — Laura Daniels, 2016 ("Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space," National Interest, February 18th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248, Accessed 7-13-2016)

That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues : duplicating the architecture of the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the

Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above. Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the I nternational S pace S tation. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead. If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements. Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability,

a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite ( ASAT ) , command and control, and intelligence technology, in line with a

military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. This has strong implications for the United States and the

international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield.

MULTILATNo miscalc – emergency systems are resilient and have huge command and control checks – their impact is denied by the Cuban Missile crisis and 83 soviet false alarm

No weaponization impact or space war Wordsworth 15 (Rich Wordsworth, writer for Gizmodo, 12/18/15, “Why We'll Never Fight a Real-Life Star Wars Space Conflict,” http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2015/12/why-well-never-fight-a-real-life-star-wars-space-conflict/ // MH) Well, never say never. You might not make to the end of this paragraph before the sky lights up and the world goes dark. But there are some good reasons to be

optimistic that won’t happen. One reassuring factor is that the more other countries develop their militaries, the more dependent on networks they become as well . China is developing its own drone programme, and so is Russia, which will both presumably be dependent on satellites to operate . And the more their (and our) economies and business interests develop, the more everyone will rely on satellites to further their economic ambitions. In the event that countries were to start knocking out each other’s satellites on a large scale, the consequences across the board – for everyone – would be disastrous. It would also be expensive in the short term. Getting things into orbit – peaceful or otherwise – still isn’t cheap, which is why only a handful of countries regularly do so. And if you want to blow up a network of many satellites today (as you would have to in a first strike, to ensure other satellites couldn’t pick up the slack),

launching small satellites or missiles into orbit is the only practical way to do that – arming satellites with their own weaponry just isn’t financially or technologically feasible on a grand scale. We are, happily, a long way from a Death Star. “I don’t think [a large first

strike] would be financially too costly [if you’re] thinking about kinetic energy weapons and the air-based or ground-based lasers,” says Jasani. “It’s viable. But if you say, ‘I’m going to put an [ASAT] weapon [permanently] in orbit’, we are then getting into very expensive and very complicated technology. So my guess is that in the foreseeable future, what we are going to focus on are the kinetic energy weapons and possibly lasers that could blind satellites or affect, for example, the solar panels. That kind of technology will be delivered in the foreseeable

future, rather than having lasers in orbit [like] the Star Wars kind of thing.” But there’s another, possibly even more persuasive reason that a kinetic war in space may not happen : it’s just so much easier – and less damaging – to mess with satellites without getting close to them. “Jamming from the ground is not difficult,” says Quintana. “If you look at the Middle East, pick a country where there’s a crisis and the chances are that the military in that country has tried to jam a commercial satellite to try and avoid satellite TV channels broadcasting anti-government

messages.” “My guess is that by the time we are ready for space warfare, I think you may not be banking on your hit-to-kill ASATs, but more on [non-destructive] high-energy laser-based systems,” Jasani agrees. “[Space debris] affects all sides, not just the attacked side. The attacking side will have its own satellites in orbit, which might be affected by the debris [of its own attack].” And if you really need to remove an enemy’s satellite coverage, you can always try to flatten or hack the control stations on the ground, leaving the satellites talking with no-one to listen. “I don’t think physically blowing things up from the ground is something that people are looking at again,” says Quintana. “Countries and governments try to find means other than physical

conflict to achieve their strategic ends. So as space becomes more commercial and more civilian and as more scientific satellites go up, then you’ll find that states will not seek to directly attack each other , but will seek other means. “It may just be that they will try to cyber-attack the satellites and take them over, which has been done in the past. It’s much easier to physically or cyber-attack the ground control station than it is to attack the satellite itself - so why would you not look to do that as a first port of call and achieve the same ends?” Ultimately, then, what might keep us safe from a war in space isn't the horror of explosives in orbit, but a question of cost and convenience.

Empirically denied – Russia and the US have ASAT. Plus, China tested in 2007 and 2013 – should have denied their impacts

No ASAT impact – won’t cause warWu 15 (Wu Chunsi, director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 5/28/15, “The antisatellite smoke screen,” http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346 // MH) Is it correct to argue that antisatellite weapons increase the risk of nuclear war? No. No nation would launch a nuclear attack because an adversary possessed antisatellite weapons. Rather, it would launch an attack because an adversary evidently intended to stage a massive, strategic attack of its own. In the early stages of a nuclear attack, of course, antisatellite weapons might be used to destroy the other side's systems for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Even so, antisatellite weapons would be tools in a nuclear exchange— not the "reason" for the exchange . (The same

is true of nuclear weapons themselves.) The most that can be said about antisatellite weapons and the risk of nuclear war is that, in a crisis, these weapons could complicate the calculations of nuclear weapon states, or figure into a nation's decision to take preemptive nuclear action . But again, antisatellite weapons would not be the "reason" for preemptive action. For nuclear weapon states that maintain a no-first-use policy—including China—antisatellite weapons could not, by definition, provoke a nuclear attack . If antisatellite weapons were actually used in a crisis, but all countries involved were committed to a no-first-use policy, conflict could still be contained within the conventional arena, without escalation to nuclear war. Nuclear risk increases only if states that contemplate the first use of nuclear weapons are involved. Therefore, what is really dangerous in a crisis is a policy that allows the first use of nuclear weapons—not the existence (or non-existence) of antisatellite weapons. Furthermore, antisatellite weapons are not even a key element in countries' decisions to adopt policies allowing the first use of nuclear weapons . My point may be clearer if I express it this way: In a world without antisatellite weapons, could all nuclear weapon states be expected to adopt no-first-use policies? The probable answer is no. Whether a nuclear weapon state takes preemptive action in a crisis is determined by the country’s political willingness to use nuclear weapons and its overall military doctrine—not by antisatellite weapons. Thus, to focus on antisatellite weapons is to misunderstand the fundamental problem endangering the world in the nuclear age .

Debris inevitable – commercial and government flights cause it – Their ENTIRE FIRST ADVANTAGE causes THIS SAME IMPACT with launches

SQ solves debris Kramer 13 (Miriam Kramer, staff writer for space.com, 9/30/13, “Incredible Technology: How to Clean Up Dangerous Space Junk,” http://www.space.com/22969-space-junk-clean-up-ideas-incredible-technology.html // MH) Humanity is generating space junk more quickly than the debris can fall back toward Earth naturally, putting satellites and spacecraft at risk of colliding with speeding pieces of debris. Unless something is done, the problem could get worse, said Donald Kessler, retired head of NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office. "In the long term, everything will eventually break up due to collisions," Kessler told SPACE.com. "Even if you don't add anything else to the environment, the collision frequency due to random collisions will create more debris than will re-enter naturally." [How Space Junk Threatens Future of Spaceflight (Infographic )] At the moment, NASA officials estimate that about 500,000 pieces of debris larger than a marble orbit the planet. There are 22,000 bits of junk as big as a softball, and there could be more than 100 million tiny fragments at least 1 millimeter across racing around Earth. But how can mission controllers on the ground remove those troublesome pieces of space junk — including defunct satellites,

spent rocket stages and other pieces of manmade debris — from their dangerous orbits? The "old-fashioned" method

Technology readily available today could mitigate the space junk threat , Kessler said. By taking only five satellites out of orbit each year for the next 100 years, while adhering to an international understanding called the 25-year rule, space agencies could stabilize the orbital environment, according to a NASA study. The 25-year rule stipulates that nations should not launch objects whose lifetime in space will exceed 25 years after the completion of their missions. Space agencies could also rely on a somewhat basic method to remove the debris, Kessler said. Engineers would need to develop some kind of technology to grapple the target piece of debris and pull it into a part of space where it could quickly to burn up in Earth's atmosphere . "Technologically speaking, the easiest way to do it is what I've been referring to as the old-fashioned way," Kessler

said. "You just design a spacecraft to go up and get it, attach a rocket to it and send it on its way or wherever you want to put it." On the horizon There are other, more high-tech options on the horizon for space cleanup as well. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's ( DARPA ) Phoenix spacecraft project would use old, but functioning pieces of defunct satellites to create new space-based systems — instead of adding completely new satellites. Officials working with the program would launch a "tender" vehicle that would make use of small "satlets" launched without an expensive antenna needed to make satellites function. Once in space, the tender would move a relatively inexpensive satlet to a defunct geosynchronous satellite. There, the old satellite's antenna could be recycled and incorporated into the tiny satellite, effectively creating a new communications system without necessarily producing more space junk. Scientists could also use lasers to mitigate the risks posed by orbital debris. "There are two ways that a laser works" to get rid of a piece of space debris, Kessler said. "One is using what they call photon power — just letting light waves slow it down until it re-enters [Earth's atmosphere], but that works really well on small stuff. "To get a big force out of it, you need to vaporize part of the surface and essentially form a jet … but when you're doing that, you don't know what might happen, so there's some uncertainty there ," Kessler added. "You would hate to cause it to blow up for example." [Photos: Space Debris Images & Clean Up] Space junk-targeting lasers probably won't be built anytime soon, however, because the national security implications of such a tool could make it a non-starter, Kessler said. That is, the possibility of weaponizing a powerful space or ground-based laser could make building such a device politically difficult. Another mission — expected to launch to space in 2015 or 2016 — will aim to rendezvous with and grapple obsolete satellites . CleanSpace One , a project of the Swiss Space Center , is designed to be the first satellite capable of grappling a piece of space junk in orbit and plunging with it into Earth's atmosphere, disintegrating both spacecraft.

No internal link to power projection – it’s incredibly resilient given our powerful defense base, huge economy and greater defense spending than the next 10 countries combined

Status quo solves coopMelton 5/6 (Marissa Melton, International Broadcaster at Voice of America, 5/6/16, “No More Space Race for US, Rivalry Gives Way to Collaboration,” MHhttp://www.voanews.com/content/no-more-space-race-for-us-rivalry-gives-way-to-collaboration/3318781.html // ) In the four decades between Shepard's last spaceflight, much has changed between the United States and its onetime rival in space. With the 1998 launch of the I nternational S pace S tation, pushing further into space has become a collaborative effort, including not just the United States and Russia, but also the E uropean U nion, China, and Japan . Over the years, at least 222 spaceflight technicians from 18 countries have worked together on long-term projects as they orbit the Earth every 90 minutes . In March of this year, U.S. Astronaut Scott Kelly returned from a one-year assignment in orbit on the space station as NASA scientists monitored the effects of long-term space travel on the human body. During that time his identical twin, former Astronaut Mark Kelly, acted as a control subject on Earth. NASA plans to monitor both men for the next year as it prepares for a new era of space exploration -- one in which private industry plays a role.

Alt cause – Russia and China Palmer 6/26 (Coburn Palmer, Reporter at The Inquisitr News, 6/26/16, “Russia and China Sign Space Alliance to Threaten US Supremacy, Target Military Satellites,” http://www.inquisitr.com/3247550/russia-and-china-sign-space-alliance-to-threaten-u-s-supremacy-targets-military-satellites/ // MH) Russia and China signed a space alliance this week to protect their interstellar interests as the Roscosmos space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites . Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed by the American space agency, so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites, reports SpaceDaily. “The US wants to preserve its monopoly in regulating space traffic. Moreover, the US military

doesn’t want make data on its objects public.” The upcoming Russian catalog of near-Earth objects would include a number of asteroids and space debris, but also the location of secret U.S. military satellites. The Pentagon published the location of Russian military satellites a long time ago, but it keeps information on its own space-going vessels and those of its allies a secret. This political stance helped push China and Russia into a space alliance designed to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in peaceful space exploration , and further the development of interstellar vehicles , according to Sputnik News.

“The Russian and Chinese governments have signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in connection to cooperation on peaceful space exploration and usage as well as creation and exploitation of launch vehicles and land-based space infrastructure.” Russia is attempting to expand its influence with the international community in space affairs and originally intended its catalog of near-Earth objects to be part of a UN database. The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates there are some 1,380 satellites and 500,000 pieces of space junk orbiting Earth, and Russia insists its comprehensive catalogue would increase safety, according to the DailyMail. “The Russian Federation proceeds to establish a national information service, whose function shall be to provide open access to the results of monitoring objects and events in outer space.” Retired U.S. Defense Department analyst Franklin Spinney said America should welcome cooperation with Russia in space affairs, according to Sputnik News. “My gut reaction is that the Russian move should (but probably will not) be viewed as a constructive move.” Russia’s intention to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites is also in line with the Open Skies Treaty signed in 1992 that includes 34 other countries and was designed to regulate unarmed aerial surveillance flights . It would

be similar to the list maintained by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). China, Russia and many other countries already know the location of U.S. military satellites so the only people left in the dark are everyday citizens of the Earth who may be unaware of the extent of America’s surveillance capability ,

reports Sputnik News. “The real threat…would be that the American people should be amazed by the shear scope of our presence, compared to that of the Russians and Chinese.” One thing is sure, the space race is heating up as countries around the world compete to see who will be the first to colonize the moon, mine nearby asteroids, and establish a Mars colony . Russia is developing a space taxi it intends to park at the International Space Station to help ferry astronauts to the lunar surface in preparation for a moon colony. Meanwhile, China is continuing with plans to launch its own space station, build a Hubble Telescope, establish a lunar colony, and send a robotic mission to Mars. Both countries lag far behind the U.S., which intends to launch a NASA-organized mission to Mars in 2030. In addition private American space transport companies have made huge strides in developing space faring vehicles. It is, in fact, these private developments that has helped fuel Russian anger. The country is outraged the U.S. has allowed private companies to do whatever they want in space. What do you think? Do you welcome Russia’s publication of U.S. military satellite locations?