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Studies in Contemporary Economics
of the Shadow Economy Proceedings of the International Conference on the Economics of the Shadow Economy Held at the University of Bielefeld, West Germany October 10-14,1983
Edited by Wulf Gaertner and Alois Wenig
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo 1985
416 H 2 333 200 19
8 85-4358
Universiiäts-
München Editorial Board D. Bös G. Bombach B. Gahlen K.W. Rothschild
Editors Prof. Dr. Wulf Gaertner Department of Economics, University of Osnabrück Postfach 4469, D-4500 Osnabrück, FRG
Prof. Dr. Alois Wenig Department of Economics, Fernuniversität Hagen Feithstr. 188, D-5800 Hagen, FRG
ISBN 3-540-15095-1 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo ISBN 0-387-15095-1 Springer-Verlag New York Heidelberg Berlin Tokyo
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the materials is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. Further, storage or utilization of the described programs on data processing installations is forbidden without the written permission ot the author. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use. a fee is payable to "Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort". Munich. © by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985 Printed in Germany Printing and Binding: Weihert-Druck GmbH, Darmstadt 2142/3140-543 21 0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS
•GUTMANN, Peter M.: "The Subterranean Economy, Redux"
FEIGE, Edgar L.: "The Meaning of the 'Underground Economy' and the F u l l Compliance D e f i c i t "
•STEIN, Bruno: "Subterranean Labor Markets: A Conceptual A n a l y s i s "
BLADES, Derek W.: "Crime: What Should be Recorded i n the National Accounts, and What Difference Would i t Make?"
1
19
37
45
CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 59
SKOLKA, J i r i : "The P a r a l l e l Economy i n A u s t r i a " 60
WECK-HANNEMANN, Hannelore / FREY, Bruno S.: 76 "Measuring the Shadow Economy: The Case of Switzerland"
BROESTERHUIZEN, G.A.A.M.: "The Unobserved Economy 105 and the National Accounts i n the Netherlands" A S e n s i t i v i t y Analysis
•O'HIGGINS, Michael: "The Relationship Between the 127 Formal and Hidden Economies: An Exploratory Analysis for Four Countries"
PESTIEAU, P i e r r e : "Belgium's Ir r e g u l a r Economy" 144
SMITH, James D.: "Market Motives i n the Informal Economy" 161
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 178
BENTAL, Benjamin, BEN-ZION, U r i , WENIG, A l o i s : 179 "Macroeconomic P o l i c y and the Shadow Economy"
GINSBURGH, V., MICHEL, Ph., PADOA SCHIOPPA, F i o r e l l a , 194 PESTIEAU, P.: "Macroeconomic P o l i c y i n the Presence of an Ir r e g u l a r Sector"
DE GIJSEL, Peter: "A Microeconomic Analysis of Black Labour Demand and Supply"
218
# ISACHSEN, Arne Jon, SAMUELSEN, Sven Ove, STR0M, Steinar: "The Behavior of Tax Evaders"
* BENJAMINI, Yael, MAITAL, Shlomo: "Optimal Tax Evasion & Optimal Tax Evasion P o l i c y : Behavioral Aspects
SCHLICHT, Ekkehart: "The Shadow Economy and Morals: A Note"
CHAPTER 4: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
C0WELL, Frank A.: "Public P o l i c y and Tax Evasion: Some Problems"
HANSS0N, Ingemar: "Tax Evasion and Government P o l i c y "
LANGFELDT, Enno: "Is a Growing Unobserved Sector Undermining Monetary P o l i c y i n the Federal Republic of Germany?"
CHAPTER 5: HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
WOLFF, Edward N.: "The Disappearance of Domestic Servants and the Underground Economy"
GLATZER, Wolfgang, BERGER, Regina: "Household Composition S o c i a l Networks and Household Production"
CHAPTER 6: EASTERN COUNTRIES
GALASI, Peter: " P e c u l i a r i t i e s and Limits of the Second Economy i n Socialism (The Hungarian Case)"
BREZINSKI, Horst: "The Second Economy i n the Soviet Union and i t s Implications for Economic P o l i c y "
BRUS, Wlodzimierz, LASKI, Kazimierz: "Repressed I n f l a t i o n and Second Economy Under Central Planning" with an appendix "Maximum P r i n c i p l e for Speculative Money Balances" by Andrzej ZIEBA
AUTHOR INDEX
THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND MORALS: A NOTE by
EKKEHART SCHLICHT Darmstadt I n s t i t u t e of Technology
ABSTRACT: If the established r u l e s are obeyed spontaneously i n an economy, t h i s increases economic e f f i c i e n c y since the u n c e r t a i n t i e s , monitorin g costs and incentive problems induced by opportunism can be avoided. Opportunism w i l l be increased by increasing the incentives f o r unlawful behaviour, however, and a s l i g h t increase i n these i n c e n t i v e s might cause a cumulative and s e l f - n o u r i s h i n g breakdown of morals. The dangers of the growing shadow economy are louring here.
1. Transaction Costs, Morals, and Economic E f f i c i e n c y
Modern economics has assimilated Coases (1937) fundamental i n s i g h t that transaction costs are paramount for understanding the formation and functioning of economic i n s t i t u t i o n s (Williamson, 1975).
Transaction costs, however, are heavily influenced by morals: If people observe the rules spontaneously, t h i s saves c o n t r o l costs and increases economic e f f i c i e n c y thereby. Hence working morals, tax morals, business morals, and the spontaneous observation of property r i g h t s are important fa c t o r s of economic e f f i c i e n c y . Think on how our economy would look l i k e i f everybody behaved absolutely o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y : Half of the population at l e a s t would be employed as policemen, and they would be corrupt"^: Transaction costs might well become p r o h i b i t i v e l y large, rendering the market system, as compared to other systems of economic co-ordination, hopelessly i n e f f i c i e n t . These considerations lead me, as an economist who i s concerned with economic e f f i c i e n c y , to worry about morals and to present some thoughts on the impact of the emerging shadow economy on morals.
I would l i k e to thank an anonymous referee for h e l p f u l h i n t s .
See also S c h l i c h t (1983), section 1.1. Note, by the way, that markets clo s e s t to perfect competition, l i k e the stockmarket, are h e a v i l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d (I owe t h i s observation to R. Coase) and that the proper functioning of other markets hinges c r i t i c a l l y upon the observation of c e r t a i n conventions, see Akerlof (1976).
2. Moral E x t e r n a l i t i e s
Exceptions undermine p r i n c i p l e s , and rules get enfeebled i f i t becomes customary to disobey them according to circumstances. The great dangers associated with the emerging shadow economy seems to me to be of t h i s kind. Since the growth of the shadow economy renders the v i o l a t i o n of laws customary, t h i s weakens the binding force of laws, i n general: In t h i s sense, we ought to expect moral e x t e r n a l i t i e s leading i n e v i t a b l y to the necessity of enforcing the observation of laws i n general more c l o s e l y . This leads to increasing cost of p o l i c i n g which are sunk.
In a wider p o l i t i c a l sense, there are a d d i t i o n a l s o c i a l costs associated with such a t r a n s i t i o n : An increasing degree of s u r v e i l l a n c e r e s t r i c t s freedom, changes the p o l i t i c a l climate and induces considerable psychic costs f o r the population at large. In a d d i t i o n s o c i a l psychology p r e d i c t s that an increasing degree of c o n t r o l w i l l undermine the i n t r i n s i c motivation to law-obedience s t i l l f u r t h e r , e s t a b l i s h i n g another one-way road to serfdom.
In a more r e s t r i c t e d economic sense the erosion of law obedience w i l l induce a s h i f t of the tax burden away from a c t i v i t i e s which are d i f f i c u l t to monitor, and towards more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l a b l e a c t i v i t i e s . The associated a l l o c a t i v e d i s t o r t i o n s increase dead-weight losses. Although one could argue that a decreasing degree of law-obedience decreases the power of the state, I think i t i s a doubtful argument to maintain that t h i s w i l l decrease the scale of government a c t i v i t i e s and thereby decrease dead-weight losses. But even i f t h i s holds true, i t might be at most a t h i r d best s o l u t i o n having to put up with the a d d i t i o n a l costs of s u r v e i l l a n c e and d i s t o r t i o n s .
3. A Model of the Breakdown of Morals
In economics we are accustomed to think i n terms of marginal changes. Hence we might be led to think that s l i g h t l y i n creasing incentives to unlawful behaviour w i l l only lead to a s l i g h t l y l e s s e r degree of law-obedience.
I would l i k e to argue that t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the case and that, at a c e r t a i n point, a cumulative and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g breakdown of morals might be i n i t i a t e d by a small increase i n incentives to behave un-lawfully.
266
Consider a c e r t a i n l e g a l or customary rule l i k e making a correct tax return, and assume that the degree of observation of t h i s rule can be measured by a number a^etO, 1] where a^ = 1 denotes s t r i c t obedience and a^ = 0 denotes non-obedience, and the subscript i r e f e r s to the number of the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l chosen.
We assume the i n d i v i d u a l to s e l e c t i t s a^ optimally such as to maximize net gains which are c a l c u l a t e d by taking into account psychic as well as non-psychic advantages and disadvantages.
Denote the average degree of law-obedience i n the economy as a whole by a. Reference group theory suggests that the psychic costs of disobedience r i s e with increasing a"** ̂ : People t r y not to deviate from established r u l e s . Hence we ought to expect a^ to be an i n c r e a s i n g function of a.
(In a d d i t i o n , there might be d i r e c t advantages f o r reference group behaviour: Think about the observation of t r a f f i c l i g h t s . If i t i s custom not to observe them, the other d r i v e r s w i l l be on t h e i r guard, and the p o t e n t i a l damage due to disregarding the l i g h t s w i l l be smaller than otherwise.)
Furthermore we might assume that the degree of obedience a^ i s affe c t e d by an e x t e r n a l l y f i x e d economic incentive e, embodied, f o r instance, i n a tax law, which establishes an a d d i t i o n a l advantage f o r
2 )
non-obedience. Hence we are led to write:
(1) a i = f 1 ( a , e ) a ± , a e(0, 1)
> 0, < 0 C a l c u l a t i n g the average over i n d i v i d u l a s leads to a new average degree of law obedience (2) â = f (a,e) â , a eCO, 1)
f l > °' f2 < 0
It i s assumed that some spontaneous (or random) instances of law obedience occur even for a = 0, and some disobedience occurs even f o r a = 1, amounting to
(3) f ( 0 , e) > 0, f ( l , e) < 1
Consider now the change of an over time.
See S c h l i c h t (1983) for some underlying theory and references. 2 ) The following analysis i s a modification of the theory developed
i n S c h l i c h t (1981).
267
A n a t u r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s
(4) â = u(f(a, e) - a) y > 0
f o r some speed of adjustment p.Under the assumption (3) (and given continuous d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y of f) there e x i s t s at l e a s t one stable degree of law-obedience a s a t i s f y i n g
(5) f ( a e) f x ( a e) < 1
It need not be unique, however. On the contrary: A possible shape of f i s as depicted i n Figure 1:
This type of shape w i l l r e s u l t i f the incentives f o r reference group behaviour are strong and people tend to behave as the majority does.
Since, according to (4), a r i s e s i f f ( a , e) > a, and a declines * *
i f f ( a , e) < a, two stable states of law-obedience a r i s e : a^ and a 2-Assume that i n i t i a l l y a high degree of morality p r e v a i l s : We have
a = a 0 . Assume now that the external incentive for transgressing the law i s increased. This w i l l s h i f t the f-curve downward. Hence a 2 w i l l be reduced. This can continue u n t i l the p o s i t i o n depicted i n Figure 2 i s reached.
268
1 -
< < 1
Figure 2»
An unstable s i t u a t i o n i s reached, and a s l i g h t increase i n the economic in c e n t i v e e w i l l r e s u l t i n a c o l l a p s e : a 2 w i l l disappear and the s i n g l e stable degree of law-obedience w i l l be the low one. At t h i s point, a s l i g h t increase of the economic incentive w i l l decrease the degree of law-obedience a l i t t l e ( f 2 • d e ) . This reduces the average degree of law-obedience. Through reference group behaviour, t h i s reduces law-obedience s t i l l f u r t h e r , and a cumulative and s e l f - n o u r i s h i n g break-
* down of law-obedience r e s u l t s , u n t i l the low eq u i l i b r i u m a, i s reached.
S t a r t i n g from low law-obedience at a,, i t i s rather d i f f i c u l t * ^
to reach the high e q u i l i b r i u m i n a^ (Figure 1). Hence the e s t a b l i s h ment of adequate morals, as long as t h e i r observation i s strongly determined by reference group behaviour, might prove to be d i f f i c u l t and c o s t l y . In t h i s sense, the breakdown of morals caused by s l i g h t economic incentives might be a c o s t l y a f f a i r .
4. What Can be Done?
The growth of the shadow economy seems to be at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y caused by economic i n c e n t i v e s . The growth of the shadow economy, however, weakens the observation of l e g a l r u l e s everywhere. This induces moral e x t e r n a l i t i e s : e f f i c i e n c y losses within the l e g a l sector of the economy. As i l l u s t r a t e d i n the l a s t s e c t i o n , t h i s might lead, at worst, to a coll a p s e of morals.
To suppress t h i s development by power of p o l i c e might be counterproductive since i t undermines the i n t r i n s i c motivation to observe the l a w 1 ) .
1) See above, se c t i o n 2.
269
The other a l t e r n a t i v e i s , of course, to reduce the gains from unlawful behaviour: Individuals ought to decide on t h e i r s o c i a l insurance cont r i b u t i o n s independently of t h e i r reported income, f o r instance.
To prevent massive moral e x t e r n a l i t i e s i t seems to be advisable, furthermore to l e g a l i z e those shadow a c t i v i t i e s which cannot be cont r o l l e d anyhow and which are accepted as legitimate i n s o c i e t y . By e r e c t i n g a fence i n a contested t e r r i t o r y one might hope to reduce f i g h t s whereas a fence somewhere i n the middle of the v i l l a g e of one of the p a r t i e s w i l l simply increase transaction costs, and w i l l appear as being rather u n f a i r .
270
References
AKERLOF, G. (1976): The economics of Caste and the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 pp. 599-617.
COASE, R. (1937): The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, pp. 386-405.
SCHLICHT, E. (1981): Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives, Z e i t s c h r i f t für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 136, pp. 161-165.
SCHLICHT, E. (1983): Cognitive Dissonance i n Economics, to appear i n : Sch r i f t e n des Vereins für S o c i a l p o l i t i k , Verhandlungen des Sozi a l w i s s e n s c h a f t l i c h e n Ausschusses, B e r l i n .
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press
271
AUTHOR INDEX
Adatia, Y. p. 304, 313
Aitken, S. p. 17
Akerlof, G. p. 265, 271
A l b e r t i n , L. p. 351
A l f o r d , R.R. p. 105, 125
Algera, S.B. p. 106, 125
Allingham, M.G. p. v i i i , 226, 255, 262, 263, 279, 281, 285, 300
Andersen, P. P- 285, 298, 300
Archambault, E. P- 361
Badelt P- 74
Baldry, J.C. P- 285, 300
Barro, R. P- 196, 217
Barry, F. P- 365, 374
Baumann, Z. P- 367, 374
Baumol, W.J. P- 322, 323
Becker, G.S. P. 198, 217, 245, 263
Ben-Zion, U. P- v i , x i i i , 179
Benassy, J.P. P- 196, 216, 217
Benjamini, Y. P- v i i i , x i v , 245, 26
Bental, B. P- v i , x i i i , 179
Berger, R. P- X, x i v , 330
Bernstein, P. P- 16
Binder, S. P. 313
Bjerkholt, 0. P- 232, 244
Blackman, S.A. P- 322, 329
Blades, D.W. P- V, x i i i , 45, 73, 7i
Block, M.K. P. 245, 263
Blokland, J . P. 107, 125
Böhm, E.
Bonneville, L.
Bowsher, N.N.
Boyle, G.E.
Br a c h t l , W.
B r e z i n s k i , H.
Broesterhuizen, G.A.A.M.
Brunner, K.
Brus, W.
Bunich, P.
Burgdorff, S.
Burns, S.
Bush, K.
Cagan, P.
Carson, C.
Cassel, D.
Charreyron, A.
Ch r i s t i a n s e n , V.
Coase, R.
Cohen, H.
C o n t i n i , B.
Courant, P.N.
Cowell, F.A.
De G i j s e l , P.
De Grazia, R.
de Lapparrent, D.
Denison, E.F.
Dezsenyi-Gueulette, A.
D i l n o t , A.
Dow, G.K.
p. 374
p. 17
p. 312, 313
p. 141
p. 350
p. X, xiv, 362, 364, 369, 374
p. V, x i i i , 106, 125
p. 310, 313
p. x i , xiv, 369, 377
p. 365, 374
p. 375
p. 351
p. 386
p. 89, 102, 306, 310, 313
p. 162
p. 130, 141
p. 370, 374
p. 273, 281
p. 265, 271
p. 105, 125
p. 85, 102, 141
p. 344, 351
p. v i i i , x iv, 226, 273, 278, 279, 281, 285, 300
p. v i i , x i i i , 179, 180, 193, 218, 226
p. 160
p. 373, 375
p. 46, 47, 162
p. 362, 374
p. 74, 84, 102, 141
p. 344, 351
393
Duchene, G.
Egner, E.
E h r l i c h , I.
Eisner, R.
Ericson, R.E.
Ernst, U.
Feige, E.L.
Feldbrugge, F.J.M
F i a l a , J .
Fisher, N.W.F.
Fourgeaud, C.
Frank, M.
Franz, A.
Freud, D.
Frey, B.S.
Friedland, N.
Fua, G.
Futaky, I.
Gabor, I.R.
Ga l a s i , P.
Gandolfo, G.
Garcia, G.
Garvey, G.
Geeroms, H.
Gershuny, J .
Ginsburgh, V.
Glatzer, W.
p. 353, 361, 364, 370, 374
p. 351
p. 245, 263
p. 36, 306, 313
p. 369, 373
p. 102
p. i v , x i i i , 5, 7, 16, 17, 19, 35, 76, 87, 102, 105, 118, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 140, 141, 161, 162, 176, 193, 305, 307, 310, 313, 314, 318, 227, 329, 361, 374
p. 366, 372, 374
p. 76
p. 93, 102, 162
p. 216, 217
p. 145, 148, 160
p. 60, 63, 65, 71, 74
p. 129, 141
p. V, x i i i , 74, 76, 77, 94, 95, 99, 102/ 104, 127, 128, 141, 146, 160, 179, 193, 194, 217, 304, 313
p. 252, 255, 257, 263
p. 85, 102
p. 375
p. 353, 355, 361, 364, 374
p. X, xiv, 353, 361
p. 186, 193
p. 16, 161
p. 386
p. 144, 160
p. 73, 140, 141, 351
p. v i , v i i , x i i i , 159, 180, 193
p. X, xiv, 330, 350, 351
394
Goldschmidt-Clermont, L.
Gorsler, B.
Gramatzki, H.E.
Greenslade
Greffe, X.
Gregory, P.R.
Gretschmann, K.
Grosfeld, I.
Grossman, G.
Grossman, H.
Gutmann, P.M.
Habich, R.
Haffner, F.
Hansson, I.
Hare, P.
Haulk, C.
Haveman, F.H.
Hedtkamp, G.
Heertje, A.
Heineke, J.M.
Heintze, R.
Henry
Holloway, T.
Isachsen, A.J.
J a s z i , G.
Jessen, R.S.
Juster, F.T.
Kahneman, D.
Ka l e c k i , M.
p. 73, 75
p. 76
p. 368, 374
p. 367, 375
p. 361
p. 367, 374
p. 226, 361
p. 353, 361
p. 363, 374, 377, 387, 388
p. 196, 217
p. i i i , i v , x i i i , 2, 16, 17, 18, 89, 102, 139, 161, 162, 179, 193
p. 350
p. 365, 374
p. i x , xiv, 142, 285, 293, 298, 299, 300
p. 361, 375
p. 161
p. 75
p. 374, 375
p. 105, 125
p. 263
p. 226, 361
p. 162
p. 36
p. v i i , xiv, 74, 87, 103, 159, 160, 227, 244, 285, 298, 300, 310, 313
p. 3
p. 147, 160
p. 344, 351
p. 245, 250, 251, 264
p. 380, 388
395
Katsenelinboigen, A
Keegan, V.
Kemeny, I.
Kirchgässner, G.
Klinkmüller, E.
Klovland, J.T.
Kof l e r , E.
Kogan, N.
Kolm, S.C.
Konrad, G.
Kornai, J .
Kucharski, M.
L a f f e r
Land, K.C.
Lang, S.
Langfeldt, E.
Laski, K.
Laurent
Leeuw, F.
Lehment, H.
Lehner, G.
Lenclud, B.
Leptin, G.
Levine, H.S.
Lind, R.
Link, W.
Longva, S.
Loretan, M.
Lundstedt, S.B.
Macaffe, K.
p. 354, 361, 374
p. 129, 142
p. 353, 361
p. 76, 89, 103, 127, 130, 139, 142, 179, 193, 304, 308, 313
p. 363, 375, 377, 388
p. 5, 88, 89, 99, 100, 103, 160, 227, 244
p. 94, 103
p. 256, 263
p. 254, 263
p. 370, 375
p. 355, 361, 377, 379, 381, 388
p. 379, 388
p. 13
p. 351
p. 350
p. i x , xiv, 139, 142, 301, 302, 304, 306, 307, 308, 313
p. x i , xiv, 362, 369, 377
p. 161
p. 36
p. 307, 308
p. 60, 70, 71, 75
p. 217
p. 363, 375, 377, 388
p. 374
p. 245
p. 351
p. 244
p. 76, 89
p. 262, 264
p. 74, 83, 88, 103, 142
396
Maital, S.
Malaguerra, C.
Malinvaud, E.
Malish, A.F.
Mantelaers, P.A.H.M.
Markish, Y.
Marer, P.
Marrese, M.
Matthews, E.
Me Gee, R.T.
Meitzer, A.H.
Menges, G.
Met t e l s i e f e n , B.
Meyer, F.
Michel, P.
M i l l a r , J.R.
M i l l e r , R.
Mirus, R.
Mlynar, Z.
Molefsky, B.
Mont, J.
Montias, J.M.
Mooslechner, P.
Mork, A.
Moroney, R.M.
Morris, C.N.
Moyer, T.
Müller-Andritzky, M.
Murphy, M.
Neubauer, H.
p. v i i i , x i v , 245, 252, 255, 257, 262, 263
p. 76
p. 196, 217
p. 372, 375
p. 125
p. 372, 375
p. 374
p. 364, 375
p. 128, 129
p. 36, 105, 118, 125, 305, 314
p. 310, 313
p. 94, 103
p. 226, 361
p. 373, 375
p. v i , x i i i , 180, 194, 217
p. 362, 375
p. 88, 103
p. 88, 103, 142
p. 372, 375
p. 8, 17, 142
p. 144, 160
p. 365, 371, 375
p. 60, 65, 66, 74
p. 262
p. 339, 351
p. 74, 84, 102, 141
p. 35
p. 350
p. 35
p. 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75
397
Neumann, M.J.M.
N o l l , H.H.
Noth, A.
Nove, A.
O'Hearn, D.
O'Higgins, M.
O f f e r d a l , E.
Olsen, 0.
Padoa Schioppa, F
Paglin, M.
Pak
Park, T.
Parker, R.P.
Pasquier, J.N.
Peacock, A.
Pencavel
Pestieau, P.
Petersen, H.-G.
Pieper, P.J.
Pommerehne, W.W.
Radice, H.
Reid, M.
Reuter, P.
Reymann, S.
Rose-Ackerman, S.
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p. V, x i i i , 76, 83, 88, 103, 127, 129, 130 142
p. 232, 244
p. 244
p. v i , x i i i , 180, 194
p. 10, 17
p. 161
p. 83, 84, 103, 142
p. 36
p. 73
p. 75
p. 227, 232
p. v i , x i i i , 144, 180, 194
p. 84, 103, 142, 304, 314
p. 36, 313
p. 76, 77, 94, 95, 99, 102, 104, 128, 141, 146, 160, 179, 193, 194, 217, 304, 313
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398
Säbel, F.
Sagi, E.
Samuelson, S.O.
Sandmo, A.
Schlesinger, H.
Sc h l i c h t , E.
Schmolders, G.
Schmucker, H.
Schneider, F.
Schneider, M.
Schroeder, G.E.
Sethuraman, S.V.
Shaw, G.K.
Siara, C.
Siebke, J .
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Simhandl, G.
Simis, K.M.
Simon, C.P.
Simons, E.R.
S i t z l e r , K.
Sjoquist, D.L.
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p. 371, 375
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p. 298
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p. 88, 103, 142
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399
S o l a r i , L.
Spicer, M.W.
Stark, D.
Stein, B.
S t i g l i t z , J.E.
Strtfm, S.
Stuart, C.
Stuart, R.C.
Summers, R.
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T o f f l e r , A.
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Willms, M.
Witte, A.D.
Wolff, E.N.
Y i t z h a k i , S.
Zapf, W.
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