of Laser Weapons - Northrop · PDF fileThe same characteristics that make laser weapons effective for these military active defense ... to heavier-than-air aircraft, ... of laser weapons,

A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R P A P E R S

by

Richard J. Dunn, III

September 2005

Laser Weapons

OperationalImplications

of

Operational Implications of Laser Weapons


ContentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................1

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................5

II. GROWING LASER WEAPONS CAPABILITY ..............................................................................6

Chemical Lasers..............................................................................................................6

Solid-state Lasers ............................................................................................................6

Free Electron Lasers ........................................................................................................7

Beam Quality .................................................................................................................7

III. PROGRESS IN LASER WEAPONS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ........................................................8

IV. DEVELOPING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR LASER WEAPONS .............................................9

V. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LASER WEAPONS AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION...10

Capabilities:..................................................................................................................10

Limitations: ..................................................................................................................11

VI. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS .............................................................................................13

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS................................................................................................13

Air Operations: Enhanced survivability and campaign flexibility..................................14

Ground Operations: Deployability and mobility without sacrificing survivability ........14

Naval Operations: Electric ships could power lasers......................................................15

Space Operations: Satellite-based laser weapons............................................................17

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): For affordable layered defense ..................................17

Homeland Defense Operations ....................................................................................19

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS................................................................................................19

Air Operations: New relevance in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism operations ......19

Ground Operations: Ideal sniper weapons....................................................................20

Naval Operations: Finding a niche ...............................................................................21

Space Operations: Could give new meaning to “space superiority”...............................21

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................................................23

VIII.CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................24

ABOUT THE AUTHOR .................................................................................................................26

1



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction: Weapons that rely on chemical reactions to propel projectiles have

dominated warfare for centuries. The primacy of current weapons is under chal-

lenge by advances in high-energy lasers with military potential that use chemical

reactions or electricity to release intense radiation instead of projectiles.

Conventional weapons may co-exist or compete with directed energy systems for

missions as these next-generation weapons increasingly assume existing roles in the

battlespace, as well as new missions that may emerge, like active defense against

projectiles. But despite progress in the technical development of laser weapons,

the development of concepts for their operational employment is not keeping pace.

Timely fielding of these capabilities requires that warfighters understand the

implications of their introduction. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess

some of the operational implications of laser weapons and to urge warfighting pro-

fessionals to make their study a priority, in time to guide laser weapons develop-

ment and to craft concepts for their operational employment.

by


September 2005

Laser Weapons

OperationalImplications

of

Growing Laser Weapons Capability

Effective laser weapons are already being devel-oped and tested. The Tactical High Energy Laser(THEL) has shot down short- and medium-rangetactical missiles and artillery and mortar rounds.The laser for the Air Force’s anti-missile AirborneLaser (ABL) aircraft achieved “first light” in asuccessful ground test, and three competitors inthe DoD solid-state laser program are well ontheir way to achieving militarily significant powerlevels in their laboratory versions.

One of the challenges in understanding the oper-ational implications of this progress lies in thevaried characteristics of different laser weapons.The most technologically mature systems arechemical lasers that derive their very high powerlevels from chemical reactions that producebeams of intense infrared radiation. Electricallypowered solid-state lasers (SSLs) are less powerfuland pass electricity through a crystal or glassmedium to produce laser beams. SSLs are alsoprogressing rapidly and promise great tacticalutility. A third class, Free Electron Lasers (FELs),use electricity to create laser light on differentwavelengths to match changing environmentalconditions.

Progress in Laser Weapons SystemsIntegration

Significant progress has been made in integratinglaser weapons into air, land and sea weapons sys-tems. Much design work has already been doneto modify the THEL into a deployable combatsystem. Systems concepts for integrating SSLsinto existing or new platforms, such as the JointStrike Fighter, have also been developed,although their technical maturity is 5-10 yearsbehind that of chemical laser systems.

Developing Operational Concepts forLaser Weapons

Technological development in laser weapons isoutpacing generation of the operational require-ments necessary to guide it. Throughout theservices, many warfighters and decision makersare not aware of the progress being made in laserweapons, their capabilities, and their limitations.

For weapons developers to create the most appro-priate and effective laser weapons, warfightersmust be able to tell them what characteristics aremost important to operational success.

Operational Characteristics of LaserWeapons and Their PotentialApplication

Capabilities that make lasers attractive for operational use are:

• Highly agile speed-of-light delivery

• Multiple target engagements and rapid retargeting

• Deep magazines

• Low incremental cost per shot

• Exceptional accuracy and adjustability

• Lower logistical support requirements

• Flexible design

Factors that limit laser weapons operational utility include:

• Atmospheric attenuation and turbulence

• Line-of-sight dependence

• Minimal effects on hardened structures andarmored vehicles

• Single wavelengths that limit the range ofoperational conditions in which they are effective

• Eye safety issues

• Chemical fuels and exhaust

Operational Implications

Balancing the strengths of laser weapons againsttheir operational limitations makes them wellsuited to roles in two key mission areas:

• Active Defense: providing air, land, sea andspace platforms the ability to defend them-selves, other platforms and large areas against

2



missiles, aircraft, bombs, artillery shells orrockets.

• Offensive Strike: providing the capability toachieve lethal or non-lethal effects against arange of suitable targets.

Defensive Operations: Laser defenses couldprovide an on-board active defense capability foraircraft that could defeat or destroy incomingmissiles or aircraft within their range. Thisgreatly increases the survivability of many non-stealthy, subsonic, vulnerable platforms like JointSTARS, AWACS and B-52s. Because it reducesthe requirement for suppression of enemy airdefenses (SEAD), active defense allows strikeoperations against center of gravity targets tobegin earlier in the air campaign.

Ground-based laser defenses can defeat mostindirect fire threats (rockets, artillery and mor-tars), significantly increasing ground force surviv-ability and freedom of maneuver.

For naval forces, lasers could provide an effectiveshield against adversary ballistic or cruise missileattacks.

Airborne and space-based lasers may also provideactive defense over large areas and could engagetargets, primarily ballistic missiles, much earlier intheir trajectories than terrestrially based defenses.

Laser weapons can also help to provide a moreaffordable, and thus more widely-spread, terminalpoint defense against theater ballistic missiles.

The same characteristics that make laser weaponseffective for these military active defense missionscould also allow them to defend critical infra-structure or government facilities against aircraftand direct and indirect fire ground weapons.

Offensive Operations: Offensive applications oflasers will most likely be dedicated to those mis-sions where laser weapons characteristics (e.g.,precision, speed and numbers of engagements)are more important than pure destructive power.

The same laser weapons that provide an activedefense capability for aircraft can also be usedagainst ground targets, providing a significant

air-to-ground capability. The combination oftheir unique capabilities with current and newgenerations of air platforms and sensors mayincrease the ability to “fine tune” the applicationof force from the air, making air power more rele-vant in counterinsurgency and counterterrorismoperations.

Laser weapons offensive applications in groundcombat will most likely be dedicated to thosemissions where their precision, speed of lightengagement time, adjustability and minimal col-lateral damage make them ideally suited.Counter-sniper missions might be a good exam-ple. Offensive use at sea may also meet nicherequirements, especially in sea-borne special oper-ations where precision and stealth are moreimportant than destructive power.

U.S. experiments have already demonstrated thatsatellites hundreds of kilometers up are vulnerableto high energy lasers. The importance of thiscapability has not been lost on countries likeChina, which is pursuing a robust high energylaser capability.

Recommendations

The U.S. needs a robust process for enhancingour understanding of the operational implicationsof laser weapons and pressing for the develop-ment of operational concepts for their use. Keysteps include:

• Fielding a variant of THEL as rapidly as possible

• Completing the ABL program

• Aggressive wargaming and field experimenta-tion with laser weapons

Conclusion

In a historic sense, operational laser weapons are“right around the corner”; however, the opera-tional community that will make many of thedecisions related to their development andemployment is relatively unaware of them. Theability of laser weapons to provide active defensesagainst a wide range of increasingly capable

3



offensive threats may reverse the trend of offen-sive weapons’ increasing superiority over defen-sive capabilities.

If laser weapons live up to the potential they haveshown thus far and if their development proceeds

as fast as projected, warfare could enter the age oflaser weapons within the decade, much soonerthan most expect. To leverage this emergingcapability, we need operational concepts to guideour investment in the transformational technol-ogy of laser weapons.

4



5



1 “Laser” is actually an acronym for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation: a device that converts incident electromagneticradiation of mixed frequencies to one or more discrete frequencies of highly amplified and coherent radiation.—Webster’s II New CollegeDictionary, 2001. See http://science.howstuffworks.com/laser.htm for a simple discussion of the physics involved.

I. Introduction Weapons firing projectiles propelled by chemical reactions—bullets, artillery shells, missiles—have dominated thetactical level of warfare for centuries. Today, advances in the technology of high-energy lasers allow the applicationof other physical principles in a new class of weapons. Development of high-energy lasers1 with military potentialis leading to the production of light beam weapons that transfer destructive energy to targets via coherent light.Over time, the primacy of chemically propelled projectiles may give way to dynamic co-existence and competitionwith directed energy weapons as these next-generation weapons increasingly assume existing roles in the battlespaceor new missions, such as active defense against projectiles.

The challenge to the U.S. military is that our understanding of laser weapons technologies is outpacing efforts tobring these capabilities into the force. Available funding for laser weapons development lags behind what wouldbe necessary to bring technologies to maturity as quickly as possible. Equally threatening to the success of laserweapons in the field is the lack of attention to concept development for laser weapons operational employment.This situation is neither new nor unique to laser weapons. Historically, technical development of new warfightingcapabilities – everything from ironclad warships, to heavier-than-air aircraft, to tanks, radar and radar-defeating“stealth” – has proceeded faster than military forces can adapt their warfighting approaches to incorporate the fulladvantage of the new capability.

Unfortunately, this imbalance frequently means that weapons developers move along at great speed in designingadvanced systems with tremendous battlefield potential, but they do so in splendid intellectual isolation. Lackingthe guiding hand of operational requirements, they are unable to properly prioritize resources or focus on theweapons capabilities that are most important to warfighters. They can waste precious time and resources pursuingweapons capabilities of lesser operational utility while foregoing development of those that might truly provide adecisive advantage. Just as sadly, military forces can field an expensive and promising new capability that remainsunderutilized because warfighters do not fully understand how to employ it to its greatest advantage. In today’sfast-changing threat environment, given tight Defense resources and the exciting possibilities offered by developmentof laser weapons, the U.S. cannot afford the wasted time or resources of such mistakes in developing one of the nextbreakthrough technologies. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess some of the operational implications oflaser weapons and to urge warfighting professionals to begin an urgent effort to understand these implications. Thiswork must be made a priority if it is to take place in time to guide laser weapons development and to craft conceptsfor their operational employment.

In pursuit of that purpose, this paper first notes the progress being made in laser weapons capabilities and integra-tion, then enumerates the potential application of these developing capabilities. Finally, the paper suggests theirpotential operational implications, using a warfighting scenario to illustrate their operational impact.

Effective laser weapons have already been devel-oped and tested. The joint U.S. Army-IsraelDefense Forces Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)has shot down short- and medium-range tacticalmissiles, artillery rounds and mortars, and has theability to destroy other types of missiles in flight.Other laser weapons are making significantprogress. The laser for the Air Force’s anti-missileAirborne Laser (ABL) aircraft achieved “firstlight” in a successful ground-based test of itsmain laser, and three competitors in the DoDsolid-state laser program are well on their way toachieving militarily significant power levels intheir laboratory versions of solid-state lasers.

It is important in understanding the operationalimplications of this progress to be aware of thevaried characteristics of different laser weaponsprograms. The U.S., for example, is pursuing threedifferent types of laser weapons: chemical, solid-state and free electron lasers. All have differentcapabilities and limitations that make them bettersuited for certain operational applications. Theirdifferent stages of technical maturity will also play apart in determining their availability to U.S. forces.

Chemical Lasers

The THEL and the laser in the ABL aircraft arechemical lasers. Chemical lasers derive their veryhigh power levels (measured from 100’s of kilo-watts, or kW, to megawatts) from chemical reac-tions that produce intense infrared radiation.The radiation is collected into beams andreleased. As the “heavy artillery” of the laserweapons family, chemical lasers are very powerful.They require relatively large amounts of chemicalfuels and produce significant amounts of heatthat must be convected away in the exhaust.

Chemical laser weapons have been under devel-opment for over thirty years and represent themost mature laser weapons technology. Current

versions tend to be large and somewhat bulkybecause of their high power, like the ABL, orbecause they have not yet been fully “productized”as field-ready weapons systems, like the THEL.Systems designed for field operations can be sig-nificantly smaller. For example, concepts have beendeveloped for a transportable version of THELthat occupies 25% of the volume of the first gen-eration system. Moreover, because THEL has beentested extensively and is technologically mature,an operational version could be fielded in about18 months.2 Chemical lasers can operate at a sin-gle wavelength (e.g. 1.315 microns (µM) for ABL)or over a range of wavelengths (e.g. 3.5 to 3.9 µMfor THEL). These longer wavelengths also allowthem to penetrate atmospheric turbulence better,giving them the ability to operate in a variety ofatmospheric conditions. Longer wavelengths alsomean that reflected laser energy will not damagehuman eyes.

Solid-state Lasers

Significant progress is also being made in devel-oping the technology for electrically poweredsolid-state lasers (SSLs) that pass electricitythrough a crystal or glass medium to producelaser beams. Unlike the THEL chemical laser,SSLs only operate with one shorter wavelength.Light in this wavelength range has more difficultypenetrating atmospheric turbulence and is alsodamaging to human eyes.

Although they are less powerful (in the tens ofkW today) than chemical lasers, recent improve-ments in SSL power levels promise to provideeffective laser weapons in the near to mid futurethat are light enough to be mounted on smallercombat platforms (e.g. fighter aircraft and groundcombat vehicles). SSLs can be powered by elec-trical sources on aircraft, ships or ground vehicles.

For the foreseeable future, however, these lasers willbe lower power than their chemical laser brethren;

6



2 Marc Selinger, “U.S. Army Studying Guns, Lasers, Interceptors to Destroy RAMS,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 28, 2004.http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/RAM10284.xml

II. Growing Laser Weapons Capability

7



3 Marc Selinger, “DOD Solid-state Laser Demos Delayed Three Months,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 23, 2004.4 Hampton Stephens, “Air Force, Army Effort is Advancing Tactical Laser Technology,” Inside the Air Force, July 16, 2004.5 Discussion with Dr. Gary Koop, Northrop Grumman Space Technology.6 Statement by Art Stephenson, Vice President, Directed Energy Systems, Northrop Grumman Space Technology, National Press Club, Washington,

D.C., May 4, 2005.7 Dave Ahearn, “ONR Laser Power Jumps 10 Fold; Further 10-Fold Leaps Seen,” Defense Today, August 4, 2004, p. 4.

suited for multiple naval applications than singlewavelength solid-state lasers.

Significant progress is also being made in increasingFEL power levels (now at about 10 kW),7 and FELsmight offer a more attractive path than SSLs tousing electricity to achieve very high power levels.However, there are particular challenges to deploy-ing FELs at sea. For example, their size dictatesintegration on only the largest ships and makesretrofitting existing ships extremely difficult.

Beam Quality

Research also has produced substantial improve-ments in beam quality at high power levels. BeamQuality (BQ) is essentially a measure of how tightlythe laser beam can be focused to form a small andintense spot of light on a target at some distancefrom the laser. In many cases, the intensity of thisfocused spot is proportional to 1/BQ2, where a BQmeasurement of 1 is perfect and higher numbersindicate “lower” quality. A fairly modest change inBQ (i.e. BQ “decreasing” from 1.5 to 2.0) resultsin a decrease of nearly a factor of two in the inten-sity of the beam deposited on the target. Thus,maintaining good laser BQ as power is scaled up isa very important requirement for the laser designer.

but they can support an extensive set of militarymissions requiring less power and smaller plat-forms. Parenthetically, if solid-state laser systemscould be produced at the high megawatt powerlevels of chemical lasers, they most likely wouldbe as large as chemical lasers of the same power.

The U.S. military operational community does notwidely appreciate the progress that has been madein increasing SSL power levels. As noted earlier,the three corporations participating in DoD’s JointHigh-Powered Solid-State Laser Program eitherhave achieved or will shortly achieve 25-kilowattpower levels with solid-state lasers in a laboratoryenvironment.3 While this is far from the 100 kWrange that the DoD’s High Energy Laser JointTechnology Office believes is necessary for a tacti-cal laser to be effective, this work is viewed by manyin the industry as promising. As technology pro-gresses, weight might emerge as a problem as it isestimated that reaching an objective power-to-massratio would result in a laser system weighingabout 11,000 pounds4, much heavier than wouldbe feasible for some of the uses described above.However, some in industry argue that technologi-cal advances could reduce the weight of a SSL laserof optimal power to less than 4,000 pounds.5

Power levels, however, are not the only measure oflaser weapons technological maturity. To create aneffective weapon, the laser must be integratedinto a complete system that can acquire, trackand destroy targets and is fully mated with its car-rying platform’s power, control, and other sys-tems. At current funding levels, it could be sevento nine years before an integrated solid-state laserweapon system can be delivered from the labora-tory to the testing range.6

Free Electron Lasers

The U.S. Navy is interested in the “tunable” FreeElectron Laser (FEL) that uses electricity to createlaser light on different wavelengths to matchchanging environmental conditions at sea. Navyweapons developers believe the FEL is better

Power Required to Affect Targets of Interest

Increasing Lethality or Increasing Range for Same Effect

1 kW 10 kW 100 kW 1 MWPower

Chemical LasersSolid State Lasers

Destroy Sensors

Destroy Sensors atLong Range Disable

Truck Engine

Destroy In- Flight Artillery

Rockets

TerminalDefeat ofVSRBM

CounterPersonnel

Disable Ground- Based Radars

Destroy SoftUAVs at

Short Range

Destroy TBM / TEL Canister

Destroy Soft UAVs at Long Range

DestroyIn-Flight

Artillery Shells

Destroy PowerEquipment /Cell Towers

Destryoy A/C and CMs at Short Range

Destroy A/C andCMs at Long Range

CurrentlyDemonstrated

Available within ~2-10 Years

DetonateLand Mines

Blind Sensors

Figure 1. Power Levels Required for Different Missions

8



III.Progress in Laser Weapons Systems Integration

Developers are also progressing with design con-cepts for integrating laser weapons into existingand new air, land and sea weapons systems. Themost advanced is the anti-missile Airborne Laser(ABL), whose ground-tested laser modules willsoon be fitted into the extensively modifiedBoeing 747 aircraft for airborne tests.

Other chemical laser systems concepts are also welladvanced. For example, much design work hasalready been done to modify the THEL into adeployable combat system known as High EnergyLaser-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars (HELRAM)that can be used to destroy multiple types of threats,including rockets and artillery and mortar rounds.

Systems concepts for SSLs have also been devel-oped, although their technical maturity is four tofive years behind that of chemical laser systems.8

Because SSLs draw very large amounts of electricpower, weapons developers have focused on powersupply. For example a laser weapon could be car-ried on a hybrid electric ground fighting vehicle(Figure 3) and powered by the electrical system.

Similarly, the concept for integrating a SSL intothe F-35 Joint Strike Fighter would place the lasersystem in the fan cavity of the short-take-off-and-vertical-landing version of the aircraft and use thefan shaft to power a megawatt-sized generator(Figure 4).

Other concepts have been developed for a wholerange of military platforms including unmannedaerial vehicles (UAV’s), bombers, C-130s and sur-face vessels (Figure 5).

Retractable Beam Director

Ancillary Equipment

Laser Gain Generator

System Controller

Electrical Generator

Figure 2. HELRAM Fire Unit

Figure 4. 100kW Solid State Laser Weapon Systemfor F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter)

Joint Strike Fighter B-2 Bomber

Army Tactical Trucks

Submarines Airships

Satellites

Surface Ships

AC-130 Gunship

Fighter Aircraft Pod Slab

FiberBeam Control

or ++

Figure 5. SSL Weapons Integration Concepts

Figure 3. Hybrid Electric Vehicle with Solid State Laser

8 Stephenson.

9



9 Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals (AULIMP), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/index.html10 Several feasible approaches to defending missiles and other targets from laser weapons include spinning the missile or aircraft, highly reflective sur-

faces, or ablative materials. The effectiveness of these approaches is yet to be determined.11 Bob Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, MR-1209-AF. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p. 86.

IV. Developing Operational Concepts for Laser Weapons

Despite these technical advances in laserweapons, much of the military operational com-munity remains unaware of their potential.Numerous discussions with serving officers atseminars, conferences and wargames over the pastseveral years indicate that understanding of thecurrent state of progress in laser weapons ismostly limited to the scientific and technicalcommunities. Beyond that, even the leadingthinkers and writers of the military operationalcommunity have paid scarce attention to laserweapons and their operational implications. Asearch of Air University Library’s very compre-hensive Index to Military Periodicals reveals ascant total of 15 articles with the term “laserweapon” in their titles—in a 102,810 page data-base.9 Despite several nascent efforts to under-stand the military worth of these systems,appreciation of their potential throughout themilitary operational community remains low.

A serious consequence of this lack of laser weaponsawareness among warfighters is that technologydevelopment is outpacing generation of the oper-ational requirements necessary to guide it. Thismay cause developers to pursue technologyadvances in sub-optimal directions, wasting pre-cious time and resources. To develop the mostappropriate and effective laser weapons U.S.forces will need, warfighters must be able to tellthe weapons developers what characteristics aremost important to operational success. To begindeveloping appropriate operational concepts,platforms and organizations, tactics, techniques

and procedures to exploit the advantages of laserweapons, warfighters also need to determine howlaser weapons relate to and interact with kineticand chemical energy weapons.

We also need to figure out how to defend againstlaser weapons.10 This will be an important part ofour own laser weapon development processbecause we must avoid fielding weapons that canbe easily countered by an enemy. However, itwill also be very important to protect our ownforces against laser weapons.

Since World War II, an underlying assumption ofU.S. defense planning has been that U.S. forceswill enjoy a technological edge over potentialadversaries. That might not be true of laserweapons. Because they offer an opportunity toovercome the huge U.S. advantage in advancedmissiles and other high-technology capabilities,other countries and non-state actors may pursuedirected energy weapons based on their ownsecurity, economic and political objectives.11

These objectives will shape the kinds of capabili-ties these actors develop and ultimately the rangeof responses and operational concepts the U.S.pursues. While the U.S. is believed to hold a sig-nificant lead in laser weapons development, thereis no guarantee that we will not face an enemywith at least some laser weapons capability in thenot-too-distant future. Thus, it behooves us toconsider possible counters for laser weapons as wedevelop operational concepts that might exploittheir capabilities to our own advantage.

In order to appreciate how different laserweapons and their varied characteristics mightimpact future warfare, it is important to under-stand the unique capabilities and limitations ofthese weapons. In general, laser weapons offerwarfighters opportunities for quick and precisetarget engagement, flexibility and a light logisticsburden. They are limited by atmospheric condi-tions, dependence on line of sight, relatively lowpower levels and several safety concerns.

Capabilities:

The following capabilities make lasers attractivefor operational uses.

• Highly agile speed-of-light delivery: Laserweapons engage targets at the speed of light—there essentially is no time of flight as for pro-jectile weapons. This makes them well suitedfor engaging close-in maneuvering targets (e.g.surface-to-air missiles or SAMs, air-to-air mis-siles or AAMs, UAVs and cruise missiles) andextremely fast ballistic targets (e.g. rockets,artillery and mortar rounds). There is norequirement to calculate and fly an intercept-ing trajectory with a target as for guided mis-siles. However, laser weapons do require sometime to acquire and track targets and have to“dwell” on the target long enough (several sec-onds) to deposit sufficient energy to destroy orneutralize it.

• Multiple target engagements and rapid retar-geting: Because laser weapons have few movingmechanical parts and are constantly powered orreloaded by recharging their chemical or elec-trical energy stores, they can engage multipletargets very quickly, limited for the most partonly by their ability to be supplied with fuelor electrical power or to dissipate waste heat.Shifting from one target to another involvesonly repointing and refocusing mirrors. Thus,they are well suited for the types of multiple-target engagements that might be required todeal with salvo firings of artillery or rockets.

• Deep magazines: Because lasers only consumechemical fuel or electricity, the total numberof shots they can fire is limited only by theamount of chemical fuel available or, in thecase of solid-state lasers, the fuel available todrive the electrical power source.

Chemical lasers can operate continuously forthe full duration of their magazines (e.g. for10-20 targets for HELRAM). “Refueling” thelaser requires exchanging the depleted maga-zine by hooking up a depot-filled tankmounted on a palletized trailer, a relativelyeasy procedure that takes just minutes. Spacepermitting, the laser could be connected totwo magazines; one could be switched outwhile the other provides fuel for firing.

For SSLs, the number of shots that can befired at any one time is limited by the laser’sability to reject heat or the capacity of its bat-teries. These limitations translate into a “dutycycle limit”: the laser can only be fired for solong before it has to shut down to rechargebatteries or eliminate heat. For some plat-forms, such as airplanes or ground vehicles,typical duty cycles are such that after engagingroughly 10 to 20 targets the laser must cool orbe electrically recharged over a time span of10-20 minutes before being able to fire again.For other platforms, like naval ships wherelarge amounts of electricity and cooling areavailable, properly designed SSLs could runalmost indefinitely. Outside of the coolingperiods and over long periods of time, onlythe fuel onboard the platform limits SSL fir-ings. On aircraft, ships and ground combatvehicles that can be refueled during missions,fuel availability is not a limiting factor.

• Low incremental cost per shot: For a projectileweapon system, the incremental cost per eachshot is essentially the cost of the ammunitionexpended. Guided missile systems in particu-lar expend a lot of expensive hardware (i.e.rocket motors, guidance systems, avionics,

1 0



V. Operational Characteristics of Laser Weapons and Their Potential Application

1 1



12 For comparison, procurement costs of the JDAM are $21,000 (tail kit only); for the JSOW, $660,000; for the JASSM, $300,000; and for theAMRAAM $386,000. Even the basic Maverick can cost $152,000. By contrast, the fuel required per shot of the large laser in the ABL costsapproximately $10,000. David H. Freedman, “Lasers: the Light Brigade,” Strategic Affairs, No. 26/Issue: August 16, 2001, p. 3. For a 100 kWsolid state laser, the cost of the fuel required to generate electricity for each shot is less than a dollar.

seekers, airframes, etc.) in the form of missilesevery time they fire. Laser weapons, on theother hand, only expend energy. The cost perincremental shot is essentially the cost of thechemical fuel or the fuel required to generatethe electricity needed to power a solid-statelaser or FEL, and these tend to be low. Thecost of employing laser weapons systems,therefore, lies in developing, building, fieldingand maintaining the systems, not in the“ammunition” they consume. Whether a sys-tem fires one shot or a thousand shots, the costis relatively fixed. For laser weapons, the lowincremental cost per shot helps to reduce lim-ited inventory problems that can handicapweapons like highly advanced but expensivemissile systems.12

• Exceptional accuracy and adjustability: Oncecued by radar or other sensors, laser weaponsuse a low-powered beam to acquire and tracktheir targets. This beam can be focused any-where on the target with great precision beforethe co-aligned high-power laser is engaged,delivering the desired level of damage at thatexact point on the target. If designed to do so,laser weapon’s power levels could be adjustable.Additionally, the “dwell time” on the target canbe changed to adjust the amount of damageinflicted. Accuracy and adjustability combineto allow exceptional precision strike capability,eliminating or limiting collateral damage andallowing lethal or non-lethal applications.

• Lower logistical support requirements: Unlikeguns that must be resupplied with ammunitionor missiles that must be replaced once expended,laser weapons only require additional chemicalfuel or fuel to generate the electricity neededfor power. For electrically powered solid-statelasers or FELs, this eliminates the requirementto transport, store and load munitions, result-ing in an extremely short logistics tail.Chemical laser fuels can be resupplied by fac-tory-loaded fuel “magazines” that can be trans-ported in standard cargo vehicles.

• Flexibility: Laser weapons are modular andscaleable. Several identical laser modules can

be “stacked” to create a higher-powered laser.They can also be configured to correspond tothe carrying capacity of different platforms.Unlike guns and missiles that often have to bedesigned for specific missions, a single laserdesign can fill multiple mission requirements.

Limitations:

Laser weapons do have unique limitations thatcould impact on their operational utility.

• Atmospheric attenuation and turbulence:Because laser beams must be propagatedthrough the atmosphere, they can be affectedby airborne particles (dust, smoke), watervapor or atmospheric turbulence that absorb,bend or scatter laser energy. To adjust forsome of these factors, laser weapons use “adap-tive optics” that compensate for atmosphericdistortion of the laser beam. Space-basedlasers will only be affected if they are usedagainst targets in the atmosphere.

• Line-of-sight dependence: Laser weaponsrequire direct line-of-sight to engage a target.Screening or shielding materials that cannotbe readily burned through reduce their effec-tiveness. Projectile weapons, on the otherhand, can have significant penetrating capabil-ity and can follow arcing ballistic trajectoriesto hit targets in defilade behind buildings,mountains, etc.

• Target Suitability: Because of their relativelylow power levels, laser weapons will probablylack the “punch” of larger non-laser chemicalor kinetic weapons for some time. They arebest suited for targets that must be engagedvery quickly and precisely, such as rockets,missiles or artillery rounds in flight, or thatcan be killed or disabled by focusing damageon small areas, such as thin-skinned vehicles.Their effects are minimal on hardened struc-tures like bunkers or even buildings. Againstarmored vehicles they are effective only in dis-abling vulnerable components such as anten-nas, sensors and external fuel stores.

• Single wavelength. Different wavelengthstransmit energy better under different atmos-pheric conditions. Chemical and solid-statelasers typically generate light energy either ona single wavelength or over a small range ofwavelengths. The FEL can be “tuned” to awide range of wavelengths to meet specificrequirements, but this “tuning” involves alengthy process to make the appropriatechanges to the optical system or requires that avery complex mechanism be included in thedesign of the laser.13

• Eye Safety Issues. Eye safety is a major concernin the use of laser weapons. While somechemical lasers operate at eye-safe wavelengths,all high power SSLs currently do not.14 Becauseany laser energy that is not absorbed by thetarget is either scattered or reflected, this non-absorbed energy poses an eye safety risk to

friendly personnel without laser eye protectionor civilians in the target’s vicinity. For thisreason, efforts are currently underway todevelop concepts for high power SSLs thatoperate in the eye-safe portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum.

• Chemical Fuels and Exhaust. Chemical lasersrequire chemical fuels and generate exhaustwhen they fire. Some fuels, like the highlycorrosive fuel of the ABL’s Chemical OxygenIodine Laser (COIL), require multiple safetysystems and risk mitigation plans. Others, likethe deuterium fluoride reactants used by theTHEL, are relatively safe. The exhaust fromthe ABL is released high in the atmosphere,where it poses no hazard. The exhaust fromground-based lasers like THEL contains smallamounts of toxins that are readily absorbed bycommercially available scrubbing systems.

1 2



13 Tuning” involves major re-configuration of the laser (e.g. switching optics.) Thus a laser system is tunable in the sense that it can be designed tooperate at 1.5 µM or 2.0 µM, or 2.5 µM, but it cannot change from 1.5 µM to 2 µM to respond to changing mission conditions unless consider-able complexity is built in to allow this to be done remotely.

14 Deuterium fluoride lasers like THEL and the ABL’s Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) are eye safe. Most current versions of SSLs are not.

If the U.S.—or another power—successfullyfields laser weapons on different warfighting plat-forms, how might they affect the conduct of mili-tary operations? This question is fundamental inprioritizing operational requirements to guide thetechnical development of laser weapons.

Analyzing the capabilities and limitations of laserweapons in an operational context implies theyare well suited to roles in two key mission areas:

• Active Defense: Lasers can provide air, land,sea and space platforms the ability to defendthemselves, other platforms and geographicareas. They can defend against missiles, air-craft, bombs, artillery shells or rockets bydestroying or neutralizing these threats beforethey reach their intended targets. For missiledefense, lasers can provide point defense of aspecific target or area defense against theaterballistic and cruise missiles as a complement todefensive missiles.

• Offensive Strike: Lasers can provide the capa-bility to achieve lethal or non-lethal effectsagainst a range of suitable targets, mostly as acomplementary capability for chemical andkinetic weapons.

The following sections address the operationalimplications of laser weapon capabilities for thesemission areas. The fictional vignette illustratesthese implications in an operational context. It isnot in any way predictive of future events.

1 3



VI.Operational Implications

Continued on page 14 �

Vignette:

15 Robert W. Duffner, Airborne Laser: Bullets of Light. (New York, NY: Plenum, 1997), pp. 23-41.16 Duffner, pp. 279-315.

Operational Impact of Laser Weaponson Combat OperationsThe Second Korean War: 2024

Laser weapons made their major combat debut inthe Straits of Hormuz Crisis of 2014. During initialoperations against Iranian forces blocking the

Straits, U.S. strike aircraft suffered unacceptablelosses to advanced model long-range Russian SAMsimported by Iran. To minimize escalation, U.S.national leaders wanted to restrict the conflict to thearea in the immediate vicinity of the Straits and werereluctant to authorize strikes against SAM sites hun-dreds of kilometers inland. Urgently seeking a non-escalatory counter to these threats, USCENTCOMrequested the four available prototype F-35 JointStrike Fighters equipped with lasers, then in thedemonstration and validation phase of development,to provide active defense for strike packages.

Flying with only one aircraft escorting each strikepackage, the F-35 Laser Fighters were highly suc-cessful in defeating the late-model SAMs, even when they were fired in volleys. The Laser Fighters’reputation was further enhanced when one also shotdown several low-flying supersonic antiship cruisemissiles.

Following this highly successful combat perform-ance, the Services placed a top priority on develop-ing and fielding laser weapons, mostly for activedefense purposes but also to complement intercep-tor missile point defense capabilities. When hostili-ties threatened with a resurgent North Korea in 2024,most U.S. rapid deployment forces were equippedwith these capabilities.

Defensive Operations

The ability of laser weapons to defend airborneplatforms has been known for several decades.The U.S. Air Force’s Air Force WeaponsLaboratory (AFWL) first demonstrated the tech-nical feasibility of employing laser weapons todefeat airborne threats in 1973 by using aground-based gas dynamic CO2 laser to shootdown a drone aircraft flying at 200 miles perhour.15 By 1983 AFWL’s Airborne LaserLaboratory program was able to integrate an airborne high energy chemical laser with therequired target acquisition, tracking and laserbeam training technologies to shoot down fiveAIM-9B Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (travelingaround 2000 miles per hour) and a simulatedantiship missile.16 The technologies to defeat arange of fast moving, highly maneuverable threatshave been available for some time.

Ground Operations: Deployability and Mobilitywithout Sacrificing Survivability — Groundforces, like air forces, can profit from theenhanced survivability provided by active defenselasers. Because high power laser defensive systemswill probably weigh several thousand pounds forthe foreseeable future, they are not man-portable.These systems will be mounted on dedicatedvehicles that provide active defense for other

Air Operations: Enhanced Survivability andCampaign Flexibility — Laser defenses couldprovide an on-board active defense capability foraircraft to defeat or destroy incoming missiles oraircraft within their range. This has several majorimplications for air operations.

First, it greatly increases the survivability of manyaircraft. With active laser defenses on board,non-stealthy, subsonic, vulnerable platforms (e.g., Joint STARS, AWACS, ABLs17, B-52s)become much more survivable against SAMs andAAMs. Conversely, laser-equipped aircraft (likethe ABL with its very long range laser) could alsoescort aircraft that lack their own laser defenses.Second, because modern SAMs have ranges ofhundreds of kilometers and fighters have opera-tional radii of several thousand kilometers, sup-pression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and airsupremacy campaigns today may have to activelysuppress air defenses over tens of thousands ofsquare kilometers, a major operational task. Bydefending individual aircraft or flights of aircraftagainst SAMs and AAMs rather than attemptingto neutralize these threats throughout the battle-space, active defense laser systems could signifi-cantly reduce SEAD requirements.

Active defense lasers could also improve thesequencing of SEAD and air supremacy cam-paigns. Today, these must be completed to a sig-nificant degree before strike operations begin, tolimit the attrition of strike aircraft. However,because aircraft defensive lasers can shoot downSAMs or AAMs as they are fired at the defendedaircraft, commanders could have the option tobegin strike operations before either a SEAD orair supremacy campaign is complete. This meansthat “center of gravity” targets that affect the out-come of the operation directly, such as commandand control facilities or invading enemy groundforces, can be prosecuted from the very beginningof air operations, significantly reducing the timerequired to execute a successful air campaign.Because active defense laser weapons provide sig-nificant aircraft self-defense against SAMs andAAMs, other defensive requirements, such aselectronic warfare support for strike packages,might be reduced.

1 4



17 Although ABL’s lasers are intended to defeat ballistic missiles in boost phase, they provide an inherent capability against AAMs and SAMs as well.


Korea 2024 Continued…

Attacking with little warning in January 2024, NorthKorean forces intended to capture Seoul, then therest of South Korea, before U.S. forces could inter-vene. They began their attack by suppressing SouthKorean air bases with a constant barrage of SCUDmissiles carrying a mix of persistent chemical andsubmunition warheads. They also used non-persist-ent chemical weapons to open corridors throughROK defenses for their mechanized forces.

The North Koreans recognized that the US-ROKCombined Forces Command (CFC) would use bothnaval air and long-range strike aircraft operating outof Japan and Okinawa to strike bridges, assemblyareas and other key targets to slow and attrit theirground forces. In response, they deployed long-rangeadvanced Russian SAMs to provide effective airdefense coverage of their forces without displacingtheir air defenses to the south. Deployed in hardenedshelters and employing updated Russian andChinese-provided systems to defeat U.S. electroniccounter measures, the North Korean integrated airdefense system (IADS) proved relatively effectiveagainst all non-stealthy U.S. airborne platforms,except those equipped with active defense lasers.

Protected by laser defenses, U.S. manned andunmanned ISR assets operated over friendly forceswell within the SAM envelope and rapidly developedhigh-resolution, near-real time targeting data againstthe invading North Korean mechanized forces. TheNorth Koreans had anticipated U.S. air forces wouldhave to dedicate their initial efforts to suppressingthe North Korean IADS, but active laser defenses onmany U.S. strike aircraft reduced the SAM threat to amanageable level and allowed U.S. forces to immedi-ately support the hard-pressed ROK defenders.Long-range bombers employed precision munitionsthat were supplied targeting data by near-real timeISR, providing highly accurate and persistent close airsupport for coalition ground forces.

1 5



combat systems and units within their coveragerange. But the improvements in survivabilityoffered by laser systems may enable the design oflighter combat vehicles, supporting efforts tobuild more strategically deployable, tacticallymobile ground forces.

Today, most losses on the conventional groundbattlefield are caused by indirect fire weapons, -including artillery, rockets and mortars that fol-low ballistic trajectories - and air-deliveredbombs. Guided direct fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man-portableair defense systems are also very lethal. Hyper-velocity large caliber tank rounds are another sig-nificant direct fire threat. An example is thearmor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) roundsfired by the Army’s M-1 tank, which essentiallyare yard-long depleted uranium rods traveling atthousands of feet per second.

Protecting against these weapons at present requiresheavy armor, leading to massive vehicles such asthe 70-ton M-1 tank that require considerableresources to deploy and consume large amountsof fuel on the battlefield. Active laser defensescould improve the survivability of lighter vehiclesby defeating some of these threats before theyreach their targets. The THEL has already destroyedrockets, artillery and mortar rounds in flight,demonstrating that lasers can deal with theseindirect fire threats.18 Given THEL’s demonstratedcapabilities, it appears that similar laser systemswould also be capable against manned aircraft.

In addition to protecting combat forces, activelaser defenses can also protect key facilities andinfrastructure, such as logistic bases, airfields andports from indirect fire. In counterinsurgencyenvironments, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, thiswould probably be their key role.

However, lasers are not well suited for defeatingdirect fire threats, like ATGMs, tank rounds androcket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The flat tra-jectories, very short times of flight, and mass ofthese munitions make them difficult targets for alaser system, which must dwell on a target longenough to cause it to explode or veer off course.Consequently, laser active defense systems willwork best when complemented by other active

defense systems. Current development effortshave focused on detecting and tracking incomingdirect fire threats with millimeter-wave radars orinfrared sensors, then engaging them at closerange with proximity-fused grenades or at longerranges with rockets. These rocket and grenadeactive defense systems will most likely remain thepreferred solution to direct fire threats for theforeseeable future.

Development of effective active defense laserswould assist ground force designers in balancingthe conflicting requirements for strategic deploya-bility and tactical mobility and survivability.Survivability requires armor that adds weight andreduces deployability and mobility. In combina-tion with rocket or grenade active defensesagainst direct fire threats, active defense lasers canenhance survivability and reduce the requirementfor heavy armor, reducing the weight of combatvehicles and thus increasing their strategicdeployability and tactical mobility.

Naval Operations: Electric Ships Could PowerLasers — Many of the characteristics that makeactive defense lasers attractive to ground and airforces would benefit naval forces as well. Anoperational solution deploying lasers at sea couldprovide the U.S. Navy significant capabilities andenhanced operational flexibility. For example,lasers could provide an effective shield againstadversary ballistic or cruise missile attacks,enabling safer operation in the littoral environ-ment and establishment of sea bases well withinenemy missile range.

18 Space Daily, August 27, 2004, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/laser-04r.html.



Pinned in their defensive positions by heavy vol-ume of North Korean artillery firing from hardenedpositions north of the DMZ, ROK ground forceswere unable to maneuver into the flanks of theNorth Korean penetrations. However, the soleremaining U.S. Army heavy brigade in Korea hadrecently been equipped with organic activedefense laser vehicles. These destroyed a highpercentage of the thousands of artillery roundsand rockets fired at the brigade as it successfullycounterattacked to isolate, then destroy, the leadNorth Korean corps.

Developments in naval shipboard power alsofavor electrically-powered laser weapons. TheNavy is moving toward greater electrification,notably with ships like CVN-21 and DD(X).These ships will have significant excess electricalgeneration capacity and a backbone of powercables to move large amounts of power through-out the ship efficiently,19 making it relatively easyfor them to host solid-state laser weapons.

Lasers would work well in supporting the Navy’s“Sea Shield” concept for sea-based defensive operations.20 They offer significant opportunitiesfor improving the protection of the "Sea Base"(the Navy’s concept for sustaining forces ashorewithout shore bases) or protection of ships andshipping at sea. For example, naval forces areincreasingly being required to operate in littoralregions, where they are threatened by small, fastand potentially suicidal craft such as jet skis, fastracing craft known as cigarette boats, andBoghammers21 that can easily hide among thecommercial fishing, cargo and passenger craftfleets. With their adjustable power levels, ship-mounted laser weapons could provide a gradu-ated yet robust response to these threats whileavoiding serious damage to innocent civilian craft that might inadvertently approach naval vessels.

Another major threat to naval forces is the nextgeneration of advanced supersonic sea-skimmingantiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) that may not bedetected until they are seconds from hitting theirtargets.22 Active defense lasers offer a high speedof engagement to complement close-in defensiveguns and missiles. Defensive laser systems

1 6



19 Scott C. Truver, “Team Effort,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 9, 2003, p. 26. The DD(X) in particular has an Integrated Power System capable of“near instantaneously switching power from propulsion to weapons and back.”

20 Sea Shield is the U.S. Navy’s concept for protecting our national interests with layered global defensive power based on control of the seas, forwardpresence, and networked intelligence. It includes theater air and missile defense. Admiral Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21: Projecting JointCapabilities,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 128/10/1,196, October 2002, p. 35.

21 The term “Boghammer” specifically refers to speedboats manufactured by Boghammer Marin in Sweden. Capable of 50-knot speeds, 40 were soldto Iran in 1983 and used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards for attacks against oil tankers and other vessels in the Straits of Hormuz in the mid-late 1980’s. Boghammer has since become a common term referring to this class of small, fast attack craft. The Aida Parker Newsletter, Issue 200,October, 1996. http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/Aida/aida-200.html.

22 Antiship cruise missiles are difficult targets for existing cruise missile defense systems such as the gatling-gun Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS)long deployed by the US and other navies. Trends in cruise missile development include increases in speed (now supersonic: mach 2) and reduc-tions in both flight altitude and radar cross section. These make detection difficult until the missile is close to the target. U.S. General AccountingOffice, Report to Congressional Requesters, Defense Acquisitions: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense.GAO/NSIAD-00-149, July 2000.

23 Power requirements for the laser drop by a factor of 5 to 10 because of the better aspect angle to the target and ability to put the beam on a softerpart of the target.

mounted on escorting ships also have an advan-tage here not only because they can engage targetsfor a longer period but also because they canengage the more vulnerable soft side rather thanthe harder nose of cruise missiles.23 Aircraft-mounted laser systems might provide the best fleetarea defense against hypersonic cruise missiles.

Sea Shield is also focused on the projection ofdefense ashore and here, too, lasers could offerimportant capabilities. As lasers transition intothe sea Services, great opportunities will arise forprojecting defense throughout the littoral – bothover the water and inland. Navy ships could protect U.S. and allied forces ashore from manyforms of indirect fire weapons. For example, alarge deck amphibious ship operating close toshore with a large, long-range laser defense sys-tem could theoretically provide a “sea shield”against air, missile or artillery attack over ele-ments ashore, significantly improving their survivability and ability to maneuver.

The Navy operates at long ranges and in chang-ing maritime atmospheric conditions like seahaze, both of which challenge the capabilities oflaser weapons. Therefore, the Navy is most interested in laser weapons with the high powerlevels normally associated with chemical lasers.However, as noted earlier, the Navy is focusingon all-electric ships and, for this reason, someargue that a high-powered FEL is best suited fornaval very high power applications. Determiningwhether SSLs or FELs or some mix thereof willbest meet Navy requirements will probablyrequire significant development and operationaltesting.

1 7




Seeking to defeat the North Korean forces deci-sively before they could withdraw into strong defen-sive positions, CFC opted to conduct a fixing attackwith ROK forces in the south while U.S. forces con-ducted an amphibious envelopment into North Korea.Success of the amphibious operation depended onthe ability to build combat power ashore very rapidly.

Consequently, CFC decided to accept risk andplace its Navy Sea Base well within range of NorthKorea’s numerous supersonic antiship cruise mis-siles (ASCMs). Keeping these missiles in their hard-ened and camouflaged shelters until the Sea Basewas in range, the North Koreans launched waves ofASCMs that exhausted the magazines of availablemissile defense missiles. Anticipating this possibil-ity, the admiral commanding had kept his Sea Baseflotilla in tight formation and boxed by the four avail-able DD(X)s equipped with active defense laser sys-tems. The defending destroyers and Navy UCAVsarmed with laser weapons guided by the navalforces’ net centric command and control were ableto defeat most of the ASCMs that penetrated the ini-tial defenses.

24 U.S. policy does not advocate the weaponization of space, and Northrop Grumman Corporation supports that policy. However, any policy discus-sion should be informed by analysis of the potential operational implications of space-based lasers. Therefore, such analysis is included in thiseffort. See Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing, The White House, May 18, 2005, for statement of U.S. policy.

25 Preston, et. al., p. xvi.26 Statement of Christopher Bolkcom, Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Hearing on Cruise Missile Proliferation, June 11, 2002, p.2.27 Bradley Graham, “Missile defense program changes course,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2002.

Space Operations: Satellite-Based Laser Weapons24 — Space-based lasers may alsoprovide active defense over large areas, dependingon the wavelength of the energy propagated andexisting atmospheric conditions, includingweather.25 A space-based laser satellite constella-tion would have the inherent advantages and dis-advantages conferred by orbital mechanics.Operating in space allows the placement of satel-lites far above the earth in vantage points thatprovide line-of-sight access to large portions ofthe earth’s surface, including potentially deniedareas within a hostile state. These vantage pointshave obvious advantages for directed energyweapons based in space just as they do for sen-sors. However, this access is complicated by themotion of satellites within their orbit versus themotion of the earth. Only satellites in very high(23,000 mile) geosynchronous (GEO) orbits


maintain their position relative to the earth’s sur-face. But GEO orbits are not suitable for space-based lasers for a number of reasons, the mostobvious being that they put the laser at too greata distance from potential targets. The best solu-tion for laser systems would be a constellation ofsatellites to achieve the desired coverage at lowerorbits. The satellites would not linger over spe-cific portions of the globe but would orbit theearth on predictable paths with “access” to differ-ent surface locations. About a dozen satellites atan altitude of around 1,200 – 1,500 km can pro-vide continuous coverage of most of the earth(excluding polar regions).

Space-based lasers could engage targets, primarilyballistic missiles, much earlier in their trajectoriesthan terrestrially based defenses. Ballistic missilethreats could be engaged shortly after they ascendabove the clouds during their vulnerable boostphase, before they deploy decoys.

Active defense lasers could also potentially protecthigh-value satellites from attack by nano- or micro-satellites operating in a kinetic collision or para-sitic mode. In the vacuum of space, potentiallyshort engagement ranges would likely keep such asatellite self-defense system relatively lightweight.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): For AffordableLayered Defense — Ballistic missiles armed eitherwith weapons of mass destruction or advancedcapability conventional warheads pose one of thegreatest threats to forward deployed or deployingU.S. forces. Although missiles such as the PatriotAdvanced Capability-Phase 3 (PAC-3) haveproved relatively effective against theater ballisticmissiles (TBMs), they are expensive. SCUDs andother TBMs based on 1940’s technology are rela-tively inexpensive (around $1 million)26 while asingle PAC-3 costs approximately twice as much.27

For budgetary reasons, then, defensive missilestend to be low-density/high-demand items foreven the most wealthy and advanced military

1 8



powers. Defending a point target28 such as an airbase against theater ballistic missiles with a highlevel of confidence can require two defensive mis-siles for each attacking missile. Defending morethan a few critical targets against large numbersof missiles quickly becomes cost prohibitive.Because offensive missiles can be retargetedagainst any target within their range arcs, evenrelatively robust missile defenses can be over-whelmed if the enemy is willing to expend therequired number of offensive missiles.

An attacking ballistic missile goes through threephases of flight enroute to the target: boostphase, when the rocket motors are firing; mid-course, when the missile is coasting along its bal-listic trajectory; and terminal, when it isdescending toward its target. One of the basicprinciples of missile defense is to create as manydifferent “layers” of defense in as many of thesephases of flight as possible because each defensivelayer increases the probability that the enemymissile will be destroyed before it hits its target.Longer-range defensive systems can provide areadefense of large areas, shorter range systems pro-vide point defense of specific targets.

The projected role of the Airborne Laser in boostphase missile defense is well known, but ground-based lasers are also well suited to terminal pointdefense of critical targets. These lasers can fire tensof shots against offensive missiles very quickly,making them difficult to overwhelm. The chemi-cals consumed per shot cost less than $10,000,much less than the millions of dollars for defen-sive missiles. Thus, even taking into account theinitial cost of the laser weapons, laser-based pointBMD may prove to be a highly effective—andmore affordable—means of adding an additionallayer of defense against TBM attack.

Because they are more affordable, laser defensescan be more widely spread. They can comple-ment missile defense missiles of longer ranges.Megawatt-class chemical lasers could defeat the-ater ballistic missiles. Multi-megawatt class lasers(much larger than any system under developmenttoday) would be required to defeat the faster and

28 “Point targets” are specific geographic locations, such as an airbase, as opposed to “area targets” that refer to a larger geographic area.29 See “Chemical Fuels and Exhaust” discussion on page 12.

much harder targets presented by ICBM reentryvehicles (RVs). In both cases, effectiveness of alaser defense would depend on developing sys-tems concepts that overcome the potential effectsof clouds, fog or dust storms. For example, air-craft basing would allow the laser weapon tooperate above these weather effects.

Because solid-state lasers are modular and stack-able, it may eventually be possible to create mega-watt solid-state lasers that could fulfill the BMDrole, assuming they can be linked to sufficientlypowerful electrical sources. Alternatively, FELsmay prove scaleable into the megawatt range.This would be particularly important for fleet-based missile defense because chemical lasersrequire chemical fuels, making them less wellsuited for shipboard use.29 With their advancedelectrical power systems, next generation navalvessels could be ideal platforms for large solid-statelasers or FELs. However, even with lasers in themegawatt range, the amount of energy that wouldhave to be used against a TBM RV in a very shorttime will limit ship-based BMD coverage areas.

For maritime forces, BMD may become evenmore important in the future if TBMs areequipped with maneuvering warheads capable ofstriking ships under way. Even limited laserdefensive coverage areas could be very importantto future fleet BMD because missile defense ofthe fleet and the littoral areas it protects requiresgreater numbers of assets than resources and prac-tical limitations make feasible. Current andfuture vessels have a finite number of verticallaunch system (VLS) tubes that can be dedicatedto defensive missiles. These tubes cannot bereloaded at sea; consequently, once all of a vessel’sdefensive missiles are expended, it must return toport to reload. A vessel defending a fleet off thecoast of Taiwan, for example, might have to tran-sit all the way to Guam and return. This limitsthe numbers of TBMs that naval forces canengage. However, if next-generation large navalvessels were to power megawatt-sized solid-statelaser or FEL missile defenses, they could essen-tially reconstitute their laser missile defense capa-bility with each refueling at sea.

1 9



Homeland Defense Operations — The same characteristics that make laser weaponseffective for these military active defense missionscould also allow them to defend critical infra-structure such as bridges, nuclear power plants andchemical plants, or government facilities like theWhite House, Capitol and the Pentagon, againstaircraft and direct and indirect fire groundweapons. Against an attack by a hijacked aircraft,for example, laser defenses could provide a gradu-ated response that might first illuminate thecockpit, then disable control surfaces to impedemaneuverability and force the aircraft to fly awayfrom the target. The same weapons could defeatterrorist mortar or missile attacks, providing ahighly flexible point defense against multiplethreats. Located at airports, they could also defendaircraft landing and taking off against MANPADS.

Cruise missiles launched from ships at sea areanother homeland security challenge that couldbe met by airborne laser systems. THEL-likechemical lasers scaled up to megawatt-classpower levels on wide-bodied aircraft (about thesize of a C-130) could defend relatively largeareas with small numbers of aircraft, providing aneffective, persistent defense at affordable cost.

30 See “Deep Magazines” discussion on page 10. For some electricity-limited tactical platforms (e.g. airplanes) SSLs can only fire about 15-20 “bullets”before they have to recharge batteries or cool down. However, for platforms where power and cooling are readily available (e.g. ships) some SSLconfigurations can operate for unlimited run times and 100% duty cycle.

Korea 2024 Continued… Offensive Operations

Because lasers put considerably less destructiveenergy into a target than the larger chemical orkinetic munitions, offensive applications of laserswill most likely be dedicated to those missionswhere their other characteristics (e.g., precision,speed and numbers of engagements) are moreimportant than pure destructive power.

Air Operations: New Relevance in Counterinsurgency,Counterterrorism Operations — Laser weaponscould add significant air-to-air capabilities to airplatforms. Because laser “bullets” travel at thespeed of light, engagements have no “fly out”time and can be completed very quickly. Solid-state laser weapons also have “deep magazines,”meaning they do not run out of ammunition aslong as they can be recharged and cooled.30 Thiswould make laser-armed aircraft ideal for mis-sions that might require multiple air-to-airengagements over a protracted period. For exam-ple, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs)armed with lasers (and equipped with sufficientelectrical power generation capability) could con-duct denial-of-flight operations over large areas ofenemy territory for an extended period. A mis-sion such as NORTHERN or SOUTHERNWATCH over Iraq could become a far more eco-nomic operation.

The same laser weapons that provide an activedefense capability against SAMs, AAMs or air-craft can also be used against targets on theground, providing a significant air-to-groundcapability. In combination with current and newgenerations of air platforms and sensors, laserweapons may significantly increase the ability to“fine tune” the application of force from the air.This could make air power more relevant incounterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

Laser weapons’ accuracy, range and adjustabilityallow for major increases in the precision withwhich destructive effects can be delivered fromthe air. They can reduce the minimum area ofdamage from multiple square meters for smalldiameter bombs to several square centimeters.This makes it possible to engage point targets

Recognizing that U.S. air bases in Japan andOkinawa were a critical coalition center of gravitythat had to be neutralized before their forces couldrenew their attack, the North Koreans began salvofiring No Dong intermediate range ballistic missileswith persistent chemical agent warheads at them.Although these missiles were a major threat, CFCopted to reserve its limited Airborne Laser (ABL)and ship-based Kinetic Energy Intercept (KEI) mis-siles assets to prevent successful launch of NorthKorean nuclear missiles. The hundreds of No Dongreentry vehicles reaching Japan began to over-whelm the limited numbers of Theater High AltitudeAir Defense (THAAD) missiles available to theJapanese Self Defense Forces before additional U.S.missile defense forces could arrive in theater.However, the Japanese had deployed laser pointdefenses at the most critical bases and thesedestroyed many of the remaining No Dong war-heads aimed at those targets.


2 0



with little or no collateral damage, allowing closeair support of ground forces intermingled withenemy forces or engaged in urban or close ter-rain.31 Such precision also allows engagement ofspecific sub-elements (e.g. antennas, externaltransformers) of critical targets like radio stationsand electrical power plants without totallydestroying them. However, as previously noted,eye safety issues, particularly in urban environ-ments, would need to be addressed, or the lasersused must operate at eye-safe wavelengths.32

One of the limiting factors for strike aircrafttoday is the amount of ordnance they can carry.This is particularly true of fighter-bombers thatprovide the majority of today’s strike capability.Even advanced models, such as the F/A-22 andthe F-35 JSF can at best carry eight next-genera-tion small diameter bombs or air-to-air missiles.Once these are expended, the aircraft must returnto base to rearm, even if it has fuel remaining.Thus the amount of on-board ordnance some-times hinders the ability of air power to maintaina persistent presence in the battlespace with afixed number of aircraft.

Solid-state laser weapons, however, require onlyelectricity provided by on-board generators (usu-ally driven by the engines) to fire. This meansthat even small strike aircraft can potentially firehundreds of laser shots (allowing time to rechargeand cool between series of shots). Refueling theaircraft essentially rearms the laser. Thus, if anaircraft can be refueled in the air, it can provide apersistent presence in the battlespace limited onlyby crew endurance and the reliability of electro-mechanical systems. This would point to an idealmarriage between solid-state laser weapons andlong-endurance airborne platforms, such as UCAVs.

Effective application of such persistent precisionattack capability will enable a major expansion inthe way we think of air power’s relevance acrossthe full spectrum of conflict. For example, laserweapons with their deep magazines mounted onhigh-altitude, stealthy UCAVs also equipped withhigh resolution sensors could persistently denyenemy personnel the ability to operate in the

31 The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)/DARPA Advanced Tactical Laser Advanced Technology Demonstration is intended todevelop this air-to-ground capability. It will develop a modular laser, initially installed on a C-130, that reportedly will be able to slice metal at anine-mile range. “Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL),” GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/atl.htm.

32 The use of lasers for close air support is not totally without risk to supported troops. Scattered laser energy possibly reflecting from targets is likelyto blind personnel in the immediate area who are looking at the target unless they have appropriate laser eye protection.

open over large, remote areas. Employing thesecapabilities to their full advantage requires thedevelopment of new tactics, techniques and pro-cedures for everything from targeting to engage-ment to battle damage assessment.

Ground Operations: Ideal Sniper Weapons —Because of their size, weight and lack of heavyarmor piercing / deep penetration capability,offensive applications of laser weapons in groundcombat will most likely be dedicated to thosemissions where the precision, speed-of-lightengagement time, adjustability and minimal col-lateral damage of laser weapons are desired. Forcounter-sniper missions, for example, a laserweapon paired with acoustic and optical sensorsthat track a sniper’s bullet back to the firing pointalmost instantly could automatically be aimed to


The ROK defenders stabilized their positions andbegan to build combat power for a decisive coun-terattack while the North Koreans desperatelyattempted to resupply and reinforce their stalledforces. However, these efforts were greatly ham-pered by U.S. area denial operations. Operating innear-space, surface moving target indicator radar(SMTI) platforms equipped with active laserdefenses cued other manned and unmanned SMTIplatforms that effectively tracked and identified allNorth Korean ground traffic from Pyongyang tobelow the DMZ. These sensors guided long-range,persistent, stealthy UCAVs flying from bases inJapan and off carriers. Equipped with laserweapons, these UCAVs destroyed a significant por-tion of the soft-skinned North Korean resupply vehi-cles attempting to move south.

North Korea was left with no strategic options afterthe successful amphibious envelopment supportedby precision air support defeated the attackingNorth Korean forces. Its available No Dong missileswere exhausted and its limited nuclear missiles wouldbe destroyed by orbiting ABLs if they were launched.The UCAV area denial cap cued by persistent ISRessentially blocked their ability to move most forcesthroughout the country. Recognizing the futility oftheir situation, the North Korean governmentrequested a complete and unconditional ceasefire.

2 1



33 See footnote 24.34 Steven J. Zaluga, “Red Star Wars,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1997, p. 207.35 CNN, “Pentagon beams over latest military laser test. U.S. wants to determine vulnerability of satellites.” http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/20/pen-

tagon.laser/, October 20, 1997.36 U.S. Department of Defense, FY04 Annual Report to Congress on PRC Military Power, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf p. 42.

engage the sniper before he is able to take cover.The advantages of laser weapons over conven-tional machine guns are that lasers have no “timeof flight” and produce little collateral damage.

The “stealth” characteristics of lasers also makethem ideal sniper weapons. Unlike their por-trayal by Hollywood, real laser weapons have novisible beam and have no sonic “report”, muzzleflash or recoil. Under most atmospheric condi-tions, the only way an enemy would know he wasbeing engaged by a laser would be to see theeffect on the target. The systems use low-powerlasers to establish the aim point for co-alignedhigh-power lethal lasers. Once the aim point hasbeen established, the operator only has to ener-gize the high power laser to kill the target—theepitome of the sniper’s “one shot, one kill” motto.

The precision and adjustability of laser weaponscould make them highly effective in counterin-surgency or stability and support operations(SASO) where force must be applied carefully toachieve a desired effect. For example, laserweapons could be used to kill or neutralize armedinsurgents hiding within a crowd where otherweapons would injure innocent civilians. Atlower power levels, lasers might achieve only non-lethal effects. For these purposes, laser weaponswould probably be most effective when mountedon UAVs or helicopters and used at extendedranges. Operational planning must take intoaccount existing treaty constraints that prohibitthe intentional blinding of combatants and non-combatants by lasers.

Naval Operations: Finding a Niche — The samefactors that limit the offensive role of laserweapons in ground operations also limit theiroffensive utility at sea. However, lasers may meetniche requirements, especially in sea-borne specialoperations where precision and stealth are moreimportant than destructive power.

Another opportunity for lasers might be in sub-marine operations. Integrating a laser head witha periscope would give submarines the capabilityto engage surface targets from periscope depth.

This would allow them to strike targets such assmall boats without revealing their presence orexpending a torpedo or missile. They could alsoattack low altitude aircraft and soft targets ashore.

Space Operations: Could Give New Meaning to“Space Superiority”33 — Laser weapons speed-of-light delivery, exceptional accuracy and adjusta-bility make them well suited for engaging targetsin space from the ground or for engaging targetson the surface or in the lower atmosphere fromspace. The lack of atmosphere to attenuate powerand the fact that they only need to be rechargedto be rearmed (for SSLs) also makes them idealspace-to-space weapons. As noted earlier, laserweapons can play a defensive role on space plat-forms, but they clearly have offensive utility as well.

Concerns over the offensive use of lasers againstspace targets have risen steadily since a Sovietground-based laser (GBL) tracked the Challengerspace shuttle at low power in 1984, causingequipment malfunctions and crew distress.34 U.S.experiments have also demonstrated that satelliteshundreds of kilometers up are vulnerable to highenergy GBLs.35 The importance of this capabilityhas not been lost on countries like China, whichis pursuing a robust high energy laser capability.36

For technologically sophisticated nations withmilitaries that are dependent on information anddata (e.g., positioning/navigation/timing, intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and com-munications) derived from space-based systems,the potential threat from GBLs is real.Information about the target satellites’ opera-tional characteristics, like orbital parameters, isreadily available in open sources. The physicaldestruction of satellites may not be as importantto the attacker as the ability to jam, spoof or oth-erwise inhibit a spacecraft’s functional effective-ness for a limited period of time. The beam’sintensity and point of impact will determine theGBL’s lethality and effectiveness against a space-based target. Due to the megawatt levels ofpower required, chemical lasers rather than solid-state lasers will most likely be the lasers of choicefor GBLs for the foreseeable future.

2 2



Laser weapons could also be placed into orbit.The vacuum of space is an ideal environment forlasers, but orbital mechanics will dictate space-based lasers’ operational utility. However, foroffensive counter-space operations, timelines arenot usually critical. Over a period measured inhours, a few space-based lasers get a good shot at

all low earth orbit (LEO) satellites. With sufficientpower levels, they could attack targets from theearth’s surface well into orbit. If such weaponsare eventually developed and fielded, they mightbe so overwhelming that they would make suc-cessful operations in other mediums impossiblewithout first achieving true “space superiority.”

2 3



As important as the consequences of fielding thelaser weapons described in previous sections maybe, experience shows that technological innovationmay generate even more important consequencesthat are impossible to predict. This makes itimperative that the U.S. defense community pur-sue a robust process toward enhancing our under-standing of the operational implications of laserweapons and development of operational conceptsfor their use.

The first requirement is to develop a true appre-ciation of laser weapons capabilities by hands on,practical experience with them. This means weneed to press on with existing laser weapons pro-grams as rapidly as practical. Serious considera-tion should be given to fielding a productizedprototype of the THEL as quickly as possible.With its proven effectiveness against rockets,artillery and mortars, relatively modest improve-ments in the existing test system would allowprototypes to defend key facilities and bases inIraq and Afghanistan. This is an importantobjective in itself, but it would also demonstratethe combat effectiveness of active defense lasers,serving to spur interest and progress in laserweapons development. Experts have said thateither laser weapons will prove themselves in cur-rent combat operations or it will be another tenyears before they are fielded.37

We also need to bring the Airborne Laser pro-gram, long the flagship of laser weapons develop-ment, to fruition within the planned timeframe.Like THEL, having a real, flying laser weapon forexperimentation and demonstration purposes willdo much to catalyze interest in the potentialcapabilities of all categories of laser weapons.

Other efforts to speed our appreciation for laserweapons should include an aggressive wargamingand experimentation program. This programshould take the following standard steps for oper-ational concept development:

• Tabletop wargames to identify critical areas of focus.

• Detailed modeling and simulation that will in turn guide the development of prototypeweapons and employment concepts.

• Prototype modular laser weapons packagesthat can be mounted on operational aircraft,vehicles and vessels for hands-on field experi-mentation.

• Field experimentation in operational units todevelop tactics, techniques and procedures forlaser weapon employment.

VII. Recommendations

37 Army Brigadier General Philip Coker, the director of capabilities development at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has stated that hesees two alternatives to the development of effective laser weapons. Either a viable system is fielded within a year or it will be 10 more years beforelaser weapons are fielded. Defense Daily Network, January 24, 2005, http://defensedaily.com/VIP/dd/current. htm.

2 4



From the technology development standpoint,operational laser weapons are right around theproverbial corner. Given adequate resourcing, a“productized” chemical laser weapon could beshooting rocket and mortar rounds from battle-field skies within 18 months.38 If the AirborneLaser program continues to make progress as pre-dicted, the ABL may be tested against ballisticmissiles in a few years.39 Solid-state and free-elec-tron laser weapons, adding to the range of laserweapons capabilities, may be less than a decadeaway.40 Meanwhile, the personnel who will makekey decisions on the development, acquisitionand employment of these systems are alreadyhalf-way or more through their military careersbut most have developed little awareness of thepotential implications of laser weapons.

Even a relatively cursory examination of thepotential capabilities of laser weapons indicatesthat their introduction to operations can causesignificant shifts in warfighting dynamics, espe-cially in the competition between offensive anddefensive capabilities. Lasers can provide effectiveactive defenses against a range of increasinglycapable threats that are now difficult or impossi-ble to defeat, such as SAMs, AAMs, rockets,artillery and mortars—and potentially, theaterballistic missiles. Major improvements in accu-racy, range and lethality have made these attack-ing weapons more and more dangerous, but laserweapons may reverse this trend by making itmuch easier for forces to defend themselves.Offensive use of laser weapons may make possiblethe much more precise application of force froma variety of combat platforms.

The consequence of these shifts in all warfightingdimensions is illustrated in the scenario.

• Active laser defenses on airborne platformswill reduce the need to suppress air defenses,

significantly speeding up the prosecution of aircampaigns. However, as these defenses reducethe effectiveness of SAMs and AAMs, ground-based air defenses may also turn to laser systems,forcing airborne platforms to either operate atvery low levels or become very stealthy to avoiddetection. Offensive use of airborne lasersagainst ground targets could allow the muchmore precise application of force from the air.

• For ground forces, active laser defenses againstmortars, artillery, rockets and even aerial bombswill significantly reduce the impact of thesethreats on the battlefield, minimizing the require-ment for counterfire and allowing ground com-bat units to maneuver much more freely evenwhile underneath the enemy’s threat umbrella.

• Similarly, active laser defenses will increase thesurvivability of naval surface forces againstcruise and ballistic missile threats, allowingthem to operate more safely inside an enemy’smissile threat envelope.

• By adding another affordable layer of pointdefense against theater ballistic missiles, laserdefenses will significantly enhance the abilityto defend ports, airfields and other high valueU.S. and allied targets, making it more diffi-cult for adversaries to pursue anti-access strate-gies or to threaten regional allies.

If laser weapons live up to the potential they haveshown thus far and if their development proceedsas fast as projected, warfare may enter the age oflaser weapons much sooner than most expect. To leverage this emerging capability, we needoperational concepts to guide our investment inthe transformational technology of laser weapons.The implications for our national security are sosignificant that developing these operational con-cepts merits top priority for our military intellec-tual energy.

VIII. Conclusions

38 Selinger, “U.S. Army Studying Guns, Lasers, Interceptors to Destroy RAMS.”39 Tariq Malik, “The Power of Light: An Airborne Laser for Missile Defense,” Space.Com, November 17, 2004.40 Stephenson, Ahearn.

2 5



2 6




Richard Dunn is a senior analyst at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center,

where he is responsible for preparing in-depth assessments of military, politi-

cal, technological and economic developments worldwide. He is a recognized,

wide-ranging authority whose opinions on defense matters are sought by the

national and international media. Before joining Northrop Grumman

Corporation, Dunn spent over four years at SAIC, where he developed new

approaches for understanding the future of warfare. Dunn joined SAIC after

completing a successful 29-year career in the U.S. Army that included brigade

command and staff positions of significant responsibility and culminated with

service as director of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Staff Group. At the U.S.

Military Academy at West Point, Dunn taught Chinese language, international

relations, and Chinese politics and government. Dunn’s education includes a

bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Bucknell University and a master of

public affairs degree from Harvard University. He also studied international rela-

tions in Taiwan as the first Olmsted Scholar to study in Chinese. Dunn is a

1991 graduate of the National War College.

About the Author


The Northrop Grumman Corporation established the

Analysis Center in 1977 to conduct objective analyses of

strategic trends, defense policy, military doctrine, emerging

threats and operational concepts, and their implications for

the defense industry. The Analysis Center Papers present ongo-

ing key research and analysis conducted by the Center staff

and its associates.

Analysis Center Papers are available on-line at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Web site at www.analysiscenter.northropgrumman.com. For substantiveissues related to this paper, please contact Richard J. Dunn, [email protected], or call him at 703-875-0007. For copies, please call 703-875-0054.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense company headquartered in Los Angeles,California. Northrop Grumman provides technologically advanced, innovative products, servicesand solutions in systems integration, defense electronics information technology, advanced air-craft, shipbuilding and space technology. With more than 125,000 employees, and operations inall 50 states and 25 countries, Northrop Grumman serves U.S. and international military, govern-ment and commercial customers.

© 2005 Northrop Grumman Corporation. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America.

Documents

of Laser Weapons - Northrop · PDF fileThe same characteristics that make laser weapons effective for these military active defense ... to heavier-than-air aircraft, ... of laser weapons,