REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES versus CARMENVICTORIA BELMONTEG.R. No. 197028October 9, 2013MENDOZA, J.:FACTS: On October 24, 2002, Belmonte filed before the RTC her Application for Registration and Confirmation of Titles of two (2) lots located in Barangay Hagonoy and Barangay Bambang, Taguig City, respectively. Daniel Victoria, Jr., Belmontes attorney-in-fact and younger sibling, alleged that Belmonte inherited the subject properties from their parents, as evidenced by an extrajudicial settlement of estate. He presented a photocopy of the said document claiming that the original copy got lost. Belmonte narrated that her parents had been in possession of the said lots since the Japanese occupation in 1943. She attached tax declarations, technical descriptions, geodetic engineer's certificates, and conversion plans in support of her application.The OSG opposed the application arguing that Belmonte failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. RTC granted Belmontes application for registration of land title holding that she was able to successfully establish her ownership over the lots in question and that the land sought to be registered was the same land described in her application for registration.CA affirmed the RTC decision explaining that although Belmonte was not able to present the original tracing cloth plan, she sufficiently established the identity of the subject properties through the certified blueprint copies of the conversion plan. The CA further stated that Belmonte successfully established the possession and occupation of her predecessors-in-interest since 1943. The OSG moved for a reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.ISSUE: Whether Belmonte has successfully proven possession and occupation since June 12, 1945RULING: The triple requirements of alienability and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier under Section 14(1) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, are indispensable prerequisites to a favorable registration of title to the property. Each element must necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise, the application for registration should be denied. Belmonte, failed to convince the Court that she has met the indispensable requirements of possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier to merit the registration of the title in her name. Possession and occupation alone, for 30 years or more, does not suffice. The earliest tax declaration that Belmonte showed for one of the lots was dated 1949, falling short of the time requirement of possession since 1945 or earlier. The Court cannot give any probative value to the 1949 tax declaration because the property was declared in the name of a certain Francisca Osorio. Belmonte failed to establish the connection between Francisca Osorio and her father and predecessor-in-interest, Daniel Victoria. As to the other lot, records show that Belmontes predecessor-in-interest started declaring the property for tax purposes only in 1966. Belmontes irregular and erratic declaration and payment of real property taxes belie her claim of open and continuous possession of the said lots. Also, general, and often vague, statements as to how Belmonte, through her supposed tenant, possessed the land in question, are mere verbal assertions that do not satisfy possession and occupation as required by law. Evidently, Belmonte's witnesses were not able to give a concrete, consistent and credible picture of how she exercised dominion or exercised control over the subject properties. The Court is constrained to deny Belmonte's application for registration of title.SAN FERNANDO REGALA TRADING, INC. vs. CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC.G.R. No. 178008/G.R. No. 178042October 9, 2013ABAD, J.:Facts: Cargill Philippines, Inc. and San Fernando Regala Trading, Inc. were cane molasses traders that did business with each other for some time. San Fernando claimed that Cargill reneged on its contractual obligations to deliver certain quantities of molasses. Cargill denied this, insisting that San Fernando actually refused to accept the delivery of the goods. Cargills filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against San Fernando before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.Cargill alleged that on July 15, 1996 it entered into Contract 5026 covering its sale to San Fernando of 4,000 metric tons (mt) of molasses at the price of P3,950.00 per mt. Cargill agreed to deliver the molasses within the months of April to May 1997 at the wharf of Union Ajinomoto, Inc. (Ajinomoto) along the Pasig River, Metro Manila. This was a risk-taking forward sale in that its execution was to take place about 10 months later when the parties did not yet know what the trading price of molasses would be.Shortly after, Cargill also entered into Contract 5047 covering another sale to San Fernando of 5,000 mt of molasses at P2,750.00 per mt. The delivery period under this contract was within October-November- December 1996, sooner than the delivery period under Contract 5026. Apparently, San Fernando had a deal with Ajinomoto for the supply of these molasses. Cargill further alleged that it offered to deliver the 4,000 mt of molasses as required by Contract 5026 within the months of April and May 1997 but San Fernando accepted only 951 mt, refusing to accept the rest. On April 2, 1997 Dolman V, the barge carrying Cargills 1,174 mt of molasses, arrived at the Ajinomoto wharf but San Fernando refused to accept the same. The barge stayed at the wharf for 71 days, waiting for San Fernandos unloading order. Because of the delay, the owner of the barge slapped Cargill with demurrage amounting to P920,000.00. Cargill also suffered P3,480,000.00 in damages by way of unrealized profits because it had to sell the cargo to another buyer at a loss. Cargill further alleged that it earlier sought to deliver the molasses covered by Contract 5047 at the Ajinomoto wharf in the months of October, November, and December 1996, but San Fernando failed or refused for unjustified reasons to accept the delivery. Consequently, Cargill suffered damages by way of unrealized profits of P360,000.00 from this contract. Apart from asking the RTC for awards of unrealized profits, Cargill also asked for a return of the demurrage it paid, attorneys fees, and cost of litigation.In its Answer with counterclaim, San Fernando pointed out that, except for the 951 mt of molasses that Cargill delivered in March 1997, the latter made no further deliveries for Contract 5026. As for Contract 5047, San Fernando maintained that Cargill delivered no amount of molasses in connection with the same. On both contract, Cargill admitted its inability to deliver the goods and proposed to move delivery periods, one which San Fernando rejected because it had already contracted to sell the subject molasses to Ajinomoto and was already expecting profits from them. RTC dismissed Cargills complaint for lack of merit and granted San Fernandos counterclaims. It was incomprehensible, said the RTC, for San Fernando to refuse Cargills deliveries, considering that Ajinomoto had already agreed to buy the molasses from it. Cargills failure to make the required deliveries resulted in San Fernandos default on its obligations to Ajinomoto, prompting the latter to cancel its orders. The RTC awarded San Fernando its claims for unrealized profits, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of litigation.The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled on appeal that Cargill was not entirely in breach of Contract 5026 but was guilty of breach of Contract 5047. since San Fernando unjustifiably refused to accept the April 2, 1997 delivery, it should reimburse Cargill the demurrage that it paid the owner of the barge. Cargill was made liable to San Fernando for unrealized profits that it would have made if it had sold them to Ajinomoto. CA deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of San Fernando for its failure to sufficiently establish Cargills bad faith in complying with its obligations. The CA also deleted the awards of attorneys fees and cost of litigation. Cargill and San Fernando both appealed to the Supreme Court.Issues: 1. Whether or not Cargill was guilty of breach of obligation covered by Contract 5026;2. Whether or not Cargill was guilty of breach of obligation covered by Contract 5047; and3. Whether or not moral, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and cost of suit in favor of San Fernando shall be awarded.Rulings:1. Cargill committed no breach of Contract 5026 because it had earlier delivered 951 mt and sent the barge containing the remaining goods at the Ajinomoto's wharf. It was actually San Fernando that refused to accept this delivery. however, since Cargill failed to deliver the balance of 1,875 mt of molasses under Contract 5026, it must pay San Fernando the latters unrealized profits had it been able to sell that 1,875 mt of molasses to Ajinomoto. anything less than that quantity constitutes breach of the agreement. 2. When Cargill wrote San Fernando on May 14, 1997 proposing to move the delivery dates of this contract to May, June, and July, 1997, it was already in default. Cargills failure to deliver the 5,000 mt of molasses on October-November-December 1996 makes it liable to San Fernando for P11,000,000.00 in unrealized profits. Cargill of course points out that San Fernando never wrote a demand letter respecting its failure to make any delivery under that contract. However, demand was not necessary since Cargills obligation under the contract specified the date and place of delivery.3. CAs deletion of the RTCs award of moral damages to San Fernando is proper. Moral damages are not awarded to a corporation unless it enjoyed good reputation that the offender debased and besmirched by his actuations. San Fernando failed to prove by sufficient evidence that it fell within this exception. Besides, moral damages are, as a rule, also not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proved. San Fernando failed to show that Cargill was motivated by bad faith or ill will when it failed to deliver the molasses as agreed. CA correctly deleted the award of exemplary damages to San Fernando. In breach of contract, the court may only award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The evidence has not sufficiently established that Cargills failure to deliver the molasses on time was attended by such wickedness. CA correctly deleted the award of attorneys fees and cost of litigation to San Fernando. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation under Article 2208 of the Civil Code are proper only when exemplary damages are awarded. Both parties actually committed shortcomings in complying with their contractual obligations. For these, they must bear their own expenses of litigation.VIRGILIO G. CAGATAO versus GUILLERMO ALMONTE, ARTHUR AGUILAR, SPS. ERNESTO FERNANDEZ AND A VELINA FERNANDEZ, MARVIN JOHN FERNANDEZ, MARSON FERNANDEZ AND MARJUN FERNANDEZG.R. No. 174004October 9, 2013MENDOZA, J.FACTS: A homestead patent over the property subject of this controversy was issued in favor of Juan Gatchalian. Cagatao claimed that Gatchalian sold the lot to Delfin Manzulin in exchange for one carabao, as embodied in a barter agreement, which was unfortunately destroyed or lost during the Second World War. Manzulin allegedly executed a private written document in the Ilocano dialect, transferring ownership over the property to his son-in-law, Cagatao. The latter then occupied and cultivated the land until the Fernandez Siblings attempted to take possession of the lot, thereby prompting him to file the subject complaint before the RTC.Respondents contended that the Spouses Fernandez purchased the property from Almonte and Aguilar who had in their possession a tax declaration covering the said land. To protect their interest, on January 17, 1996, Spouses Fernandez once again bought the same property for P220,000.00 from Emmaculada Carlos, believed to be the owner of the lot by virtue of TCT No. T-12159-A, a reconstituted title in her name. The former, in turn, executed a deed of sale in favor of their children resulting in the issuance of TCT No. T-249437 in their names. Cagatao questioned the sale to Spouses Fernandez by Carlos because, at that time, Manzulin was already the owner of the subject property. He also pointed out that it was highly irregular that Spouses Fernandez would buy the same property from two different vendors on two different occasions. Cagatao insisted that TCT in the name of the Fernandez Siblings was a nullity because the sale from the Spouses Fernandez was simulated, as testified to by Avelina Fernandez who confirmed that she and her husband did not sign the deed of sale purporting to have transferred ownership of the property to the Fernandez Siblings.The respondents claimed that Cagatao was unable to present proof of title or any public document embodying the sale of the property from Gatchalian to Manzulin and from the latter to Cagatao. They also argued that even if a homestead patent was indeed issued to Gatchalian, the same became void when he did not occupy the land himself.RTC ruled that Cagataos evidence was insufficient to prove his ownership over the land in question because Manzulin never acquired a lawful title to the property from his predecessor, Gatchalian. The RTC ruled that Cagataos claim of possession could not prevail over the claim of ownership by Spouses Fernandez as evidenced by a certificate of title. It, however, nullified the transfer from Spouses Fernandez to Fernandez Siblings because Avelina herself admitted that she and her husband never signed the deed of sale, which transferred ownership to their children. RTC sustained the validity of TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of Carlos, theorizing that someone must have applied for an original certificate of title from which the said title was derived. Cagatao elevated the case to the CA. CA deemed as speculative and without legal basis the trial courts conclusion that Gatchalian might have abandoned his homestead patent, leaving it open for another person to apply for a patent and secure an original certificate of title from which TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of Carlos originated. In other words, the ownership of the land remained with Gatchalian by virtue of the homestead patent in his name, and neither the alleged transfer to Manzulin nor the theory of abandonment of the RTC could divest him of said title. CA held that the two sales could not overlap, it invalidated the January 17, 1996 deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez. CA declared that Cagataos claim of ownership could not be recognized, it nevertheless ruled that his possession could not be disturbed because only the true owner could challenge him for possession of the subject property. Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the CA. CA ruled that the deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez could not be declared null and void, especially because Carlos was not impleaded as a party in the case. In addition, Cagataos possession of the subject property should be respected. Any party, including the respondents, who would like to assert their claim of ownership or a better right over the lot should assert their right in an appropriate action in court against him. Cagatao moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.ISSUE/S: Whether or not the reconstituted TCT in the name of Emmaculada Carlos is void.RULING:Cagataos entire petition revolves around the assertion that the reconstituted TCT No. 12159-A in the name of Carlos was a fake and should have been declared void. CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the existence of a valid Torrens title in the name of Carlos, which has remained unchallenged before the proper courts, has made irrelevant the issue of whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest should have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. The purpose of adopting a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. The Court has repeatedly ruled that a person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and need not inquire further, unless the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry. There has been no showing that Spouses Fernandez were aware of any irregularity in Carlos title that would make them suspicious and cause them to doubt the legitimacy of Carlos claim of ownership, especially because there were no encumbrances annotated on Carlos title. The current possessor, shall remain to be so until such time that his possession is successfully contested by a person with a better right.JAIME P. ADRIANO andLEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC.versusALBERTO LASALA and LOURDES LASALAG.R. No. 197842October 9, 2013MENDOZA, J.:FACTS: petitioner entered into a security service contract with respondents for a period of one year ending on September 25, 1993. respondents received a letter signed by petitioner Jaime P. Adriano (Adriano) reminding them of their non-compliance with the security services agreement, among which were the failure to assign security guards with the required height and educational attainment, and the failure to provide the agreed service vehicle. Respondents relieved and replaced the unqualified personnel with Adrianos recommendees. respondents received another letter reiterating the same instances of non-compliance. They talked to Adriano who replied with an invitation to hold a meeting. Respondents agreed. Adriano mentioned that the differences could only be settled by cooperating with each other. He requested from respondents payment to petitioner Emmanuel Santos, to Captain Perez, and to himself. acting as the bridge in resolving the issues. a series of correspondence between the parties took place, with the petitioners constantly reiterating respondents alleged violations of the service contract. In the last letter, they added another grievance non- payment of the minimum wage. Respondents sought audience before the LT300 Board but to no avail. The Board terminated the contract as voted upon in a meeting. Respondents filed a complaint for damages alleging that LT300 and Adriano illegally terminated their services. RTC ruled in favor of respondents that the agreement could only be terminated for a valid cause; that respondents neither committed any violation nor failed to give security services to LT300; that respondents were not given their right to be heard under the fundamental principle of due process of law; and that respondents were entitled to all the benefits and considerations due them. CA categorized as baseless and flimsy all the allegations thrown against respondents. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petitionISSUES:1.Whether the CA erred in holding the petitioners liable for illegal pre-termination of contract2. Whether the CA erred in awarding temperate damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees to respondents.RULING:1. Respondents did not violate the contract. respondents cannot be faulted for the absorption of personnel who failed to meet the minimum qualifications of at least 2nd year of college and 56 in height. it is ridiculous and unfair to allow the petitioners to use this ground in terminating respondents services when, in truth, they were active participants in the selection and hiring process. The CA was correct in ruling that the petitioners complaints as to the non-provision of service vehicle and non-payment were groundless and flimsy. Evidence on record does not support the position that the minimum wage of the security guards were not being paid. No proof, such as documented complaints filed by the affected employees showing non- compliance, was adduced during the trial. In fact, no untoward incident in the entire duration of the agreement was reported or proven on account of its distance. For lack of material evidence, the Court cannot bestow credence on the petitioners position. petitioners were the ones who committed the breach by their abrupt and groundless termination of the agreement. Although pre- termination was allowed under the contract, the petitioners could not just invoke and exercise the same without a valid and legal ground. petitioners are, thus, reminded that "every person must, in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his duty, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Respondents clearly complied with their part of the obligation under the security services agreement but it appeared that whatever they did, the petitioners were bent on ending it. This exercise by petitioners of their right to pre-terminate the contracted services without a just cause was nothing but a flagrant violation of the contract.2. Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in cases of breach of contract provided that there was fraud or bad faith. The inappropriate dealings of Adriano to acquire financial gain at the expense of respondents, with the approval or acquiescence of the Board; the hiring of unqualified personnel being used as a ground for termination despite the fact that such hiring was upon their recommendation; and the repeated allegations of non-compliance even if respondents had corrected already what were complained of, constituted unjust and dishonest acts schemed by the petitioners to provide an appearance of validity to the termination. These acts manifested petitioners malicious and unjust intent to do away with respondents services. As bad faith attended the termination of the service contract agreement, Court is convinced that the petitioners acted' in bad faith and are, thus, liable for moral damages.FREDERICK VENTURA, MARITES VENTURA-ROXAS, and PHILIP VENTURA versusHEIRS OF SPOUSES EUSTACIO T. ENDAYA and TRINIDAD L. ENDAYA,namely TITUS L. ENDAYA, ENRICO L. ENDAYA and JOSEPHINE ENDAYA - BANTUGG.R. No. 190016October 2, 2013PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:FACTS: On June 29, 1981, Dolores Ventura entered into a Contract to Sell with Sps. Endaya for the purchase of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 392225 and (343392) S-6797 (subject properties), situated in Marian Road II, Marian Park, Paraaque City, Metro Manila.The contract to sell provides that the purchase price of P347,760.00 shall be paid by Dolores in the following manner: (a) downpayment of P103,284.00 upon execution of the contract; and (b) the balance of P244,476.00 within a 15-year period (payment period), plus 12% interest per annum (p.a.) on the outstanding balance and 12% interest p.a. on arrearages. It further provides that all payments made shall be applied in the following order: first, to the reimbursement of real estate taxes and other charges; second, to the interest accrued to the date of payment; third, to the amortization of the principal obligation; and fourth, to the payment of any other accessory obligation subsequently incurred by the owner in favor of the buyer. It likewise imposed upon Dolores the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties, or to reimburse Sps. Endaya for any tax payments made by them, plus 1% interest per month. Upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, Sps. Endaya undertook to execute a final deed of sale and transfer ownership over the same in favor of Dolores.Meanwhile, Dolores was placed in possession of the subject properties and allowed to erect a building thereon. Before the payment period expired, Dolores passed away. Dolores children, Frederick Ventura, Marites Ventura-Roxas, and Philip Ventura, filed before the RTC a Complaint for specific performance, seeking to compel Sps. Endaya to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. The petitioners averred that due to the close friendship between their parents and Sps. Endaya, the latter did not require Dolores to pay the downpayment stated in the contract to sell and, instead, allowed her to pay amounts as her means would permit. The payments were made in cash as well as in kind, and were recorded by Trinidad in a passbook given to Dolores to evidence the receipt of said payments. Sps. Endaya refused to execute the corresponding deed of sale.Sps. Endaya countered that Dolores did not pay the stipulated downpayment and remitted only a total of 22 installments and that After Dolores' death, petitioners no longer remitted any installment. Sps. Endaya pointed out that petitioners complaint for specific performance must fail since the automatic cancellation clause under their contract rendered the same cancelled with Dolores failure to make a downpayment and to faithfully pay the installments. RTC ordered Sps. Endaya to execute a deed of absolute sale and to pay petitioner's attorney's fees and costs of suit. Dissatisfied, Sps. Endaya elevated the matter to the CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. CA observed that aside from the payment of the purchase price and 12% interest p.a. on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell imposed upon petitioners the obligations to pay 12% interest p.a. on the arrears and to reimburse Sps. Endaya the amount of the pertinent real estate taxes due on the subject properties, which the former, however, totally disregarded as shown in their summary of payments.Due to the death of petitioner's counsel, they were unable to file a timely motion for reconsideration and the judgment became final and executory. Titus Endaya, heir of Sps. Endaya, demanded petitioners to vacate the subject properties, which they refused. petitioners filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court to set aside the CA's Decision .ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondents should execute a deed of sale over the subject properties in favor of petitioners.RULING: A thorough review of the records reveals no sufficient reason to warrant the reversal of the CAs Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint for specific performance, which sought to enforce the contract to sell and to compel respondents to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. respondents had no obligation to petitioners to execute a deed of sale over the subject properties. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale. As aptly pointed out by the CA, aside from the payment of the purchase price and interest on the outstanding balance, the contract to sell likewise imposed upon petitioners the obligation to pay the real property taxes over the subject properties as well as interest on the arrears. However, the summary of payments as well as the statement of account submitted by petitioners clearly show that only the payments corresponding to the principal obligation and the interest on the outstanding balance were considered in arriving at the amount of P952,152.00. There is no justifiable reason for this omission. Petitioners indeed failed to comply with all their obligations under the contract to sell and, as such, have no right to enforce the same.EDILBERTO U. VENTURA, JR.versusSPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDAG.R. No. 202932October 23, 2013CARPIO, J.:FACTS: Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on June 9, 1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda , and Socorro had a son, who was the father of petitioner Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf. The Vitas property was covered by TCT No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres.Edilberto claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila.Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda. Esteban passed away on 1997, while Socorro on 1999. In 2000, Leonora Urquila, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning and that the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Also, RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co- owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondentsRULING: No. CA's decision is affirmed. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. The TCT covering the Vitas property shows that it is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase married to Socorro Torres is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Also, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. and the parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban. the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property while Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions. CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S. YBANEZversusSHIRLEY G. QUINONESG.R. No. 175822OCTOBER 23, 2013PERALTA, J.:FACTS: Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City. She fitted four items and decided to purchase a jeans worth P2,098.00. Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store. When she went out of the store, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office to which the Guess employees agreed. When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty. Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinsons was furnished said letter and then conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter. respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for Damages before the RTC against petitioners. Petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time. They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions. As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.RTC dismissed both complaint and counterclaim of the parties. The trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.On appeal, the CA reversed RTC's decision. CA found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the official receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment. Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment. It held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondents employer. Ybaez moved for the reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not CA erred in finding that the letter sent to the Cebu Pacific Office was made to subject herein respondent to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury2. Whether or not CA erred in awarding moral damages and attorneys feesRULING:1. Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Considering that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum. It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing it of the incident but also obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. These statements are outrightly accusatory. It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.2. Respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney's fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant's grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done." They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.