34
ED 167 011 AUTHOR TITLE INSTITUTION` SPANS AGENCY REPORT NO -- PUB DATE NOTE AVAILABLE FRC-- EDRS.PRICE DE -__RIPTORS ABSTRACT rart'ofa series of studies cn higher gdscatiOd. different countries, this essay examinea reit, t ens" 4 weer' universities and govertIments frcm a ccmparitive perspective. TwO ma for themes that appear in the literature are the determinants of increased government control and the extent of that pcwer; six recent books that address these themes are discussed. The most frequently cited determinant of increased government control of universities is system expansion. Newe'r institutions generally lack the power of more established institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni)`, and proliferaktion increases the need. for active coordination- Expansion has also changed intra-university structures in away that stimulates government involvement. DemaUds that universities meetsocial, economic, and political needs beyond the campus also affect government control. Government control over the university has increased as overall, government control Ihs increased in most socio-economic spheres. The extent of goverrment control and patterns of control in different countries are examined. Centralized control; autonomy and academic freedom; the power of, coordinating boards; and control over appointive, academic, and financial policies are considered. (sW) OC BENT RISME ME 0 993 Levy, Daftiel, C. ' Universities and Government The Comparative Politics of.Hiqher Educatton. A Review Essay. Yale Higher Education Research-Group Noticing raper 31. Tile Univ., New Haven, coon,. Inst. for Social and Policy Studies. Lilly Endowment Inc.;.Indienapoli-, Ind. THERG-31 Dec 78 'Higher Education Research -Group,'Instituticwfor Social and Policy. Studies, ,Yale University, 1732 -l-- Station New Haven, CT .06520 M1140.83 HC-A2.06 Plus Postage. College Administration; *Comparative Educe i Educational Coordination; *Federal Regulation; Foreign'Countries4 Government Role; *Government School Relatioftship; *Higher Education: .*Institutiotal Autoney; Literature Reviews; Political,Influences; *Postsecondary Education As a Field of Study; Social Influences * * *** ***************** *4.*****4***** **************** Reproductions supplied by ERRS are the best that can be made * *, from the original document. **************************************** siott***********************

OC BENT RISME · 2014. 2. 11. · Newe'r institutions generally lack the power of more established institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni)`, and proliferaktion increases the

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Page 1: OC BENT RISME · 2014. 2. 11. · Newe'r institutions generally lack the power of more established institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni)`, and proliferaktion increases the

ED 167 011

AUTHORTITLE

INSTITUTION`

SPANS AGENCYREPORT NO --

PUB DATENOTEAVAILABLE FRC--

EDRS.PRICEDE -__RIPTORS

ABSTRACTrart'ofa series of studies cn higher gdscatiOd.

different countries, this essay examinea reit, t ens" 4 weer'universities and govertIments frcm a ccmparitive perspective. TwOma for themes that appear in the literature are the determinants ofincreased government control and the extent of that pcwer; six recentbooks that address these themes are discussed. The most frequentlycited determinant of increased government control of universities issystem expansion. Newe'r institutions generally lack the power of moreestablished institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni)`, andproliferaktion increases the need. for active coordination- Expansionhas also changed intra-university structures in away that stimulatesgovernment involvement. DemaUds that universities meetsocial,economic, and political needs beyond the campus also affectgovernment control. Government control over the university hasincreased as overall, government control Ihs increased in mostsocio-economic spheres. The extent of goverrment control and patternsof control in different countries are examined. Centralized control;autonomy and academic freedom; the power of, coordinating boards; andcontrol over appointive, academic, and financial policies areconsidered. (sW)

OC BENT RISME

ME 0 993

Levy, Daftiel, C. 'Universities and Government The ComparativePolitics of.Hiqher Educatton. A Review Essay. YaleHigher Education Research-Group Noticing raper 31.Tile Univ., New Haven, coon,. Inst. for Social andPolicy Studies.Lilly Endowment Inc.;.Indienapoli-, Ind.THERG-31Dec 78

'Higher Education Research -Group,'InstituticwforSocial and Policy. Studies, ,Yale University, 1732 -l--Station New Haven, CT .06520

M1140.83 HC-A2.06 Plus Postage.College Administration; *Comparative Educe iEducational Coordination; *Federal Regulation;Foreign'Countries4 Government Role; *GovernmentSchool Relatioftship; *Higher Education:.*Institutiotal Autoney; Literature Reviews;Political,Influences; *Postsecondary Education As aField of Study; Social Influences

* * *** ***************** *4.*****4***** ****************Reproductions supplied by ERRS are the best that can be made *

*, from the original document.**************************************** siott***********************

Page 2: OC BENT RISME · 2014. 2. 11. · Newe'r institutions generally lack the power of more established institutions (the size, tradition, or alumni)`, and proliferaktion increases the

w UNIVERSITIES ANDTHE COMPARATIVE P(

HIGHER EDUCATA Rvyiew Ess

YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEWWORKING PAPER

YHERG7-31

2vEirmIssioN10 IWPILODHCV

THISMA TEHIALILAN ILEEN

LILIAN r111'

December 1978,,

*Daniel C. LevyResearch AcsociaHigher Education Research G oUp

i I II I(0NAL frrsoimeEsENr(mmnisoN(SI-N 1E11 fl III(_) ANC)THU VIM: S?; IOM co N fa

r..L/ 9 DEPARTMENT

OF FIEACTN,EDUCATIONwELgANENATIONAL 1NsTITutt of flkoucitnopo

THIS pot:I/MENT HAS BEEN REPO'DOCED EXACTLY- AS, RECEIVED

PROMtHE PERSON

OR ORGANIZATIONORIGIN-

A T 1NG ITPOINTS OF

VIEW OR OF'INIONSSTATED NDNOT NECESSARILY

RERE."EplSENT,

OFF IC DIALNATIONAL/IsiSTITUTE

OriC4TION POSITION

OR POLICY

The research reported in this paper has been part of the work conductedby the Yale Higher Education Research Cronn. It has been supported by ,

research funds from the Lilly Endowment for the comparative study ofacademic organization and governance. The paper will appear as a reviewarticle in_a forthcoming Issue of Comparative Politics. /y

In the interest of fullest possible circulation of information and ideas,the Higher Education Research Group reproduces and distributes theseWorking Papers- at the request of author9Nwhe are affiliated with the

-tGroup. -The views expressed are those of the authors.

Content of this WorkAkg Paper is not for publication or for quotationwithout permission. A list.of the:Working Papers of the Group may beobtained, from the address below.

Highe Education Research GroupInstitution for Social and Policy Studies

Yale University- 1732 Yale Station ,

New Haven, Connecticut 06520

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John 1L7an de Craaff, BOrton R.achmidt, and Donald Wheeler,ln'Seven Nationtil S stefis of1978)

A

erry Haar, The: Pol les o H h-Praeger, 1977)

Dorotea'Furth,likietrdem cwPowery Patterns o

her Educa ion (New York:

dueation in Sraz 1 (New York:

Galo C6mez O. '.Chile de ho -_educ ci6n, et Alra y ciencia (Mexico-city: Ca de Chile,_1976 I

Lawrenee E. Gla4e6x And-ThomasThe National PoliticsMeath, 1976)

Congress- and the Colleges:due on Lexington, Ma D.C.

Vincent ChukweeMeka Ike, University D 14no n in Africa: The N erianExperience -(Ibadan, Nigeria: d University Press., 1976

Dunlop Nowlan, The Politics of :.-her Education: Lathe Academ _n Illinois (Urbana, Illinois: University o19,76)

makers Andlinois,

A .r2iLul--A

The ,myth that the univerY

belated and painful death.

y_

somehoW above politics has'been dying a

However noble the image of a community of scholars

immune from the tainting influences f politics, are increasingly forced

to realize that there is, after all, a politics of higher education. But it

has taken Ark evidence of blatant government involvement, following hard on

the heels of tumultuous intra-university politicization. Scholars have lagged

behind government officials in adequately appreciating the political aspects

of such functions As: training of government leaders, bureaucrats, techno-

crats and professionals, satisfaction of middle -class asOirations, research

relevani,fa'rlevelopment or nationalism _ simply expenditure of substantial

public funds. Even when the politi_ of primary and secondary education began

receiving attention, spurred by community'power studies in the fifties and

sixties, the univer y _ "self - evident virtue, professional dignity and

innocence" protected its sanctuary status from political scientists' -crutiny.1

6

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Notwithstanding imPortant pockets of recent /improvement, political scientists

still. lag behind their. brethren in enonom cd, bistoryc and sociology in the

study:of higher educationon; Even in wha should be our special sub - domain:

"Until 'recently most of the work. on t ei,politite of higher education as

carried out by scholars in educatio Political scientists showed little

3Interest..

One reasonable explanation or this inactivity is the recency of the

dramatic rise in gdvernment co .01. Study did not come until the university

ctramunitY itself perceived _Eminently clear and present danger4

But this

timetable explanation has limited validity. In fact, strong government con-

trol is not so new as co nly portrayed. Emerging literature on government

control in the U.S. to n ignores theAegacy of strong state inVolvement.5

At' any rate, governmen_ involvement is historically more marked in many other

_ .

nations. One-need. ony think of the Napoleonic model, accenting centralized

control:by the ministry, long prominent in,EuroPe and, through export and

adaptation, parts Latin America. S- there is clear need for historical

as well as contem rrary research. Such research might help identify what

sort of government control i_ indeed new, in scope or type.

ThiS essay concerns itself specifically with relations between Universi-

ties and goVertritents, cross-nationally. Thus, it focuses on the least treated,

aspects within the literature. These aspects can be ranked in the following

ascending order of neglect: the politics of education, the politics of

4

higher edUcation, university-government relations, the comparative study'

those relations.- Even by the time we reach, the politics of higher education,

there ip so little study that it would be highly gratuitous to advocate any

particlar substantive ix sue or methodological approach for political scien-

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.Comparativists have scarcely appeared on the scene. This may

bit surprising given the classic perception of the university as an'eminently

international Institution, and, especially, given certain definite cross-

national trends in higher education. But it is quite understandable given the

dearth of work available on nations individually. 7. It follows naturally-

that, "in the comparative analysis of academic power, the state of the art

remains primitive. 118 "Comparison" still generally refers to interstate con-

.parison within the U.S. The best attempts at such Com-parison with state

coordinating or regulatory'boards.9 -hurt of actual comparisons, among nations,

we have mostly edited volumes with highly individual chapters on particular

nations -- and even these focus only partly on politics.10

I.

Ironical the politics of higher education would see to offer a tsxt-,

book example'o the de -rabil ty of comparative analysis.11

in which the efficacy of present practices is often questioned/ one might

First, in an eta

well be interested in policy lessor's from (or for

in both North and South America favor movement toward certain European modes

abroad. Many policy-makers

of central planning. Meanwhile, some European nations are themselves experi-

menting with the perceived virtues of greater system decentralization and

university autonomy! Yet we know very little'about different policy outcomes

across different U.S. state systems, lone different national systems.1 2

A

Second, appreciation and understanding of particular policies is enhanced

when we know how general or idiosyncratic'they are. Which elements of a given

,nation's politics of higher education are attributable to cross-nationil pat-4

terns in highet education and which to particular characteristics of that

nation's politics? A related, third reason for comparative analysis is that

such'analysis is a prerequisite to accurate assessments of the extent

growing or actual government control. cannot appreciate the individual

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trees until we know s- ething,ofAhe forest.

The immediate usefulness of-a review essay on the comperat politics of

higher education, especially for comparativists not expert in th_ subject

ter, lies in synthesizing some significant aspects of a small bUt extremely

diffuse literature. Many works on.higher educhtion in partiCular nations now

devote some section to politics. As interest in the politics of higher educa-

tion gathers,momentum,,it is time to take stock of what has been said inn,

scattered sources. in the hope of structuring present (and even future) research

around salient themes. Two major themes which preoccupy the literature are:

the determinants of increased government power and the extent of`that power.

Special attention is given here to, six very recent books which deal sub-.

stantially with these themes. Pue to the proliferation of works which par-

tially treat university - government relations, amidst the dearth irks

which treat them as their central theme, the idea here is tp establish Impor-

tant cross-national patterns morej*an to review a few "must" books closely.

Inlact, sad to say, there really are no "must" works in_the recent literature.

Thus, after a few summary comments on the si-- books themselves, the essay-

proceeds .directly to an exploration of those patterns.

It would seem petty to belabor the obvious individual weaknesses of the

six works in terms -f socialgcience scholarship.. They are all highly

descriptive. -They rarely achieve systematic analysis or explanation. Even

the few political scientists represented tend to deal somewhat superficially

with central disciplinary tenets and hypotheses. Instead, some of the accounts

by participant-observers,(Nowlan, a former state representative, Gladieux,

legislative assistant, Glimez, a rector -- and then political prisoner

offer a crisp, lively quality. Other accounts draw heavily on secondary

sources. Both types often lapse into tedious detail of formal provisions,

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promulgated or ,simply propoaed, often into, bewildering repetition. Finally,

there is veryilittle.effort at comparison. Only Van d Graaff et al., make.

a syatematic effort. Hut one should not be too harsh on works appearing'

a relative vaedum. We should not slay young. Taken as a group, these

six works fairly representative

our

e somewhat better, e tainly no worse

of a 1stiltimitivelerature. Thus they are most welcome, contributions.

Foisibly the closest we have to, a. "must" work is the Nen-nation study

by Van de Graaff et al. There are seven separate country chapters, giving

gOod coveKage of the industrialized democracies., Ihter_sting contrasts

develop between four centralized systems of-state Control over higher educe-

tion.(France, Italy, Sweden, West Germany) and three less centraliied systems

-Ong land, Japan, and espegially the U.S.). An interactive dynamic emerges

between the conceptually-oriented introductory and (two) concluding chapters

and the detailed country chapters. This imparts a cohesiveness too, often

lacking ,multiple- authorship works. One can truly compare the countries

__analyzed. Unfortunately for our purposes, the authors devote substantialfi

attention to matters of iritra- university policyb but,_happily, these are

often related to university-government affairs.

The toughest country of the seven to analyze -at the national level is

the U.S., owing to the absence of an overarching federarstructure. But

Cladieux and Wolanin, focusing on the Educationfil Amendments Act of,1972,

document the recent ascendency of aderal role. By their own .account

(p. 249), the authors attempt little more than a traditional narrative case-.

study of "fascinating slice of political life." But they do provide a

rare look.at the national policy - making process as it -gains importance.

Still, the preponderance of government authority remains at _te level.

We therefore need more monographs like.Nowlan's on Illinois. 'Nowlan explores

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the role of tate le ature, especially the House Higher Education

Cotimittee. His study is insightful. Unfortunately, neither the Nowlan nor

the Gladieux and Wolanin accounts, due to their focus on the legislative

branch, gives a clear perspective on the overall growth of gOvernment pow

or all its shortcomings, actIolarship on the politics of higher educe-

tion in more developed countries fares well compared to seholarhhip on the

less developed countries. Judging from its title, The politics Of Hi her

14ducation in Brazil seem to offer more of an exception than it does

fact,'silice it actually limits itself largely to admissi,onn policy.- None-

theless, the treader gain6 some unde ,tanding of he role.of the twat' _ratian,

military junta which assumed power, in 1964. A broader, if more subjective,

account of even more repressive government policy in action is found in

G6mez's analysis of Chile since its military coup in 1973. This work give.,

fearful look at,something perhaps apprdaching the "ex _11 of

gpvernment contra in Latin America. It is more difficult to fend n recent

work principally devoted to African university-government relations. Most,

like Ikes,- teally concentrate on, university development or the role of the

university in nation-building. .Within this latter category, h never, one

does get a feel for- bow political issues

Drawing continually on these six and num

impinge on the university.,

other works,

now considers th o principal themes. - -- the growth

essay

nd-extent of government

control over the universities -- selected to 'Nip synthesize the literature

on university government relations.

Determinants

Although the determinants of.increaRed government control obviously vary,

from nation to nation, it is interesting for compnraptiv srs to note

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WIEsble imllaritiea found An very dive.rne settings. The most frelrently

eited'determinant. in sy_tem expansion, Fabulous post-war growth in enrol

ments, in more end less.deieloped nations alike, eroded the traditional

elitist aura of he university. Expanding numbers meant expanding needs,

icing expectations_-- and greater dependence on government funds. The

ivory tower faced crumbled. Skyrocketing costs ended the debate within

many U.S. univerniUieH as to desirability of seeking' greate gOv nment

aid.-3

Responding to the ever greater burden, government officials w rld-.

4wide naturally concluded that more accountability wan'proper compens ion.

1

Concomitantly, many privte sectors declined in proportional size, ns in the

U.S., or became "less private," as in Brazil and Japnii.- The 11-- gov-

ernmenell' irnt set a limit on the amount private universi

WCAM fes and then offered compensating subsidies only if these. univer-

ies loined the nationally - unified

brenkirv,, sharply

15system. The Japar _ government,

h its post-war policies, assumed A major burden for pri-

vats universities' expenses.16

Paradoxica

not only g-

rationales for

nnd this symbolizes the momentum toward government action,

wing scale, but limited car stagnating scale, are

contlool. `African govexnments insist thn.t limited

enrAllments and research capnbi ies make inherited traditions of university

autonomy unaffordable luxuries. Governments which a few years back insisted

that expansion required greater direction now argue that sharp reversals in

enrollment rates, coupled with hard economic times, require imposed prioriti

and economies,. Maurice Kogan's analvnis of the Pnglish evolution from c_otitrol

predicated on growth to control predicated on stagnation, is il.lust,rative.17

Retu rnin; to factors associated with growth, multiplying enrollments

institutional. proliferation, bajedten led to dr

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to increasing government control: There are two Neale ways in which prolifa.

eration is associnte1 with control. First, newer institutions generally

lack the-size, tradition, AlUmni, or, in short, entrenched power hich help

shield more established institutions from external control. Moreover,

disproportionate percentage of theme new institutions helong to the non-

university sector. Where technical Institutes Are created largely out o

government dissatisfaction with the manpower performanre of traditional uni-

ver , and are charged with more "applied" tankn, greater external con-.

"binary system, " -In which polv-trol is a logical consequence, England'

'technics labor un

do, is a good ex

ter government supervision than universities

11 rly, -year institutions or "community

coll n" have been gaining steam throughout the American. Within it doe le

the big surge started in the late fifties, the U.S. had over 1,000

such institution

1

-regional collegft

t 307; of thr high' .ducati 1 enr llment. ChIl

mark one imt r_ont Latin American

foray; Mexico's regional inntltuces, started in 1)4R, hut proliferating

rapidly after 1970, mark

The second honk. reason

increased

coord inat icn . Smelsv

is Eh._

pr(hing

Issue of how t ms change durir-

California) twut led to it

imnulatcd eff rts-st coord

established prestige univers

net

In

iiiilarnertta l

II in tiny lead to

active

filet -.11- func tionalist

finds' that m:_- ducat ion (in

ntional diversification, which, turn, has

20, even f,t,tnrf rrdizat1 nu. Of course, the

resist effort S at external coordination,

especially when sra dnrdizntiopv'er --go e-sharing are Imp] ied. The 1 ue

then hecomea --iher the external nuthor1t

. The State of California so

hag the power to

did, w4tlr Berkeley, the Fast,Afr__ n

o

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9

PpderAt.ton genern ly 111d not with n dn'n Mnkr

or cenntiturnt root

ttt r of ef fart

curb the

Univernit- Co

rtinn within the tinivert ity of finnt Africa).21,

ntnndnrd17ntion, enordinntinn rnnv hr deemed nerennnry

"wnnteful duplication",found in hpont neaumly proUfrrnting

Ti inntn prnvtrlrn an extrrmr exnmplr,22 tlr, n r

mny be n renponne to the romplox Ind rntnhrtine ( ,ndn of nn "ever- ive -n

frig" highrr 7ninc tion ttvrrtrm, lot) nhown Illinois. /Nino, an innt

tut Orollfcrote and ompete against one another, the le,

1t id heyn.eonnidered thrir natural n(:dn in t.hrown in 1""

what

on. Thin en-

coorngn ser sr-t lny of 'atoll vonerdhle innult tIons an the Univers!

thy Central University tl

V

i iv) t11(., 7-lat fonal UniveLnIty of

)1ne7ueir. In num, fnntit

ntl

)nal prol

thIfshed al -wv11 alt thp

enth'i tr !et) It

.1 tin t Itnt Int

Expansion hot'; alno (11,int 1ntra-onlyersIty In a woy that

pit, and Inom of

Lion, oft.rtt 1rat1fur to

.err hln I don yynI around t:onlo pro-

Latin Ami4In

the_hreal-dtpwn or

-fessors or ch.

Inmrnt flivc)Irment. ln

only )1Inft:r pro

anal I fueled demands for m

Wento 11

Y-

orad fro] thi* 'crea !t1 A v.;trrrnm Into which not

rn and hnt nlso p.overnmentn would move. To take

an examply trom another Fryef

the univer- :.tratned

;fits inf on-o kern within

-riphon n on acht:evinp, consennus

In} the innti t'It Lotta l,ntruntury onki

Crosn-notloi Ilv, rrovfrry unf 117,or

ahas -11-eN you

un I vvrq Lv 111! ;t rat lc

as it links perso

tappeninr in I'lexicor

feet 4.'111(71.U:op outside Inter

rIiv problciil, el

hemnylven

24ence .

nniversity worke)

rt1 to power which

's communitIi ical

national labor IcTislation, as

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Probably the mastlballyhpoed aspect o intra-university, politica has

been student attivism. West GerMan students, pursuing iquest popularised

by Argentine students fifty years lier, demanded "co- government" with

strong student nnd'junlor faculty participation. And', around the world,

activism has often spilled over into violencebeyondeampua enclaves. Many

authors have argued that activism shattered the university- government

ffair, d 611ahed the university special aura) and killed the myth O

the university dispnssioned judgment.25

Specific examples

government reactions abound. In many_pntl mentary democraci the student

disorders of the late sixties led directly to sprites of gove _ment legisla-.

ti n.26

Lerman lawn which so recently head promoted autonomy and intro-

university democratization, now (Hideo. 1973) have 'dem nded reduced autonomy

and greater state involvement. Janan ministry of Education (1969) passed

its p law on internal university ove_ -ancj4 .'71-1e Brazilian

junta, which upon its asornsion had responded to student leftism by abolish-

ing the? 4ational -Union of Students, responded to renewed activity (1967-8).

with renewed repression.27

Chile' Univerflity Reform Movement (1967-1973),

which (reflecting turbulent national politicat-events ) involved unprecedented$ u

politicization, would he dealt with similarly by that nation's junta. 28

Thus the ab ontof all student political activity to eradicate the

Mar st eauee Compared to these cases, tr.S. vernment reaction was

minimal. But higher Education Act

dents involved in dlrrulticns, encOmaged many

968, barring aid to stu-

efforts to infrInge on

university authority; though most efforts never were promulgated, they some-

times compelled desired measures by "sending a message.."

Adjuiting the focus a bit, there are certain',basica ra-university-

factors which, while interrelated ithother factors,

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attention as determinants of government control.

Van de Graaff and Furth write of the growing belief in the "politiciza-.

tion ' principle that university performance should be gauged by national

needs and social standards.29

overnments increasingly demand that univer-

sities meet needs beyond the campus. The sanctuary principle is in general

disrepute, nowhere more starkly evidenced than in those Latin American

countries, like Venezuela, where the traditional claim to "extraterritori-

ality" has been suppressed30

Many Third World governments, such as the

Mexican and the Tanzanian, have decreed that all graduates devote some

specified time to social service, decrees which inevitably lead to university

protests and only sometimes (Tanzania) to apnarent government sdecess.31

Those governments, such as the Tanzanian and the Cuban, which demand that

their universities produce "new" or "socialist" citizens, have obvious

rationales for great control. Throughout the world, less intense but still

significantly increasing government pressure is found, again often despite

university resistance, for programs of "lifelong" or "recurrent" or Wen"

(non-classroom) education. Even in the U.S., not generally cited to illustrate

active: government involvement egalitarian social ends, the trend in

clear. Gladieux and Wolanin (p. 95) describe the evolution of legislation

aimed at "equal opportunity" or even "college as a matter of right." And

everybody -is- talking about court pressures for affirmative action or

"reverse'discrimination.

Beyond such social ends, governments worldwide are increasingly pressing

their universities to achieve definite political and economic ends. In

Afr a as Ike shows or Nigeria, the watchword is fon-building.1 2

lint 1

independence, Nigeria's "university colleges" were intimately tied to the

University of London, attempting to replicate cu

13

Alum rather than to adapt

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12-

o

to local exigencies. Dependency continued to manifest itself during nationhood,

as reflected in the predominant role of foreign scholars and advisors. And the

problem of nation-building persisted as regional divisions, reaching tragic pro-'1,J!

portions in the 1967 Civil War, obstructed the junta's centralization policies.

Whatever the frustrations, however, widespread progress toward Africanization

has taken place; the main point here is that it generally came first in the gov-

ernment sector, which then authoritatively demanded it in the university sector.

Similarly, Rudolph a &Rudolph cite the nationalistic pressures aimed at making

Indian higher education "less like an exotic transplant` from an alien culture.

Meanwhile, many Latin American govtrnment- have been insisting on nation-

u33

rebuilding. Cd1mez and Haar detail the application of the Chilean and Brazilian

juntas' counter - revolutionary ideologie_ .to higher education.- The university

must be a spearheading force to create a strong, centralized, technocratic,

"moral" society. Of special interest is the role of Brazil's Superior War

College. Its training not only in warfare but administration, management,

planning -- yes and even social science -- contributed to the military's self-

.

perceived readiness to rule.34

To a lesser extent, national regeneration has

Spurred government involvement in the more developed, nations Also. A common

example is the Natiothil Defense Education Act in response to Sputnik; like-

wise, the English government soon became concerned lest its universities liot

keep scientific pace with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Recently, a number of governments have become more extensively involved

in manpower policy, and therefore in university admiSsions policies. The premium

is on sound "articulation between manpower needs and university career enroll-

men-- Meanwhile, a number of Latin American governments have been impressed

with planning models focused on human capital.

A final cross-national determinant of increased government control has

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received distressingly little treatment in the literature. Perhaps it is too

obvious. Probably the literature simply has not paid due attention to distinctly

political variables. Government control over the university has increased

overall government control has increased in most socioeconomic spheres. The

last few decades have witnessed a secular growth in governments' welfare-state

-----Towers in most. Western industrialized nations. But the secular growth or

govbrnment power in the mdc's pales in comparison to the dramatic groWth of

government power in many ldc's. Ike describes how English advocacy of autonomy

for Africa's newly independent universities was rendered impotent not only byi

the quest for African .zation but, more definitively, by the advent of authoritarian

35 _

one-par y states and then military juntas. The Niger an government moved in

increasingly determined fashion after the 1966 coup and the 1967 Civil War.

Similarly, there is no more prominent ca t& of the growth of government control

over universities in South America than shocking regime transformation.

Expansion, proliferation, politicization, and the ideology of development

doubtless would have stimulated significant changes in control in any case--

but nothing like the repressive grip felt today in Brazil, Chile, Argentina,

Uruguay, __ for that matter, Cuba. It is interesting to note, in tlaar's

and.G6mez's accounts, how highly overall government repression correlates with

repressive universit=y policies. The Brazilian evolution to increased authoritat-

Lianism, 1964-1968, included university purges and depolitiza ion, The Chilean

junta's initial counter - revolutionary wrath focused on the particular personnel,

curricula and universities associated with the'marxist left, while its evolving

repression of middle-class democratic sectors inevitably intensified control over,

for example, the Catholic universities associated with the "recessed" Christian

Democr36Ac Party. How fasclnatUn-, it would be to explore what both Haar's and

G6rez's work are already too dated to do: how government control. may he receding

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as the regimes become somewhat less repressive.

Comparative Extent of Government Control

Fundamentally similar problems emerge in considering the cross-national

extent as well as determinants of increased governmental control. Again

there is a proliferation of scattered information but woefully little systematic

analysis. One searches in vain for criteria or methods by which to assess

relative degrees of autonomy and control. In fart, the literature scarcely

attempts anything approaching an operational definition of autonomy. There is

only ad hoc consideration of different relevant issues. Consequently, there is

a decided lack of objectively comparable data. Thus it is understandable that

the literature has generally refrained from attempting cross-national assessments.

But it is also lamentable. Only very broad statements about high or low autonomy

are possible. Invidious ordinal ranking aside, we can rarely compare different

patterns of government control. A reading of Ike on Nigeria and Naar on Brazil,

for example, allows us to compare patterns only where there are infrequent

coincident emphases. What is more distrubing is that a reading of Ike

Nigeria and, for example, Okafor on Nigeria, produces so little common grqund.37

In fact, Okafor seems to imply a wider range of government control -- despite

the greater recency of Ike's account, covering years in which the government's

role has-expanded.

Again, the unusual value of the Van de Craaff et al. study is evident.

khile it does not allow for any definite one-seven national ranking, it does

give us certain grounds for distinguishing cases of relatively greater and lesser

control, and, more importantly, for comparing patterns of control. The authors

establish- floral and specific differences between "statist" political

educational -ystems and the more autonomous ones. A good deal of diverse

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literature tends to support their broad conclusions. Traditional respect for

autonomy in England and the fJ.S. certainly contrasts with continental faith

in centralized administrative planning. Similarly, the U.S. or even Japanese

,emphasis on vibrant private sectors finds no parallel ifi.the continental bias

for higher education 4s an in egral part of the public welfare sector. Excepting

only West Germany's Land strati es, those European nations have concentrated

- government power at the national level. Excepting,,to some extent, Brazil and

Mexico, the same is true of Latin America. The contrast again is sharp` to th4'

U.S., perhaps even sharper to Canada.3S

And as in soymany policy areas, the

plural checks and balances among U.S. branches of government ,impose limits on

government control which appear, quite unusual in cross-national perspective.

But numerous quaiifications,-to these broad comparisons have now led some

scholars to speculate, about "cnnvergence"9 syst'emsjwith centralized control

experiment with autonomy, while more autonomous ones move toward the "Swedish

model." Much attention has focused on France's 1968 "Orientation Law,"

ostensibly geared to increase institutional initiative and autonomy, and on

40Sweden's 1977 Reform as a "far-reaching attempt to decentralize authority.'

Perhaps there is some relevancehere to the genet 1 hypothesis, suggested by-

Huntington, and others, that certain political systems which had previously

pursued centralized power in order to harness energies will consider partial

decentralization in order to achieve the flexibility necessary to cope with

increasing complexities.41 But even after a full decade, decentralization in

French higher education is probably not fundamental.42

if cross-national

convergence is occurring, it still seems destined to take place far closer to

the government control pole than to a median point.

A particularly dramatic, and much-noted, manifestation of increased

government control over universities (at least in the previously less centralized

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tlystemS) is the growing power of coordinating boards. The' literdture's classic

case is Great Britain's University Grants Committee (UGC). Originally established

as a buffer between the univerAties and the government, a mechansim by which

external coordination could be imposed by professional peers cognizant of

government needs 4it could forestall imposition by government officials themselves.

There is, however, growing despair in academic circles that the UGC is evolving

into that most sinister of all institutional creatures -- a government bureau.

"It appears to many that the UGC now merely puts an acceptable face. upon a

broad policy decided In WhitehalL"4 3

This fate would repTesent a particularly

dire symbol for the-cause of university autonomy because the UGC has been so

widely heralded as an alternative to government control.

6 clearest cases of UGC institutional transference naturally involve

commonwealth countries. Nigeria established a National Universities Commission

in 1962. In the ensuing decade government representation increased and the

Commission's powers expanded; Canada and Australia face similar prospects for

their UGC-like buffers, found at the provincial level.44

Despite important

limits qn its power, India's UGC "is by far the most important influence at

the national level on higher education."45

-B t even the U.S. seems to be

turning its back on itsycherished pluralist beliefs in competition among

....;I, ,146

1.--..autonomous institutions as it "closes the f ontier There is a definite___

evolution of.state

coo dilating boards from advisory, to regulatory bodies.

\. ,

Also remarkable is the hdvent of stroag coordinating boards in nations, such

47as Brazil and Chlle", with histories of extreme isolation among universities.

Brazil's Federal Education Council, comprised of twenty-four members nominated

by the President, has broad powers over:academic policy. The Chilean junta

has tried hard to transform the previously ineffective Council of Rectors into

a potent coordinating body. New boards in less repressive Latin American

1

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setti

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have followed less certain trajectoriet.48

And there are some real

efforts, in many nations, at voluntary inter-university coordination to stall

the government offensive.

Turning more specifically to what governments have actually come to

control, the literature is especially unorganized. There are hopelessly ad hoc

references to control over some particular aspect here, some partiCular aspect

there. It seems useful, tentativelyat least, to categorize the major issues

in academic governance according to three broad policy areas. Appointive,

academic, and financial policies appear to fom pretty inclusive, if not so

mutually- exclusive, categories for a range of_issnes diffusely discussed in

the literature.

The appointive category deals mostly with the selection of students,

professors and administrators. Of these, no single issue has attracted as

much attention as student admission, especially in those democracies with nationally-,

based, rather than university baked, policies. The continental tradition of

fairly open admissions and career choice for secondary-School graduates has

largely given way to "government-determined enrollment capacities and controlled

access and admissions."49

The Swedish government has gone furthest toward

explicit linking of access to manpower policies. Certain other systems are

becoming increasingly nationalized, government-style. In Japan, recent laws

limit admissions to provincial universities and impose a stand _dized entrance.

exam for national universities. Similarly, as Haar analyzes in detail (pp. 65-

149), Brazil has moved from university exams to a single nationally-standardized

exam. Perhaps the most striking example of government control over access

policy, found in Brazil or especially Chile, is the emphasis on restrictive

political-ideological criteria. Of course, Cuba now has nearly two decades of

,50experience with such criteria, its adaptation of "red and expert.'

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With certain modifications; many of these comparisons seem to hold for

the hiring (and firing) of professors. Whereas .professors are hired as

employees of the national civil service in the centralized systems, they are

hired as employees of the individual universities in the less centralized.

systems. Again certain authoritarian' cases show the extreme pattern of

strong government intervention- according to highly politicized criteria But,

judging from the Brazilian case, professorial appointments still usually

emain within the university's purvie

Not so

51

th administrative appointments. Most authoritarian governments

control these very carefully. Each of Chile's eight universit ectors is a

military officer: In a vivid illustration of blunt authoritarian coercion, a

Nigerian military governor, lacking the constitutional means to fire a univer

sity vice-chancellor (chief executive simply called him into his office and

"showed" him his gun; the vice-chancellor resigned.52

Even in the U.S. there

is considerable government representation on public university governing

boards, let alone on statewide coordinating boards.

Three related cross - national hypothese merit suggestion here. The first

that governments generally exert stronger control over important adMinistra0.1

tive appointments than over ongoing academic policy. By vesting authority,in

officials they can.trust, governments need not attempt to deal with the com-

plexities of specialized academic tasks. The second is that governments

insist on direct control over appointments or ongoing governance. Thus one

author, perhaps excessively influenced by the Swedish case, goes so far as to

suggest an inverse relationship between the two concerns53

The third hypo-

thesis is that strong university administrations are inversely related to

strong ministerial rule. Thus U.S. and English universities head of govern-

.\

ment involvement by lodging responsible, coordinating, bureaucratic authority

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in university- authorities -- precisely 'the,opposite of European practice,

where universities e controlled simultaneously by individual "chairs" and

national ministries,.54 Perhaps it in this context 4that recent French and

West German attempts to strengthen university rectors accompany attempts to

lessen ministerial control. Of course, as our authoritarian cases show most

clearly, strong university-wide authority may go hand-in-hand with strong

government authority. There is a pronounced need for furtl3er investigation

of these three hypotheses relating appointments and ongoing academic auto

The category of academic autonomy could encompass academic freedom from

external control, as well as university authprity over degree nting, cur-

riculum, careers and the like. Academic freedom warrants somewhat special

analysis, however, because it does not necessarily constitute a part of insti-

tutional autonomy. In'many West European nations, an enviable degree of

Academic freedom of individual thought and expression traditionally has been

55coupled with considerable ministerial control over institutional policies.-

Only at certain points does the distinction between the concepts of academic

freedom and institutional autonomy actually blur to the point where a viola-

-ion of one is a serious violation of the other. For example, ministerially-

imposed standardized curricula in France and Italy necessarily restrict

individual professors' freedom.

'Academic_freedom and institutional autonomy over - academic policy correlate

more strongly both in authoritarian settings, where each is limited, and in

less ministerially - oriented democracies, where each'is substantial. Our

authoritarian cases show clear.violations of one which simultaneously violate

ther. Brazil's "cornerstone").Z68 Reform abolishes student and professor

dissent, imposes stiff penalties for acts of subversion, and demands int

university reorganization with increased government regulatioh of curriculum

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and course con ent.--56

Thus, for example, the junta determines disciplinary

,frenrollments, eliminating "marxist" or 'superfluous courses, especially in

the social sciences, and substituting courses consistent with its "national

!ecuricy" doctrine. The general blueprint has been xeroxedC? export to

Chip little lost in handling or translation.

-So it is only in certain democracies, those where education ministries

do not play very strong roles in higher educati4

that one finds relatively.;

high levels of both individual academic freedom and institutional autonomy,

ove academic affairs. Universities usually set academic policy, while aca-

demic freedom has been relatively respected, when assessed, in cross-national

perspective. (This is not to overlook significant abuses, not Only by govern-

ments but by other extra-university powers such as private donors, profes-

sional associations or external examiners.)

Btit even in these less ministerially-oriented democracies, rising govern--

went intervention chips away at institutional autonomy over academic affa

UGC guidelines ongly favor" careers like computer sciences while they

57Kogan writ,es that the UGC"strongly discourage" careers like architec.ure

)imposes disciplinary distributions by n within national percentages

58fixed by the ministry. If central cont_o over disciplinary choice and

human regourCes emerges as one of the most salient manifestations of rising

government control, the comparatively mihimal government role in the U.S.

probably reflects on the relative strength of the market system.59

Finally, we may speak of financial policy. No other realm of government

control see

cial

to quantit

ticularly

ms so omnipotent. And yet, despite the fact that certain finan-r--

rs potentially :Lep(' themselves more than other governance matters

Ave empirical analysis, there is less literature on them. Par-

iking is the lack of study on the political ramifications

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,different forms of financing. Tuitions, 'loans and subsidies are more often

treated as economic or equity issues. But even before one considers the

ifications of who pays, the:very question of who determines who pays

merits gfeater attention than it ,has received. Within Latin America, for

example, it would be interesting to compare the dramatic government impo

tion of tuition in Chile to the moderate -overnment actions in Brazil and

Colombia, to the relative failure in Mexico.60

For those cases in'which government subsidies sustain the universities,

the literature's widespread )tion is that funding means control. The

correlation seems especially clear -cut for the more authoritarian regimes

and the state systems of the continent.

federal government did not hesitate to

rites (p. 163): '"In sum, the

e both sanctions, and rewards.

to pursue its policy goals." European ministries have generally involved.

themselves dired-ly in line-budgeting, even to

pre-auditing expenditures.

even in ministerial systems,

supposed.61

Some of the European countries are tentatively moving toward

treme, in France, of ,'

is not clear that government funding,

ually leads to the de-- of control common

greater autonomy over; -distribution at, the lower levels of the governance

structure and for example, the French Treasury now demands only post-

auditing.62

There-are, however, sure signs of increasing government financial control

in the previously more autonomous systems. Kogan notes the portance of the

UGC's shift away from Treasury, "notoriously bad at con lling anythini

directly," to Education, where "there i4 now hardly a category of universityx.

n63' _expendituye is not conditioned by VGC:prescrin ls. Similar comm 1 s

coult-rbe-m1(_ many of the UGC offspring. And V. S. governments

insist on significantly increased financial ov lght. Even the

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government, via the GAO, has gained the authority to assess the cost-,

64effectiveness of programs it finances.

Still, we do not in fact know the degree and type of control accompany-

ing government financing. Surely there is abundant, and growing, evidence

of a correlation. At the extreme, universities in Communist suf

great external control with their 1007 government financing, while certain

private universities in Mexico and the U.S. suffer little Such control in

iving only token,

versities rec

universities derive 75% of their income f rom the governnie

But

dramatic example.. which defy the as,umed correlation. The nos

thin a single nation, South Africa' black nni-

ve government financing while the more auttnomous white

65

he who pays the piper n calls the tune, there arc also

governments in South America have ent=thcir prop

tionc as

a -1- Ian

Tonal financial contrihn-

N substantially increase their control. Ilenwhile, national uni-

versities in countries like Mexico and Venezuela maintain relatively high

levels of autonomy despite nearly total dependence on government funds. Many

Latin Americans wouid (lisp( _ the plural logic, so self-evi. ent to most

North Ameri and repeatedly sustained- to CoMmission and,

that matter, endo by tog Robbins C.nmmittee on Higher Education,

fjtt

-'heIps ire.nre intitnt ant iomv. The/

fie insfoati that multiplicity may lead to duplicity. l e sponttiblltty is

that a mul iplicity

not clearly fixed. Each of the donors can he fickle, evasive or punitive.

Thus, if funding necessarily implie.s some

clear that a linear correlat n holds. Even

.4% amol it is not at n11

ramont givIiu the

university 's Income id more intineneo than giving 207, tt doe"

not follow that Bove _amen e 1 (1 the most

correlations still womld not prove ionships.

urthermor in ar

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ess Trove

_Focusing as it does on the growth of government power, -merging liter

tore on the politics of higher education in different nations presents a

bleak picture for university autonomy. It sugges s powerful explanations or

i c ased government cont and compellin manifestations of_ it. Un.for

natelv, however, it ha devoted far ton little attention to the limits to this

1. A tair overview of current It ra nvev's the impre don of an

alm n xornb

gover- n

of government power, a one-way dynamic: what the

to the univeraltv. Dig ing deeper i__

i however . one finds intriguing

limited take an example discussed above: Institutional proliferation

the subject mat

government po

clearly .ti,nttlatesa Increased efforts; at artive coordination, but by increasing

'Ins'; at and complexi

coord nation. 1;11

_future reeareh.

Difficult to tl

cool d votively al

; worth au

pro{litce girt ric rtionately

a few relevant hyp theses

1, as ;y::, wouli he a range of political citltut

var 1 that are tb, difinse effects of cherished tradi t ions; of autonomy

(fat ; Amer 1 fear of

In naual rather than imposed doe

ii 11 1 (U.!;. ), or beliefs

n °tn.ik ing (Japan Wht II;

d fl ont entra at ion within the gov Inmca

ectora? f;01-1 government , vane(' - ti

nc,torin.n,ly inefficient ministries, marshal the capa

coot

!IV

r from vibrant, private

developed With

necessary for

what extent are ,rsIties s..tfc, and their lobbiv

few governments chit hope to cope whit alit' spec la I f: t =d lot ot-

to ttion and taaks th it are part and par

lio ally poworfnl the yersity's°J1

acatdenilc enterprise

.nally middle °c lass)

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24--

constituency of students, professors, and alumni?.7-1 Are these privileged

eonstituencies and specialized tasks especially conducive to cooperative,

even "corporatist," rather than subordinate, relations with government

elites?72

:flow much strength does the university derive from its vital role

not only in primary funttiqns like scientific research, but secondary ones

like political trceeruttp nt?73

To what -Xtent,do all the above factors add

up to greatly iodyt-,

in sed control t

-y strength which. at leaSt slows government efforts at

incremental pace?74

of the reason that the emerging 1 eratureon university-government

relations has neglected inherent university strengths is that it has ectiticett-

NI disproportionately on "recent reforms" and changes. The sobering

is that we cannot properly contemplate changes until we understand what

is changing. The literature readily demonstrates that government power,

cross-nationally, is on the rise significantly so. But a review of works,

on different nations also sensitizes us to

this literature -- its laundry list approaer-to explaining the growth of

government control, its ad hoc assessments of the extent of that control,

ively primitive state of

and, of course,

4-

of common la

cove_ra;e of the field. It still lacks the sort

methods, and historical and comparative data put

rvahle. trends into persepetive.- Whatever constraints all this imposes

on studies of particular tions, it imposes far greater constraints on cross-

national analysis.

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25

rOOTNCri5

1`Step B.miley, Eaducation lnterestGr's Capitol

Olaohi American Coutc11 on Education, 1975) , 1-2; Samuel CoveAnd Barbara Whiteside. Solomon, "'The Politics of llighet Education: ABiblio graphic Essay ,",, ..Tournal o f duEcati on 34 , no. 4 (1968) , PP. 181-182 ; Sluntsel Ooye. and Carol Everly Floyd, 'Research on Higher EducationAdministration, and Tolicy A Uneven Report," Public Adrninistr on Rev35, no . 1 (975) p 112_ jloo see'Terr-y Hartle , "Public ;Policy p.nd HigherEducat:itiet;" Public ldrrrin st ratfign evict./ 37, rio. 2 (1977), pp. 196-201.

2 Burton R.. ,C lark and Ted 1, K. yea un, Aca emi c ower in the, United Sta(Washingt on, t .0 The Arne rican As sociati for Higher ducation, 1976pp. 35 -36 .

G. 5, lama The ofiof Queensland, 1974 PP 62-6

-matt on (Queensland, Australia : University

Lauri R . King, "I h Wash in T.eht?-1stii _her EducationLocingto ass, D. C. Heath, 1975) , 17.

J ohr S 3 j hi teh cad,Yale Univers 19 73

ell e and St ate (New Haven :

6 Although th:.Es essay co1Icentrat es on the government role, it should beclear than there are other iMPtOr elcternal actors impinging on. autonomy.Arnong the very best hooks or intra-uni-versity 2overnance is Graeme Moodieand lowland lustace, Power and Are thori twin Br t i sh Uri five rs itien (London:Geor2e Allen and twin Lt d. , 1974 ). t Leon. Epstein analyzes "universitygovernmene broadly ; a rare attempt by a- political scientist. Governingthe1.Inivessi.Ay (San Francisco; Josney-Bass 1974 ), pP . 1 -2. Especially inLatin America, most -work liar facuee: on student p of tics, sometimes relatedto national politics . See, for eiarnple, the review article by Danl. Thomasand fielard Craig " Student DiOSQilt in La tire, kEner ica: .Toward a ComparativeAnalysis, Latin American Research Itcvi is 0, rio. 1 (1973), pp. 71-96.

7 _The tins t not ed though ncir dated, exception is Robert Berdahl' s BritishUniversAti e A t he _State lerke2ey : University of California Press, 1959). Of uriusually 14 gh gtal ty , and of fering cogent in.tranational comparisons, isEd<ucetion and n Tad aF (Cani1ridgc, Mass.: Harvard UniversityProse, 197 2) Tdited ley Susame 1-loe bet [ZIA° 1pla and Lloyd 1. Rudolph, thisvolurne def ie rnan;, of my general cr1 tioisns of the literature.

Burton R. Ciarlo, ice.derriie er 1 nal (Chicago : University of Chicago,1977) , p. 16S.

For maniple, Robert lerdabl, State Cootdication(Washingtotl, D. C. Arne -tic an co until on Educati on, 1971) ; Kenneth Mortimerand T. R. NeConvell, il-J2LtIgi Au thorityElkstlyely= (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978). See also lyrnan Clenr:y mparative work on financing. For

27

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example, StateFityketing_for Higher Education: _IntersgentyConfAipt 044Consensus (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Educe.--ton, University of:California, 1976). A rare attempt at broader basedinterstate comparison riot surprisingly reads as (four) rather interesting.cases stapled together. The papers, originally presented at the annual,Midwest Political Science Association meetings in 1971 and 1972 appear inJoseph Tucker, "The Politics of Public Higher Education," AAUP_ Ballatin?_

vol. 59 (1973), pp. 286-323.

10Philip Aitbach, ed., University- Reform (Cambridge, Mass. Schenkman,

1974); Barbara Burn et al., Hi her Education in Nine Countries (New York:

McGraw Hill, 1971); James Perkins, ed., EkghtTI4astioxiA4tonon-to Systems (Nev York: International Council for Educational Development,1972); Paul Seabury, Universities of the Western World (New York: The Free

Press, 1975). Recently, the International Council for Educational Developmentproduced'a twelvenation study, §yk5E111Lliwia-_,ILm, 1978. The

OECD produces Reviews of National Policies for Education. Journals mostlikely to carry articles on the comparative politics of higher educationinclude Minerva, Highar_Educatian, and Com arative Education Review. Fora general compilation of citations see Robert Derdahl and Ceofge AltomaTe,CeM arative Higher Education: Sources of Information (New York: InternationalCouncil on Educational Develppment,-Occaaional Paper no. 4, 1972). For

sources on developing nations see Philip-Altbach and David Kelley, Higher_Education in Developing Countries: A SelectedBihliagraphy096971974rTYTiecc:Praeger, 1974).

11A disarmingly succinct rationale for comparative analysis is found in

Charles Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis,"in W. D. Gwyn and C. C. Edwards, eds., periastlyt_qLiblicPolic-Makin (New Orleans: Tulane University;' 1975), pp. 240-Al.

14

12On the 11-.S.: Cove and Floyd, p. 116.

13Glad eux and Wolanin, p. 22.

RudolphR and Rudolph, The Political System and the EduCation System4,An Analysis of Their Interaction," in Rudolph and Rudolph, P. 29.

15I -pp.-- 92, 160-63.

16Do n ald Wheeler, "Japan," in Van de Graaff et al., P. 143. Also see'

T. J. Pempel, "The Politics of Enrollment Expansion

nJapanese Universities,'

Journal of As _dies 33, no. 1 (November 1973), 67-86.

17Maurice Kogan, Educational_ 13.2119T7MSkin (Hamden, CT: George Allen and

Dnw,in, Ltd. 1975 ) , pp. 26-44.

18Hugh Livingstone, The Universit) An orianizationalAnalyais (Glasgow:

Mackie, 1974), p. 105; Van de Graaff, "Great Britain;" in Van de Graaff,p. 86. On France University Institutes of Technology see John Van de Graaff,

28

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"The F'olitic8 of Innovation in French higher Edu ation," Piper Education,no. 5: (1976), pp. 189210. Of course some institutes elsewhere are morecontrolled by private than government sectors.

19Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 19.

20Neil" J. Smelser, "Growth, Structural Change, and Conflict in California

VulAic Higher Education, 1950-1970,'" in ELIblicKbe-Ed,ed. Smelser and Gabriel Almond (Berkeley: University of California, 1974)9,

9-141.

Southall, Feder he_ EduKarst African Publishing flous 1974

22 ,Gomez, PP. 55-59.

obi:

23Nowlan, p: 64; Daniel Levy, "Government Efforts to Cope with Giantism,"

Lors.421111gicsiti-herEplement, #324 (1978); Orlando Albornoz,"Higher Education and the Politics of Development in Venezuela," Journalof Interame can Studies and world Affairs 19, no. 3 (1977), PP. 302711.

24eler, pp. 135-38.

P125

26

-Glad eux and Wolanin, p. 26; Nowlan, p. 76; King, p. Kogan, p. 198.

Van de Craaff et al., passim. The definitive work should be HansDaalder, ed., i_,FiLlatpid Universitie(forthcoming).

27Haar , pp. 64-65.

2Gilmez, pp. 47-49.

29: "Introduction," Van de Craaff, p. 10.

30 John Har,son,

America (Austin: Univers of Texas, n.d.).

31Southall, pp. 113-20.

32Ike, pp. 221-32; Southall, 112; Marshall Murphree, "Universalism,

Particularism and Academic Freedom," pp. 103-107 and Leonard Thompson,"Seine Problems of Southern Aftican Universities," pp. 282-84; in The Futureof the UniELt]E, ed. U. W. Van der Merwe and David Walsh (Cape Town:David Philip, 1977); Pierre 1. van den Berghe, Power and Privil!gf_2tanAfrican University (Cambridge, .Hass.: Schenkman, 1973), pp. ,28 -32 and,pass M;Eric Ashby, African Universities and Western Tradition (London: OxfordUniversity, 1964); T. esu u, ed., Creatin fire African Univ :si

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(Ibadan Oxford University Press, 1973). Also see Eric Ashby, Bniversttiesl:British,- Indian, African (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1066)$'and James Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development: (Princeton, ,s

N. J.: PrincetOn University, 1965),

33Rudolph and Rudolph . 5.

Haari.25-26. For more on the political role of War Colleges see.Alfred Stepan and Luigi:Einaudi, Latin American instijitional Development(Santa Monica: Rand4 1971). On higher education and national developmentin democratic SouthtAmerica, see Kalman Silvert and:Leonard Reissman,Education Class and' Nation: The Ex erience of Chile and Venezuela (NewYork: Elsevier, 1976)1 Patricia Weiss Fagen Chilean_ veraitiea:Problems of Autonomy and Dependence Oeverly Hills: Sage ProfessionalPapers in Cpmparative Politics 01 04& 1973); Orlando Albornoz, !IiigherEducation," pp. 291-314.

35Ike, p. 206, and pp 204-220, assim.

36 ,

'O6Triez, pp. 78 -89. On the relationship between university andgovernhent under a far milder authoritarian regime see Daniel Levy,"University.Autonomy and Regime Authoritarianism: The Case of the'NationalUniversity of Mexico," Latin American Research Review 14, no. 3 (1979,-forthcoming).

37Nduka Okaior, The Development Univ ondon:

Camelot Press, 1971).

38On Canada: Murray Ross, The University: The AnatomyofACademe (New

York: McGraw Hill, 1976); Commigsion on the Relations Between Universitiesand Governments, The University, Society and Government (Ottawa: Universityof Ottawa, J970); William Mansfield Cooper, Governments and the University(Toronto: Macmillan, 1966).

39James Perk ns, "The Future of the Univer- y," in Perkin , 301.

ADRune Fremfors, "Public Policies for Institutional Governance in Prance,

Sweden anti the United Kingdom," paper prepared for,rhe Joint ECPR/IMHEWorkshop on "University Governance: Policies, Problems and Performance,May 1978, Paris, p. 7.

41SamuelS Huntington, Political Orde

Yale University, 1968), p. 138.(New Haven:

42An atypically harsh view on the lack of change appears in Raymond

Boudon, "The:French University Since ;968," Comparative:Politics 10,

no. 1(1978)', pp. 89-120,', A survey of attitudes is presented in Alain.Bienayme: lystems of Higher Education: France (New York; InternationalCO-melt for Educational Development, 1978).

0

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43% Livingstone, 108..

44Ike, pp. 205, 216; Ros 232; Robert McCraig., ed., Policy And Planning

in Higher Education (Queensl d, Australia: University of Queensland, 1973).

45Rudolph and Rudolph, p.

46

47Haar, p. 38; G6mez,1 '5455.

48George R. Waggoner, "University Autonomy and Natibnal Planning in

Latin AMerica," ReVista/Reviewinteramericana 7, no. 1 (1977), pp. 125-27.Possibly the principle attempt to adapt the UGC form is Colombia's NationalUniversity Fund. 'See Richard Pelczar, "University Reform in Latin America:The Case of Colombia," in Altbach, ed., University Reform, pp. 43-52;John J. Bailey, "Government and Educational Policy in Colombia 1957-1968,"Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972.

F.

Berdahl, Statewide,

49Dietrich Coldschmidt, "Systems of Higher Education," in Van Graaff

et al., p. 155.

50A distinctly anti - Revolution account is given by Luis Boza Domfnquez

La situaci6n universitaria en Cuba (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Peel._ co,S.A., n.d.).

51Haar, p.

52Ike, p. 175.

53Jan-Erik Lane, "University Autonomy--A New Analysis," a. working paper

of the Center for Administrative Studies, Ume& University (1977), p. 46.Perhaps the second hypothesis seems more applicablethan the- first. toEuropean countries where rectors haVe'been selected by university faculties,while ministerial control over e.g., curriculum has been substantial.But,ene would have to probe the role of "out-- stationed" administrative officialsof the ministry.

54 Burton R. Clark, "Academic Power:_. Concepts, -odes, and Perspectivesin Van de Graaff at al., pp. 174-75:

55Jack Embling,1A Fresh LOok at' Hl .,her Educationutopean--Implications

oftheCareCorprmissionReorts (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1974), pp. 99-100.

56Haar p. 67.

57Embling, p.

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58,gan, p. 200.

59' Joseph Ben-David, Trends in Amer=ican Higher Educationof Chicago, 1972).

60 C6mez,p0. 5-51, 59-68; Haar, pp. 60-62, 191; Daniel Levy, "Theolitical,Struggle over Tuition in Mexico," Revista del Centro de E-udiosEducativoa (forthcoming).

61Burton, R. Clark, Academic Power in Italy, P. 50.

62Jacques Fotherand, "Policy Formation and Change in Gaullist France:

1968 Orientation Act of Higher Education," Comparative Politics 8, no. 1(1975), p. 60.

63 Kogan, pp. 196-97.

64Gladieux and Wolanin, p. 229

65Academic-Freedom Committee The teen Uniyersities in outh__Africa and

Academic Freedom (Cape Town: Jute, 1974), p. x.

66Daniel Levy, "Limits on Government's Financial Control of the University:

Mexico," working paper published by the Institution for :So ial and PolicyStudier, Yale University. (1977), PP. 1 -3 and passim.

67See, for example, Margaret Ann Goodman, "The Politica Role of t14

University in Latin America:" Comparative Politics 5, n 2 (1973), pp. 279-92; Hein-z Eulau and H. Quinley, 'State Officials and Hi her Education _(NewYork: McGraw Hill, 1970); Wheeler, pp. 1357.38.

68See, for example, Carnegie Commission, The Capitol and the CaTpus NeW

.York: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp. 11-15,-63-66.mr

69See, for example, Guy Benveniste

-exiccu (New York: Praeger, 1970).

70

71See,

in,Elites(London:

for example, No-len, pp. 14-15.

r example,'Dgrcy Ribeiro, "Universities and Social Development,"n Latin America; edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Sopari

Oxford University, 1967), pp.-343-381,

Plannin in

72See, for example, Dietrich Goldschmidt, "Sweden,' in Van de Graaff at

'al., pp'. 69-74. ,

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73See for example, Joel D. Harkin, An African Dilemma: University

Students Develo ment and Politics in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda (Nairobi:d University, 1975

,

74 See, for Jacques Fbmerand's thesis, in "Policy For-on incrementalism in policy7making in French higher education.

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INSTITUTION FOR SOCIAL AND POLICY 'STUDIES"

The mission of the Institution for Social andforicy Studies (ISPS) isto encourage and undertake multidisciplinary, research and educa-tion. The ISPS is oriented to the exploration of social oblems ratherthan to the refinement of discipline-based methodolNyAn recentyears, ISPS research hes focused on the problems of the city, educ-tion, health service delivery; and on the modeling of social systems.Currently, research is also being d el: ed on criminal justice, goy-einmyrilal reform, environment, incom_ distribution, aging, the policy,making process, and value problemViri public policy. ISPS is not a_Consulting organization but an instrument for enriching the socialsciences and relate disciplines in the University.

Higher Education Research GroupInstitutionlor Social and Policy Studies1732 Yale Station (36 Mansfield Street)Now Haven, Connecticut 06520