Observing the 2006 Nicaragua Elections (PDF)

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Observing the 2006Nicaragua Elections

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OBSERVING THE 2006NICARAGUA ELECTIONS

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THE CARTER CENTER

OBSERVING THE 2006 NICARAGUA ELECTIONS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Mission Delegation and Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

The Pre-election Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Election Day and Its Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

A. Invitation to Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

B. Role of Long-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

C. Strategic Deployment of Short-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

D. Representative Deployment of Short-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

E. List of Short-Term Deployment Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

F. Observation Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

G. Carter Center Public Statements and Press Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

The Carter Center at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90

CONTENTS

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FOREWORD

The Carter Center has monitored national elec-tions in Nicaragua four times, beginning in1990. Throughout the past 16 years, we have

sought to ensure that Nicaraguans and the internation-al community were provided with accurate informationabout the quality of the elections. Carter Centerobservers and staff tracked the technical preparationsand the electoral campaigns, observed the vote processand count, and provided follow-up visits to monitorelectoral justice and the inauguration of new officials.We contributed our knowledge, suggesting to electionauthorities, political parties, and civil society ways inwhich the election process could be improved.

This report is presented in the same constructivespirit. It documents the Center’s observation of theelection process beginning in January 2006, proceed-ing through the March regional elections on theAtlantic Coast, the verification of the voter list inJune, the campaigning that began in August, and theNovember elections. It highlights the work of our long-term regional coordinators and election delegation aswell as the project direction provided by the AmericasProgram staff. I am grateful for the leadership provid-ed to the mission by the former president of Peru,Alejandro Toledo, and former president of Panama,Nicolás Ardito Barletta, who accompanied me inNicaragua and helped negotiate some of the difficul-ties that might otherwise have marred this goodelection.

Nicaragua entered 2006 already exhausted from anine-month political crisis, during which the executiveand legislative branches recognized two different ver-sions of the constitution. The Friends of theDemocratic Charter, a group of former leaders andcabinet ministers organized through The CarterCenter, assisted by sending two fact-finding missions toNicaragua and supporting the Organization ofAmerican States in facilitating a solution to theimpasse. Ultimately it was agreed that the next legisla-

ture, which was to be elected in November 2006,would decide whether to implement constitutionalreform. Nicaraguans from diverse ideological view-points urged The Carter Center to monitor thoseelections.

We therefore accepted the official invitation thatcame in January 2006 to observe the elections. As inthe past, the Nicaraguan government asked us to begin

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter discusses the upcomingNicaraguan elections at a July 2006 press conference inManagua where he was making a pre-election visit.

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the monitoring mission early and take into accountthe pre-election period in analyzing whether the elec-toral process met international standards, and we didso. After the election, our observers stayed in the fielduntil the departmental and regional electoral authori-ties had finished adjudicating challenges. I am proudof these volunteers’ nonpartisan dedication to support-ing democracy in Nicaragua and abiding by thePrinciples for International Election Observation thatThe Carter Center helped develop.

The Carter Center remains at the forefront ofinternational efforts to observe elections and continuesto advance its monitoring methods. In Nicaragua, weimplemented new technologies to ensure that the sitesselected for observation were representative of eachdepartment or region and to identify areas that couldbe potentially vulnerable to problems so we could givethem special attention and deter fraud. As part of theCenter’s ongoing commitment to support democraticdevelopment between elections, we have worked inNicaragua with government and civil society to raiseawareness about the right to information and to

increase citizens’ access to public documents.I offer congratulations to the Nicaraguan people

for their faith in elections as a means of choosing theirleaders. The 2006 elections resulted in an alternationin power, returning Daniel Ortega to the presidencyafter a 16-year absence. This demonstrates that anyparty playing by democratic rules can win and havethat victory respected by its opponents and the interna-tional community, even after several electoral losses.Five parties competed vigorously for the vote, andthree emerged with major blocs of seats in the legisla-ture, breaking down some of the polarization that hasstrained Nicaraguan democracy since the revolution,and this too may help consolidate democracy.

We present this new report in a spirit of coopera-tion with Nicaragua and hope that the reforms itsuggests will be discussed and implemented by govern-ment and civil society with an eye to furtherstrengthening Nicaragua’s democracy.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter

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In January 2006, Nicaragua’s Supreme ElectoralCouncil invited The Carter Center to observe thatyear’s electoral processes, including the regional

elections on the Atlantic Coast held in March and thepresidential, legislative, and Central AmericanParliament elections in November. After visiting thecountry to discuss the invitation and ensure that wehad the welcome of the government and all parties,we accepted. We did so cognizant of the constitutionalcrisis that had consumed the country for nine monthsin the previous year, which had been resolved by post-poning implementation of reforms until a newgovernment could be elected and take office inJanuary 2007. The crisis had revealed strong tensionsbetween the two large parties representing the histori-cally opposed ideological currents that had foundexpression in the revolution and counterrevolution—the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) andConstitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC)—but also objec-tions from other quarters to the political pact thesedominant parties had made to increase their controlof the branches of state.

Thus began a year of monitoring electoral develop-ments in Nicaragua. We recognized an immediateneed for an analyst expert in Nicaraguan politics to beon hand tracking events and were grateful thatEconomist Intelligence Unit correspondent David Dyewas able to serve as consultant to us. He provided reg-ular reporting from Managua on the broad politicalscene and specific electoral matters. He also helpedtrain our delegates, offering a concise political historyof Nicaragua and the perspective that comes with hav-ing lived there for more than two decades. Mr. Dyewas also the primary author of this report.

Our invitation did not permit sufficient time forus to organize observation of the March regional elec-tions on the Caribbean Coast, but we sent a studymission of five experienced observers to the North

Atlantic Autonomous Region and South AtlanticAutonomous Region. They deployed under the leader-ship of Hector Vanolli, who had previously led anOrganization of American States (OAS) observationmission for regional elections in 2000, and who wouldreturn in June to help me lead an 11-person observa-tion of the verification of the voters list. Hector’sexpertise and good contacts with Nicaraguans and col-leagues in the OAS were a tremendous help, and wewere sorry that obligations elsewhere prevented himfrom joining our delegation in November.

Among those who observed the verificationprocess was the former Bolivian ambassador to theUnited States, Jaime Aparicio, who in July became ourchief of mission. He accompanied former U.S.President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn;Jennifer McCoy, director of the Carter Center’sAmericas Program; and me to Managua July 3 through6 for a pre-election fact-finding mission. Apariciowould return at the end of the month to set up anoffice and hire our efficient and dedicated local staffand would thereafter be our representative inManagua and the official spokesperson for the mis-sion. He was the highest level consultant we have everemployed as mission leader, which reflected theCenter’s ongoing commitment to democracy inNicaragua and our estimation of the importance ofthese elections, which ultimately would return formerPresident Daniel Ortega to the presidency, a milestoneof alternation in government that would nonethelesscarry substantial tension for the country. Aparicio wasprecisely the right person for this mission, employingconsummate diplomatic skills to ease tensions that nat-urally arise during electoral processes and maintainingwarm relations with Nicaraguans with a wide variety ofpolitical viewpoints.

On Sept. 7, The Carter Center deployed regionalcoordinators to reside in Leon, Granada, Esteli,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Matagalpa, Juigalpa, Bluefields, and Bilwi (PuertoCabezas). Coordinated from Leon by Dr. JulieCupples, these long-term observers met daily with elec-tion officials, party leaders, local governmentrepresentatives, civil society groups, and the police andmilitary to track local preparations for elections andthe campaign in Nicaragua’s 17 departments andregions. They built relationships with the domesticobserver organizations at the local level and with OASand European Union observers once they arrived.They filed lengthy weekly reports that Cupples com-piled and sent on to our offices in Managua andAtlanta, allowing us to keep up with events outsideManagua and understand the political climate. It wasthrough these observers that we learned of problemssuch as partisan distribution of voter identificationdocuments and were able to take action in Managua toput an end to it. We give special thanks to these indi-viduals—Jacob Bradbury, Julie Cupples, Rene deVries,Melida Jimenez, Anais Ruiz, Amparo Tortosa Garrigos,and Gabriel Zinzoni—who conducted accurate report-ing and were the visible face of The Carter Center insmall towns and rural communities for three months,all the while living in modest circumstances and main-taining open minds and hearts.

On Nov. 1, a delegation of 57 additional observersarrived in Managua for training, deployment, observa-tion, and debriefing. Roughly half of these volunteersreturned to Managua to report the day after the elec-tion, and the others stayed in their deployment site anadditional week to monitor the intricate process ofgathering in the vote and processing challenges.Coming from 20 countries, almost all were Spanishspeakers, and many had prior experience in Nicaraguaand as election observers. Their names are too manyto mention here, but their work was the heart of ourelection mission, and we are grateful for their demon-strated commitment to strengthening democracy inNicaragua. They are to be commended for theirpatience over long hours of training, vote monitoring,and observation of the counting process, all on a vol-untary basis. It should be noted here that their

deployment was guided by two technical analysts: Dr.Susan Hyde drew samples to assign most teams to visitspecific voting sites to ensure that we had a representa-tive sample of the quality of the election, and Dr.Marcel Guzmán de Rojas and colleagues in his firmdeveloped a geographic information systems model toidentify areas that were particularly vulnerable topotential problems so that we could deploy specialteams to cover those communities.

Three former presidents led the election observa-tion: President Carter, former Panama PresidentNicolás Ardito Barletta, and former Peru PresidentAlejandro Toledo. They were guided by JenniferMcCoy, director of the Carter Center’s AmericasProgram, who set the strategic vision for the mission.They met with the Supreme Electoral Council,President Enrique Bolaños, candidates from all parties,the international community, and private sector andcivil society representatives to understand their levelsof satisfaction with the process and areas of remainingconcern. Their leadership was essential in ensuring ourdelegation’s full access to all aspects of the process andin maintaining fluid communication with Nicaraguanauthorities, the diplomatic corps, and the leadershipof the OAS and European Union and domestic elec-tion observation groups.

None of this work would have been possible with-out the generosity of the governments of Denmark,Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Their com-bined support enabled the Center to implement aprofessional 15-month observation mission from theMarch Atlantic Coast elections through the inaugura-tion of the new president and presentation of thisreport. We thank them for their vision and dedicationto helping consolidate democracy in Nicaragua.

Any project of this sort requires a great deal ofpreparation by staff in Atlanta and Managua, all ofwhom worked tirelessly for the success of the mission.Special mention should be made of our logistics assis-tant, Sarah Rivard, whose good humor and efficiencywere crucial in setting up the pre-election visits, ouroffice, and the electoral observation in November. Dr.

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A small group of Carter Center staff managed the observation mission in the field.

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Sharon Lean coordinated our office during the elec-tion, receiving and compiling the reports from 29delegation teams and keeping the leadership apprised.Rachel Fowler came for the election to direct theManagua office and synchronize the actions of our del-egation and leadership team, setting a supportive tonefor staff interaction despite the pressure of themoment. Americas Program Assistant Director LauraNeuman stepped in with her legal background to trackdown information on alleged procedural problems asthey emerged. Associate Director of PeaceDevelopment Amy Jackson accompanied our donordelegates, whose contribution to The Carter Center isnot only financial but also an active interest in whatwe do that resulted in their participation as volunteerelection observers. Financial analyst CourtneyMwangura aided our field office in the handling offinancial reports and coordinated the disbursal andreporting of deployment funds. Communications coor-dinator Deborah Hakes coordinated the many pressrequests we received and also was our mission photog-rapher, and many of her photos as well as some fromdelegates outside Managua are printed in this report.

Hakes was supported by Sarah Moros, a former sum-mer intern who tracked news on Nicaraguathroughout the summer and coordinated withSpanish-speaking press in November. RodneyMcDonald, a former Peace Corps volunteer inNicaragua, cheerfully volunteered his time to manageour fleet of vehicles and drivers. Carter Center internsLaura Ertmer and Paul Lubliner filled in whereverextra hands were needed to translate, prepare the brief-ing materials, pack deployment kits, and answerincoming calls from our observation teams. Our lead-ership team interpreters, David Traumann and KayStubbs, and our donor team interpreter, Thomas Lee,were reliable, professional, and discreet. The publicimage of our mission was in their hands, and they per-formed admirably. Finally, back in Atlanta, staffmembers Karen McIntosh and Danielle Steele provid-ed outstanding logistical support for the mission.

It has been my privilege to work with this talentedgroup of staff, consultants, and volunteers. The successof the mission belongs to all of us.

Shelley McConnellSenior Associate Director and Mission DirectorAmericas Program

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MISSION DELEGATION AND STAFF

DELEGATION LEADERS

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States, Carter Center Co-founderThe Honorable Nicolás Ardito Barletta, Former President of PanamaThe Honorable Alejandro Toledo Manrique, Former President of PeruDr. Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Americas Program, The Carter Center, United StatesDr. Shelley McConnell, Senior Associate Director of the Americas Program, The Carter Center, United StatesAmbassador Jaime Aparicio, Chief of Mission, The Carter Center, Bolivia

DELEGATION

Santiago Alconada, Attorney, ArgentinaJessica Allen, Intern, Service Centre for Development Cooperation--–KEPA, FinlandCraig Auchter, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Butler University, United StatesEnrique Bravo-Escobar, Doctoral Student in Government, Georgetown University, MexicoLawrence Coben, Chief Executive Officer, Termisis Energy Acquisition Corporation, United StatesLaurie Cole, Senior Analyst, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, CanadaPeter DeShazo, Director of the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United StatesWill Durbin, Policy Analyst, M. J. Bradley & Associates Environmental Consulting, United StatesAlexandra Escudero, Project Manager, NeighborWorks America, United States/ColombiaDavid Evans, Professional Photographer, United StatesRichard Feinberg, Professor of International Political Economy, University of California, San Diego, United StatesSandra Flores, Consultant, U.N. Development Programme/Bolivia, FranceKen Frankel, Board Member, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, CanadaJohn Graham, Chair, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, CanadaCymene Howe, Mellon Fellow and Visiting Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, United

StatesRick Hutcheson, Managing Partner, Vacation Palm Springs Real Estate, Inc., United StatesDaniela Issa, Adjunct Professor, Departments of Political Science and Language and Linguistics, University of

Tampa, BrazilDavid Ives, Executive Director, Albert Schweitzer Institute, Quinnipiac University, United StatesCoby Jansen, Technical Adviser, Health Programs, The Carter Center, United StatesHelen Keogh, National Coordinator for Adult Learning, Department of Education and Science, IrelandRob Kincaid, Managing Partner, Vacation Palm Springs Real Estate, Inc., United StatesJennie Lincoln, Professor, Department of Political Science, Georgia Institute of Technology, United StatesCasey Margard, Former Program Officer for PATH, United StatesKelly Margard, Student, University Preparatory Academy, United StatesMatthew Maronick, Program Manager, Familia Padre Fabretto/Fabretto Children’s Foundation, United StatesBernard McCabe, Psychologist, Health Service Executive, IrelandChristopher Mitchell, Consultant, United States

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Benjamin Naimark-Rowse, Program Officer, Open Society Justice Initiative, United StatesVibeke Pedersen, Head of Section, Department for Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, Danish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, DenmarkVeronica Querejasu, Consultant, BoliviaPeter Quilter, Partner, The SLT Group, LLC, United States/ArgentinaStephen Randall, Professor and Director, Institute for United States Policy Research, University of Calgary,

CanadaTatiana Rincon, Professor, Universidad Externado de Colombia, ColombiaKristen Shelby, Project Facilitator, Proyecto de Vacunación de Desarrollo Comunal, United StatesWilliam C. Smith, Professor, Department of International Studies, University of Miami, United StatesRose Spalding, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, DePaul University, United StatesJack Spence, Associate Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of Massachusetts Boston, United StatesAscension Toledano Gomez, Media Officer, Dorna Sports, SpainAnneli Tolvanen, Teacher, Kawartha Pine Ridge District School Board, United StatesGeorge Vickers, Regional Director for Latin America, Open Society Institute, United StatesCarlos Walker, Information Technology Manager, Mesoamerica Investments, BrazilTom Walker, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Ohio University, United StatesDennis Young, Independent Social Scientist, United States/Belize

LONG-TERM OBSERVERS

Jacob Bradbury, United StatesJulie Cupples, United KingdomRene De Vries, The NetherlandsAmparo Tortosa Garrigos, SpainMélida Jiménez, Sweden/El SalvadorAnais Ruiz, United StatesGabriel Zinzoni, Argentina

STAFF

Robert Ellzey, Leadership Coordinator, The Carter Center, United StatesLaura Ertmer, Intern, Americas Program, The Carter Center, United StatesRachel Fowler, Assistant Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, United StatesDeborah Hakes, Communications Coordinator, Office of Public Information, The Carter Center, United StatesAmy Jackson, Associate Director, Office of Institutional Development, The Carter Center, United StatesNancy Konigsmark, Director of Scheduling, The Carter Center, United StatesSharon Lean, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Wayne State University, United StatesPaul Lubliner, Intern, Americas Program, The Carter Center, United StatesRodney McDonald, Project Manager, Carpenters Rule, United StatesSarah Moros, Intern, The Carter Center, United StatesCourtney Mwangura, Financial Analyst, Peace Programs, The Carter Center, United StatesLaura Neuman, Assistant Director, Americas Program, The Carter Center, United StatesSarah Rivard, Logistics Assistant, Americas Program, The Carter Center, United States

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CONSULTANTS AND ADVISERS

David Dye, Political Consultant, The Carter Center, United StatesMarcel Guzmán de Rojas Wesner, Chief Executive Officer and Founder, NEOTEC, BoliviaSusan Hyde, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Yale University, United States

MANAGUA STAFF

Carolina Beatriz Castaneda Aguirre, Administrative Official, El SalvadorAlexandra Fiallos, Administrative Assistant, NicaraguaLuis Rodolfo Pérez Salmerón, Lead Driver, Nicaragua

The Carter Center 62-member delegation to Nicaragua was led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former PanamaPresident Ardito Barletta, and former Peru President Alejandro Toledo.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In November 2006, Nicaragua held elections forthe presidency and vice presidency, the legislature,and the Central American Parliament. Earlier that

year, the country held regional elections for the govern-ing authorities of the Atlantic Coast. At the invitationof Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council and the gov-ernment of President Enrique Bolaños, The CarterCenter agreed to observe these electoral activities, estab-lishing a small presence for the March Atlantic Coastelections and mounting a full election observation mis-sion for the general elections held Nov. 5, 2006.

CONTEXT FOR THE CARTER CENTER’SDECISION TO OBSERVEA prolonged constitutional conflict in 2005 set thescene for elections and sparked hemispheric concernabout the stability of Nicaragua’s young democracy.Essentially a dispute over the balance of powerbetween the executive and legislative branches of gov-ernment, the constitutional crisis was resolved viafacilitation by the Organization of American States(OAS). The crisis underscored the fragility ofNicaragua’s democracy, and Nicaraguans from a widearray of political groups therefore urged The CarterCenter to observe the 2006 elections as it had the1990, 1996, and 2001 races. The crisis also galvanizedpublic opposition to the political-pact making byNicaragua’s main parties that had incited the conflict,spawning new political leadership that promised tomake the 2006 elections unusually competitive. Thefact that Nicaragua’s election authorities were partisanin composition and excluded all but the two largestparties engendered distrust among new and small par-ties and some civic groups, increasing the felt need forinternational election observation.

ELECTION OBSERVATIONThe Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) formally invitedThe Carter Center on Jan. 23, 2006 to observe both

the Atlantic Coast regional voting and the nationalelection. The Center scheduled two visits by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter to Nicaragua during theelection process and also invited the former presidentsof Panama and Peru to co-lead its election observationmission. Although, during the campaign, SandinistaNational Liberation Front candidate Daniel Ortega dis-played a certain mistrust of international and nationalelection observers, the CSE adhered to Nicaraguan tra-dition in extending observers credentials, hearing theirconcerns, and at times accepting their suggestions forways to improve the election process. The CarterCenter established a field presence for the MarchAtlantic Coast elections, sent 11 observers to the verifi-cation of the voters list, deployed seven long-termobservers, and ultimately fielded 62 observers to moni-tor the Nov. 5 voting, leaving a large number of thesein the field for the following 10 days to observe the res-olution of challenges to the vote tallies. Over thecourse of the year, The Carter Center sent pre-election

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Dr. JenniferMcCoy, director of the Carter Center’s Americas Program,gave their observations of the pre-election period at a July2006 press conference in Managua.

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delegations on fact-finding visits, commissioned techni-cal reports, and regularly published recommendationson how to improve election preparations and the cam-paign climate.

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVECONCERNSA deeply politicized election body lacking adequatepartisan balance raised fears that some election rulesmight not be implemented fairly. Partisanship struckhome within the CSE when infighting between thetwo parties controlling that body made quorum forma-tion and decision-making problematic over afive-month period in early 2006. An overcrowded elec-toral calendar and inadequate planning for theproduction and distribution of citizen identity cardshelped fuel suspicions that political bias was operatingin the issuance and delivery of voting documents.Political parties unrepresented in the CSE criticizedthe distribution of election workers in the polling sta-tions and municipal-level election offices as unfair anddesigned to promote irregularities. Electoral regula-tions were not always clear or issued fast enough toassist the contending parties in the proper exercise oftheir rights, including regulations concerning cam-paign finance. Nonetheless, the election authoritiesmanaged other preparations well, including the manu-facture of ballots and registration of parties andcandidates. The latter process was approached with aninclusive spirit more in keeping with democracy thanhad been the case in 2001. Five contending partieswere able to undertake their campaigns unhindered,and no violence was reported. With a greater variety ofoptions, electoral debate was lively and vigorously pro-moted in the media.

ELECTION DAY AND AFTERMATHVoter turnout on election day, Nov. 5, was lower thanin 2001 but still very high overall, and the voters exer-cised their right to vote patiently and in an orderlymanner. Materials were distributed on time, andpolling sites opened with only minor delays. The bal-

loting was administered in an unbiased manner and inaccordance with established procedures. The authori-ties provided support to resolve problems that didoccur, but these were minor incidents. There was nosystematic pattern of irregularities that might haveindicated fraud. The support provided by the armedforces for maintaining peace and facilitating the securetransportation of materials was exemplary. Despite aproblem-free transmission, the CSE was slow in report-ing final vote totals, while anomalies surfaced in someareas as challenges to vote tallies were processed. Thedomestic observer group Ethics and Transparencycharged that the CSE’s decision to ratify disputed voteresults for the North Atlantic Autonomous Regionamounted to fraud.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESULTSDespite the aforementioned difficulties, the electionsgenerally met international standards for an acceptableelection. When the traditional Liberal vote split in theelection to form two parties, former revolutionaryPresident Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista NationalLiberation Front (FSLN) won an undisputed victory bya wide-enough margin to avert a runoff. The legislativeelections resulted in significant blocs of seats for theFSLN and both the Constitutionalist Liberal Party andthe Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance-Conservative Party, aswell as a smaller number for the Sandinista RenewalMovement.

The presidential results unequivocally reflected thewill of the Nicaraguan voters, as did all but one of thelegislative races. The defeated candidates for presidentaccepted the victory of Sandinista leader DanielOrtega with good grace and only minor delays.Comprehensive parallel counts by one of the new par-ties and a domestic observer organization aided theacceptance process. The return of the FSLN to powerafter losing in 1990 represents a positive alternation ofparties in office and helps preserve the chances for aneventual consolidation of democracy.

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OPPORTUNITIES FOR SYSTEMIMPROVEMENTAlthough there were notable improvements over pastelections in competitiveness, the electoral systemremains largely unprepared to process a close election.The level of distrust permeating the electoral systemindicates a pressing need for the election authority tobe put on a nonpartisan and professional footing.National interest in carrying out a constitutionalreform creates a prospect for positive change, and theCSE’s own interests in reforming the electoral law andupdating the system for issuance of national identitycards are also welcome opportunities for remedyingremaining deficits in the electoral system.

COORDINATION OF OBSERVATION EFFORTSThe 2006 elections witnessed continuing consolidationof national observer organizations. However, nationaland international observation efforts were not alwayseffectively coordinated. Constant informal discussionsamong the observers and with donor organizations cre-ated widespread consensus concerning the analysis ofproblems in the election picture, but lack of unity as totheir solution impeded effective representation of com-mon positions to the election authorities on certainissues. Observer organizations nevertheless cooperatedextensively in the field on election days on the AtlanticCoast and nationally and, in some cases, collaboratedin monitoring the resolution of challenges. Nicaraguaneeds to depoliticize and strengthen its electoral systemso as to build public confidence and reduce its depend-ence on international observers.

On Nov. 5, 2006, Nicaraguans went to thepolls to elect a president and vice president,90 deputies to the National Assembly, and

20 representatives to the Central AmericanParliament. For the fourth consecutive time, TheCarter Center was on hand with a sizable contingentof observers to monitor the election. Former U.S.President Jimmy Carter had helped mediate difficul-ties that arose during the historic 1990 election inwhich the revolutionary Sandinista NationalLiberation Front party (FSLN) had ceded power toVioleta Chamorro. The Center returned in 1996 and2001 to monitor hard-fought contests in which theLiberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) turned backattempts by Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega to regainthe presidency.

Acknowledging the positive role The CarterCenter had played on prior occasions, the SupremeElectoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral, CSE)issued a formal invitation to The Carter Center Jan.23, 2006, to observe both the Atlantic Coast regionalelections scheduled for March 2006 and the nationalelections in November of that year. Upon accepting,the Center staff decided early to schedule two visits byPresident Carter to Nicaragua in 2006 to assist in anyway that would overcome difficulties in the electionprocess. With four major parties, both the presidentialand legislative races were expected to be more competi-tive than on previous occasions but also potentiallymore conflictive.

To understand why international observation ofNicaragua’s elections was still necessary after 16 years,a brief glance back at institutional changes wroughtduring the previous six years is helpful. In 2000, legis-lators from the Sandinista and Liberal partiesreformed the constitution to share power in state insti-tutions to the exclusion of other political forces. Theseincluded the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), which

was expanded to seven members to permit a numericalbalance between Liberal and Sandinista magistrates.The major parties also rewrote the electoral law, effec-tively inhibiting new parties from forming, eliminatingnonparty forms of electoral participation, and generallylimiting competition. Although key barriers to newparty formation were struck down as unconstitutionalin October 2002, restrictions such as the ban on non-party candidacies remained in 2006.

These constitutional changes, resulting from anagreement between the leaders of the Liberal andSandinista parties, were collectively referred to as apolitical pact and sparked concern that election lawand a politicized CSE would favor the major partiesunfairly and hinder their rivals from competing effec-tively. Although the 2001 national voting passed withonly minor problems, fraud charges were lodged in thewake of municipal voting in 2004, particularly in thecity of Granada. By 2005, new political forces voicedfear that the Sandinista and Liberal party leaderswould use their control of the courts and comptrollers-general to ban other party presidential candidates fromthe 2006 race.

In late 2004, a fresh political pact by theSandinistas and Liberals added tension to the pre-election picture. The two parties again changed theconstitution to make the president’s nominations tocabinet positions and other posts subject to ratificationby a 60 percent majority of the National Assemblydeputies, among other matters. The changes sparked a10-month political crisis when President EnriqueBolaños refused to accept the amendments andinvoked help from the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) under the 2001 Inter-AmericanDemocratic Charter. In May 2005, The Carter Centersent a mission headed by former Argentine ForeignMinister Dante Caputo to examine the prolongedimpasse. The OAS subsequently named Caputo tofacilitate a solution to the crisis, which was achieved in

THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

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JAN. 23, 2006 President Jimmy Carter receives a letter frompresident of the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council(CSE), Roberto Rivas, inviting The Carter Center to observethe regional elections in March and national elections inNovember.

JAN. 31–FEB. 2 Carter Center Senior Associate DirectorShelley McConnell and Dr. Fernando Tuesta, former chiefof the Peruvian electoral authority, travel to Nicaragua toexplore a potential observation mission by The CarterCenter.

MARCH 5 The Carter Center deploys four observers toobserve the Atlantic Coast elections in the North AtlanticAutonomous Region and the South Atlantic AutonomousRegion.

JUNE 16-20 Dr. Shelley McConnell leads a group of 11international observers in monitoring the voter verificationprocess in 13 departments and the South AtlanticAutonomous Region.

JULY 3-6 President and Mrs. Carter, along with Chief ofMission Jaime Aparicio, Americas Program Director JenniferMcCoy, Shelley McConnell, and political consultant DavidR. Dye conduct a pre-election assessment trip in which theymeet with the CSE, President Bolaños, presidential candi-dates and political parties, domestic and internationalobservation groups, the diplomatic community, and civilsociety.

JULY 27 Chief of Mission Jaime Aparicio arrives inNicaragua to begin regular meetings and contacts with theCSE, political parties, and domestic and international obser-vation groups. The Carter Center opens a field office inManagua.

SEPT. 4–9 Elections expert Ron Gould conducts a technicalpreparation assessment visit, meeting with elections authori-ties and technical experts from other observation groups.

SEPT. 6–10 Pedro Nikken, member of the Friends of theDemocratic Charter, joins Jaime Aparicio in Managua toconduct a series of high-level visits with the government,CSE, political parties, and other observer groups.

SEPT. 8 The Carter Center deploys seven long-termobservers to Granada, Leon, Bluefields, Bilwi (PuertoCabezas), Juigalpa, Matagalpa, and Esteli.

OCT. 9–14 Technical consultants Marcel Guzmán de Rojas

and Luis Alberto Quiroga analyze election day preparednessand create plans for technical aspects of the Carter Center’selection day observation.

NOV. 1 Medium-term and short-term observers arrive inManagua.

NOV. 2–3 All observers receive training to monitor electionday and the resolution of challenges.

NOV. 3 Observer teams are deployed throughout Nicaraguato all departments and regions. Presidents Toledo andArdito Barletta arrive in Managua to begin meetings withPresident Bolaños, political parties, and other observergroups.

NOV. 4 Presidents Toledo and Ardito Barletta meet withEden Pastora. President Carter arrives in Managua where hejoins Presidents Toledo and Ardito Barletta in meetings withthe CSE, Daniel Ortega, the European Union, and theOrganization of American States.

NOV. 5 Sixty-two Carter Center observers monitor openingof polls, voting, and counting on election day. The leader-ship team holds meetings with Eduardo Montealegre, JoséRizo, and Edmundo Jarquín.

NOV. 6 Domestic observer groups debrief the leadershipteam on their observation. Observers return to Managua todebrief the leadership team on election day activity.Leadership team holds meetings with Edmundo Jarquín,Daniel Ortega, and Eduardo Montealegre.

NOV. 7 Long-term and medium-term observers are rede-ployed to departments and regions to monitor challenges.The leadership team holds meetings with José Rizo and lead-ers of the business community. Former presidents departNicaragua.

NOV. 7–11 Long-term and medium-term observers monitorpreparation of departmental and regional summary tallysheets and adjudication of challenges.

NOV. 11–14 The Carter Center’s medium-term observersdepart Nicaragua.

NOV. 30 The Carter Center closes its field office inManagua. Political consultant David R. Dye remains inManagua after long-term observers depart.

JAN. 9–11, 2007 Shelley McConnell represents PresidentCarter at the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega.

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an October 2005 agreement to postpone implementa-tion of the controversial reforms until January 2007.

Along with civil society and domestic observerorganizations, Nicaragua’s political parties, includingthose that had split from the Liberal and Sandinistaparties in opposition to the pacts, asked The CarterCenter to conduct an in-depth observation of allaspects of the 2006 process. Although fears of politicalbias in the upcoming election were rife, a thoroughinternational observation of the process could helpmitigate problems. Albeit financial constraints wouldmake it impossible to open and staff the pre-campaignstages in the first half of 2006, The Carter Centerresolved to accompany the process to the extent thatits resources permitted.

Belying worries that certain candidates would bebarred from running, the five parties that wanted toparticipate did successfully register their candidates forpresident on May 31, 2006. These included two dissi-dent candidates who split from the main Sandinistaand Liberal parties (FSLN and PLC) to lead their ownparties. The five candidates and their parties were:Daniel Ortega for the Sandinista National LiberationFront (FSLN), José Rizo for the LiberalConstitutionalist Party (PLC), Eduardo Montealegrefor the newly formed Nicaraguan LiberalAlliance–Conservative Party (ALN-PC); Herty Lewitesfor the existing Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS)and Edén Pastora for the small Alternative for Change(AC).

But other problems became evident. Attempts byforeign countries to influence Nicaragua’s election out-come reached a depth and visibility unmatched since1990. While the U.S. government once again maneu-vered to unify the Liberal forces to thwart a comebackby Daniel Ortega, Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávezcame to Ortega’s aid as a key ideological ally.

Most important, trust in the CSE was low amongthe new political parties, civil society, and a largeminority of citizens, a result of what was perceived asexcessive politicization of the institution and itsauthorities at all levels. Adding to the lack of confi-

dence was a perception that operative control of theCSE administration had passed into Sandinista hands.The CSE responded to this lack of confidence at timeswith mistrust of its critics, some of whom it ostensiblybelieved were trying to undermine its work. In a noveldeparture, the CSE’s mistrust extended to some electionobservation organizations, injecting further tensioninto the process.

ATLANTIC COAST ELECTIONSAND THEIR AFTERMATHThe first phase of the 2006 election season spannedthe elections for regional council members on theAtlantic Coast in early March, an area also known asthe Caribbean Coast. Held every four years, theseelections determine who will occupy 45 seats on eachof two autonomous councils, which then select thegoverning authorities for the North and SouthAtlantic Autonomous Regions. These regions arehome to Nicaragua’s principal indigenous peoples,including the Miskitu, Mayangna, Rama, Garifuna,and Creole, which represent roughly 12 percent of theoverall population of the country. Infighting in theCSE, controversy over alleged plans to manipulate thevoting rolls, and attempts by foreign actors to forgealliances between Nicaraguan parties and supportthem financially all marked this initial period. Theperiod also coincided with a drawn-out negotiationbetween the Sandinista and Liberal leaderships overwho would hold power in diverse institutional posi-tions in the country.

In the period leading up to balloting on the Coast,the seven-member CSE reached an impasse. The four-person Sandinista majority, led by CSE presidentRoberto Rivas, made decisions with which the three-person Liberal minority (with ties to the PLC)disagreed. Rather than accept the decisions as demo-cratic, the Liberals boycotted CSE sessions anddenounced the actions of their colleagues as illegal.Because the presence of five members was required fora quorum, such boycotts effectively hindered the CSEfrom making decisions, although all business was not

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brought to a halt. Among observer groups, the Liberals’tactics revived memories of 2001, when infightingbetween the two CSE factions over candidate registra-tion and the internal organization of the CSE itselftwice led to lengthy interruptions of operations.

Two issues in particular sparked dissent. One was aNov. 21, 2005, ruling by the CSE Department ofPolitical Party Affairs to allow the Liberal forces back-ing pre-candidate Eduardo Montealegre, who had splitfrom the main Liberal party – the PLC, to change thename of their group from the Liberal SalvationMovement (a pre-existing splinter party) to theNicaraguan Liberal Alliance. The PLC had used“Liberal Alliance” as the label for its coalition in thetwo previous elections, and it argued that this labelwas its political-intellectual property and other forceshad no right to use it. The CSE rejected this argumentout of hand and approved the name change.

Although the PLC-affiliated Liberal magistrates even-tually dropped their objectionson this point, the CSE majori-ty made a more controversialdecision not to apply the termsof Articles 41 and 116 of the2000 election law. These arti-cles stipulated that any voter inpossession of a valid identitycard (cédula) must be allowed tovote at the polling stationnoted on the card, even if theperson’s name could not befound on the voter roll.National observer organizationsEthics and Transparency andthe Institute for Democracyboth opposed striking thesearticles. They argued that theCSE had overstepped itsauthority—only the NationalAssembly, not the CSE, couldchange the election law.

The PLC went a step further, claiming that ineliminating Articles 41 and 116, the Sandinista majori-ty was preparing fraud in March via manipulation ofthe voter rolls. The PLC alleged that many AtlanticCoast citizens would arrive at their voting places, findtheir names missing from the rolls, and, in the absenceof guarantees provided under Articles 41 and 116, bedenied the right to vote there. Instead, they would betold to vote elsewhere, but many would be unable toget to the new location or would become discouragedand give up the attempt to vote. This hypothetical shellgame, nicknamed “crazy mouse” (ratón loco), wouldeffectively deprive many residents of their right to vote.In the midst of a mounting media outcry, the PLCbriefly flirted with the threat of boycotting the electionentirely if Articles 41 and 116 were not reinstated.

After both national and some international electionobservers, including The Carter Center, and civil societyargued for restoring the stricken clauses, the CSE major-

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The Carter Center fielded two observers to the North Atlantic Autonomous Region for theMarch 2006 Atlantic Coast elections; the north and south coastal regions are home toNicaragua’s principal indigenous peoples.

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ity backtracked and announced on Feb. 9 that Articles41 and 116 would be implemented after all.

Despite this recantation, the Liberal minorityrefused to end its boycott, fueling uncertainty concern-ing the real motives behind its stance. At this juncture,the Sandinista side in the CSE, backed by theSupreme Court, tried to normalize the functioning ofthe CSE by calling the three alternate magistrates(suplentes) for the absent Liberal magistrates into serv-ice in order to form quorum and make decisions.Rather than ease tension, this move sparked still moreconflict. The Liberals argued that the election lawclearly reserved the option of calling up suplentes to themissing magistrates themselves. To press its point, theLiberals called on the National Assembly to give itsopinion of Article 6 of the election law, which coversthe role of suplentes.

The CSE majority decided to ignore this contro-versy and on Feb. 20 called two of the three alternatemagistrates into its deliberations. The CSE then madea series of rulings to which the Liberals once againobjected. These included the re-election of CSE VicePresident Emmet Lang, whose term was about toexpire, and the anticipatory re-election of CSEPresident Roberto Rivas, whose mandate was sched-uled to lapse in August. The PLC immediatelydenounced the decisions as illegal. As voting day onthe Coast approached, the political atmosphere inManagua heated up as PLC spokesmen threatened todisrupt vote counting with massive numbers of chal-lenges, and members of civil society called on the CSEto resign en masse.

PEACEFUL VOTING ON THE COASTThe four political parties that would go on to contestthe national election in November—the SandinistaNational Liberation Front (FSLN), the LiberalConstitutionalist Party (PLC), the Nicaraguan LiberalAlliance–Conservative Party (ALN-PC) and theSandinista Renewal Movement (MRS)—made theirpresence felt on the Coast and campaigned to varyingdegrees, albeit without exciting more than mild inter-

est among the voters. Regional parties rooted in theCoast itself, Yátama (“Mother Earth” in Miskitu) andthe Movement for Coast Unity Party (PAMUC) round-ed out the roster of participants along with otherminor parties. The official 42-day campaign periodcommenced on Jan. 19.

Absent sufficient time and resources to mount afull-fledged observation, The Carter Center marked itspresence in the Coast election by sending two-personfact-finding teams to both the North and SouthAutonomous Regions. Team members coveredBluefields and Laguna de Perlas in the South Atlanticalong with Bilwi and its environs in the North.Contradicting the expectations of some in Managua,the March 5 voting and its aftermath in the Caribbeanareas transpired in absolute calm. About 45 percent ofregistered Coast residents turned out to vote, a modestimprovement over 2002. In most respects, the machin-ery of the CSE worked well in guaranteeing thesmooth functioning of local vote boards, although IDcard hole punchers (used to protect against double vot-ing) and ultraviolet lamps needed to read securitymarks on cédulas were found to be defective in a signif-icant number of cases.

The major irregularity noted by all observers wasthe number of Coast residents who could not findtheir names on the rolls. Estimates of the percentageof voters in this situation varied wildly among theobserver groups, from a low of 3 percent to highs of 15to 20 percent, but the portion was significant in allcases. The incidence of this phenomenon appeared tobear out the wisdom of the CSE’s decision to applyArticles 41 and 116 as written; in the absence of theserules, numerous frustrated voters might well havecaused disruption of the process.

At the end of the day, the PLC, traditionally theCoast’s strongest party, emerged with a relative majori-ty of 40 percent of the popular vote, followed by theFSLN with 27 percent and Yátama with 16 percent. Apolitical newcomer, the ALN-PC garnered just 9 percentof the popular vote and the MRS won a scant 3 percent.In May, an alliance between the FSLN and Yátama

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would go on to form the government of the NorthAtlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) while the PLCwould take office in the South Atlantic AutonomousRegion (RAAS) after securing the defection of a coun-cil member from the ALN-PC.

Immediately, however, conflict erupted betweenthe PLC and Yátama over the number of seats eachparty claimed to have won in the RAAN. Chargingthat fraud was occurring and was being abetted by theauthorities, Yátama supporters occupied the offices ofthe Regional Electoral Council in Bilwi, capital of theRAAN, briefly sequestering the council president inhis office. Underlying the conflict was a lack of clarityconcerning the election districts in which certainpolling stations, or juntas receptoras de votos (JRVs), wereto be counted. Whereas the PLC argued that theassignment of JRVs to districts was rigorously deter-mined in Law 331, Yátama invoked a pre-electionpolitical agreement, supposedly concluded among allthe parties, which located certain disputed vote boardsin areas that were party strongholds. The conflict con-cluded after the CSE in Managua ratified the validityof this agreement and upheld Yátama’s claim to thedisputed seats on the RAAN council.

THE CARTER CENTER VOICESITS CONCERNSThe outcome of the Coast process, together with thefirst steps in the upcoming national election season,prompted The Carter Center to issue an extensive pub-lic statement on May 9, 2006. In regard to Coast issuesproper, the Center urged the CSE to explain publiclywhy so many residents had failed to find their nameslisted on voter rolls and to clarify the exact locations ofall JRVs. The majority of the Center’s recommenda-tions, however, focused on issues that it judged wouldbe salient through the remainder of the 2006 electionprocess and could affect the quality of the national elec-tions. Two of these were of immediate concern.

Despite their party’s strong showing, the PLC mag-istrates’ boycott of CSE proceedings had persisted,

albeit in weakened form, after the Coast voting. Thispersistence was disquieting. If the strife in the CSEcontinued indefinitely, it could jeopardize the nationalelection by hindering the magistrates from making alegitimate declaration of election winners inNovember. In this context, the Center strongly urgedthe CSE factions to resolve their differences as quicklyas possible. In fact, the Sandinista and Liberal magis-trates agreed on May 16 to put aside theirdisagreements, form a quorum, and resume normaldeliberations. They moreover pledged to maintain aquorum throughout the entire election process tocome (a promise they kept).

Budding intervention by foreign governments inNicaragua’s election affairs at this juncture promptedanother recommendation from The Carter Center. Asearly as November 2003, the Bush administration hadpublicly opposed the re-election of either formerPresident Daniel Ortega or former President ArnoldoAlemán (under house arrest for a corruption convic-tion), saying either candidate would be detrimental tothe development of democracy in the country. Afterunsuccessful attempts in 2005 to unseat Alemán fromPLC leadership, U.S. officials by April 2006 wereactively attempting to forge an electoral coalitionbetween the PLC and the emergent Nicaraguan LiberalAlliance around the candidacy of EduardoMontealegre in order to thwart any comeback byOrtega. Ambassador Paul Trivelli in particular drewfire from various sides for his outspoken remarksagainst Alemán and Ortega.

At the same time, the government of Hugo Chávezin Venezuela signaled strong support for Ortega’s re-election bid by agreeing to provide theFSLN-dominated Nicaraguan Mayors Association withsubsidized petroleum products. With burgeoning pub-lic debate about these foreign influences threatening tomake an already polarized election still more conflic-tive, the Center asked all governments to refrain frominterfering in Nicaragua’s internal affairs and allow theNicaraguan people to debate the legitimate election

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issues undisturbed. In addition, the Center suggestedthat the CSE publicize existing regulations regardingthe reporting of campaign contributions so that allplayers, foreign and national, would be fully cognizantof the rules of the game.

As things transpired, the party and candidate regis-tration process concluded successfully on May 31,when five presidential candidates were duly inscribed.This put to rest any lingering doubt about candidatesbeing excluded from the race. Daniel Ortega headedan alliance between the FSLN and the NationalConvergence dubbed “United Nicaragua WillTriumph,” while his former Sandinista rival HertyLewites led an alliance centered in the MRS. Despitethe strenuous efforts of the U.S. government to unifythem, the Liberal forces remained split. The PLC nom-inated former Vice President José Rizo as its standardbearer, and the ALN-PC alliance put up former foreignminister and banker Eduardo Montealegre as its candi-date. After changing its name, a small evangelicalgrouping called Alternative for Change (AC) chose for-mer guerrilla leader Edén Pastora to lead its chargeagainst the larger parties.

With the battle lines thus drawn, Nicaraguan vot-ers found themselves contemplating a wider array ofreal political options than in any election since the1980s. By virtue of the 2000 Liberal–Sandinista pactagreement, the leading candidate could win the presi-dential race on the first round of voting with 40percent of the vote or as little as 35 percent, providedthe candidate had a lead of at least five percentagepoints over the second-place finisher. With initial opin-ion polls showing four relatively strong candidates inthe race, there was much speculation about which can-didate could win with a plurality between 35 and 40percent, thus avoiding the need for a runoff.

VOTING CARDS AND THEELECTORAL ROLLOnce candidate and party registration for the presiden-tial elections were over, attention shifted to other keyissues that had emerged in the process, namely voter

registration and the quality of the electoral roll. InNicaragua, the voters list process includes citizensreceiving from the CSE a unique identity card called acédula, which serves both for voting and general identi-fication purposes. Despite being a formal requirement,surveys in recent years revealed that some 15 to 18 per-cent of the voting-age population (citizens over age 16)lacked possession of this key document. This propor-tion was highest among the youngest cohort of voters.Among the possible reasons cited to explain this situa-tion was the fact that the municipal offices of the CSE,which normally issue cédulas, had been closed during2004 and 2005 due to budgetary restrictions. As aresult, citizens desiring to acquire or replace their IDcards had to travel to department capitals to requestthem, a prohibitive expense for many poor people.

Two factors heightened concern in 2006 overshortfalls in cédula issuance. One was the CSE’s salu-tary decision not to permit people to vote via ad hocarrangements, a practice that had been allowed in sev-eral previous elections, citing fear that the integrity ofthe election would be compromised. In other words,the CSE refused to countenance people without cédu-

A Supreme Electoral Council staff member transfers the infor-mation from a newly produced cédula (voting document) intoa record book before it is turned over to a citizen.

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las voting with the aid of witnesses to attest to theiridentity, as had occurred in 2001. This ruling made itimperative for one to possess a valid cédula if one want-ed to vote in November.

A second factor was suspicion in parts of civil soci-ety and the citizenry at large that the lack of cédulas inthe hands of younger voters derived not from apathynor from practical obstacles in obtaining the docu-ments, but rather from lack of interest among themagistrates of a politicized CSE in seeing the electoralroll grow in normal fashion. Instead, some theorized,the CSE preferred to see growth in the roll subtlyrestricted while both the magistrates and their respec-tive parties engaged in a parallel distribution of votingdocuments to their supporters to the detriment of par-ties lacking representation on the CSE. These tactics,it was held, could significantly bias the composition ofthe effective electorate to the disadvantage of newpolitical forces participating in elections for the firsttime. Data from a June 2006 survey by the CostaRican polling organization CID-Gallup argued againstthe validity of this suspicion. The survey first foundthat some 16 percent of Nicaraguans still lackedcédulas. However, the absence of these documents wasdistributed fairly evenly across the party spectrum, sug-gesting that political bias had not affected thedistribution of the documents to that point.

Whatever the reality of the situation, cédulaissuance and delivery became hot issues during the2006 election process, provoking efforts among civilsociety organizations to assist voters in obtaining thesedocuments. A leader in this endeavor was theMovement for Nicaragua, a civic group that hadsprung up in late 2004 to oppose the constitutionalreforms passed that year by the National Assembly. Inparticular, the group opened local offices in Managuaand other cities to help people to obtain birth certifi-cates from the civil registry. Due to the chronicunderreporting of births (and deaths) in rural areas ofthe country, this was the first, and for many people themost difficult, step in obtaining a cédula.

To speed up the cédula process, the Movement for

Nicaragua advocated that municipal authorities issuebirth certificates free of charge and that the CSE openadditional windows in the central registry of personsin Managua to attend to the large flow of requests forcédulas. Movement leaders also urged the CSE to heavi-ly promote cédula issuance among high school studentswho had recently come of voting age and collaboratewith civil society in an effort to distribute cédulas thathad been requested and manufactured but not yetdelivered to the voters.

As part of its May recommendations, The CarterCenter had urged the CSE to cooperate with civil soci-ety initiatives in this area and intensify its efforts toproduce and deliver identity cards to all citizensrequesting them. In June, the CSE reopened its munic-ipal offices and began receiving applications for cédulasin the normal fashion. Over the course of 2006, theCSE claimed to have produced a total of 420,125 cédu-las. Of these, 190,367 were new issues, while 215,702were replacements and 14,056 were renewals. In con-trast, in 2005 the CSE had issued some 153,000 newcédulas and replaced nearly 56,000 others. Theseincreases indicated the strong interest of citizens inparticipating in the November voting but also reflectedthe necessity of the cédula for many other transactions,such as opening a bank account, obtaining credit, qual-ifying for a drivers license, serving in the military, andholding most jobs.

The Center also recommended collaborationbetween the election authorities and civic organiza-tions in improving the election list. Ethics andTransparency (ET) decided to study the 2004 nationalelectoral roll to determine its current quality, conduct-ing a two-way audit based on samples drawnconcurrently from the roll and from the population.When the roll itself was sampled and attempts weremade in local neighborhoods to verify the informationcontained there, 25.3 percent of individuals in thesample were found to have died or emigrated from thecountry. This figure was not surprising, as it wasknown that the roll is not properly updated due tononreporting of deaths and migratory movements

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among the population. More puzzling was the findingthat in more than 10 percent of cases, the person onthe roll had never lived at the address listed, and, insome cases, the address itself did not exist.

The person-to-roll audit, which drew a sample fromthe population and then checked the informationobtained against the roll, uncovered other data of inter-est. In the most intriguing case, the names of 10percent of people who had valid cédulas and were sam-pled in this audit could not be found on the rolls. Thiswas anomalous: In theory, Nicaragua’s electoral rollsimply assembles photographic images of all the cédulasrequested by the citizenry, meaning that anyone whohas asked for an ID card should perforce be found onthe roll unless the person has expressly requested to beremoved. Whatever the explanation for the finding,such citizens would surely need the help of Articles 41and 116 to vote at their local polling stations inNovember. In addition, 17 percent of those sampledwere no longer living at the addresses listed on the roll;this underscored the need for a thorough updating ofaddresses so that voters would be able to cast ballots atthe polling stations nearest to their homes.

THE CENTER OBSERVESCITIZEN VERIFICATIONAn opportunity for Nicaraguans to update the address-es and other information contained in the voters listhad been foreseen in the election calendar. In two suc-cessive weekends during the month of June, the CSEcalled on all voters to visit their local polling stations,called juntas receptoras de votos, or JRVs, to verify thattheir information was correct and request changes ifneeded. Prior to this event, the U.S.-based electionassistance organization IFES, in collaboration with theCSE, compiled the names and addresses of thousandsof Nicaraguans to whom cédulas had been issued inprior years but who had never come to pick them up.During the citizen verification, books filled with thesenames would be posted in all polling stations so thatpeople knew the cédulas were available to be collected.In addition, if a cédula had been requested but notmanufactured, other lists noted the point in theprocess at which it was stalled, and people who cameto verify in the hope of picking up their cédulas weredirected to the proper authority.

During the second weekend in which voters couldvisit their polling stations to verify their information,June 17 and 18, The Carter Center fielded a team of11 experienced election observers to observe the pro-ceedings. Fanning out to cover 13 departments andthe South Atlantic Autonomous Region, the observersrecorded relatively low citizen participation in the veri-fication exercise and a complete absence of problems.The two verification weekends resulted in 234,508address changes requested by citizens being incorporat-ed into the electoral roll. Although substantial, thisnumber was lower than expected. It may also havebeen significantly below the maximum number ofchanges needed. If the CSE was correct in estimatingthat the “real” electoral roll (excluding the dead andmigrants) consisted of about 2.8 million voters, and ifthe Ethics and Transparency organization was correctin finding that 17 percent of those voters needed tochange their addresses in order to cast ballots close to

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The Supreme Electoral Council hung banners to identify thelocation of voting centers during the citizen verification process.

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chief of mission for the rest of the Center’s 2006observation effort, and political consultant David R.Dye. President Carter arrived the day after the untime-ly death from heart failure of MRS candidate HertyLewites, who was immediately replaced by his runningmate, Edmundo Jarquín.

Over the course of three days, President Carter andhis team met with Nicaraguans and foreigners involvedin a multitude of ways in the election race and process.After courtesy calls on President Enrique Bolaños, for-mer President Violeta Chamorro, and Cardinal MiguelObando y Bravo, the delegation met with presidentialcandidates José Rizo (PLC), Eduardo Montealegre(ALN-PC), and Edmundo Jarquín (MRS) and with rep-resentatives of Alternative for Change (AC) to heartheir views concerning the election process as it wasunfolding. Only FSLN candidate Daniel Ortegadeclined the invitation to meet with the former U.S.president. The election missions of the Organization ofAmerican States and the domestic observer groups ETand IPADE also gave their evaluations of the process toPresident Carter and Center staff, as did diplomatsfrom Europe and Latin America.

The delegation’s key meeting was with the authori-home, a demand to amend some 475,000 addressespotentially existed in the population. Due to the limit-ed public response to the first two verificationopportunities, however, the CSE refrained from callingpeople to a third weekend. The CSE’s final statisticsindicated that 812,255 citizens of an estimated total of3,154,405 had verified their data during the course ofthe verification exercise.

PRESIDENT CARTER VISITSFrom July 3 through 6, former U.S. President JimmyCarter visited Nicaragua to make a firsthand assess-ment of the developing electoral situation. PresidentCarter was accompanied by his wife, Rosalynn, co-founder of The Carter Center, and by Center officialsJennifer McCoy and Shelley McConnell, director andsenior associate director, respectively, of the Center’sAmericas Program. Also participating were formerBolivian ambassador to the United States JaimeAparicio, whom President Carter publicly named as

Carter Center observers (shown standing behind desk) werepresent during the voter verification process in whichNicaraguans visited their local polling stations to verify thelocations where they would vote in November and to ensurethey were on the electoral roll.

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Roberto Rivas, president of the Supreme Electoral Council,welcomes President and Mrs. Carter.

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ties of the CSE, who were led by President RobertoRivas Reyes, Vice President Emmet Lang of the FSLN,and Liberal Magistrate Luis Benavides. During a pressconference at the close of his visit, President Carterinformed Nicaraguans that the CSE had assured thedelegation that a certain number of essential procedur-al steps would be taken: Pending election regulationswould be issued in timely fashion; sufficient creden-tials would be produced and opportunely distributedto domestic observers; the CSE would post the elec-tion day tallies by JRV on its Web site as they wereentered into the tallying computer; and internationalelection observers would have access to the postelec-tion dispute resolution process in the municipal anddepartmental election councils (called CEMs andCEDs, respectively).

President Carter’s press remarks addressed threeadditional issues related to the election process.Responding to concerns expressed by Nicaraguans onmany sides, President Carter said categorically that“The Carter Center strongly opposes foreign interven-tion in Nicaragua’s election process.” He also urgedthe CSE leadership to ensure equitable distribution ofthe vote board personnel nominated by political par-ties other than the FSLN and the PLC. This

recommendation stemmed from discontent at the wayin which representatives of other parties had beenassigned to departmental and municipal electioncouncils in June. Finally, President Carter under-scored the Center’s concern about slowness in cédulaissuance and seconded the above-mentioned sugges-tions of the Movement for Nicaragua for acceleratingcédula production and delivery.

CIVIL SOCIETY SEEKS TO POSTPONECÉDULA DEADLINEIn the weeks following President Carter’s July visit, theissues of ID-card manufacture and distribution becamemore salient. A study by Ethics and Transparency pro-vided a timely quantitative assessment of theseproblems. In early May, Ethics and Transparency beganfollowing a small sample of 537 citizens as they request-ed their documents and, in many cases, pestered theCSE to provide them. By early September, only 101 ofthe 537 people had actually received their cards, andonly if they had been persistent in demanding them.Many others had been told repeatedly by local CSEofficials to come back later to pick up their documentswithout specifying a date.

Meanwhile, the Movement for Nicaragua contin-ued as the paladin in efforts to spur both municipalauthorities and the CSE into more decisive action toproduce and distribute voting documents. TheMovement for Nicaragua complained about what itbelieved to be deliberate inaction on the part of localauthorities in responding to the requests for birth cer-tificates generated by its local offices. By mid-July, afterfive months in operation, these offices had received5,700 such requests, but local mayoralties and theirassociated civil registries of persons had reportedlyaccepted only 2,134 of these for processing. At laterstages of the cédula generation process, the CSE hadissued just 1,530 cédula stubs (for pickup of the docu-ments when ready), and a mere 60 citizens had actuallyreceived a manufactured voting card.

In view of these results, the Movement forNicaragua and other sectors began to suspect that the

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President and Mrs. Carter meet with ALN-PC presidentialcandidate Eduardo Montealegre in July.

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electoral and municipal authorities had slowed thepace of cédula issuance for partisan purposes. The CSEresponded with the allegation that the Movement forNicaragua and other forces, including the Bolaños gov-ernment, were attempting to discredit its work. Aparticular matter of controversy was the Movement’sclaim that as many as 800,000 people still lacked cédu-las; both the CSE and domestic and internationalobserver organizations found this claim greatly exagger-ated. In a climate of uncertainty, the Movementnevertheless mobilized public opinion as well as sup-port from the business community for a proposal toextend the cédula issuance deadline to give more timefor citizens to act. Whether it happened as a conse-quence of this pressure or for other reasons, theNational Assembly voted Aug. 4 to postpone the lastday for receiving cédula requests for two weeks, fromAug. 6 to Aug. 21. Along with the CSE, the domesticobserver groups Ethics and Transparency and IPADEwarned that this move would slow a very tight election

calendar, potentially creating fur-ther difficulties.

By this point, the CSE’stense relations with parts ofNicaraguan civil society were mir-rored in the mistrust it displayedtoward some internationalobservers, notably the electoralmission of the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS). On Aug.1, at the behest of the Bolañosgovernment, OAS mission chiefGustavo Fernández, a former for-eign minister of Bolivia, gave averbal report to the OAS perma-nent council in Washington,D.C., on the election situation inNicaragua. In particular,Fernández commented on thepartisan makeup of the electoralinstitution as part of the back-drop to the problems plaguing

the election process. CSE Vice President Emmet Langresponded Aug. 5, rejecting the idea that the CSE’soperations were in any way partisan and decrying asupposed lack of respect by the OAS for the work ofNicaragua’s election authorities. The CSE magistrateinsinuated that the regional organization was overstep-ping its bounds and interfering in his country’selectoral affairs.

Several weeks later, Sandinista presidential candi-date Daniel Ortega went further, calling the OASobservation of Nicaragua’s election “humiliating” andimplying that it formed part of a campaign orchestrat-ed by the Bush administration to discredit theelections in which he believed he was destined toemerge victorious. These remarks capped a period ofmonths in which the Sandinista leader had periodi-cally expressed a lack of confidence in electionobservers in general and advised his supporters to bewary of them.

Members of Movement for Nicaragua voice their concerns over the slow pace of cédulaissuance at a July meeting with President Carter.

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THE CAMPAIGNS COMMENCEIn the midst of this developing complication, TheCarter Center established its mission office inManagua in August and began an ongoing observationthat would continue through November. As part of theobservation plan, seven long-term observers arrived,received training, and were deployed on Sept. 8 toLeón, Granada, Estelí, Matagalpa, Juigalpa, Bluefields,and Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas), where they began monitor-ing the campaign and election preparations. During aperiod of more than two months, the long-termobservers would provide the mission leadership withdetailed reports on the campaign and election prepara-tions in Nicaragua’s 15 departments and twoautonomous regions while they prepared the ground

for the coming of many short-term observers in lateOctober.

The opening of the Center’s mission headquarterscoincided with the onset of the official 75-day cam-paign period, which began on Aug. 19. The campaignstyles of several of the contenders were quite novel, notleast in the case of Daniel Ortega, a former revolution-ary leader making his third attempt to regain thepresidency. Regarded as an adherent of the hard-lineLatin American left, Ortega reassured businessmenthat his support for Hugo Chávez’s alternative eco-nomic arrangements (“ALBA”) did not imply anannulment of the Central America Free TradeAgreement with the United States, approved inNicaragua the prior year. Pledging to work for unityand national reconciliation, the FSLN campaign fur-thermore strove mightily to dissipate longstandingfears that a victory by Ortega would bring a return tothe hardships of the 1980s Contra war. The Sandinistacandidate declined offers to participate in debateforums with his rivals, while his party eschewed thelarge-scale rallies that had been the hallmark of previ-ous campaigns in favor of small reconciliationmeetings and door-to-door visits to voters. Even hiscampaign colors changed from the traditional FSLNred and black to soft pastels of purple and pink with acampaign theme of love and reconciliation.

With these low-key tactics, the Ortega team evident-ly hoped to avoid losing votes to an alternative left-wingcandidate, Edmundo Jarquín, a former Sandinista diplo-mat who had become the standard bearer of the MRSon July 4. Jarquín portrayed himself as a moderate leftoption combining responsibility in economic policy (thecandidate had long been a high official of the Inter-American Development Bank) with deep concern foralleviating the plight of the poor majority. The MRScandidate moreover became a media favorite by mock-ing his own appearance, calling himself “the ugly fellow”(el feo) to ingratiate himself with the humblest of ordi-nary citizens. However, lack of campaign financing anda weak organization hampered the MRS from undertak-ing a truly national campaign.

As the campaigns commenced, political propaganda appearedon almost every telephone pole and blank wall.

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On the Liberal side of the spectrum, former vicepresident turned PLC candidate José Rizo Castellónattempted steadfastly to get out from under the ballastof Arnoldo Alemán, who despite serving a 2003 prisonsentence for fraud and money laundering was still thePLC’s top leader. Under new leadership, José Rizoasserted, pact making between the PLC and the FSLNwould come to an end. With “Nicaragua First!” as apunchy campaign motto, Rizo advertisements over-whelmed voters with detailed promises to improve thecountry’s economic infrastructure and social services.In contrast to the FSLN, the PLC organized the largestrallies of the 2006 campaign, choosing to display politi-cal muscle to convince voters that it was still a force tobe reckoned with.

The newest of the contenders, EduardoMontealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance stoodas a dissident Liberal staunchly opposed to the PLCmaking pacts with the FSLN. Montealegre also project-ed the image of a successful professional who couldextend the macroeconomic accomplishments of theoutgoing Bolaños administration, in which he hadserved as finance minister and chief of staff. His han-

dlers nevertheless sought ways to overcome the percep-tion that, as a banker and scion of a traditionalupper-class family, he lacked social concern or the com-mon touch. Montealegre’s campaign ads thushammered relentlessly on the promise of “more andbetter jobs” and economic opportunities for all underthe government of the ALN-PC. Despite doubts aboutits organizational abilities among potential campaignfunders, the novel Liberal-Conservative alliance wasable to put together a respectable campaign apparatusfor so young a party.

With a wider range of candidates, the level of cam-paign debate in 2006 was generally higher than inprevious contests. But negative campaigning by the twoLiberal contenders prevailed in the late stages. Pollfindings suggested that an even split in the Liberal votebetween Eduardo Montealegre and José Rizo wouldhand the FSLN an easy win. Survey analysts alsoargued that a sizable swing vote (voto útil) was waitingto be cast for the candidate who could convincinglyportray himself as the man able to beat Daniel Ortega.To attract this vote, the Liberal candidates took turnsswiping at one another in their campaign spots while

Carter Center staff Shelley McConnell (left) and JenniferMcCoy advise President Carter prior to a meeting with apresidential candidate.

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Daniel Ortega’s campaign included large billboards erected incities and rural areas promoting peace and reconciliation.

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their parties dredged up televised images of Sandinistarule in the 1980s in an attempt to frighten the voterswith the specter of Ortega’s return to power.

PROCEDURAL CONCERNSDespite the aforementioned tensions, at the beginningof September the election process appeared to be basi-cally on track. Because no fresh quarrels between theparty factions in the CSE had erupted, quorum washolding and the logistical preparations for Novemberappeared to advance steadily despite the delay in thecédula deadline. Technical expert Ronald Gould, a for-mer official of Elections Canada, reported to TheCarter Center in early September that voting proce-dures, logistics, and operations appeared to be wellorganized but recommended that an information tech-nology expert assess the strengths and weaknesses ofthe transmission system due to gaps in the phone com-pany Enitel’s coverage of the country and thepossibility that power outages could affect the process.Noted Venezuelan jurist Pedro Nikken complementedthis technical assessment with a review of the political

situation for the Friends of the Democratic Charter, agroup of former presidents, prime ministers, and cabi-net members based at The Carter Center.

Three issues loomed as potential stumbling blocksto a satisfactory process outcome. The first was theslowness with which the CSE came forth with key reg-ulations, in particular one concerning the ways inwhich the magistrates would eventually deal with thechallenges (impugnaciones) emanating from the pollingstations on voting day and subsequent appeals.Because the November balloting was expected to beclose, especially in National Assembly races, fear hadarisen that the contending parties could vie with oneanother to alter or challenge the vote results arbitrarilyfor partisan advantage. Clear rules for the adjudicationof disputes were essential to avoid preferential treat-ment and subsequent conflict.

An initial version of the challenges regulationissued Sept. 5 met with criticism from several politicalparties as well as from observers on the grounds thatfiling challenges would be too easy: The refusal of evenone of the three members of a given voting board tosign a tally sheet would be sufficient to annul theresults. The opposition led the magistrates to revisethe regulation omitting this provision. The CarterCenter and other observers noted, however, that theregulation still lacked specific criteria to guide the mag-istrates in deciding how to handle cases in whichelection tally sheets had been altered and party pollwatchers requested their annulment. A symposium onelection challenges organized by the Institute forDemocracy (IPADE) and the National DemocraticInstitute (NDI) on Sept. 12 strongly recommended anaddition specifying that if cases arose in which thealteration of tally sheets made it impossible to detectthe will of the voters, the CSE should proceed underArticle 131 of the electoral law to open the ballotboxes and recount the votes, a procedure the CSEappeared reluctant to incorporate. The Carter Centerwould second this recommendation in a statement inlate October.

A second issue concerned fairness in the distribu-

MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin mocked hisown appearance, using the campaign slogan “Vote for the uglyfellow who wants a beautiful Nicaragua” on billboards.

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documentation was not in order or had not been sub-mitted on time. It was difficult for Carter Centerobservers to judge with precision to what extent thiswas actually the case or whether the parties’ documen-tation was genuinely deficient or late. The MRS alsoclaimed to have been unjustly excluded from trainingsessions for the second members. In sum, the partyargued, official practices were effectively excludingmany potential party workers from occupying theirspots. In Managua, although the initial decision of theCEM was to divide the posts in one-third chunks to allthree parties, at the end of a long, drawn-out battle, theMRS received only 125 posts in almost 2,000 JRVs.

In this and other areas, the shortfall of secondmembers thus created was filled by de oficio appoint-ments by the CEMs of nominees from other parties,at times even from the FSLN and PLC. The unevenrepresentation fueled suspicions that a scenario wasunfolding in which two or more of the parties repre-sented on the JRVs would somehow confabulate toalter the election results or their transmission inareas where races were close. Among ALN and MRSparty workers, lack of confidence in the CSE deep-ened as a result.

A third major concern revolved around the deliv-ery of voting documents. According to official CSEstatistics, the final 2006 voter roll had swollen to3,665,141, an unusually large 22.3 percent gain overthe 2001 list and 10.2 percent increase over that usedfor the 2004 local balloting. In light of this strikingincrement, concern that the roll was being unfairlyunrestricted waned, and domestic observers Ethics andTransparency and IPADE conceded that despiteknown deficiencies, Nicaragua’s voters list was notnotably inferior in quality to its average LatinAmerican counterpart. Assurances by the CSE that itwould again permit citizens to vote under the provi-sions of Article 41 further allayed concern about thepractical effects of any problems with the roll thatmight occur. Several parties nevertheless complainedof receiving the final list very late. This delay allowedthe parties scant time to check for errors or anomalies,

tion of so-called “second members” (actually the thirdposition) in the three-member local polling stations.Law 331 allocated the first two positions on theseboards to the two largest parties judged by the resultsof the previous elections, reserving the third positionto the other participating forces. Regulations specifyingprecisely how the latter posts would be distributedamong other parties were lacking, however. In 2006the CSE appeared to have given the MunicipalElection Councils (CEMs) latitude to decide these cri-teria themselves, meaning the rules varied from placeto place. While a division of the second membersamong the three new parties (ALN-PC, MRS, AC) inequal parts was one possible criterion, CEMs in someplaces decided to distribute the seats not by thirds butin proportion to the percentages of slates of candidatessubmitted by the parties, a practice that gave the betterorganized contenders an advantage.

The application of these rules became anothersource of controversy. The MRS and to a lesser extentthe ALN charged CEM officials with arbitrarily discard-ing many of their slates on the grounds that their

Long-term observer Anais Ruiz observed an FSLN rally inBluefields, where she met presidential candidate Daniel Ortega.

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contributing to their mistrust of the CSE.Due to the growth of the voter roll, an enormous

number of new and replacement cédulas, approximately420,125, had been produced in 2006 and had to bedistributed to the voters by Nov. 5. By mid-August, theCSE realized it had insufficient time to produce anddistribute full-fledged cédulas to all those who hadasked for them. It therefore decided to manufacture214,434 supplementary documents, an alternative formof election identification containing the citizen’s pic-ture but easier to produce. These supletorios were to beused only for voting purposes and would be collectedafter the voting concluded. Supplementary voting

cards had been used previously and presented no prob-lems in principle. By September, concern was growing,however, over the very short time available to produceand distribute these supletorios along with roughly100,000 newly manufactured cédulas to voters.

On Oct. 19, The Carter Center issued its final pre-election statement with recommendations for resolvingthe problems remaining in the election picture. Givenlingering concern about postelection challenges spark-ing disturbances, the Center’s statement included theabove-mentioned considerations concerning the rulesfor resolving challenges, calling in addition on the par-ties to exercise restraint in lodging frivolous challenges.

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At an FSLN rally in Bluefields, supporters wear party baseball caps as they await candidate speeches.

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Worry over problems with vote transmission com-plicated the possible postelection scenario. InManagua, the CSE had decided to electronically trans-mit all of the capital city’s tally sheets from thenational baseball stadium instead of from diverse trans-mission centers as it did in 2001, apparently forreasons of economy. The ALN and MRS feared thatthe agglomeration of thousands of election workersattempting to transmit their tallies at the same timecould lead to disturbances in the sports facility, as hadoccurred on one previous occasion. To guard againstthis, The Carter Center suggested that CSE officialsundertake transmission trials to accurately assess theCSE’s capacity to handle the flow of people and docu-ments. The Center furthermore urged the authoritiesto provide party poll watchers in the CSE’s nationalcomputing center with copies of transmitted tallysheets in as prompt a manner as possible so that thesecould be checked rapidly against copies the parties hadcollected in the polling stations.

From then on to voting day, the delivery of votingdocuments to the citizens became the prime issue ofconcern in the electoral process. Following the two-week extension of the Aug. 6 deadline for cédulaapplications, the CSE had to race to produce hundredsof thousands of cédulas and supletorios, then transportthem to the offices of the Municipal ElectoralCouncils for people to pick up. These offices alreadyheld 140,000 cédulas manufactured in prior years thatcitizens had never bothered to retrieve. While this lastfact did not occasion much concern, The CarterCenter urged both election officials and civil society tosearch for ways to ensure delivery of the greatest possi-ble number of newly issued cédulas and documentossupletorios to the voters.

By Oct. 29, the CSE claimed it had delivered atotal of 140,911 documentos supletorios, about two thirdsof those manufactured. By this point, however, reportshad surfaced in the media and from Carter Centerlong-term observers in the field that delivery of docu-ments was being handled in some cases not by officialsof local election bodies but by activists of political par-ties, especially the FSLN and PLC. Such reportsreinforced longstanding suspicions that a parallel andbiased distribution of voting documents was underwayin an attempt to give the parties that controlled theCSE an unfair advantage over their rivals. In this con-text, Jaime Aparicio, the Carter Center’s mission chiefin Nicaragua, visited the affected departments andthen called on the CSE in Oct. 31 statements to themedia to investigate the reports and, where necessary,to bring the anomalous situation under control.

The election race generated less tension in thefinal stretch. Despite the possibility of sizable last-minute vote swings, opinion polls consistentlypredicted a victory by former President Daniel Ortegaby a large-enough margin to make a second round ofvoting unnecessary. Although departmental racesmight be close, a growing perception of certainty aboutthe presidential outcome lessened fears of possible sce-narios following voting in which large numbers ofchallenges would be made to tally sheets, which wouldcause disturbances involving supporters of the con-tending parties. Nonetheless, The Carter Center put inplace a computerized mapping system (geographicinformation system, or GIS) that would indicate, basedon preliminary vote results, where such challenges hadthe greatest chance of impacting vote outcomes andinstructed its observers to pay close attention to resolu-tion of challenges.

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Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter personallyheaded the Carter Center’s delegation to theNov. 5, 2006, Nicaraguan election. Two distin-

guished Latin Americans, former Peru PresidentAlejandro Toledo and former Panama PresidentNicolás Ardito Barletta, accompanied Carter as co-lead-ers and gave the delegation strategic help. Otherparticipants included staff leaders of the Center’sAmericas Program, Jennifer McCoy and ShelleyMcConnell, who had continued the operative direc-tion of the election mission in Atlanta, assisted bylocal Chief of Mission Jaime Aparicio and politicaladviser David R. Dye.

Sixty-two Carter Center observers deployed earlySunday morning, Nov. 5, to monitor the balloting andits aftermath throughout Nicaragua. The deploymentof the bulk of the observers was guided by a geograph-ic information systems (GIS) analysis and by anattempt to randomize routes to increase the statisticalvalue of the data they would record (see Appendices Cand D for details about these preparations).

Center observers visited 412 polling stations, orJRVs, out of a total of 11,274 in the country’s 15departments and two autonomous regions. At theopening of the polls, as expected, voting board presi-dents and first members were found to be drawn inequal numbers from the ranks of the FSLN and PLC.In view of the controversy surrounding JRV secondmembers, it is noteworthy that of the 320 cases inwhich voting board personnel were willing to revealtheir party affiliations, 152 were found to represent theALN-PC, 69 the MRS, and 62 the AC. In 27 cases ofsecond members, these personnel were drawn from theranks either of the FSLN or the PLC

On average, four party poll watchers (fiscales) werepresent at each JRV opening. Poll watchers from theFSLN, PLC, and ALN-PC were present in virtually allthe JRVs surveyed, while the MRS fielded poll watch-

ers in about 80 percent and the AC in 29 percent ofJRVs visited. Domestic observers from Ethics andTransparency were on hand in 327 JRVs and fromIPADE in 76. Carter Center and other internationalobservers were for the most part received cordially byJRV officials, although in some places, members drawnfrom the FSLN initially denied them access or restrict-ed their ability to gather information.

During the day, Center observers found the votingeverywhere to be orderly and peaceful and problems tobe absolutely minimal. Fully 98 percent of the stationshad their voters lists clearly posted, a full complementof materials was found in almost all JRVs visited, andvoting was suspended briefly during the course of theday in only four cases. In 18 polling stations canvassedin the late afternoon, the observers found that a totalof 337 citizens had been allowed to vote even thoughthey were unable to find their names on the electoralroll, while only four were turned away under the same

ELECTION DAY AND ITS AFTERMATH

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Voters lists hang outside of polling stations to assist voters inlocating the voting center where they have been assigned.

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circumstance. Given that these voters represented near-ly 8 percent of those on the lists, this finding againdemonstrated the relevance of applying Articles 41 and116 of the election law as the CSE had decided.

After the 6 p.m. closing of the polls, Carter Centerobservers monitored the vote count in 28 JRVs.Everywhere, the count proceeded calmly and in order,although in some cases so slowly as to conclude in thewee hours on Nov. 6. On average, party poll watchersfrom four parties participated, and all received copies ofthe tally sheets for their party’s records. Significantly, inview of pre-election expectations, the observers wit-nessed only one challenge to a vote tally being lodged,by the PLC in Boaco department. Observers subse-quently monitored tally sheets being transmitted fromthe offices of the telephone company Enitel, a processwhich also transpired without any hitches. Contrary tothe fears of some, the reception and transmission of1,998 tally sheets in the national stadium in Managuaoccurred without incident.

While Center observers went about their business,Presidents Carter, Toledo, and Barletta met in

Managua with the CSE and with the heads of the elec-tion missions of the Organization of American States(OAS) and the European Union (EU) to hear theirevaluations of the process approaching culmination.The delegation leaders then commenced a round ofinterviews with candidates Ortega, Montealegre, Rizo,and Jarquín, who conveyed their election forecasts tothe former presidents.

The CSE’s first report of returns came at 3 a.m.on Nov. 6 with roughly 16 percent of tally sheets com-puted. Confirming the prediction of late opinionsurveys, these early results indicated that DanielOrtega would win the presidential election with a 10-point spread over his nearest rival. At about 6 a.m.,without authorization from the CSE, Ethics andTransparency released results from 85 percent of itsquick-count sample; these also showed Ortega leadingEduardo Montealegre of the ALN-PC by 38 to 29 per-cent. Together with its National Democratic Instituteadvisers, Ethics and Transparency briefed PresidentCarter and his co-leaders on details of the count laterin the day. With minor variations, this margin of dif-

Former Panama President Nicolás Ardito Barletta andShelley McConnell, senior associate director of the AmericasProgram, inquire about security on election day.

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Carter Center observer Sandra Flores travels by boat on theRio San Juan to visit polling stations that would otherwisebe difficult to reach.

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ference between Ortega and Montealegre was destinedto hold up as the official returns slowly trickled in.

President Carter received Daniel Ortega and hiswife, Rosario Murillo, late Monday afternoon to con-gratulate them on Ortega’s excellent electoralperformance that would soon be announced as givingthe Sandinista leader an unquestioned victory.Following the meeting, Ortega appeared on televisionto assure Nicaraguans that all was calm. Ortega wentout of his way to promise domestic and foreign busi-ness representatives that their investments andproperty rights would be fully respected under the newSandinista government. The next day, Carter and hisstaff received a delegation of Nicaraguan business lead-ers who conveyed their expectations concerning thevictory of the former revolutionary as president ofNicaragua. In apparent response to his assurances,most subsequently pledged their cooperation with thepresident-elect. A diverse group of analysts drawn frompolitical and media circles also presented their viewson the implications of Ortega’s victory to PresidentCarter, his co-leaders, and the rest of the delegation.

Due to the slowness with which official results werereported, the defeated presidential candidatesdemurred in recognizing the Sandinista leader’s tri-umph. But after the CSE announced the results from91.5 percent of the voting tables at 6 p.m. Tuesday Nov.7, second-place finisher Eduardo Montealegre concededdefeat and traveled to Ortega’s home to extend his con-gratulations. While the president-elect pledged himselfto a new political culture of dialogue, the leader ofNicaragua’s new second-largest party promised that hisopposition to the future Sandinista government wouldbe constructive. Center officials called Montealegreafterward to express satisfaction at this stance.

MONITORING CHALLENGESAfter Nov. 6, no doubt existed concerning who hadwon the presidency. The outcomes of department-levellegislative races were still to be determined, and theways in which even a small number of challenges tolocal-level vote tallies were adjudicated could potential-

ly bear on the distribution of National Assembly seatsamong the parties. For more than a week after theNov. 5 voting, therefore, Carter Center long-termobservers and medium-term observers remained postedin all departments and regions to observe the process-ing of election results and the challenges and appealsarising from the vote count.

The processing of challenges occurred in twostages, at each of which party poll watchers and elec-tion observers were theoretically allowed to be present.Among other duties, the Municipal Election Councils(CEMs) were responsible for resolving arithmeticalerrors in local voting board tallies and attempted toresolve the challenges that had been lodged by the pollwatchers attending the voting tables on election night.Each CEM was then charged with producing a provi-sional municipal tally sheet (sumatoria municipal)containing all the valid votes in its municipality. Thissummation, along with any corrections or challengesthat could not be resolved in timely fashion by amajority vote of the three CEM members, passed tothe Departmental Election Council (CED) for furtherprocessing. The CED was charged with adjudicating

An unarmed electoral police officer (left) stands guard at the doorto a polling station in Rio San Juan as citizens wait to vote.

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any remaining challenges and producing a provisionaldepartmental tally (sumatoria departmental). Appeals ofdecisions were possible at both levels, meaning thatmunicipal-level poll watchers could appeal CEM deci-sions to the CED and department-level poll watcherscould appeal CED decisions to the CSE in Managua.

Despite assurances from CSE President Rivas thatCarter Center observers would be able to monitor thechallenges process freely, access to the deliberations ofthe CEMs and CEDs varied from place to place anddepended on local circumstances. Observers had rea-sonable access to several councils in which conflictswere apparent, as in Matagalpa, while in others, chal-lenges were resolved in private but sparked nodisagreement among the parties. Limitations notwith-standing, observers were usually able to determine whathappened through interviews with election officials andparty fiscales. In Managua, access was denied to resolu-tion of most of the challenges in the CEM, housed inthe national stadium, but party poll watchers were pres-ent and vouched for the honesty of the process.

Carter Center teams reported no significant prob-lems in Chinandega, Chontales,Granada, Madriz, NuevaSegovia, Jinotega, Río San Juan,or Rivas. In Rivas, the Center’sobserver witnessed the sole casein which a CED opened a ballotbox to recount the ballots inorder to decide a challenge,which was resolved to the satis-faction of all parties.

Seven other departments pre-sented problems of varyingdegrees of magnitude and com-plexity. In these, individualincidents were detected and cor-rective measures sometimes taken.

In León, tensions were evi-dent in the relations betweenelection officials affiliated withthe FSLN and poll watchers

To prevent duplicate voting on election day, members of the polling station apply indelibleink to the thumb of each voter after he or she votes.

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Former Peru President Alejandro Toledo and Jennifer McCoy,director of the Carter Center’s Americas Program, examine avoter’s ID document.

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from other parties. In León city, voting table pollwatchers claimed they were not allowed to observe thevote transmission in the local office of Enitel, whilemunicipal-level fiscales of the ALN and the PLC com-plained of being excluded from areas of the CEM inwhich they had been assigned by their parties to work.In the town of La Paz Centro, a confrontationoccurred on election night involving CEM officialsand party fiscales, subsequent to which a large numberof tally sheets were transferred to the CED in Leónwithout poll watcher supervision. Both ALN and PLCasked for these tallies to be annulled, a petition theCED denied. At the department level, the chief pollwatcher from the ALN furthermore charged that hismunicipal counterparts had not received copies of thesummary municipal tallies as required by law.

In the department of Estelí, the municipal tallysheet for San Nicolás arrived at the CED without thesignatures of the three members of the CEM, leadingthe ALN to challenge the results although it wasunclear whether the numbers had been changed. Bycontrast, in Managua, a Carter Center observerrequested a computer printout from a single JRV at theCEM and checked it against the physical tally sheetthat had arrived from the corresponding table, detect-ing a clear difference in the numbers. The ALN-PCreported other discrepancies of this kind.

The situation in Matagalpa was difficult to interpret.In the wake of the voting, conflict had surfaced inMatagalpa city between the president of the CEM, a PLCappointee, and the FSLN first member over the totals onthe municipal tally sheet. The CEM second member, anALN supporter, sided with FSLN in this controversy.During later processing in the CED, the number of votesfor ALN rose significantly as arithmetic corrections weremade to tally sheets. However, on Nov. 11, an ALNdepartment-level poll watcher charged that certain munic-ipal tallies had been altered on the department summaryduring the night after she had inadvertently fallen asleep.The national-level party does not appear to have pursuedthe matter, however, and submitted no further appealagainst the tallies in Matagalpa department.

In Boaco, where the ALN and the FSLN disputeda close race for the second departmental deputy, analliance between the PLC and the ALN worked toannul the results of a key voting board without clearjustification, reducing the FSLN’s slender lead. Thepresident of the CED, a Sandinista appointee, appealedthe result. A flagrant case of vote fraud meanwhileoccurred in the southern department of Carazo. Here,both MRS and ALN poll watchers detected that tallysheet figures for 19 JRVs had been changed in theprocess of being transcribed onto municipal summarysheets. These changes systematically disadvantaged theMRS, reducing its totals by 783 votes in favor of theFSLN. Denunciation of these alterations by The CarterCenter, other observers, and the media had the salu-tary effect of prompting an immediate correction by theelection authorities, who restored its rightful votes tothe MRS, permitting that party to win one of the threeNational Assembly seats in dispute in the department.

The most conflictive situation unfolded in Bilwi(Puerto Cabezas), capital of the North AtlanticAutonomous Region. At the regional election council,the PLC complained of tally sheet numbers being

Former Peru President Alejandro Toledo (left) greets PLCpresidential candidate José Rizo as President Carter looks on.

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changed by FSLN-linked officials in as many as six ofthe region’s eight municipalities. In one of these,Bonanza, a local PLC poll watcher claimed he hadbeen prevented from lodging a challenge to a disputedJRV total. In another, the town of Siuna, PLC fiscalesdetected discrepancies between their tally copies andthe originals in two JRVs. The party complained aboutthese situations both to The Carter Center and to thedomestic observers from Ethics and Transparency. ThePLC’s challenge to results in four municipalities wouldeventually pass to the CSE in Managua for resolution.

FINAL RESULTSBy the end of this process, Carter Center personnelwere sometimes the only observers left in key depart-ments where problems had arisen. After watchingthese problems unfold and accumulate, the Centercalled publicly on Nov. 14 for the CSE to resolve theirregularities that had arisen. The CSE published theprovisional final results from Nicaragua’s 2006 nation-al election the same evening.

Disappointing expectations, the CSE had failed toupdate the election results published on its Web sitesince Nov. 6 when it had reported tallies for 91.5 percent

of the voting tables. In the new, near-final summation,winning FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortegareceived 38.0 percent of the vote, Eduardo Montealegre28.3 percent, José Rizo 27.1 percent, Edmundo Jarquín6.3 percent, and Edén Pastora 0.3 percent. The seats fordeputies in the National Assembly were provisionally dis-tributed as follows: 38 for the FSLN, 25 for the PLC, 22for the ALN-PC, and five for the MRS.

CSE President Roberto Rivas revealed that 121challenges to JRV tallies had been filed across thecountry, most of which had been resolved at themunicipal level. Only 30 challenges had managed toreach departmental election councils, and only 16eventually arrived at the CSE itself for decision.According to Rivas, none of these affected the out-come of any election race.

With the publication of these provisional figures,the political parties had a three-day period in which tofile appeals against the CSE’s tallies. Only the ALN-PCand the PLC availed themselves of this opportunity. Inthe ALN’s case, the appeal of the provisional finalresults challenged errors that party officials had detect-ed in the CSE’s summation of vote totals in the

Long-term observer Rene deVries informs President Carter,staff, and other Carter Center observers of his observations ofelection day in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region.

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The Carter Center held press conferences to informNicaraguans and the international community about theelection process.

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departments of Masaya and Estelí. In the former case,the error was obvious, and the CSE had agreed to cor-rect it even in advance of its eventual ruling.

The PLC’s appeal was more complicated andrevolved around the party’s challenges to summary talliesfor four municipalities in the North AtlanticAutonomous Region. The PLC directly charged the pres-ident of the Regional Electoral Council, FSLN-appointeeNery González, with altering the results for departmentaldeputies in these areas, thereby depriving the PLC of667 valid votes and one of the region’s three seats in thelegislature. Information in the hands of internationalobservers was insufficient to judge the validity of thePLC’s accusation, but Ethics and Transparency assertedthat its observers had recorded the data from all theJRVs in the municipalities involved and found these tocorrespond correctly with the tallies presented by thePLC. On Nov. 24, Ethics and Transparency publiclycharged that fraud had been committed against the PLCto the benefit of the FSLN and that the RegionalElectoral Council was covering for it.

The CSE proclaimed the victors in the presidentialand legislative races on Nov. 22, effectively ratifying theprovisional vote totals it had previously published andconfirming those identified a week earlier as winners.In the briefest of responses to the appeals it hadreceived, the magistrates amended the errant voteresults in Masaya but dismissed all other arguments bythe parties. In the most important case, they expresslyratified the ruling of the North Atlantic AutonomousRegion Regional Electoral Council in the challengebrought by the PLC. The CSE did not provide detailsof the appeals it had decided nor did it offer any rea-soning or justification for the decisions taken. In laterstatements to the media, however, CSE President Rivasindicated that the PLC’s suit had been rejected on pro-cedural grounds, namely that its appeals had not beenlodged at the proper level.

The council’s rulings affected the fates of two los-ing candidates in the presidential race. According tothe constitutional changes of 2000, the standard-bearerfor the runner-up party in the national elections auto-

matically becomes a deputy in the National Assembly.The CSE awarded this deputyship to EduardoMontealegre because the ALN-PC had won the second-largest number of votes for president, althoughanother party, the PLC, had won more deputies. The2000 amendments furthermore grant a seat in theincoming legislature to the nation’s outgoing presi-dent, who in this case was Enrique Bolaños. Thispotentially gave the ALN-PC 24 votes in the legislature.Defeated PLC candidate José Rizo, who had beenelected vice president along with Bolaños in 2001,claimed the right to serve as Bolaños’ alternate (alldeputies in the Nicaraguan legislature have substituteswho stand in for them as needed). The CSE deniedthis claim on the grounds that Rizo had resigned fromhis post in 2000 to run for the presidency. Citing thetext of the constitutional amendment, which appearsto give the alternate position to the vice president, whois popularly elected, Rizo announced he would appealthe CSE’s ruling to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court.

President Carter meets with former Argentina PresidentAlfonsin, a leader of the Organization of American States’observation mission to Nicaragua and member of the CarterCenter’s Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of theAmericas.

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Nov. 5, 2006, was the fourth time in the last 16years in which international observers havewatched a national election in Nicaragua

come to fruition. Foreign election monitors unani-mously concluded that the 2006 election conductedby the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) met interna-tional criteria for an acceptable election.

The Carter Center congratulates the Nicaraguanpeople for their display of civic consciousness over thecourse of the entire process. As has become customary,the ordinary citizens who worked as polling stationofficials and party poll watchers generally displayedexemplary dedication to their tasks while citizens exer-cised their right to vote with patience anddetermination. We furthermore congratulate PresidentDaniel Ortega Saavedra on his undisputed victory andhis presidential rivals for their prompt and uncondi-tional acceptance of the popular verdict. It isencouraging that despite the difficulties thatNicaragua’s young democracy has witnessed over theyears, the electoral process continues to be accepted byall actors as the vehicle for a peaceful transfer of powerfrom one government to another at constitutionallystipulated intervals.

The CSE also deserves its share of recognition forthe successful 2006 outcome. In a country where theelection system strives to bring the ballot box intoclose proximity with the voters, a veteran CSE admin-istration with internal scaffolding dating from the1980s demonstrated the organizational and logisticalcapacity necessary to make both the Atlantic Coastand the national elections happen in one year withminimal problems. In terms of delivering ballot boxesand papers to the voters, training voting board person-nel, and managing the flow of data transmission afterthe voting, the 2006 elections were arguably betterorganized than their counterparts in 2001 or 1996.

The success of the 2006 election in meeting inter-national standards does not mean, however, that all is

well with Nicaragua’s electoral system. After the 2001elections, The Carter Center expressed a hope thatinternational observation of Nicaragua’s electionswould become unnecessary over time and that whatev-er observation did take place would increasingly rest inthe hands of national election observers. Instead, the2006 elections in Nicaragua came to be more heavilyobserved than any of their recent predecessors since1990, with The Carter Center, the European Union,and the Organization of American States on handwith sizable contingents of monitors. Domestic organi-zations also fielded people in unprecedented numbersto observe the process.

Election observers can play a vital role in ratifyingthe legitimacy of a particular election process and evenhelp cement an election system over time. But repeatedrecourse to international election observation evenafter national organizations have developed a demon-strated capacity to fulfill their role should be a causefor concern. In essence, The Carter Center undertookits observation mission in 2006 because diverse politi-cal and civic organizations as well as prominentindividuals petitioned it to do so. These actors evinceda strong belief that, in the absence of internationalmonitoring, the constituted election authorities couldnot be relied on to conduct an election that was freeand fair. The reasons for their distrust go to the heartof key system problems that still require solution.

THE COSTS OF MISTRUSTIn its report on the 2001 elections, The Carter Centermade a lengthy series of recommendations for changesin Nicaragua’s electoral law and administration. Someof the recommendations revolved around aspects ofthe election law (Law 331 of Jan. 24, 2000) thatrestricted the presentation of new political options tothe voters. These included onerous requirements topresent signatures from 3 percent of all voters to registerboth parties and candidates. Though this stipulation

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was dropped after a subsequent court ruling, other stiffrequisites for forming parties and alliances and main-taining party registration after national elections arestill on the books. The 2000 law furthermore did awaywith nonparty candidacies for deputy, a measure thathas not been rescinded.

A second set of suggestions involved what theCenter judged to be a harmful politicization of theCSE and its apparatus, which had been wrought thesame year by the decision of the two major parties, thePLC and the FSLN, to name all the magistrates of anexpanded election council from their own ranks.Complementing this politicization of the CSE, the newlaw expressly dictated that the principal officials oflower-level election bodies would also be drawn fromthe major party ranks. Underscoring the impasses inCSE functioning which arose in 2001 as a result of thispoliticization, the Center recommended instead thatthe naming of election officials at all levels be put on aprofessional basis to ensure that decisions would benonpartisan, transparent, and technically well-founded.

Five years later, Nicaragua’s electoral power andadministration remain party based at all levels, fromthe magistrates of the CSE to the officials of local vot-ing boards. Election councils based on partyrepresentation are frequent in Latin America. However,in no other case is the division of power in an electionauthority part and parcel of a broad bipartisan agree-ment to share power in diverse parts of the state to theexclusion of other political forces. This overarching con-text makes Nicaragua’s election bodies not onlypartisan but uniquely prone to an excessive and damag-ing politicization with diverse effects, some of whichspill over from other public institutions.

As the foregoing narrative records, a lack of confi-dence permeated relations among many of the actorsinvolved in the 2006 process, affecting even the partiesrepresented in the CSE itself. That distrust created cer-tain problems directly while tending at the same timeto magnify the appearance of others and make meas-urement of their real dimensions more difficult. To

gauge the ramifications of this phenomenon, considerthe following:

■ Due to lack of confidence in the electoralbranch, the executive branch disbursed a funding levelfor the elections and normal operations that the CSEcomplained was insufficient.

■ Amidst jockeying for power between the partiescomposing the CSE, the PLC accused the FSLN ofplanning to manipulate the electoral rolls on theCaribbean Coast, using this accusation to justify arolling boycott of CSE deliberations that stretched forfive months. In other parties, suspicion about the ratónloco lingered long thereafter.

■ The ALN-PC and MRS initially feared that theparties controlling Nicaragua’s major institutionswould use their power to disqualify their candidatesfrom the presidential race and that the CSE would rat-ify their exclusion.

■ Parts of civil society and the party spectrum sus-pected that municipal and election authorities weredeliberately retarding the issuance of birth certificatesand the delivery of voting documents in order for thelarger parties to gain political advantage.

■ When the Bolaños government’s suspicions ofthe CSE’s intentions led it to request a report from theOrganization of American States’ election mission, theCSE responded with fear that the regional body wasattempting to undermine its authority, and the FSLNresponded with charges that the United States wasattempting to use the Organization of American Statesto discredit its upcoming election victory.

■ The ALN-PC and MRS parties suspected thatirregularities in the assignment of second members inpolling stations (JRVs) were designed to orchestrateconnivance among JRV members and fiscales to doctorelection results.

■ The same parties feared that their larger rivalswould create disorder during the transmission of voteresults in the national stadium to extract further politi-cal advantage.

■ Over an extended period, national observers

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worried needlessly that the CSE would impede timelydelivery of their credentials to prevent them from car-rying out their missions and to cover up anomalies.

■ Some parties and observer groups feared thatthe CSE wanted to reserve a wide margin of discretionto decide election challenges on a political basis.

As events transpired, distrust did not develop intoconfrontation. Nicaragua has been fortunate in that inall its elections, large margins of votes have separatedthe winning party from the losers in the balloting forpresident. However, when victory margins are narrow,conflict is more likely to occur. In this circumstance, itis crucial for an electionsystem to have a reserve oftrust among the politicalactors and the citizenry atlarge. Countries like CostaRica, in which a reservehas accumulated overtime, are able to process elections won by a hair’sbreadth and engender widespread acceptance of thevote. Other countries, such as Mexico, in which confi-dence has been built only recently, are prone to crisis ifballoting is very close.

Judging from its experience in 2006, Nicaragua is acountry in which the reserve of trust in the electionsystem is still shallow. A tendency exists in Nicaraguanpolitical culture to regard the examples of distrust enu-merated above as normal and manageable. In fact, thelevel and pervasiveness of the distrust evidenced inthese examples are very high. Toward the end of theprocess, moreover, some of the phenomena hauntingthe minds of the suspicious came to pass, albeit on asmall scale. Evidence of political bias in the distribu-tion of voting documents arose in certain areas. In thewake of the voting, attempts to change vote tallies arbi-trarily were detected in specific localities. The processterminated with a controversial decision by the CSE toratify vote results in the North Atlantic AutonomousRegion in spite of compelling evidence that they maynot be correct.

Given the wide margin by which Daniel Ortegawon the presidency, the above anomalies did not makeenough of a difference to anyone to challenge the fun-damental legitimacy of the process. Had the electionrace been much closer, however, and challenges to elec-tion tallies consequently more numerous, thesephenomena might well have erupted on a much largerscale and occasioned significant postelection conflict.Such conflict is a situation that Nicaragua’s electionsystem is not currently prepared to confront. Neitherwill it be prepared in future elections to do so unlessthe core problem of the system’s politicization is

resolved. The lack of confi-dence that permeates therelations among the actorsin the system is not likely towane until such time asparty representation in elec-tion bodies is replaced by

the appointment of apolitical officials of recognizedimpartiality.

The depoliticization of Nicaragua’s electoral bodycould well provide the additional advantage of wardingoff foreign interference in elections. The Carter Centerand President Carter personally have consistently criti-cized the U.S. government for arrogating to itself theright to intervene in the Nicaraguan political processto shape election outcomes and in 2006 criticizedVenezuela for the same reason. That criticism wouldcarry more weight, however, if confidence in the coun-try’s election authorities were higher than at present.

RECOMMENDATIONSBased on the Carter Center’s observation of the 2006electoral process and the analysis presented above, theCenter offers the following recommendations with theknowledge that all election systems can be improvedand in the spirit of making a positive contributiontoward continued progress in establishing an electoralprocess that enjoys the full confidence of theNicaraguan people and the capacity to efficiently andtransparently conduct Nicaragua’s elections.

It is crucial for an election system to have areserve of trust among the political actorsand the citizenry at large.

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1. Build a Nonpartisan Election Authority at All Levels Nicaragua’s election system has been subjected tointense scrutiny. Political parties, civil society, academ-ics, and others have developed in-depth analyses of thesystem’s problems and elaborated a multitude of rec-ommendations for resolving them. Almost all of theseanalyses have ended up recommending the depoliti-cization of the system by eliminating partisanrepresentation. Proposals to reduce the number ofmagistrates who sit on the CSE and lower theirsalaries in order to make elections less expensive alsoabound.

This Carter Center report will not attempt tosummarize, add to, or supplant these contributions,but with the experienceof 2006 fresh at hand, wedo wish to second themon their central point.Our strongest and mostbasic recommendation isonce again thatNicaragua’s political par-ties and their legislators consider a thoroughgoingreform aimed at creating a nonpartisan election sys-tem. Such a reform would involve rules and criteriafor the selection of electoral magistrates designed toensure the political neutrality, professional compe-tence, and moral integrity of the people chosen. Anynumber of mechanisms to guide the choice of elec-tion officials by the National Assembly are available,and previous analyses provide a menu of options fromwhich to choose. Mechanisms also exist for nonparti-san election authorities to consult political parties sothat parties have a voice but no vote in proceedings.As mentioned in the Carter Center report on the2001 elections, lawmakers could also consider separat-ing the normative and jurisdictional functions of theelectoral magistrates from the administration of elec-tions per se, placing the latter function in the handsof a professional administrative body. At lower levels,

the members of departmental and municipal electioncouncils and local voting boards should likewise bechosen on a nonparty, apolitical basis (such as a lot-tery of registered voters) to maximize trust in theelection apparatus on the part of the citizenry.

Municipal elections are currently expected to beconvoked in November 2008. The same four partiesthat now have representatives in the National Assemblyare very likely to again be the chief participants in thoseelections. Assuming that a wholesale reform does nottake place before these elections, less far-reachingchanges are possible and could do much to help avoidthe problems that arose in the national voting; in fact,these would dampen the prospects for any postelectiondifficulties to erupt in closely contested municipal

races. Some suggestions areoutlined below.

By 2008, the politicalcomposition of Nicaragua’selection administrationbelow the level of the CSEwill have changed substan-tially. As the runner-up inthe presidential balloting,

the ALN-PC is now officially recognized as Nicaragua’ssecond political force. As such, it will have the right toname one of the two principal officials on all regional,departmental, and municipal election councils whenthese are reconvened in 2008 and later to appointeither the president or first member of all local votingboards However, that change will not by itself serve toeliminate the system’s problems, which derive at basefrom the political relationships that prevail at the upperlevel of the CSE itself due to the principle of exclusion-ary partisan administration. In 2008, the magistrates ofthe CSE will still be delegates of the FSLN and PLC ashas been the case during the current decade and in allprobability will still form part of a broader pacted con-text in which these two parties dominate a range ofstate institutions including the Supreme Court ofJustice, the Comptrollers General and the attorney gen-eral’s office.

Assuming that a wholesale reform does not take place before the 2008 municipalelections, less far-reaching changes are possibleand could do much to help.

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2. Solve the Quorum Problem Whether the CSE is depoliticized or not, there is anurgent need to solve the “quorum problem,” which hasmade itself felt since the first Liberal–Sandinista agree-ment in 2000. Here a reform of election law is inorder; it became clear in 2006 that the law as writtendoes not provide a workable mechanism for solvingthe lack of quorum via the calling up of alternate mag-istrates. Although the CSE obtained a ruling from theSupreme Court permitting such a calling, resort to thisdevice simply served to mire the CSE further in inter-nal wrangling. In essence, the problem is balancing theneed for CSE decisions to have sufficient legitimacywith the need for the magistrates to resolve the mattersbefore them with due speed. As The Carter Centerargued in 2002, the solution does not appear to lie inreducing the quorum requirement from five membersto four because that will allow one party to dominateall decisions. A workable compromise could be to con-voke CSE sessions with sufficient lead time, and thensuspend the five-person quorum rule if three or moremagistrates do not present themselves, allowing amajority of four to make decisions.

3. Improve Transparency in the ElectionCouncil’s Operations A depoliticizing reform of the election system is likely

in and of itself to make the operations of the electoralauthority more transparent. Even if such a reform isnot undertaken, the CSE would do well to considerthe benefits of greater openness and communication.During the 2006 election season, a serious lack ofcommunication affected the relations between theCSE, the political parties, domestic and internationalobservers, and the public at large. Political party repre-sentatives complained of long delays by the electionauthorities in responding to their queries and petitionsas well as a paucity of official explanations for CSEdecisions, which tended to emerge as fiats. A strikingexample is the CSE’s denial of the final appeal by thePLC against the vote totals in the North AtlanticAutonomous Region, a denial that was not accompa-

nied by even a minimal explanation of what the magis-trates had done to review the issue or on what basisthey had made their decision.

The CSE also made poor use of modern commu-nication tools to provide information. Although urgedto do so, it failed to opportunely publish many of itsresolutions and regulations over the Internet. In addi-tion, the CSE did not properly publish the results ofeither of 2006’s two elections on its Web site withdetail to the JRV level. In late March 2007, the CSEWeb site still carried results from only 91.5 percent ofJRVs in the national elections. In the case of theCaribbean Coast elections, no numerical results couldbe found at all, although the names of the winningcandidates were posted. From Nov. 7 through Nov. 22,2006, the results of the national voting were available,but only for the same 91.5 percent of JRVs. Thereafter,results with detail to the JRV level were briefly avail-able electronically, but it later became impossible todisaggregate the results for voting centers that con-tained more than one polling station. Theselimitations inhibit subsequent examination of theresults by scholars and ordinary citizens interested inthe study of national and local voting patterns.

4. Facilitate Citizen IdentityBy 2008, greater progress is needed in guaranteeingeach and every Nicaraguan the exercise of their right toidentity. The Law of Citizen Identification dates from1993, and it was thought that everyone would receive acédula at the latest by 2000. Studies done in 2006revealed why this expectation has not been met.Economic informality reduces interest in documenta-tion among a certain percentage of the populace.Nicaraguans are moreover allowed to vote at an unusu-ally young age, and some parents oppose their childrenseeking a cédula at age 16 because they fear loss of theirparental authority. But if it is not absolutely clear whatthe “normal” level of cédula coverage in Nicaraguashould be, it is obvious that the procedures required toobtain an ID card are onerous and time consuming.Monetary cost is also a consideration for some in decid-

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ing whether to initiate the process. The treatment thatordinary citizens receive from local officials also needsimprovement. In all these areas, changes are feasibleand urgent. Some practical steps include the following:

■ As the CSE has itself recognized, facilitating citi-zen identity in Nicaragua requires that somegovernment offices be open year-round to request andreceive cédulas. Immediately after the November voting,the municipal offices of the CSE were closed againand, if budgetary problems persist, may not reopenuntil 2008. By that time, another backlog of potentialcédula applicants will havebeen generated.

■ Given the inherentconnection between thetwo activities, it would beuseful for the civil registra-tion of births and deathsto be combined with the manufacture and issuance ofcédulas in one agency of government.

■ Processing and equipment need to be updatedboth in municipal civil registries, which must validatebirth certificates before cédulas can be issued, and inthe information systems department of the CSE,which is currently charged with the physical manufac-ture of the documents. In both cases, equipment isantiquated and processing slow.

■ Those lacking birth certificates altogether, whoare numerous in Nicaragua, face the additional obsta-cle of having to go before a judge with witnesses todemonstrate their identity. Such people find them-selves caught in procedures proper to the judicialsystem that are extraordinarily slow and cumbersome.The reformation of these procedures is an issue thatgoes beyond the scope of this report, but some reformis clearly needed to reduce the time required to acquirean initial birth certificate from the current minimumof six months.

Once cédulas and supletorios were issued, theirdelivery to the voters posed other problems, andreports surfaced that political parties had taken control

of delivery in some areas. In a much closer race—assome municipal contests in 2008 will undoubtedly be—allegations of widespread political bias in thedistribution of voting documents could well generatebitter postelection disputes. This possibility makes itimperative for the magistrates of the CSE to ensurethat document delivery in 2008 is strictly controlled bythe municipal election councils. Adequate planningand publicity for voters about when to pick up theirdocuments are also necessary to avoid individuals mak-ing unnecessary trips to municipal centers.

5. Extend the ElectionCalendar to Start EarlierAs the foregoing narrativeof events in 2006 suggests,Nicaragua’s election calen-dar as currently delineatedis very tight. Repeated

recourse to the issuance of supplementary voting docu-ments over several elections is a strong indication thatinsufficient time is allocated to document productionand delivery, meaning that the deadline for cédulaapplications is later than is appropriate. In late July,the National Assembly’s decision to postpone thedeadline for receiving these applications by two weekscaused a significant delay in the production of votingdocuments. For the same reason, the election roll,which is a collection of the cédulas, was finalized verylate as well. In 2006, tardiness in delivering the finalelection roll to the parties did not permit them toundertake proper audits of the roll as is their right.The combination of these delays created stress on theelectoral administration and intensified pre-existingsuspicions that the apparatus was somehow trying todisadvantage some participants.

To alleviate both pressure and suspicions, it wouldbe advisable for the deadline for cédula applications tobe moved up to give the CSE sufficient time to processthem and then produce the election roll. The priorstep in the calendar, the citizen verification exercise,could usefully be scheduled much earlier than is done

Greater progress is needed in guaranteeingeach and every Nicaraguan the exercise oftheir right to identity.

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quate time for consultation and for the participatingparties to master their content.

7. Match the Electoral Roll to VoterIdentificationAs the studies done in 2006 confirmed and quanti-fied, Nicaragua’s electoral rolls contain a substantialnumber of names of individuals who have died or havemoved from previous places of residence without thesechanges having been reported to any authority for pur-poses of statistical registry. Because mechanisms are inplace to deter double voting, these facts have not gen-erally caused enormous concern among the partiescontending in elections. Such mechanisms are notfoolproof, however, and in light of lingering suspicionsabout their efficacy, it is advisable for the authoritiesto consider a major cleanup of the election roll in theshort term.

In addition, as recent investigations uncovered, asignificant number of individuals who possess validvoting documents cannot find their names on the elec-toral rolls of the voting centers to which thosedocuments correspond. Throughout 2006, this anom-aly generated suspicions that a “crazy mouse” waswreaking havoc with the electoral roll. It is time for theelection authorities to put this suspicion to rest by pro-viding the political parties, civil society, and thecitizenry with a convincing explanation of why thisproblem exists and take steps to correct it, one ofwhich might be to hold an extended period of citizenverification during a nonelection year. As long as thisis not done, Articles 41 and 116 of the election law willcontinue to be necessary to prevent voters from beingunduly disenfranchised. However, these articles are nota suitable remedy for the problem and ideally shouldnot be allowed because permitting people who are noton the rolls to vote can facilitate double voting(“nomad voting”) if other weaknesses are present inthe system. Once the roll itself is cleaned up, deletionof these articles from the election law by the NationalAssembly is advisable.

at present, together with the appointment of theauthorities for departmental and municipal electionbodies. Indeed, this exercise could usefully begin soonafter the convoking of the elections in the earlymonths of the year.

6. Develop Regulations More OpportunelyRegulations governing a number of important aspectsof the 2006 election process were not developed andpublished in timely enough fashion to permit the polit-ical parties to comment on them fully or to properlyassimilate their content. Examples include regulationsconcerning the resolution of vote challenges and partyrepresentation on local voting boards (these areaddressed in detail below). In the best publicized exam-ple of this problem, parties wishing to train their pollwatchers for the November voting found that rules gov-erning the functioning of JRVs and the role of thefiscales had not been updated when they needed to starttheir training. The decision of some parties to pushahead with the training of their poll watchers usingoutdated materials led to an unseemly dispute betweenthe CSE and a foreign electoral assistance organizationthat should not be repeated.

In a lesser known case, despite extensive media spec-ulation about the sources of political money in the 2006elections, regulations of the election law dealing withthe sensitive issues of party and campaign finance werenot formulated until Aug. 15, that is, virtually on theeve of the campaign opening. This delay in clarifyingthe rules was incongruous given that parties wereexpressly permitted to claim reimbursement from thepool of public finance money for election expenses fromthe precampaign period (i.e, before Aug. 19). Given thatthe new regulations differed little from the old, in theend they necessitated only minor adjustments in partyaccounts. Had the CSE wanted to make major improve-ments in these regulations, however, Aug. 15 wouldclearly have been a very late date at which to start. As ageneral rule, it would be advisable for the CSE to beginupdating all regulations that it feels need changing assoon as the elections are convoked, both to provide ade-

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8. Ensure Fairness in Voting BoardRepresentationBy law, the “second members” (third positions) ondepartmental and municipal elections councils andlocal voting boards are assigned to the smaller parties(i.e., all but the two largest parties) participating in theelections. In 2006, disputes between CSE officials andrepresentatives of these parties concerning the rules forthis distribution occasioned serious and unnecessaryfrictions. Consequent charges that the CSE was actingunfairly to deny certain parties due representationdeepened lack of trust in the process. By 2008, regula-tions should be in place making these distributionalrules absolutely clear, barring the local-level discretionevident in the last election. Procedures for processingthe slates of candidates submitted by the partiesshould likewise be reviewed for the purpose of stream-lining the choice of qualified people for the positions,while permitting the parties to make the fullest use oftheir respective pools of party workers, which differgreatly in size.

9. Accelerate the Transmission and Tabulation ofVote ResultsWhen election results are close, delays in vote tabula-tion often generate suspicion that results are beingaltered and time is being taken for political negotia-tions to supplant the voters’ will. It is thus essential toguard against tardiness in vote counting. In 2006, theCSE presented 91.5 percent of the results from theNov. 5 election within 48 hours after the polls closed.It then took a week to gather the other 8.5 percent. Bycontrast, in the 2001 election, even with a lengthy sus-pension of the vote tabulation in the nationalcomputing center, the authorities managed to assembleprovisional totals from 99.6 percent of all JRVs inthree days, albeit these were not published by JRV onits Web site.

In 2006, the CSE debuted a new modality fortransmission of the majority of JRV tally sheets, whichin most cases involved the sending of digitally scanned

images rather than the traditional use of faxes.According to the authorities, a certain number ofthese tallies needed to be re-sent because the imageswere not legible enough for the data to be transcribedinto the CSE’s central computing system. By the timethis fact was detected, however, the original tally sheetshad been shipped to the department-level electioncouncils. Although these would later be delivered tothe CSE, the tabulation of their results was delayed. Ifthis was indeed the problem, the solution is essentiallytechnical. But a backup procedure for rapidly resend-ing faulty images is clearly necessary and should be inplace before the 2008 municipal voting.

In addition to tabulating the results swiftly, theCSE has a responsibility to share these results with rep-resentatives of the contending parties in as rapid amanner as is feasible so that the parties may check theofficial tallies against tally sheet copies from their pollwatchers in the JRVs and prepare appeals when war-ranted. In theory, party poll watchers may wish tocheck their tally copies against the scanned imagesreceived by the CSE’s transmission system or theresults that are subsequently typed in to the computerfor tabulation purposes or both. In November, partieshad limited access to the typed results on computerscreens at the national computing center but onlyreceived compact discs with scanned tally sheet imagesat irregular intervals (and never received a full set).This level of access did not give the parties sufficienttime or wherewithal to perform the necessary tasks ofchecking the results systematically and exercising theirrights to fullest advantage. The Carter Center thus reit-erates its suggestion of Oct. 19, 2006, that at the nextelection, poll watchers in the national computing cen-ter be furnished with physical copies of the JRV tallysheets as they emerge from transmission.

10. Develop Clear Rules for ResolvingChallenges to Vote TalliesThe prompt and unbiased resolution of challenges tovoting board and higher level vote tallies is also crucialin maintaining public confidence in an election sys-

DA

VID

EV

AN

S

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tem, especially when races are hotly contested.Nicaragua’s election law specifies four basic criteria forannulling results from individual voting boards andprovides parties with the opportunity to challengearithmetical mistakes at all levels of the countingprocess. However, in 2006, the specification of one ofthese basic criteria was unclear despite attempts by theCSE and the political parties to arrive at a workableformulation.

Of the 121 JRVs at which challenges were enteredagainst the initial results, the foremost single motive,operative in 52 of thecases, was “incomplete oraltered documentation.”(Law 331, Article 162,clause 4). In a regulationissued Sept. 21, the CSEprovided the phrase“altered documentation”with a working meaning.However, as several party representatives and domesticobservers pointed out, the regulation failed to clarifywhich of the tally sheets issued at JRV level had prece-dence in cases where the original tally form (used totabulate the official vote results) had been altered anddiscrepancies existed among the copies distributed toparty poll watchers. The CSE moreover refrained fromstating publicly that in cases in which damage to oralteration of tally sheets made reconstruction of thevote totals of questionable validity, the department-level election councils had the prerogative to open theballot boxes and recount the votes as is envisioned inArticle 131 of the election law.

In tandem, these limitations aroused concern thatchallenges would be resolved in a discretionary andpolitical manner as had occurred in a disputed 2004case in the city of Granada. To avoid such incidents in

the upcoming elections, it would be advisable for theCSE, political parties, and domestic observers jointlyto revisit this issue in 2008 and reach a consensualspecification of the procedures for resolving challenges,addressing the points just mentioned and any othersdeemed relevant. Unlike 2006, this should be donewell in advance of the election date to give adequatetime for full consideration of the issues involved.

In cases where controversies arise nonetheless, theCSE must take pains to publicly explain what is atissue in each case and express in full the reasons for its

decisions.

11. Clarify the Districtsto Which JRVs BelongAs the Atlantic Coast elec-tion showed, there is someuncertainty about the elec-tion districts in whichvarious JRVs are included

and hence about where their results are to be comput-ed for the purpose of calculating which candidateshave won seats. Although it appeared to be minor, theproblem generated unnecessary and serious friction.The problem also appeared to be longstanding and tohave roots in a political accord to alter the boundariesbetween certain election districts, an agreement thatwas not subsequently incorporated into law. As theMarch conflict in the North Atlantic AutonomousRegion demonstrated, it is irresponsible to allow a frag-ile political decision among parties, howeverreasonable in form, to take the place of consistenttechnical criteria backed by law and regulations. Theelection authorities should see to it that this and anyother similar problems are resolved before the nextround of voting at the municipal (2008) and regional(2010) levels. It would be advisable for the CSE tomodernize its electoral cartography unit via electronicmapping.

In cases where controversies arise, the CSEmust take pains to publicly explain what isat issue in each case and express in full thereasons for its decisions.

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Appendix A

Invitation to Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Invitation to Observe — English Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Appendix B

Role of Long-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

Appendix C

Strategic Deployment of Short-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

Appendix D

Representative Deployment of Short-Term Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

Appendix E

List of Short-Term Deployment Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

Appendix F

Observation Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

Appendix G

Carter Center Public Statements and Press Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX AINVITATION TO OBSERVE

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Supreme Electoral CouncilPresident

Managua, 23 January 2006

Dear President Carter:

I am writing as president of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) of Nicaragua, a branch of gov-ernment, to ask that you formally invite members of The Carter Center to participate andaccompany us as international observers during the two electoral processes scheduled to take placein our country this year, namely the regional and national elections, to be held on 5 March and 5November, respectively.

Considering how important national and international observation at each electoral process is forthe Supreme Electoral Council, we would like to continue what has become a tradition and here-by express once more that your presence would be most welcome, particularly in view of theinterest in our democratic process you have shown over the years.

As The Carter Center does not at this time have a field office in Nicaragua, I am sending you thisletter by fax, with a copy to be delivered to Mr. David Dye.

In thanking you beforehand for your kind attention, and in the hopes of counting on your sup-port in this matter, I avail myself of the opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of myhighest consideration and esteem.

Sincerely,

(signature) (CSE seal)Roberto Reyes Rivas

Most Excellent Jimmy CarterFormer President of the United Statesof AmericaThe Carter Center

INVITATION TO OBSERVE–ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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The Carter Center deployed seven long-termobservers (LTOs) in Nicaragua from earlySeptember until mid-November 2006. All

LTOs were based in a departmental or regional capital,and most were responsible for one or more additionaldepartments (see Table B.1).

The work of the seven LTOs involved the following:

■ meeting and building relationships with depart-mental and municipal electoral authorities (CEDs andCEMs, respectively), political parties, police, armedforces, and other national and international observergroups to document their views on the electoralprocess

■ attending political rallies to learn about partyplatforms, observe campaign expenditures, and assessthe campaign climate

■ monitoring pre-election preparations, such asthe training of polling station workers and tests of thesystems for transmission of results

■ observing the election, the transmission ofresults, and the resolution of challenges, together withshort-term observers

■ writing weekly reports for the Carter Center’schief of mission in Managua, which the Center used toform opinions and communicate with the SupremeElectoral Council and national media

The work of LTOs is very different from that ofshort-term observers, who are deployed primarily toobserve the voting process on election day. BecauseLTOs observe the preparations for election day over along period of time, they are able to build a significantdegree of rapport with political actors and follow upon problems and concerns that arise. The LTOs are ina unique position to appreciate the political dimen-sions of the electoral process that play out over alonger period and would not be particularly noticeableon election day itself. For example, while the voting

and the subsequent publication of results proceededwithout major incidents, enabling observer groups toexpress general satisfaction with the elections, there arewider political issues which, if addressed, would have ademocratizing impact on the electoral process and onboth party and citizen participation.

Much of the work of the LTOs involved receivingand documenting the electoral consequences of thepolitical pact signed between Daniel Ortega andArnoldo Alemán in 2000, which brought major consti-tutional and electoral reforms that gave the SandinistaNational Liberation Front (FSLN) and the LiberalConstitutionalist Party (PLC) dominance in the elec-toral system. FSLN success in the 2004 municipalelections led to a high degree of FSLN influence with-in the municipal authorities as well. Over time, theLTOs became trusted interlocutors to whom nonpactparties could articulate perceived discrimination. Oneof the principal concerns expressed by the nonpactparties related to the distribution of the second mem-bers in the CEMs and the polling stations (JRVs).Some citizens also said they felt intimidated by a politi-cal party and worried that if they did not showsupport, they could be at a disadvantage in terms ofbenefits, jobs, or scholarships.

In the pre-election period, the distribution of voteridentity documents (cédulas) proved onerous and ineffi-cient. Many LTOs received multiple and oftendesperate complaints from Nicaraguan citizens whohad been unable to retrieve their cédulas despite thefact their applications were timely and in order. In twodepartments, LTOs observed that instead of distribut-ing these documents through the CEM to all citizensregardless of their political affiliation, for several weeksthey were distributed in a partisan fashion by FSLNand PLC activists, a practice that was blatant and easilyconfirmed through conversations with political partymembers and citizens who had received their cédulas in

APPENDIX BROLE OF LONG-TERM OBSERVERS

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this way. The Carter Center denounced this practiceto the public and to national-level authorities whotook action to end it.

LTOs also observed a number of extremely posi-tive trends. While there were some isolated complaintsregarding destruction of campaign material, the campaignwas largely calm, peaceful, and nonconfrontational. Incomparison with previous elections, Nicaraguans dis-played high levels of tolerance of diverse politicaloptions. Election day also proceeded calmly withoutany reports of violence or intimidation of voters.

Many of the election officials are working withextremely limited resources and are to be congratulat-

ed on overcoming these constraints. Some CEMs didnot have the capacity to make outgoing telephone callsand did not have Internet access to the CSE Web site,which limited their ability to provide efficient service.Transmission equipment often arrived at the lastminute, making simulated transmissions difficult.Similarly, some JRVs lacked water or electricity andtherefore required a high degree of improvisation byCEM members as well as willingness by JRV membersto suffer sleeping and working in basic conditions withvery little remuneration. While LTOs enjoyed a highlevel of cooperation from electoral authorities whowere on the whole respectful of the Center’s presence,

LTOs were also able to observe thetensions that sometimes arosebetween members of the CEMsfrom different parties as they dealtwith these challenges under thepressure of the electoral calendar.

Another notable and positivepoint is that these elections sawmany young people in their lateteens and early 20s working in theelectoral system as observers, pollwatchers (fiscales), or polling sta-tion workers. As a result, manyyoung people have gained valuablepolitical experience and in-depthknowledge of Nicaragua’s electorallaw, which should promote diverseforms of democratic participationin the future.

Table B.1Carter Center Long-Term Observers for Nicaragua 2006 Elections

Observer Location* Area of Number of Number of Coverage Departments Municipalities

or Regions

Amparo Tortosa Esteli Nueva 3 27Garrigos Segovia

MadrizEstelí

Gabriel Zinzoni Matagalpa Matagalpa 2 21Jinotega

Julie Cupples León León 2 23Chinandega

Jacob Bradbury Chontales Chontales 3 22BoacoRío San Juan

Melida Jiménez Granada Granada 4 31MasayaCarazoRivas

Rene de Vries North Atlantic RAAN 1 8AutonomousRegion (RAAN)

Anais Ruiz South Atlantic RAAS 1 12AutonomousRegion (RAAS)

TOTAL 16 144

*The department of Managua was monitored from the Center’s office in the capital city.

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The strategic deployment of the Carter Center’s29 teams of short-term observers was based ona geographic information system (GIS) and the

recommendations of the seven long-term observerswho were in the field as of Sept. 8 observing electionpreparations.

This deployment plan took into account knownfacts about the distribution of registered voters acrossNicaragua’s municipalities, the number of registeredvoters at a given polling station, and the number ofregistered voters at a cluster of polling stations called avoting center. Such an analysis helps observers tounderstand the focus of party campaigning and the sit-uations they sometimes encounter at the polls, such as

late opening of polls, long lines, crowding, or lengthycounting processes.

Political parties can be expected to take more inter-est in municipalities with high numbers of registeredvoters and thus possible votes cast because these loca-tions are attractive places to shift significant numbersof votes in their favor by heavy campaigning.

Where there are higher numbers of voters regis-tered per polling station, observers are more likely tosee long lines of people waiting to vote and need toknow that this is normal and not an indication of aproblem in election procedures or inefficiency of elec-tion personnel. Those polling stations may take longerto open because Nicaragua’s opening procedure

APPENDIX CSTRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF SHORT-TERM OBSERVERS

Figure C.1. Number of voters by municipality.

Registered Voters Number of People

… 1000010000 … 2000020000 … 3000030000 … 4000040000 …

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includes counting all ballots, which are also signed byelection personnel and marked with a code numberspecific to the polling station that is generated at thatmoment and prevents ballot substitution. Where ahigh number of citizens are registered to vote, a highnumber of ballots may potentially be cast, causing thecounting process to take longer as well. Similarly,where a voting center has a high number of voters,observers are more likely to see crowding at the facility.

C.1. Number of voters by municipalityThe municipalities with more than 40,000 voters areshown in red, and those with fewer than 10,000 votersare shown in dark green.

The municipalities with higher voter density arethe most important to political parties in terms of elec-toral population.

C.2. Number of voters by polling stationThe municipalities where the average number of votersper polling station is 330 or more are shown in red.Long lines might be expected in these municipalitiesand both the opening procedures and ballot countingmay take more time.

Municipalities with fewer than 270 voters on aver-age per polling station are shown in dark green. Themap shows that most polling stations have between290 and 310 voters per polling station on average.

C.3. Municipalities with a high number of voters pervoting centerThere are a few municipalities, shown here in red,where the average number of voters per voting center is more than 1,200. These are municipalities wherecrowds are most likely to be observed on election day.

Figure C.2. Number of voters by polling stations.

Voters by JRVNumber of People

… 270.0270.0 … 280.0290.0 … 311.0311.0 … 330.0330.0 …

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C.4 Deployment for Maximum Observer VisibilityThe presence of election observers is believed to havea deterrent effect on individuals who would attemptirregularities and intimidation. For this reason, it isdesirable that observers be highly visible. Whilenational observers can be present in large numbers ofpolling stations all day, there are far fewer internation-al observers, so they move from one polling station tothe next to conduct surprise visits on an unpre-dictable schedule.

The Carter Center deployed 29 election observa-tion teams on election day. To geographically cover thecountry, one team was sent to each of the 15 depart-ments and two regions in the country. To decidewhich municipalities to visit within the departmentsand regions and to determine where the additional 12

teams should be deployed, the Center conducted ananalysis to maximize observer visibility.

By combining data on the number of voters in amunicipality (electoral population) with the number ofregistered voters in a voting center (voter concentra-tion), The Carter Center produced an index used toguide the selection of municipalities our observerswould visit, shown in Figure C.4.

The Carter Center teams were deployed to themunicipalities where they would be seen by more peo-ple and be able to gather information on highernumbers of voters. The municipality selection resultingfrom geographic analysis coincided with the recom-mendations made by the Carter Center’s long-termobservers who monitored the preparation of the elec-tions for three months.

Figure C.3. Municipalities with a high number of voters per voting center.

Voters by CVNumber of People

… 500.0500.0 … 700.0700.0 … 800.0900.0 … 1200.01200.0 …

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DEPLOYMENT TO OBSERVE CHALLENGESTo further tailor its deployment plan, The CarterCenter also took into account the concerns raised bycandidates, parties, civil society, and the internationalmedia in meetings conducted during pre-election visitsby experts and by its chief of mission and politicalanalyst.

As the election neared, many Nicaraguans recalleda controversy that arose in the 2004 municipal elec-tions, where the results for the mayor of Granada weredetermine via a controversial annulment of a tallysheet. In 2006, some feared that targeted annulment oftally sheets could alter the outcomes of some races fordepartmental deputies in the national legislature. Thenumber of votes needed to affect the presidential raceor a national deputy race was too high for such a strat-

egy to be carried out without massive annulments thatwould be obvious even to nonexperts and were there-fore of less concern.

After the voting was done and challenges werefiled, The Carter Center conducted an analysis basedon officially published preliminary results that calculat-ed the legislative seats that could be lost or won with achange of less than 1.000 votes, given the particulari-ties of Nicaragua’s system for determining seatallocation (called the media mayor). The calculationtook into account the quotient effect as well as theparty median effect. Observers assigned to monitor res-olution of challenges at the CEMs and CEDs werenotified of these close races so that they would be sureto note any challenges filed there and how those wereresolved. Challenges are only important where they are

Figure C.4. Index that guided deployment of Carter Center observers.

By CV and JRV ConcentrationCV, JRV and Urban

54321

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ruled to be valid, so The Carter Center continued itsobservation in each department or region for the offi-cial period following the elections designated for thehandling of challenges at the municipal and depart-mental or regional levels.

The use of GIS modeling in election observationis experimental and further development of these tech-niques is needed. The Carter Center is committed toremaining at the forefront of innovation in electionobservation methods.

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Of the 29 Carter Center short-term observersfor the 2006 Nicaraguan elections, 20 wereasked to participate in an experimental

improvement in election day methodology. Each teamwas asked to visit a list of randomly selected voting cen-ters (CVs) and polling stations (JRVs). The randomselection of CVs and JRVs for each team was done intwo stages. First, participating teams were assigned ran-domly to CVs within a predetermined geographic area.Second, within the pool of assigned CVs, JRVs werealso randomly selected.

Standard election day practice for internationalobservers involves assigning teams to specific geograph-ic regions and giving each team considerable leeway inchoosing which areas are visited on election day.Randomizing observers on election day has severaladvantages over standard practice and was undertakenwith the goal of improving the accuracy of the observa-tions collected by short-term observers. By usingsampling methods, this technique should generateinformation about JRVs that is closer to the mean ofthe overall population and allows for the statisticalcomputation of confidence intervals and other infor-mation.

For each team assigned to a predefined geographicarea, the list of randomly selected CVs was drawn froma complete list of CVs. Although Carter Center teamswere deployed to every department in Nicaragua,observers did not attempt to reach every municipalitywithin each department. Of the 11,274 JRVs in thecountry, 5,990 were included in the pools from whichsamples were drawn. An additional pool of JRVs wasvisited by the nine Carter Center observer teams whowere not given a randomly generated list of CVs andJRVs. The remaining JRVs were located in municipali-ties where Carter Center observers did not travel onelection day. Because the assigned municipalities from

which samples were drawn were not selected randomly,the data collected by Carter Center teams participatingin the randomization can only be generalized to themunicipalities included in the original pools.1

Ten teams in Esteli, Madriz, Chinandega,Chontales, Masaya, North Atlantic AutonomousRegion (RAAN), and Managua were given lists of CVsgenerated using simple random sampling, stratified byteam. The samples of CVs given to the 10 teams inNueva Segovia, Matagalpa, Jinotega, Leon, Chontales,Masaya, Granada, Rivas, Carazo, and the SouthAtlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) were generatedwith additional consideration to the logistical chal-lenges in the region. The long-term observer (LTO)assigned to the region defined specific parameters, andrandom samples were generated until one met theLTO defined parameters, making the method anunequal probability sample. This method wasemployed to maximize the chances that the lists ofCVs would be feasible for short-term observers.Although not simple random sampling of CVs, eachCV out of all CVs in the region has a known probabil-ity of being included in the sample. The JRVs for all20 teams were selected from within the assigned CVs

APPENDIX DREPRESENTATIVE DEPLOYMENT

OF SHORT-TERM OBSERVERS

1. The municipalities from which samples of CVs and JRVs weredrawn include Acoyapa, Belen, Bluefields, Buenos Aires,Chichigalpa, Chinandega, Ciudad Antigua, Ciudad Dario, CiudadSandino, Condega, Corinto, Dipilto, Diria, Diriamba, Diriomo, ElCua, El Rama, El Realejo, El Rosario, El Tuma-La Dalia, Esteli,Granada, Jinotega, Jinotepe, Juigalpa, La Concepcion, LaConcordia, La Libertad, La Paz Centro, La Paz de Carazo, LaTrinidad, Leon, Managua (II), Managua (IV), Masatepe, Masaya,Matagalpa, Mosonte, Muelle de los Bueyes, Nagarote, Nandaime,Nindiri, Niquinohomo, Ocotal, Palacaguina, Potosi, PuertoCabezas, Rivas, San Fernando, San Isidro, San Juan de Oriente,San Juan del Sur, San Lucas, San Marcos, San Nicolas, San Pedrode Lovago, San Rafael del Norte, San Ramon, San Sebastian deYale, Santa Teresa, Santo Domingo, Santo Tomas, Sebaco, Somoto,Telica, Tipitapa, Tisma, Yalaguina.

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that were selected using systematic random sampling. The ability of each team to actually visit the ran-

domly assigned CVs and JRVs varied considerably. Insome areas, logistical barriers were too high, and teamsvisited only three to five CVs from their list. The fourparticipating teams in Managua had few problemsfinding nearly all of the assigned CVs, and teams tend-ed to encounter more difficulties when their assignedarea became more rural.

In total, the 29 Carter Center teams visitedapproximately 433 JRVs. Of these, 345 were visited bythe 20 teams that participated in the experimental useof randomization, and 282 of these were in randomlyassigned CVs.

Thus, for each piece of information systematicallycollected by Carter Center observers at JRVs, theabove information can be used to calculate a confi-dence interval or margin of error. The data must beweighted to account for the multistage randomization,the disproportional stratification between regions, andthe bias of observers away from very rural areas.

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Team Names Deployment Area Route

1 Tatiana Rincón and David Ives Nueva Segovia Ocotal and surroundings2 Ascensión Toledano and Tom Walker Madriz Somoto and surroundings3 Amparo Tortosa Garrigos and Matt Maronick Esteli Esteli to Condega4 Gabriel Zinzoni and Peter de Shazo Matagalpa Matagalpa to Sebaco5 Jennie Lincoln and Benny McCabe Jinotega Jinotega and surroundings6 Anneli Tolvanen and Bill Smith Jinotega Jinotega to Yali7 Julie Cupples, Casey Margard, and Kelly Margard Leon Nagarote to Leon8 John Graham, Rob Kincaid, Rick Hutcheson, Leon El Sauce to Leon

and Amy Jackson9 Ken Frankel and Benjamin Naimark-Rowse Chinandega Chinandega to Somotillo10 Carlos Walker and Helen Keogh Chinandega Chinandega to Corinto11 Coby Jansen and Santiago Alconada Boaco/Chontales Boaco to Comalapa12 Laurie Cole and Jack Spence Boaco/Matagalpa Boaco to Muy Muy

to Esquipulas13 Jacob Bradbury and Veronica Querejasu Chontales Juigalpa to Santo Domingo

to Santo Tomas14 Rose Spalding and Alexandra Escudero Chontales/RAAS El Rama to Juigalpa15 David Evans and Sandra Flores Rio San Juan San Carlos16 Daniela Issa and George Vickers Masaya Masaya and surroundings17 Mélida Jiménez and Richard Feinberg Granada Nandaime to Granada18 Enrique Bravo and Lawrence Coben Rivas Rivas to San Juan del Sur19 Cymene Howe and Stephen Randall Carazo/Masaya Jinotepe and surroundings20 Rene de Vries and Craig Auchter RAAN Puerto Cabezas21 Anais Ruiz and Dennis Young RAAS Bluefields and El Bluff22 Laura Neuman, Vibeke Pedersen, Managua Managua

and Courtney Mwangura23 Chris Mitchell, Paul Lubliner, Managua Managua

and Laura Ertmer24 Kristen Shelby and Jessica Allen Managua Managua25 Peter Quilter and Will Durbin Managua Managua26 Sharon Lean, Rachel Fowler, Marcel Guzmán Managua Managua

de Rojas, and Sarah RivardLeadership 1 President Carter and Jaime Aparicio Managua/Masaya Managua and MasayaLeadership 2 President Ardito Barletta Managua Managua

and Shelley McConnellLeadership 3 President Toledo and Jennifer McCoy Managua Managua

Note. RAAN = North Atlantic Autonomous Region; RAAS = South Atlantic Autonomous Region.

APPENDIX ELIST OF SHORT-TERM DEPLOYMENT TEAMS

THE CARTER CENTER


61

The Carter CenterNicaragua 2006 Observation Mission

Election Day Checklist November 5, 2006

Observer name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time at JRV: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Department of JRV: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Municipio of JRV: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _JRV no. and location: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _No. of registered voters: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No. of ballots cast so far: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Average time to vote: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No. of people in line (est.): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1. Was the voters list clearly displayed outside of the voting center? YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2. Which party poll watchers (fiscales) were present? (Check those present):PLC (Rizo) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN (Ortega) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN (Montealegre) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _MRS (Jarquin) _ _ _ _ _ _ AC (Pastora) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

3. Which domestic observers were present? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Ethics and Transparency (ET) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Institute for the Promotion of Democracy (IPADE) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Other (specify)

4. Which parties nominated the JRV election officials (miembros de mesa)? (List party):JRV President _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1st Member _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2nd Member _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5. Did party poll watchers (fiscales) and/or domestic observers indicate that there were: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ no problems _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ few significant problems (explain on back) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a few, but not significant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ many significant problems

6. At what time was the JRV ready to receive votes ? (ask JRV members and mark only one): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 7AM and 7:30AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 7:30AM and 8:30AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 8:30AM and 10:00AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ After 10:00AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Still not open

APPENDIX FOBSERVATION FORMS

THE CARTER CENTER


62

Election Day Checklist, continued

7. JRV members assert that they received (before the JRV was constituted):Blank Acta de Constitución y Apertura, Cierre and Escrutinio YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Unmarked ballots and ballot box YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Voters list (Padron) YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Labeled empty plastic bags to store ballots and actas YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Finger marking ink (Tinta indeleble) YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ID hole punching device (ponchadora) YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8. JRV members assert that the table opened in (mark only one): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ the originally specified location _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a different location _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ did not open

9. JRV members assert that the opening acta was signed by:JRV President YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1st Member YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2nd Member YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

10. JVR members assert that ___________poll watchers (fiscales) signed the opening acta.

11. What is YOUR overall evaluation of how voting was going at the polling site? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JRV functioned normally and without irregularity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Some minor irregularities, but not significant in terms of result _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Serious problems that could potentially distort the result

COMMENTS/EXPLANATION OF PROBLEMS12. Check those problems that apply:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JRV closed or voting suspended (explain below) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Insufficient materials (which kind?) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Security problems (explain below) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Indelible ink not applied correctly (explain below) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ID card not punched when Art. 41 used _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Intimidation of voters (explain below) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Secrecy of ballot not assured (explain below)

13. How many voters were denied an opportunity to vote thus far?Reasons (give numbers):Not on list (no witnesses/witnesses not accepted) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _No voter document _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Discrepancy between voter ID and list _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Cédula ruled invalid _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

14. How many voters that were not in the voters list were accepted to vote (excluding party poll watchers, police,military, and JRV members)? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

THE CARTER CENTER


63

Closing and Counting ReportNicaraguan Elections, November 5, 2006

The Carter Center

Observer Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

JRV No. and Location: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Department/Region: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Municipality: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

COUNTING PROCESS

1. Domestic observer present? YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2. Other international observers present? YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

3. Party poll watchers (fiscales) present? PLC (Rizo) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN (Ortega) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN (Montealegre) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _MRS (Jarquin) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC (Pastora) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4. Time poll closed: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5. Time count started: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

6. What party poll watchers registered challenges? (If yes, explain on back)PLC (Rizo) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN (Ortega) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN (Montealegre) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _MRS (Jarquin) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC (Pastora) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

7. Did count function normally? (If no, explain on back) YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8. Did JRV president give poll watchers copies of results (actas)? YES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ NO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

9. Number of citizens not permitted to vote:Reasons (give numbers): Not on list _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Discrepancy between card and list _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

No voter document _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Voter at wrong JRV _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Ran out of materials _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JRV suspended or closed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

10. Total voters on list: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

THE CARTER CENTER


64

Closing and Counting Report, continued

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ALN-PC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total valid votes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Null votes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total votes cast _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Approx. % participation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

DIPUTADOS NACIONALES ELECTION RESULTS

FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ALN-PC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


Null votes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total votes cast _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


DIPUTADOS DEPARTAMENTALES ELECTION RESULTS

FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ALN-PC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


Null votes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total votes cast _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


THE CARTER CENTER


65

Summary – Election Day ReportNicaraguan Elections, November 5, 2006

The Carter Center

Observer name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Total # of JRVs visited (# of forms): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Department or region (use separate sheets for each department or region): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Sum total of registered voters at JRVs visited: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Avg. minutes taken to vote: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1. How many of the JRVs had the voters list clearly displayed: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2. How many of the JRVs had party poll watchers (fiscales) present from:

PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

3. At how many JRVs were domestic observers present from:Ética y Transparencia (ET) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Instituto para el Desarrollo y la Democracia (IPADE) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Otros (especifique) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4. How many officials (miembros de mesa) at the total number of JRVs were nominated by each party?President: PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1st Member: PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2nd Member: PLC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FSLN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ALN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MRS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5. At how many JRVs did party poll watchers and/or domestic observers indicate that there were:no problems _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _a few, but not significant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _a few significant problems _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _many significant problems _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

6. How many JRVs were ready to receive votes at: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 7AM and 7:30AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 7:30AM and 8:30AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Between 8:30AM and 10:00AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ After 10:00AM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Never — did not open

7. How many JRVs asserted that they had NOT received the following materials before opening?Blank Acta de Constitución y Apertura, Cierre and Escrutinio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Unmarked ballots and ballot box _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Voters list for that JRV(padrón electoral) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Labeled empty plastic bags to store ballots and tally sheets (actas) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Finger marking ink (tinta indeleble) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ID hole punching device (ponchadora) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8. At how many JRVs did the table open atthe originally specified location _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _a different location _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

THE CARTER CENTER


66

Summary Report, continued

9. At how many JRVs did someone assert that any of the following officials did NOT sign the opening acta?President _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _First member _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Second member _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

10. What was the AVERAGE number of party poll watchers (fiscales) who signed the opening acta? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

11. How many JRVs did YOUR TEAM evaluate as functioning:NORMALLY and WITHOUT IRREGULARITY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _with some MINOR IRREGULARITIES but NOT SIGNIFICANT for result _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _with SERIOUS PROBLEMS that could potentially distort the result _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

12. At how many JRVs were the following problems found?JRV closed or voting suspended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Insufficient materials _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Security problems _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Indelible ink not applied correctly _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ID card not punched when Art. 41 used _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Intimidation of voters _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Secrecy of ballot not assured _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

How many JRVs did your team visit after 4PM? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

For the next questions consider only the JRVs visited after 4PM.

13. At how many JRVs were voters denied the right to vote?Reasons (give total number of voters for each category):Not on list (no witnesses/witnesses not accepted) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _No voter document _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Discrepancy between voter document and list _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Cédula not valid _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Ink residue on thumb _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

14. What was the sum total of the number of voters (excluding poll watchers, police, military, and JRV members)who were accepted to vote despite not being on the voters list? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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APPENDIX GCARTER CENTER PUBLIC STATEMENTS

AND PRESS RELEASES

In January 2006, The Carter Center received from thepresident of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), Dr.Roberto Rivas, an invitation to observe Nicaragua’sregional and national elections to be held in Marchand November 2006, respectively. In the spirit both ofits past observation missions in Nicaragua in 1989–90,1996, and 2001 and its continuing support forNicaraguan democracy as expressed in two visits by theFriends of the Democratic Charter in 2005, TheCarter Center expressed its willingness to observe. Ittherefore sent a pre-election delegation to ManaguaJan. 31–Feb. 2, 2006, to discuss with the electionauthorities the proposed framework for observationand the form that a possible Carter Center electionobservation mission might take. The delegation includ-ed the former chief electoral officer of Peru, Dr.Fernando Tuesta; the senior associate director of theCarter Center’s Americas Program, Dr. ShelleyMcConnell; and political analyst David R. Dye.

The Carter Center delegation met with a widearray of Nicaraguans who come to the election with avariety of perspectives. These included Dr. Rivas andCSE Vice President Emmet Lang as well as magistratesLuis Benavides, José Marenco, and Julio Osuna;Foreign Minister Norman Caldera and his staff; PLCleaders Wilfredo Navarro, Noel Ramirez, and SilvioCalderon; FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega,accompanied by legal representative Edwin Castro andparty election officials Lumberto Campbell and JuanJosé Ubeda; presidential candidates Eduardo

Montealegre and Herty Lewites with accompanyingstaff members; representatives of two national observerorganizations, Roberto Courtney of Etica yTransparencia and Mauricio Zúñiga from IPADE; andRosa Marina Zelaya from the Movimiento porNicaragua. In addition, the delegation met with U.S.Ambassador Paul Trivelli and staff, including officialsof USAID, OAS representative Pedro Vúskovic, NDIlocal director Deborah Ulmer, and consultants fromIFES, a U.S.-based organization that offers technicalelectoral assistance.

In these conversations and via the mass media,The Carter Center delegation was made aware of elec-toral matters that need clarification, includingconcerns related to the electoral list, voting docu-ments, application of Articles 41 and 116 of theelectoral law, the lack of a quorum for decision makingwithin the CSE, and the potential that some candi-dates may be disqualified from the presidential race,thus limiting competition and representation, amongothers.

Of particular concern to the delegation was theongoing division within the CSE that has resulted inthat body’s inability to reach a quorum for decisionmaking. This is a serious problem that has the poten-tial to severely affect the electoral process, includingthe elections on the Atlantic Coast, and therefore asolution is urgently needed. It is the responsibility ofall CSE members to cooperate to move beyond thisimpasse.

February 7, 2006

Carter Center Report on Pre-election Delegation Visit to Nicaragua,Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 2006

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Independent of the legal discussion surroundingArticles 41 and 116 of the electoral law, the delegationnoted that these articles permit citizens to exercisetheir right to vote and constitute valuable instrumentsfor overcoming deficiencies in the electoral list. Theyare an important complement to the verificationprocess, in which citizens are not always able to partici-pate, and can encourage turnout on election daybecause citizens can be assured they will have theopportunity to vote. Safeguards exist to prevent doublevoting, such as the use of indelible ink to mark the fin-gers of those who have voted.

It is the responsibility of the electoral authoritiesto create confidence in the electoral process by provid-ing transparency and taking proactive measures toguarantee that citizens can exercise their right to votein free and fair elections, not merely taking reactivemeasures to redress complaints. The Carter Centerurges the CSE to redouble its efforts to eliminate alldoubts concerning the development of the electoralprocess, among other things, by sharing informationfully and distributing documentation in timely fashionto all relevant actors. The Center furthermore cautionsthe political parties against fostering unwarranted fears

that discredit the electoral process in which they arejointly engaged.

The Carter Center reaffirms its commitment tosupport Nicaraguan citizens in the fullest expression oftheir rights through its impartial and professional elec-tion monitoring efforts, as it has done in Nicaragua inthe past and in dozens of other countries. Becauseelection observation requires examination of the entireprocess, not just the vote and count on election day, itis vital that international observation efforts com-mence as soon as conditions permit. Our delegationwas encouraged to learn of the early support providedby the international community for election observa-tion and noted that diverse and ongoing support willbe needed for those efforts to be maximally effective.At the same time, The Carter Center stresses the needfor international actors to formulate their statementsconcerning the elections in ways that maximize thefairness of the contest and avoid any affront to legiti-mate national sensitivities.

The Carter Center thanks the many Nicaraguanswho took time to meet with the delegation and sharetheir perspectives concerning this important civicprocess.

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In response to an invitation extended by the sevenmembers of the Supreme Electoral Council, TheCarter Center announced today that it is sending asmall contingent of observers to the regional electionson the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, scheduled forMarch 5, 2006. The elections for Atlantic Coastregional councils are critically important for strength-ening the process of regional autonomy and thereforeof democracy and are of importance to allNicaraguans.

In regard to the issues mentioned in our first com-muniqué Feb. 7, The Carter Center notes withsatisfaction that a quorum was obtained in theSupreme Electoral Council that same day to permit avote on changing the name of one of the alliances par-ticipating in the election, notwithstanding the fact thatsome of the magistrates registered their dissent fromthe decision and later appealed it to the courts. Themagistrates of the Supreme Electoral Council likewisetook a positive step forward on Feb. 8 by clarifying thatArticles 41 and 116 of the elections law would be fullyrespected on voting day, although not all the doubtsconcerning how the articles will be applied have beendissipated.

The Carter Center nevertheless expresses its con-cern over the persistent impasse in the Council, whoseseven magistrates have been unable to form a quorumin a sustained fashion, to the point where the SupremeCourt of Nicaragua recently ruled that a quorumcould be established via the incorporation of alternatemagistrates. The Center reiterates that it is the respon-sibility of all the magistrates to cooperate fully and

comply with their duty to meet, thus obviating anyneed to resort to other powers of state in order toresolve their internal problems.

The legal and constitutional discussion sparked bythe above-mentioned judicial ruling aside, the Centerobserves that consensus among Nicaragua’s highestelection authorities remains fragile with just a week togo before the regional voting commences. It also noteswith concern that important political actors haverecently weighed the possibility of withdrawing fromthe race. Neither of these situations is conducivetoward an orderly election process.

Given the above circumstances, The Carter Centercommends the Liberal Constitutionalist Party for itsdecision to remain in the race and urges other partieswho may harbor doubts about the process to do like-wise. The Center furthermore urges the magistrates ofthe Supreme Electoral Council to make every effortpossible to allay doubts about the full and properapplication of Articles 41 and 116, duly instructing allvoting board officials about the correct manner oftheir implementation. Finally, it exhorts all actors—election authorities, political parties, and socialgroups—to do everything in their power to see to itthat the regional elections are held in an orderly fash-ion and with maximum participation of the voters.Withdrawing from the race at the last moment, callingfor abstention, or creating problems for the function-ing of the voting boards on election day will not helpguarantee respect for the political rights of the Coastpopulation, which is eagerly awaiting its opportunity tocast its ballots on March 5.

Communiqué on Nicaragua’s Pre-election Climate

February 23, 2006

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Atlanta... The Carter Center is pleased to announcethat former U.S. President Jimmy Carter will visitNicaragua from July 3–5, 2006, to assess the progressof preparations for that country’s national election onNov. 5. During his stay, President Carter will meetwith Nicaragua’s electoral and governmental authori-ties to discuss possible modalities for a Carter Centerelection observation mission. He will also meet withthe entire spectrum of participants in this year’s elec-tion, along with Nicaraguan civil society organizationsand both national and international observers.

This will be the fourth time since 1990 that TheCarter Center has observed a national election inNicaragua. During each of the three past elections,The Carter Center issued periodic reports on its activi-ties accompanied by recommendations for improvingthe process. In advance of President Carter’s visit, TheCarter Center would like to offer Nicaraguans somereflections on the way in which the current electionprocess in their country has been developing. Wewould also like to offer the electoral authorities a set ofsuggestions about ways to strengthen the process nowunderway.

Atlantic Coast Elections. The 2006 electionprocess passed an important milestone on March 5when Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast population went tothe polls to choose representatives for two regionalcouncils, which form the highest level of theautonomous government that presides over the coun-try’s Caribbean areas. As it had announced previously,The Carter Center sent a small team of observers towitness the voting in a limited number of voting tablesin these areas, which contain Nicaragua’s principalindigenous populations. The Organization of AmericanStates and two national organizations, Ethics andTransparency and the Institute for Democracy, did thesame with much larger numbers of personnel.

According to the unanimous judgment of theobservers, the Atlantic Coast elections generally quali-fied as a success. Until the final stage, these electionstranspired in a tranquil and orderly atmosphere withvery little friction among the parties and candidates.With certain lapses, the organization of the electionswas described by the observers as good. For example,almost all the voting tables opened on time, and fewsuffered any interruption during the day. After ratify-ing their validity, the Supreme Electoral Councilsuccessfully trained local election officials in the cor-rect application of Articles 41 and 116 of the electionlaw, which permitted a significant number of citizensto vote who might otherwise have been excluded fromthe process. Against the grain of certain predictions,the vote count concluded with few challenges to theresults at the tables. An especially encouraging elementwas the upturn in voter turnout, which reached 45 per-cent of all those enrolled as compared to 39 percent in2002. All the foregoing merited, and merits, the con-gratulations that the observers expressed to allinvolved—the voters, the parties and candidates, andthe Supreme Electoral Council.

TWO CONCERNSNonetheless, the political events that preceded andsucceeded the Atlantic Coast voting posed, and contin-ue to pose, serious questions about whether the rest ofthe 2006 election process will transpire in an equallypeaceful manner.

Lack of Consensus. The Carter Center views withconcern the persistent lack of consensus among theauthorities of the Supreme Electoral Council, a diffi-culty that continues to hamper the seven principalmagistrates from sitting together normally to take deci-sions in common. More worrisome still is that thissituation has continued for several months with nodefinite way of ending the impasse in sight. The fact

Third Report on the Nicaraguan Pre-election Process

May 10, 2006

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that impasses now affect other powers of state as well isalso disquieting, as it points toward the possibility thatthe entire election process could bog down institution-ally in its final stages.

This situation began when a sector of the principalmagistrates refused to form the legal quorum of fivemembers, arguing that certain decisions taken orabout to be taken by their colleagues lacked or wouldlack legality. The latter, in turn, had recourse toNicaragua’s Supreme Court, obtaining a judgmentfrom the constitutional chamber permitting them toincorporate alternate magistrates to fill the quorumand make decisions. They proceeded to make a seriesof important decisions with which the first group ofmagistrates again disagreed. Together with other actors,the dissenting magistrates criticized the court’s rulingas irregular and in contradiction with Article 6 of theelection law, whereupon they asked the Nationalassembly to make a so-called authentic interpretationof the article in question. However, months havepassed since the date of this request without the assem-bly being able to act to settle the issue.

The Carter Center has no comment on the legalityof the decisions made by the majority of magistrates,the Supreme Court ruling, or the authentic interpreta-tion of Nicaragua’s election law. However, it wishes toregister its concern that if this impasse is prolongedfurther, lack of political consensus in the SupremeElectoral Council may interfere with the progress ofthe election process and promote a situation of uncer-tainty both before and during November’s voting.

In fact, we would observe that in February 2006,in tandem with the Council’s internal difficulties, vari-ous political actors alleged that plans for fraud ormanipulation of the vote were underway on theAtlantic Coast. Several participants even threatenedmomentarily to withdraw from the race at the sametime that fear emerged of massive challenges to thevote count on election night. The specter of possibledisturbances evoked by this scenario eventually ledPresident Enrique Bolaños to ponder the option ofdecreeing a state of emergency to safeguard public

order in case this were necessary. In addition, at vari-ous moments during this period, calls were heard forthe magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Council toresign en masse.

Fortunately, the crisis scenario forged in Managuavanished on election day, apparently due to the goodjudgment of Coast residents, who refused to counte-nance the transfer of the Pacific areas’ politicaltensions to their territories. But the possibility that ascenario of this kind—full of suspicions and threats tocreate difficulties—could erupt again in the late monthsof this year not only cannot be discounted but is clear-ly latent.

For this reason, and in anticipation of an electioncontest that promises to be tense and polarized, it isadvisable to begin to act to avoid possible negative sce-narios. This can be done by acting on those factors thatgenerate the suspicions, which then multiply and convertthemselves into actions capable of destabilizing an elec-tion. Above all, progressive clarification and fortificationof the rules of the game are required, as this is the onlyway to maximize the confidence of all election actors andthe citizenry at large that the guarantees for the integrityof the vote will be fulfilled at the end of the day.

In good measure, this confidence depends on theperceptions that citizens have of the work of the elec-toral authorities. In the coming phases of the process,the magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Council willbe called upon to make key decisions, some routine,some unforeseen, to keep the process on track down tothe eventual proclamation of the winning candidates.For these decisions to have the maximum possible con-sensus and legitimacy, it is indispensable that themagistrates work in harmony with one another andthat the citizens see them working in that fashion. TheCarter Center therefore urges the magistrates onceagain to make an effort to find a way to resolve theirdifferences.

Electoral Sovereignty. Our concern over the emer-gence of negative scenarios has increased upon seeingthe climate in which the precampaign period is devel-oping. In recent weeks, the great majority of

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Nicaraguans have watched in silence while noted politi-cal, governmental, economic, and even religious figureshave engaged in debates over the positions taken by for-eign governments and their diplomatic representativeswith regard to Nicaragua’s election contest. In touchingthe deep national sentiments of the Nicaraguan people,such debates contribute to a state of polarization thatinjects tension into the election process and may leadto disturbances at the end of the campaign. Given theimportance of the political choices that Nicaraguan par-ties will present to voters this year, it is very importantfor parties and their candidates to be specific in theircampaign proposals and promote rational politicaldebate. As a contribution to that debate, The CarterCenter requests that neighboring governments in thehemisphere respect the dignity of the Nicaraguan peo-ple by abstaining from interference in their internalaffairs, thereby helping Nicaragua to center its electiondebate on concrete alternatives accompanied by theirrespective arguments.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIONMeanwhile, with all due respect to the magistrates, TheCarter Center would like to suggest that the SupremeElectoral Council contemplate a series of measures tofortify citizen confidence in the electoral process. Someof our recommendations, accompanied by additionalcomments, refer to aspects of the recently concludedAtlantic Coast elections, while others look forward,anticipating problems that may emerge in the comingmonths at the national level.

1. “Article 41” Voters. On March 5, a significantnumber of Nicaraguan citizens with valid voting cardsfailed to find their names on the Atlantic Coast electionrolls. This situation occurred amidst the intense wave ofspeculation alluded to above and despite a process of cit-izen verification that the Supreme Electoral Councilregarded as successful. According to differing figuresfrom observer organizations, the number of cardholdersabsent from the rolls varied between 3 percent and 1percent of all those who voted. Regardless of the precisenumber, this percentage is high. It is also of concern in

that if such a number of voters had been denied theopportunity to cast their ballots, a series of conflictsmight well have ensued. Fortunately, the SupremeElectoral Council took the wise decision to permit thesepeople to vote under the terms of Article 41 of the elec-tion law. The situation of these voters nevertheless posesa question mark, given that, in principle, no voter inpossession of a valid voting document should be absentfrom the lists. Given these facts, it would be helpful forthe Supreme Electoral Council to explain toNicaraguans why discrepancies between the voter docu-ment and the election rolls arose and what the Councilis now doing to prevent a repetition of this problem inthe national elections.

2. Materials that Failed to Function. According toother reports from the observers, on the day of theCoast voting, a series of materials that are key to safe-guarding the integrity of the vote failed in significantmeasure to function properly. These include vote cardpunches, lamps for reading vote card security stripes,and even the indelible ink used to mark voters’ fingersso as to preclude the possibility of their voting twice.These problems, which have repeated themselvesacross successive elections, are another source of con-cern. Improvement in this regard is vital before theNovember voting takes place. Once again, it would betimely for the Supreme Electoral Council to informthe citizenry about the measures it plans to take to pre-vent election materials from failing as some did duringthe Atlantic Coast vote.

3. Location of Voting Places. In the wake of thevoting on the North Atlantic Coast, disturbancesoccurred in Bilwi due to the refusal of the indigenousparty Yátama to accept the allocation by the electionauthorities of a given council seat, alleging the existenceof a prior political accord that had supposedly trans-ferred certain voting tables from one election districtto another. According to analyses of the nationalobservers, the origin of this conflict lay in the lack of aclear prior definition and publication of where the vot-ing tables were located in regard to the boundariesamong the Coast election districts. Fortunately, the

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episode of violence instigated by Yátama, which sawthe head of the regional election council sequesteredin his offices, was resolved without major problems.The fact that this situation was resolved on the basis ofa political accord rather than on the basis of clearlyestablished prior rules nevertheless sets a negativeprecedent. The Supreme Electoral Council could helpto dispel any doubt about the repetition of disputesrelated to electoral boundaries by publishing as soon aspossible on its Web page the regulations that definethe exact locations of Atlantic Coast voting centers inrelation to the region’s election districts and by assur-ing the citizenry that no such uncertainty exists inregard to the location of voting places in the rest of thecountry’s departments and regions.

4. The Final Count. By May 5—a full two monthsafter the voting—the Web page of the SupremeElectoral Council still registered only the preliminaryresults of the Atlantic Coast voting as on March 9. Onthat date, the total number of votes amounted to100,352. According to the April 1 edition of La Prensanewspaper, the Council reported that the final total ofvalid votes was 93,524. To clarify this difference to thecitizens, it would be advisable for the Council to pub-lish the final official results of the Atlantic Coastelection on its Web site as soon as possible, accompa-nied by an explanation for the reduction in thenumber of valid votes, assuming such a reduction hasactually taken place.

5. Missing ID Cards. Recent opinion polls havethrown up the striking datum that between 15 and 18percent of all Nicaraguans of voting age lack thenational identity cards that are required to vote. Inview of these numbers, and given myriad reports con-cerning the nondelivery of these documents to thecitizens, it is indispensable to start now to make a max-imum effort to get these documents into the hands ofas many voters as possible before November. Thiseffort should aim at the many young people who havecome of voting age in recent years in which the majori-ty of local ID-issuing offices have been closed, alongwith people who seek replacement cards and the cards

already manufactured that have not yet been delivered.We urge the election authorities to intensify the paceof the processing, manufacture, and distribution ofvoter identification documents, cooperating fully withcivil society and electoral assistance organizations whowish to contribute their energies and ideas to the solu-tion of this problem.

6. Verification and Audits. A thoroughgoingprocess of citizen verification with maximum outreachto potential voters will also be conducive to the objec-tive of guaranteeing all Nicaraguans their right to vote.We urge all citizens to avail themselves of the opportu-nity to check their presence on the voting rolls whenthat opportunity comes in June. Once again, theSupreme Electoral Council can help to maximize thenumber of citizens reached by this process by sharingthe tools necessary to assist voters who wish to verifytheir status with civil society and other organizations.Meanwhile, an appropriate audit of the national elec-tion roll is a necessary complement to the verificationexercise and will help the election authorities to identi-fy and correct any problems, thus ensuring that theelection lists that finally emerge as definitive are of thehighest possible quality. In this regard, we urge theelection authorities to cooperate with the efforts of thenational observers and specialized election assistanceorganizations to carry out a professional-quality auditof the national roll.

7. Money in Politics. The political debate of thelast few weeks has been marked by allegations that oneor another political force is contravening the rules thatgovern party and campaign financing in Nicaragua.The Carter Center underscores that the financing ofparties and campaigns is necessary in a democracy andshould not be viewed only from the angle of its poten-tial negative effects. In any case, complete clarityshould exist among parties, candidates, and potentialdonors about the rules of the game for legitimate con-tributions. We urge the Supreme Electoral Council topublish all current regulations concerning campaignfinance and ordinary political party funding as quicklyas possible on its Web site.

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8. Rules for Observers. After completion of theAtlantic Coast elections, the Supreme ElectoralCouncil has issued new regulations regarding electionobservation during the national elections inNovember. This document represents a laudable effortby the election authorities to fix the rules of the gamefor the observers, an issue that has not been exemptfrom a certain amount of tension in past elections.However, to avoid any future friction betweenobservers and election officials, we would like to rec-ommend that the Supreme Electoral Council, inconjunction with the observers themselves, specifymore precisely those aspects of the regulations havingto do with access to the sites destined for key steps ofthe process, such as the municipal and departmentalelection councils and the computing centers at all lev-els, and in addition guarantee the timely accreditationof all observers.

A common thread running through many of theideas we have presented is the recommendation thatthe Supreme Electoral Council make better use of itsWeb site as a means of communicating with politicalactors and the citizenry. This recommendation fits

with the efforts the Council is making this year todevelop the capacities of its Web page with technicalassistance from IFES. It would indeed be advisable forthe electoral authorities to routinely publish all oftheir official resolutions electronically, as maximizingthe transparency of its acts is the best way for an insti-tution to strengthen the trust of the citizenry.

In conclusion, we would like to express our thanksanew to the magistrates of Nicaragua’s SupremeElectoral Council for the invitation they have extendedus to observe the 2006 elections. The opennessdemonstrated by the election authorities to the workof both national and international observers, in addi-tion to constituting another guarantee of the process,permits us to make suggestions that can help obviatethe problems that may crop up on the road to electionday. We are hopeful that with sensible and timely deci-sions on the part of the election authorities and themature and responsible conduct on the part of politi-cal actors and voters, election day this November willturn out to be the civic and democratic exercise we allwish it to be.

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In the days ahead, Nicaraguan citizens will have anopportunity to participate in a verification process, inwhich they will personally confirm that their namesare on the voters list for the national elections inNovember. I encourage all Nicaraguans of voting age toparticipate in the verification process June 17 and 18.This is an important opportunity to correct any errorsor omissions in the voters list. The right to vote is pre-cious and should be protected, and by verifying yourname and voting location, you can contribute to build-ing a strong democracy in Nicaragua.

To demonstrate the concern of the internationalcommunity about the need to develop the most accu-rate voters list possible prior to the elections,international observers will monitor the verificationprocess. A delegation from The Carter Center willdeploy to various departments and autonomousregions to monitor verification this weekend andassure that citizens have the opportunity to make anyneeded corrections so they can cast a vote inNovember and help select their new government.

Message from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carterto the Nicaraguan Electorate Encouraging Participation

in the Verification Process

June 15, 2006

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Managua, Nicaragua... The Carter Center sent agroup of 11 experts from Argentina, Bolivia,Colombia, Costa Rica, Ireland, the United Kingdom,and the United States to Nicaragua for the purpose ofobserving citizen verification of the voting rolls duringthe weekend of June 17 and 18, 2006. The Center’sobservers were deployed to the departments of Boaco,Carazo, Chinandega, Chontales, Estelí, Granada,León, Jinotega, Madriz, Managua, Masaya, Matagalpa,and Nueva Segovia as well as to the South AtlanticAutonomous Region.

During the course of their work, Carter Centerobservers confirmed that, save for minor slip-ups, theverification exercise was conducted in consonance withestablished procedures. With few exceptions, all thepersonnel assigned to the verification centers showedup to work and carried out their duties appropriatelyand in the prescribed manner. All the materials need-ed for the verification procedure were, moreover,distributed in good condition, although some centersran out of forms for making address changes beforethe close of the process.

In all, Carter Center observers witnessed the pres-ence of poll watchers from at least two of theparticipating parties or alliances, and in the majority ofcases three were present. Technical personnel of theSupreme Electoral Council assisted the process correct-ly, and security conditions were adequate.

Over the two days of the verification exercise, TheCarter Center generally witnessed a small turnout forthe process. The following circumstances may have hadan impact: Some number of citizens arrived to checknot only their own names on the roll but, informally,those of family members and friends as well. Othervoters appear to have regarded checking themselvesagainst the roll as unnecessary, given that they havealways voted successfully at the center in question.Finally, in some cases, the publicity given to the eventwas insufficient.

The information contained in a voting roll isessential to permit citizens to participate in an electionprocess. The Carter Center believes that citizen verifi-cation exercises are absolutely necessary, given thatthey allow citizens to confirm or correct the data aboutthemselves that are found on the roll. The CarterCenter therefore urges all Nicaraguans who have notconfirmed their presence on the voting lists to do so inthe offices of their Municipal Electoral Councilsbefore the deadline on Aug. 6, 2006.

The Carter Center furthermore wishes to high-light the dedication and civic commitment of thepersonnel who conducted the verification process andcongratulates the Nicaraguan people for their citizenawareness.

The Carter Center Observes Nicaragua’s Voter RegistrationVerification Process

June 21, 2006

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Managua... Rosalynn and I have spent three days inManagua learning about the election process, accompa-nied by Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of the CarterCenter’s Americas Program; Dr. Shelley McConnell,senior associate director; Dr. Jaime Aparicio, our newchief of mission for the Nicaraguan elections; andDavid Dye, our political analyst.

We met with President Bolaños; four members ofthe Supreme Electoral Council including its president,Roberto Rivas; candidates; and other party membersfrom four of the five political parties and alliances par-ticipating in the 2006 elections. Daniel Ortegadeclined our invitation.

We also met with the Organization of AmericanStates as well as the national election observer groupsEthics and Transparency and IPADE, representativesfrom civil society groups concerned with the elections,the resident representative of the U.N. DevelopmentProgramme, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and formerPresident Violeta Chamorro and her family.

We arrived at a sad and difficult moment in whichone of the presidential candidates, Herty Lewites, hadunexpectedly died. Nevertheless, Nicaraguan leaderswere willing to take the time to meet with us and sharetheir hopes and concerns regarding the electionprocess, which we appreciate.

POLITICAL-ELECTORAL CLIMATEWe were pleased to learn of some important electoralprogress. All the parties and candidates have now regis-tered, and the concerns about possible disqualificationof candidacies have subsided. It is important forNicaragua that candidates engage in healthy competi-tion for office, giving citizens a choice about who theirleaders will be.

The Carter Center strongly opposes foreign inter-

vention in Nicaragua’s electoral process. Almost all ofthe Nicaraguans with whom we spoke expressed con-cern about foreign governments endorsing, vetoing, orfunding specific candidates.

President Rivas has assured us that the SupremeElectoral Council (CSE) will give The Carter Centerthe access we need to observe every step of the elec-toral process. National and international observers willbe credentialed to enter the juntas receptoras de voto(JRVs) to observe the voting and vote count and toobserve the transmission of the results, resolution ofcomplaints at the departmental and regional electoralcouncils, and activities at the departmental and nation-al counting centers.

He has informed us that the CSE will also issuesufficient credentials to national observers such as ET,IPADE, and CEDEHCA and has eliminated priorrestrictions on those credentials. We were glad to hearthat the political parties understand the value of partypoll watchers and are organizing their poll watchers tobe present in all the JRVs on election day.

We also heard concerns about the political frame-work of the electoral process. By law, only two partiesname magistrates to the CSE, and some parties told usthey feel excluded and consequently lack confidence inthe election authorities. We urge the CSE to meet reg-ularly with representatives of all the political parties toconsult and inform them.

We were pleased to witness the tremendous inter-est and citizen involvement in the electoral process todate. This includes citizens’ groups, domesticobservers, party poll watchers, and voters.

RECOMMENDATIONSAll elections pose administrative and technical chal-lenges. Our conversations suggested remaining steps

Statement by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Nicaragua’sPre-election Climate

July 6, 2006

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that can be taken to develop an effective and transpar-ent process and ensure that Nicaraguans andinternational observers alike will have confidence inthe elections.

1. Identification card (cédula) process. We arevery concerned about the backlog of production anddistribution of cédulas. We have some suggestions,which were well received by the CSE, for ways to facili-tate the process:

a. To facilitate the issuance of birth certificates,reach agreement with mayors’ offices so that these arefree of charge, as well as establish a precise date bywhich citizens can pick up their birth certificates.

b. Several civil society organizations have voluntari-ly cooperated on this task. A number of identity cardshave been issued and not delivered. It is important tostrengthen the information campaigns concerning theexact addresses of the municipal electoral centers atwhich these identity cards can be collected. COSEPand others have offered to assist.

c. Send mobile identity card units to high schoolsto register citizens of voting age.

d. Have the Managua Municipal Electoral Centeraccept applications from all of Managua’s districts.

e. Instruct the municipal electoral councils in thecountry to indicate the date on which the identity cardwill be issued on the slip/stub acknowledging receiptof their application.

f. Undertake a greater effort to increase the dailyreception of applications and the issuance of identitycards by using the necessary human and materialresources.

The CSE believes it is meeting the demand fornew cédulas but committed to provide additionalhuman and material resources where there is a demon-strated need.

2. Voters list. No voters list is perfect, but theCSE should do everything possible to update the list.After the 2001 elections, we called for a modernizationof the civil registry and a concurrent updating of thevoters list. This has not yet been accomplished.

Consequently, we are pleased that the CSE has com-mitted to implement Articles 41 and 116, which allowany voter with a valid cédula to vote, even if he or shedoes not appear on the voters list. The limitations ofthe voters list also make it even more important tohave effective indelible ink, tested beforehand with theparticipation of the parties, to prevent double voting.

3. Selection of voting precinct (JRV) officials.Each level of the electoral administration, includingdepartment and municipal councils and votingprecincts, is constituted of three members. By law, thepresident and first member are chosen by the twolargest parties—the FSLN and the PLC—and the secondmember is chosen from individuals presented by theremaining three parties. There should be equity inthis representation. The departmental- and municipal-level boards have already been chosen with adistribution that does not appear to be balanced. Forexample, Alternativa por el Cambio received 35 per-cent of the principal positions for departmentalcommittees and 27 percent for municipal committees;the ALN-PC alliance received 53 percent of the depart-mental committees and 55 percent of the municipalcommittees; and the MRS received 12 percent of thedepartmental committees and 18 percent of the munic-ipal committee slots.

We urge the municipal electoral councils to ensureequity in the choice of the principal JRV second mem-bers.

4. Regulations. It is very important that all of therules of the game be clarified before the processbegins. We discussed four questions in particular withthe CSE: the process by which JRVs will be nullified,political finance regulations, allocation of deputy seatsin the five departments that have only two deputies,and location of JRVs. The CSE assured us that it willpublish these regulations well before the election andhopefully by Aug. 6.

5. Posting of election results. The CSE committedto publishing on its Web site on election night boththe results of each voting precinct (JRV) as the CSE

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enters them into its computer and also a scannedimage of the tally sheet (acta de escrutinio) from eachprecinct. This is a very positive step that will allowcomplete transparency in the tabulation of results.

6. Dispute resolution process. Complaints andappeals after the election are an important part of theprocess. We will stay in the country to observe thisphase as well. The CSE guaranteed observers to haveaccess to the dispute resolution process, and we expectto observe resolution of disputes at the regional levelas we did in 2001. We have discussed with the CSEaccess to observing the appeals at the national level,and we hope to receive written copies of the appealsand the decisions, rationales, and votes of the CSE onthose appeals.

BEYOND ELECTIONSTransparency is another essential element of electionsand necessary for the establishment and perpetuationof democracy. In Nicaragua, The Carter Center hasbeen engaged for a number of years in supporting theestablishment of an access to information regime. Wehave worked in partnership with the president’s com-munications director, civil society organizations,leaders of the media, and the National Assembly intheir promotion of a comprehensive access to informa-tion law, and we were pleased to hear of the advancesand great possibilities for the passage of a law beforethe summer recess. Moreover, we received positive sig-nals from the candidates concerning their dedicationto transparency and commitment to ensure the fullimplementation of an access to public information law.

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The Carter Center fielded its first election observers inNicaragua on Sept. 8, 2006, sending seven observers tobegin monitoring the election process. The observersreceived a two-day training at the Carter Center’sManagua office before deploying to Esteli, Leon,Matagalpa, Granada, Juigalpa, Bluefields, and PuertoCabezas. The Center will also initiate observation ofthe department of Managua from its office in the capi-tal this week.

The observers will establish relationships with theelectoral authorities, local governments, political par-ties, domestic observer groups, and security forces inall 17 departments and autonomous regions. All are

Spanish speakers, and they come from a variety ofcountries including Argentina, the Netherlands, NewZealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.

“Good training and early deployment of electionobservers are hallmarks of professional election obser-vation,” said Carter Center Chief of Mission JaimeAparicio, the former Bolivian ambassador to theUnited States. “Moreover, these and other observerswill remain in Nicaragua for a period after the electionto monitor the handling of challenges to the vote.”The observers are expected to stay in Nicaraguathrough Nov. 21 or if there is a second-round election,through Dec. 21.

Carter Center Launches Election Observers in Nicaragua

September 20, 2006

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Having accompanied Nicaragua’s election processthroughout 2006, and monitored it intensively sinceSeptember, The Carter Center takes this occasion toexpress its views concerning the progress of the prepa-rations for the Nov. 5 balloting.

The Carter Center congratulates all the actors inthis year’s election process—the voters, the political par-ties, and the electoral branch—on the contributionsthey have made to its progress so far. True to theirword, the magistrates of the Supreme ElectoralCouncil have kept their promise in May 2006 to main-tain quorum among the seven members and havetaken the decisions needed to keep the various phasesof the process moving forward. Parties and candidateshave generally acted in such a way as to preserve thecivic spirit that should prevail in any election cam-paign. Together, all the actors have so far kept theirconduct within parameters sufficiently strict to sup-pose that, once concluded, the 2006 election processmay comply with international standards for a free andfair election.

We likewise wish to congratulate the executivebranch and those responsible for generating and dis-tributing electricity in Nicaragua on the accord theyhave recently reached to guarantee normal power sup-plies to the voting centers, computing centers, andother election-related installations. We are hopeful thatthis accord will dispel the concerns that have been gen-erated in recent weeks about power cuts on voting dayand the days immediately following and that the citi-zens will come to the polling places with fullconfidence that their votes will be respected. We alsorecognize the tests and adjustments that the SupremeElectoral Council has been carrying out in variousmunicipalities despite the electricity cuts.

In addition, The Carter Center would like to con-

vey a series of recommendations concerning potentialproblems that still need to be resolved or preventedbefore Nov. 5 and its immediate aftermath. The finalstretch of any campaign is always the tensest periodand the one fullest of potential dangers to the process,especially when the race is very close. As always, weoffer these comments and recommendations in a sin-cere desire to collaborate in improving the electionprocess, which we hope will be crowned with successin an atmosphere of complete transparency.

1. The Campaign Climate. Political parties bearthe maximum responsibility for making an electioncampaign substantive and maintaining its climate with-in the bounds of respect for the honor and integrity ofall participants. For the most part, during the currentcampaign, Nicaragua’s parties have transmitted sub-stantial programmatic messages to the voters and haveparticipated in a large number of candidate forumsand debates. We urge them to maintain this attitudein the final campaign stretch, correcting the trendtoward personal attacks that has emerged in the lastfew weeks. We also want to reiterate our call to thegovernments of the hemisphere to refrain from inter-vening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua at thisdelicate juncture.

2. Delivery of Voting Documents. With onlythree weeks to go before the election, the delivery ofID cards and especially of supplementary voting docu-ments to hundreds of thousands of voters is still anunresolved issue. We urge the municipal election coun-cils and all observers to lend maximum attention tothis problem so as to facilitate the delivery of thelargest possible number of documents to the citizenry.This will guarantee the right to vote and avoid suspi-cion that a biased distribution of these documentscould negatively affect the legitimacy of the election

The Carter Center Nicaragua Election Observation Mission: Pre-election Statement

October 19, 2006

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process. We also urge a mass publicity campaign sothat voters will come to the municipal election officesand pick up their documents. In addition, initiativeand creativity in civil society at local level can helpgreatly by mobilizing resources and vehicles with whichto help citizens get to these offices and pick up theirdocuments on time.

3. Transmitting the Vote. Throughout the world,the hours following the conclusion of the voting arealways the moments of highest tension in electionprocesses. The Carter Center hopes that the technicalprocess of vote transmission will be accomplished with-out any complications. It is important for the electoralauthorities to take the necessary precautions so thatthe transmission of election results for Managuamunicipality from the national stadium is effectedwithout undue delays or crowding and in a climate ofcomplete order. For this purpose, a prior assessment ofthe flows of people and documents through the stadi-um is appropriate because it would guarantee asufficient number of points at which to transmit allthe tally sheets within a reasonable time frame withoutcreating any bottlenecks. We would also recommendholding simulations of the transmission process withthe participation of the political parties and observers.

4. Guarantees for the Parties. Toward the sameend of speeding the transmission and processing of thevotes in an atmosphere of complete transparency, werecommend that the authorities of the SupremeElectoral Council guarantee the poll watchers assignedby the political parties physical copies of all the tallysheets as soon as these are received in the nationalcomputing center. As quickly as time permits, the con-tending parties wish to check these copies with thosethey receive from the local polling places, thus guaran-teeing the fidelity of the vote transmission. This stepwill contribute strongly to dispelling any doubt aboutthe transmission and strengthen confidence in theprocess as a whole.

5. Responsible Challenges. The political partieshave a legitimate right to challenge the results of thevoting at the local polling places. But this right should

be exercised with due responsibility, foregoing excessivechallenging of the tally sheets for the exclusive purposeof securing a momentary political advantage. In thisregard, we exhort all parties to instruct their pollwatchers to limit their challenges to those that trulymerit the consideration of the election authorities,thus avoiding the proliferation of irresponsible chal-lenges.

6. Respecting the Voters’ Will. The SupremeElectoral Council has made an effort to define certainrules that the election authorities at different levelswill use to decide the challenges they receive. We rec-ommend appending the recently issued regulations onthis matter and instruction stipulating that in thosecases where the tally sheet undergoes alteration, thecopy of the sheet that is not altered will be accepted inits stead. This addition, which could usefully be accom-panied by a public statement of the Council to thesame effect, will help resolve any doubt about how tointerpret the intention of the voters at a given pollingplace. In addition, we urge the magistrates of theSupreme Electoral Council and other authorities toadhere to the letter and spirit of Article 131 of theelections law, which permits, in those cases where it isimpossible to detect the will of the voters throughexamination of the tally sheets, opening the ballotboxes and recounting the votes. In such cases, only thisprocedure will guarantee full respect for the will of thepeople.

7. Legitimate Victors. Once the vote count hasconcluded and the challenges are resolved, one of thelast remaining steps in the election process is theassignment of deputy seats in the National Assembly.So that there exists no doubt concerning who legiti-mately occupies those posts, it is necessary for theSupreme Electoral Council to decide on how to inter-pret the rules for assigning these seats in the fivedepartments that elect only two deputies. The ambigui-ty contained in the current election law on this mattershould not be allowed to contaminate the eventualproclamation of the winning candidates in the nation-al legislature. We therefore urge a clear prior definition

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of the rules for this seat assignment before voting day. In conclusion, The Carter Center wishes to reaf-

firm its historic commitment to democracy inNicaragua as well as its decision to responsibly fulfillthe tasks of election observation for which it has beeninvited once again this year, to the end of ensuringthat the right to vote of all Nicaraguan citizens is fullyrespected.

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Atlanta… The Carter Center announced today that ithas named former Peru President Alejandro Toledo andformer Panama President Nicolás Ardito Barletta to joinformer U.S. President Jimmy Carter as co-leaders inobserving Nicaragua’s national elections on Nov. 5,2006. The Carter Center delegation will also include50 international observers deployed throughout thecountry.

“The participation of former Latin American presi-dents demonstrates that other countries in the regionshare Nicaragua’s desire for transparent, free, and fairelections,” said Jaime Aparicio, chief of mission for theCarter Center’s election observation project. The Latin

American leaders are expected to arrive in Nicaraguaon Nov. 3, 2006, and President Carter will arrive thefollowing day. They hope to meet with PresidentEnrique Bolaños, the Supreme Electoral Council,political party leaders, representatives of domestic andinternational election observation delegations, andothers and will monitor the polls on election day aswell as the counting process and handling of chal-lenges.

Past Carter Center election missions have been ledby former presidents and prime ministers fromArgentina, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the United States.

Carter Center Names Leaders forElection Mission to Nicaragua

October 27, 2006

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This is the fourth national election that The CarterCenter has observed in Nicaragua, beginning in 1990.Your country has always held a special place in myheart. It is a pleasure to be here in the company of mytwo co-leaders, the former president of Panama,Nicolás Ardito Barletta, and the former president ofPeru, Alejandro Toledo.

We are here at the invitation of the SupremeElectoral Council (CSE) and the Nicaraguan govern-ment. The Carter Center’s role has been to observeelection preparations in order to inform the interna-tional community and to offer advice to the CSEbased on our experience in monitoring 66 elections in26 countries worldwide.

Since January of this year, The Carter Center hassent six pre-election delegations to Nicaragua. We werepresent for the regional elections on the CaribbeanCoast and monitored the verification process. InAugust, we opened an office in Managua headed byJaime Aparicio, our chief of mission, who is a formerBolivian ambassador to the United States. In earlySeptember, we placed seven long-term observers in loca-tions outside of Managua, including both the Northand South Atlantic Autonomous Regions, and theseobservers have reported on developments in the elec-tion campaign. Our technical specialists have developedmethods for identifying any patterns that may emergein procedural irregularities or annulment of votes.

Throughout our observation of this electoral year,we are very pleased to note that Nicaragua is establish-ing an electoral process that has the potential to meetthe expectations of its citizens to be able to choosetheir representatives in a competitive campaign and avoting process with accuracy and integrity. Five politi-cal parties and alliances have organized, registered, andcampaigned across the country in a peaceful climate.

Civil society has organized to monitor the elections.Nicaragua is again playing host to international observ-er organizations including the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS), the European Union (EU),and The Carter Center. Despite deep political divi-sions, political competition is occurring without resortto the civil conflict Nicaragua has experienced in itspast. International observers today are focused on thetechnical aspects of the process, not violent clashes,and we will therefore focus on the progress andremaining concerns in this regard.

In the half-dozen public statements we have madesince January, The Carter Center has drawn attentionto problems with the technical preparations for elec-tions and the political climate and made constructivesuggestions for resolving them. The CSE hasaddressed a number of our observations, includingthese areas of progress:

1. The seven magistrates of the CSE have keptquorum and taken decisions.

2. The CSE has issued credentials to nationalobserver organizations in a timely fashion to visit thevoting sites (JRVs) on election day.

3. The CSE has issued some of the regulations ofwhich publication was still pending at the time of ourJuly visit. In particular, rules for making and resolvingchallenges have been published, along with regulationsfor election complaints and a code of election ethics.

4. After a two-week postponement of the applica-tions deadline by the National Assembly, the CSE hasaccelerated the production and delivery of cédulas andsupplementary voting documents to the municipalcenters.

Other problems, such as deficiencies in the nation-al registry and therefore the electoral list, will require along-term solution.

Statement by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The CarterCenter on the Eve of the Nicaragua Elections

November 4, 2006

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We have also been pleased to learn of the CSE’splans to ensure a smooth transmission and reportingof the vote and about government and private sectorefforts to guarantee adequate electricity for the votingcenters and installations of the CSE at all levels.

Nevertheless, we have some remaining concernsthat we have discussed with the CSE. These includethe following:

1. Reports about problems concerning the nam-ing and training of second members for the JRVs

2. Reports about political bias in the distributionof voting documents to the citizens in certain areas

3. Uncertainty over the criteria the CSE will useto resolve any challenges that arise

Yesterday, The Carter Center deployed 50observers throughout Nicaragua to observe the proceed-ings on election day and also the resolution ofchallenges afterward. These observers come from 20different countries and have been trained for this work.

My co-leaders met with President Bolaños and theAlternative for Change party, among others. Thisafternoon we will meet with Daniel Ortega and theFSLN, with whom I was unable to meet in July whenI visited Managua and met with other party leaders.Tomorrow we will observe the election and also meet

with the presidential candidates from the PLC, ALN,and MRS parties.

The Carter Center conducts its election observa-tion in accordance with the Declaration of Principlesof International Election Observation and Code ofConduct adopted at the United Nations in 2005. Assuch, our interest is in the integrity of the process andnot in the outcome of the election.

We have come to monitor the election, not super-vise it. We are opposed to external intervention in theinternal affairs of Nicaragua, and since May, we haveurged publicly that other nations respect Nicaragua’ssovereignty in this election process. As foreigners weare here to help, but ultimately the quality of the elec-tion lies in the hands of the Nicaraguan people. Wehope all citizens will make tomorrow a festive day ofcivic pride, and we urge political parties and candi-dates to refrain from making prematureannouncements of victory until the official results areannounced.

To the citizens of Nicaragua: Your vote matters,and the secrecy of your vote is guaranteed. We urgeyou to exercise this precious right by going to the pollstomorrow.

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Once again we wish to thank the Supreme ElectoralCouncil (CSE) and the government of Nicaragua fortheir kind invitations to observe the 2006 electionprocess. This is the fourth national election TheCarter Center has observed in Nicaragua since 1990,and each experience brings fresh lessons.

Overall, we found the election climate to be compet-itive and the election administration to be adequatewith significant improvements over past electoralprocesses. Nicaraguan democracy has evolved from adecade of revolutionary civil conflict to an emergingdemocracy swinging between an extreme party fragmen-tation in 1996 to a restrictive two-party dominant systemprior to the 2001 elections. The 2006 elections had fivepolitical parties competing energetically in a campaignfree of violence. The military and police played a posi-tive and nonpartisan role supporting the elections.

Nevertheless, the electoral process needs furtherimprovement in the future. Leading into the elections,we had long-term concerns about the civil registry andthe adequacy of the national voters list. These areissues that need to be addressed after the current elec-tion process concludes, and we hope the Nicaraguanauthorities will address them. We were also concernedinitially about the possible disqualification of politicalcandidates and have been pleased to note that this didnot occur.

In the week leading up to the election, we voicedconcern about reports of political bias in the distribu-tion of voting documents, including cédulas anddocumentos supletorios. Both The Carter Center andother international and domestic observers have notedevidence of this phenomenon in several places in thecountry. A number of voting documents were notdelivered prior to election day, possibly denying somecitizens the opportunity to vote.

Importantly, despite these and other concerns, fivepresidential candidates went forward with the election,all persuaded that they stood a chance of winningunder the current rules and conditions.

The CSE announced results as of late Nov. 6 for 61percent of polling sites (JRVs). The results for the presi-dential race show FSLN candidate Daniel Ortegaleading with 38.59 percent of the vote, followed byEduardo Montealegre with 30.94 percent and Jose Rizowith 22.83 percent. These are preliminary, not final,results and are subject to change. In addition, the coun-try elected a new National Assembly, which will bevitally important given the role the legislature will playunder the constitutional reforms to go into effect inJanuary. We intend to follow the vote reporting processthrough to the end in these legislative contests.

Yesterday our 62 observers visited 412 JRVs, report-ing very few significant problems either in the opening,

The Carter Center Nicaragua Election Observation Mission: Postelection Statement

November 7, 2006

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the voting process, or the closing and vote count.Almost all JRVs had the materials they needed, and thevoting proceeded calmly and for the most part withoutinterruption. Very few citizens who came to vote wereunable to do so. Party poll watchers from at least threeparties were present at more than 96 percent of thetables we visited, and these poll watchers all receivedcopies of the tally sheets. Roughly half of the secondmembers of the JRVs we visited were nominated byALN, with the remainder divided between MRS andAlternative for Change. Together, the findings on partypoll watchers and second members suggest that a mixof parties was able to organize effectively.

Official figures from the CSE indicate a low num-ber of challenges to the vote tallies, which coincideswith our delegation’s findings of few significant irregu-larities. Our observers will remain in Nicaragua thisweek to follow up on the resolution of challenges tothe vote tallies and the results of legislative races.

We note that once again that Ethics andTransparency has done a timely quick count, theresults of which closely match those presented by theCSE so far, and we congratulate the group on its suc-cess in this endeavor. It and other civil societyorganizations, such as IPADE, Movimiento porNicaragua, and Hagamos Democracia, worked tirelesslyto ensure a good process.

Although no candidate has claimed victory, wewere concerned about premature victory celebrationon the part of one party. We note with satisfactionthat early reactions did not damage the process.Official results will be known only after several dayswhen the tally sheet processing is completed. We notethat challenges and complaints (impugnaciones y recursos)must also be considered.

We hope for reconciliation among the contendingforces and urge the future president-elect to reach outto the other parties and candidates. We have met withthe four major presidential candidates last night andthis morning. Although there are still some questionsto be resolved concerning the vote and count, all indi-cated they could dialogue with their former adversariesin a search for healing in this divided country.

We want to thank the Organization of AmericanStates and the European Union for excellent coopera-tion throughout and their representatives in the fieldfor the mutual support we have offered and received.Our observers have also cooperated closely with ournational observer counterparts whose willingness toremain throughout the day in their assigned JRVsoffers an additional safeguard that internationalobservers are too few in number to provide.

All the candidates recognize the new political reali-ty in the makeup of the National Assembly. After acompetitive campaign, there is an opportunity to worktogether to deepen trust in political institutions andprocesses. We urge the newly elected NationalAssembly to modernize the political institutionsincluding the Supreme Electoral Council. We encour-age the approval and the implementation of an accessto information law. These steps will enhance greatertransparency, professionalism, and citizen confidence.

As he completes his term in office, we congratulatePresident Bolaños for his consistent support fordemocracy and transparency.

Finally, we thank the Nicaraguan people for provid-ing us with the information and cooperation needed tosuccessfully carry out our observation mission.

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As The Carter Center continues its observation of theelectoral process in Nicaragua, we note that theSupreme Electoral Council has reported the results for92 percent of the polling stations. These results indi-cate that Daniel Ortega has a clear lead of 9 percentover the second-place finisher Eduardo Montealegre inthe presidential race.

On Nov. 7, Eduardo Montealegre conceded defeat.We applaud the graciousness of Montealegre inacknowledging his defeat in a true democratic spiritand promising to act as a constructive opposition forthe well-being of all Nicaraguans. In addition, yester-day, Nov. 8, Edmundo Jarquin and Eden Pastoraacknowledged Daniel Ortega’s victory, and today JoseRizo conceded the race as well.

We congratulate Daniel Ortega and applaud hisstatesmanship in reaching out to his political oppo-nents to work together to fight poverty and govern onbehalf of all Nicaraguans.

The Carter Center continues to monitor the leg-islative races, which are still being counted, as well asthe resolution of challenges originally made at the JRVlevel and any appeals that may be made at the nationallevel. We urge the departmental electoral councils inMatagalpa, Carazo, and other departments and regionswhere the process is still ongoing to act swiftly andwith transparency in making arithmetic correctionsand resolving challenges concerning the tally sheetresults for deputies in the National Assembly. We have22 observers still present in the 17 departments andregions as the departmental and regional electoralcouncils finish their work. Carter Center representa-tives will remain in Nicaragua until the SupremeElectoral Council announces the final results and theseats are awarded in the National Assembly.

The Carter Center conducts its election observa-tion in accordance with the Declaration of Principlesof International Election Observation and Code ofConduct adopted at the United Nations in 2005.

Statement Concerning Nicaraguan Election Results from The Carter Center

November 9, 2006

THE CARTER CENTER


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Overview: The Carter Center was founded in 1982 byformer U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife,Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, toadvance peace and health worldwide. A nongovern-mental organization, the Center has helped to improvelife for people in more than 65 countries by resolvingconflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production.

Accomplishments: The Center has observed 67 elec-tions in 26 countries; helped farmers double or triplegrain production in 15 African countries; mediated orworked to prevent civil and international conflictsworldwide; intervened to prevent unnecessary diseasesin Latin America and Africa; and strived to diminishthe stigma against mental illnesses.

THE CARTER CENTER AT A GLANCE

Budget: $49.1 million 2005-2006 operating budget.

Donations: The Center is a 501(c)(3) charitable organi-zation, financed by private donations from individuals,foundations, corporations, and international develop-ment assistance agencies. Contributions by U.S. citizensand companies are tax-deductible as allowed by law.

Facilities: The nondenominational Cecil B. DayChapel and other facilities are available for weddings,corporate retreats and meetings, and other specialevents. For information, 404-420-5112.

Location: In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east of down-town Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum,which adjoins the Center, is owned and operated by theNational Archives and Records Administration and isopen to the public. 404-865-7101.

Staff: 160 employees, based primarily in Atlanta.

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