SERAFIN MODINA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS AND ERNESTO HONTARCIEGO, PAUL FIGUEROA, TEODORO HIPALLA At bar is a Petition for Review onCertiorariassailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 26051 affirming the decision of the trial court in the case, entitled "Serafin Modina vs. Ernesto Hontarciego, Paulino Figueroa and Ramon Chiang vs. Merlinda Plana Chiang, intervenors", which declared as void and inexistent the deed of definite sale dated December 17, 1975 as well as the Certificates of Title Nos. T-86912, T-86913, T-86914 in the name of Ramon Chiang.1wphi1.ntThe facts that matter are as follows:The parcels of land in question are those under the name of Ramon Chiang (hereinafter referred to as CHIANG) covered by TCT Nos. T-86912, T-86913, and T-86914. He theorized that subject properties were sold to him by his wife, Merlinda Plana Chiang (hereinafter referred to as MERLINDA), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 17, 1975,1and were subsequently sold by CHIANG to the petitioner Serafin Modina (MODINA), as shown by the Deeds of Sale, dated August 3, 1979 and August 24, 1979, respectively.MODINA brought a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against the private respondents, Ernesto Hontarciego, Paul Figueroa and Teodoro Hipalla, docketed as Civil Case No. 13935 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.Upon learning the institution of the said case, MERLINDA presented a Complaint-in-intervention, seeking the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale between her husband and MODINA on the ground that the titles of the parcels of land in dispute were never legally transferred to her husband. Fraudulent acts were allegedly employed by him to obtain a Torrens Title in his favor. However, she confirmed the validity of the lease contracts with the other private respondents.MERLINDA also admitted that the said parcels of land were those ordered sold by Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceeding No. 2469 in "Intestate Estate of Nelson Plana" where she was appointed as the administratix, being the widow of the deceased, her first husband. An Authority to Sell was issued by the said Probate Court for the sale of the same properties.2After due hearing, the Trial Court decided in favor of MERLINDA, disposing thus:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (1) declaring as void and inexistent the sale of Lots 10063, 10088, 10085 and 10089 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara by Merlinda Plana in favor of Ramon Chiang as evidenced by the deed of definite sale dated December 17, 1975 (Exhibits "H"; "3"-Chiang; "9" Intervenor) as well as the Certificates of Title Nos. T-86912, T-86913, T-86914 and T-86915 in the name of Ramon Chiang; (2) declaring as void and inexistent the sale of the same properties by Ramon Chiang in favor of Serafin Modina as evidenced by the deeds of sale (Exhibits "A", "B", "6" Chiang and "7" Chiang) dated August 3, and 24, 1979, as well as Certificates of Title Nos. T-102631, 102630, 102632 and 102890 in the name of Serafin Modina; (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates of title in the names of Ramon Chiang and Serafin Modina and to reinstate the Certificates of Title Nos. T-57960, T-57962, T-57963 and T-57864 in the name of Nelson Plana; (4) ordering Serafin Modina to vacate and restore possession of the lots in question to Merlinda Plana Chiang; (5) ordering Ramon Chiang to restitute and pay to Serafin Modina the sum of P145,800.00 and; (6) ordering Serafin Modina to pay Ernesto Hontarciego the sum of P44,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages plus the sum of P5,000.00, for and as attorney's fees, with costs in favor of said defendants against the plaintiff.On appeal; the Court of Appeals affirmed the aforesaid decisionin toto.Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition for Review under the Rule 45 seeking to set aside the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.Raised for resolution here are: (1) whether the sale of subject lots should be nullified, (2) whether petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith, (3) whether the decision of the trial court was tainted with excess of jurisdiction; and (4) whether or not only three-fourths of subject lots should be returned to the private respondent.Anent the first issue, petitioner theorizes that the sale in question is null and void for being violative of Article 14903of the New Civil Code prohibiting sales between spouses. Consequently, what is applicable is Article 14124supraon the principle ofin pari delicto, which leaves both guilty parties where they are, and keeps undisturbed the rights of third persons to whom the lots involved were sold; petitioner stressed.1wphi1.ntPetitioner anchors his submission on the following statements of the Trial Court which the Court of Appeals upheld, to wit:Furthermore, under Art. 1490, husband and wife are prohibited to sell properties to each other. And where, as in this case, the sale is inexistent for lack of consideration, the principle of inpari delicto non oritur actiodoes not apply. (Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil 490), (Emphasis ours) Thus, Art. 1490 provides:Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:(1) when a separation of propety was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or(2) when there has been a judicial separation of property under Art. 191.The exception to the rule laid down in Art. 1490 of the New Civil Code not having existed with respect to the property relations of Ramon Chiang and Merlinda Plana Chiang, the sale by the latter in favor of the former of the properties in question is invalid for being prohibited by law. Not being the owner of subject properties, Ramon Chiang could not have validly sold the same to plaintiff Serafin Modina. The sale by Ramon Chiang in favor of Serafin Modina is, likewise, void and inexistent.xxx xxx xxxThe Court of Appeals, on the other hand, adopted the following findingsa quo: that there is no sufficient evidence establishing fault on the part of MERLINDA, and therefore, the principle ofin pari delictois inapplicable and the sale was void for want of consideration. In effect, MERLINDA can recover the lots sold by her husband to petitioner MODINA. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the sale was void for violating Article 1490 of the Civil Code, which prohibits sales between spouses.The principle ofin pari delicto non oritur actio6denies all recovery to the guilty partiesinter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract.7When two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with respect to inexistent contracts.8In the petition under consideration, the Trial Court found that subject Deed of Sale was a nullity for lack of any consideration.9This finding duly supported by evidence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not disturb such finding absent any evidence to the contrary.10Under Article 140911of the New Civil Code, enumerating void contracts, a contract without consideration is one such void contract. One of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is that it produces no effect. So also, inexistent contracts can be invoked by any person whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. A transferor can recover the object of such contract byaccion reivindicatoriaand any possessor may refuse to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the transfer.12Thus, petitioner's insistence that MERLINDA cannot attack subject contract of sale as she was a guilty party thereto is equally unavailing.But the pivot of inquiry here is whether MERLINDA is barred by the principle ofin pari delictofrom questioning subject Deed of Sale.It bears emphasizing that as the contracts under controversy are inexistent contracts within legal contemplation. Articles 1411 and 1412 of the New Civil Code are inapplicable.In pari delictodoctrine applies only to contracts with illegal consideration or subject matter, whether the attendant facts constitute an offense or misdemeanor or whether the consideration involved is merely rendered illegal.13The statement below that it is likewise null and void for being violative of Article 1490 should just be treated as a surplusage or anobiter dictumon the part of the Trial Court as the issue of whether the parcels of land in dispute are conjugal in nature or they fall under the exceptions provided for by law, was neither raised nor litigated upon before the lower Court. Whether the said lots were ganancial properties was never brought to the fore by the parties and it is too late to do so now.Furthermore, if this line of argument be followed, the Trial Court could not have declared subject contract as null and void because only the heirs and the creditors can question its nullity and not the spouses themselves who executed the contract with full knowledge of the prohibition.14Records show that in the complaint-in-intervention of MERLINDA, she did not aver the same as a ground to nullify subject Deed of Sale. In fact, she denied the existence of the Deed of Sale in favor of her husband. In the said Complaint, her allegations referred to the want of consideration of such Deed of Sale. She did not put up the defense under Article 1490, to nullify her sale to her husband CHIANG because such a defense would be inconsistent with her claim that the same sale was inexistent.1wphi1.ntThe Trial Court debunked petitioner's theory that MERLINDA intentionally gave away the bulk of her and her late husband's estate to defendant CHIANG as his exclusive property, for want of evidentiary anchor. They insist on the Deed of Sale wherein MERLINIDA made the misrepresentation that she was a widow and CHIANG was single, when at the time of execution thereof, they were in fact already married. Petitioner insists that this document conclusively established bad faith on the part of MERLINDA and therefore, the principle ofin pari delictoshould have been applied.These issues are factual in nature and it is not for this Court to appreciate and evaluate the pieces of evidence introduced below. An appellate court defers to the factual findings of the Trial Court, unless petitioner can show a glaring mistake in the appreciation of relevant evidence.Since one of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is that it does not produce any effect, MERLINDA can recover the property from petitioner who never acquired title thereover.As to the second issue, petitioner stresses that his title should have been respected since he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. The Court of Appeals, however, opined that he (petitioner) is not a purchaser in good faith. It found that there were circumstances known to MODINA which rendered their transaction fraudulent under the attendant circumstances.As a general rule, in a sale under the Torrens system, a void title cannot give rise to a valid title. The exception is when the sale of a person with a void title is to a third person who purchased it for value and in good faith.A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.In the case under scrutiny, petitioner cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith. There are circumstances which areindiciaof bad faith on his part, to wit: (1) He asked his nephew, Placido Matta, to investigate the origin of the property and the latter learned that the same formed part of the properties of MERLINDA's first husband; (2) that the said sale was between the spouses; (3) that when the property was inspected, MODINA met all the lessees who informed that subject lands belong to MERLINDA and they had no knowledge that the same lots were sold to the husband.It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which would put a reasonable man upon his guard to make the necessary inquiries, and then claim that he acted in good faith. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his wilful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.15Thus, petitioner cannot claim that the sale between him and MODINA falls under the exception provided for by law.With regard to the third issue posed by petitioner whether the Trial Court's decision allowing recovery on the part of Merlinda Chiang of subject properties was void petitioner's contention is untennable. It is theorized that as the sale by MERLINDA was by virtue of an Order to Sell issued in the Intestate Estate Proceedings of her late husband, Nelson Plana to allow recovery will defeat the said order of the Probate Court. Petitioner equated the aforesaid Order to Sell as a judgment, which another court in a regular proceeding has no jurisdiction to reverse.Petitioner is under the mistaken impression that as the Order to Sell had become a judgment in itself as to the validity of the sale of the properties involved, any question as to its nullity should have been brought before the Court of Appeals on appeal when the said Order was issued.It is a well-settled rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has jurisdiction over a case brought to rescind a sale made upon prior authority of a Probate Court. This does not constitute an interference or review of the order of a co-equal Court since the Probate Court has no jurisdiction over the question of title to subject properties. Consequently, a separate action may be brought to determine the question of ownership.16Lastly, on the issue of whether only three-fourths of the property in question should have been returned to MERLINDA, petitioner's stance is equally unsustainable. It is a settled doctrine that an issue which was neither averred in the Complaint nor raised during the trial before the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as such a recourse would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.17The issue of whether only three-fourths of subject property will be returned was never an issue before the lower court and therefore, the petitioner cannot do it now. A final word. In a Petition for Review, only questions of law may be raised. It is perceived by the Court that what petitioner is trying to, albeit subtly, is for the Court to examine the probative value or evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below18. The Court cannot do that unless the appreciation of the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. But this is where petitioner utterly failed.1wphi1.ntWHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No. 26051 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL CAPALUNGAN,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE C. RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R. RIGONAN,respondents.This petition1seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 1996, which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 582-17 forreinvindicacionconsolidated with Cadastral Case No. 1.2The petition likewise seeks to annul the resolution dated December 11, 1996, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. Consequently, on February 2, 1976, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. On July 3, 1977, he amended the complaint and included his wife as co-plaintiff. They alleged that they were the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on January 28, 1965; that since then, they had been in continuous possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally, and they refused to leave them when asked to do so.Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs' claims. According to defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages against plaintiffs.During trial, Juan Franco, Notary Public Evaristo P. Tagatag3and plaintiff Felipe Rigonan testified for plaintiffs (private respondents now).Franco testified that he was a witness to the execution of the questioned deed of absolute sale. However, when cross-examined and shown the deed he stated that the deed was not the document he signed as a witness, but rather it was the will and testament made by Paulina Rigonan.Atty. Tagatag testified that he personally prepared the deed, he saw Paulina Rigonan affix her thumbprint on it and he signed it both as witness and notary public. He further testified that he also notarized Paulina's last will and testament dated February 19, 1965. The will mentioned the same lots sold to private respondents. When asked why the subject lots were still included in the last will and testament, he could not explain. Atty. Tagatag also mentioned that he registered the original deed of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds.Plaintiff Felipe Rigonan claimed that he was Paulina's close relative. Their fathers were first cousins. However, he could not recall the name of Paulina's grandfather. His claim was disputed by defendants, who lived with Paulina as their close kin. He admitted the discrepancies between the Register of Deeds' copy of the deed and the copy in his possession. But he attributed them to the representative from the Office of the Register of Deeds who went to plaintiffs house after that Office received a subpoena duces tecum. According to him, the representative showed him blanks in the deed and then the representative filled in the blanks by copying from his (plaintiffs) copy.Counsel for defendants (petitioners herein) presented as witnesses Jose Flores, the owner of the adjacent lot; Ruben Blanco, then acting Registrar of Deeds in Ilocos Norte; and Zosima Domingo, wife of defendant Eugenio Domingo.Jose Flores testified that he knew defendants, herein petitioners, who had lived on the land with Paulina Rigonan since he could remember and continued to live there even after Paulina's death. He said he did not receive any notice nor any offer to sell the lots from Paulina, contrary to what was indicated in the deed of sale that the vendor had notified all the adjacent owners of the sale. He averred he had no knowledge of any sale between Paulina and private respondents.Ruben Blanco, the acting Registrar of Deeds, testified that only the carbon copy, also called a duplicate original, of the deed of sale was filed in his office, but he could not explain why this was so.Zosima Domingo testified that her husband, Eugenio Domingo, was Paulina's nephew. Paulina was a first cousin of Eugenio's father. She also said that they lived with Paulina and her husband, Jose Guerson, since 1956. They took care of her, spent for her daily needs and medical expenses, especially when she was hospitalized prior to her death. She stated that Paulina was never badly in need of money during her lifetime.On March 23, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants (now the petitioners). It disposed:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs, and as prayed for, the Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.Defendants are hereby declared, by virtue of intestate succession, the lawful owners and possessors of the house including the bodega and the three (3) parcels of land in suit and a Decree of Registration adjudicating the ownership of the said properties to defendants is hereby issued.The alleged deed of sale ( Exhs. "A", "A-1", "1" and "1-a") is hereby declared null and void and fake and the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby denied.Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants:a) P20,000.00 as moral damages;b) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;c) P10,000.00 attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.No pronouncement as to costs.4Private respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.On August 29, 1996, the CA reversed the trial court's decision, thus:WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 23, 1994 is hereby SET ASIDE. The plaintiffs-appellants Felipe Rigonan and Concepcion Rigonan are declared the owners of the properties under litigation and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to VACATE the subject properties and SURRENDER the possession thereof to the heirs of the plaintiffs-appellants.Costs against the defendants-appellees.5Hence, this petition assigning the following as errors:ITHE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF LEGAL SUBSTANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.IITHAT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT AND CLEARLY VIOLATES THE RULE THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURTS ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT ON APPEAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN SAID FINDINGS ARE ESTABLISHED BY UNREBUTTED TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.IIITHAT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, CONJECTURES, OR ON INFERENCES MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.IVTHAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.VTHAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE PREMISED ON SUPPOSED ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BUT IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THUS CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.6The basic issue for our consideration is, did private respondents sufficiently establish the existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property? Marked as Exhibits "A," "A-1," "1" and "1-a," this deed purportedly involved nine (9) parcels of land, inclusive of the three (3) parcels in dispute, sold at the price of P850 by Paulina Rigonan to private respondents on January 28, 1965, at Batac, Ilocos Norte.7The trial court found the deed "fake," being a carbon copy with no typewritten original presented; and the court concluded that the document's execution "was tainted with alterations, defects, tamperings, and irregularities which render it null andvoid ab initio".8Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine that factual findings of trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, especially when said findings are established by unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. They add that the Court of Appeals, in reaching a different conclusion, had decided the case contrary to the evidence presented and the law applicable to the case. Petitioners maintain that the due execution of the deed of sale was not sufficiently established by private respondents, who as plaintiffs had the burden of proving it.First, the testimonies of the two alleged instrumental witnesses of the sale, namely, Juan Franco and Efren Sibucao, were dispensed with and discarded when Franco retracted his oral and written testimony that he was a witness to the execution of the subject deed. As a consequence, the appellate court merely relied on Atty. Tagatag's (the notary public) testimony, which was incredible because aside from taking the double role of a witness and notary public, he was a paid witness. Further his testimony, that the subject deed was executed in the house of Paulina Rigonan, was rebutted by Zosima Domingo, Paulina's housekeeper, who said that she did not see Atty. Tagatag, Juan Franco and Efren Sibucao in Paulina's house on the alleged date of the deed's execution.Secondly, petitioners said that private respondents failed to account for the typewritten original of the deed of sale and that the carbon copy filed with the Register of Deeds was only a duplicate which contained insertions and erasures. Further, the carbon copy was without an affidavit of explanation, in violation of the Administrative Code as amended, which requires that if the original deed of sale is not presented or available upon registration of the deed, the carbon copy or so-called "duplicate original" must be accompanied by an affidavit of explanation, otherwise, registration must be denied.9Thirdly, petitioners aver that the consideration of only P850 for the parcels of land sold, together with a house and a warehouse, was another indication that the sale was fictitious because no person who was financially stable would sell said property at such a grossly inadequate consideration.Lastly, petitioners assert that there was abundant evidence that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Paulina Rigonan was already senile. She could not have consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on the deed.In their comment, private respondents counter that at the outset the petition must be dismissed for it lacks a certification against forum shopping. Nonetheless, even disregarding this requirement, the petition must still be denied in due course for it does not present any substantial legal issue, but factual or evidentiary ones which were already firmly resolved by the Court of Appeals based on records and the evidence presented by the parties. Private respondents' claim that the factual determination by the trial court lacks credibility for it was made by the trial judge who presided only in one hearing of the case. The trial judge could not validly say that the deed of absolute sale was "fake" because no signature was forged, according to private respondents; and indeed a thumbmark, said to be the seller's own, appears thereon.In their reply, petitioners said that the copy of the petition filed with this Court was accompanied with a certification against forum shopping. If private respondents' copy did not contain same certification, this was only due to inadvertence. Petitioners ask for the Court's indulgence for anyway there was substantial compliance with Revised Circular No. 28-91.On the contention that here only factual issues had been raised, hence not the proper subject for review by this Court, petitioners reply that this general rule admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; and when the Court of Appeals overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. All these, according to petitioners, are present in this case.Before proceeding to the main issue, we shall first settle procedural issues raised by private respondents.While the trial judge deciding the case presided over the hearings of the case only once, this circumstance could not have an adverse effect on his decision. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation or cessation from the service of the presiding judge. A Judge may validly render a decision although he has only partly heard the testimony of the witnesses.10After all, he could utilize and rely on the records of the case, including the transcripts of testimonies heard by the former presiding judge.On the matter of the certification against forum-shopping, petitioners aver that they attached one in the copy intended for this Court. This is substantial compliance. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain their prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the court's existence.11While the issues raised in this petition might appear to be mainly factual, this petition is properly given due course because of the contradictory findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Further, the later court apparently overlooked certain relevant facts which justify a different conclusion.12Moreover, a compelling sense to make sure that justice is done, and done rightly in the light of the issues raised herein, constrains us from relying on technicalities alone to resolve this petition.Now, on the main issue. Did private respondents establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale? Our finding is in the negative.First, note that private respondents as plaintiffs below presented only a carbon copy of this deed. When the Register of Deeds was subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten deed but only a carbon copy was presented to the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a "duplicate original," the deed contained filled in blanks and alterations. None of the witnesses directly testified to prove positively and convincingly Paulina's execution of the original deed of sale. The carbon copy did not bear her signature, but only her alleged thumbprint. Juan Franco testified during the direct examination that he was an instrumental witness to the deed. However, when cross-examined and shown a copy of the subject deed, he retracted and said that said deed of sale was not the document he signed as witness.13He declared categorically he knew nothing about it.14We note that another witness, Efren Sibucao, whose testimony should have corroborated Atty. Tagatag's, was not presented and his affidavit was withdrawn from the court,15leaving only Atty. Tagatag's testimony, which aside from being uncorroborated, was self-serving.Secondly, we agree with the trial court that irregularities abound regarding the execution and registration of the alleged deed of sale. On record, Atty. Tagatag testified that he himself registered the original deed with the Register of Deeds.16Yet, the original was nowhere to be found and none could be presented at the trial. Also, the carbon copy on file, which is allegedly a duplicate original, shows intercalations and discrepancies when compared to purported copies in existence. The intercalations were allegedly due to blanks left unfilled by Atty. Tagatag at the time of the deed's registration. The blanks were allegedly filled in much later by a representative of the Register of Deeds. In addition, the alleged other copies of the document bore different dates of entry: May 16, 1966, 10:20 A.M.17and June 10, 1966, 3:16 P.M.,18and different entry numbers: 66246, 74389 19 and 64369. 20 The deed was apparently registered long after its alleged date of execution and after Paulina's death on March 20, 1966.21Admittedly, the alleged vendor Paulina Rigonan was not given a copy.22Furthermore, it appears that the alleged vendor was never asked to vacate the premises she had purportedly sold. Felipe testified that he had agreed to let Paulina stay in the house until her death.23InAlcos v. IAC, 162 SCRA 823 (1988), the buyer's immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale. The alleged vendor's continued possession of the property in this case throws an inverse implication, a serious doubt on the due execution of the deed of sale. Noteworthy, the same parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still included in the will subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized by the same notary public, Atty. Tagatag.24These circumstances, taken together, militate against unguarded acceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale.Thirdly, we have to take into account the element of consideration for the sale. The price allegedly paid by private respondents for nine (9) parcels, including the three parcels in dispute, a house and a warehouse, raises further questions. Consideration is thewhyof a contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract.25On record, there is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to several people.26We see no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of land with a house and warehouse at a meager price of P850 only.InRongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in their advanced years, and were not in dire need of money, except for a small amount of P2,000 which they said were loaned by petitioners for the repair of their house's roof. We ruled against petitioners, and declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of consideration.In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.27However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial court's finding and conclusion on the matter:The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of land including the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null and void ab initio.28WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 1996 and December 11, 1996, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, dated March 23, 1994, is REINSTATED.SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA,petitioners,vs.BERLINDA F. SILVA, Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity as Attorney-In-Fact,respondent.To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller's certificate of title.1But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 1662and 1733of the Civil Code or Article 1244of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.5The extent of his inquiry depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorneyduly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appearflaws in its notarial acknowledgmentmere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its execution.Appealed by Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the November 21, 2001 Decision6of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 487677which affirmedintotothe January 10, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89, and the February 27, 2003 CA Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 is a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-2765, Reconveyance and Damages filed with the RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila by Berlina F. Silva (Berlina), through Hermes Dorado (Dorado) as Attorney-in-Fact, against Spouses Claro and Nida Bautista (Spouses Bautista). Spouses Bautista filed their Answer8and a Third-Party Complaint against Berlina's husband, Pedro M. Silva (Pedro).9In an Order dated August 6, 1991, the RTC declared third-party defendant Pedro in default for failure to file an answer to the Third-Party Complaint.10The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the RTC, are as follows:1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds for xxx Metro Manila District III over a parcel of land (Lot 42, Block 10, of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-210217, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot 903, Malinta Estate, LRC Record No. 5941) situated in xxxBarrioof Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an area of 216 square meters, more or less, was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980;2. That on March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista; and3. That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.11Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.12The RTC rendered judgment on January 10, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988 executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land, described and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 Metro Manila District III, null and void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 reinstated.2. Ordering defendants to reconvey the property covered by the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 together with the improvements thereon to the plaintiff.3. Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum ofP5,000.00 in the concept of reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit.Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.Judgment on default is hereby entered in favor of the third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista against third-party defendants Pedro M. Silva, condemning the third-party defendant Pedro Silva to indemnify/pay third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) the contract price of the sale of the property, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the execution of the said document on March 3, 1988 until the amount is fully paid and for whatever amount that the thirdparty plaintiffs were adjudged and paid to the plaintiff by reason of this decision and the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.13Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001 Decision, affirmedin totothe RTC decision;14and, in a Resolutiondated February 27, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.15Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside on the following grounds:I. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as attorney-in-fact has no legal authority to file action against spouses petitioners.II. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine on its face.III. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity [thereof] does not include the one half share of the husband.16The petition fails for lack of merit.As to the first ground, petitioners argue that for lack of authority of Dorado to represent respondent, the latter's Complaint failed to state a cause of action and should have been dismissed.17The argument holds no water.True, there was no written authority for Dorado to represent respondent in the filing of her Complaint. However, no written authorization of Dorado was needed because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent, and not merely through Dorado as her attorney-in-fact. As correctly observed by the CA, respondent herself signed the verification attached to the Complaint.18She stated therein that she is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the preparation of the Complaint.19Respondent also personally testified on the facts alleged in her Complaint.20In reality, respondent acted for and by herself, and not through any representative, when she filed the Complaint. Therefore, respondent being the real party in interest, by virtue of the then prevailing Articles 16621and 17322of the Civil Code, the Complaint she filed sufficiently stated a cause of action. The sufficiency of the Complaint was not affected by the inclusion of Dorado as party representative for this was an obvious error which, under Section 11 of Rule 3,23is not a ground for dismissal, as it may be corrected by the court, on its own initiative and at any stage of the action, by dropping such party from the complaint.24Anent the second ground, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that they are purchasers in good faith.That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact.25The same is conclusive upon the Court,26especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the NBI which constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA, and on the uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany working as a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987.The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.27But then petitioners disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or in the unauthorized sale of the subject property. They are adamant that even with their knowledge that respondent was in Germany at the time of the sale, they acted in good faith when they bought the subject property from Pedro alone because the latter was equipped with a SPA which contains a notarial acknowledgment that the same is valid and authentic.28They invoke the status of buyers in good faith whose registered title in the property is already indefeasible and against which the remedy of reconveyance is no longer available.29In the alternative, petitioners offer that should respondent be declared entitled to reconveyance, let it affect her portion only but not that of Pedro.30Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact not cognizable by us in a petition for review.31We resolve only questions of law; we do not try facts nor examine testimonial or documentary evidence on record. We leave these to the trial and appellate courts to whose findings and conclusions we accord great weight and respect, especially when their findings concur.32We may have at times reversed their findings and conclusions but we resort to this only under exceptional circumstances as when it is shown that said courts failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.33No such exceptional circumstance obtains in the present case for we find the conclusions of the RTC and CA supported by the established facts and applicable law. However, we do not fully subscribe to some of their views on why petitioners cannot be considered in good faith, as we will discuss below.A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith as a defense against any action questioning his title.34Such status, however, is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.35A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.36To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title.37Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land;38second, the latter is in possession thereof;39and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property,40or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.41Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property.42Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title.43Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.44In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted the following forms of inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA presented to them by Pedro;45second, they brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (the notary public who prepared the deed of sale) and asked whether it was genuine;46and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after they advanced payment of Php55,000.00 to Pedro.47Essentially, petitioners relied on the SPA, specifically on its notarial acknowledgment which states that respondent appeared before the notary public and acknowledged having executed the SPA in favor of Pedro.The RTC and CA, however, found such inquiry superficial. They expected of petitioners an investigation not only into the whereabouts of respondent at the time of the execution of the SPA48but also into the genuineness of the signature appearing on it.49We find such requirements of the RTC and CA too stringent that to adopt them would be to throw commerce into madness where buyers run around to probe the circumstances surrounding each piece of sales document while sellers scramble to produce evidence of its good order. Remember that it is not just any scrap of paper that is under scrutiny but a SPA, the execution and attestation of which a notary public has intervened.To what extent, therefore, should an inquiry into a notarized special power of attorney go in order for one to qualify as a buyer for value in good faith?We agree with one author who said:x x x To speak of "notice", as applied to the grantee, is to follow the language of the Statue of Elizabeth. Its proviso protects the man who purchases "upon good consideration and bona fide * * * not having at the time * * * any manner of notice or knowledge." The term "notice", however, is really but an approach to the test of good faith, and all modern legislation tends toward that point.Thus, some present day statutes (outside of the Uniform Law) may speak of notice, actual and constructive, and define both terms, but they should be "liberally construed, so as to protect bona fide purchaser for value." They may require the grantee to have "knowledge" of the debtor's intent, but save for technical purposes of pleading, the term is read in the light of the rules we are studying. It comes always to a question of the grantee's good faith as distinct from mere negligence.50There must, indeed, be more than negligence. There must be a conscious turning away from the subject x x x.As put by the Supreme Court, the grantee must take the consequences if he "chooses to remain ignorant of what the necessities of the case require him to know." The search, therefore, is described by the question, did the grantee make a choice between not knowing and finding out the truth; or were the circumstances such that he was not faced with that choice?(Emphasis ours)This means that no automatic correlation exists between the state of forgery of a document and the bad faith of the buyer who relies on it. A test has to be done whether the buyer had a choice between knowing the forgery and finding it out, or he had no such choice at all.When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution.51A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.In sum,all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.52Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the operative words "duly notarized" and "all things being equal." Thus, said rule should not apply when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.InDomingo v. Reed,53we found that the special power of attorney relied upon by the buyers contained a defective notarial acknowledgment in that it stated there that only the agent-wife signed the document before the notary public while the principal-husband did not. Such flaw rendered the notarial acknowledgment of no effect and reduced the special power of attorney into a private document. We declared the buyer who relied on the private special power of attorney a buyer in bad faith.InLao v. Villones-Lao,54andEstacio v. Jaranilla,55we found that the buyers knew of circumstances extrinsic to the special power of attorney which put in question the actual execution of said document. InDomingo Lao, the buyer knew that the agent-wife was estranged from the principal-husband but was living within the same city. In theEstaciocase, we found admissions by the buyers that they knew that at the time of the purported execution of the special power of attorney, the alleged principal was not in the Philippines. In both cases we held that the buyers were not in good faith, not because we found any outward defect in the notarial acknowledgment of the special powers of attorney, but because the latter had actual notice of facts that should have put them on deeper inquiry into the capacity to sell of the seller.In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy56and we are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into evidence by her counsel.57We emphasize this fact because it was actually this photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the deed of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further investigation on the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public hasofficiallysigned it.58There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith.All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead, they took no precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the notary public who prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who was the notary public who prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro.59In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good faith.That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife.60We see no reason to deviate from this rule.WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED. The Decision dated November 21, 2001 and Resolution dated February 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeal areAFFIRMED.RAMIREZ VS RAMIREZPetitionerPotencianoRamirez filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 69401.OnOctober 8, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Ma. Cecilia Ramirez before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City (RTC) for annulment of: 1) a Deed of Donation; 2) Waiver of Possessory Rights; and 3) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.T-5618 and T-5617.[1]Petitioner claimed that respondent caused the execution of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to acquire ownership over the land and improvements then covered by TCT Nos. T-4575 and T-4576. Using the Deed of Donation, respondent allegedly succeeded in having TCT Nos. T-4575 and T-4576 cancelled and TCT Nos. T-5618 and T-5617 issued in her name.Furthermore, petitioner alleged that with the Waiver of Possessory Rights, respondent was able to cause the Office of the City Assessor to transfer to her name the tax declarations on the improvements in the land.[2]The Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights were allegedly executed by petitioner and his wife, Dolores Ramirez, onJanuary 29, 1993andOctober 24, 1995, respectively. However, the death certificate presented showed that Dolores died onApril 5, 1991and, consequently, could not have executed the assailed documents. Petitioner repudiated the other signatures appearing on the two documents that were purportedly his and insisted that he did not intend to transfer the properties to respondent.In her Answer, respondent alleged that her father, petitioner, would not have filed the case were it not for the fact that he remarried despite his age of 84 years.She further claimed that it was her fathers idea to cause the preparation of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to save on expenses for publication and inheritance taxes.After trial, the RTC ruled that the signature of Dolores on the Deed of Donation was a forgery while her signature on the Waiver of Possessory Rights was genuine.It also found petitioners signatures on both documents to be genuine. It then held petitioner and respondent inparidelicto,as participants to the forgery, and ruled that they must bear the consequences of their actswithout cause of action against each other in accordance with Article 1412 of the Civil Code. The RTC dismissed the complaint.[3]Petitioner went to the CA, which held that Doloresssignature on the Deed of Donation as well as her alleged signature appearing in the Waiver of Possessory Rights wereforgeries.The petition was denied and the CA likewise held both parties inpari delicto.[4]The issue is simple: whether petitioner and respondent are inparidelicto.As one of the modes of acquiring ownership, donations are governed by Title 3, Book III, of the Civil Code.Donationsintervivosare additionally governed by the general provisions on obligations and contracts in all that is not determined by the title governing donations.[5]Hence, the rule onparidelictounder the general provisions of contracts is applicable to the present case.The Court agrees with the rulings of the CA and the RTC that petitioner and respondent are inparidelicto.Nevertheless, both courts erred on the applicable law. Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which they applied, refers to a situation where the cause of the contract is unlawful or forbidden but does not constitute a violation of the criminal laws, thus:ARTICLE 1412.If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:(1)When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;(2)When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him.The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.On the other hand, where the act involved constitutes a criminal offense, the applicable provision is Article 1411:ARTICLE 1411.When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being inpari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.Petitioner alleged that the signatures of Dolores on the Deed of Donation and on the Waiver ofPossessoryRights are a forgery. Respondent does not deny this allegation. Forging a persons signature corresponds to the felony of falsification under Section 4, Title IV of the Revised Penal Code.Hence, the act of forging Doloress signature constitutes a criminal offense under the terms of Article 1411 of the Civil Code.The Court now proceeds to determine if there is ground to hold the parties inparidelictounder Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Under this article, it must be shown that the nullity of the contract proceeds from an illegal cause or object, and the act of executing said contract constitutes a criminal offense. The second requirement has already been discussed and is found to be present.On the first element, petitioner claims that the object or cause of the Deed of Donation and of the Waiver ofPossessoryRights is the transferred real properties and that there is nothing illegal about them. He maintains that the illegality instead stems from the act of forgery which pertains to consent, which is not material to the application of Article 1411. The argument is untenable. Object and cause are two separate elements of a donation and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine ofparidelicto. Object is the subject matter of the donation, while cause is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the transaction. Petitioner wrongly asserts that the donated real properties are both the object and cause of the donation.In fact, the donated properties pertain only to the object.Therefore, while he is correct in stating that the object of the donation is legal, his argument misses the point insofar as the cause is concerned. The cause which moved the parties to execute the Deed of Donation and the Waiver ofPossessoryRights, the motive behind the forgery, is the desire to evade the payment of publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which became due upon the death of Dolores.[6]Undeniably, the Deed of Donation and the Waiver ofPossessoryRights were executed for an illegal cause, thus completing all the requisites for the application of Article 1411.Both petitioner and respondent are, therefore, inparidelicto.Neither one may expect positive relief from the courts from their illegal acts and transactions. Consequently, they will be left as they were at the time the case was filed.WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUOZ, Attorney-in-Fact,Petitioner,vs.ALEGRIA BAUTISTA, ANGELICA BAUTISTA, PRISCILLA BAUTISTA, GILBERT BAUTISTA, JIM BAUTISTA, GLENDA BAUTISTA, GUEN BAUTISTA, GELACIO BAUTISTA, GRACIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO S. TANDOC and CESAR TAMONDONG,Respondents.During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square meter parcel of land (the property) in Poblacion, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12951. She died intestate on January 19, 1970, leaving behind her spouse Isidro Bautista (Isidro) and five children, namely: Teofilo Bautista (Teofilo), Alegria Bautista (Alegria), Angelica Bautista (Angelica), Pacita Bautista (Pacita) and Gil Bautista (Gil).On April 21, 1981, Isidro and four of his five children Pacita, Gil, Alegria, and Angelica executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition1of the property in which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children. Teofilo was excluded from the partition.Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired of the property, sold the same, by Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981, to their sibling Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc (Pedro).2Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations3and TCT No. 187774in their names over 209.85 square meters of the property including the shares they purchased from Angelica and Alegria.Pacita, with Pedros conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute Sale5dated April 13, 1993 of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedros nephew.On January 24, 1994, herein petitioner Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact Francisco Muoz, filed a Complaint6against his siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his already deceased sister Pacita), Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already deceased brother Gil), Pricillas children Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, and Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership, possession and damages.In his complaint, petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong was fictitious as it was impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila, she being already seriously ill at the time.7In their Answer,8the defendants-herein respondents sisters Alegria and Angelica, who were joined therein by their co-defendants-respondents Priscilla, Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, Gelacio, and Gracia, claimed that it was Pacita who caused the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and because they trusted Pacita, they signed the document without scrutinizing it; and that they learned about the contents of the partition only upon Teofilos filing of the Complaint.By way of cross-claim9against Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the answering defendants-respondents claimed that a few weeks after the partition, Pacita approached Angelica and Alegria to borrow their share in the property on her representation that it would be used as security for a business loan; and that agreeing to accommodate Pacita, Angelica and Alegria signed a document which Pacita prepared which turned out to be the deed of absolute sale in Pacitas favor.In their Answer with Counterclaim,10Pedro and Cesar Tamondong claimed that they were buyers in good faith.11In any event, they contended that prescription had set in, and that the complaint was a mere rehash of a previous complaint for falsification of public document which had been dismissed by the prosecutors office.12By Decision13of June 24, 1999, Branch 57 of the RTC of San Carlos City rendered judgment in favor of Teofilo, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:1)Declaring as null and void and of no force and effect the following documents:a) Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated April 21, 1981;b) Deed of Absolute Sale [d]ated May 14, 1981;c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18777;d) Tax Declaration Nos. 59941, 45999, and 46006;e) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 13, 1993;2)Ordering the partition of the land in question among the compulsory heirsof the late Spouses Isidro Bautista and Teodora Rosario3)Ordering defendants Cesar Tamondong and Pedro Tandoc to vacate the premises.No pronouncement[s] as to cost.14(Underscoring supplied)On appeal by Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the Court of Appeals, by Decision15of February 21, 2003, reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed Teofilos complaint on the ground of prescription.16His Motion for Reconsideration17having been denied,18Teofilo filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.19The petition is impressed with merit.The Court of Appeals, in holding that prescription had set in, reasoned:Unquestionably, the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is invalid insofar as it affects the legitimate share pertaining to the defendant-appellee in the property in question.1avvphi1There can be no question that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was fraudulently obtained. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Suchaction for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Significantly, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.In the present case, defendant-appellee isdeemed to have been constructively notified of the extra-judicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot on December 21, 1981. From the time of its registration, defendant-appellee had four (4) years or until 21 December 1985, within which to file his objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. Unfortunately, defendant-appellee failed to institute the present civil action within said period, having filed the same only on 17 January 1994 or more than twelve (12) years from the registration of the deed of extra-judicial partition. Hence, defendant-appellees right to question the deed of extra-judicial partition has prescribed.Even on the extreme assumption that defendant-appellees complaint in Civil Case No. SC-1797 is an action for reconveyance of a portion of the property which rightfully belongs to him based upon an implied trust resulting from fraud, said remedy is already barred by prescription. Anaction of reconveyance of land based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten yearsfrom the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title.x x x xThe complaint of defendant-appellee was filed only on 17 January 1994, while the deed of extra-judicial partition was registered and inscribed on Transfer Certificate of Title 12951, on 21 December 1981. Clearly,the complaint was filed twelve (12) years and twenty-seven (27) days after the inscription of the deed of extra-judicial partition on TCT 12951. Hence, even if We consider defendant-appellees complaint as an action for reconveyance against plaintiff-appellants on the basis of implied trust, we find and so hold that his remedy for reconveyance has also prescribed.20(Underscoring supplied)As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid, however. SoSegura v. Segura21instructs:x x x The partition in the present case was invalid becauseit excluded six of the nine heirswho were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." Asthe partition was a total nullityand did not affect the excluded heirs,it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two yearsx x x22(Underscoring supplied)The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe.23Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilos co-heirs.24Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle ofnemo dat quod non habet.25WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED. The decision of the courta quoisSET ASIDEand the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 isREINSTATED.JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST,petitioner,vs.PR BUILDERS, INC.,respondent.Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981.The facts:Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project inBarangayNiyugan, Laurel, Batangas.When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618.On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a Decision2in favor of spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant, rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to:1) Reimburse complainant the sum ofP3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was filed;2) Pay complainant the sum ofP297,000.00 as actual damages;3) Pay complainant the sum ofP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;4) Pay complainant the sum ofP150,000.00 as exemplary damages;5)P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and6) Cost of suit.SO ORDERED.3Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner.4From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment.5On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties.6Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.7On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution.8On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)9inBarangayNiyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m..11Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties atP6,500.00 per sq m isP83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount ofP5,450,653.33. The sum ofP5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.14At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.16Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17reasoning as follows:While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is PhP6,500.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we definitely cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square meter levied properties is only around PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the execution sale of the said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings was seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel, Atty. Noel Mingoa. However, instead of resolving first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff Ozaete totally disregarded the objection raised and, posthaste, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the payment of the legal fees (pars. 7 & 8, Sheriff's Return).While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that, mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground to annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378). The difference between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00 is PhP77,616,000.00 and it definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when there was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho (par. 7, Sheriff's Return) and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel (par. 6, Sheriff's Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the execution sale.Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the auction sale, but the determination of the value of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.x x x xIt is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to consider the fair market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and any levy in excess of the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424).x x x x18(Emphasis supplied).The dispositive portion of the Order reads:WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead Respondent's real properties that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations thereon.SO ORDERED.19A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition with the CA on September 27, 2000.On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision20dismissing the petition. The CA held that petitioner's insistence thatBarrozov. Macaraeg21does not apply since said case stated that "when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be material" holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere inadequacy," but an inadequacy that shocks the senses; thatBuan v. Court of Appeals22properly applies since the questioned levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value ofP83,616,000.00 which shockingly exceeded the judgment debt of only aroundP6,000,000.00.Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23petitioner took the present recourse on the sole ground that:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.24Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their names.Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession,no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Emphasis supplied).The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens25or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.26Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect.28It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are deemedin pari delictoor "in equal fault."30In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other."31This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32that permit the return of that which may have been given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code);33(b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code);34(c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);35(d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36(e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegalper sebut merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37and (f) the party for whose benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)38and labor laws (Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. A distinction between the two is material in the determination of when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or vendee and, ultimately, the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional proscription has been breached.In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.40On the other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.41In other words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.42Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership.Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount ofP3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved.43Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,44moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.45The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-callednunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its