Upload
others
View
1
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
ioICO-o
I**=00=o
University of Toronto-
York University
Joint Centre
for Asia Pacific Studies
:CO
litics and Society
in Hong Kong
towards 1997
fi
4:
edited by Charles Burton
CANADA AND HONG KONG PAPERS NO. 1
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2010 with funding from
IVIulticultural Canada; University of Toronto Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/politicssocietyiOOburt
Politics and Society in Hong Kong Towards 1997
Politics and Society
in Hong KongTowards 1997
Papers presented at the Canada and Hong Kong Workshop
Brock University, 5 January 199
1
Edited by
Charles Burton
Canada and Hong Kong Papers No. i
Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies
Toronto, 1992
Canada and Hong Kong Research Project
University ofToronto - York University
Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies
York Lanes, Suite 270
York University
4700 Keele St.
North York, Ontano
CANADA M3J 1P3
Copyright © 1992 by the Governing Council ofthe
University ofToronto and the Board ofGovernors ofYork University.
All rights reserved.
ISBN 1-895296-04-8
Pnnted in Canada at the Coach House Press.
Director, Canada and Hong Kong Project: Diana Lary
Associate Director: Bernard Luk
Coordinator and Editor: Janet A. Rubinoff
Calligraphy for cover design byJerome Ch'en, York University.
Introduction to the Series:
Canada and Hong Kong Papers
This book is the first ofa series to be pubhshed by the Canada and HongKong Project. The project was set up in 1990, in recognition of the
importance of the growing relationship between Canada and HongKong. One of the exciting things about this project is the high level of
interest that there is now in the relationship between Canada and HongKong and the enthusiasm which we have found for doing research on the
subject. We have been able to attract a number oi scholars and profes-
sional people with a detailed knowledge of Canada and Hong Kong to
contribute to our series.
The books in this series will look at various aspects ofthe relationship
between Canada and Hong Kong in the period leading up to the return
ofHong Kong to Chinese sovereignty^ in 1997. Over the past few years
relations between Canada and Hong Kong have increased enormously
and have been changed dramatically by the great wave of migration to
Canada over the past decade. Since migration is the linchpin ofthe rela-
tionship, some ofthe books in the series, such as this first one, will focus
on the emigration climate in Hong Kong and will look at fictors which
encourage or inhibit migration.
We would like to express our appreciation to Ruth Hayhoe,
University of Toronto, and Bernard Luk, York University and the
Chinese University of Hong Kong, for reading and commenting on
earlier versions of this manuscript. We also thank Jerome Ch'en, York
University, for the calligraphy on our cover.
The Canada and Hong Kong Project is funded by the Donner
Canadian Foundation. We would like to thank the Foundation for its
generosity and for its steady, informed support.
Diana Lary
Director
Canada and Hong Kong Project
Contents
Introduction to the Series 5
Contributors 9
Introduction 11
Under China's Shadow MING K. CHAN
Dimensions ofUnionization in Recent Years 15
Labour Unions and the Pohtics ofTransition 16
Labour Unions and Election Politics in the 1990s 25
Epilogue: Toward 1997 and Beyond 33
Education ni Hong Kong Up to 1997 and Beyond BERNARD H.K. LUK
Background to the Education System 37
The School System 39
The Education System and 1997 41
The Input Factors 42
The Process ofSchooHng 53
The Output 59
Summing Up 60
Crises and Transformation THOMAS I.S. LEUNG
Hong Kong's Socio-Political System 62
1997 and the Self-Transformation ofthe Role ofReligion 63
Struggling for Democracy During the Basic Law Drafting Process 66
The Tiananmen Square Massacre and Its Impact on Hong Kong 70
The Final Draft of the Basic Law 72
The Struggles of 1990 73
The Sunset ofReligious Freedom m Hong Kong 75
Conclusion 7(S
Uncertain Refuge: Freedom of the Press
Under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights perry KELLER 81
The Colonial Legacy 84
The Pressure of Decolonization 88
Contributors
Charles Burton is Associate Professor of Politics at Brock University and
Associate Director of the Brock Centre for Canada and Asia Pacific Studies.
Following his b.a. studies at Carleton University and the University ofToronto,
he spent one year at Cambridge studying Chinese and three years at Fudan
University, prc. He completed a Ph.D. in East Asian Studies at the University
of Toronto. He is currently on secondment as First Secretary, Cultural and
Scientific Affairs, in the Canadian Embassy to China. Primarily interested in
research on Chinese politics, he is author o{ Political and Social Change in China
Since 1978 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).
Ming K. Chan is presently Lecturer in the Department of History at the
University of Hong Kong and Executive Coordinator of the Hong Kong
Documentary Archives, Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Born in
Hong Kong, he received his b.s. from Iowa State University, m.a. from the
University ofWashington and a Ph.D. in history from Stanford University. His
academic works in English include Historiography ofthe Chinese Labor Mopement,
i8g3-i94g (Hoover Institution Press, 198 1) and Schools into Fields and Factories:
Anarchists, the Giiomindang and the National Labor University in Shanghai, 1927-
igj2 (with Arif Dirlik; Duke University Press, 199 1). Publications in Chinese
include Dimensions of the Chinese and Hong Kong Labor Movement (Hong Kong
Christian Industrial Committee, 1986); Perspectives oti the Hong Kong and Chinese
Labor Movement (with A. Leung; hkcic, 1982); and the British Sunset in Hong
Kong: Historical Challenges in the Wilsonian Era of Transition (Hong Kong
Economic Journal Press, 1989). He is the general editor ofthe new scries, Hong
Kong Becoming China: The Transition to 1997. His most recent work, edited with
David Clark, The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for "Stability and Prosperity"
Under Chinese Sovereignty? (M.E. Sharpe, 1991), is the inaugural volume in this
series.
Perry Keller is a Lecturer in Law at Manchester University where he teaches
pubHc and private international law. After completing a B. A. at the University of
British Columbia in 1979, he studied for two years at Nanjing University in
China. He received his i l.b. in 1985 from Osgoodc Hall Law School at York
University and an ll.m. from Harvard Law School in 1 99 1 . His research interests
encompass the international and comparative law aspects ofrights to freedom of
expression and freedom of information. He has written several articles
concerning legal issues in China and Hong Kong.
Thomas I.S. Leung is Director of Chinese Studies at Regent College,
Vancouver, B.C. Originally from Hong Kong, he completed an m.a. in
philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1977 and his Ph.D.
specializing in Chinese Philosophy at the University ofHawaii in 1986. He has
published eleven books in Chinese in the fields ofChinese philosophy, Chinese
political culture and the philosophy of religion. One of his books. Penetration
and Transformation, A Neo-Confncianist-Christian Dialogue, has recently been
translated into English but not yet published.
Bernard H.K. Luk is a senior lecturer at the Faculty ofEducation, the Chinese
University of Hong Kong, and a visiting associate professor with the History
Department, York University. Born in Hong Kong, he received his b.a. in
history from c.u.h.k. and his M.S. in comparative education and Ph.D. in history
from the University of Indiana. He is co-editor of The Other Hong Kong Report
(Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1989) , and has also published five books
and numerous articles in Chinese or English on Hong Kong history. Hong
Kong education, and education in modern China.
Introduction
The political and social impact of the reversion of Hong Kong to
Chinese sovereignty after 1997 is bound to be substantial regardless ofthe
promises of "no change for 50 years." While the agreements between
Chma and Britam over the preservation ofrights and freedoms in Hong
Kong may be sincerely supported by the Chinese side, doubts about how
these guarantees should be understood naturally remain. A large number
of rights and freedoms are already guaranteed Chinese living on the
Mainland by the Constitution ofthe People's Republic of China. Will
Hong Kong be allowed more rights and freedoms than other parts of
China after 1997? Hong Kong's culture and values are clearly considered
a threat to the social norms underlying the politics and culture of the
People's Repubhc ofChina today. It is unhkely that "bourgeois liberal-
ism" will be acceptable for Chinese in Hong Kong if it is considered by
China's ruling party to be damaging to the spiritual civihzation of
Chinese on the Mainland. On v/hat basis can Hong Kong's poHtical
culture be made compatible with the political culture ofthe rest ofChina
after 1997?
There is litde common ground m the perspectives of Hong Kong's
colonial administrators and the Chinese Communist Party leadership on
the basic question of the relationship of the individual to the state.
Mutual misunderstanding between the people of Hong Kong and the
Beijing-backed administrators who will be running Hong Kong after
1997 appears inevitable, regardless ofthe degree ofgood will existing on
both sides. In cases ofconflict, the Mainland perspective can be expected
to prevail over that ofHong Kong.
On a snowy 5 January 1991, a group of scholars with professional
interests in Hong Kong's future gathered in the Board Room ofBrock
University's Schmon Tower overlooking the Niagara escarpment. The
purpose ofthis first workshop, sponsored by the Canada and Hong Kong
Research Project, was to examine Hong Kong pohtics and society in
terms of the impact of the 1997 changeover. Papers focused on four
different aspects: labour unions, the press, educational institutions, and
religion.
The paper by Ming Chan on labour unions provides a highly reveal-
12 Poliliis and Sociciy iti I loin^ Kotit^ Towards iggy
ing narrative on the shifting alHanccs and priorities of Hong Kong's
labour leaders in the lead up to 1997. The role ofthe PRC-backed labour
forces in Hong Kong can be expected to change dramatically after the
reversion ofHong Kong to the PRC's sovereignty. As different elements
seek to maximize their advantage, highly dynamic, politically-charged
factional activities are increasing in intensity with surprising results.
Bernard Luk's paper discusses the very substantial differences in the
"philosophy" underlying education in Hong Kong under British colo-
nial rule and the Mainland under Chinese socialism. The impact of 1997
is already being felt in Hong Kong as large numbers ofteachers have been
abandoning the profession. The fate of religious schools and the future
role ofMandarin versus English in Hong Kong education are issues that
remain to be clarified.
Thomas Leung's paper explores the politicization of a once socially
passive element ofthe Christian community in Hong Kong in response
to the perceived future impact ofthe end ofBritish rule in the territory.
It is hoped that studies of the response of Hong Kong's other religious
communities to the prospect of 1997 will be forthcoming. Finally, Perry
Keller's paper looks at the effectiveness ofthe Hong Kong Bill ofRights
as the legal instrument for protection offreedom of expression in HongKong and civil liberties in general in the years ahead. All of these papers
deal with myriad unknowns, but each sheds light on the practical
response ofspecific elements ofHong Kong society to emerging politi-
cal realities. Through these details, a clearer notion of the "big picture"
ofpolitics and society in HongKong after 1997 should gradually emerge.
Throughout the day long workshop, a lively exchange spanned a
number of topics on China's and Hong Kong's preparations for 1997.
Discussion ranged from the very mundane, such as how Mainland
sympathizers have induced Hong Kong fortune-tellers to reassure their
substantial clientele that all will be well after 1997, to the very poignant.
The latter included the revelation that the ever-resourceful Hong KongChristian church had sent a delegation to Eastern Europe to learn how to
fulfil the requirements of their faith under the stringencies of Leninist
regimes.
All agreed that careful consideration of the Hong Kong question by
informed neutral parties was a basis for maintaining Hong Kong's stabil-
ity and prosperity after 1997. No one wants to see Hong Kong degener-
ate under Chinese sovereignty; however, it would be naive to down play
the complexity of the transition of political authority from Britain to
China. There are many difficult issues regarding Hong Kong's future
Politics and Society in Hoii^^ Kong Towards iggy 1
3
political and social organization that would be best resolved through an
open process of dialogue between China and all parties involved, in an
atmosphere ofmutual respect and trust. Ideally this volume may bring to
the fore some ofthe specific questions that should be addressed in such a
dialogue.
The Workshop was coordinated by Charles Burton (Brock
University). Papers were presented by Ming K. Chan (University of
Hong Kong), Thomas In-sing Leung (Regent College), and Bernard
Luk (York University and Chinese University of Hong Kong). Perry
Keller (University of Manchester) was unable to attend the workshop,
but his paper was read and discussed in his absence. Other participants
included Steve Chan (York University), Teresa Chu (Canadian Council
of Churches), Victor Fie (Brock University), Diana Lary (York
University) and Janet Salaff (University of Toronto) . Financial support
for the workshop was provided by the Canada and Hong Kong Project
oftheJoint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies (University ofToronto - York
University) and by Brock University.
Charles Burton
Brock University
Under China's Shadow:RealpoHtik ofHongKong Labour Unionism To^vard 1997
Min^K. Chan
Dimensions ofUnionization in Recent Years
The spectacular economic growth and rapid industrial development of
Hong Kong during the past four decades has provided the objective
conditions conducive to the development of labour unionism.
According to official data at the end of 1990, there v^^ere 452 employees'
unions with a total membership of439,500 in Hong Kong. The number
oflabour unions is quite impressive yet the average enrolment, at nearly
1,000 members per union, is rather low, and the union membership
density of 18% among a total workforce of 2.8 million is not a sign of
strong unionization.
About one-third ofthese 452 labour unions are affiliated with one of
the two politically rival federations—the Hong Kong Federation of
Trade Unions (hkftu) on the left and the Hong Kong and Kowloon
Trades Union Council (hktuc) on the right. The remaining 300 unions
have a total membership of 234,000, a majority of them white collar
elements from the civil service and the teaching profession. Founded in
1948, the pro-Peking hkftu has 82 affiHated unions with some 174,500
members. Many of these leftist unions are industrial units covering
workers in shipyards, textile mills, public transport, public utilities, and
printing and construction industries. The pro-Taipei hktuc, also
founded in 1948, has 70 affiliated unions with a total membership of
31,000. Many of these are craft unions in the restaurant and building
trades."
In addition to the division between unions and the duplication of
unionization efforts due to the left-right rivaliy, a more fundamental
cause for the fragmentation of organized labour in Hong Kong today is
still the craft guild mentality. The latter influences the process ofunion-
ization along very narrowly demarcated lines of skills, trade, and work
location. The unique features of Hong Kong's industrial growth also
present serious problems for systematic unionization. A multitude of
small-scale factories and workshops constitutes the bulk ot local manu-
facturing and industrial employment, combined with the absence of
large scale enterprises, aside from transport and public utilities. This frag-
mentation and proliferation are particularly pronounced among the
15
i6 Politics and Society in Hong Kong 'Cowards tggy
non-aligned and independent unions, mainly in the service sector. The
major component of this bloc are the civil servants' unions, some i8o
strong with a combined membership of over 1 10,000. They represent
about 60% ofHong Kong's 190,000 civil servants.^
The rivalr\' between the left and the right among local labour unions
has for a long time afforded the Hong Kong government ample oppor-
tunities to play a balance ofpower game. Though large in numbers, the
right-wing unions generally suffer from undersized membership while
the left-wing unions have a much more substantial grassroots base. In the
1970s, the right wing of organized labour tended to collaborate much
more with the colonial regime than their leftist counterparts. There had
always been one or more representatives from the HKTUC-affiliated
unions sitting on the government's official consultative body, the Labour
Advisory Board, which had been boycotted by the hkftu hierarchy of
leftist unions until 1982. The government "rewarded" the moderate
right oforganized labour by appointing a former hktuc secretary to the
Legislative Council (Legco) in 1976, the first time anyone from the ranks
oflabour was accorded a seat in this chamber ofcolonial power.
Historically more militant, the left-wing unions suffered serious
setbacks in the Cultural Revolution-inspired disturbances of 1967, both
in public esteem and the colonial regime's tolerance. The 1967 distur-
bances marked a crucial turning point in the development of a relatively
more enhghtened social poHcy wdth greater concern for the grassroots,
such as labour legislation and official measures for industrial welfare.
These undertakings also had the effect oftoning down vigorous union-
ism and radical collective actions that might be disruptive to social stabil-
ity and economic prosperity'.
Labour Unions and the Politics ofTransition, 1984- 1990
A new page in local union politics was turned with the December 1984
Sino-BritishJoint Declaration which provided for the PRC's resumption
of sovereignty over Hong Kong on i July 1997. Under this bilateral
agreement. Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of the PRC with a promised high degree of autonomy and the
preservation of its existing legal system, market economy, social institu-
tions, and lifestyle unchanged for fifty years until 2047. The Joint
Declaration almost simultaneously ushered in two new political
processes: first, attempts by the Hong Kong colonial authonties to intro-
duce some form of representative government; and second, the drafting
ofthe HKSAR Basic Law under prc control with limited inputs from the
MING K. CHAN: Undcr China's Shadow 17
Hong Kong public. Ideally, these two processes together could lead to
genuine decolonization with democracy. However, the "high degree of
autonomy" for the SAR with a fully "elected legislature" after 1997, as
explicitly promised in the Joint Declaration, meant different things to
different people. To most local people, this meant the Western style
democratic system of one-man, one-vote universal franchise for a
directly elected legislature. However, to the prc authorities, local
conservatives, and pro-Beijing elements, it meant many types of elec-
toral arrangements, not just popular direct elections. This crucial differ-
ence eventually divided local politics and contributed much to the dete-
rioration of the Beijing-Hong Kong-London relationship, with local
labour leaders and unions playing active political roles since 1985.'^
To start with, the leftist hkftu has completely reversed its previous
"abstentionist" policy toward both the Hong Kong government and the
local community. It no longer boycotts but instead willingly participates
in the government's labour consultative machinery. Yet, it remained
until recently, relatively low-profile and even passive in its approach to
industrial conflicts and other labour issues. The opposing hktuc hierar-
chy of right wing unions has been on the decline with shrinking
membership due to natural attrition. It has further suffered from the
double impact of the 1997 China syndrome and the eroding interna-
tional status of Taipei. The recent rapprochement between Taipei and
Beijing, as well as their increasingly close economic and human ties, has
rendered the anti-PRC stance ofthe hktuc even more untenable.
Starting with the 1982-84 Sino-British negotiations, there has been a
rapid politicization ofthe Hong Kong people. The official British policy
before 1984 was not to permit any constitutional change at all in the
colony. In November 1984 the Hong Kong government announced its
policy decision on limited democratization. While no member ofLegco
was to be directly elected, it provided for twenty-four indirectly elected
members for the 1985 elections, with further substantial increase in
elected (even directly elected) elements for the 19S1S elections. This
British commitment to democratic reform and the first ever election oi
twenty-four seats to the legislature, held in September 1985, was
regarded by many as a necessary and vital inducement to the Hong Kongpeople's grudging acceptance ofthe joint 1 )eclaration.'
The September 1985 election to Legco saw the two seats allotted to
organized labour in the "functional constituency" categories split and
shared by the left and right. A vice-chairman ofthe hkftu, Mr. Tam Yiu-
chung, and a leader of the hkiuc, Mr. Pang C'hun-lu>i, were both
1
8
Politics and Socicly in lloii'^ Koni^ 'towards iggj
elected without contest. Apparently, the balance ofpower formula still
worked, but only due to the fact that the election for the two labour seats
was conducted on a one-union-one-vote rather than a one-union-
member-one-vote basis. Thus, the hkftu and hktuc, each then with
about 70 affiliated unions, were able to divide the field equally.
Furthermore, the civil service unions, the third force, are not eligible to
sit in Legco since their leaders and members are government employees.
In September 1988 Mr. Pang and Mr. Tam were re-elected, again with-
out contest, to a second three-year term. The other major union in the
third force is the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, which is
now the second largest union in Hong Kong with some 45,000
members. Its chairman, Mr. Szeto Wah, was successfully elected to
Legco from the education functional constituency. He too, was re-
elected without opposition for another term in 1988.
The HKFTU also actively encouraged members to register as voters in
the 1985 District Board (db) elections and the 1986 Urban/Regional
Council elections. In the DB contests, it claimed 10 out of a total of 525
candidates were members of affiliated unions, 5 ofwhom were elected.
The HKTUC reportedly put up 7 candidates, with 2 elected. In contrast,
24 members of the Professional Teachers' Union reportedly won DB
seats. Furthermore, both the hkftu and hktuc also had drawn up lists of
DB candidates whom members were asked to support.
The Basic Law drafting process entailed some political manoeuvres
and power-realignment among organized labour. Injune 1985, the PRC
established a Basic Law Drafting Committee (bldc) with fifty-nine
appointed members, thirty-six from China and twenty-three from
Hong Kong. Only two ofits members were unionists, Mr. Tam and Mr.
Szeto. Most of the other Hong Kong BLDC members were business
tycoons and professionals serving big business interests. In December
1985, the PRC set up the Basic Law Consultative Committee (blcc),
supposedly a Hong Kong organ to "collect and consult" local public
opinion on the Basic Law drafts. The blcc membership of 180 was
wholly composed of Hong Kong residents from many walks of life,
including thirteen who represented labour unions.
Prior to the formation of the BLCC, a Joint Conference of Labour
Groups on the Basic Law was formed in September 1985, open to all
unions, to collect and express the views oforganized labour on the Basic
Law. By October some 167 labour organizations had joined. The Joint
Conference was invited to nominate seven members to the blcc while
the civil service unions were asked to nominate six. It was agreed that
MING K. CHAN: IJiidei' China's Shadow 19
these nominees would be decided by election. Because the hktuc
unions had refused to participate in the Joint Conference, the hkftu
affiliates had a majority ofvotes in the election. The non-aligned HongKong Christian Industrial Committee (cic) and some other labour organ-
izations bargained for the allocation of one of the seven BLCC seats to a
representative from the CIC, two from the hkftu camp, and two each to
represent the non-aligned labour unions. Just before the election, CIC
Director Lau Chin-shek was informed that some of hkftu's memberunions refused to support him in the election. Two unions close to the
CIC then withdrew from the Joint Conference, and they were followed
by another twenty civil service unions in protest against what was
perceived as leftist manipulation and discrimination againstthe independ-
ent unionists. In the October 1985 election for labour nominees to the
BLCC, three ofthe seven elected were from the hkftu camp, three from
independent unions, and one from an independent labour federation.'"
This split over BLCC representation highlighted the cleavages that have
long beset Hong Kong's unions and brought out openly the antagonism
between the hkftu and the unions allied with socio-economically more
militant, yet politically independent, labour-pressure groups, such as the
CIC.
Another example involves attitudes towards constitutional change.
The independent unions have generally lobbied for a more democratic
political framework for the future sar as well as more substantive rights
for labour. They have demanded a higher proportion of representatives
elected by universal suffrage in future government and have called for
inclusion ofsuch labour rights as organization, collective bargaining, and
social security in the Basic Law. Although largely concurring with
demands for labour rights, the hkftu parted ways with the independent
unions on the future political system. Echoing the line ofPRC leaders that
the primary task is to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, they
rallied for moderation in the pace and extent ofdemocratization.
In May 1987, the Hong Kong government published a Green Paper,
The igSy Rcvini' of Dci'clopincnts in Representative Goi>ernnteiif. arguing tor
public consultation through the end of September 1987. in contrast to
the 1984 White Paper, this Careen Paper did not advocate any specific
political or electoral reform. Instead, it invited public comment on a
number of options. Direct election ofsome members to Legco in 19S8
was listed as an option. Besides the issue of direct election, the Hong
Kong government all but jettisoned its aim, as stated in the 1984 White
Paper, of trying to develop a system of representative government
20 Politics and Society in Honi; Koni^ Towards tggj
"which is more directly accountable to the people ofHong Kong."
The PRC authorities lost no time in expressing their opposition to
direct elections and labelled the British attempt to develop representative
government in Hong Kong before 1997 as a violation ofthe Sino-British
Joint Declaration. Allied by their firm opposition to the introduction of
direct elections in 1988, local leftist figures and pro-FRC organizations
joined forces with conservative business elites to actively reject this
option. As the most massive local leftist organ, the hkftu assumed a very
high profile at the forefront of this "campaign against direct elections."
The HKFTU leadership repeatedly stressed the need to maintain Hong
Kong's "stability and prosperity" as the paramount concern ofthe grass-
roots. According to them, as the rank and file workers were untrained
and ill-prepared, early introduction ofdirect elections could only under-
mine confidence in Hong Kong and workers' economic wellbeing.
Some leftist unionists even coined the slogan that "Hong Kong workers
only want their meal tickets but not the ballot tickets.""
In order to gain a majonrv' in the pubhc consultation exercise, the
HKFTU resorted to the distribution, among its 170,000 affiliated
members, ofidentical pre-printed letters opposing 1988 direct elections.
Members then signed and mailed these letters to the Hong Kong
Government Pubhc Opinions Survey Office. In its October 1987
report, the Survey Office revealed that on the crucial question of
whether there should be direct elections to Legco in 1988, 94,270 indi-
vidual submissions were opposed and 39,345 in favour. This result was
achieved by counting each ofthe identical pre-printed letters from left-
ist organs as valid expressions against direct elections, while downgrad-
ing the tens of thousands of signatures on the joint petition from the
democratic lobby in support ofdirect elections as only one single submis-12
sion.
In February 1988 the Hong Kong government, claiming the lack ofa
clear consensus, rejected the introduction of direct elections in 1988.
Instead, it promised that in 1991—the year after the Basic Law was
promulgated—at least ten out offifty-seven members ofLegco would be
directly elected. It even acknowledged the need, as demanded by
Beijing, for a "convergence" bet\veen Hong Kong reforms before 1997
and the future Basic Law. The left-wing unions, in an "unholy alliance"
with conservative big business interests, had become the PRC's vanguards
in deraihng the train of local democratization under British auspices.
This only widened the gap between the non-aligned unions, which by
and large support the early and more full-scale introduction of direct
MING K. CHAN: Under China's. Shadow 21
elections, and the leftist unions. The Basic Law drafting process,
however, revealed the rather limited clout enjoyed by the leftist unions
I'is-a-vis local big business in advancing legitimate labour interests in the
future SAR.
When the Basic Law First Draft was released for public comment in
the spring of 1988, the most controversial and heated debates focused on
the constitutional structure for the post- 1997 sar. The five-month long
public consultation did not yield any consensus on this vital issue. In
October 1988, the hkftu proposed a blue print for the future sar legis-
lature in which 45% of the seats would be allocated to representatives
from functional groups, 40% filled by direct elections, and 1 5% from an
electoral college, with all representatives sitting in a single chamber.*'
Yet, this proposed model from the largest pro-PRC organ in HongKong was soon obliterated by a highly regressive and restrictive "main-
stream model" promoted in November 1988 by Louis Cha, an influen-
tial Hong Kong newspaper publisher and BLDC member. In essence, the
"mainstream model" postponed the introduction of a complete directly
elected legislature tor at least the first fifteen years ofthe sar, until 2012.
It stipulated that even then, the decision for a directly elected legislature
would depend on a referendum to be held once ever^' ten years.
Furthermore, the "mainstream model" suggested only 27% ofthe sixty
legislative seats were to be directly elected in 1997. These directly elected
seats would increase to 38% in 2003 to a legislature of sixtv'-five
members, then to 50% in the 201 1 election to an expanded eighty-
member legislature. The rest of the legislature would be indirectly
elected via the functional constituencies.
Despite strong and wide-spread public disapproval, the BLDC in
January 1989 adopted the "mainstream model" as the basis for the second
draft ofthe Basic Law released in February 1989. By actively supporting
the "mainstream model," the hkftu not only undermined its own more
liberal October 1988 model but also was viewed by many as an accom-
plice to this political conspiracy, betraying the interests ot Hong Kong
workers. The echoing ofthe FRC line by the leftist unions only served to
de-legitimize their claim of representing the rank and file aspirations of
local labour, who soon turned sharply against Beijing in the events ot
May-June 1989.
From the very beginning of the C'hincsc demcKratic movement in
April 1989, the democratic lobby and the student organizations in Hong
Kong were strongly supportive oftheir counterparts on the Mainland. In
Hong Kong, the very sharp, swift, and massive echoes to the Beijing
22 Politics and Socicly in Hotij^ Kon^ 'lowcmis iggy
events reflected more than the genuine patriotic concern of the local
Chinese populace who realized that their own fate had been inevitably
linked to the Mainland. To many of them, the plight of the Beijing
masses in pursuit of democratic reform was a real-life parallel to their
own uphill battle in the still ongoing Basic Law drafting process and the
abortive attempts at constitutional reforms in 1987-88. Events in Beijing
galvanized the people ofHong Kong into full-scale collective action. It
was this awakened Hong Kong citizenry that filled the ranks ofthe May2 1 one million and May 28 one and a halfmillion people protest marches
on the island.'^
The protest movement in Hong Kong became a much needed
morale-boosting opportunity^ for the local democratic lobby to seize the
initiative in the last round ofBasic Law drafting consultation and in the
pre- 1997 realignment ofpolitical forces. Many ofthe leading lights ofthe
local democratic lobby who became the leaders of the Hong Kongprotest movement were also prominent figures of the non-aligned
labour organizations. They took advantage ot the Beijing crisis to form a
new umbrella coalition, the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic
Democratic Movement in China, linking together many of the pro-
democratic bodies and civic groups as well as labour organizations. Szeto
Wah was elected the chairman ofthe Alliance, and several labour leaders
were members of its executive committee. They are still the controlling
elements of this Alliance, which has been condemned by the PRC-CCP
leadership as a "counter-revolutionary, subversive" organization aimed
at overthrowing the Communist state in China.^"^
While not affiliated with the AlHance, the hkftu and other previously
pro-PRC mass organizations took parallel action wdth the democratic
lobby to condemn the suppression of Beijing demonstrators, hkftu
chairman Cheng Yiu-tang (blcc and PRC National People's Congress
member) and vice-chairman Tam Yiu-chung (bldc and Legco
member) were in the front row ofthe May protest marches. Members of
many hkftu unions and employees in PRC-owned businesses also took
out signed advertisements in the local dailies in support of the Beijing
students.
Of even greater negative impact and considerable embarrassment to
the Basic Law drafting mechanism was the resignation of two HongKong members from the BLDC, including Louis Cha. Another two
members, leading pro-democracy figures Szeto Wah and Martin Lee,
boycotted its proceedings. Ten members ofthe BLCC also resigned in the
summer of 1989, including several from the ranks oforganized labour.
MING K. CHAN: Under Clihia's Shadow 23
Following the shock of the Beijing events, there were some notable
shifts in favour of direct elections among various sectors ofHong Kong.
In late May 1989, a majority of the members of the Executive and
Legislative Councils (Omelco) expressed their "strong desire" to speed
up and enlarge the scope of pre- 1997 constitutional reform. This
"Omelco Consensus" model aimed to have one third of Legco directly
elected in 1991 which would be increased to 50% by 1995, the last such
election to be held under British rule. It also suggested that the entire
Legco should be directly elected by 2003 .
'^
Meanwhile, the conservative big business elites, particularly the
"Group of 89" blcc/bldc members, also relaxed their firm opposition
to the introduction of directly elected components into both the pre-and
post- 1 997 legislature. They took the lead in reaching a compromise
"4:4:2" model with the so-called "moderates" and some elements ofthe
pro-democratic lobby in October 1989. This "4:4:2" model referred to
the proportional distribution of directly elected (40%), functional
constituencies (40%), and electoral college originated seats (20%) for the
legislature from 1995 to 2001 . Even though in the fall of 1989 two-thirds
of the surveyed local public opinion found this "4:4:2" model accept-
able, it did not receive popular endorsement as a genuinely democratic
blueprint.'^
To counter both the "Omelco" and the "4:4:2" models, Beijing put
forward its own preferred design for the future sar political structure
with much stronger checks and balances. In September 1989, T.S. Lo, a
BLCC vice-chairman and leader of the New Hong Kong Alliance,
entered the arena with an ultra-conservative model. It proposed a
bicameral legislature with only 25% of the seats directly elected by
universal suffrage. The rest would be returned by functional constituen-
cies (50%) and an electoral coUege (25%). By splitting the legislature into
two tiers, this model enabled an indirectly elected upper house to exer-
cise veto power over the partially directly elected lower house. This
"bicameral model" provoked an immediate and angry retort from
democratic circles as well as strong disapproval from the general public.
Even many ofthe business elites were reluctant to support this introduc-
tion ofa bicameral legislature with its obvious "divide and rule" implica-19
tions.
Despite the fact that this final round of supposedly open "public
consultation" on the Basic Law Draft was still ongoing, Beijing rushed to
endorse this extremely unpopular "bicameral model" in October 1989.
The HKFTU then backtracked on its earlier proposal for the sar legislature
24 Politics and Socit'ty in I loin; Koin; Towards iggj
and rallied around the "bicameral model" in an attempt to project a
facade of mass support. However, the events ot May-June had left too
deep a scar on the hearts and minds of the labour grassroots for them to
remain docile. Some members ofindividual labour unions affiliated with
the HKFTU publicly repudiated the Federation's claims ofpopular support
for this model. They pointed out that the rank-and-file union member-
ship had neither been consulted by their own union nor by the hkftu on
their response to this model. If they had been asked, they would defi-
nitely have opposed this "bicameral model."-"
After further Sino-British secret negotiations in mid-February on the
SAR political structure and the pre-1997 democratization pace, the final
draft of the Basic Law was promulgated by the FRC on 4 April 1990. Onthe future political framework, labour union assessments of the Basic
Law varied. The hkftu and its affiliates considered it acceptable as doing
"justice to the interests ofall circles." Independent unions, w'hich gener-
ally supported the democratic lobby, were disappointed with the
outcome. The hktuc remained silent. While it is difficult to assess howmuch impact organized labour as a whole had on the drafting ofthe Basic
Law, its limited influence is evident in those areas ofmutual union agree-
ment. The rights to strike and to participate in trade unions are included
in the Basic Law% as is reference to legal protection of "welfare benefits
and retirement security' of the labour force" (Basic Law: Ch. 2, Art. 7,
36). However, demands from both the hkftu and independent unions
also included the right of recognition from employers and the right of
collective bargaining, which were not included in the Basic Law.
Some have considered the unions largely irrelevant to the drafting
process. The major players have been the PRC, the British government,
and the Hong Kong business elites. Unionists were a minority on the
BLCC and had only token representation on the BLDC. Members ofHongKong's capitalist class have made frequent visits to Beijing, and PRC lead-
ers have been well informed of their needs and concerns. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the labour unions, like the rest of
the Hong Kong populace, have had only a marginal influence in shaping
their political future."' Throughout the Basic Law drafting process, the
legitimacy and public image of the leftist unions were also seriously
compromised by their lop-sided collaboration with conservative big
business interests, without gaining any substantial socio-economic
concessions in return.
MING K. CHAN: Viider China's Shadou' 25
Labour Unions and Election Politics in the 1 990s
The promulgation of the Basic Law in April 1990 ushered in the final
phase ofHong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty. In March 1990
the Hong Kong government unveiled the constitutional reform for its
sunset years as shaped by the need to converge with the Basic Law. The
September 1991 Legco election witnessed a major realignment of the
sixty seats: eighteen ofthem were directly elected from nine geographic
constituencies, each returning two members; civil servant official seats
were reduced from ten to three; appointed members were also reduced
from twenty to eighteen; while functional constituency seats increased
from fourteen to twenty-one. In 1995 the last British-conducted elec-
tion for the sixtv'-seat Legco will have a total oftwentv' elected seats. The
three official seats and all seventeen appointed seats will be abolished.
The rest ofLegco will be a combination of thirt)' functional seats (50%)
and ten seats (16.7%) returned by an electoral college whose exact
composition and selection procedure are yet to be determined."" Under
the Basic Law, the 1995 Legco members will remain in office until 1999
under the "through tram" formula. Then, the sar political system will
evolve at a snail's pace over the next decade with half of the legislature
directly elected by 2007. The balance between directly and indirectly
elected sar legislators may shift after 2007, probably in favour of the
latter.-"*
The PRC establishment and its leftist front organizations in HongKong were unable to make any gains in the September 1991 elections.
Liberals swept these seats, taking sixteen ofthe eighteen. To some extent,
the PRC can rely on conservative big business and professional elites to
counterbalance part of the strength of the democratic lobby. However,
most ofthese big business and professional elites have only limited popu-
lar appeal. Furthermore, while some of these elites display pro-Beijing
sentiments, many ofthem had in the past enjoyed special privileges under
British patronage. Hence, they are of dubious allegiance to Beijing as
their firm opposition to a more democratic political system has little to
do with their adherence to the I'Rc: official line but is based on a self-
centred desire to preserve the status quo.
Under such circumstances, the PRc:'s most effective and reliable crack
troops are the leftist mass organizations, ofwhich the hki tu system is the
undisputed flagship. Thus, the role of the hkftu will be increasingly
political toward 1997. This politicization ofunion roles is not limited to
the leftist unions but is extended to the entire organized labour camp in
Hong Kong during the transition era. The 1982- 1984 Sino-British nego-
26 Politics and Society in Hont^ Koii^ Towards iggj
tiations unlocked this l^andora's box, and the Basic Law drafting process
accelerated the tempo of Hong Kong's political maturity, with the
formation of political groups or parties the natural outcome. While it is
definitely not Beijing's intention to allow the Basic Law and its drafting
process to serve as midwife to the birth of Hong Kong's democratic
system, new political groups/parties began to emerge after its promulga-
tion. The prc^-ciemocracy circle's two new political "parties," the
United Democrats of Hong Kong (udhk) and the Hong Kong
Democratic Foundation (hkdf), were formally established on 23 April
and 24 June 1990, respectively. On the other side of the spectrum, the
Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong Kong (ldf), supported by
conservative big business elites, was inaugurated on 6 November 1990.
The United Democrats, headed by Martin Lee, has become the main-
stream political organization at the toretront of the local democratic
movement. It has a large organized labour component among its top
leadership. Six of thirty members on its Central Committee, including
Szeto Wah and Lau Chin-shek, are leaders ofmajor non-aligned unions.
In addition, some leaders of other non-aligned unions were founding
UDHK members and even served on its Organizing Committee. Taken
together, these organized labour figures in the udhk represent a substan-
tial portion ofthe independent unions camp, including some ofthe more
influential civil service unions. These organized labour elements in the
UDHK were also active in the 1987-88 direct election campaign spear-
headed by Szeto and Lee and the 1989 protest movements under the
leadership ofthe Patriotic Alliance.
In view of the actual grassroots strength as reflected in membership
figures, the 199 1 elections confirmed the realpolitik reaHgnment among
organized labour in Hong Kong. It has departed from the traditional
bipolar order of left versus right as the hktuc can only be a marginal
player of minor political significance. The independent unions are of
much greater significance, not just because of their membership size
(56% oftotal unionized workers) but also due to their leaders' affiliation
with the udhk. While definitely not a "labour party" in nature or by
design, the udhk counts organized labour among its major pillars of
support besides professionals, academics/intellectuals and, to a much
lesser extent, petit bourgeois/smuU entrepreneurs. In contrast, the hkdf,
composed mainly of professional and business executives with some
non-Chinese expatriate members, is totally devoid of labour elements.
In the 1 5 September 199 1 Legco direct elections, the udhk fielded a total
of fifteen candidates, at least one in each of the nine geographic
MING K. CHAN: Under China's Shadow 27
constituencies. For the other three slots, they collaborated with another
democratic public affairs group, Meeting Point. In order to contest the
Legco direct elections, Szeto Wah, politically the most prominent local
unionist, gave up his very safe, educational functional constituency seat
to a key lieutenant, Cheung Man-kwong, who was easily elected. Szeto
won in the Kwun Tong-East Kowloon constituency, which is a manu-
facturing town and working class neighbourhood.
However in 1991 , the independent unions still could not dislodge the
HKTUC from the "labour union" functional constituency Legco seat that
it has occupied since September 1984. This is because the two Legco
"labour union" seats are indirectly elected on a "one-union-one-vote"
basis. Due to their continued fragmentation, the independent unions
have yet to achieve the solidarity to put their collective weight behind a
single candidate with sufficient popular and institutional support.
Notwithstanding the kmt's sharply declining influence in Hong Kong,
the HKTUC incumbent, Peng Chun-hoi, was re-elected without opposi-
tion. Nonetheless, the hktuc's abiUty to hold on to this labour functional
seat in the 1995 Legco election is questionable, not only due to the
Beijing-Taipei rapprochement that would obliterate its partisan stance,
but more importantly due to the increasingly strong cohesion emerging
among independent unions.
One of the most noteworthy recent developments is the establish-
ment of a new umbrella federation which may eventually serve as the
core to unite a majority of the independent unions. After three years'
fermentation and preparation, the Hong Kong Confederation ofTrade
Unions (hkctu) formally came into existence on 21 August 1990, with
Cic's Lau Chin-shek as Chairman and Lee Cheuk-yan of the Clothing
Industry Workers General Union as Chief Executive. They both will
serve two-year terms."'* So far a total of twenty-two unions and four
federations of labour unions have jomed the hkctu, with a combined
membership ofsome 100,000."^ Most ofthem arc white collar workers,
with civil servants the major component.
Still the highly parochial nature ofmany civil service unions, which
have proliferated and fragmented along narrow demarcations, may make
genuine unity among them an elusive long term goal. The increasingly
intense involvement in local politics on the part of some independent
unions may also deter other independent unions fromjoining the hkctu
in order to preserve their politically non-aligned status. This is particu-
larly true among many of the civil service unions whose members have
little choice but to remain in Hong Kong and work for the sar govern-
28 Poliliis (1)1(1 Sociciy in Uoin; Kom; I'onumh iggj
nicnt. Thus, the hkci u still faces a long uphill course to become a full-
fledged umbrella organ uniting the independent unions.
As for the hkitu, its generally successful re-entry into the mainstream
of grassroots socio-economic concerns since the early 1980s has been
partially mitigated by its political collaboration with the big capitalists in
the 1987-88 campaign against direct democracy and further undermined
by the June 4 events. In order to compensate for its political collusion
with big business, the hkftu has recendy been particularly aggressive in
its role as a champion for socio-economic interests of the entire labour
sector. It sometimes took parallel action and even on various occasions
allied with its erstwhile political counterpart, the hktuc, as well as the
leftist establishment's most bitter labour critic, the CIC. Notable examples
include the full-scale but unsuccessful campaign in the mid-1980s for the
establishment of a central provident fund by the government to provide
retirement benefits to all qualified workers.""'
More recent examples of the hkftu's functioning as promoter of
labour interests include its upfront involvement in the November 1989
China Motor Bus Company drivers' strike due to pension problems. It
also has participated in very vocal and still continuing opposition to the
government decision on the import oflabour to ease the local manpower
shortage (even though over 95% of these imported workers come from
the PRC).'^^ In both cases, the hkftu has tried hard to advance the cause
oflocal labour by adopting a stance basically indistinguishable from that
ofthe CIC, the hkctu, and the rest ofthe independent union bloc. In fact,
inside the Legco chamber, the hkftu joined the hktuc in voting against
the bill on imported labour which was favoured by the employers. This
provides yet another illustration of left and right collaboration on non-
political, bread and butter issues. Ofeven greater significance is the fact
that such left and right cooperation reflects the hkftu's very keen analy-
sis o^ the future power realignment among organized labour, with the
independent unions posing an increasingly serious political challenge to
the left-wing unions. As such, the hkftu actually operates in a "scissors
style"—the left and right against the middle bloc. The left and right equal
splitting ofthe two Legco labour union functional seats in 1 99 1 is but one
ofthe most obvious outcomes of this "scissors" exercise.
In the 1991 elections, inter-union manoeuvres became even more
political. The hkftu officially announced in April 1990 its formal and
active participation in the 1991 Legco direct elections by fielding its own
candidates."*^ In the spring of 199 1 , it seemed likely that the leftist union-
ists would field three to four candidates in the contest, including Tam
MING K. CHAN: Under China's Shadow 29
Yiu-chung (who would yield his safe Legco labour functional seat to
another hkftu officer), two senior female officers ofthe hkftu, plus the
leader ofa hkftu affihated union. However, inJuly 1991 , the hkftu put
up only one official candidate in the Septeinber Legco direct elections
—
Federation Vice President Miss Chan Yuen-han, who ran in the
Kowloon Central constituency. Of equally profound political conse-
quence was the hkftu's indirect, but no less active or crucial, involve-
ment in the 1991 direct elections through its official endorsement ofand
grassroots level campaign contributions to candidates fielded by other
leftist organs, "pink" bodies and the ldf. Such contributions included
organizational skills, manpower, social network, and propaganda output.
As evident in the campaign against direct democracy and the Basic
Law exercise, the leftist unions will likely place partisan objectives above
and even at the expense ot labour interests in poHtical power plays in the
transition to 1997. In the 1991 direct elections, the democratic lobby's
limited alliance with some independent unionists faced a very tough and
much better financed challenge by the leftist unions-big business-"pink"
organizations three way coalition under Beijing's patronage. Even
though the democratic lobby scored a full victory and captured most of
the eighteen directly elected seats, Legco during 1991-95 will still be
dominated by a majority ofappointed and functionally elected members
whose pro-big business or pro-British or pro-PRC incHnation will, in
effect, reduce the democratic elements to a permanent vocal minority.
The first election in 1991 , that of the District Boards (db) on Sunday
March 3, yielded some interesting patterns of labour involvement in
party politics. The 274 seats in the nineteen DBs drew 475 candidates; 81
incumbents were re-elected without contest. Voter turnout reached
32.5% which was higher than the 30.3% of the previous DB election in
1988, but lower than the 37.5% in 1985 and 38.9% in the first DB election
in 1982. About 70% ofthe candidates were affiliated with a dozen polit-
ical groups or public organizations."
The democratic lobby's three major organs—the udhk (eighty candi-
dates with fifty-six elected). Meeting Point (thirteen candidates, eleven
elected), and the Association for the Promotion of Democracy and
Livelihood (seventeen candidates, fourteen elected)—managed to get
75% to 85% of their candidates elected. The more moderate, middle
class hkdf achieved less impressive results with three of its seven candi-
dates elected (43%). The conservative ldf did nc^t fire tt^o well; only fifty
ofthe eighty-nine candidates it supported were elected (56%). Yet, only
thirty-five of these eighty-nine candidates had openly acknowledged
30 Politics mid Society in Hon<i Konfi Towards iggj
their i.df affiliation.-^" This, indeed, is a rather disturbing practice with
serious imphcations for fairness, integrity, public accountability, and
legitimacy.
The HKFTU also resorted to similar tactics in this election. It claimed to
put forward sixteen candidates of whom twelve were elected (a 75%success rate, better than the 66% in 1988). Among these twelve success-
ful aspirants, only three ran openly with official hkftu endorsement
while the others received its "support" unacknowledged.'" This raises
the question ofwhether the leftist unions are still suffering from theJune
4 political impact to such an extent that formal identification with
known pro-Beijing organs would cost votes. Besides the sixteen hkftu
elements, the local pro-PRC front also supported another twenty-seven
candidates whose leftist links were often unacknowledged." It is ironic
that both leftist labour and conservative big business had chosen to chan-
nel their support in such a clandestine manner.
The HKCTU did not field any DB candidates of its own but selectively
extended its support to forty candidates (thirty were elected), all of
whom were allied with democratic lobby organs. The hkctu's support
was based on the political platform of the individual candidate and the
chosen candidates' signed endorsement of the hkctu's platform on
labour issues. These include a ban on imported labour and demand for a
central provident fund which are strongly opposed by conservative busi-
ness interests.^'^ This pattern of mutual endorsement continued in the
September Legco direct elections. In the 5 May 1991, municipal elec-
tions, the democratic lobby scored an impressive 85% victory for its
candidates while the big business conservative circle had only halfof its
candidates elected, some ofthem endorsed by hkftu leaders.
Indeed, the momentum generated by the March and May elections
helped to propel the democratic lobby to a stronger than expected land-
slide victory in the September Legco elections. In the functional
constituency indirect elections on 12 September 1991, both hktuc's
Peng Chun-hoi and hkftu 's Tarn Yiu-chung were re-elected without
contest to their labour union seats. The teaching profession's functional
seat was won by Cheung Man-kwong, a United Democrats member
who succeeded his mentor, Szeto Wah, to become head of the
Professional Teachers' Union. Cheung defeated two other candidates by
15,193 votes to 886 votes for the head of the leftist Hong Kong
Federation of Education Workers and 836 votes for an independent
candidate who is head of the Hong Kong Aided School Teachers
Association. Even with the lowest voter turnout rate at 44%, the teach-
MING K. CHAN: Under China's Shadon> 3
1
ing profession is by far the largest functional constituency. Cheung's 90%support against the left wing candidate's 5% support is politically signifi-
cant as Cheung is also spokesman for and an executive committee
member ofthe Patriotic Alliance.^
The UDHK also gained a seat in the health care constituency when its
new candidate was elected without opposition. Another democratic
group, the hkdf, had its two co-founders re-elected to the medical seat
(uncontested) and the Hong Kong General Chamber of CommerceSeat. In the latter contest the hkdf defeated the candidate supported by
the arch-conservative and pro-Beijing elements by 487 votes to 416
votes. ^ In other functional seats, there was also a trend toward prefer-
ence for liberal or moderate figures and the rejection of pro-Beijing
candidates. This trend became even more pronounced three days later in
the territory's first ever direct legislative election.
The historic first direct elections for Legco on 15 September 1991
yielded a landslide victor)^ for democratic activists, who captured sixteen
ofthe eighteen contested seats and 65% ofthe popular vote. In this elec-
tion the voter turnout was a record at over 750,000 or 39.15% of 1.91
million registered voters. A total offifty-four candidates ran for eighteen
seats in nine electoral districts with 354 polling stations throughout the
whole territory.
Of the eighteen directly elected Legco members, twelve were udhk
candidates (out of a total of fifteen candidates fielded) and two were
Meeting Point candidates (out of a total of three). Other winners
included one from the Association for Democracy and People's
Livelihood. This delegate built his fame on the public housing lobby,
catering to the working class grassroots. An independent candidate, whowas formerly chair of the Journalist Association and a hard core demo-
cratic advocate, was also elected. The other two winners were incum-
bents from indirectly elected district scats m the New Territories (nt),
and both are moderates. One of these two nt winners resigned on the
eve ofthe Legco swear-in on 9 October 1991 , due to charges offalse legal
credentials. In the by-election ofDecember 8, a Meeting Point candi-
date with UDHK full support won, thus adding a seventeenth member to
the democratic camp's near monopoly of the eighteen directly elected
Legco seats.
There were two pre-eminent labour leaders among the udhk direct
election winners. One is Szeto Wah, who gave up his teaching profession
functional seat to contest and win in the Kowloon-East constituency.
His popularity also helped the victory ofanother Meeting Point candi-
32 l\^litics and Sociciy i" hioii^ Kom; Towards iggj
date who is a social worker in that working class industrial neighbour-
hood. The other labour leader is hkctu chairman, Lau Chin-shek, whocontested and won in the Kowloon-Central constituency on the udhk
ticket with c:k: endorsement. Lau not only managed a landslide victory,
gaining 68,489 votes (62.2% of voter support), but also pulled fellow
UDHK physician. Lam Kui-shing, to victory on his coat tails. Dr. Lam
won with 57,92 1 votes or 5 1 % ofvoter support. These figures make Lau
the second and Lam the fourth highest vote getters in this direct election,
ranking after udhk Chair Martin Lee (76,831 or 74.6% of votes) and
Szeto Wah (57,921 or 70.3% of votes). Of great pohtical significance is
the fact that Lau and Lam, running on a joint udhk ticket, were able to
deny a direcdy elected Legco seat to the hkftu's only candidate in this
election, Chan Yuen-han, despite her impressive result of over 40,000
votes (40.8%) in the Kowloon-Central constituency.
The loss by Chan was a fate shared by all other leftist and conservative
candidates in this direct election. They include one from the "new left"
Hong Kong Forum and one from the leftist Kwun Tong neighbourhood
organization. Moreover, all four ldf candidates, as well as two from the
ultra-conservative New Hong Kong Alliance and one from the Civic
Association, were defeated. Two "independent" candidates supported
by the local left also lost. Parallel to the wholesale electoral rout ofpro-
Beijing candidates was the defeat of radical leftist elements. Two of the
candidates who lost had close ties with Trotskyist groups.
On the other side of the pohtical spectrum, the Kuomintang's (kmt)
involvement in this election is believed to have been marginal. The only
known case of kmt political association was in the Kowloon East
constituency where a unionist affiliated with the hktuc ran as an inde-
pendent but without its formal support. Both this pro-Taipei unionist
and the leftist Kwun Tong neighbourhood activist were defeated by
Szeto Wah and his Meeting Point ally.
From their public endorsement and active campaign support, there is
a clear case of collusion or even joint sponsorship between the local left
and conservative big business, as well as some colonial establishment
elites. For instance. Island East "independent" candidate Cheng Kai-
nam from the Hong Kong Forum had the full support of the leftist
Federation of Education Workers, other pro-PRC organs, and public
figures, as well as conservative businessmen and appointed Legco
members. Cheng came third after udhk winners, Martin Lee and ManSai-cheong, an Urban Councillor.
It is evident that the September 15 direct elections have afforded
MING K. CHAN: Under China's Shadow 33
Hong Kong people an historic opportunit\- to speak out and to entrust a
clear and popular mandate to their elected representatives to facilitate
fundamental changes in the Hong Kong polit)^ The leftist and conser-
vative defeat has also ushered in a new power alignment for the local
organized labour front in this transitional era to 1997.
Epilogue: Toward 1997 and BeyondThe realpolitik ofHong Kong labour unionism has indeed changed very
dramatically in the last decade. The China factor still remains, but China
is no longer the only focus ofloyalt)^ or the sole source ofsupport in the
unions' struggle against colonial repression and capitalist exploitation.
Rather, in the process toward decolonization with limited democracy, a
new alignment of leftist unions-pkis-big business versus democratic
lobby-independent unions is fast emerging. This was partly confirmed
by the 199 1 Legco elections, which have not only laid the electoral foun-
dation for the 1995 elections but also have shaped the domestic political
configuration in the HKSAR in the immediate post-1997 years. While
some scholars suggest a continued "marginalization" of labour unions'
actual economic and political effectiveness in the foreseeable future,^"
the impact ofpolitics on Hong Kong's labour unionism will continue to
increase.
Whatever the change in the PRC's leadership and policy toward HongKong in the near future, the independent union bloc will continue to be
a major source ofsupport for the democratic lobby's election efforts. As
for the left-wing union network, the PRC's high-handed approach will
seriously erode its local populanr\' unless it can effectively dissociate itself
from Beijing politically while a more liberal PRC Hne would trim part of
its rivalry' with the militant core of the independent unions.
Furthermore, the fading influence of the right-wing hktuc bloc will
yield the institutional ground for a more fluid centre-and-left political
balance among organized labour in Hong Kong toward 1997. By then,
the SAK polit\' will likely evolve towards a corporatist state-society mix
with labour playing a limited ifvocal public role. From Beijing's perspec-
tive, the preferred functions ofthe local labour unions in the SAR will be
that ofsocial and economic welfare, not unlike the current experience of
labour unions in Singapore. The hkftu's recent full-scale promotion of
labour welfare facilities and its public campaign against tax increases in
the Hong Kong Government's 1991 budget reflect its awareness of the
need to cater to the workers's everyday needs in order to gain member-
ship and popular legitimacy as a bona-fide local labour (instead of I'Kt-
34 Politics and Society in Iloii<^ Koiij^ Towards, iggy
led political) organ in building its socio-economic influence and elec-
toral clout.
In this reorientation toward bread and butter issues, the leftist unions
may find more common ground for collaboration with the independent
unions despite their political differences. Yet, it is far from certain that
they will see eye to eye on critical choices. For instance, in the post-direct
election era, all local labour leaders have been unanimous in their strong
opposition to the government's expanded scheme for the importation of
labourers. However, in a Legco debate on 1 1 December 1991 , the inde-
pendent unions and udhk Legco members supported the establishment
ofa central provident fund while both hktuc and hkftu representatives,
along with other indirectly elected and appointed Legco members,
supported the government's proposal for a compulsory but private41
retirement pension system.
All these may signal a very significant development in the rising tide
oflabour activism in the countdown to 1997. The politicization oforgan-
ized labour, together with civil servant unrest and the intensification of
labour militancy over socio-economic concerns, will characterize the
Hong Kong labour movement in the transition era and will affect the
grassroots foundation for "stability and prosperity."
Notes
1. Hong Kong Government Information Service, Hong Kong iggi, (Hong Kong, 1991),
pp. 107, III.
2. Ibid., p. III.
3
.
These figures are based on the Registrar ofTrade Unions, Annual Departmental Report,
igSg. Also see Hong Kongiggi, p. 238.
4. See Ming K. Chan, ed.. Dimensions ofthe Chinese and Hong Kong Labor Movement (Hong
Kong: Chnstian Industrial Committee, 1986), pp. 237-239.
5. On the realpolitik of the Basic Law drafting and the British democratization attempts,
see Ming K. Chan and David Clark, eds. , The Hong Kong Basic Daw: BlueprintJor "Stability
and Prosperity" Under Chinese Sovereignty? (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). which is
the inaugural volume ofthe new series, "Hong Kong Becoming China: The Transition
to 1997." See especially Chapter I, "Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of
Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-1990," by Ming K. Chan.
6. See Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, Chhia, and Attempts at Constitutional
Reform in Hong Kong, ig43-ig32 (Hong Kong: Oxford LJniversity Press, 1988), and the
revicwby MingK. Chanin H(i»i,'Ko/!i;L(7i('J(iHn/(i/2i, pt. i (January 1991): 139-42.
7. See, Hong Kong 1 985: A Revieiv of 1 984 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government
Information Service, 1985), pp. 42-5 1
.
MING K. CHAN: Utidcr China's Shadow 35
8. Norman Miners, "Moves Toward Representative Government 1984-1988" in Hong
Kong: The Challenge of Transformation, eds. Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat
(Hong Kong: Centre ofAsian Studies, University ofHong Kong, 1989), pp. 19-35.
9. Norman Mmers, "The Representation and Participation of Trade Unions in HongKong Government" in Labour Movetncnt in a Chatiging Society, eds. Y.C.Jao et al. (Centre
ofAsian Studies, University ofHong Kong, 1988), p. 45.
10. Wall Kin Y'at Po. 21 November 1985.
11. Hong Kong Labor Education Center, comp., LmIkv Movement Monthly, no. 42
(September 1987), pp. 36-42.
12. Miners, (1989), p. 29.
13. Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, comp.. Federation of Trade Unions Press
(October 1988).
14. On the details of this "mainstream" model, see South China Morning Post Hong Kong
Review i989 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1989), p. 1 1; Miron Mushkat,
Basic Law Therapy (Hong Kong: Baring Securities Ltd., 1990), p. 3
.
15. The following accounts of the Hong Kong response to the Beijing events during
April-June 1989 are based mainly on the following newspapers: Hong Kong Economic
Journal, Ming Pao, Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao, Wall Kin Yat Po, Sing Taojih Pao, and South
China Morning Post (scmp). Also see Ming K. Chan and Tuen-yu Lau, "Dilemma of the
Communist Press in a Pluralistic Society: Hong Kong in the Transition to Chinese
Sovereignty, 1988-1989", Asian Survey 30 (August 1990): 73 1-47.
16. See People's Daily. 8 July 1989. See also, Emily Lau, "A 'Subversive" Alliance: China
Attacks Territory's Democrats," Far Eastern Economic Revieii', 3 August 1989, p. 29.
17. Office of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (Omelco), Comments
on the Basic Eiw (Draft) (Hong Kong, October 1989).
18. Hong Kong EconomicJournal, i November 1989; SCMP, 2 October 1989; and Hong
Kong Standard, 3 1 October 1989.
19. See Mushkat, Basic Law Therapy, pp. 3-4; South China Morning Post Hong Kong Review
i990 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1990), pp. 12-13; ^^'<^ i990 Yearbook
(Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990), pp. 122-123.
20. Ibid., p. 123 ; and .SCA/P, 2 October 1 989, reveal tlie fict that the "4:4:2" model rather
than the "bicameral model" was closer to the hkftu's own preference. Ming Pao, 30
October 1989, reports the complaints from members of iikftu's affiliated unions.
21. David A. Levin and Steplien Chiu, "Dependent Capitalism, Colonial State and
Marginal Unions: The Case of Hong Kong," in Organized Labor in the Asian-Pacific
Region: A Comparative Analysis of Trade I'nions in Nine Cotnitrics. ed. Stephen Frenkel
(forthcoming).
22. SCMP, 22 March 1990, p. 7.
36 Poiitici and Society in Hoii^ Konj^ Towards iggj
23. Baiic Lini'oftlic Hoii<^ Koii{> Special Administrative Region ofthe People's Republic ojChina,
arts. 66-68, annex II.
24. This author was keynote speaker at two seminars inJanuary 1988 and 1990 organized
by the Hong Kong Labor Education Center as part ofthe planning and organizing effort
for the formation of HKCTU, which eventually adopted the "Swiss Confederation
Model" as advocated by the author.
25. Hong Kong Economicjournal Monthly, No. 166 (January 1991), pp. 92-97; also inter-
view with Apo Leung, Hong Kong Labor Education Center, 6 May 1991.
26. See Levm and Chiu, in Organized Labor in the Asian- Pacific Region (forthcommg).
27. Labor Movement Monthly, No. 69 (December 1989), pp. 1-15; No. 79 (October 1990),
pp. 1-16; and No. 80 (November 1990), pp. 21- 27.
28.SCMP, 23 Apnl 1990.
29. SCMP, 4 March 1991, p. i; Hong Kong Daily News, 22 January 199 1.
30. Hong Kong Daily News, 3 March 198 1 , p. 12.
31. Ibid.
32. Hong Kong Economicjournal. 1 March 1991.
33. Interview with Lee Cheuk-yan, 22 March 1991.
34. SCMP, 6-7 May 1991
.
35. Ming Po Daily News, 1 3 September 1991 , p. 2; Hong Kong Daily News, 14 September
I99i,p. 12.
36. Hong Kong Daily News, 14 September 1991, p. 12; Far Eastern Economic Review, 3
October 1991, p. 11.
37. SCMP. 14 September 1991; "Election Special," Hong Kong Standard, 16 September
1 99 1, frontpage.
38. SCMP, 9 October 199 1, p. i; Hong Kong Economicjournal, 8 October 199 1, p. 5, and
9 December 1991, p. 5.
39. AH voting data come from Ming K. Chan, "The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong:
Democratization Under Beijing's Shadow," in China in Transition: Economic, Political and
Social Developments, ed. George T. Yu (Urbana: University' of Illinois Press, forthcom-
ing). See especially Tables II and III, which are based on figures reported in SCMP, Hong
Kong Daily News, Sing Tao Daily News, Oriental Daily News, Hong Kong Standard, Ta Kung
Pao, Wan Wei Po, and Ming Po Daily News for the 16-17 September I99i penod.
40. Levin and Chiu, in Organized Uibor in the Asian-Pacific Region (forthcoming).
41. SCMP, 12 December 1991, p. 6.
Education in Hong Kong Up to 1997 and Beyond
Bernard Hung-kay Liik
As Hong Kong approaches the transfer of sovereignty' from the United
Kingdom to the People's RepubHc of China in 1997, various aspects of
Its society will inevitably undergo change in accordance with the Joint
Declaration signed by China and Britain in 1985. Increasing economic
interdependence with South China began in the early 1980s with the
open door policy of China and has been gaining momentum. Political
development, proscribed to a large extent by the Beijing-promulgated
Basic Law of the future Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong,
continues with a low level ofdemocratization. The sense ofbeing under
siege pervades most segments ofsociety, and emigration is increasing. ' In
the midst of all this, the Hong Kong education system cannot remain
unaffected. This essay will examine where and what kinds ofchanges are
likely to occur in the education system in the run up to 1997 and beyond.
It should be borne in mind at the outset that the "one countr\% two
systems" arrangement, enshrined in the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law, was meant by its Beijing proponents to be a fifty-year transition
period for the people ofHong Kong to prepare themselves for embrac-
ing full integration with the Fatherland. Hence, although these august
documents provide that after 1997 Hong Kong will continue to have its
own school system distinct from that of the Mainland, one could still
expect education in Hong Kong to be made to serve an important role in
smoothing the way for the dragon's embrace. Unless the government of
the Special Administrative Region is able to assert complete autonomy
from Beijing in its domestic policy, which does not seem likely in early
1992, there will be pressure from Beijing to reform Hong Kong educa-
tion, particularly those aspects which may relate to national unit^-.
Background to the Education System
Hong Kong came into existence in the mid-ninetcenth century whenHong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula were ceded and leased by
the emperor of China to the queen of England in two stages, after the
Opium Wars in the late- 1830s and late- 1850s. Then at the end of the
century, the New Territories were leased for 99 years during the Western
37
38 Politics and Society in //<)/)(,' Komi Ton'ards iggy
powers' scramble tor concessions troni the Chinese empire.
However, Hong Kong was not a Chinese city that came under British
rule. Rather, it was a city built by Chinese emigrants under British spon-
sorship. Hong Kong Island before the cession had c:)nly a handful offarm-
ing and fishing hamlets remote from any urban centre, "a barren rock
with ne'er a house upon it."- The population ofHong Kong consists of
successive waves of immigrants from southern or other parts of China.
They were mostly poor peasants who left their home villages and towns
because offimine, povert)', unsettled conditions, war, or the unbearable
oppression ofgovernment. In Hong Kong, cohort after cohort ofimmi-
grants have contributed to a thriving economy and a generally stable and
peaceful society.
For the first century ofHong Kong's existence, most ofthe newcom-
ers did not settle there permanently. Many ofthem were men who had
left their families behind in their home districts upstream along the Pearl
River valley, to which they would return for periodic visits and for
retirement. Many of the families which migrated to Hong Kong also
maintained strong ties with their clans back in the home districts. Hence,
the children of the migrants very often spent their formative years and
their schooling, ifany, partly in Hong Kong and partly in China.
It was not until the 1950s, w^hen the t"wo million new migrants from
the Communist revolution decided that they did not want to return to
Hve in their home distncts, that the population ofHong Kong began to
settle permanently in the territory. In fact, the overwhelming majority of
the inhabitants ofHong Kong in the 1950s had few previous ties with the
territory. These peasants, artisans, merchants, and members ofthe intel-
ligentsia gradually formed a new community during the early post-war
decades. Hence, it was only since then that two generations ofyoung
people have spent most or all oftheir formative years and their schooling
in Hong Kong and a truly autochthonous Hong Kong education system
emerged.^
The government which presided over the formation of the new
community and the establishment ofthe education system w^as a British
colonial ts'pe of administration, with the top echelons appointed firom
London and the middle and lower ranks recruited locally. Its legitimacy
was not recognized by the People's Republic ofChina, which regards all
the nineteenth-centupy' "unequal treaties" as invalid. Nor was it built
upon any constitutional expression of the popular will. Rather, the
government has legitimized itself by performance. It has made itself
acceptable to the population by its success in maintaining law and order.
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Ediicaiioti in Hoii^ Kong 39
fostering economic prosperin-, and ensuring the provision of essential
utilities and social ser\^ices; by achievement of some kind of balance
among the interests of different segments of societ\^; by promotion of a
measure ofvertical social mobility; and, not least, and by insulation ofthe
people from successive Chinese governments agamst which they have
voted, often most reluctantly, w^ith their feet.
The Hong Kong government follows a basic policy which a senior
administrator once characterized as "positive non-interv^entionism.""* It
is decidedly not laissez-faire but rather an almost Daoist preference tor
minimal but strategic action, directed tow^ards areas such as trade promo-
tion and provision of basic social needs, including education, with the
aim of optimizing stability and prosperity. This policy has worked well
and has contributed to the government's legitimation by success.
The School System
The school system that emerged during the 1950s, and has continued to
evolve, is a unique blend ofChinese and Western educational traditions.
The outward appearance of its structure, its nomenclature, and some of
its day-to-day practices were derived from Bntam. However, its spirit,
dominated by centralized competitive examinations and by exhortation
to hard work tor the sake ot tamily enhancement, undoubtedly devel-
oped from the Chinese educational tradition. Teacher-student relations
likewise grew out ofChinese tradition, albeit in the setting ot an indus-
trial society. The curriculum, however, is an amalgamation of Chinese
and British traditions with certain contents and techniques also intro-
duced from other Western societies, especially North America.^
The school system is the largest industry in the territon,', comprising
some 1.3 million staffand students (nearly a quarter ofthe entire popula-
tion), who work in more than 1 400 institutions at all levels. These range
from kindergartens to graduate schools, covering a wide variety of
general education as well as specialized or vocational programmes. The
educational system annually consumes about 17% ot the government
budget and 3% of the gross domestic product.'' Over the past tour
decades, it has functioned effectively to provide the necessan,- workforce
for economic and social development and the major ladder ot success tor
two generations ofHong Kong's youth.
The main features ofthe school system may be summarized as follows.
Compulsory education starts at the age ofsix when every child in HongKong IS expected to attend Primary One, but a majority o\ children
would liavc experienced preschool or kindergarten tor one or nun-e
40 Politics and Society in Hoii'^ Kon^ Towards iggj
years bcfc^rc that. Friniar)' school lasts for six years, and the programme
includes Chinese language, mathematics, English language, social stud-
ies, science, arts and crafts, music, physical education, and moral or relig-
ious education. The language of instruction for almost all the children is
Chinese (spoken Cantonese and written Mandarin). Most children
attend on a half-day basis, either in the morning or in the afternoon.
The three year curriculum ofjunior secondary' education (Forms Oneto Three) is again basically similar for all the children and consists of
English language, Chinese language, mathematics, integrated science,
Chinese history, a choice of one or more social subjects, as well as art,
music, physical education, and moral or rehgious education. The
languages of instruction in most subjects for the majority ofchildren are
spoken Cantonese and written English. Most pupils attend full-day.
Compulsory education ends at age fifteen when most pupils complete
their junior secondary stage. However, nearly 90% of the age cohort
continue in some form of senior secondary education. Some attend
vocational courses lasting six months to two years, but most ofthe pupils
are in the two-year academic stream (Forms Four and Five) , studying for
the competitive Hong Kong Certificate ofEducation Examination. This
examination may be considered the initiation rite ofthe industrial soci-
ety. Each year some 50-60% of the candidates perform well enough to
quahfy for white collar positions in the job market, while a smaller
percentage earn admission to matriculation programmes (Form Six) in
academic secondary schools to prepare tor the even more competitive
examinations qualifying for admission to tertian,' education. Those whodo poorly in the examination either try again the following year, take up
vocational courses in the technical institutes, or enter the labour force as
unskilled workers.
In 1990 some 14% of the age cohort was admitted to all forms of
tertiary education in Hong Kong.' Tertiary education consists ofdegree
programmes in the arts, science, social sciences, business, education, and
the technological professions oftered by the universities and the poly-
technics. It also applies to diploma programmes in education, nursing,
business, languages, design, technology, and the performing arts offered
by a variety of institutions. There is an Open Learning Institute which
offers multimedia distance education at degree level. Most of these
programmes are publicly funded. There is also a grants and loans scheme
which provides comprehensive financial aid to ensure that an academi-
cally qualified student does not have to give up his/her place because of
financial need.
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Edncatioti ill Hoii^ Kong 41
In addition to the 60,000 students attending tertiaw-level institutions
within Hong Kong itself, there is also a large number of young
Hongkongans studying in universities and colleges overseas. As 1997
approaches, the number ofstudents going abroad is likely to continue to
increase. In 1990 over 20,000 students went overseas for their studies,
usually to one or another of the English-speaking or Chinese-speaking
societies. Canada was the most popular choice.
The Hong Kong education system has expanded tremendously
during the past decades, as shown in the following diagram companng
enrolment in 195 1 and 198 1. Not only has it provided opportunities for
more and more Hongkongans to attend school for longer and longer
courses, it has also served to bring about greater equality between the
sexes, in education as well as in employment at the end ofschooling.
Enrolment in the Hong Kong School System^
Males Females
Post-secondary
300,000
Secondary
Primary
300,000
The Education System and 1997
In the remaining sections ofthis essay, the Hong Kong education system
will be examined in terms of its input factors, its operational factors, and
its output, including an analysis ofhow these might relate to the impend-
ing change ofsovereignty during the next decade or so. The input fictors
include the values and knowledge existing in Hong Kong society which
42 Politics and Society in Hon<^ Kon<^ Towards iggj
are transmitted into the school system, as well as the human and financial
resources which arc invested in the system. The operational factors
include policy and administration, curriculum and pedagogy, languages
of instruction, and school life. Output refers to the body of students
completing their schooling and leaving the system at various levels. Each
of these factors can be expected to undergo considerable change up to
1997 and beyond.
The Input Factors
The school system is an integral part ofsociety and receives sustenance in
the form of teachers, pupils, ideas, information, values, and financial
support.
Values
Hong Kong is one of the most open and liberal societies in Asia and is
characterized by a broad range ofcultural, ethical, religious, and political
values—from Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist to Humanist and Chris-
tian; from Nationalist to Communist to Liberal to Social Democratic.
The government, a colonial set-up without a long term commitment
and a cultural agenda, does not officially espouse or actively propagate
any particular ideology or system ofvalues, and the society as a whole is
eclectic and cosmopolitan. Different ideas and values are openly
expressed in speech, print, and the electronic media where they compete
for acceptance. It is not at all uncommon for most or even all ofthe above
viewpoints to be represented on an ordinary street corner news kiosk or
bookstore.
In addition to all these values embodied in the "great traditions" of
East or West, there is also a strong undercurrent ofpeasant values, derived
from the southern Chinese countryside. This is the region from which
the majority ofHong Kong people have migrated within living memory.
These peasant values of pragmatic and industrious dedication to the
survival and material improvement of the family, within a fatalistic
acquiescence to the general social context, are seldom articulated.
Nevertheless, they are suffused throughout Hong Kong society, at work
and at school.
An important aspect of the values commonly found in Hong Kong
society is the sense ofidentity with Chinese culture rather than with any
Chinese state. This is derived partly from the peasant tradition ofkeep-
ing a safe distance from government and partly from the sense of alien-
ation from Chinese politics when the migrants exiled themselves from
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Edlldltioil ill Hoiii^ Koiig 43
their home villages or towns.
The broad range ofvalues thriving in Hong Kong society finds its way
into the schools through the textbooks and teachers, as well as from the
homes ofthe pupils and through the news media which are often used as
supplementary teaching materials. While textbooks tend to be more
conservative than society at large and reflect Confucian, Christian, and
capitaHstic ideas more than other options, there is no uniformity ofvalues
among all the subjects or texts available to any one class ofpupils.
There is also little ideological uniformity, beyond a certain consensus
about professional practice, among teachers who come from family
backgrounds which are diverse ideologically. Also, many of them were
college or university students in the 1970s when the very lively student
movement fostered serious debates about social, cultural, and political
issues from several divergent perspectives and was a significant part of
their formative experience.
On the part of education authorities, the political tests (principally
against communism), which had been administered in the process of
textbook adoption or of student recruitment in the Colleges of
Education since the 1950s, were abolished in the 1970s. Consequently, a
pupil in a Hong Kong school is likely to be exposed to pluralistic values,
rather than to a monolithic outlook. As for a sense of ethnic rather than
political identity, Chinese culture has found its way into Hong Kongschools as part of the emotional baggage of many ot the teachers and
parents. It has also been encouraged by British colonial policies to de-
politicize the educational system.'"
However, the range ofideas available in society and in school is likely
to become narrower by 1997 and beyond. Although freedom of belief
and expression is supposedly guaranteed by thejoint Declaration and the
Basic Law, the People's Republic government has shown itselfto be very
intolerant ofcriticism ofChina by Hong Kong people. This attitude has
became even more apparent since 1989 when millions ofHongkongans
demonstrated in support of the democracy movement in Beijing and
condemned theJune 4th massacre and its aftermath."
Beijing has written into the Basic Law vague and general prohibitions
against expressions and actions which may be detrimental to national
unity, and it has put pressure on the Hong Kong government to disband
properly incorporated community-based organizations in Hong Kong
which supported the democracy movement in China. Such actions from
Beijing do not reassure Hong Kong people that anything like the exist-
ing pkiralism and openness will continue after 1997. (Jiven the ideolog-
44 Politics and Society iti Hon^ Koin> Towards iggy
ical orientation of the government in Beijing and the influence that it
will be able to exercise, directly or indirectly, on the government of the
Special Administrative Region after 1997, it is very likely that the range
ot values treely expressed and propagated in Hong Kong will become
narrower and more directed towards the political goals of a unitary
Chinese state. The range of values officially permitted in the school
system will be narrower still and aimed at inculcating unity of purpose
with the state.
Knowledge
In any school system, the range and amount ofknowledge that is current
in the curriculum are selections from the knowledge available in the
society at large. As one of the major urban centres on the globe. HongKong is a meeting point for the world's two most popularly used
languages and enjoys wide availability ofknowledge of all kinds. There
is a free flow of information in Chinese and English and, to a smaller
extent, injapanese, French, and German. The common attitude towards
cultural and technological knowledge is open, cosmopolitan, eclectic,
and pragmatic. Hong Kong people have an insatiable appetite for newideas, and a good deal of this knowledge and attitude finds its way into
the school curriculum and school life.
Hong Kong is an important consumer, transmitter, and producer of
knowledge. In terms oftransmission and consumption, it has one ofthe
highest per capita rates in the world for the publication and sales ofnews-
papers and magazines, as well as films and television programmes. It is
one of the major centres for publication in Chinese and the hub of the
worldwide Chinese language book trade. Regionally, Hong Kong is also
an important link in the world network of English language publishing
and distribution.
The knowledge that is brought from other parts ofthe world to HongKong is widely disseminated locally. The academic libraries are amongthe best stocked and best managed in Asia. Although not as well
endowed, the public libraries are very heavily patronized. For those whoprefer to absorb information and ideas in more digestible dosages, most
of the newspapers are richly supplemented with local and international
cultural, social, literary, and technological pages. There is also a wide
variety of more specialized magazines. For selection of materials, the
editorial policies ofthe numerous print media represent a broad range of
ideological and cultural perspectives.
In addition to reading, Hong Kong people gain new knowledge from
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education in Hon^ Kon<^ 45
the electronic media. The news programmes make use ofclippings from
all the Chinese-speaking and English-speaking societies, and locally
produced documentaries and investigative reporting are among the
more popular shows. On the radio, phone-in discussions on the social,
economic, and poHtical issues ofHong Kong, China, and the world are
popular daily features. On such programmes, persons with many diver-
gent viewpoints and educational levels freely present their facts and argu-
ments and debate those ofothers.
Travel is another important means for Hong Kong people to gain newknowledge. Hong Kong is a major centre for tourism, Asian performing
arts, and conferences, and every year millions offoreign travellers bring
in elements of their cultures, experiences, and ideas. The amount of
outgoing travel is comparable to, if not higher than, that of incoming
travel. The vast majority ofHongkongans have knowledge and experi-
ence at first hand of other societies which they inevitably compare to
their own, not infrequently in print.
All these factors together represent a very large amount ofinformation
and ideas which freely enter and circulate in Hong Kong, with very little
official censorship. Such ideas are readily available to be acquired by the
average Hongkongan as her or his personal knowledge. This is signifi-
cant for education, as much ofthe new knowledge available to society is
input into the school system periodically through revisions of subject
syllabuses and textbooks, as well as through updating programmes of
teacher education. There is also continuous inputting through the
extracurricular reading ofteachers and students, the use ofcurrent media
materials in the classroom, and the general exposure ofstudents, parents,
and teachers to the media and the social milieu ofopenness to and avail-
ability ofnew information and ideas.
At the top end of its school system. Hong Kong has been gaining
momentum in the production ofnew knowledge. In science and tech-
nology, the continuous reception and adaptation of international
knowledge since the 1960s have fostered a number ofworld-renowned
mathematicians and scientists who have spent significant portic:>ns ot
their careers in Hong Kong. In the social sciences, the 1970s was a period
of reception of Western knowledge, and the 1980s witnessed research
work reflecting increased localization ofthe imported knowledge. In the
humanities, there also appeared during the 1980s new perspectives in the
appreciation and interpretation ofinherited Chinese and Western tradi-
tions. A locally rooted academic community and tradition were rapidly
taking shape when the issue of 1997 started to threaten tlicir further
46 l^olitics and Society in Honj^ Koitj^ Towards iggj
growth and existence.
From the angle of knowledge consumption, transmission, and
production, there are several ways which 1997 could bring about radical
changes to the Hong Kong scene. Just as with values, the range ofoptions
in the social sciences and humanities available to Hong Kong people after
1997 is likely to become more narrow. This could take place through
government censorship ofthe media and the publishing industry, official
or unofficial pressure on editors to exercise self-restraint, or commercial
control ofthe market place for information and ideas.'"
Already, state corporations ofthe People's Republic, controlled from
Beijing, have bought significant portions of the shares in the telecom-
munications industry in Hong Kong. They have been active in local
publishing and the estabhshment of large bookstores in strategic loca-
tions throughout the territory, gaining virtual monopoly of the book
trade in certain districts. While profit undoubtedly has been an impor-
tant motive in these business ventures, ownership also implies a great deal
ofpower.'"^
The publishing and retail ofbooks by these Beijing-owned firms so far
have remained liberal and eclectic. They carry Hong Kong and Taiwan,
as well as Mainland, works and even some titles by the 1989 dissidents.
However, after a few more years ofexpansion when the near monopoly
has grown to cover all of the territon,', these state-owned presses could
easily, without resorting to censorship, shut out all non-conforming
intellectual options by limiting the local dissemination of knowledge
through books to what is acceptable to the Beijing authorities. In terms
of scientific and technological knowledge, restriction also might be
imposed after 1997, not from China but from the West, especially the
U.S.A. At that time the change of"camps," consequent on the transfer of
the sovereignty' of Hong Kong, will automatically Hmit the territory's
access to certain information and products at the cutting edge of the
development of electronic and other fields.
Whether or not the transfer ofsovereignty will result in the reduction
of travel of foreigners to Hong Kong or of Hongkongans outside the
territory, it could very well restrict the freedom of expression of travel
experiences where these might be construed to cast an unfavourable light
on the Mainland government, national unit>', or unification. This
restriction is expressly provided for in the Basic Law.
The values and knowledge that are officially current within a school
system tend to reflect the preferences of the powers that control the
system. When the free flow of information and ideas into and within a
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education in Hon^ Kong 47
society becomes restricted, the knowledge input into its school system
will most probably be even more limited. However, compliance with or
undermining ofofficially prescribed limits depends to a certain extent on
the staff and the students who constitute the main part oi' the system.
These human input factors in the Hong Kong school system are also
undergoing significant change.
Staff
The teaching staffis the key factor in any school system, as well as an inte-
gral, though somewhat specialized, part of the educated workforce of a
society. The supply of teachers depends on the availability and willing-
ness of educated men and women within the society to be trained and
employed as teachers.
In Hong Kong, nearly fifty thousand educated members of society
have chosen to serve as teachers. They range from assistant kindergarten
teachers, who had junior secondary education and a short course of
training, to university and polytechnic lecturers with master's or doctoral
degrees. The overwhelming majority ofteachers have had most or all of
their own general schooling and professional training in Hong Kong.
Most of them too have come from peasant, worker, or lower middle-
class family backgrounds. Many ofthem had been participants in succes-
sive student movements on the campuses ofHong Kong tertiary institu-
tions. Although personally they subscribe to a diversity ofideological or
religious perspectives, professionally they share a general consensus char-
acterized by the work ethic, meritocracy, competitive social mobility,
and an eclectic mix ofauthoritarianism and liberahsm.
The teaching profession has been one ofthe fastest growing and best
organized occupations in Hong Kong. Both the academic and the
professional qualifications of Hong Kong teachers are internationally
recognized, and the levels of remuneration also have been rather high.
Since the 1970s, teachers have enjoyed largely successful unionization,
which has helped to protect their interests uis-a-uis the Hong Konggovernment, the employer or paymaster ofmost teachers. Various teach-
ers' organizations also have been active in advocating educational
reform, promoting the democratization ofsociety and politics, and other14
causes.
From the 1950s to the 1980s, Hong Kong never had a teacher short-
age. There were always educated men and women willing to serve as
teachers, even though in the early decades many ofthem had no profes-
sional training and received in-service training tor their teaching certifi-
48 Politics and Socicly in Hon^ Koni^ Towards iggj
cates when they were already on thejob. Over the years it has been possi-
ble gradually to raise the academic and professional requirements for
appointment to teaching positions, and plans were made in the mid-
1980s for further advances in this area. PoHtical questions about 1997,
accentuated by the Beijing massacre of 1989, have dampened these plans
quite considerably, and the concern by the early 1990s is how to maintain
standards rather than to raise requirements.
Hong Kong teachers are very well aware that teachers in the People's
Republic enjoy little social esteem and even less income, and have been
the frequent victims of political campaigns. If the economic reforms of
the open door policy in China gave some enticement to the business
sector of Hong Kong, they offered little consolation to the teachers of
Hong Kong who could see few material improvements for their
colleagues on the Mainland.
Nevertheless, many Hong Kong teachers were hopeful that the Joint
Declaration would guarantee sufficient autonomy for the Special
Administrative Region so that they could continue to teach much as
before, and that the Mainland reforms would in time bring about a more
open, less repressive, and more amenable China. The first hope was
greatly weakened by the process ofthe drafting ofthe Basic Law during
which Hongkongans saw one after another ofthe promises ofautonomy
and democracy, which many believed were in the Joint Declaration,
reinterpreted by the Beijing-appointed drafters. The second hope was
crushed by the tanks on Tiananmen Square. Teachers who had been
fervent in support of the hunger-strikers and protesters of Beijing
became bitterly disillusioned after the massacre there.
For the first time, a teacher shortage in Hong Kong was reported three
months after the massacre when many teachers resigned their jobs in
order to collect their superannuation funds, to emigrate, or to change
occupations for those in greater demand by countries accepting immi-
grants. The school term opened in September 1989 with 5% of the
primary and secondary teaching positions unfilled.'^
The Education Department responded to the sudden, and still contin-
uing, staffing crisis by compromising on some of its own requirements.
It permitted some teachers without Hong Kong degrees, but with local
diplomas or Taiwan or Mainland degrees, to teach in the senior forms
and some teachers with lower quaHfications to teach in thejunior classes.
However, the problem is not likely to go away as emigration accelerates.
Emigrants come from all classes in society', but a large proportion ofthem
are from the pool of highly educated persons from whom the school
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Edttcatioii ill Ho/jj Kong 49
system draws its staff. In fact, some countries, such as Australia, recruit
immigrant teachers from Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the teacher education institutions are receiving far fewer
applications than usual to their programmes as many young
Hongkongans feel insecure aboutj oining a profession which has suffered
disproportionately under the Chinese Communist Party. The colleges
and faculties of education cope with their recruitment problems by
broadening their criteria for admission. For instance, in September 1990
the faculties admitted into their one-year post-baccalaureate pro-
gramme of teacher certification, which is the main training course for
secondary school teachers, much higher percentages of applicants with
degrees from Taiwan or Mainland universities.
Broadening the basis ofrecruitment ofteachers and student-teachers
is no doubt necessary for crisis intervention but is likely to lead to other
problems and changes in the not too distant future. Hong Kong students
who had gone to Taiwan or the Mainland tor their undergraduate stud-
ies, whether because of their own political orientation or because they
had previously failed to enter local institutions, are likely to be different
from the local graduates in many ways. These include their sense of
belonging, ideas ofand relations to authority and the state, the parame-
ters and standards of their academic knowledge, and their self-confi-
dence. Previously, teachers with Taiwan or Mainland degrees consti-
tuted only a very small percentage of the teaching staff of the whole
system, and the ethos and consensus of the protession was set by the
locally trained majority. As the numbers of these two groups in the
profession increase, distinctions and divisions between them and with
locally trained teachers will likely be accentuated and lead to conflict.
Further attrition may well result from such conflict.
This will be especially so if the Mainland-educated teachers gain
ascendancy over the other two groups after 1997. With Mainland-
educated staffin the majority or in control, the professional ethos and the
open and tolerant attitudes towards values and knowledge could also
undergo considerable change.
Students
Hong Kong has always had difficulty with statistical projections ofenrol-
ment in its school system. In earlier decades, the problem was with popu-
lation increase through births and immigration. As birth control became
widely practised, immigration, which was often illegal and beyond
control, was the unpredictable factor.
50 l\ilin(S and Sociciy in Hoin> Kon^ J'oii'ards iggy
Since the mid- 1980s, however, the problem has been reversed. The
birth rate of Hongkongans has been decUning dramatically, partly
because some families have chosen to have their babies born overseas and
partly because some couples postpone marriage or procreation in antici-
pation of 1997. The accelerating pace ofemigration also has made it diffi-
cult to predict enrolment. The loss of students from the Hong Kongschool system could take place with family emigration or through fami-
lies sending their children overseas for secondary or post-secondary stud-
ies. With the former, the loss could come at any stage in schooling; with
the latter, students are more likely to leave at the end of the junior
secondary, senior secondary, or matriculation stages. In either case, the
scale ofthe loss is difficult for planners to predict.
Hong Kong has been sending large numbers ofstudents overseas since
the 1960s. However, in the past students have gone abroad for their
tertiary education. They were mostly children from well-to-do families
or children from white-collar families who had previously been unable
to enter local higher education. There were also some youngest children
from large working-class families. By and large students from middle or
lower class backgrounds, who were doing well in secondary school,
stayed in Hong Kong to compete for admission to the local tertiary insti-
tutions. In anticipation of 1997, however, a far larger number ofstudents
at different stages and across different social strata are being sent abroad to
study—some to stay with relatives or friends oftheir parents, some to be
enroled in boarding schools, and some to live on their own or with peers.
The problems that this mass movement has caused, both for the students
and their families and for the school system, have not been addressed.
The trend is likely to continue up to 1997 and beyond.
So far as the Hong Kong education system is concerned, the problem
ot attrition is not only one of numbers but also one of quality. In 1990
with the first admission exercise after the Beijing massacre, the local
universities found that the calibre ofthe pool ot applicants, even to such
elite programmes as medicine, law, andjournalism, while still competi-
tive, was not as high as before. Whether or not this is a temporary
phenomenon is too early to tell, but it is certainly cause for concern in the
context of a projected rapid increase in tertiary enrolment. In the wake
of the Beijing massacre, the Hong Kong government announced plans
to double the intake ofdegree courses during the 1990s in order to boost
confidence in the territory and to train replacements for the expected
brain drain. Maintaining standards in the face ofmassive emigration will
be a major problem.
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Ediicatioti ill Hon^ Kong 51
Not only do students leave, some also return after a few years. Since
many Hong Kong families emigrate for political security rather than for
economic betterment, they may decide to return to Hong Kong after
fulfilling their residence requirements overseas, especially if employ-
ment prospects in their adopted countries happen to be grim. The chil-
dren ofthe returned emigrants may or may not be able to fit comfortably
into the Hong Kong school system because they will have adjusted to the
language, curriculum, teaching and learning st^de, and student culture of
the adopted countnes. They may need special schools—international
schools existing at the periphery ofthe Hong Kong school system, which
are compromises between the Hong Kong and overseas models. A few
such schools already are in operation, and a Canadian school recently
opened in November 1991. Here again it is difficult for planners to
predict either the size of the return flow or what proportion of the
returned students will be in regular schools and what proportion in inter-
national schools.
All these factors related to 1997—emigration, the rapid expansion of
tertiary education, returned students in special schools—tend to erode
the ethos which has been the common formative experience ofyoung
Hongkongans during the past decades: the work ethic, the beliefin meri-
tocracy, and the promise of a bright future open to talent and industri-
ousness.^
Finance
The overwhelming majority ofprimary and secondary schools in HongKong are in the public sector, that is, fully financed by the government.
These include a small number of schools operated directly by the
Education Department and a much larger number of aided schools
which are operated by a variety ofvoluntary agencies, including religious
organizations, county-of-origin clubs, clansmen's associations, cham-
bers of commerce, and others. Aided schools are free to set their ownpedagogic policies, appoint their own staff, or raise additional funding
for supernumerary equipment. However, they may not charge tuition
fees and must follow Education Department guidelines for statt-student
ratios, staffqualifications and salaries, and curnculuni standards, as well as
adhere to the centralized systems of pupil allocation, which leaves little
discretion for the principal to admit or reject any pupil.
Educational funding in Hong Kong comes from the general revenue
of the government, not from local rates. Over the decades, the level of
funding given to the schools has tended to be equalized, so that by the late
52 Politics ami Socicly in Hoin; Kom; Towards tggy
1980s, a pupil attending a public-sector school would enjoy nearly the
same amount of government investment as any of his/her peers in any
other public-sector school in Hong Kong. Smiilarly, a teacher working
in a public-sector school would be paid the same amount as any other
public-sector teacher of the same qualifications and seniority, whatever
the district. Such equalization has been the result of popular advocacy
and government policy and has gone a long way towards equalizing
educational opportunity between the sexes and across social classes.
As for private-sector schools, they are financed from tuition fees,
which can be very expensive in the case of a small number of interna-
tional schools and a larger number of less expensive and less endowed
local private schools. The international schools have been serving the
children of expatriates from multinational firms and generally have
followed the curricula and practices of the home countries. The local
private schools include a minority' which are connected with the
Chinese Communist Part)'. The majorit\', however, are commercial
operations catering to pupils who are not qualified scholastically for
academic senior secondary education in the public sector (which serves
some 75% of the age cohort) and, yet, do not want to attend publicly-
funded vocational institutions.
In the run up to 1997, the financial situation and policies of the
government are likely to undergo significant change. There also has
been an important change in the arrangements for educational funding.
While the economy ofHong Kong as a whole is not expected to contract
during the political transition and beyond, government revenue will
probably be reduced, but expenditure is projected to increase rapidly.'^
During the past decades, the Hong Kong government has followed
conservative financial practices which usually brought in some annual
surplus for the Reserve Fund. Since Hong Kong is a free port and collects
import duty on only a few classes ofmerchandise, a very large proportion
ofgovernment revenue has been derived from income and profit taxes.
Not only are these levies imposed at very low rates, they are also collected
from rather narrow segments of society—precisely those segments
which are emigrating disproportionately from the territory, the highly
educated and better paid professionals and entrepreneurs. The govern-
ment is preparing for any eventuality by laying the groundwork for
imposing a sales tax which has already given rise to considerable protest.
In any case the tax base and total revenue are likely to become somewhat
less stable during the 1990s.
Meanwhile, large scale projected developments, like the rapid expan-
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education in Hon<^ Kong 53
sion of tertiar)' education and the even more ambitious Port and Airport
Development Scheme, will demand unprecedented levels of govern-
ment expenditure. All this will inevitably bring changes in the priorities
and patterns of government policies, including deficit financing and
lower standards of funding for those stages of education which benefit
the most people and help promote social equality—namely, priman,' and
secondary education.
Already in 1990, the government adopted the "Direct Subsidy
Scheme," whereby qualified secondary schools, whether in the public or
private sector, could seek annual grants from the government and still
charge fees, set their own standards of staffing and salaries, follow their
own curriculum, and not participate in the centraHzed allocation of
pupils. This gives the schools in the Scheme many of the advantages of
public funding without the obHgations and most of the freedom of
private schools. It is expected to benefit the Communist-connected
schools, as well as international schools.^^
In fact, as part ofan effort to stem the brain drain, government policy
has encouraged international schools in order to attract emigrants to
return with their families to work in Hong Kong. However, the conse-
quence of the Scheme will be divergent levels of educational funding,
with children ofthe elite attending better endowed schools than children
from ordinary families. This is a reversal ofthe long-term trend towards
equalization. If government revenue does become unstable, affecting
government expenditure on education, the gap between the directly
subsidized schools and schools remaining within the public sector is
likely to become wider.
The Process of Schooling
The school system makes use of the moral, intellectual, human, and
material resources supplied by societ)^ and organizes them in ways which
are expected to facilitate teaching and learning. As Hong Kongapproaches 1997, a number ofchanges in these arrangements are already
in existence, and it is commonly expected that more changes will come
after the transition ofsovereignty.
Policy and Administration
The school system ofHong Kong is characterized by the government's
taking charge ofoverall planning but maintaining only loose operational
control. Most operational matters are decentralized and dependent on
54 I'oliliis and Society in I Ioii{> Kon^ Towards iggy
the voluntarism of the sehool-sponsoring bodies, such as the Christian
and Buddhist churches, philanthropic organizations, and other commu-
nity groups. This is the administrative implication of the pattern of
public-sector financing outlined above. It is part and parcel ofthe over-
all government policy of positive non-interventionism, whereby the
government has been trying to minimize its direct involvement in vari-
ous aspects ofsocial life.''^
In this way, the government makes its annual educational plans on the
basis of demographic data and its medium-term plans on social and
economic considerations. These plans, which range from five to fifteen
years in coverage, usually are drafted in the form ofgreen papers and then
published for public consultation. Comments from the education-
related professions and from the general public have been prolific, and
often have been taken into account when the subsequent policy state-
ment or white paper is prepared. Hence, since the 1970s, there has been
broadly based public consultation on educational poHcies and plans.
These consultations have helped not only to garner opinions but also to
legitimize government educational policies in the absence ofelections to
either the Board ofEducation or the Legislature.
In addition to consultation by green papers, there is also a system of
standing or ad hoc committees dealing with educational matters which
provide the government with professional or pubHc opinion on existing
practice or proposed innovations. These committees are appointed by
the governor or the director ofeducation, but they do tend to represent
a broad range of opinion and aim at evolving consensual policies. All in
all, the approach to decision making is not democratic, but it is also not
autocratic and allows for quite considerable pluralism.
At the level ofthe school, there is great diversity in the styles ofadmin-
istration, varying from one sponsoring body to another and from one
school to another. Some schools have very authoritarian heads while
others have a great deal of teacher participation in decision making.
Some have rather strict hierarchies, and others have more equal coUe-
giality among the teachers. A few schools allow a fair amount ofstudent
input and some very little in different aspects of school poHcies.
Pluralism, resulting from decentralization and voluntarism, is the rule.
One thing, though, is common to the administration ofalmost all the
schools in Hong Kong. As a result of stringent government measures in
the 1950s and 1960s to de-politicize education, no political party has
been allowed to organize in the schools. Except for a small number of
schools connected with the Chinese Communist Party on the Mainland
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education in Hoin^ Kong 55
or the Chinese NationaHst Party on Taiwan, there has been general
compHance with this regulation. After 1997, however, it would be very
surprising indeed if there were no Communist Party organization or
influence in more and more schools, even though on various occasions
during the late-i98os, Party and state representatives from the Mainland
have offered several different opinions about future Party activities in
Hong Kong.
With or without Party interference, the change in government is also
likely to bring changes in the policy making and administration ofeduca-
tion. The government ofthe future Special Administrative Region will
derive its legitimacy from appointment by the authorities in Beijing and
from partial elections under the Basic Law. With this legitimization, the
future government may find it less requisite to consult by green papers
and by committees. It may, perhaps, even find it less convenient to do so
if it senses a potential conflict between the demands ot the profession or
the public and the demands emanating from Beijing.
In the same vein, if there should be a demand from up north during
the early twenty-first century to make use ofeducation in Hong Kong to
promote full national integration, the government of the Special
Administrative Region may find it necessary to tighten government
control over all aspects of education. This would effectively do away
with voluntarism. In any case, there is likely to be rather more central-
ization and less pluralism within the school system.
Curriculum and Pedagogy
The curriculum in Hong Kong is organized in a unique pattern which is
partly Chinese and partly English. According to the policy adopted in
1989, the hitherto diversified and confusing senior grades will be
reformed to produce a uniform school ladder with a six-year primary
cycle, a three-yearjunior secondary cycle, a two-year senior secondary
cycle, a two-year matriculation cycle, and a three-year baccalaureate
cycle—i.e., the "6-3-2-2-3" system. There has been considerable debate
in recent years on whether the uniform ladder should be based on a
supposedly more Chinese pattern, with a three-year senior secondary
cycle plus a four-year baccalaureate cycle, i.e., the "6-3-3-4 system".
The debate is likely to remain alive and continue beyond 1997."
The curriculum ofprimary and secondary education in Hong Kong is
subject based, and permits, especially in the secondary cycles, a great
many choices and free combinations of subjects. In fact, in senior
secondary education, there is no officially required subject at all. Subject
56 Politics and Sociciy in Hoin; Kom; Towards iggy
choice is very nuicli a matter ot convention, consensus, and individual
aspirations for advanced education or employment.
The subject syllabuses are published by the Education Department
and the Examinations Authority, and are prepared by committees of
serving teachers and officials from these government agencies.
However, there is no unity of values, ideology, or approach among the
several dozen syllabuses which tend to reflect the preferences ofindivid-
ual committees or authors, at least as much as those of the government
agencies. The original contents of these syllabuses were derived from
Britain and China, but since the 1970s, they have become increasingly
localized and distinct from their counterparts in the tw^o metropolitan
powers.
In any case, the syllabuses are meant to be "recommended" and not
"prescribed," and schools are, at least in theory, welcome to prepare their
own syllabuses and submit them to the Education Department for
approval. Since the late 1980s, the Department has offered monetary
grants to encourage School-Based Curriculum Development, in an
effort to make schooling more responsive to pupils with divergent needs.
The programme has been well received by many schools and teachers.
Teaching and learning in Hong Kong schools, particularly in the
senior secondary and matriculation cycles, are dominated by the public
examinations. These are subject-based, academic achievement tests.
The setting ofthe questions and grading ofthe papers are undertaken by
independent committees of teachers appointed by the Examinations
Authority and involve fairly sophisticated pedagogical and statistical
techniques. Some of the tests are moderated by the Examinations
Syndicate ofLondon Universit\', to ensure international recognition of
the results.
The actual practice of teaching and learning under the syllabuses and
the shadow of the examinations vary a great deal from school to school
and from teacher to teacher. There is a broad range from rote learning to
activity methods, but the overall trend since the 1970s has been towards
greater use ofstudent-centred approaches and problem-solving activities
and away from rote memorization and teacher- or text-centred author-
ity.
After 1997 northern influence and the northern example will
undoubtedly gain some ascendancy. Instead of free combinations of
subjects, there may be a more or less rigidly prescribed common curricu-
lum, both for teaching and for examination. Instead ot teacher-based and
loosely coordinated curriculum committees, there may be a government
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Educcitioii ill Hoii<< Kotig 57
dominated and tighdy controlled set-up for curriculum revision. The
public examinations will be patterned more closely after their counter-
part on the Mainland. London moderation may be replaced with Beijing
regulation, and international recognition may be given up as unneces-
sary or even harmful. In addition, the trend towards student-centred and
problem-solving pedagogy, which matches well with the pluralism of
Hong Kong hfe, may be displaced by state-centred and thought-unify-
ing approaches.
Whether or not these authoritarian structural changes will come to
pass, one important change is almost certain. The languages used in
Hong Kong schools have been spoken Cantonese, written Mandarin,
and spoken and written English. Since the existing language pattern has
been found to be unsatis£ictory, the profession, as well as the Education
Department, has tried to fmd ways to assure effective learning of both
Chinese (Cantonese) and Enghsh. The Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law both provide exphcitly for the continued use ofEnglish in various
aspects ofHong Kong life, including education. However, the Beijing
drafters of the Basic Law have refused to enshrine Cantonese language
rights and have treated the very suggestion from a group ofdistinguished
Hong Kong hnguists with unconcealed contempt."' Therefore, it is
likely that the Beijing authorities will attempt to influence the future
Special Administrative Region government to impose Mandarin as the
only acceptable form ofthe Chinese language in Hong Kong schools
—
surely a step towards national unity ofthought and expression.
Ifthis should be the case. Hong Kong teachers and students struggling
with two non-native speeches—Mandarin and English—will fmd it
very difficult to use active, student-centred and problem-solving peda-
gogy and may have to be content with rote learnmg ofprescribed texts.
Also, Mainland-educated or northern-born teachers will enjoy an
unbeatable professional advantage over their Hong Kong-born and
educated colleagues.
Campus Life
In spite of the pressure of examinations, life in Hong Kong secondary
schools is not all work and no play but is enriched with a variety ofafter-
hours social, cultural, sports, social service, and religious activities. While
the actual offerings differ greatly from school to school, the practice as a
whole is encouraged by the Education Department and by many school
sponsoring bodies. In part, this is a measure to prevent the rise ofjuvenile
delinquency which so far has been less serious in Hong Kong than in
58 I'oliiits iiiitl Society in Hon^ Kom; Towards iggj
most other industrial societies. The forni-niaster/mistress or home-room teacher is responsible for student counselling as well as for helping
to organize extracurricular activities. Activities which require special
skills are assigned to teachers with such expertise.
One thing particularly noticeable on the grounds of most primary,
secondary, and tertiary schools in Hong Kong is the almost complete
absence ofany political symbol, whether ofparties or ofthe government.
This is the most visible, or rather invisible, aspect of the long-standing
pohcy to de-politicize education. There is also no organized poHtical
activity or group in the schools.
However, since the 1970s there has been an increasing trend to
encourage student self-government in secondary schools, as practical
civic education and leadership training. In a few schools, this has taken
the form of universal suffrage to elect freely nominated candidates for a
students' council, which would then take charge of almost all the
extracurricular activities and which would be consulted by the school
administration on certain school policies. Most institutions, however,
have not gone this far but have more hmited parameters for students'
organizations, while some schools do not permit any degree of self-
government at all.
The tertiary institutions all have self-governing student unions which
have joined together to form the Hong Kong Federation of Students.
The unions and the federation, as well as other tertiary-level student
organizations—most notably the Hong Kong Federation of CathoHc
Students—have been very active not only with social functions and
cultural festivals, but also with social and pohtical reform. Since the 1970s
they have helped bring about some of the most important reforms in
Hong Kong, such as the estabHshment ofthe Independent Commission
Against Corruption. They were also among the most vociferous
supporters in Hong Kong of the democracy movement in Beijing in
1989. In fact, the tents crushed by the tanks on Tiananmen Square had
been supplied by the student unions and federations ofHong Kong.
For this reason alone, if not for others, the authorities in Beijing will
want to have some influence and control over campus life in HongKong. The absence of political symbols certainly wiU not last beyond
1997, as the People's Repubhc will be eager to show the flag aU over the
reclaimed territory. There can be little doubt, too, that the Chinese
Communist Party will attempt, overtly or covertly, to gain control over
extracurricular life at all levels of education in Hong Kong. Depending
on the circumstances of each school or institution, this could take the
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education iu Hoii(i Kong 59
form ofParty cells or front groups among the administrators, the teach-
ers, or the students.
The Output
The output ofa school system is made up ofthe school leavers and grad-
uates who, by virtue of the education they have received, are different
firom unschooled or less schooled persons. Hence, they wiU be able to
make different contributions to the social, economic, political, and
cultural life of the society in which they live. In Hong Kong during the
past tour decades, the output of the school system at various levels has
helped transform the territoiy trom a colonial seaport with two million
demoralized peasant refugees to a modern metropolis with a unique and
vibrant industrial, commercial, and cultural life and identity. Education
has not only helped to transform Hong Kong society as a whole, but also
enabled many Hong Kong families to fmd their places in the sun, to put
a very considerable distance between their socio-economic origins and
destinations.
Since the 1960s the school system of Hong Kong has contributed
educated persons not only to Hong Kong society but also to other soci-
eties around the world, in the form ofstudents overseas who decided to
stay in their host countries upon graduation and in the form of outright
emigrants. The close relations between Hong Kong and Canada have
been built, in part, on this foundation."" In recent years, with the open
door policy in the People's Republic of China, many educated and
skilled Hongkongans also have contributed their knowledge and skills to
the economic and social development ofChina, by working as entrepre-
neurs or employees ofjoint venture companies investing in China.
As 1997 approaches, and even beyond the transfer of sovereignty, all
these forms of the outward contribution of the Hong Kong school
system are likely to continue. The mix and the quality of that contribu-
tion probably will change from time to time, depending on external
factors as well as on the input and operational factors ofthe school system.
As for Hong Kong society itself, the very severe brain drain, caused by
the 1997 question and aggravated by the Beijing massacre, calls for
greater and greater output from the school system to help fill the short-
falls in the educated workforce. While the haemorrhage continues at an
increasingly rapid rate, the school system itself, especially at its higher
levels, suffers from staffshortages. As long as the political question ofthe
future internal autonomy remains unresolved, increasing the output ot
Hong Kong higher education may simply increase the rateotcmigratiiMi
6o Politics and Society in Hotii> Koii^ Towards iggy
by giving more persons the means to qualify for immigrating to other
countries. That political question, of course, is much larger than the
school system and is the core ofthe predicament in which Hongkongans
find themselves.
Summing UpThis essay has examined the changes that are likely to occur in the HongKong education system up to 1997 and beyond. The future, ofcourse, is
not ours to see, and the scenario which has been presented here is
premised upon the developments since the mid-1980s of the school
system itselfand ofSino-Hong Kong relations. World events during the
past few years often have taken unpredictable turns, and the future
Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong may yet turn out to be
much more autonomous, pluralistic, and free than hitherto supposed.
This author will be only too happy to find by the year 20 1 1 that his gener-
ally pessimistic outlook for the autochthonous school system of Hong
Kong in this essay was entirely wrong.
Notes
1
.
T.L. Tsim, "Introduction," in Tfie Other Hong Kong Report, eds. T.L. Tsim and B.H.K.
Luk (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1989), pp. xv-xxxv; J. Walden,
"Implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration," in ibid., pp. 45-62; T.L. Tsim,
"Implementation ofthe Sino-BritishJoint Declaration," in The Other Hong Kong Report,
iggo, eds. R.Y.C. Wong andJ.Y.S. Cheng (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1990), pp. 131-46.
2. The remark was made by Lord Palmerston. For the early history ofHong Kong, see
G.B. Endacott, A Histoiy ofHong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1964),
chap. 1-3.
3. B.H.K. Luk, "Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curnculum: Hentage and
Colonialism," Comparative Education Reineif }$ (November 1991): 650-68, esp. 661-64.
4. The phrase v^^as first used by Philip Haddon-Cave, Financial Secretary of the HongKong Government during the late 1970s. For a discussion of the policy, see A.J.
Youngson, Hong Kong Economic Growth and Policy (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1982).
5. B.H.K. Luk, "Education," in Tlw Other Hong Kong Report, pp. 151-88.
6. Hong Kong iggo (Hong Kong: Government Infomiation Service, 1990), pp. 376-77
(app. 7), pp. 382-83 (app. 10, loA).
7. Sir David Wilson, "A Vision of the Future," (Annual address by the Governor to the
Legislative Council, 1 1 October 1989), in ibid., p. 12.
BERNARD H.K. LUK: Education in Hong Kong 6i
8. Wong and Cheng, eds. The Other Hotig Kong Report, iggo, pp. 376-77.
9. H.K. Luk and K.L. Wu, Education Deuclopnient in Post- IVar Hong Kong: Chronicles in
Graphs (Hong Kong: Wah Fung Book Company, 1983), chap, i, charts 1.1-1.8.
10. Luk, "Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curncuhnn," pp. 664-67, section on the
1953 report ofthe Chinese Studies Committee.
11. Tsim, "hnplementation of the Sino-British Jonit Declaration," pp. 139-45; Luk,
"Education," in The Other Hong Kong Report, iggo, pp. 391-94, section on the Beijing
democracy movement and Hong Kong's students and teachers.
12. On existing threats to freedom of expression, see H. Litton, "Public Order," in TIte
Other Hong Kong Report, pp. 273-79; and in The Other Hong Kong Report, iggo, pp. 184-
86.
13. The Commercial Press, the largest of the China state-owned book publishing and
selling firms operating in Hong Kong, has eight large branch stores throughout the terri-
tory. It has formed a conglomerate for business in Hong Kong and in overseas Chinese
communities with other state-owned publishers.
14. Luk, "Education," in The Other Hong Kong Report, pp. 171-72; and updated in The
Other Hong Kong Report, iggo, pp. 391-94.
15. Ibid., p. 394.
16. B.H.K. Luk, "Pnvatization and Meritocracy: the Real Issue of the Direct Subsidy
Scheme," in Differences and Identities: Educational Argument in Late Twentieth-Century Hong
Kong, ed. A.E. Sweeting (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University' Faculty of Education,
1990), pp. 47-55.
17. A.K.F. Siu and Y.F. Luk, "The State ofthe Economy," in The Other Hong Kong Report,
iggo, pp. 205-20.
18. Education Commission, Report No. 3, (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1988),
chap. 4; cf Luk, "Education," in The Other Hong Kong Report, p. 188.
19. The Hong Kong Education System, (Hong Kong: Government Secretariat, 1981), chap.
4-
20. Education Commission, Report No. j, chap. 3, esp. 32-34.
21. B.K.Y. T'sou, "Language Issues in Hong Kong," paper presented at the International
Conference on Cultural Tradition and C^ontemporary Education, Chinese University ot
Hong Kong, 1988.
22. Beginning in Spring 1990, statistics of migration from Hong Kong to Canada are
presented in each issue ofthe Canada and Hong Kong Update, ed. and pub. by the Canada
and Hong Kong Research Project, Joint Centre for Asia i'acific Studies, York
University-University ofToronto.
Crises and Transformation: the Implications of 1997 for
Christian Organizations in Hong Kong
Thomas In-sing Leung
Hong Kong's Socio-Political System
Since Hong Kong is a British colony, the ultimate power and sovereignty
over Hong Kong resides with the British government whose policy for
administering its colonies has been to rule on an "as-needed" basis.'
Although the Hong Kong government possesses considerable autonomy
in most policy matters, its sphere of authority is still that of a regional
government with the fmal power of legislation being retained by the
British parUament. Hong Kong has no constitution ofits own but is ruled
according to two documents, the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions,
enacted in 1917." These bills define the power of the Governor, the
Executive Council (Exco) and the Legislative Council (Legco). The bills
come under the category of prerogative legislation through which the
British government can annul laws passed in Hong Kong^ and the gover-
nor is given the power to dissolve the Legislative Council.^
Through this political structure, the Hong Kong government's
authority has been strictly limited. Moreover, there has been no partici-
pation by the people of Hong Kong in the executive or legislative
process. Before 1985 all members in the two councils were appointed by
the governor. As the government absorbed the political power ofHongKong's elite into its administrative structure, the basic political model of
the territory has been aptly labelled by one analyst as "administrative
absorption ofpolitics."^ The government and its policies for social devel-
opment have been based, not on the mass consensus of the community
but on the decision making ofa limited elite group. Political integration
involves discussion with the elite and the absorption ot their opinions
into the decision-making process.
This elite consists of key representatives of wealthy commercial and
professional groups. In this sense, the government runs Hong Kong as if
it were a big commercial institution, and the board members, as it were,
make all the decisions. They have all the executive power and imple-
ment their policies through a large bureaucratic system. The general
philosophy behind the administration is a kind of "positive non-inter-
ventionism," based on the values ofand benefits to the elite. The admin-
istration avoids intervening in economic development.
62
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Ciises and Transformation 63
The essence of Hong Kong politics, at least prior to the limited
democratization introduced in 1985, is a system of freedom without
democracy. Hong Kong people have freedom and opportunities to
develop their living standard but limited participation ni the power
structure. "Submissive individualism" has become the dominant ideol-
ogy ofthe Hong Kong people. Abandoning the quest for political partic-
ipation, most people make use ofthe legally-protected freedom to strive
for private and individual success. This is a form ofindividualism which
submits to the political authorities who, in turn, respect certain human
rights and provide room for economic freedom.
Given this background, the function ofthe religious community has
been Hmited to fulfilling individual spiritual needs rather than fighting
collectively for a more just society. Hong Kong people enjoy religious
freedom. The nature of this freedom has been summarized by the
Manifesto of the Protestant Churches in Hong Kong on ReUgious Freedom,
drawn up by Protestant church leaders in the early 1980s. Hong Kong
people's religious rights include the freedom to choose and propagate
religious belief, including to one's children; to assemble for religious
purposes, including in public facilities; to run such facilities as schools,
social welfare agencies, seminaries, and cemeteries; and to associate
freely with religious believers worldwide.
'
Since the government puts few limitations upon reHgious communi-
ties, they have tended to support the political system. It could be said that
the role ofreHgion in Hong Kong has also been a kind of "positive non-
interventionism." Most religious bodies have not intervened in the
political structure, nor have they encouraged people to participate in
politics or criticize the established system. Moreover, many reHgious
communities have fulfilled only a marginal service function; they have
existed only to fulfil the spiritual needs ofthe people.
1997 and the Self-Transformarion of the Role of Religion
In the early 1980s Hong Kong society was challenged by the 1997 issue.
When then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Ghma in
1982, the Beijing government demanded that Hong Kong be returned
to China in 1997. After two years ofnegotiations, the British and Chinese
governments signed an agreement known as the "Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Future ofHong Kong." The accord affirmed that the
colony would be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997- Chinese
authorities promised in the agreement that after its return. Hong Kong
would retain a "high degree of autonomy," and "Hong Kong people"
64 Politics mid Society in Hotn^ Ktwsj Towards iggj
were to rule and retain a capitalist system for at least fifty years. A mini-
constitution embodying these principles and spelling out the post-1997
legal and political structure ofthe territory, "The Basic Law ofthe HongKong Special Administrative Region," was drawn up by a committee
convened by the Chinese government and composed ofrepresentatives
ofHong Kong and China.
This sequence ot events forced people to begin to rely on themselves
to shape their future since they could no longer depend on the British.
The Christian communities at that time were quite responsive, and some
of their leaders assumed a sense of responsibihty for Hong Kong. The
churches would no longer be marginal social institutions but would take
an active role in creating the future. This was not an overnight awaken-
ing of the churches as the Christian community had already become
involved in social issues in the late 1970s. For example, the magazine
Breakthrough, a fundamentalist Christian magazine with wide secular
appeal, began to discuss sensitive social issues after it was founded in
1975. Also, the liberal Christian Industrial Committee had worked for a
decade with factory workers to further their rights.
An early expression ofProtestant Christian social concern occurred in
November 1980 when the Hong Kong Council ofChurches organized
a conference called, "The Mission of the Hong Kong Churches in the
80s." With 120 representatives from mainstream churches, they
discussed five main issues: i) evangelization oflower-income people; 2)
evangelization ofstudents; 3) concern for Christians in China; 4) partic-
ipation in public policy; and 5) influencing the attitudes ofcitizens.
Toward the end of the conference, the two public bus companies in
Hong Kong announced a fare increase of 100 per cent. Since the major-
ity ofthe population relied on public transport, this increase was likely to
adversely affect working people. As an expression ofconcern for lower
income families, some pastors started public demonstrations against the
fare increase. These actions received a positive response from the secular
world. More than three hundred groups, religious and non-rehgious,
formed a "Joint Council to Oppose the Raising of Fares on the TwoPublic Bus Systems." From that time some Christian communities have
taken a more active and critical stance on social issues.
From these pioneering actions, some Christian leaders moved to face
the challenge of1997. In the year 1983-1984, three important documents
were drawn up: i ) "The Creed ofHong Kong Christians in the Heart of
Present Socio-PoHtical Transformation;" 2) The Manifesto ofthe Protestant
Churches in Hong Kong on ReUgious Freedom; and 3) the "Opinion Paper
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Ciises aiid TnvisforDiaiioii 65
on the Future ofHong Kong."'^
In September 1984, twenty-one Christian leaders were invited by the
Chinese government to visit Beijing. They took with them an opinion
paper which discussed not only religious issues but also proclaimed the
solidarity of Christians with Hong Kong people as a whole. The paper
maintained that a trustworthy government is one which is directly
responsible to its citizens, with a separation of legislative and executive
powers. Further, Hong Kong people should have the right to participate
in the drafting ot the Basic Law, insuring that it affirms the dignity and
rights ot the non-elite. Freedom of travel, holistic social welfare, bilin-
gualism and moral education should all be guaranteed in post- 1997 HongKong. Finally, in order to equip the people to take up the responsibility
implied in the Chinese government's own slogan, "Hong Kong people
ruHng Hong Kong," the opinion paper insisted that a democratic system
should be promoted in the territory prior to the hand-over date.
hi discussing the concerns ofthe churches, the opinion paper stressed
that freedom ofthought and belief, and indeed freedom in all areas oflife,
had to be protected after 1997. Christian educational and social services,
as well as the freedom to maintain relationships with churches from all
over the globe, should continue to receive government support and
sponsorship, as under the colonial administration.
Underlying the opinion paper was a view ofthe Christian community
as an integral, deeply rooted part ofHong Kong society. Christian lead-
ers were not merely concerned tor their own religious freedom but also
with the whole development of the region. They demanded a more
open and democratic society so that people could participate meaning-
fully in the government and protect their rights.
As demonstrated by the three documents, the Christian community
was developing a more participatory model and was starting to cooper-
ate with the middle class democratic lobby that was seeking to influence
the future of Hong Kong. One reason for this transformation was that
Christians had developed their own identity and character. Most of the
Protestant Christian population are middle class people who share the
anxieties of their peers.'" Unable to participate in or have any intiucnce
over the processes ofgovernment, they have no way to control their ownfate. When Hong Kong is transferred to the authoritarian Communist
government, the middle class stands to gain little but risks losing its intel-
lectual freedom and its property. The only protection for them would be
the right to participate in the system. Under the British colonial govern-
ment which respects the rule of law, most middle class people feel safe
66 Polilicf and Socicly in Hmn; Kon^ Towards iggj
even though they cannot participate in their own government.
However, there are no guarantees that the Communist government will
allow itselfto be subject to a legal system. In the eyes ofthe very anxious
middle class, only a more democratic political structure can protect the
rights .\]m\ autonomy ofthe people.
An important difference between Christian and normal middle class
aspirations is that the Christians believe demanding democracy is a way
to implement Biblical principles ofjustice. Democracy is not only for
their own benefit but also for the good of the poor. With this in mind,
the Christians ofHong Kong have become increasingly vocal in calling
for a more democratic and just future.
Struggling for Democracy During the Basic Law Drafting
Process
In anticipation of the gixnit transition of 1997, the Hong Kong govern-
ment in 1984 proposed a reform of the Hong Kong political system and
released a "Green Paper" on the future development of representative
government. Direct elections to the Legislative Council on a regional
basis was one option discussed in this paper. As an initial step forward, in
1985 the government introduced a proportion of indirectly elected
members into Legco. Prior to 1985 Legco was made up of only
appointed members. Thus, in 1985 twenty-four out ofthe fifty-six were
indirectly elected. Perhaps the government hoped to create a check on
the power ot the future executive branch ot the government by making
Legco more powerful and more representative.
In the same period, the Chinese government formed a 52-member
committee to dratt the Basic Law to govern Hong Kong after 1997.
China appointed twenty-five people whom it believed to be representa-
tive of different social groups. Among the twenty-five was one leader
representing religious interests, the Anglican Bishop ofHong Kong and
Macau, Peter Kwong. Members from China made up the rest of the
committee. It appeared that as far as religious freedom itself was
concerned, the Basic Law would be acceptable.
The major controversy ofthe 1987-1988 period was not the drafting
of the Basic Law but whether or not Hong Kong should introduce
directly elected members to Legco in 1988. In May 1987 the Hong Konggovernment released a "Green Paper," entitled The i987 Reuiew of
Dci'clopifjcnts ill Rcprcsciitatiue Government, and called for the public to
submit proposals. The Chinese government soon showed that it was not
pleased with the idea ofdirect elections in 1988 because it feared that the
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Crises and Transformation 67
development ofa democratic system in Hong Kong before the Basic Lawwas drafted and promulgated would force China to accept a democratic
system in the territory after 1997. However, middle class people were
excited by the new hopes tor democracy raised by discussions of direct
elections in the following year. They actively joined in discussing and
supporting direct elections in 1988.
Faced with the opportunity to create a democratic system in HongKong, the Christian communities were mobilized again. A group of
Christian professionals and intellectuals founded an organization called
"Christian Sentinels for Hong Kong" and wrote a series of articles in
newspapers to promote direct elections and comment on the Basic
Law.'" In 1987 many evangelical pastors and Christian leaders signed a
declaration urging all Christians to support direct elections in 1988. Both
Catholics and Protestants held interdenominational mass gatherings to
support these elections, which demonstrated the response of grass roots
as well as middle class Christians to the new political situation.'
This activism was contrasted with the position of the institutional
churches. The leaders ofsome mainline denominations had developed
close relationships with China. For the sake of ensuring the survival of
their institutions after 1997, their attitude towards direct elections in
1988 was conservative and low-profile. Whether theologically liberal or
evangehcal, the institutional churches tended to be alooffrom political
issues, preferring silence and inaction. However, parachurch organiza-
tions and Christian lay people were very active in the democracy move-
ment. The Christian communities were split, not according to theology
but by political attitude.
Under great pressure from China, the Hong Kong government
allowed only indirect elections to Legco in 1988 and a small proportion
of directly elected members in 1991.'"' After this decision was
announced, the focus ofattention on the democratization ot Hong Kongshifted to the drafting ofthe Basic Law.
In August 1988, after the first draft of the Basic Law was released tor
discussion, a position paper was drawn up by many C^hristian leaders,
entitled "Position Paper ofHong Kong Protestant C^hurch Workers on
the Draft Basic Law." This document not only discussed religious issues
but also proclaimed that the church had contributed to the overall social
development of the community. With their previous experience of
participating in the forefront ofsocial development, the Christian work-
ers summarized their political beliets in five pcMiits:
i) An open political svstcm whicli allows participation is the condi-
68 Politics and Society in Hoii<i Konij Towards iggj
tion for Hong Kong's advancement.
2) People, as the greatest resource for social development, need to be
respected and trusted.
3) Instead ofjust the interests ofparticular sectors or social strata being
protected, all the interests of all the different social groups should be
protected.
4) The political system must have built-in checks and balances.
5) Human rights must be protected.
Based on these beliefs, the position paper demanded the protection of
the various rights, duties, and freedoms of Hong Kong's people in the
Basic Law. It recommended that all the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applicable to Hong Kong be
guaranteed in a legally effective way in the Special Administrative
Region after 1997. After commenting extensively on the articles of the
Draft Basic Law, Christian leaders called for an open political system and
stronger checks and balances in the post- 1997 political structure.
This overt promotion of direct elections by Hong Kong Chnstians
apparently threatened the Chinese government. While both Protestant
and CathoHc leaders were promoting these ideas among the approxi-
mately 500,000 church-goers in the territory, the Chinese Communist
authorities gave a warning signal through articles in newspapers signed
by Xin Weisi. "Xin Weisi" is the pen name used by a writer or writers
who comment on the Hong Kong situation from the perspective ofthe
Chinese Communist Party^
The articles of Xin Weisi are interpreted as an unofficial Chinese
attempt to influence opinion in Hong Kong. Although China has
promised to develop a political system in accordance with the will ofthe
people ofHong Kong, the Chinese government also wishes to commu-
nicate what opinions are most appreciated. Thus, in the writings ofXin
Weisi the views of China's leaders can be expressed in a pubhc way but
not by the Chinese government. The government can then adopt these
same opinions and claim to the world that these views are from Hong
Kong and that China is listening.
Articles by Xin Weisi are printed in the influential Hong Kong daily,
Ming Pao. Claiming to represent China's official views in an unofficial
way, these articles criticized the whole democratic movement and the
idea of direct elections in 1988.''' On 5 December 1986, Xin pubHshed
an article entitled "Jibenfa yu zongjiao ziyou ("The Basic Law and
Rehgious Freedom"), ^^ in which he described how some Christian
organizations had recently participated in social issues in the name ofthe
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Ciiscs aud Trmisformation 69
church, with the result of a pohticized church. He maintained that cler-
ical professionals were using religious meetings to promote their ownpolitical views and had moved beyond the sphere of religious activities.
Advocating the principle of separation of church and state, the article
discouraged Christians from participation in shaping the future ofHongKong. Xin claimed that the expression of political views by religious
personnel could bring no advantage and might even bring unpleasant
consequences.
This article provoked criticism from both religious and secular writ-
ers. The major objection raised was that Xin had confused the meaning
of the "separation of church and state" with the "separation of religion
and politics." He used the Chinese terms zheng, which can mean "the
state" or "politics," ^ndjiao, which can mean "church" or "religion."
Shifting back and forth between the different meanings of the Chinese
terms, he advocated the idea that religious people should not participate
in political activities.
Under fire from religious groups, Xin wrote a second article in
February 1987, clearly stating that neither the church, its institutions, nor
religious professionals (clergy, parachurch workers, etc.) ought to partic-
ipate in political activities or express opinions on political matters.'^ Hewarned that participation by the church in politics would bring inter-
vention from the Chinese government.
These two articles mdicated that the Chinese government felt threat-
ened by the political activities of the Hong Kong Christians. Chinese
authorities used this veiled method to warn the churches and demand
they stick to fulfilling their traditional functions under the model ofposi-
tive non-interventionism—or in Marxist terms, the function ofopiate of
the people. However, this warning served only to challenge Christians to
further political involvement. Beijing's attempt to limit religious free-
dom in Hong Kong, even before the territory came under Chinese
sovereignty, was unprecedented. It spurred Christians to struggle even
more ardently for greater protection of Hong Kong's political system
after 1997.
All these activities indicated the transformation of the role of
Christianity in Hong Kong. Reflecting deeply on their social role,
Christian groups were not satisfied with the marginal function of
conducting Sunday services and social events. They wanted to partici-
pate in the process ofshaping the destiny ofHong Kong, hi theological
terms, such groups moved towards a prophetic role, histead of taking a
"back seat" on social questions, they wanted to "stand up front" to help
70 Politics tvid Society in I loin; Komi I'on'ards iggj
guide society forward. Although the institutional churches, for the sake
of survival after 1997, still wanted to stay alooffrom social and political
issues, a significant proportion ofHong Kong Christians wished to take
a more active stand on these important issues. Some community
churches, in which the pastor is also a social worker, have been set up
among the poor in housing estates and squatter areas where they can
better serve and mobilize local people. The advantage ofthis community
church model is that it is rooted in the masses and that ifthe institutional
churches were ever eliminated by political authorities, churches could
still survive among the people.'" Many fellowships among different
groups of people have been set up, such as for actors, lawyers, Central
District office workers, basketball players and others.
Thus, in response to the challenge of 1997, Christians have sought to
root their faith beyond the institutional church. Some socially and polit-
ically active Christians have separated from the Hong Kong Christian
Council, which has become more institutionalized and has retreated
from involvement in issues of social concern. They have formed a new
organization called the Hong Kong Christian Institute to encourage
like-minded Christians to participate in the concerns and sufferings of
Hong Kong's people.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre and its Impact on HongKongOn IS April 1989, the pro-reform, former General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Yaobang, died in Beijing. Hu had
been deposed for failing to take a tough stand against student demonstra-
tions in late 1986. After his death, students gathered in Tiananmen
Square in memory ofhim and in criticism ofthe conservative old leaders
ofChina who had forced him to step down in 1987.
On April 26 the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, the
People's Daily, published a commentary condemning the student
demonstrations as counter-revolutionary. In response, more than 2,000
joined in a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square to demand a retraction of
this judgment and a fair evaluation of their motives. Millions of people
joined in street marches in their support. People demanded the resigna-
tion ofthe old leaders and political reform. On May 20 the angry Premier
of the State Council, Li Peng, declared martial law in the capital, and
hundreds of thousands of troops began to move towards Beijing. The
whole Chinese nation, including Hong Kong, was shaken.
The Hong Kong Christian Institute and eight other Christian organi-
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Ciiscs Mid Traiisfontiiitioii 71
zations published a declaration supporting the Beijing students and call-
ing on the Chinese government to respect freedom of speech. It also
called on Hong Kong Christians to pray for China. On May 20, the day
of the declaration of martial law, fifteen Christian organizations formed
a "Council of Hong Kong Christians in Support of the Chinese
Democracy Movement," later called the "Hong Kong Christian
Patriotic Democratic Movement." It organized almost thirty thousand
Christians tojoin in the historic protest march ofmore than one million
people in Hong Kong on May 21. Around this time many declarations
supporting the students and condemning the Chinese government's
declaration of martial law were published by different Christian groups,
fellowships, and individuals. Thousands ofChristians gathered in various
districts to pray for China.
In the night ofjune 3-4, the Chinese People's Liberation Army, using
tanks and machine guns, broke through the non-violent protective lines
of people. The massacre came as a great blow to Hong Kong people.
Once again, over a million people took to the streets to protest against the
brutahty of the Chinese government. The Hong Kong Christians in
Support ofthe Chinese Democratic Movement and the Catholics were
actively involved in demonstrating. On June 5 they organized a funeral
procession for the dead in Beijing which was attended by over ten thou-
sand Protestant and Catholic Christians. Hundreds of individual
Christians, as well as organizations, published declarations condemning
the massacre and further persecutions in China. However, the aged lead-
ers ofChina remained, and remain, firmly on their thrones.
Hong Kong people were so disillusioned by these events that any
hope and trust they had in the Chinese government were shattered.
They saw that the true face of the Chinese government was no better
than the repressive Stalinist/Maoist regime of the Cultural Revolution
era. Since 1978 the whole reform movement under Deng Xiaoping had
not brought any substantial improvement in the rights and dignity ofthe
people. The tragic realization was that Hong Kong would come under
the control of this same government after 1997.
In order to restore the confidence ot tiic people of Hong Kong, some
C'hristian leaders joined forces with other pro-democracy groups to
promote a "Hong Kc^ng people saving Hong Kong" campaign. They
urged the British government to grant the right ofabode in the United
Kingdom to Hong Kong citizens, so that the people of Hong Kongcould establish a safety net with the support ofthe international commu-nity. The outcome ofthis effort was the agreement ofthe British govern-
72 I\^lilics ami .SooVfy /// I loin> Koin^ 'Ihwiirds iggy
iiiciit to issue full UK passports to only 50,000 elite households, in order
to keep key professionals in the territory until 1997. The British were not
prepared to assume responsibility for proteeting the future of the Hong
Kong people as a whole. After this disappointment, the people ofHong
Kong turned their attention and their hopes towards ensuring that their
human rights would be adequately protected in the Basic Law.
The Final Draft of the Basic LawThe final version of the Basic Law was passed by the National People's
Congress (China's parHament) in April 1990.''^ As expected, the conser-
vative leaders of China allowed only a limited proportion of directly
elected representatives to Legco. According to the provisions of the
Basic Law, only twenty out of sixty Legco members will be directly
elected by 1997. The proportion will be increased to twenty-four (40%)
in 1999 and thirty seats (50%) in 2003 . This slow pace ofdemocratization
was received coldly by the general public.
Since the support ofthe people ofHong Kong for the Chinese demo-
cratic movement had threatened Beijing authorities, a clause forbidding
any "subversive activities" in Hong Kong was added to the final draft of
the Basic Law. This was intended to discourage any pro-democracy
actions in Hong Kong by threatening legal prosecution against such
activists.
In response to the spirit of the Basic Law, the reform process of the
Hong Kong pohtical system slowed down. While the government
announced that the number of directly elected seats in 1991 would be
increased from ten to eighteen, it also made clear that there would be no
further change until 1997. Eight additional elected seats were not very
encouraging to many Hong Kong people since the government would
not challenge the Chinese decree that only one third of the legislature
would be directly elected in 1997. After the internal crisis caused by the
Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese were even more determined
to avoid a participatory and representative pohtical model for Hong
Kong. The British preferred the old colonial style of appointing a few
ehte "yes-men" into the government and running Hong Kong as if it
were a company with a board ofdirectors.
On 9 February 1990, sixteen Protestant and ten Catholic groups
published a joint declaration urging the Hong Kong representatives on
the Basic Law Drafting Committee to take a stand for the democratic
rights of Hong Kong people. As a "last-ditch" effort, these groups
exhorted representatives to vote against the Basic Law if the final draft
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Crises and Transforination 73
were not democratic. However, the final version of the Basic Lawretained its conservative wording and allowed only a limited degree of
democracy under the shadow ofChina.
The Struggles of 1 990The only encouraging experience for Hong Kong people in recent years
has been the great changes in Eastern Europe. In order to boost the
morale of Christians in Hong Kong, the Christian Patriotic and
Democratic Movement, founded in the wake of the Tiananmen
massacre on 24June 1989, has organized many prayer meetings and semi-
nars on this issue. A fourteen-member delegation including pastors,
Christian leaders, and theologians was sent to visit Poland and
Czechoslovakia in September 1990. They shared experiences with the
churches and encouraged each other to hope for a promising future.
Some church leaders from Eastern Europe were also invited to come to
Hong Kong and give seminars about their struggles. By introducing their
church model, they showed Hong Kong Christians ways in which the
church could survive under a communist government. They also
encouraged Hong Kong Christians by sharing their experiences of
reform in Eastern European countries through Christian faith and
hope.-"
After the June 4 massacre, Hong Kong people urged their govern-
ment to introduce a Bill of Rights into the Hong Kong legal system
before 1997. Most Christians supported this demand. The colonial legal
system still contains many laws which could be a threat to human rights.
While the Hong Kong government has not used these laws in violation
ofhuman rights, there would be no guarantee that the new government
would not use these laws, ifthey remained in place after 1997, to suppress
dissenting voices. Only a Bill ofRights that had legal priority over other
laws could safeguard the human rights of Hong Kong's people in the
future. In response to the urging ofthe Hong Kong public, the govern-
ment published the draft Bill of Rights on 16 March 1990, which
covered basic human rights as laid out in "The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights." The final version was passed injune 199 1
.
However, China has publicly declared that this Bill cannot have prece-
dence over the Basic Law. Christians in Hong Kong, as part ot the inter-
national church community, have asked Christians in other countries to
watch and help safeguard the implementation of the new Bill ot Rights.
In May 1989 the Catholic Church published a plan for its develop-
ment over the next ten years."' The focus of the document is "harmony,"
74 Politics and Society iti Hoii^ Koiij^ iowdnis iggj
in contrast with the confrontation and separation experienced by the
people ofHong Kong and China in the past. Furthermore, it stressed that
the differences ofothers must be accepted, in keeping with the Church's
poHcy of accommodation with China. Through dialogue, both sides
should respect each other. Facing the possibility of pressure from the
future Communist government, the Catholic Church also emphasized
setting up small communities as part of its strategy for survival. Since a
large institutionalized church is more easily controlled or persecuted by
a political power than a "grass roots" based church, in small communi-
ties the believers can keep the faith even under government pressure.
With the increase in disillusionment and frustration about the situa-
tion in China, the number of Hong Kong people emigrating abroad
surged to an alarmmgly high total of 62,000 in 1990."" Since many of
them appHed to emigrate after the Tiananmen massacre, continuing high
rates of emigration are expected until 1997. Faced with this crisis in
confidence, the Hong Kong Christian Council launched the "We Love
Hong Kong" campaign beginning in 199 1. As stated in the campaign
proposal, it aims "to redirect attention from those who are leaving Hong
Kong to those who are staying behind. . . . We must take responsibility for
our city now and in the future.... The purpose of the campaign is to
appreciate and celebrate the industrious character of our people and to
encourage them to carry on."
The "We Love Hong Kong" campaign seems to be a new direction
towards which the Christian community is struggling after all the
discouraging experiences oi^ 1989 and 1990. Instead of focusing on
matters in China which the people of Hong Kong have no power to
affect. Christians are putting their effort into Hong Kong. As Hong
Kong people lose their hope for a promising future, many Christians
believe religion is the one dimension ofhuman culture most able to bring
hope to people living under great difficulties. While the Hong Kong
Christian Council was planning its "We Love Hong Kong" campaign,
the BiDy Graham Crusade ofNovember 1990 resulted in the conversion
to Christianity ofmore than 20,000 people.
hi facing 1997, the direction for Hong Kong Christian communities
IS perhaps best summed up by the Reverend Kwok Nai-wong, director
of the Hong Kong Christian Institute. He concluded that creating a
democratic culture is a difficult task: "Only such a culture can recreate
the value and dignity of every person, can reaffirm that the citizens are
the centres, not the periphery, of any society." The church should
"enable those who must stay in Hong Kong to speak up and fight for a
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Criscs and Tninsforiuatioii 75
fairer arrangement for their future. The church must seek ways to
actively support the democratic movement and all efforts to create a
democratic culture in Hong Kong."'"' This ami wraps up the past strug-
gles and opens up a new horizon for religious communities in HongKong.
The Sunset of Religious Freedom in Hong KongArticle 141 ofthe Basic Law, the post- 1997 constitution ofHong Kong,
states that religious freedom shall not be restricted. It says:
The Government ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
not restrict the freedom of religious organizations or restrict religious
activities which do not contravene the laws of the Region. Religious
organizations shall, in accordance with the law, enjoy the rights to
acquire, use, dispose ofand inherit property and the right to receive finan-
cial assistance. Their previous property rights and interests shall be main-
tained and protected. Religious organizations may, according to their
previous practice, continue to run seminaries and other schools, hospitals
and welfare institutions and to provide other social services. Religious
organizations and believers in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region may maintain and develop their relations with religious organiza-
tions and believers elsewhere."
This is a well-drafted article. However, the lack ofconfidence among
Hong Kong people comes from the fact that it may only be a well-drafted
piece of paper. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China is
also well-drafted, but since 1949 the law in China has been interpreted
according to the whims ofthose who controlled the government. As far
as the Basic Law is concerned, article 158 states that, "the power ofinter-
pretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress [npc].""'' Since the people of Hong Kong
have no final authority to interpret the Basic Law, its guarantee of relig-
ious freedom may turn out to be worth no more than the paper it is writ-
ten on.
Concerning religious freedom, a much more sensitive issue is that
such rights within China itself are far more restricted than in the Basic
Law. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (I'Rc;) states
that, "The people of the People's Republic of China enjoy religious
freedom." However, it also says, "No one is permitted in the name of
religion to damage the social order, harm the health of the people or
obstruct the national educatic^ial system. Religious bodies and religious
76 Politics and Society in Honi> Koii^^ I'owards iggy
affairs arc not to be controlled by foreign forces.""^' Religious freedom is
restricted in the sense that the healing ministry and any promotion ofthe
religious world view that challenges the atheistic educational system is
not allowed. Moreover, the phrase about damaging the social order is
open to interpretation, giving room for the intervention of the state in
religious matters. Hong Kong religious communities are worried that
after 1997, with the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the
new government may not respect Article 41 of the Basic Law or will
eventually apply the more restrictive provisions ofArticle 36 ofthe PRC
Constitution.
Furthermore, in contrast to the Hong Kong Basic Law, which has no
"religious poHcy," China does have a religious policy which defines free-
dom of religion in a restrictive way. The major post-Mao statement of
this pohcy, released in 1982, states, "Any rehgious organization or
believer should not evangelize, preach and advocate theism, nor spread
religious hterature and books, the publication of which has not been
permitted by the government.""'' Also in 1982, an internal document
concerning the administration of Christianity stated, "the concretizing
of religious poHcy should not be misunderstood as support for rehgion;
on the contrary, it is to weaken religion.""** In 1986 an article on the
Party's religious policy, published by the official magazine Hongqi (Red
Flag), stated that "normal" rehgious activities are protected by law while
"abnormal" rehgious activities are to be limited or halted. "The basic
point ofall the rules," said the author, "is to hmit all religious activities to
recognized places of religious activity.""'-' AH these stipulations of either
law or policy which limit rehgious freedom in China raise valid concerns
for the religious freedom ofthe people ofHong Kong after 1997.
Even more worries were created in 1988 when the Guangdong
Provincial People's Government published the "Guangdong Province
Regulations on the Administrative Supervision of Places of Rehgious
Activity. "'° This law set many limits to religious activities. Religious
personnel are only allowed to operate in designated places of religious
activity or under certain conditions in cemeteries, crematoriums, hospi-
tals, and believers' homes (clauses 23 and 24). The content ofall rehgious
training must be registered with and approved by the religious affairs
authorities of the government (clause 7). Only approved rehgious
personnel are permitted to conduct religious activities such as expound-
ing scriptures or preaching (clauses 9 and 25). All donations from foreign
believers must be approved by the government (clause 30). From this
provincial code, it is clear that "rehgious fireedom" in China apphes only
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Crisi's and Transformation 77
to religious activities conducted by approved workers in limited places.
All ofthese examples ofChinese religious policy and provincial relig-
ious laws have heightened sensitivities in Hong Kong over whether
these policies will have an adverse effect in the territory after 1997. HongKong religious communities are worried about the possible intervention
by the post-1997 government in the religious freedom ofHong Kong.
Their concerns can be summarized under two headings: constitutional
intervention and administrative intervention.
i) Constitutional Intervention: Although Article 141 of the Basic
Law is weU-drafted, the interpretation of the Law Hes with the npc
Standing Committee. Some terms in the Basic Law, such as "religious
freedom," are understood differently in China and Hong Kong. For
Hong Kong people, religious autonomy means total freedom, unlimited
by any religious "policy" or administrative code. However, the Chinese
official understanding of religious freedom is limited to certain places,
times and workers. Outside ofthese, there is no freedom at all. It is quite
possible after 1997 that the Chinese government wiU choose to defme
the religious liberty stipulated in the Hong Kong Basic Law in terms of
normal Chinese understanding and practice. Vesting the power ofinter-
pretation of the Basic Law in the npc Standing Committee opens the
door for constitutional intervention by China m Hong Kong's religious
freedom.
2) Administrative Intervention: In China, religious freedom is
limited to those within the spiritual community. For any outside relig-
ious activity', the community must apply for permission and go through
an administrative procedure. It is easy for a secular government to use
administrative procedures to interfere with religious freedom. In HongKong many religious activities are held in public places and currently
need the approval ofthe Urban Council for rental of facilities. Who can
guarantee that the government after 1997 will continue to permit the use
ofpublic facilities and venues for religious activities? In fact, one case of
administrative intervention by the present Hong Kong government
actually occurred in 1990. The Hong Kong Christian Patriotic
Democratic Movement applied to use a public stadium for a mass meet-
ing in order to pray for the future ofChina and support pro-democracy
political prisoners arrested in 1989. According to Christian worker
Helena Wong,"" the Urban Council dared not approve the rec]uest and
asked for the opinion ofthe ChiefSecretary, the top bureaucrat in HongKong. Because of the sensitivity of the political issue and possible pres-
sure from China, the Urban Council eventually did not approve the
78 Politics ami Sociiiy in I loin; Kiiin> Towards iggj
application. Though a Christian organization may in theory be entitled
to preach anci to educate religious believers, it may, through administra-
tive measures, be denied access to venues suitable for these activities.
This incident appears to foreshadow anticipated administrative inter-
vention after 1997.
Conclusion
As Hong Kong is the sixth largest trading entity and one ot the most
important financial centres in the world, its continued existence and
prosperity are ofglobal importance. However, Hong Kong cannot pros-
per ifattention is paid only to its economic development. The economy
cannot be isolated from such factors as cultural diversity, political stabil-
ity, and the availability ot human resources. Only the protection offree-
dom in Hong Kong can provide the right conditions for the region's
continued development, and such freedom can only be protected by a
democratic system. In its forty years ofcommunist rule, China has had a
very poor record compared with democratic countries. At the same
time, the Basic Law does not promise a democratic future for HongKong though it does indicate that certain freedoms will be legally
protected. In the absence ofpopular participation in the political system,
no one can guarantee that these freedoms will not be impinged upon.
The safeguarding ofreligious freedom will be one measure ofrespect for
the Basic Law and the future ofHong Kong.
Notes
1. See P.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).
2. In the Liiu's of Hoiig Konii (Hong Kong: Government Pnnter), vol. 28. Analyses ofthese
laws can be found in P. Wesley-Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Lei Jingchuan, "Xianggang de
zhongyang zhengzhi ji qi tezhi" ("Hong Kong's Central Political System and its
Character") in Guoduqi dc Xianggang (Hong Kong in Transition), ed. Zheng Yushuo (Hong
Kong: Joint Pubhshing, 1989), pp. 19-37.
3. Letters Patetit. Clause vii.
4. This clause was added in 1985; see Royal Instructions, Clause xxvilia.
5. Ambrose Y.C. King, "Administrative Absorption ofPohtics in Hong Kong: Emphasis
on the Grass Roots Level," Asian Survey 1 5 (May 1975): 422-439; also idem, "Xingzheng
xma zhengzhi: Xianggang de zhengzhi moshi" ("Administrative Absorption of Politics:
Hong Kong's Political Model"), in Xiang(iatig ::hi fazhan jingyan (Hong Kotig's Experience
of Development), eds. Ambrose Y.C. King and Hsing Mu-huan (Hong Kong: Chinese
THOMAS i.s. LEUNG: Crises and Transfonnation 79
University Press, 1986), pp.3- 19.
6. The manifesto was included as appendix 2 of the "Opinion Paper on the Future o(
Hong Kong," carried by the Christian leaders to Bcijmg m 1984.
7. Breakthrouf^h was founded by Ms. So Yuen-pei and Dr. Philemon Choi in 1975. Ms. So
was a well-known Christian writer who died in 198 1 . Dr. Choi is a medical doctor whogave up his profession in order to become a full-time Christian worker. For many HongKong fundamentalist Christians today, Dr.Choi is now the most respected spiritual and
socio-political leader.
8. 1 was myselfinvolved in some ofthese issues. For a briefhistory ofthese activities, see
Jiang Dawei, "Bashi-niandaijiaohui lianhe guanshe xingdong pingyi" ("An Evaluation
ofthe United Social Concern Activities ofthe Churches in the 1980s"), Si {Thought), no.
I (April 1989): 7-10.
9. These three documents were included as appendices of the "Opinion Paper on the
Future ofHong Kong."
10. According to a 1990 sample survey, 45% ofChristians in four different churches were
preparing for or considering emigration to other countries, mostly to Canada, Australia,
and Singapore. Since the qualifications for immigration to these countries favour white-
collar professionals and wealthy investors, the high rate ofimmigration from the church
shows that most Hong Kong Christians are middle class professional people or rich. See
"Analysis of the Results of the Questionnaire on the Future Direction of Hong KongChristians," Si (Thought), no. 10 (November-December 1990).
11. See the Hong Kong Government White Paper, The Development of Represetitatwe
Gouermnent: The Way Forward (Hong Kong, 1988), p. 6.
12. Most ofthe important articles ofthe "Christian Sentinels" are collected in Guodiiqi de
Xianggang: zhengzhi, jingji, shehui {Hong Kong in Transition: Politics, Economy, Society)
(Hong Kong: Shouwang Press, 1988).
13. For the historical development ofthis Christian movement, see In-sing Leung, "The
Socially Responsible Spint of Hong Kong Christians: An Analysis of Its History and
Present Actions," Pai Shing Semi-monthly 157 (December 1987): 46-47; see also Zeng
Chongrong, "The Split of Views in the Church on Social Concern Issues," Pai Shing
Semi-monthly ijj (October 1987): 13.
1 4. See The Development oj Representative (joirrnment, pp. 8-14.
15. Some of Xin's articles are collected in Xin Wcisi, Xin IVeisi zhenghin ji {Collected
Political Articles ofXin Weisi) (Hong Kong: MingPao Publishers, 1987).
16. Reprinted in ibid., pp. 89-94. An English translation of this article can be found in
China News and Church Report 868 (2 January' 1987).
17. In Xin, Collected Political Articles, pp. 1 21-133; summarized m English with commen-tary in C7n'»rt News and Church Report 878 (6 February 1987).
18. Some churches along these lines liave been established in C'hai Wan and other squat-
ter areas.
8o Politics ami Society in Hoitci Kon^ Towards iggj
19. The Basic luiw of llic ilotn; Kom^ Adiiiiiiistrativc Ret^ioii of the People's Republic of (Jliitta.
April, 1990.
20. Some papers presented in these seminars have been pubHshed in From Eastern Europe
to Hou<^ Konci'. '['he Communist Re(^ime and the Church (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Christian
Institute, 1990).
21. "Towards a Bright Decade: The Future Pastoral Responsibihties of the Cathohc
Church in the Hong Kong Region." It is in the form ofan open letter from the Catholic
Bishop ofHong Kong, John Baptist Cardinal Wu, published by the Church on May 14,
1989.
22. This figure is compared with 42,000 people in 1989.
23. Rev. Kwok Nai-wong, "Hong Kong: Realities and Proposals," speech given to the
delegation of the Basel Mission visitmg Hong Kong on 8 October 1990.
24. The Basic Law, An. 141.
25. Ibid., Art. 158.
26. The Constitution ofthe People's Republic of China, Art. 36.
27. Central Committee Document No. 19 (1982), "The Basic Policy ofOur Party on the
Rehgious Question in the Period of Socialism," in Zhonggong dui Jidujiao de zhengce
{Chinese Communist Policy Towards Christianity), ed. Zhao Tianen (Jonathan Chao)
(Taipei: China Evangelical Seminar^' Press, 1986).
28. "Summary of the Data Concerning Strengthening the Work of Admmistering
Christianity, " in ibid., pp. 451-54.
29. Jiang Ping, "Renzhen xuexi Makesi-zhuyi de zongjiao lilun he Dang de zongjiao
zhengce" ("Conscientiously Study Marxist Religious Theory and the Party's Rehgious
PoHcy"), Hongqi {Red Flag) 9 (May 1986).
30. This "Regulation" is published in Zhongguo yu Jiaohui {China and the Church) 67
(August-September 1988): 19-22.
31. Interview with Helena Wong, Hong Kong Christian Institute, Hong Kong, 10
December 1990. In addition to working for the Institute, Ms. Wong is a pro-democracy
activist in Hong Kong society. In June 1990 she was prosecuted by the Hong Konggovernment for: i) using a loud hailer in a public place without approval from the
Commissioner ofPolice, and 2) collecting donations in a public place without approval
from the Director of the Social Welfare Department.
Uncertain Refuge:Freedom of the Press Under the Hong Kong Bill of
Pjghts
by Perry Keller
Among the many industries which have flourished in Hong Kong since
the Second World War, the colony's commercial press has been particu-
larly fortunate. Hong Kong has served as an oasis ofvitality in a Chmese
publishing world blighted by the doctrinal rigidities ofthe PRC and, until
recently, Taiwan. It has also developed into a leading centre for regional
reporting and publication. The city's print media is especially diverse,
boasting fifty-five Chinese and five English language newspapers as well
as a wide selection ofmagazines and other periodicals. The latter include
respected international publications such as the Far Eastern Economic
Review and Asiaweek. Although many of these newspapers are no more
than newsheets specializing in business tips or horse racing and enter-
tainment gossip, there are at least a dozen Chinese and two major Enghsh
language dailies that offer full news coverage.
Radio broadcasting is divided between the public sector Radio
Television Hong Kong network, which operates both Chinese and
English language stations, and the private sector Commercial Radio
network which has three stations. The government is considering the
authorization of a third radio network. Two private companies, Asia
Television Limited and Hong Kong Television Broadcasts Ltd., operate
Chinese and English language television stations. Further competition in
the form of a satellite-based television network is also under develop-
ment. However, a government approved consortium, assembled to
introduce cable television, collapsed in disarray in 1990.'
The image ofvitality and diversity presented by the Hong Kong press,
however, does create a misleading impression that the media, particu-
larly the print media, is sustained by a local readership deeply committed
to a broad spectrum ofsocial and political opinion. While it is undeniable
that there are deeply held differences of public opinion in the territoiy,
outside factors have, in fict, played the major role in shaping the Hong
Kong press. One examination of these outside influences divides the
commercial print media into four general categories: the ultra-leftist
dailies which operate as press organs of the Chinese government; the
rightist and ultra-riizhtist dailies which are informally c^r formalK' linked
82 Politics ami Soiiciy in I loini Ko)n> Toii'tinis iggy
to the government in Taiwan; and the dominant centrist dailies wliich
are market oriented, advertising supported newspapers that have
attempted to stay neutral in Taiwan-PRC disputes." The existence of
papers that are allied to and often supported by the governments of the
PKC and Taiwan has helped to foster a Chinese language press which is
undoubtedly more prolific and diverse than might otherwise be
expected in the colony. International media corporations which control
leading pubhcations, such as the South Cliitia Morfiiii^^ Post 2Lnd Asian Wall
StreetJournal, have similarly played a major role in the development of
the important English language press. The choice ofHong Kong as abase
for regional reporting and publication has certainly boosted the terri-
tory's significance as an international press centre. However, this exter-
nal dimension also tends to obscure the weaknesses of the local press.
The vulnerability of the Chinese press that lies behind its robust
appearance can be seen m the self-censorship which the centrist Chinese
language dailies have reportedly begun to practise in the face ofBeijing's
virulent attacks on its press opponents in Hong Kong.^ This increase in
editorial self-censorship may foreshadow the Chinese government's
ability to stifle the critical spirit of the press after 1997. However, self-
censorship and political bias in reporting are certainly not new phenom-
ena in the centrist press. According to Chin-Chuan Lee, at least one
major centrist daily, Ming Pao, maintained a pro-Beijing story line
throughout the last decade."* Consequently, it is evident there is as muchconformit^^ to political pressure as there is apparent diversity of political
opinion in the Chinese language press. The left and right-wing dailies
have generally adhered to the views of Beijing and Taipei, while the
centre has sought to avoid political controversy. The EngHsh language
press has not been subject to the same degree ofpressure from Beijing'-''
Lacking comparable influence within the Chinese community, these
publications are seemingly not perceived by the Chinese government as
a significant internal threat. Nevertheless, with its external corporate ties
and international readership, this sector remains a potentially powerful
defender ofliberal interests in Hong Kong after 1997.
It is plain that the return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 presents an
enormous threat to the survival ofHong Kong's currently enjoyed press
freedoms. The Chinese government's antipathy towards liberal concepts
ofindividual rights and freedoms is well known. Comprehensive control
of the media is a well established feature ofChinese communist admin-
istration which dates back to the pre- 1949 communist controlled base
areas. In China today the publication of all newspapers, periodicals and
PERRY KELLER: Uncertain Refugee 83
books, as well as the broadcasting of radio and television, is not only
subject to multiple government regulator\' controls, but is also enmeshed
by the supervisory organs of the Communist Part\^ Despite periodic
moderations m the intensit\' ofcontrol, the priman,' function ot the press
throughout the Communist era has been to foster support for partv' and
state policies/' Confidence in China's commitments to the preservation
ofHong Kong's civil liberties after 1997 has virtually disappeared follow-
ing the suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989. The Chinese
leadership has shown that it is not only prepared to interpret its civil liber-
ties commitments in a restrictive manner, but is also prepared to disre-
gard those commitments when vital interests appear to be threatened.
Since June 1989 the Chinese government has also made known its
restrictive view offreedom ofthe press in Hong Kong, rejecting any crit-
icism, especially from the Chinese language press, that questions the
legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party rule or its major poHcies.
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, in late 1990 the Chinese
leadership approved a long term strateg}' to deal with the press in HongKong. This strategy divides press publications into four groups: the
Communist Party controlled press, the friendly centrist press, the pro-
Taiwan centrist press, and finally the opposition press, which is to be
"isolated and attacked."^
Following the Beijing massacre, the British and Hong Kong govern-
ments sought to stem the collapse of confidence in Hong Kong by
announcing major projects designed to bolster the colony's economic
and political systems. These included the massive new airport project
and, in the area of civil liberties, the incorporation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the iccpr) into Hong Kong law
in the form of a Bill ofRights.
The ICCPR, one of the two principal United Nations treaties setting
international human rights standards, was first applied to Hong Kong in
1976 when Britain ratified both treaties for itself and its dependent terri-
tories.'^ However, ratification had little effect on the Hong Kong legal
system. Without domestic legislation, Britain's acceptance of the iccpr
only amounted to a virtually unenforceable international obligation.
The protection ofcivil liberties in Hong Kong, including freedom of the
press, therefore remained a matter of administrative discretion, largely
excluded from judicial review.
The importance ofthe iccpr to Hong Kong rose sharply in 19S4 with
the signing ofthe Sino-British Joint Declaration in which Britain agreed
to return the colony to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. In this treaty the
84 Poliliis iiiid Sodciy in Hoin; Koi^^ Towards iggy
government of the I'KC also committed itself to the preservation of the
ICCPR and its companion covenant, as applied to Hong Kong by
Britain.'" This commitment was later enlarged upon in the Hong KongBasic Law, the fundamental Chinese statute enacted in April 1990. This
law sets out the guidelines for the structure ofthe post- 1997 Hong KongSpecial Administrative Region (the "sar") and the relationship of the
SAR with the Central People's Ciovernment in Beijing." Article 39 ofthe
Basic Law states that the Covenants shall remain in force and shall be
implemented through the laws ofHong Kong.
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which came into effect on 8 June
199 1 , effects a transfer ofresponsibility for the protection ofcivil liberties
from the administration to the judiciary. It is also an attempt to anchor
China's general commitments regarding the iccpr to a body of case
precedents to be issued by the Hong Kong courts under the Bill of
Rights. The enactment of the Bill of Rights is, therefore, an unprece-
dented opportunity to entrench a liberal civil liberties regime into the
legal fabric of Hong Kong. Yet, it also represents a heavy burden for a
legal system that is entering the instability and uncertainty ofdecoloniza-
tion. In these circumstances it is not at all clear that the system is capable
of serving as the primary means of protecting civil liberties. For many
Hong Kong publications which depend on an open pluralistic society for
their survival, seeking legal protection under a Bill ofRights after 1997 is
an option which raises more questions than it answers.
The cynical, but probably accurate, answer to these questions is that
China, through its power of interpretation over the uncertain language
ofthe Basic Law, can easily override legal constraints to silence its critics
in the press. Yet, this response is also simplistic in its assumptions about
the health of press freedoms in Hong Kong and ignores the complex
colonial history that underlies the development of the media. The
colony's long tradition ofrepressive press laws, curbed in application by
liberal administration, has created a press system that is especially vulner-
able to pressure from Beijing. This tradition, coupled with the larger
problems of a colonial legal system ill-equipped to survive the pressures
ofdecolonization, has grave implications for the future ofpress freedoms
under the new Bill ofRights.
The Colonial Legacy
In 1 844 when English law was formally introduced to the newly acquired
Crown Colony ofHong Kong, the concept offreedom ofthe press was
well established in Britain. As early as 1695, liberal arguments in favour
PERRY KELLER: Uiiccrtaw Refugee 85
of press freedoms, advanced by progressive thinkers such as Locke and
Milton, brought about the aboHtion of government press Ucensing. In
the United States, the adoption of the First Amendment of the
Constitution, which prohibits the enactment ofany law abridging free-
dom ofspeech or ofthe press, occurred fifty years before China's cession
ofthe island ofHong Kong in the Treaty ofNanking. Liberal views on
the importance ofa free press were, however, not always consistent with
the needs of colonial authorities in distant parts of the British empire.
Constant vigilance against threats to British authority' w^as a necessary and
accepted part of colonial administration. While military force was avail-
able for emergencies, the legal system was expected to serve as the prin-
cipal means of preventing the spread of subversion among the local
population.
Throughout its existence, the government of Hong Kong has dealt
with threats to colonial security' and public order by means of criminal
prosecution, either under English statute or common law or local ordi-
nance. Through several decades of piecemeal legislation, the govern-
ment accumulated a formidable armoury of legal powers. These laws
enabled it not only to punish anyone seeking to overthrow or unlawfully
alter the colonial form of government, but also to prevent the publica-
tion of any ideas or opinions which might instigate such subversion.
Although the postwar liberalization of government policy has led to a
reduction in this armoury in recent years, press and publication legisla-
tion in Hong Kong remains more restrictive than in Britain.
Aside from its broad emergency powers, '^ the government's principal
legal instrument for the control of subversive publications is the law of
sedition. Under this law it is a criminal offence to engage in any activities
intended to undermine the authority' of the British or Hong Konggovernments. These activities include publication ofanything intended
to bring into hatred or contempt, or excite disaffection against, the
administration ofjustice; to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the
inhabitants of Hong Kong; to promote feelings of ill will or enmity
between different classes; or to incite persons to vic:)lence or to counsel
disobedience to law.'
In the early decades ot this century, as an English and Chinese press
developed in the colony, the government also enacted legislation which
created specific press-related criminal offenses and established a statutory
basis for extensive regulatory control over newspaper publication.'"^ In
195 1 these ordinances were collected into a single statute entitled the
Control of Publications (Consolidation) Ordinance (the ci'co).'^ It was
86 Politics and Society in Hoin; Kon\^ Towards iggj
not until H^Sy that this extraordinary collection of press control related
offenses and administrative powers was the subject of major legislative
reform. The cpco prohibited any publication calculated to persuade
anyone to commit any offence or to join any prohibited political group,
as well as the publicaticiu of "false news likely to alarm public opinion or
disturb public order.""' Under the cah.o the government held the power
to prohibit the import ofany publication prejudicial to the security ofthe
colony and the power to suppress or suspend for six months any newspa-
per for press related offenses.'^ This law also provided a consolidated
statutory basis for regulatory powers over, among other things, the regis-
tration of news agencies, newspaper proprietors, printers, publishers,
editors and distributors, as well the licensing ofprinting presses."
The government effectively rescinded the cpccj in 1987 through an
amendment which renamed the ordinance the Registration of Local
Newspapers Ordinance and stripped it of much of its content.'*^ The
retention o^ newspaper and news agency registration attracted little
public attention as compared to the outcry which greeted the govern-
ment's attempt to preserve the offence ofpublishing false news, through
an amendment to the Public Order Ordinance."*^ In 1989, after suffering
a barrage of criticism from the Hong Kong press, legal and academic
communities, and further criticism from the Human Rights Committee
(established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights), this offence was repealed."
The electronic media of Hong Kong, like most electronic media in
the world, are subject to a more restrictive regulatory regime than applies
to the print media. This distinction is often justified on the grounds that
the influence ofthese media is much greater than that ofnewspapers and
periodicals. In addition, the relatively small number offrequencies avail-
able for broadcasting creates a natural limitation on competition that
requires government intervention.~ Whether the latter concern has
retainecl its validity is open to question, given the opportunities for
competitive programming that have resulted from technological
advances in satellite and cable communications. However, for govern-
ments that are concerned by the consequences ot spontaneous action by
their citizens, the powerful effect oftelevision on the attitudes and opin-
ions ofviewers remains a sensitive political issue. The sense of personal
involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen protests in Beijingfelt by the several
hundred thousand Hong Kong residents, who demonstrated their
support in the streets, was a remarkable display of television's power to
affect public opinion. This effect no doubt made a deep impression on
PERRY KELLER: Uncertain Refugee 87
China's leadership.
Television broadcasting m Hong Kong is licensed under the
Television Ordinance w^hich subjects all licensees to an extensive range
of detailed programming and service obligations."^ As a condition of
every license, no television programme may include any material likely
to mislead or alarm; encourage or incite crime, civil disorder, or civil
disobedience; discredit the law or social institutions or serve the interests
of any foreign political party.""^ Under the Television Ordinance, the
government's Broadcasting Authority also holds a residual power to
prohibit the broadcast ofany programme which threatens the peace or
good order ofHong Kong.
In addition to regular broadcasting license revocation procedures
under the ordinance, which include rights of notice and appeal, the
Governor may revoke a license summarily when in his opinion it is
necessary to do so for the security ofHong Kong. Radio broadcasting is
subject to the licensing and regulatory requirements of the Tele-
communications Ordinance." This long standing ordinance makes it an
offence for any person to transmit a telecommunications message which
he knows to be false and also grants the Governor the power to prohibit
the transmission ofany telecommunications message when necessary in
the public interest."''
In spite of its history of restrictive press and publication legislation.
Hong Kong has a justifiable reputation for enjoying one of the most
liberal press regimes in Asia. In recent decades the government has
combined its legislative powers with a generally tolerant attitude towards
the press, permitting a broad spectrum ofopinion and criticism to appear
in the media. The influence of post-Second World War concerns in
Britain and elsewhere regarding civil liberties has played an important
role in the development of this policy. In addition, the antipathy felt by
many Hong Kong Chinese towards the Communist government in
China and their consequent willingness to live under British rule has also
encouraged a liberalization of government press policy." The authori-
ties have acted with restraint in bringing prosecutions for political
offenses involving the press; the last reported prosecution for seditious
publication occurred in 1952. Ironically, this case was against the editors
ofa mainland controlled newspaper, the Ta Kiiii<^ Pao, for publishing alle-
gations that the government had persecuted the Hong Kong people."^
The government's policy of tolerance is also reflected in minor legal
reforms that occurred before the clean-up of press and publicatitm laws
in 1987, such as the revocation of regulations requiring the licensing of
88 Polilics iiiiil Sociciy in I loin> Kon{; Towiirds iggj
all commercial printing presses.-^
The principle offreedom ofspeech has not always outweighed colo-
nial security and public order concerns. In 1987 the government sought
to replace the legally defective Film Censorship Regulations with an
ordinance permitting the censorship of films whenever it is likely that
exhibition of the film would "seriously damage good relations with
other territories."^" Although the government was prepared to compro-
mise with its critics by including a reference within the ordinance to the
freedom of expression provisions of the ICCPR, it refused to delete the
provision.^' Official censors subsequently relied on this ground to cut
sixteen minutes from a documentan^' film concerning the 1989
Tiananmen protests in Beijing.'''
Until its decision in 1989 to enact a bill of rights, the Hong Kong
government had maintained a British approach towards the issue of civil
liberties protection. It asserted that the individual is best protected by an
administration based on a liberal philosophy ofgovernment and a judi-
ciary which operates according to the principles of natural justice and
personal liberty embodied in the common law.' The government's
position was well exemplified by the Attorney General's statement to the
Legislative Council during the "false news" controversy that the pubHc
could trust that the prosecution for the pubhcation of false news would
only be used as a measure oflast resort."
The historical combination ofrepressive press laws and liberal admin-
istrative policy presents a difficult legacy for Hong Kong after 1997.
Should the Central People's Government in Beijing or its supporters
within the government of the future Hong Kong SAR order the enact-
ment oflaws restricting currently enjoyed press freedoms, colonial legis-
lation is filled with useful precedents. Many restrictive laws have only
recently been revoked, and others he dormant on the statute books. ^ It
can be argued that the Bill of Rights offers an opportunity to turn the
page on the troublesome colonial past and entrench a liberal civil liber-
ties regime in Hong Kong that is up to international human rights stan-
dards. However, even ifthe Chinese government accepts the entrench-
ment ofsuch a regime, it is not clear whether the colonial legal system is
capable of effectively carrying out this responsibiHty.
The Pressure of Decolonization
Hong Kong's legal system is often described as one ofthe major accom-
plishments ofBritish rule, the successful creation ofthe "rule oflaw" on
alien soil. Yet, however much Enghsh law is accepted, or at least toler-
PERRY KELLER: Uncertain Rejhgce 89
ated, by a majority of the population,^^ the legal system remains both
alien in its origin and colonial in its form. Its very success may well be
bound to the British colonial relationship. Consequently, it is open to
question whether this system will have sufficient resilience and legiti-
macy to survive the transition to Chinese sovereignty and serve as a basis
for the protection of civil liberties.
The law of Hong Kong, which rests on a doctrine of English law
supremacy over Chinese customary law, has developed in most areas by
following the statutory and case law precedents ofBritain. While there
are many specific divergences, the colony has remained closely tied to
the British model. It is a system that has benefited the territory and
resulted in a sophisticated legal system far exceeding the capabilities of
the colony's own limited legal resources. However, the most efficient
elements ofthe colonial system are not necessarily those which will most
easily survive the transition to Chinese sovereignty and continue to play
a positive role in the administration ofthe Hong Kong SAR.
Perhaps the most troubling problem created by Hong Kong's depen-
dency on British legal and administrative models is the language of the
law itself While the exclusive use of English may have seemed unre-
markable in a British colony, it is certain to be a contentious issue in a post
colonial setting. Yet, while many Hong Kong Chinese already find it
unsatisfactory that the law should be expressed in a language barely
comprehensible to most of the population,^^ few solutions lie in sight.
The entire body ofEnglish common law plainly cannot be translated into
Chinese. Apart from its many specialized terms that lack Chinese equiv-
alents, the translation ofa sufficient corpus ofcase law is an inconceivable
task. Beyond these technical concerns, Tomasz Ujejski has singled out a
deeper and more complex issue regarding the translation ofHong Konglaw. He questions whether the philosophical and ethical basis of the
common law is so inextricably bound to the linguistic structures of the
Enghsh language that full translation is a true impossibility."^'"^ Thegovernment has recently introduced measures to address the language
problem, such as the planned translation of all Hong Kong statute law
into Chinese and the introduction of spoken Cantonese, as well as
Chinese documents, in the Magistrates' courts. However, as the govern-
ment concedes that English must remain the principal language of the
law, the ability of these measures to address the problem oflegitimacy is
doubtful. In the long term, the perception ofmany Hong Kong C^hinese
that a foreign language legal system is an anachronism is likely to seriously
undermine the authority ofthe law. For those who attempt to use tlic Hill
90 Politics and Society in Horn; K()»i> Towards iggj
of Rights to protect press freedoms after 1997, the ease with which the
law can be made to appear remote and irrelevant to the life ofthe Chinese
community presents a serious obstacle. The authority of a court order
can be easily deflected ifthe authority ofthe law itself is in question.
The protection of civil liberties under the Bill of Rights also faces
difficulties that arise out of the current state of the administration of
justice. The structure ofgovernment in Hong Kong has remained virtu-
ally unchanged since its establishment. In spite of recent efforts to
remove its colonial image, -^'^ the territory remains a colony under British
law, subject to the direct authority ofthe Crown. Supreme executive and
legislative power continues to rest in the position of Governor, who is
assisted by the Executive Council, which advises on executive matters,
and the Legislative Council, which advises on and consents to legislation
under the presidency of the Governor.'*" Hong Kong is, therefore, a
colony in which the Westminster model ofdecolonization, the develop-
ment ofcabinet government responsible to the legislature, has been still-
born.
The colony has traditionally depended on a highly centralized and
executive-dominated bureaucracy that has provided both political lead-
ership and government administration. British government supervision
and guidance have been directed through the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office since its amalgamation with the Colonial
Office, hi the absence of democracy, the government has sought to
establish greater legitimacy in the local Chinese community through the
use of formal and informal channels of consultation with community
groups and individuals. The domination of the senior levels ofgovern-
ment by British and other foreign expatriates has historically been a sensi-
tive issue. However, the government ot Hong Kong has successfully
reduced its reliance on expatriate officers as a result o^ civil service
reforms initiated in the late 1960s."*' The Legal Department, which is
responsible for most aspects ofthe administration ofjustice, has been an
exception to this trend. British and other Commonwealth laM^ers
continue to dominate middle as well as senior ranks ofthe Department,
constituting three fifths of all government legal officers. ^^ Efforts to
increase the number of local lawyers in the Department have not been
markedly successful. While many Hong Kong Chinese have entered the
legal profession in recent years, most have preferred to practice in the
private sector. Moreover, according to a Hong Kong Institute of
Personnel Management survey, a majority of local lawyers expect to
emigrate before 1997.^^ Efforts to "localize" the Legal Department have
PERRY KELLER: Uncertain Refugee 91
until recently foundered on the lack ofexperienced local lawyers willing
to accept the political risks and reduced circumstances of government
service/"* The Department has now embarked on a programme ofinten-
sive grooming ofselected local lawyers within the Department for senior
positions and the phased reduction ot expatriate staff.
In the past expatriate lawyers have played an important role in main-
taining the essential compatibility of the local legal system with that of
Britain. The shared social, cultural, and educational background oflegal
officers in Hong Kong and London has no doubt contributed to the
considerable autonomy the colony has enjoyed in legal affairs.
Nevertheless, the dominance ofnon-Chinese speakers, largely without
ties to the local community, has also perpetuated a gap between the
highly British character ofthe legal administration and the Chinese char-
acter ofthe community. The government's current efforts to change the
personnel within the legal Department are not intended to alter the char-
acter of legal administration. Consequently, the transition to Chinese
authority will be especially difficult for legal administration in HongKong, as it attempts to find its identity as an independent common law
jurisdiction and at the same time suffers a loss of experienced personnel
with the departure ofexpatriate government officers.
The judiciary has also been a traditional bastion of expatriate service,
containing many members who previously served in the ranks of the
Legal Department. In 1989, apart from Chiefjustice Sir T.L. Yang, only
two Hong Kong Chinese judges sat among the thirty-one judges ofthe
High Court and Court of Appeal."*^ Although the recruitment of local
judges is a government priority, expatriate judges arc expected to play a
significant part in thejudiciary for at least another decade. The lingering
presence of non-Chinese faces on the senior bench, until now an
accepted part of colonial life, has already begun to provide an easy target
for critics ofthe legal system. As Hong Kong shifts responsibility' for the
protection of civil liberties from the administration to the judiciary, the
dominance of expatriate judges, however experienced, will inevitably
detract from the authority and legitimacy ofjudicial decisions among the
local community.
The enactment of the Bill of Rights is a heartening development for
the protection of freedom of the press in Hong Kong. It the liberal
doctrines present in international human rights law can be successtully
incorporated into local law, the government will have created a barrier
to the abuse o{ individual rights that did not previously exist in the
colony. Yet, as it is clear to everyone concerned with this project, making
92 Politics and Socict)' in Hoii(> Koui^ Towards tggj
the Bill of Rights effective will be a formidable task.
The coinniercial press may well be sceptical of the guarantees it has
been offered under the Bill. It remams dogged by restrictive media laws
which, despite government restraint in application, remain available for
the future SAR administrations. Moreover, in turning to the Bill for
protection, the press is faced with a legal system that has yet to overcome
its own colonial past. In a state of weakened legitimacy, the law will
clearly require the energetic support ofthe government ofthe SAR if it is
to survive decolonization with its authority intact. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that a legal system which is dependent on the goodwill of the
executive can also serve as an effective base for the protection ofindivid-
ual rights against abuses ofstate power.
Notes
I.Jesse Wong, "Hong Kong Cables's Collapse Tells a Story of a Battle of Wills AmongPartners," /l.TkJ» Wall StreetJournal Weekly, 1 8 March i99i.P- i-
2. Chin-Chuan Lee and Joseph Man Chan, "Hong Kong's Press in China's Orbit:
Thunder of Tiananmen" in Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism, ed.
Chin-Chuan Lee (New York: Guilford Press, 1990), p. 142.
3. Cher^'l Wu-Dunn, "For Hong Kongjournalists, A Hampering Deadline: 199 1," NewYork Times, 14 November 1990, p. 5.
4. Lee and Chan, "Hong Kong's Press in China's Orbit," p. 151.
5. A sign of Beijing's apparent indifference to Enghsh language press criticisms can be
seen in its willingness to allow the sale ofthese publications within China while banning
the distribution ofseveral Chinese language pubhcations.
6. J. Polumbaum, "The Tribulations ofChma'sJournalists after a Decade ofReform" in
Voices ofChina, p. 49.
7. "Big Brother's Blacklist," Far Eastern Economic Rei'iew, September 1990, p. 24. See also
Li Demin, "Rumours are Rumours," People's Daily (Overseas Edirion), 11 November
I990,p. 3-
8. Ibid.
9. The iccPR and its companion covenant, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, were adopted by theUN General Assembly in 1 966 and came
into effect ten years later following ratificarion by a sufficient number ofmember states.
10. Sino-BritishJoint Declaration on the Question ofHongKon<i (1985), Annex L pt. XIIL
1 1
.
Tlie Basic Diw ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ofthe P.R.C., April 1990,
3rd sess. ofthe 7th National People's Congress.
PERRY KELLER: Uncertain Reftijiee 93
12. Emergency Regulations Ordniance (1964), Cap. 241 Lmws of Hong Kong [lhkJ.
13. Crimes Ordinance (1970), Cap. 200 lhk, s.io (i).
14. These included the Chinese Publications (Prevention) Ordinance (1907), the
Printers and Publishers Ordinance (1927), and the Prohibited Publications Ordinance
(1938).
15. Control ofPublications (Consolidation) Ordinance (1951), Cap. 268 lhk.
16. Ibid., S.3 and s.6.
17. Ibid., S.7 ands.8.
18. See the Newspapers Registration and Distribution Regulations (1951), Cap. 268 lhk,
S.18; the News Agencies Registration Regulations (1951), Cap. 268 lhk, s.i8; Printing
Presses (Licensing) Regulations (1951), Cap. 268 lhk, s.i8; and the Printed Documents
(Control) Regulations (195 1), Cap. 268 lhk, s.i8.
19. Control ofPublications Consolidation (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 1 5 of 1987).
20. Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 16 of 1987).
21. For more detail sec Article 19, International Centre on Censorship, Freedom of
Infomiation and Expressio)i i)i Hong Kong (London, 1988), p. 8.
22. Consultative Committee for the Basic Law, Final Report on Freedom of the Press, (14
March 1987).
23. Television Ordinance (1988), Cap. 52 lhk.
24. Television (Standards ofProgrammes) Regulations (1987), Cap. 52 lhk, s.27.
25. Telecommunications Ordinance (1983), Cap. 106 lhk; Radio Programnie Code of
Practice (Hong Kong Government Printer, 1985).
26. Telecommunications Ordinance, s.3 3.
27. Liu Siu-Kai and Kuan Hsm-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong,
1990), p. 19-
28. Fei Yi Ming and Lee I'sung Mngv. I'he Crown (1952) 36 Hong Kong Ltiw Report |HKLR|
133-
29. Printing Presses (Licensing) Regulations (1951), Cap. 268 lhk, s. t8.
30. Film Censorship Ordinance (198S).
31. For more detail see Johannes C^han, "Freedom of E.xpression: Censorship and
Obscenity in Hong Kong" in Ciuil Liberties in Hong Kong, ed. Raymond Wacks (Hong
Kong; Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 2 1 o.
94 Politics and Society in hUnn; Kon^ 'I'oti'ards iggy
32. Jill McGivcring, "Censorship in the Spotlight," South CJtiiia \Ioniin(> Post, 24 May1990, p. 8.
33. K. C'han and K. Lau, "Some reflections on the Human Rights Committee's Hearing
ofthe United Kingdom Second Report on Dependant Territories, held November 4-5,
1988 in Geneva," (1990) 20 Hoi{^ Koiij^ Lawjoiinial 1 56.
34. Emily Lau, "Alarming the Press," Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1987, p. 10.
35. The government of the FRC has frequently demonstrated a knowledge of colonial
history and a willingness to use past practices against Britain in furtherance of Chinese
policies. For example, in recent disputes over financial plans for a new Hong Kongairport, the Chinese government has relied on decade-old Hong Kong government
policy statements regarding the need tor fiscal conservation, to oppose Hong Kong's
current plans. Financial Times, 23 April 1991 , p. 4.
36. Liu and Kuan, The Ethos of the Hoii^^ Konj^ Chinese, p. 127.
37. Tomasz Ujejski, "The Future of the English Language in Hong Kong Law" in The
Future of the Law in Hong Kong, ed. Raymond Wacks (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1989), p. 165.
38. Ibid., p. 183.
39. In recent years, for example, the Hong Kong government has routinely made use of
legislative amendments to replace the word "colony", where it appears in local ordi-
nances, with the name "Hong Kong."
40. P. Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law in Hong Kong, 2 vols. (HongKong: China and Hong Kong Law Studies, 1987), 1:151.
41. Ian Scott, "TheSupplyofProfessionals in the Hong Kong Civil Service" in The Hong
Kong Civil Service and its Future, eds. Ian Scott and John P. Burns (Hong Kong: Oxford
Universit}' Press, 1988), p. 65.
42. Ibid.
43. Steve Glain, "Impasse in Appeals Court May Jeopardize Hong Kong's TenuousIndependent Legal System," Asian Wall StreetJournal Weekly, 13 May 1991, p. 2.
44. Scott, "Supply ofProfessionals," p. 65.
45. Hong Kongjndiciary Report (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1989), p. 12.
46. Asian Wall StreetJournal Weekly, 13 May 1991, p. 2.