NY B9 March 31 Hearing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and Press Report- 1st Pgs for Reference 434

8/14/2019 NY B9 March 31 Hearing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and Press Report- 1st Pgs for Reference 434

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON

TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Public Hearing

Monday, March 31, 2003

Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom HouseAuditorium

One Bowling GreenNew York, York


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LEXIS-NEXIS View Printable Page Page 1 of 2

LexisNexis"Copyright 2003 Facts on File, Inc.Facts on File World News Digest

March 31,200 3SECTION: Pg. 245A1LENGTH: 67 6 wordsHEADLINE: Terrorist Attack Aftermath:September 11 Panel Holds First Public HearingBODY:An independent comm ission investigating September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. held itsfirst public meeting March 31 in New York City. Congress, after much political wrangling, had createdthe commission in November 2002 to conduct a broad inquiry into the attacks and the government'sfailure to prevent them .New York Governor George Pataki (R) and New York City Mayor M ichael Bloomberg (R) eachaddressed the first public hearing of the panel, the National Comm ission on T errorist Attacks Uponthe United States. The session was held at the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House, several blocksfrom the former World Trade Center, where nearly 2,800 people had died in the September 11 attacks.The panel heard testim ony from survivors of the September 11 attacks, and from deceased victims'family members. The testimonials urged the panel to investigate aviation security, immigrationconcerns, and the centralization of intelligence gathering an d analysis.Public hearings continued April 1, with testim ony from Glenn Fine, the inspector general of the JusticeDepartment; Le e Wolosky, a former National Security Council lawyer; and Ken Holden, thecommissioner of the City Department of Design an d Construction. The witnesses testified on possibleways to prevent new attacks.The panel January 27 had held its first meeting, a closed-door session in Washington D.C., at which itappointed an executive director an d established rules governing financial disclosures an d recusals fo rpanel members. (Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had resigned as chairman of the panel inDecember 2002, following med ia allegations of potential conflicts of interest between the inquiry an dclients of Kissinger's international consulting firm.)The panel named P hilip Z elikow its executive director. Z elikow, a University of Virginia historian, hadserved as executive director for the Markle Foundation's Task Force on N ational Security in theInformation Age, which in October 2002 ha d produced a report urging the centralization ofcounterterrorism intelligence gathering. Z elikow had held a similar post on an election reformcommission chaired by former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.The September 11 commission had held a second p rivate m eeting February 12, after which Chairmanand former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean (R ) announced that public hearings would com mence inNew York th e following month.The panel was expected to hold hearings approxim ately every other week until M ay 2004, when a draft

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF LITIGATING ASSISTANTLAWRENCE S. KAHN, NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT,BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATESTUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2003

My name is Lawrence Kahn, I am the Chief Litigating Assistantof the New York City Law Department.

I would like to direct the Commission's attention to a seriousconsequence of the September 11th terrorist attack on the World TradeCenter that needs to be addressed. I amspeaking about the billions ofdollars in litigation that has been brought against the City of New York andthe very real potential that lawsuits will continue to be commenced formany years to come. This litigation poses serious consequences for thosewho responded so extraordinarily to the terrorist attacks. I cannotemphasize too strongly how critically important it is that the federalgovernment take steps now to protect local governments and privatecontractors from litigation arising from future terrorist attacks.

To date, more than 2300 claims have been brought against theCity related to the World Trade Center attacks. Virtually all allege injuriesincurred in the days and weeks following September 11. These claims areseparate from all the claims of the victim's families which, as you know, can


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STATEMENT OF FIRE COMMISSIONER NICHOLAS SCOPPETTABEFORE THE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATES

Apr i l 1,2003

Thank yo u Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton an d Commission Members for thisopportunity to discuss the Fire Department's progress in rebuilding and enhancing preparednessin the aftermath of 9/11.

I believe the Department has done anoutstanding job over the last year and a half torebuild an d recover from 9/11. By all statistical measures, the Department is performing its firean d medical services functions as well or better than before that disastrous day. W e have alsobeen working diligently to increase ou r preparedness for future potential terrorist incidents.

I. BackgroundAs you know, the Department retained the consulting firm of McKinsey & Company a

little over a year ago to help us learn as much as possible from the tragic events of 9/11.McKinsey worked intensively with a high-level team from the Department to examine theresponse, operations an d command structure that was in place prior to, during, an d after theattacks on the World Trade Center. The purpose of the study, which Mayor Bloomberg and Ireleased on August 19, 2002, was to make recommendations for improving the functioning of theFire Department's Incident Command System, communications tools and technology, and otheraspects of our response to large-scale incidents.


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STATEMENT OF POLICE COMMISSIONER RAYMOND W. KELLYBEFORE THE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATES

ApriM,2003

In the aftermath of September 11th, we felt it was important to get anobjective assessment of the Police Department's response, and we usedMcKinsey and Company to help provide us with "lessons learned." We didnot ask McKinsey to provide a definitive history of what occurred onSeptember 11th>, but rather to identify opportunities where the Departmentcould improve.McKinsey identified those opportunities and we have addressed each ofthem, including improved coordination with the Fire Department. We'veestablished inter-operabilitywith Fire Department communications. We putFire Department commanders in Police Department helicopters to helpthem better coordinate operations at major fires. And we have senior staffassigned to each other's headquarters to de-conflict any issues that mayarise.There is awhole host of other initiatives we have undertaken, but I think itwould be a mistake for the Commission to focus exclusively on the eventsof September 11th, on the day itself, without looking forward to the legacy ithas left us.While much has been written about what transpired on that day, the mostimportant lesson of September 11th was the most obvious one: The UnitedStates was unprepared to prevent major terrorist attacks against thePentagon and the largest city in America. The lesson learned quickly herein NewYork City was that the Police Department had an obligation to do allin its power to deter another terrorist attack.We established a new Counter Terrorism Bureau to do exactly that, and werecruited Lieutenant General Frank Libuiti of the Marine Corps to stand itupand get it running.We assigned 1,000 police officers to counter terrorism duties, despiteattrition in our ranks.

Documents

NY B9 March 31 Hearing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and Press Report- 1st Pgs for Reference 434