Nuremberg Trials Topic Guide

Ad-Hoc Nuremberg Trials 1

!


!

LETTER FROM THE DAIS

Dear Delegates,

Hello everyone! My name is Wendy and I, along with Emily, am your senior staffer YMUN 39’s Commission on the Status of Women. Currently, I’m a sophomore at Yale, majoring in Psychology with a Neuroscience track with plans to go to graduate school.

Outside of the classroom and YMUN, I am also part of Yale’s Mock Trial team, a mentor in WYSE (Women and Youth Supporting Each Other), a mentoring group for local middle school girls, and I am running a non-profit, Codi’s Hats.

With the ever-evolving policies on reproductive health rights and women’s rights, I’m ex-cited to see the different stances and cultural clashes that the topics may bring out. I look forward to seeing how you all respond in the committee. See you soon!

- Wendy Cai, Yale ‘15

Hi guys! I’m Emily, and I will also be working as one of the directors for CSW. A North-ern California native, I’m currently a sophomore at Yale in Branford College, majoring in Economics with a possible double major in East Asian Studies. After graduation, I hope to live and work in China for several years before pursuing a graduate degree, possibly in business or law.

When not going to classes or preparing for YMUN, I also serve as a mentor in ReadySet-Launch, an organization providing college counseling services to low-income students, participate in Danceworks, a dance group at Yale, and I serve on the alumni fundraising board for my high school. I also enjoy cooking, baking, and playing softball.

I can’t wait to hear your thoughts on the topics we have prepared for committee this year. Women’s rights remain a hotly debated topic globally, and I know you all are going to come up with informed, innovative solutions to these pressing problems. Please don’t hes-itate to email either Wendy or me with any questions or concerns.

- Emily Harris, Yale ‘15

All the best, Wendy Cai ([email protected]) Emily Harris ([email protected])

Dear delegates, Welcome to the Nuremberg Trials, and to YMUN XL. We hope to make Nuremberg Trials something special for you. Generally, all Model UN committees follow the same format and use the same procedure, but we’re abandoning everything we know and building this committee from the ground up. For those of you that have participated in Model UN before, we think this will be a welcome change. You won’t be wed to an overly formal parliamentary procedure that effectively impedes substantive debate. Instead, you will be placed in a 1945 courtroom in the city of Nuremberg, tasked with assessing the criminality of two Germans accused of war crimes. This trial will be a watershed in international law history, particularly in the history of war crimes tribunals. As such, as you adhere to some of the precedents established in previous war crimes trials, you will largely be setting your own. Given the importance of what you will be doing as delegates to the Nuremberg Trials, we will ask for your frequent and sustained participation; this committee is not for the shy. Those that have a particular academic interest in the “big ideas” of international law history, or a particular extracurricular interest in activities like Mock Trial, will especially appreciate this committee. We ask that you write amici curiae briefs—“friend of the court” briefs—rather than position papers. An amicus brief is a written legal document submitted by a third party arguing why one party to a case should prevail, or highlighting some of the legal principles that the third party thinks the court should consider. If you are unsure of what this should include, do a quick Google search for “amicus curiae,” and maybe read one or two as examples. You should write two, one page, single-spaced briefs: one on Herman Göring, and one on Karl Dönitz. Draw from each man’s history and the legal principles you come across in your research. Ben: Ben is extremely excited to putting together the Nuremburg Trials committee for YMUN this year. Hailing from the town of Hamden, Connecticut, Ben is intending to major in some combination of political science, economics, and East Asian studies. Aside from YMUN, Ben does a wide variety of things in the Yale International Relations Association, and he actively participates on Yale’s competitive debate and Model UN teams. You can reach him at any time at [email protected] (literally anytime – he unfortunately never sleeps). David: David is from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and he is planning on majoring in a social science field. His main extracurricular focuses are Yale Model Government Europe—essentially the same as Model UN, but simulating the EU rather than the UN—and The Politic—Yale’s political magazine. In high school, he was known as the moped-riding jazz pianist that always fell asleep in class. You can contact him at [email protected]. As the conference approaches, please feel free to email either of us with any questions! All the best, Ben Della Rocca David Steiner


!

TABLE OF CONTENTS Topic History 5 Current Situation 12

Trial 1: Herman Göring 16 Trial 2: Karl Dönitz 21

Questions to Consider 25 Bloc Positions 26 Role of the Committee 27 Structure of the Committee 28 Suggestions for Further Research 30 "##$%#$&'! ! ! ! ! ! ()!


!

!

Changing Conceptions of War Crimes and International Standards The year 1947 is a unique time, a true turning point, in our world’s history. This year is so important not just because it marks the ending of the largest-scale war ever fought—a war that, like the First World War before it, changes the nature of warfare irrevocably. Rather, this year is also important because it for the first time provides the international community the chance to seriously discuss and devise protocols for the ways sovereign states interact with each other, when dealing with international justice. Indeed, this year completes a period that for the first time sees the phrase “international community” carry any meaning in political discourse. However, while the infrastructure allowing for formal international laws and regulations was not in place prior to the time that this committee operates, that does not mean that pre-20th century societies had no conception of international justice, crimes committed in war, or international cooperation using due process of law. As members of the Nuremburg Trials Committee deliberate over both the culpability of the defendants and the role of the international community to execute sentences on war criminals, they would do well to understand how conceptions of international law and war crimes have changed over time. Particularly, such an understanding will help committee members realize the value of the international standards they set here—it will also provide precedent to use in crafting those standards.

The Earliest “War Crimes”—1474

The very first person ever to undergo trial by something resembling an international court was Peter von Hagenbach, a knight in the Germanic military forces of the 1400s. Born to a noble family in Hagenbach (modern day France), von Hagenbach was appointed by the Duke of Burgundy as Vogt to the region known as Upper Alsace. In medieval times, a Vogt was the German term for the “advocator” or overseer who oversaw the execution of law and the wellbeing of citizens in a particular region. From 1474 to 1477, the Burgundian Wars were waged in this region between the Dukes of Burgundy and the House of Valois, the ruling house of most of France at this time. In the early stages of the war, rebellions broke out among the people in part of the upper Rhine, specifically in an area under von Hagenbach’s control as Vogt. Von Hagenbach and other regional authorities had been commanded by the Archduke of Austria to keep the regions on the upper Rhine secure for Austria. However, von Hagenbach’s approach to keeping order was a campaign of terror against the upper Rhine population. As he besieged and overtook the town of Breisach, von Hagenbach committed multiple acts of murder and rape, among other atrocities. After von Hagenbach lost control of Breisach later that year, word of his brutalities got out, and the Archduke of Austria intervened.i What the Archduke decided to do to prosecute von Hagenbach, however, was a remarkable decision for this time. The standard procedure for cases like this—cases where a knight or soldier exhibits improper behavior as judged by his commander—was for the knight’s commander to order a summary execution as punishment for his crimes.

Topic History!


!

But for von Hagenbach, the Archduke convened a court to try and convict the war criminal. Moreover, the court that the Archduke of Austria convened was international, at least in some significant sense, in that 28 judges from different states of the Holy Roman Empire sat on the court. This made the court that tried von Hagenbach look strikingly similar to the international tribunal of the Nuremburg trials. After reviewing the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty on multiple crimes including murder and rape, and von Hagenbach was formally charged with the violation of the “laws of God and man.”ii He was executed later in 1474. Perhaps even more reminiscent of the Nuremburg trials is that von Hagenbach’s main defense in his case was the he was just following orders as a soldier, and as such he personally was free of guilt. “Is it not known that soldiers owe absolute obedience to their superiors,” von Hagenbach reportedly questioned, referring to his orders from the Archduke himself to keep the upper Rhine regions secure.iii However, the court found von Hagenbach culpable regardless, considering him to have committed crimes that “he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent.”iv

That last quote also brings to light an important principle that seems to be at the heart of most war crimes convictions, international or otherwise, throughout history: the idea that there are basic codes of conduct which people inherently know they ought respect in all situations. For proponents of war crime convictions by international tribunals, this idea is a main prong of attack against the “just following orders” defense. Some important questions here, however, are 1) do such basic, universal standards of human conduct truly exist in all situations including war? and 2) if so, what types of behavior fall into the category of crimes all humans recognize as always inherently wrong. Commission of Responsibilities At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the delegates of 10 Allied Powers ratified the Commission of Responsibilities at a plenary session of the committee in January. (The five major powers Britain, the USA, France, Italy, and Japan were joined by Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Poland, and Belgium) The Commission was created for the purpose of determining the facts surrounding 1) the “responsibility of the


!

authors of the war,” 2) the “facts as to the breaches of the laws and customs of the war committed by the forces of the German Empire,” 3) the degree to which those culpable were responsible for their offences, and 4) the “constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences.”v Ultimately, the international community never successfully followed through on the recommendations of this committee; however, the Commission’s legacy is one of significantly altering discourse and thought on the proper handling of war crimes cases. As they relate to war crime prosecution, the recommendation of this Commission was the establishment of a permanent international tribunal to try war criminals. The Commission advised that the tribunal be comprised of three judges from each of the five major powers and six judges appointed at large by other countries. Notably, they also advised that no one receive any immunity from prosecution as a result of special status or any other factor—even for heads of state. As a report from the committee stipulated:

“[There] is no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal.”

-The Commission of Responsibilities, 1919, page 23

While the proposals of the Commission were bold for the time, the United States and Japan did dissent in part from the committee’s recommendations. The US in particular argued that heads of state should not be held responsible

and tried. Part of the reason for this objection is the precedent the US found in municipal law and in the laws of many countries of the sovereign of an area being immune from certain types of prosecutions. An additional opposing argument was that lower-level government and military officials ought be the focus of the tribunal—proponents maintained that these individuals often authored the orders that broke international laws, while heads of state set broader visions and make military decisions that do not inherently engender the committing of war crimes. Thus, the purpose of the tribunals—to prosecute those responsible for committing crimes against humanity—would be best served by devoting international resources to investigating the operations and decision making of lower level officers. Japan shared this concern as its main reservation. Moreover, the United States also objected to the idea of retroactive punishment, or punishing war criminals for actions that had not been criminalized at the time they were committed. The final objection was that the United States proposed that the recommendation for the tribunal suggest that the tribunal be a temporary solution for the Great War alone. For subsequent violations, the United States suggested that ad hoc tribunals be formed comprised of members of the states affected by the war or conflict. Leipzig War Crimes Trials Despite some disagreement among the delegates on the Commission of Responsibilities, international Allied leaders of the post-war era generally embraced the Commission’s sentiments.vi The Treaty of Versailles, the treaty that formally ended World War I and articulated


!

the terms of surrender, conveyed policies largely in line with the Commission’s recommendations. Articles 227 through 230 of the treaty provided for German officials to be arrested and tried as war criminals. Trials were to take place on an international tribunal with five judges, one from each of the Great Powers of the day. In addition, the Treaty of Versailles included other recommendations and findings by the Commission of Responsibilities—the Treaty specified Germany and Austria-Hungary as the primary instigators of the war and specifically named Kaiser Wilhelm II a war criminal, demanding that Holland give him up from asylum. However, adopting the Commission’s policies in the Treaty is the closest international leaders got to instituting international criminal justice. Germany refused to extradite any of the roughly 900 criminals named by the Allies as war criminal suspects; the Dutch were equally unwilling to extradite the former Kaiser for fear of violating neutrality. The German government instead proposed trying the war criminals in the German court system in Leipzig, the trials’ namesake, as opposed to criminals’ being tried by their nation’s enemies. Additionally, the Germans offered much resistance to Allies’ requests of whom to try. Eventually, Germany and the Allied forces agreed upon a list of 45 people to try, and the Allies gave up seeking Kaiser Wilhelm entirely.

This list of only 45 was reduced even further with difficulties in tracing the suspected criminals and acquiring evidence against them. Eventually, a mere 12 individuals ever faced trial. However, at the outrage of many allied countries, the results of these trials were extremely lenient. Six of the 12 people tried were found not guilty; of those convicted, the sentences were very short, with the longest being four years in prison and the shortest ones only a few months. Despite these criticisms of the trials’ leniency, in Germany itself the public widely held the trials as excessively harsh and unfair against their country. Primarily, the German people objected that only people of German nationality were tried at all in the process of trying war criminals after the war. Additionally, military imprisonment was considered by Germany an especially dishonorable punishment for those serving in the military, specifically, and many Germans subscribed to the argument that these convicts had no responsibility for choosing their own actions as they were obeying direct orders. Although there was certainly much lacking in the outcome of the Leipzig Trials, these trials are a first major step towards the Nuremburg Trials in that they represent the culmination of the international community’s efforts to act together in convicting criminals of war. Moreover, much of the legal foundation of the Commission of Responsibilities also serves as the impetus for the


!

Nuremburg Trials’ convergence. Certainly for the Nuremburg Trials to fulfill its purpose and be recognized as just, it must improve upon its predecessor in Leipzig. Kharkov Trials

Three officials of the Kharkov Gestapo were tried before a Soviet military court in Kharkov, Ukraine in December of 1943.vii This was the first trial of Nazis or Nazi collaborators before any court. with the defendants consisting of Nazi personnel and a Russian collaborator that chauffeured the Kharkov Gestapo.viii In some ways, Kharkov was a stepping stone to Nuremberg; Soviet newspapers like Pravda and Moscow News insisted that the Kharkov trial proclaimed the triumph of justice, and the Nuremberg Trials would make use of the forensic evidence first introduced in the Kharkov Trials. But the trials in Kharkov did not go without criticism.

“The trials getting under way at Kharkov are so much like the pre-war purge trials at Moscow that they seem like an incredible repetition of the incredible. Again all the prisoners have confessed without waiting for any evidence to e presented against them. Again they have stood in the witness box to elaborate on their high crimes and many misdemeanors in gory detail. Again they have stuck their heads in the noose as though they were just dying to be executed. And again the American public wonders what strange thing is going on.”

-“The Kharkov Trials,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 18, 1943, page 6

Indeed, Kharkov was a Stalin show, and it

shows how the International Military Tribunal proceedings might have been conducted had the Soviets had their way at Nuremberg. Following the termination of World War II, the policy and techniques tested in Kharkov were resumed by the Soviet Union. A series of public trials were conducted in Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Leningrad, Smolensk, Briansk, Velikie Luki, and Nikolaev, and death sentences abounded.

Tokyo Trials

The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 called for the trial and purge of those who “deceived and misled” the Japanese people into war. U.S. General MacArthur, moving quickly, ordered the arrest of 39 suspects, mostly General Tojo’s cabinet members, roughly one week after Japanese surrender. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East held the Tokyo Trials after the Nuremberg Trials, adopting the same three categories of crimes used at Nuremberg.

-Class A: Charges alleging “crimes against the peace” were to be brought against Japan’s top leaders who had planned and directed the war. -Class B: “Conventional war crimes” charges could be leveled at any Japanese rank. -Class C: “Crimes against humanity” charges could be leveled at any Japanese rank.ix

The Tokyo Trials faded from the

international spotlight because of the long time they took to complete,x but the trials have been criticized as another example of “victor’s justice.”


!

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 These conventions produced the first

multilateral treaties that addressed the conducts of warfare, largely based on the Lieber Code. The Lieber Code, the first official, comprehensive, codified law that delineated regulations for behavior in times of martial law, was signed and issued by U.S. President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. A German international law scholar, Walther Schucking, asserted that a “definite political union of the states of the world has been created with the First and Second Conferences.”xi The judges of the Nuremberg Trials decided that by 1939, the rules laid forth in the 1907 Hague Convention (not signed by all countries at the time) were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as declaratory of the laws and customs of war.xii Thus, a country did not have to ratify the 1907 Hague Convention in order to be bound by its decisions. Command Responsibility

Command Responsibility, established by the Hague Convention of 1907 and first applied in the 1921 trial of Emil Müller in Leipzig, holds that military commanders are responsible for the acts of their subordinates. If the subordinates violate the laws of war and the commanders do not

prevent or punish these crimes, then the commanders can be held responsible. Generally, in order to find a military commander liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the prosecution must prove:

1) That those committing the atrocities or war crimes were under the command of the defendant;

2) That the commanders knew or should have known, based on the circumstances at the time, that their subordinates were engaging in impermissible conduct;

3) That the commanders did nothing to prevent or punish those responsible for the commission of such crimes.xiii

Kellog-Briand Pact Under the Kellog-Briand Pact, officially the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signatory states promised not to use war to resolve “disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them.”xiv In the sense that this pact tried to outlaw war, it failed. But it is nonetheless quite important, serving as the legal basis for the creation of a new category of crimes—crimes against peace—that we saw in Nuremberg.


!

Nuremberg Charter The Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis is also known as the Nuremberg Charter and London Charter. It stipulated that crimes of the European Axis Powers could be tried in three categories: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Article 8 of the charter stipulated that holding an official position could not be a wholehearted defense to war crimes; obedience to orders could only be considered in the mitigation of punishment.


!

Crimes Considered by the Nuremburg Trials

All those being tried at the Nuremburg Trials are answering for offences in one or more of 4 different categories. Those for categories are:

1. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of a crime against peace

2. Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression and other crimes against peace

3. War crimes 4. Crimes against humanityxv

These crimes have been specifically enumerated just prior to the convening of this committee – after much debate they have all been defined in the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (informally the Nuremburg Charter). Thus, the Nuremburg Trials is charged with trying defendants for their involvement in criminal actions under these 4 categories specifically. (This committee can debate about what types of specific actions should be considered to truly fall under the general definitions of these categories, but ultimately the committee is testing for occurrences

of these crimes) Categories 1 and 2 are very similar in effect and can often be grouped together for the sake of convenience. As becomes further evident in the descriptions below, any specific definitions of these 4 categories other than the broadest definitions are far from universally agreed upon and have been recognized only on an ad hoc basis. (In reality, the role of the Nuremburg Trials as a body was more limited to carrying out the specific instructions of the Nuremburg Charter. However, for the purposes of this committee, we invite delegates to assume, as part of their charter, the task of taking these guidelines and assessing the extent to which the international community can legitimately punish these categories of crimes. In other words, these four categories as they are defined by the will be some of the subject of this committee’s debate and discussion.) Although war crimes is a specific term for one of these four categories of international offences in war, the term “war crimes” can be used colloquially to refer to all of the above categories. One other interesting observation, which this committee may want to consider when developing recommendations for the future, is that the

Current Situation !


!

Nuremburg Trials have jurisdiction only to assess the criminality of individuals operating for the Axis powers. This arises as the result of the reluctance of nations such as France and Russia—likely due to Russia’s questionable military actions in Finland—to institutionalize the criminalization of war crimes in any general or long-term manner. Below we define these crimes and offer descriptions of the criteria for convicting an individual under each of these different crimes. 1. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy

for the accomplishment of a crime against the peace

This category of criminal actions and the second category (wars of aggression) are effectively very similar – this first category essentially refers to planning and conspiring to commit crimes against the peace. A crime against the peace refers very loosely to an action taken by a country or entity that disrupts the peaceful coexistence between independent states or societies, in the absence of a justification for war (as described below). Perhaps in another scenario the distinction between an actual crime against the peace and just planning to commit a crime against the peace would pose the main questions before the tribunal. However, the Nazis in World War II have certainly had the opportunity to carry out much of what they conspired to achieve well beyond the point of “acting against the peace.” The distinction between conspiracy and action, therefore, will likely be relevant in the Nuremburg trials mostly in terms of having some affect on the severity of criminals’ sentences, if affecting sentences at all. To give a general example, members of the

committee should ask themselves how one who has worked for years to build up a nation’s army precisely to invade another country should be handled compared to one who assumed the role of as a military commander only when the invasion was occurring. 2. Planning, initiating and waging wars of

aggression and other crimes against the peace. This second category specifically codifies wars

of aggression as crimes against the peace. It also emphasizes that actions besides war that unduly violate the sovereignty, autonomy, or peaceful coexistence of a society can constitute crimes against the peace.xvi As noted above, terms such as “crimes against the peace” by no means possess a longstanding universal definition. Further, what criteria have been discussed by the international community certainly lack specific or clear examples or precedents to illuminate the terms’ meaning. What is clear is that the Nuremburg Charter intends by “crimes against the peace” to refer to the actions of starting a war or conflict unjustly—as opposed to war crimes, which refer to unjust actions during a war that is already occurring. The Charter further implies that to determine what does and does not constitute a war of aggression requires assessing the motives of instigating an armed conflict. This committee should consider what might constitute possible justifications for making a first strike in war, then, if it wishes to assign guilt methodically in these situations—i.e. the committee should ask itself what a nonaggressive war is. Additionally the committee should seek to answer the question of what other types of action ought be defined as “aggressive.” The Charter


!

indicates that an action might be aggressive it involves instigating conflict in a region that undermines that region’s sovereignty or self-sustainability, and this tribunal ought determine what actions meet these standards of violating sovereignty, etc.xvii Some precedent exists for the illegalization of these types of aggressive actions. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact between European states is an agreement that, although—as events leading up to these trials demonstrate—largely unsuccessful, outlaws aggression as an action on the part of any state. However, this agreement would only purports to punish states for acts of aggression, not individuals, and this committee should consider the philosophical justifications for or for not applying this standard to individuals. 3. War crimes War crimes refer to actions that violate international standards of appropriate action in the context of war. Past agreements post World War I have definitively criminalized the use of “weapons of mass destruction” (a blanket term that, prior to 1944, refers to the use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons) in war. Similarly, those agreements have also codified the targeting of civilians in war as a war crime; moreover, as made clear in the committee history section, the idea of sparing civilians in war is one that has been upheld

in practice for centuries. Treating prisoners in ways that deprive them of any basic standard of living or subjecting them to significant torture or other adverse conditions also historically falls under the category of war crimes.

This committee should consider Germany’s war crime history especially in terms of its systematic killing of large numbers Jews and other minority groups in areas under its control. Although not everything is known at this point about the scale and scope of these execution programs, evidence is indicating that using brutal and inhumane execution methods and imprisoning captives in camps that deprived people of basic human necessities. 4. Crimes against humanity Crimes against humanity are another category of offences that currently lack standardized and universal definitions and criteria. The Nuremburg Charter uses language that suggests crimes against humanity to refer to any practice that puts humans in conditions that to an extreme to degree reduce their quality of life in an inhumane way, or more generally undermine their human dignity and sense of self-respect. Little precedent exists to as guidance for handling crimes against humanity. However, the committee might consider for its purposes treating crimes against humanity as applying to actions


!

analogous in purpose to war crimes, except without those actions’ necessarily occurring in war. Major questions that the committee must answer here include not only what practices cross the line of undermining human dignity and quality of life in undeniably odious ways, but also what level of involvement in those processes (assent by inaction versus pulling the trigger of a gun, for instance) merit action from this committee. The handling of crimes against humanity will be an important task of this tribunal, and the tribunal should certainly feel empowered to exercise its judgment in this matter.


!

Hermann Göring (b. 1893) testifies at the Nuremburg Trials as a former World War I fighter ace who went on to become one of the highest-ranking politicians of Nazi Germany—and one of Adolf Hitler’s closest confidants. He stands accused of all four of the crimes that defendants at the Nuremburg Trials can be faced with, as described above.

Personal Introduction: Early Life and Rise to Prominence Göring was born in Bavaria into a financially comfortable family, with his father in Africa as a member of the colonial service. Göring served as a fighter pilot in Word War I, where he saw much success, obtaining numerous medals and honors for his service. By the end of the war he received a promotion to become the third commander of the Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1), an elite and prestigious formation of four smaller fighter squadrons, more commonly known as “Richthofen’s Circus,” taking the name of its original commander.xviii In operation from 1917 to 1918, JG 1 claimed an impressive 644 Allied aircraft destroyed, while enduring barely over 100 casualties of its own. As a result of his accomplishments, Göring garnered considerable national fame after the war. Following World War I, Göring studied at Munich University from 1920 to 1921. In 1922, Göring joined the Nazi Party. Like many Nazi recruits of the time, Göring had grown increasingly critical with the post-World War I German government. Göring and others perceived the government as too weak and advocated a leadership that embraced German nationalism and would fight hard to bring Germany back to greatness.

TRIAL I.

Herman Göring !


!

Göring spent much of 1924 to 1928 in Sweden, but he returned to Germany in 1928 to be elected to the Reichstag, or the German parliament, as a member of the Nazi Party. Just four years later in 1932, Göring was appointed Speaker of the Reichstag, as Hitler and the Nazis gained more and more influence. In 1933, Hitler arranged for Göring to become Minister of the Interior for Prussia, putting him in charge of what was at the time the largest state in Germany. The new Chancellor of Germany Adolf Hitler convinced President Hindenburg to sign an emergency decree providing for this measure as a result of the incredible sway Hitler now held in the German government and with the German public. Hindenburg by this point cooperated with and signed onto nearly all aspects of Hitler’s Nazist agenda. Hitler also gave Göring control of the Luftwaffe, or the German airforce.xix At this time, Göring was almost certainly the most famous and well-known Nazi figure in Germany, save only Adolf Hitler himself. After becoming Minister of the Interior for Prussia, Göring also cemented his reputation as an unwavering proponent of the absolutism of the Nazi movement and ideology. He exercised an iron fist in preserving Nazi dominance in Prussia. As he controlled the Prussian police force, Göring replaced hundreds of police personnel with ardent Nazi enthusiasts to promote Nazi propaganda, and he later installed a force of 50,000 Nazi forces as an auxiliary police force. He furthermore ordered the police never to interfere with the actions of the Secret Service or other Nazi forces—for any reason. The result of this was that Prussian people had absolutely no path of recourse if they were harassed, assaulted, murdered, or abused in any other way by Nazis.

World War II Legacy

Göring holds the distinction of the being the highest-ranked Nazi official tried at the Nuremburg courts. He was an integral part of numerous aspects of German initiatives during World War II; the major areas of his involvement in the war are detailed here.xx Luftwaffe Göring is responsible for creating the Luftwaffe in the years before World War II. The Luftwaffe is the bulk of the German air force during World War II, and the institution brought Germany a significant degree of military success especially early on in the war.xxi The German government officially established the Luftwaffe on April 1, 1935, appointing Göring the Commander-in-Chief responsible for building up and developing the unit. Oversight of both the development and the deployment of the Luftwaffe were largely left to Göring and his vision, notwithstanding the fact that Göring received the autonomy to undertake this project from Hitler himself. Notably, these actions also violated the Versaille Treaty agreements that Germany not assembly an air force capable of military conflict—all operations regarding the Luftwaffe initially happened in secret. The committee should consider this when assessing Germany’s intentions in conducting these and other initiatives as part of its broader economic development.

By the time that the war started in 1939, the Luftwaffe had already reached an operational size of 1000 fighters and 1050 bombers. Prior to the start of the war, Luftwaffe pilots also practiced combat with the new fighter Me-109 by attacking towns in Spain involved in the Spanish Civil War. Thousands of people died in Spanish towns in


!

1937 alone on strikes ordered presumably by Göring himself—though concrete evidence for such orders is difficult to locate. By any metric, the Luftwaffe was an absolutely integral part of Germany’s ability to quickly cause the surrender of other countries at the beginning of World War II, as the Luftwaffe was the main reason that the Blitzkrieg strategy saw such success. The Blitzkrieg tactics, which essentially involved lightning strikes by Germany’s large state-of-the-art air force, toppled first Poland, and then Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and finally France, before a failed attempt to overtake the British in the drawn-out Battle of Britain in 1941. In waging war against France, the Luftwaffe was particularly instrumental, destroying three entire Allied Air Forces in the Battle of France in 1940, to secure victory for Germany in barely six weeks. While Britain overcame the Blitzkrieg and the Luftwaffe with a combination of advanced radar technology, comparable aircraft technology, and generally daring military tactics—British air forces managed to down two German planes for every one British lost—no other country was equipped to put up any effective fight. Still, Göring’s position at the prow of the Luftwaffe puts him right at the center of events that lead to the downfall of numerous European

countries. In the best case for Göring, the Nazi general is highly implicated in instigating and facilitating conflicts that undoubtedly bear traits of wars of aggression. Evidence also exists—though not definitively—that German officials carried out inhumane experiments on prisoners of war to test humans’ responses to hypothermia: essentially, to test what happens to people when they are exposed to extremely low, life-threatening temperatures. This evidence also indicates that Luftwaffe personnel carried out these experiments, meaning that Göring himself likely oversaw them.


!

Other Involvment in the Military Affairs of Germany As already noted, Göring was one of Hitler’s closest confidantes prior to and throughout the war that Germany launched. As such, Göring was involved in other activities in the German government in terms of conspiring to commit war crimes and facilitating the actualization of those plans once laid. Since it was announced in September 1936, Göring was made the supervisor of Germany’s Four Year Plan, an economic and political overhaul passed formally in October of 1936 to prepare Germany for the upcoming war.xxii These operations significantly altered Germany’s economy and increased Germany’s industrial output. The main goal of the plan was to reestablish Germany’s economic self-sufficiency. Core tenets of the Four Year Plan included protecting agriculture to stabilize food sources, as well as heavy investment in refineries, aluminum production, and the development of synthetic materials. In retrospect, Göring presumably oversaw these changes in order to meet the prerequisite for rebuilding the German military forces, in violation of the Versailles treaty, even though not all elements of the Four Year plan directly led to increased military capacity from the plan’s inception. Indeed, however, the Four Year Plan ultimately enabled Germany to build a stronger and more state-of-the-art air force than any country in the world, with the potential rivals the United States and Britain. Germany created well over 2,000 air combat units in just a few years after September 1936. The intense focus on metal production and synthesis further indicates the intent of Göring and the German government.

Promotion of agricultural is also able to be seen as a potential precaution for reduced access to international food markets during a period of war. The reforms that did center around building up military forces occurred, furthermore, in secret, perhaps also signaling an aggressive and malicious intent. Göring exercised extremely broad powers in pushing his agenda, further marking his high-level involvement with and decision making in the Four Year Plan and Germany’s other long-term war strategies. Throughout this period, Göring propagated the Secret Service and other police units loyal specifically to the Nazi regime throughout areas in Germany—Prussia especially—and gave them powers to arrest nearly any citizens they deemed fit. As such, the Secret Service worked with other government agencies to spread propaganda favorably to the Nazi party in the years leading up to World War II, and they frequently arrested those who they viewed as dissidents to their ideology. Once arrested, citizens


!

often had no ability to appeal or seek any other recourse. Göring’s choices to use such extreme government force to accomplish his goals certainly demonstrate his commitment to Germany’s programs in question. The committee should consider the thrust Germany’s actions—especially its secret operations—and determine whether or not those actions are indicative of conspiracy to engage in wars of aggression, and whether they shed light on the degree to which Germany’s initial acts of war can be in any way justified.


!

Karl Dönitz was born on September 16,

1891 to Emil—an engineer—and Anna Dönitz.xxiii He graduated from secondary school in Weimar.xxiv Dönitz enlisted in the Kaiserliche Marine (“Imperial German Navy”) as a sea cadet on April 4, 1910. He was promoted to midshipman a year later and to lieutenant in 1913.

In World War I, he served on a light

cruiser, SMS Goeben, in the Mediterranean before being appointed to a submarine fleet in October of 1916.xxv Submarines would later be central to Dönitz’s World War II strategy. While in

command of UB-68 in 1918, Dönitz was taken prisoner as British forces sunk the submarine near Malta. His time as a prisoner in a war camp, though, was not unproductive; he formulated what he later called Rudeltaktik (“pack tactic” or “wolfpack” in English).xxvi The Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (“BdU,” or “Commander of Submarines” in English) closely monitored and controlled the German U-boats that were given much independence when on patrol. The U-boats generally patrolled separately, but once a convoy was located, they would quickly congregate like a wolfpack.

Dönitz was repatriated in July of 1919 and

returned to Germany the following year, resuming his naval career. He continued to rise through the ranks: lieutenant commander, commander of the cruiser Emden, and then—following the re-introduction of U-boats to the German fleet—captain, in which capacity he was given command of the first U-boat flotilla in September of 1935.xxvii By November of 1937, Dönitz had become convinced that a major campaign against merchant shipping was practicable, and he began advocating for the conversion of the German fleet to almost entirely U-boats.xxviii Dönitz clashed with Hermann Göring, who was unwilling to provide the necessary capital to spend on the navy. The navy, Dönitz claimed, needed 1,000 submarines to win any future war with Britain. By 1939, it had 57, only two of which were modern Type VIIs.xxix The building of Nazi Germany’s U-boat fleet was done clandestinely, in violation of the Versailles Treaty clauses still in effect.

TRIAL II.

Karl Dönitz


!

Dönitz focused his fleet’s efforts against merchant traffic,xxx believing that cutting off England’s import trade could bring about its capitulation. In some respects, this effort was successfully. The U-boats, coordinated by radio using encoded messages, began to damage the British economy. As 1940, 1941, and 1942 passed, the fleet had more successful operations, including, notably, Operation Drumbeat. By May of 1942, when Dönitz had enough U-boats to fully implement his wolfpack tactic, the U-boats were sinking Allied ships faster than they could be built,xxxi at 700,000 tons per month.xxxii

“The only that that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.”

-Winston Churchill, The Second War, Volume II (p. 529)

“The U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been wise for the Germans to stake all upon it.”

- Winston Churchill, The Second War, Volume IV (p. 107)

By 1943, Allied technology began to catch

up, so Dönitz continued to press for new submarine technology and more advanced U-boat designs. And he had a new pedestal from which to do so; on January 30, 1943, Donitz was promoted to grand admiral and replaced Admiral Erich Raeder as commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine. Raeder preferred to expand the Kriegsmarine’s surface fleet rather than its submarine fleet, but Donitz’s loyalty and proven ability won him Hitler’s trust.

“According to the German radio Admiral Dönitz, in an address to the German Naval Staff when his flag was hoisted over the German Admiralty, said: ‘The entire German Navy will henceforth be put into the service of inexorable fight to the finish.’


!

The dismissal of Admiral Raeder [as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy] will add to Germany's despair, for he was a man who was trusted, says Reuter. The Navy - least Nazified of the German forces - will deplore, his departure. Raeder put the Navy before the party and as far as possible kept it efficient and self-respecting. He is replaced by a more ardent Nazi.”

-The Manchester Guardian, February 1st, 1943 In May of 1943, German U-boats were

forced to withdraw from the Atlantic. The allies had introduced successful anti-submarine strategies and technologies, including the convoy system, long-range aircraft patrols, improved

antisubmarine detectors and depth charges, and ultra radio intercepts.xxxiii

The war wore on, and so did the years 1943, 1944, and 1945. As the Soviets converged on Berlin, Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945. In his will, he ordered that Dönitz replace him—a seemingly odd choice given that Donitz had fallen out of Hiter’s trust near the end. Hitler, though, perceived the Navy as the only military branch that always remained loyal to him.

As Dönitz formed a government, he encouraged German troops to only surrender to the Americans or British, not the Soviets, correctly believing that the Soviets would be much less


!

forgiving conquerors than the Western Allies. The Western Allies, not wanting to stoke Stalin’s paranoia, demanded that Germany surrender to all the Allies simultaneously. So it did; Dönitz sent a German delegation to General Eisenhower’s Rheims headquarters to sign the surrender documents.

“No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the most primitive demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. Be hard, remember that the enemy has no regard for women and children when he bombs German cities.”

-order from Karl Dönitz, September 17th, 1942

“Only the Fuehrer has for years realized with what danger Bolshevism threatens Europe. Perhaps even this year, Europe will realize that Adolf Hitler is the only statesman of stature in Europe. Europe's blindness will one day come to a sudden end and thereby bring Germany's psychological help and political possibilities arising therefrom.”

-Karl Dönitz, speech, April 11th, 1945

“Communists would probably have seized power by means of a bloody revolution.”

-on why he support Hitler and the Nazi Party, Karl Dönitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days

“What would have become of our country today if the Fuehrer had not united us under National Socialism? Divided along party lines, beset with the spread poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, because we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we would have long since succumbed under the burden of this war and delivered ourselves to the enemy who would have mercilessly destroyed us.”

-Karl Dönitz, speech on Heroes’ Day, March 12, 1944

!!!!


!

Questions to Consider!!!1 The territoriality principle holds that an individual can be tried for a crime only if the act was a crime at the time and place at which it was committed. This principle would suggest that the Nuremberg Tribunal should consider the laws of Germany and evaluate the actions taken within Germany’s territory in this context. But what conquered territory should count as German? To what extent should we adhere to the territoriality principle? 2 Should the principle of universality, which gives states or international organizations criminal jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where the alleged crime was committed and regardless of the accused’s nationality and country of residence, supersede the principle of territoriality? Are the crimes being considered too serious to tolerate jurisdictional arbitrage? That is, are they crimes against all?


!

Bloc Positions Judges

Judges focus on the standards of international law already in effect and concerns for what the standards should be going forward. We also urge them to keep in mind the effect that their decisions—and how they choose to apply various legal principles—will have on precedent in the future. To a large degree, the questions the judges consider may be less whether these individuals are guilty or not guilty of the crimes for which they are being tried, and more what scope of action is appropriate from the international community.

For a very general overview of the judges at Nuremberg, see here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/nuremberg/peopleevents/p_judges.html. Prosecuting Attorneys

Prosecutors should focus on making the case of the need for the international community to take punitive action in the cases of these Nazi aggressions. In doing so, they must make clear how holding aggressors responsible in a court of law is in line with other established objectives of

international law and efforts to preserve human dignity.

For a very general overview of the prosecutors at Nuremberg, see here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/nuremberg/peopleevents/p_prosecutors.html. Defense Attorneys

Lawyers for the defense will have a dual mandate: attempting to clear the defendants and making a case for restraint on behalf of the international community. As you prepare the defense arguments, you may find versions of the arguments made in—and surrounding—the Leipzig Trials to be useful guides. To make this simulation more engaging, we’ve included two American defense lawyers that actually argued at the Tokyo Trials against Japanese officials, rather than at the Nuremberg Trials against German officials. These two lawyers should incorporate some of the defenses of the Japanese officials and creatively apply them to the cases of our two German officials.


!

Role of the Committee

As a major step towards the enforcement of international justice, the role of this committee is more complex than the role of a typical criminal court. Not only is the Nuremburg Trials committee charged with upholding the international laws and standards with regards to war crimes; the Nuremburg Trials participants must also take seriously their committee’s role as precedent for all other proceedings in the arena of international justice and international relations. Given the multifaceted nature of this committee’s role, deliberations of the committee will be divided roughly into two separate but related parts. First, to hear the facts of the cases at hand and to illuminate the respective innocence or guilt of the defendants, this committee will start by operating in precise judicial format (the operations of judicial format are described in the Committee Structure section below). The goal of the judicial segment of this committee is to answer the question of the defendants’ guilt or innocence. Delegates to this committee should bear in mind that to a large extent, debate will likely not center around whether or not those charged were truly involved in the administration of past wartime atrocities in a direct way. Indeed, with regards to what actions the defendants took during the war, this committee will likely find that uncovering the truth of what transpired in the war is not difficult. Rather, delegates in the committee will likely find that their time is best spent deliberating (1) the nature of culpability for criminal action in times of war, (2) the authority of this committee to enact certain sentences, and (3) the appropriate sentence length and description merited by the culpability of the perpetrators, once initial matters of fact are cleared up. Second, after determining the appropriate sentences for defendants, the Nuremburg Trials committee will move into the less formally structured general format. In general format (structure again described below), deliberations are less rigid with regards to procedure, and the goal of the committee shall be to develop explicit recommendations and standards for the administration of international justice, based off of the outcomes of the previous judicial deliberations. Ultimately, the goal of the segment of the committee is to answer very clearly the question of how war crimes should be handled by the international community. Judges and lawyers shall work to create a short resolution enumerating the degree to which actions in war, in the view of the Nuremburg Trials committee, should be criminalized, what the consequences of those actions should be, and how those consequences should be duly administered.


!

Structure of the Committee By it’s nature as one of the world’s first international criminal tribunals, the format of the Nuremburg Trials takes on a unique shape that makes it operate distinctly from any other deliberative international decision making body. Delegates to this committee will assume the role of either judge or lawyer. Judicial Format In the judicial segment of the committee, first the defendants, and then at intervals the witnesses, will be called in for official questioning by lawyers in the trials. In turn, lawyers will ask questions to those being interrogated; judges will be allowed to interrupt and ask further clarifying questions of their own, at the discretion of the committee chair. After interrogations of the defendant are complete—and until subsequent witnesses are summoned—lawyers will then begin their opening arguments as to why they believe the defendants innocent or guilty. Opening arguments are meant to be substantial speeches on the parts of the lawyers—4 to 5 minutes in length—and once completed, these will then be followed by questioning of the lawyers by the committee judges. After initial questioning of the lawyers, the committee will then move into a consistently structured round of deliberation by the judges. In these rounds of deliberation, the judges will each say their opinions regarding the case and pose any questions they feel must be answered. As these are not the final deliberations of the body and as such are semi-formal, lawyers may give speeches in this round of deliberations at the discretion of the chair. However, before any lawyer may speak, each judge must speak once, or explicitly decline to speak; furthermore, the speaking time of each lawyer must be no more than half of the time allotted for judges to speak in deliberations. At any point in the deliberations process after each judge has had the opportunity to speak once, a lawyer may introduce a motion to bring a new witness for interrogation or introduce a new piece of evidence to the committee. These requests must be submitted in writing to the chair prior to the motion; for new evidence that a lawyer wishes to submit, a summary description of the evidence and its significance must be provided by the lawyer with the written request. Motions to introduce a new witness or new evidence must be passed by a majority vote of the judges. Motions to reintroduce a previous witness for questioning may be entertained, but only at the discretion of the chair.


!

Once the witness or evidence has been dismissed by the lawyers, the committee reverts to a new period of deliberation by the judges. This process continues until all lines of questioning and argumentation have been exhausted, and the lawyers have nothing new to argue further. At this point, the committee will enter into strict deliberations with a two-thirds majority vote of the entire body; upon entering strict deliberations, each judge will be afforded an opportunity to offer final thoughts and ask fellow judges final questions regarding the case before them. As these final rounds of deliberations are strict in format, lawyers will not be allowed to speak under any circumstances. Once the judges feel that they have exhausted deliberations and are ready to cast a verdict, they will pass by a majority vote a motion to move into voting procedure. Voting procedure will be determined ad hoc based on the exact charges being voted upon. A rough summary of the judicial format of this committee, as described, is in list form below:

1. Opening speeches by the lawyers 2. Initial examination of the defendants 3. Initial questioning of the lawyers 4. Deliberation by the judges 5. Introduction of a witness or of evidence 6. If witness, examination of the witness; if evidence, examination of the evidence 7. Questioning of the lawyers 8. Second deliberation by the judges 9. (Repeat steps 5-8 until all deliberation and new lines of evidence are exhausted) 10. Closing speeches by the lawyers 11. Strict deliberation by the judges 12. Final judgment of the committee

General Format After the judges have reached verdicts on the sentences of the defendants, the committee will then enter the general format segment of deliberations. At this point, lawyers and judges will works to pass a resolution that details recommendations for how other questions of international justice be handled in the future. These recommendations should include coverage of the nature of the body or bodies that oversee international justice administration, standards for penalties, standards for the criminalization of actions, and definitions of culpability. The resolution passed by the committee in general format is supposed to reflect the views of both the lawyers and the judges of these cases, to incorporate the input of all those involved in the process of the Nuremburg Trials. Any resolution must be passed by a majority vote of all the committee members, and the committee may pass only one resolution in its deliberations.


!

Suggestions for Further Research ! 1) “General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. 2) The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, edited by George Ginsburgs and V.N. Kudriavtsev, (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990). 3) Karl Dönitz, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage, translated by R. H. Stevens as Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959). 4) David Blumenthal and Timothy McCormack, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007). 5) Alan E. Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers, The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and its Legacy (University of Nebraska Press, 2003).

Please also make sure you are registered on the delegate forum, your advisors should provide you with a sign up ink. For the latest information, updates, topic guides and more, visit Yale Model United Nations online at: http://ymun.yira.org

For the second year, YMUN will be offering a competitive essay competition. For the rules and guidelines visit: http://ymun.yira.org/essay-contest/

Interested in participating in a challenging new program for highly motivated and exceptional delegates? Apply for the Global Exchange Program at: http://ymun.yira.org/global-exchange/

Get connected and download the new Yale Model United Nations iPhone application: https://itunes.apple.com/tc/app/yale-model-united-nations/id721125366?mt=8 or search for Yale Model UN

Like Yale Model United Nations on Facebook and receive all the latest updates: https://www.facebook.com/yalemun

Stay up to date and follow Yale Model United Nations both before and during the conference: @YaleModelUN

Find the latest pictures on Yale Model United Nations’s Instagram: ymun: http://instagram.com/ymun


!

NOTES

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!i Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals: The Law of Armed Conflict, vol. II, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1968, p. 463; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Court,” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 11. ii “Exhibit Highlights in the First International War Crimes Tribunal,” The Harvard Law Bulletin, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2006/spring/gallery.php iii Ibid. iv The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under international law By Edoardo Greppi, Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Turin, Italy, International Committee of the Red Cross No. 835, p. 531-553, October 30, 1999. v “Commission of Responsibilities,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_of_Responsibilities vi “The Leipzeig trials; an account of the war criminals' trials and a study of German mentality,” Claud Mullins, London: H.F.&G. Witherby, 1921, http://archive.org/stream/leipzeigtrialsac00mull/leipzeigtrialsac00mull_djvu.txt. vii “Karkhov Trial,” American-Israeli Cooperative Initiative: Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/WarCrime34.html. viii Michael Bazyler, “Forgotten Trials of the Holocaust by Michael Bazyler,” The Hub on Venice, Nov 4 2011, http://www.thehubonvenice.com/2011/11/04/forgotten-trials-of-the-holocaust/. ix “The Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1946-1948), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX101.html. x Holly Meck, “The Tokyo Trials,” www.army.mil, Nov 18 2010, http://www.army.mil/article/48334/. xi Walter Schucking, The International Union of the Hague Conferences (Clarendon Press, 1918). xii “Judgment: The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawre.asp. xiii Anne E. Mahle, “Command Responsibility – An International Focus,” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/world_issues_com.html. xiv “Kelogg-Briand Pact 1928,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm. xv Karel Barto�ek, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7, page 5. xvi “Crimes Against the Peace,” http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/crimes-against-peace/ xvii Karel Barto�ek, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7, page 5. xviii “Herman Goering,” http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/hermann_goering.htm. xix “The Rise of Hitler,” http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/riseofhitler/burns.htm. xx “Herman Goering,” http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=62. xxi “Hitler Organizes the Luftwaffe,” http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hitler-organizes-luftwaffe. xxii “Herman Goering,” http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=62. xxiii “Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891-1980),” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/donitz_karl_admiral.shtml.


!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!xxiv “Karl Dönitz,”Lebendiges Museum Online, http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/biografien/DoenitzKarl/. xxv John Simkin, “Karl Doenitz,” Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERdoenitz.htm. xxvi “Karl Doenitz,” American-Israeli Cooperative Initiative: Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Doenitz.html. xxvii Kennedy Hickman, “World War II: Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz,” About.com, http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/naval/p/doenitz.htm. xxviii Karl Dönitz, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage, translated by R. H. Stevens as Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959). xxix John Simkin, “Karl Doenitz,” Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERdoenitz.htm.

xxx Donitz practiced unrestricted submarine warfare. Unrestricted submarine warfare occurs when submarines attack merchant ships without warning. It was controversial during World War I and deemed a breach of the rules of war. Germany’s use of restricted submarine warfare was a large reason why the U.S. entered the war in 1917. Though technically banned by the 1930 London Naval Treaty, unrestricted submarine warfare was a generally accepted practice in World War II. xxxi Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1949), 134 xxxii S.M. Ritchie, “The effectiveness of the leadership of Karl Dönitz,” Australian Defence College, Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/PublcnsGeddes2003_300310_EffectivenessoftheLeadership.pdf. xxxiii Kennedy Hickman, “World War II: Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz,” About.com, http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/naval/p/doenitz.htm.!

Documents

Nuremberg Trials Topic Guide