The Cato Institute

Taiwan

History

Discourse of nuclear weapons in Taiwan (Republic of China) is largely a part of its broader foreign

relations with the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan does not currently possess nuclear weapons.

However, it had pursued nuclear weapons proliferation during the Cold War, motivated primarily by

the looming nuclear program of its cross-strait rival, China, which conducted its first test in 1964. At

the time, Taiwan was recognized as the Republic of China by the United Nations, and had signed

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. Taiwan lost its UN seat under the

“China” label in 1971, and was supplanted by the People’s Republic of China.

Despite the political loss, the Taiwanese government has continued to adhere to peaceful nuclear

cooperation agreements, including the Section 123 Agreement with the United States.1 The U.S.

Department of Energy describes the agreement as an avenue “for cooperation in other areas, such

as technical exchanges, scientific research, and safeguards discussions,” and that in order for a

country to enter into these exchanges, it must “commit itself to adhering to U.S.-mandated nuclear

nonproliferation norms.”2

Historically, the issue of nuclear weapons has been a contentious issue for the Taiwanese people and

government alike, virtually completely fueled by the security dilemma from China’s nuclear arsenal

just minutes away from Taiwan’s shores.

In 1995, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui spoke to the National Assembly about Taiwan’s nuclear

capabilities as a passive-aggressive “reminder” to China, which made international headlines.3 He

expressed that Taiwan “should re-study the question of nuclear weapons from a long-term point of

view,” and that, “Everyone knows we had had the plan before.” Lee eventually backtracked his

rhetoric and “immediately moved to reaffirm that, despite Taiwan’s capabilities, it ‘will never change

its stance on developing nuclear weapons.’ Etel Solingen, President of the International Studies

Association, said the move was due to the tempering influence of the international community and

Taiwan’s national image.

“The concern with image had a very specific referent, involving Taiwan’s ability to retain

global access and economic viability even as its diplomatic relations with the rest of the

world had dwindled over the years under China’s unrelenting pressure … Efforts to retain

international access dictated an ever tighter economic relationship with China that was

capable of defusing tensions across the Straits.

1 Behrens, Carl. "Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues." Issue Brief for Congress, 2006, 3–17. Accessed June 25, 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IB10091.pdf. 2 nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacefulcooperation 3 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/29/news/29iht-taiwan_4.html

“Following China’s test-firing of missiles near Taiwan in 1995, a National Assembly deputy

urged the government to consider nuclear weapons takes long-term study’ and that ‘Taiwan

used to have the capability to make nuclear weapons but it caused international concern and

damaged the country’s image,’ reassuring that Taiwan will not develop a nuclear arsenal.”

Chen administration

U.S. State Department official Robert Sutter describes the nuclear weapons debate in Taipei as

having been “quiet and seemingly resolved for many years,” but recently being revisited due to

contentious domestic debates on the usage and subsidization of nuclear energy. A large number of

political elites assert that recent nuclear energy debates have added “to powerful circumstances that

push Taiwan toward a nuclear-free future.” Sutter states that “such circumstances add to reasons

why Taiwan decision makers would eschew nuclear weapons development and strengthen Taiwan’s

growing interest in a position as a world leader in fostering and supporting rigorous global nuclear

non-proliferation,” add that these Taiwan policy trends are “in line with American interests and

policies.”4

Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists—a nonprofit organization that

advocates for arms control—published a memoir in 2010 in which he suggested that Chen Shui-

bian, Taiwan’s nationalistic and conservative president from 2000 to 2008, had been sanctioning the

secretive development of nuclear weapons.5 He asserted, citing a “well-informed source,” that the

purpose might have been to “bargain with the United States, or cause trouble on the mainland,” and

that through secondary sources, he heard ‘We still have a military project going in the nuclear area.’”

Stone also recalled reacting to a Taipei Times editorial which called for the proliferation of a nuclear

deterrent against China because, at the contemporary moment, “Taiwan has to hold out until the

U.S. comes to its aid,” the speed of which was described as “tortoise-like.”6

“Some people in Taiwan think this means that Taiwan can hitch a free ride on the back of

U.S. strategic interests. One of the more foolish, and distressingly widespread, follies we

have heard from the pan-green camp is that Taiwan does not need to spend money on

upgrading its military effectiveness because the U.S. is compelled to defend it, come what

may. This is utter rubbish. But is it any more idiotic than the nature of the debate about the

kind of weapons Taiwan needs?

“It is current U.S. policy to prevent nuclear proliferation, or so Washington says. The irony

is that in preventing Taiwan many years ago from working on its own nuclear deterrent, the

U.S. may one day risk a nuclear exchange with China because of Taiwan. To avoid this, it

might be useful to think about how Taiwan might acquire the means to stop China even

thinking about an attack.”

4 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Robert-Sutter.pdf 5 http://catalyticreligion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Defending-Civilization-Using-Catalytic-Ideas-Jeremy-Stone.pdf 6 www.taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2004/08/13/2003198573

It is worth mentioning that the Taipei Times’ editorial board is notably pro-independence and wary

of the PRC. Its reaction to Stone’s memoir was likewise suspicious of China’s nuclear prowess,

proclaiming that a “nuclear-armed China continues to threaten Taiwan,” and calling Stone’s rhetoric

alarmist.7 The piece says U.S. and Chinese intelligence prevents Taiwanese nuclear proliferation,

stating, “That the Chen administration, for all its faults, would have engaged in nuclear adventurism

stretches credulity. Though it has the technical know-how to do so, Taiwan could hardly have

launched a nuclear weapons program without the U.S., let alone China, becoming aware of it.”

Ma administration

Ultimately, Chen was succeeded by Ma Ying-jeou, a foreign policy liberal whose party ousted Chen’s

in the Taiwanese legislature. The Nuclear Threat Initiative stated that “compared to their low point

during Chen’s presidency, relations between Taipei and Beijing have improved significantly under

Ma,” who, in December 2008, called for the establishment of “‘military confidence-building

measures,’ including ‘prudent consideration [of] the withdrawal of missiles deployed against

Taiwan.”8 The NTI observed that Ma’s outreach “appeared to be acknowledged by Chinese

President Hu Jintao in a speech less than three weeks later, which mentioned engagement and

exchange ‘on military issues and exploratory discussions on the issue of establishing a mechanism of

mutual trust for military security.’” Further manifestations of warming relations included military

budget cuts under the Ma administration.9

Because internal polarization on the issue of nuclear energy also gave rise to extended debates on

nuclear weapons, it is important to analyze public opinion on the former. There are currently three

nuclear power plants on the island, but the current Ma administration has promised to cease all

construction of a fourth plant after massively scaled protests in Taipei against nuclear power. The

Christian Science Monitor called the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan once a “fringe movement” that

“is going mainstream.”10 Indeed, nearly 60 percent of Taiwanese believe nuclear power would yield

greater risks than benefits, and “they fear a disaster akin to Japan’s 2011 Fukushima earthquake and

reactor meltdown. Like Japan, Taiwan sits in a highly seismic area.”

According to The Monitor, more than 95 percent of Taiwan’s energy is important from neighboring

countries. Supporters of nuclear power argue that fusion’s relative cleanliness and high yield of

electricity against coal and oil should incentivize domestic production. Nuclear power accounts for

about 20 percent of the island’s total energy production.

While few studies on Taiwanese public opinion on nuclear weaponry specifically are available online,

ample sources exist for views on nuclear energy, which may help illustrate the general Taiwanese

sentiment toward nuclear power—weaponized or not—among the public.

7 www.taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2010/09/14/2003482847 8 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/taiwan/ 9 http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/01/20/192791/MND-considers.htm 10 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0728/Taiwan-s-nuclear-power-plants-are-magnets-for-protesters-and-snorkelers

South Korea

History

In the way Taiwan’s limited but existential nuclear ambitions are primarily fueled by China’s own

nuclear capacity, South Korea’s ambitions are fueled by its aggressive northern neighbor, the DPRK,

which by one official measure has around one or two dozen simple nuclear weapons.11 South Korea

does not currently possess nuclear weapons. However, like Taiwan it has pursued them in the past,

and only up until 2008, the Republic of Korea possessed a stockpile of chemical weapons of mass

destruction (which it had to declare to the international community as part of its obligation under

the Chemical Weapons Convention). The ROK government has since destroyed them.

The ROK has had both the technological capability and raw materials to produce a nuclear weapon

since the late Cold War, but has chosen to not to undertake its production. It first floated the idea in

1970, when the United States announced it would withdraw its military forces from South Korea, so

that the ROK would be able to sanction an independent nuclear program for defense against China

and the Soviet Union. It founded a Weapons Exploitation Committee shortly after U.S. withdrawal,

through which the country sought after the construction of plutonium reprocessing facilities.12

South Korea’s nuclear program officially ceased with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which

the ROK signed in 1975. However, President Park Chung-hee declared that the Republic of Korea

should seek a balance-of-power strategy in the East Asian sphere by acquiring nuclear weapons, and

a large amount of research was clandestinely conducted in South Korea up until the U.S. pressured

France—Korea’s primary source of funding for its reprocessing technology—to withdraw support

later that year.13 One scholar noted two of Park’s quotes in interviews that alarmed officials in the

U.S. government with regard to that incident.14

“In July 1975, Korea concluded an agreement with France for a loan for the construction of

nuclear reprocessing facilities and two nuclear power plants. This was undoubtedly the most

risky action taken by Park in his attempt to reverse the effects of the withdrawal of U.S.

forces from Korea. In his interview with The Washington Post on 12 June, for example, Park

declared that, ‘Although Korea has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, we do not

develop them presently.’

“And Park went further, stating publicly, as well as in a meeting with Washington officials,

that, ‘If the U.S. nuclear umbrella is to be removed, Korea will have to develop nuclear

weapons.’ This public display of Park’s intentions—especially in affirming that Korea’s

nuclear option would entirely depend on a U.S. security commitment—clearly unnerved key

policy-makers in Washington.”

11 http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_production_16Aug2012.pdf 12 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/index.html 13 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/ 14 Kim, Hyung. Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 304.

Indeed, the Nautilus Institute asserted that Park’s actions and rhetoric toward those aspirations were

reckless and did more to escalate security dilemmas in the Orient than prevent them. Among those

costs, a report asserts, is that the program had no tangible benefit and only isolated the South from

the international community.15

“Declassified U.S. Embassy Seoul cables related to nuclear proliferation during the Park

Chung Hee era show that, far from making South Korea more secure, Park’s toying with the

nuclear option made him an unpredictable and even dangerous client who needed restraint

in the eyes of U.S. policymakers … Nothing could justify North Korea’s nuclear weapons

more than South Korea reactivating its nuclear weapons program. Park sought nuclear

weapons mostly for political and symbolic reasons, not military gains, and South Korea paid

a high price for his failed programs.”

Public support

South Korean public support for nuclear proliferation has increased in light of North Korea’s recent

nuclear tests and rhetoric. In the past, “talk of South Korea arming with its own nuclear weapon

used to be taboo in the country,” but a February 2013 poll by the Asan Institute found that, in the

wake of a third DPRK test, 66 percent of respondents believe their country should begin assembling

preemptive missiles—especially because they feel less and less hopeful that the United States would

provide South Korea with that “nuclear umbrella” in the case of an attack from the North. Further,

only 48 percent of respondents had faith in a U.S. nuclear response, a 7 percent decrease from

2011.16

Figure 1: South Korean Support for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

15 http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/park-chung-hee-the-cia-and-the-bomb/ 16 http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-46-the-fallout-south-korean-public-opinion-following-north-koreas-third-nuclear-test/

Figure 2: South Korean Support for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

The report continues:

“Immediately following the test, 63% stated that they felt insecure due to the test. In the

same survey the North Korean nuclear test was cited by a plurality (40%) as the greatest

social risk, followed by violent crime (34%), and fatal diseases such as cancer (13%). One

interesting finding to come out of that survey was that among the 36% who reported not

feeling insecure due to the North’s nuclear test a plurality (35%) reported not feeling

threatened because they viewed the North’s nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in

negotiations with the United States. The next largest segment (32%) cited the fact that they

believed there was very little possibility for North Korea to strike South Korea with a

nuclear missile.

“South Korea as a nation is becoming more confident in its place in the region and the

world, and as such it is beginning to redefine its role in both. While the Park administration

will begin its term by largely maintaining the hardline policies of the Lee administration, the

door for engagement will be left open. What is more concerning, however, is the increasing

talk and support for a nuclear weapons program. Such a decision … would have important

implications not only for South Korea but for international arms control regimes.”

There is a notable lack of consensus by age cohort in the responses; younger generations are more

hawkish against the DPRK, while older generations are less so, believing that peaceful reunification

remains a possibility and should continue to be a national priority. Indeed, it was “South Koreans in

their 20s who were most likely to see the renewal of open hostilities as possible,” and the youngest,

“while much more progressive on a host of social issues, are decidedly security conservative.”

[The full study can be found here.]

Gallup Korea also conducted a similar poll and found that more than 64 percent of respondents

favored Seoul developing its own nuclear program as a deterrent to North Korea; 28 percent said

they were opposed to such a program.17

Elites

Political figures like Chung Mong-joon, a lawmaker who ran for president against Park Geun-hye in

2012, stated: “We, the Korean people, have been duped by North Korea for the last 20 to 30 years

and it is now time for South Koreans to face the reality and do something that we need to do. The

nuclear deterrence can be the only answer. We have to have nuclear capability.” 18 He was later

quoted in The New York Times in stating that, “The Americans don’t feel the North Korean nuclear

weapons as a direct threat. At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans

will cover us with [their] nuclear umbrella.”19

Perhaps even more aggressively, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok echoed

pro-proliferation sentiments, and responded to North Korea’s threat to attack the South by asserting

that, “If North Korea is to attack the South with its nuclear weapons ... Kim Jong Un’s regime will

cease to exist on the face of Earth.” 20

In response to Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in early 2013, Seoul unveiled a cruise missile, which the

government claims to be “so precise that it can target ‘a specific window of a North Korean military

commander's office.’” President Park’s administration was scrutinized for this perceived escalation

of tensions, but she defended the program two years later, stating in an interview that “the North

Koreans continue to enhance the sophistication of their nuclear capabilities and also develop a wide

range of missiles. So it is incumbent upon us to fashion a response. In the future, this missile will be

a key element to our Korean Air and Missile Defense System.”21

Additionally, nuclear energy is a prominent issue in South Korea. The government under Park has

pushed for large-scale improvements to its nuclear energy infrastructure. In April 2015, the ROK

and U.S. governments signed a nuclear cooperation pact that approved South Korean research “for

its fleet of 23 nuclear reactors,” while continuing to prohibit the Koreans from producing their own

fuel, The Wall Street Journal reported.22 Complicating discourse, however, has largely been that,

“Washington has been resistant, concerned about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.” Indeed,

as it did in 1975, the contemporary United States has played an active role in quelling South Korean

fervor for nuclear proliferation.

17 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/21/2013022100645.html 18 http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/04/05/1826421/south-korea-nuclear-weapons/ 19 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?pagewanted=all 20 http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear/ 21 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-interview-with-south-korean-president-park-geun-hye/2015/06/11/15abee3e-1039-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html 22 http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-south-korea-reach-revised-nuclear-deal-1429705290

Park herself has rejected on pursuing nuclear capabilities for weaponry, but has called on Chinese

General Secretary Xi Jinping to cooperate on preventing the DPRK from furthering its nuclear

program. President Xi “will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. [The Chinese believe] that if

we let the ongoing enhancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons continue, eventually we will face

a situation that will be beyond our control.”

Opposition

Much of the opposition to nuclear proliferation comes from intellectuals. Many South Korean

scholars who are opposed to ROK nuclear proliferation are less concerned about Pyongyang’s

aggression and more the potential international reaction and domestic consequences of the ROK’s

actions. South Korea is 85 percent dependent on trade; less than 15 percent of South Korean goods

are found or grown in the country. Trade sanctions would, in the views of Wooksik Cheong,

Director of the Korea Peace Network, cripple the South Korean economy.23

“Economic sanctions on us from the international community would be enormous—

affecting all segments of the Korean economy. As in the case of North Korea, Iran and Iraq,

ban would be imposed on all things that could be used in making nuclear weapons. They

would include bearings, time pieces, telephones, rubber, salt, cement, fertilizers,

semiconductor, automobiles, ships, steel and other materials we import. North Korea has

uranium that we don’t have and Iran has oil that is non-existent in the ROK. The ROK is

much more deeply imbedded in the international economy than North Korea or Iran. This

means that the ROK would have to pay a much higher price in the event of developing

nuclear weapons than North Korea or Iran.

“It is impossible to secretly develop nuclear weapons. If we are found red-handed as in the

case of 2004 the trouble would be much more serious than that in that year. So, if we want

to develop nuclear bombs, we should be ready to undergo various economic sanctions and

suffer difficulties. Offhand, the ROK would have to face an electric power shortage crisis.

North Korea has plenty of uranium mines that the ROK does not have and therefore we

have to import uranium from overseas. But there would be put ban on the country that tries

to export uranium to us. Without uranium, the ROK would not be able to produce even the

electric power. Nearly 40 percent of the total output of electric power generation in the

ROK comes from nuclear power plants. We would also have to face a medical crisis. There

would be no X-ray or CT tests and treatment of cancer would be substantially affected as it

is heavily dependent on radioactive isotope.”

Professor Han Yong-sup at the Korea National Defense University added that if Seoul were to start

assembling nuclear weapons, “nonproliferation in the region would soon fall apart” due to a security

dilemma, and that “Japan and Taiwan could follow the suit. Then, a domino effect of nuclear

proliferation will result.” Additionally, professor Yang Zhaohui at China’s Peking University argues

that though PRC has been notably irked by the DPRK’s recent belligerence and is a strong

economic ally to South Korea, a nuclear-armed South would still negatively “affect Sino–U.S. ties.”

23 http://koreapost.com/news/view.html?section=158&category=167&no=539

Japan

History

Japan—both in its government and its people—has historically been far less interested in nuclear

proliferation than its South Korean neighbors. However, some scholars have started to see changes

in that zeitgeist, and that talk of developing a nuclear deterrent against both the North Koreans and

the Chinese is becoming more and more common; however, that claim has been challenged. Japan

does not currently possess a nuclear weapon, but like the ROK and Taiwan, it wields the capacity

and resources to construct one in a rapid span of time. By some estimates, Japan—if it so wanted—

would be a nuclear state in less than 12 months, and some scholars argue it could be done in six.

For the entirety of the Cold War and the majority of the post-Cold War period, an overwhelming

percentage of Japanese people have opposed nuclear proliferation. Japanese attitudes toward nuclear

weapons unfolded after the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which “made the enormous

destructive power and costly long-term effects of nuclear weapons clear to the Japanese public.” As

part of a yearly tradition, Japanese leaders travel to both cities’ ground zeroes to pay their respects to

victims, and public support “[forces] Japanese government officials to reiterate and reaffirm Japan’s

anti-nuclear commitments.” Indeed, the “annual ritual denunciation of nuclear weapons is a defining

feature of contemporary Japan’s national identity,” in the same way “Thanksgiving is a defining

feature of the national identity of the United States.” 24

An important internal factor in Japan’s political culture against nuclear proliferation is Article IX of

the Japanese Constitution, which seems to imply that simply possessing a nuclear deterrent for the

purposes of elevating Japan’s military prowess against foreign nations is illegal and unconstitutional:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people

forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as

means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,

land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of

belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy

that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance.

“Public opinion polling consistently confirms very high levels of Japanese opposition to the

introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan and to the development of Japanese nuclear

weapons. This opposition is not diminishing over time. Recent polls show that the large

popular majorities in favor of Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapon state are the same or

higher than polls taken in the late 1960s at the height of the anti-nuclear movement. Even

after the North Korean nuclear test of 2006, 80 percent of Japanese polled said Japan should

continue to prevent the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan. Some U.S. defense

24 http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/japan-american-nuclear-posture.pdf

experts discount the Japanese public’s opposition to nuclear weapons and place greater

weight in the opinions of the Japanese ruling elite. But even the Japanese elite shows very

high rates of disapproval. NIRA, a respected semigovernmental Japanese research

organization, conducted a poll shortly after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998.

NIRA found that 86 percent of the “informed” Japanese elite, compared with 93 percent of

the general public, would still not choose to develop nuclear weapons even if the U.S.-Japan

Security Union of Concerned Scientists Treaty were dissolved. In this regard popular and

elite opinion is consistent with the military judgment of the conservative Japanese defense

officials who authored the 1995 JDA study on Japan’s nuclear weapons.

“There appear to be dramatic differences between Japanese and American perceptions of

Japanese concerns and intentions regarding nuclear weapons policy. In a consensus opinion

firmly held for more than four decades, Japanese security officials and experts see the

acquisition of Japan’s own nuclear deterrent as counter to overall Japanese interests. In

contrast, some U.S. officials and experts, who seem to take a more narrow military view of

the issue, see a serious risk that Japan will seek to acquire nuclear weapons—serious enough

that the United States should constrain U.S. decisions on nuclear weapons policy, even when

it runs counter to the president’s nonproliferation and arms control policy. Both

governments should address this misunderstanding at the earliest possible opportunity.”

Abe administration

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken a far more hawkish stance on Japan’s foreign policy,

and announced in 2014 his intentions to free up the possibility of mobilizing its military, called the

Self-Defense Forces, for the first time in 60 years. The so-called “reinterpretation” of the wording in

Article IX would allow Japan’s military “to take such actions as come to the aid of an American ship

under attack, or shoot down a North Korean missile heading toward the United States,” as part of

its collective self-defense agreement with the U.S.25 It was deemed by many commentators a severely

radical change to Japanese foreign policy that could mark the beginning in a shift in the balance of

power in East Asia.

As was the case for Taiwan and South Korea, the United States has historically expressed concern

over the potential for Japanese proliferation. Abe’s rhetoric has been noted by some as having

“sparked speculation both in Japan and abroad that the U.S. government is worried about the Abe

government’s belligerence and may be reconsidering extending the 1988 cooperation agreement …

which allows Japan to recover and store plutonium derived from fuel the United States supplied for

Japan’s power plants.” Indeed, as one New York Times scholar puts it, “If Mr. Abe keeps pushing

ahead with his confrontational agenda, his government may lose Washington’s support. In that case,

Japan will either have to submit to the same rules that apply to other countries on nuclear materials

or isolate itself by openly flouting them.”

Indeed, because “China is Japan’s largest trading partner and relations with South Korea, despite the

current tension over historical issues,” its interdependence with the two is “growing deeper

25 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japan-moves-to-permit-greater-use-of-its-military.html

economically and culturally. Any attempt by Tokyo to produce nuclear weapons could create a huge

backlash in both countries that is sure to negatively impact the domestic economy. Nor would the

United States likely welcome a nuclear-armed Japan, especially if it led to a rupture of relations with

South Korea, where the U.S. also has military bases, and antagonized China.”26

The U.S. Congressional Research Service declared in 2009 that “Japan going nuclear could set off an

arms race with China, South Korea and Taiwan. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision

without U.S. support, the move could indicate a lack of trust in the U.S. commitment to defend

Japan. “An erosion in the U.S.–Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia.”

Interestingly, however, when the conversation excludes dialogue on nuclear weapons, the United

States is actually supportive of Abe’s push for greater Japanese military involvement. The Obama

administration welcomed the policy announcement for expanding military power to protect its allies,

stating that Japan’s new ability to involve itself in protecting its allies would “do more within the

framework of our alliance.”27 Chinese officials, unsurprisingly, were alarmed by Abe’s rhetoric. A

foreign ministry official declared that in light of Japan’s push for a more assertive military, China had

“every reason to be highly vigilant on Japan's true intentions and its future development.”

It is mostly unclear if this shift in policy necessarily signifies a likewise positive trend in support for

nuclear proliferation among Abe administration officials. Doing so would be disastrous to approval

ratings in the Japanese political elite, and any collusion between American and Japanese scientists for

the purposes of proliferation or any “secret agreements to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japan

would outrage a good portion of the public.”28 Abe has repeatedly declared that Japan will “play a

leading role in the international community [in nuclear disarmament]” and that “I pledge to make

every effort toward the realization of permanent world peace so that there is no recurrence of the

tragedy caused by nuclear weapons,” though pundits are ambivalent as to whether this rhetoric is

genuine or more to pander to pacifist cohorts. 29, 30

Other viewpoints

Former Minister of Finance Shoichi Nakagawa and Governor of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara are two

prominent politicians in Japanese politics that both have explicitly pushed for nuclear weapons

proliferation. The former declared in 2009, in the wake of North Korean nuclear tests, that, “It is

common sense worldwide that in a purely military sense it is nuclear that can counteract nuclear.

North Korea has taken a step toward a system whereby it can shoot without prior notice. We have

to discuss countermeasures.”31 Nakagawa seemed to support ambiguous proliferation so as to keep

the North Koreans and the Chinese guessing. On the other hand, the latter asserted Japan should

26 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/10/national/history/going-nuclear-close-japan-come/#.VaO6GvlVikr 27 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/shinzo-abe-plan-lift-japan-ban-fighting-conflicts-overseas 28 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be-awesome-at-it/ 29 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201408070039 30 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/kato-ambiguities-of-japans-nuclear-policy.html?_r=0 31 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/5187269/Japan-should-develop-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-North-Korea-threat.html

also develop nuclear weapons, but went further to state that Japan develop them publicly rather than

secretly. In 2011, he said:32

“All our enemies: China, North Korea and Russia—all close neighbors—have nuclear

weapons. Is there another country in the world in a similar situation? People talk about the

cost and other things but the fact is that diplomatic bargaining power means nuclear

weapons. All the members of the [UN] Security Council have them.

“China wouldn't have dared lay a hand on the Senkakus [if we had nuclear weapons]. If the

Sato administration had unilaterally developed nuclear weapons then, for a start North

Korea wouldn't have taken so many of our citizens. We should develop sophisticated

weapons and sell them abroad. Japan made the best fighters in the world before America

crushed the industry. We could get that back.”

Shifting opinion

Indeed, in 1998, 82 percent of Japanese respondents in a Gallup poll believed the development of

nuclear weapons was by and large a negative thing for global peace, and “nearly 90 percent of all

Japanese said there was no need for Japan to possess the atomic bomb in the future.” However, the

climate is changing. In the same poll, Gallup concluded that “while all major societal groups

examined in the poll feel the development of the bomb was bad, Japanese men and adults in their

twenties and thirties are about twice as likely as women and older Japanese to say that development

of the atomic bomb was a good thing.” Additionally, “those in their twenties and thirties were more

likely than were respondents in other groups to think that it was likely that their country would be

attacked with nuclear weapons.”33

On the flip side, the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in the wake of the 2011 Japan earthquake and

tsunami may present a very prominent effect on public opinion in the opposite direction. In one

public opinion survey: “Fifty-nine percent of respondents said they are against the government’s use

of nuclear plants for economic growth, compared with 27 percent in favor. Fifty-eight percent also

said they are opposed to restarting reactors, while 28 percent said they support a resumption of

reactor operations.”34

This appears to be of some significance because support for maintaining nuclear power seems to be

tethered to support for proliferation, at least among conservatives, because of its military potential.

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of

International Studies, proclaimed “Hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power

program as the best they can do. They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a

deterrent.”35

32 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-must-develop-nuclear-weapons-warns-tokyo-governor-2235186.html 33 http://www.gallup.com/poll/4456/gallup-japan-poll-ownership-nuclear-weapons-threat.aspx 34 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201306100070 35 http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976

Australia

History

Australia does not currently possess nuclear weapons, and it never developed any in the past, even

though Australia is the third-largest exporter of uranium in the world. Perhaps the most Western

nation in the East Asian–Oceanic sphere, Australia did collaborate with the United Kingdom on

testing nuclear weapons a total of 12 separate times in the Australian Outback between 1952 and

1957. The tests were, unsurprisingly, controversial. Indeed, “the secrecy … and the remoteness of

the tests from major population centres meant that public opposition to the tests and awareness of

the risks involved grew very slowly. But as the ban-the-bomb movement gathered momentum in

Western societies throughout the 1950s, so too did opposition to the British tests in Australia.” In

one opinion poll taken in 1957, “49 percent of the Australian public opposed to the tests and only

39 percent were in favour.”36

During World War II, Australia was one of the main researchers for the Allied Powers in producing

chemical weapons of mass destruction, such as mustard gas, adamsite, and CN gas. In the decade

following the war, Australia also looked into acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the United

Kingdom or the United States as early as 1956. However, Prime Minister Robert Menzies and his

administration declared that domestic nuclear proliferation would be unwise and difficult due to

economic cost and international politics, believing instead that “such weapons should be left in the

hands of the three great powers that already had them—the United States, United Kingdom and the

USSR—and in those of no other.”37

Nevertheless, like most highly developed states, Australia easily possesses the military capacity to

deliver a nuclear weapon. The time it takes for it to create a nuclear weapon is directly dependent on

Australia’s nuclear energy infrastructure, which is less robust than Japan’s. Nuclear energy was

mostly denounced by the Australian public until it saw a resurgence of interest due to the pro-

nuclear policies of Prime Minister John Howard. Current PM Tony Abbott has generally supported

the expansion of nuclear energy, though this remains at odds with public opinion, which is discussed

under the Abbot administration subtitle.

Gillard administration

Then-PM Julia Gillard stated that “Australia supports the exploration of legal frameworks for the

eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of a nuclear weapons convention,”

but her government was heavily criticized for a move that some saw as supportive of pro-nuclear

weapons policies in other countries, namely India, which has often been at war to some capacity

against another nuclear weapons power, Pakistan.

36 http://aic.gov.au/publications/previous%20series/lcj/1-20/wayward/ch16.html 37 http://nautilus.org/apsnet/0623a-broinowski-html/

In 2013, the PM pushed for the selling of Australian uranium to India, a nuclear country, for energy

and peaceful research purposes, arguing that Australia’s previous ban on uranium sales to India “had

become an obstacle in our relationship.”38 The environmental wing of the Australian government

starkly objected to the agreement, pointing to India’s lack of signature on the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Green Party spokesman Scott Ludlum proclaimed, “I'm extremely concerned

that Australian uranium will find itself one way or another fueling a sub-continental arms race. I

think it's a mistake and the Australian government won’t be able to say it wasn’t warned.”39

The contemporary Australian Department of Defence states that its official position is “clear” in its

ideological and philosophical opposition to nuclear proliferation, though the nuances of its position

remains somewhat contradictory.

“We are committed to the goal of world free of nuclear weapons. The government has

consistently said that it wants to see deep and irreversible reductions in the numbers of

nuclear weapons held by all nuclear-armed states. However, the government acknowledges

that nuclear disarmament is a long-term process and accepts that, until it is achieved, nuclear

weapons are part of the strategic environment. In this context, the credibility of U.S.

extended nuclear deterrence contributes to international security and stability.

“These initiatives are about improving cooperation between Australia, the U.S., and other

countries in the region. They are not directed at China or at any other country. Our alliance

with the United States means that, for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely

on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia. That

protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed

the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.”40

As is the case for the three aforementioned countries, Australia is dependent upon the United States’

so-called nuclear umbrella, and that though the Oceanic country “has long and actively supported

nuclear disarmament ... and worked tirelessly toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons” it

“will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence” as part of its balance-of-power strategy. Gillard pushed

for a stronger posture alongside the United States through a renewal of the ANZUS Alliance, a

military alliance among the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand.

Abbott administration

Some have pointed to the paradoxical line of thinking that Australia is both opposed to nuclear

weapons yet also dependent on and supportive of America’s nuclear weapons program. Australia’s

decision to not participate in a UN joint statement denouncing nuclear weapons in 2013 is an

example of this, as Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop’s asserted several months later that “the

horrendous humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are precisely why deterrence has

38 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/prime-minister-julia-gillard-will-start-negotiations-to-sell-uranium-to-india/story-e6frg6n6-1226496590713 39 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/gillard-defends-decision-to-negotiate-selling-uranium-to-india/story-fn59nm2j-1226496712384 40 http://www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/disclosures/421_1213_Documents.pdf

worked.”41 Bishop is a member of Abbot’s cabinet. Abbot’s himself stated in an interview on the

recent U.S.–Iran nuclear deal that the world is more peaceful without nuclear weapons, echoing his

predecessors’ general view on the subject matter. 42

“We give it a cautious welcome but I probably should stress the caution at least as much as

the welcome … We certainly want a nuclear-free Middle East. The Middle East is the most

unstable and dangerous part of the world. If any country in the Middle East were to get

nuclear weapons, that would be a horrifying escalation of tension … If any further country

gets nuclear weapons I suspect there will be a lot of other countries rushing for them.”

In a Weekend Australian poll, Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd’s pledge to not build any nuclear

reactors “is backed by most voters. Just 35 percent of voters support the construction of nuclear

power plants across Australia—down from 38 percent in May,” while nearly 40 percent of voters

remain “strongly opposed to nuclear power.”

Howard, on the other hand, has maintained that, “If we are to plan for the future … the next 20, 30,

40, 50 years, you have to take nuclear into account. We have the largest uranium mine in the world

and we have about 38 percent of the world’s recoverable uranium reserves so we would be

nationally indolent if we didn’t take advantage of that enormous gift that providence has left us.”

Abbott has chimed in as well, stating that “I would be failing Australia if I didn’t stand up for a

sensible, rational consideration of the nuclear [energy] option.”

Like in Taiwan, public opinion research has only been conducted in Australia on a small scope, and

the issue itself is not particularly salient among Australians. However, surveys on nuclear energy

research can offer a general idea as to how the Australians view the prospects of nuclear weapons.

In almost all sects, nuclear weapons are detested in Australia. Nuclear energy remains more divisive.

Activist opposition

The alleged ease of weapon proliferation once energy technology is attained has been a major talking

point to anti-nuclear activists. Australian activist Jim Green states that, “All nuclear power concepts

fail to address the single greatest problem with nuclear power—its repeatedly-demonstrated

connection to the proliferation of [WMDs], not just any old WMDs but nuclear weapons—the most

destructive, indiscriminate and immoral of all weapons.”43

James Action, Nuclear Policy Program Director at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

states that nuclear energy proliferation “can take place in very small facilities and if the technology

spreads then potential proliferators could use laser enrichment technology secretly to try and build

nuclear weapons.”44

41 http://foreignminister.gov.au/articles/Pages/2014/jb_ar_140214.aspx?ministerid=4 42 http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jul/15/tony-abbott-welcomes-iran-nuclear-deal-with-great-caution 43 http://www.resilience.org/stories/2009-08-25/nuclear-weapons-and-fourth-generation-nuclear-power 44 http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/08/01/nuclear-enrichment-revolution-meets-weapon-fears