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OVERVIEWANALYSISTREATIESOFFICIAL DOCUMENTSFACILITIES NUCLEAR BIOLOGICALMISSILE CHEMICALChemical Last updated: November, 2013

Since the early 1980s, Syria has made efforts to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemicalweapons. Regional security concerns, and most notably Syria's adversarial relationship withIsrael, represent the most likely present-day motivation behind Syria's chemical weaponsprogram.

Specifically, a series of disastrous military defeats to Israel in 1967, 1973, and 1982, followedby the weakening of Arab unity against Israel following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peacetreaty and Israel's presumed acquisition of nuclear weapons, provided impetus for Syria topursue a strategic deterrent against the conventional and nuclear Israeli threats. [1]Historically, Syria elected not to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stating that

while it supports a region-wide ban on WMD, it could not unilaterally renounce chemicalweapons as long as Israel continued to pose a threat to its security. [2]

Damascus has continued its pursuit of chemical weapons despite the damage to itsinternational reputation and the rising costs of evading international export controls onchemical weapons materials. Since embarking on a CW program in the 1970's, Syria hasobtained both chemical agents and CW-capable missiles from foreign suppliers. [3]Currently, Syria's ability to produce CW agents and delivery systems appears to remainheavily dependent on foreign support for materials and expertise. Since 2005, Jane'sDefense has reported on alleged Iranian assistance to Syria in upgrading and enhancing its

CW production infrastructure. [4]

On 12 September 2013 Syria submitted an instrument of accession to the Organization forthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and on 14 September deposited theinstrument of accession to the UN Secretary General, requesting to join the ChemicalWeapons Convention. [5] The reversal came amid speculation that the Assad regime usedchemical weapons in the ongoing Syrian conflict, and calls by the United States for limitedair strikes. The CWC has entered into force for Syria on 14 October 2013. [6]

On 16 September 2013 the United Nations released a report confirming the use of chemical

weapons outside of Damascus on 21 August 2013. [7] While the report did not apportionresponsibility to either party in the Syrian civil war, the U.S. and other western nations have


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stated that the details of the report clearly confirm that the Assad regime is responsible. [8]The UN is conducting additional investigations into the use of chemical weapons in theSyrian conflict. [9]

On 27 September, the OPCW approved a disarmament plan for Syria's chemical weapons

and related infrastructure. [10] The UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution tosecure and destroy Syria's chemical weapons. [11] The joint resolution called for thedestruction of Syria's chemical weapons production capability by 1 November 2013, and theelimination of all chemical weapons by mid-2014. [12] On 11 October, the UN and theOPCW approved a Joint Mission to oversee the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons andrelated infrastructure. [13] While the Joint Mission has oversight, the Syrian government isresponsible for carrying out the destruction process. [14] On 31 October the Joint Missionannounced that Syria met the 1 November deadline of eliminating all weapons productionand mixing capabilities. [15] The UN has concluded that it is impossible to destroy all ofSyrias chemical weapons on Syrian territory. [16] The UN and US are currently exploring

options for destroying Syrias arsenal in other countries.

History1972 to 1986: The Israeli Threat and Initial CW ImportsAlthough the majority of open source information focuses on Syrian offensive, rather thandefensive capabilities, defensive CW equipment were among the first CW-related importspurchased by Syria. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of militaryvehicles from the Soviet Union that were usually fitted with chemical protection systems asstandard equipment. According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree, the Soviet Unionprovided Syria with a full range of decontamination equipment in the 1970s and 1980s. [17]

Allegedly, personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers duringthe same period. Syria is known to have purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11protective masks; whether this represented a single purchase or a portion of a broaderacquisition effort to replace all existing masks remains unknown. [18]

Numerous press and U.S. government sources indicate that Syria first obtained chemicalweapons from Egypt on the eve of the attack on Israel in October 1973. [19] Reports thatIsraeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that Syriancombat troops received these weapons during the Yom Kippur war. [20] Notably, althoughSyrian forces suffered severe defeat, at no point did they deploy chemical weapons.

Although the lack of access to Syrian personnel or records renders all explanations for thisrestraint speculative, Syrian-born security analyst M. Zuhair Diab and Israeli military analystsboth suggest that Syria may have planned to use its chemical arsenal only in the event of atotal military collapse, which never occurred. [21]

Suboptimal military coordination among Syria, Egypt, and Iraq during the 1973 Yom KippurWar revealed fissures in Arab unity against Israel. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treatydeprived Syria of an important military ally against the Israeli threat, and according to M.Zuhair Diab, motivated a pursuit of greater military self-sufficiency. [22] Further, Diab notesthat the near-disastrous clashes with Israeli forces during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in

1982 exposed Syria's land and air vulnerabilities and further motivated Syria's military toacquire chemical weapons.


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Other regional developments may also have motivated Syria's pursuit of a CW capability.Water-sharing conflicts with Turkey over the Euphrates River contributed to tense Syrian-Turkish relations during this period, as did Turkish allegations of Syrian support for theKurdish independence movement. Syria may also have sought CW as a deterrent against a

show of force or as a form of leverage. [23] Perhaps more directly troublesome to Syrianleadership, the Soviet Union chose to support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, weakeningSyria's partnership with the USSR and further isolating Syria. [24] The combination ofincreasing political isolation and observed military deficiencies vis--vis Israel togetherprovided incentives for Syria to develop a self-sufficient CW capability.

1986 to 1997: Building CW Self-SufficiencyAccording to Israeli media, Syria began developing an indigenous chemical productioncapability in 1971 at the Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS)a facility inDamascus that today administers Syria's CW program while also contributing directly to

research and development efforts. [25] According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree,however, most reports indicate that Syria's CW production capability came online sometimein the mid-1980's. [26] In 1989, CIA Director William Webster testified that Syria had begunproducing CW agents in the early 1980's. [27] In 1983, a U.S. Special National IntelligenceEstimate first identified a Syrian CW production facility. By 1986, Seth Carus wrote that in

just five years, Syria had obtained CW production technology from Western Europe and hadfocused its attention on producing nerve agents. [28] Reportedly, unidentified U.S. officialsalso indicated that Syria could produce sarin, a charge repeated by Shimon Peres. [29] Bythe end of 1986, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, andDefense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had all openly stated that Syria was producing nerve agents

and delivery systems. [30] By 1990, both media and statements by U.S. officials indicatedthat Syria had converted several agrochemical factories into sarin production facilities. [31]Reports then appeared alleging that Syria had begun researching the more toxic V-seriesnerve agents. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents butalso suggested a lack of success. [32] While the CIA never publicly committed to the viewthat Syria possessed VX, 721 reports in the 1990s claimed either that Syria "may be trying todevelop more potent nerve agents," or that it "apparently tried to develop more toxic andpersistent nerve agents." [33]

Signaling growing official concern over Syria's burgeoning CW production capability, in June

of 1986 the Reagan Administration banned the sale of sarin and mustard precursors toSyria. [34] However, by the early 1990's numerous reports of illicit trade began to emerge.In 1996 Russian authorities charged retired Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich withshipping 800-kilograms of precursor chemicals to Syria. [35] Although these charges wereeventually dropped, Israeli press reported that Kuntsevich later admitted to the transfer ofnerve agent precursors. [36] It later emerged that Kuntsevich and Syria first agreed tocollaborate on the transfer of equipment and materials to Syria in 1992. [37] By 1997, bothU.S. and Israeli sources claimed that Syria's CW program, under the administration of CERS,included production facilities in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo and could produce sarin,mustard, and potentially VX. [38]


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Despite Syria's ongoing development of its chemical weapons capability, there have been noconfirmed incidences of combat use. [39] In 1982, Amnesty International charged that theSyrian government had used cyanide gas against a Moslem Brotherhood uprising in Hama.[40] The report, which could not be further substantiated, alleges that Syrian troopsconnected rubber piping to chemical gas tanks and pumped these substances into buildings.

The regional security trends that drove Syria's CW programnamely, counter-balancingIsrael's growing conventional warfare capabilities amid increasing military isolationcontinued throughout the next decade. During the 1980s and 1990s, Israel's militarysuperiority over Syria increased, leaving Syria increasingly vulnerable. The distancing of Syriafrom its Soviet patron in the mid-1980scombined with the all too apparent inadequaciesof Soviet-supplied equipmentrequired Syria to seek an equalizer. While the overallobjective of projecting a capability to inflict unacceptable losses on Israel's military andcivilian population remained, Syria also likely recognized the careful balancing act ofmaintaining a credible threat without provoking an Israeli attack. In this regard, Syria likely

found it advantageous to adopt an opaque chemical weapons policy, not unlike Israel'snuclear policy, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of chemical weaponseven as it continues to deploy and improve them.

Syria built its CW program off foreign support and has been a voracious importer of CWmaterials, technologies, and expertise. Due to Syria's relative isolation from theinternational community the capacity of Syria's indigenous capability built during this periodremains unknown. Open source reports generally do not include sufficient details aboutSyrian CW imports to further characterize any changes or trends in Syria's import activities.However, the overall scale of Syrian CW imports in this era declined when compared to that

of the early 1980s. [41]

1997 to the Present: Silence and ReinvigorationReporting on the Syrian CW arsenal remained relatively stable throughout the next decade.Since the initial reports alleging sarin production and potential VX research and production,few new developments have emerged in public reporting. From 2002 to 2006, reports fromthe U.S. Director of Central Intelligence repeated that "Damascus already held a stockpile ofthe nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerveagents." [42] The 2009 and 2010 versions of this report repeated a similar line, that Syria"has had a CW program for many years and already has a stockpile of CW agents" and that

"Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, includingprecursor chemicals." [43]

Relatively few open source reports of Syrian tests on CW agents or delivery systemsemerged during this decade. [44] The most recent publicly described test, a Syrian missiletest in July 2001, probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead. [45] Since thattime, Syria's CW program has maintained a very low profile, although Jane's Defense hascontinued to report on foreign support for the development of chemical warheads for Scudmissiles and other delivery systems. [46] In 2005, Jane's began publishing claims that Syriawas engaged in efforts, assisted by the Iranian government, to expand its capability to

produce precursors. [47] In early 2009, Jane's published assertions to the effect that Syria


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was modernizing and expanding its Al-Safira facility, basing these claims in part on satellitephotography, and in part on information from confidential sources. [48]

In early 2008, Seymour Hersh reported that a Syrian official had commented that "Syria hadconcluded...that chemical warfare had little deterrent value against Israel, given its nuclear

capability" following an Israeli raid on an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor being constructed.[49] While the comments of this Syrian official could provide some insight into Syria's overallCW calculus, Syria during this period made no official statements regarding chemicalweapons doctrine, nor has it publically acknowledged possessing such weapons. WhetherSyria views its CW arsenal as a realistic component of a potential battle in the Golan Heightsor as a strategic deterrent to threaten the Israeli civilian population remains a topic ofdebate. [50]

For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD while alsosupporting the right of any state to secure itself against outside threats. On numerous

occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that until Israel abandonsits presumed nuclear weapons program, Syria will neither renounce the right to possesschemical weapons nor destroy any arsenal it may possess. Whether Syrian leadership wouldin fact consider bargaining away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclearweapons program remains unknown. What is more concretely known is that Syria remainsadamantly opposed to CWC membership, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition tomembership, and discourages other Arab nations from joining.

Recent Developments and Current Status

The outbreak of civil unrest in late 2011 raised questions about both the security of Syria'schemical weapons sites and the potential use or transfer of such weapons. On 23 July 2012Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi stated that Syria would never use "anychemical and biological weapons . . . .inside Syria," that the Syrian army was storing "allstocks of these weapons" securely, and that such weapons would only be used in the eventof "external aggression." [51] In subsequent Twitter exchanges, he tried to walk back thisapparent acknowledgement of Syria's possession of chemical and biological weapons,something Syria had previously denied. [52]

As the conflict intensified, the international community became increasingly concerned that

Syrian President Assad might use chemical weapons amid Syria's deteriorating situation andrebel gains. On 20 August 2012, President Obama warned, "a red line for us is we startseeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized." [53] Severaldays later UK Prime Minister David Cameron underscored President Obama's remark thatthe threat or use of chemical weapons by President Assad's regime would warrant a revisedapproach, alluding to military intervention. [54] The newly elected President of France,Franois Hollande, took the podium at the United Nations 67th General Assembly to let theAssad government know, "that the international community will not stand aside if theywere to use chemical weapons." [55]

Between late November and early December 2012, Western intelligence agencies obtainedclear evidence that Syrian government units were preparing chemical weapons for potential


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use. At one base, soldiers were observed to be mixing precursor chemicals and taking othersteps to make the chemical weapons battlefield ready. Surveillance photos furtherconfirmed another army unit loading chemical weapons onto special military transportvehicles. [56] These actions prompted President Obama to warn Syria again on 3 December2012 that "the use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable [and] there

will be consequences and you will be held accountable." [57] Shortly afterwards Syrianforces appeared to have ceased chemical weapons preparations, and U.S. Secretary ofDefense Leon Panetta attributed the halt of Syrian chemical weapons activities to PresidentObama's warning. [58]

On 19 March 2013, allegations arose concerning a chemical weapons attack in the village ofKhan al-Assal in the Aleppo province. According to the Assad regime, a rocket spewing atoxic gas in Khan al-Assal caused 26 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. Both the Assadregime and Syrian rebels denied responsibility for the alleged attack. [59] At the request ofthe Syrian Government, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed ke

Sellstrm on 27 March 2013 to head a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident.Sellstrm said that following mission preparation, the team would spend three to four daysfor inspection, and two to three weeks to write its report and conduct chemical analysis.[60] Despite the inspection team's preparations, the Assad Government denied the teamentrance into Syria. The denial of access came amid calls by the United Kingdom, France,Luxembourg, South Korea, and Japan to increase the scope of the inspections to includeallegations of chemical weapons use in Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. [61]

On 19 April 2013, the United Kingdom and France announced they had "hard evidence" ofchemical weapons use in at least one case. [62] On 23 April 2013 Israeli Brigadier General

Itai Brun asserted sarin had been used "in a number of incidents" in Syria, based onphotographs of victims foaming at the mouth and with constricted pupils and otherunspecified symptoms. [63] Then, on 25 April 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagelstated that the "U.S. intelligence community assesses with some degree of varyingconfidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria,specifically, the chemical agent sarin." The basis for Western governments' assessmentsremains unclear, as it would presumably be very challenging to maintain chain of custodyover collection and handling of any soil or other physiological evidence. [64] However, on 13June 2013, Benjamin J. Rhodes, President Obama's deputy national security adviser,announced that the White House will extend military support to the Syrian opposition

because there was a "high certainty" Assad's forces used chemical weapons. The WhiteHouse did not clarify what the military support would encompass, but such an operationwould be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency due to the legal restraints ofsupplying arms without UN approval to groups attacking another government. [65] [66] Asfor humanitarian assistance, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman confirmedU.S. aid included protective equipment, medical treatment, and training for medicalpersonnel as a means of protection and response to the use of chemical weapons. [67]

Countering the West's assertions on 9 July 2013, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to theUnited Nations, said Russian inspectors visited the Khan al-Assal site, gathered samples for

testing in an OPCW certified lab, and discerned the "Bashair-3 unguided projectile" was firedby the Bashair al-Nasr Brigade, an affiliate of the Free Syrian Army. [68] Churkin's claims


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reinforced the West's allegations that chemical weapons were used in Syria, but only addedspeculation as to who was responsible. On 31 July 2013, UN Spokesman Martin Nesirkyconfirmed that the Assad government had agreed to allow the UN chemical weaponsinspector team into the country for the first time to examine three sites of alleged chemicalweapons use, including Khan al-Assal. [69] It is hoped that despite the elapsed time

between the alleged chemical weapons use and the team's arrival, Sellstrm's team cangather evidence and present an unbiased report.

The morning of 21 August 2013, during the UN chemical weapons inspection team's visit,new video footage emerged of an apparent chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, just outsideof Damascus. According to initial reports and video footage, the attack involved anorganized strike over a large area that utilized rockets as the dispersal mechanism. Hospitalsand make-shift medical centers reported patients suffering from convulsions,immobilization, breathing difficulties, dilated pupils, cold limbs, and foaming from themouth. Estimates of the death toll vary greatly, but various groups and video footage place

the numbers of dead in the hundreds to over a thousand. [70] Doctors Without Bordersreported that three hospitals within its network confirmed 355 people died andapproximately 3,600 displayed symptoms of neurotoxic symptoms, while a U.S. governmentassessment placed the number of dead at 1,429. [71] The Syrian government eventuallygranted the UN inspection team access to areas of Ghouta (after stalling for five days), inlieu of the team visiting the originally planned three sites. [72]

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the United States, citing Syrian chemical weaponsbrigades' actions and communications, tried to rally support to conduct limited militarystrikes against Assad's forces. However, the international coalition supporting military action

was reduced to the United States and France after the British House of Commons rejected aproposal by Prime Minister Cameron to authorize military operations. At the G-20 Summit,President Obama tried to rally the other economic powers of the world to take actionagainst Syria. On 6 September 2013, 11 countries released a joint statement calling "for astrong international response to this grave violation of the world's rules and conscience thatwill send a clear message that this kind of atrocity can never be repeated." [73] However,President Obama was unable to convince President Putin to commit Russia to taking actionagainst Syria, maintaining the ongoing deadlock among the UN Security Council members.

As the U.S. Congress prepared to vote on whether to attack Syria, on 10 September 2013

Syria agreed, following Russian urging, to put its chemical weapons stockpile underinternational control for eventual destruction, and committed to joining the ChemicalWeapons Convention. On 14 September, Russia and the United States reached a deal on aframework to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons. [74] [75] The framework called for Syriato submit a comprehensive list of its chemical weapons within one week; for inspectors toreturn to Syria by November; and for the destruction of all chemical weapons by mid-2014.[76] On 21-22 September, Syria met its obligation by providing two lists of its chemicalweapons. [77] The United States responded that the list was "more comprehensive thananticipated," and Russia and the United States began negotiating text to provide aframework for a UN resolution. [78] [79] [80]


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On 16 September, the United Nations released its much-anticipated report, stating that theUN had "clear and convincing," evidence that sarin gas was used in the 21 August attacksoutside of Damascus. [81] Subsequently, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that theevidence was "overwhelming and indisputable," that sarin was used. [82] While the reportdid not attribute responsibility to either party in the civil war, report details, such as the use

of M-14 and 330m rocket artillery, and the estimated trajectories, suggest that the Assadregime was responsible for the attacks, as the rebels do not possess the rockets used. [83]While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France accepted the UN report asconfirmation of the Assad regime's role in the attacks, Russia stated that the report was"distorted" and "one-sided," and maintains that the Assad regime did not conduct theattacks. [84] On 25 September, UN weapons inspectors returned to Syria to continue toinvestigate the use of chemical weapons in the civil war. [85] The UN team expanded theinvestigation to include additional sites where chemical weapons were allegedly used. [86]

On 27 September, the OPCW adopted a decision on the destruction of Syria's chemical

weapons. [87] The decision, recognizing the joint Russia-US framework, calls for thedestruction of all chemical weapons production and mixing facilities by 1 November 2013,and the destruction of all chemical weapons by mid2014. [88] As part of the decision, ateam of 20 experts arrived in Damascus on 30 September to "initiate inspections pursuantto [the] decision." [89]

Following the OPCW decision, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution onSyria. Resolution 2118 calls for consequences should Syria fail to fulfill its obligations;however, the resolution was not written under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and any useof force against Syria would require an additional resolution. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei

Lavrov declared that the United Nations "will stand ready to take action under Chapter VII ofthe charter," should Syria renege on its obligations. [90]

On 12 October, the UN and the OPCW approved a Joint Mission to oversee the dismantlingand destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal and infrastructure. [91] The JointMission serves to monitor and verify Syria's compliance with UNSC Resolution 2118;however, its mandate does not include participation in the destruction process for whichthe Syrian government is responsible. [92]

On 14 October the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force for Syria. [93] On 31

October, the OPCW announced that Syria had met the Phase I deadline of eliminating allproduction and mixing capabilities. [94] Phase II, the elimination of all chemical weapons,began on 1 November. As of 11 November the OPCW had completed verification activitiesat 22 of 23 sites. [95] Inspectors have been unable to visit the remaining site due to securityreasons.

According to the OPCW's initial findings, the Syrian arsenal includes 1,000 metric tons ofCategory I chemical weapons, 290 tons of Category II chemicals, and 1,230 Category IIIunfilled delivery systems such as rockets. [96] The OPCW's findings are in line with Syria'schemical weapons declaration.


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The OPCW has stated that it is not possible to destroy Syria's entire arsenal on Syrianterritory. [97] Currently, the UN and the United States are exploring options for thedestruction of Syria's weapons. Russia, Jordan, Turkey, Norway and Albania have all rejectedrequests to destroy weapons on their territory. [98] [99] [100] Denmark and Norwayannounced that they would aid in the transportation by sea of chemical weapons out of

Syria to a destruction location. [101] [102]According to Reuters the United States and Russiasubmitted a draft document to the OPCW outlining a timetable calling for the removal of allchemical weapons from Syria by the end of the year, and the destruction of all weapons by30 December 2014, six months later than the initial deadline of June 2014. [103] On 15November, the OPCW released a detailed timetable for the destruction process. The OPCWplan maintains a June 2014 deadline for the destruction of all chemical weapons, and statesthat all chemicals except for isopropanol will be destroyed outside of Syria. [104] Syria is todestroy all isopropanol, one of two precursors for sarin, on-site by 1 March 2014. [105]

The international community remains optimistic that Syria will live up to the Russia-U.S.framework. While recent developments are encouraging, experts warn that Assad maymanipulate the CWC process to maintain some parts of his chemical weapons program. Forexample, Amy Smithson of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) writes that, "Syriacould keep inspectors away from certain areas of production facilities if it declares to theOPCW that those sites have nothing to do with chemical weapons." [106] ZacharyKallenborn and Raymond Zilinskas of CNS add that, lessons from the Iraq and Libyan cases

suggest that while verifying the correctness of a state's declarations is feasible, it is onlypossible for inspectors to have a limited degree of certainty in assessing the completeness

of state declarations. As such, there is some risk, as occurred in the Libyan case, that theregime could successfully retain a secret CW capability. [107]

Although the United States initially applauded the comprehensiveness of Syria's declarationof its arsenal, it too remains skeptical of its accuracy and the Assad regime's intentions.[108] Citing U.S. intelligence suggesting Syria may try to hide some of its chemical weapons,U.S. envoy to the United Nations Samantha Powers stated, "We are still reviewing [thedeclaration] we obviously bring skepticism born of years of dealing with this regime, yearsof obfuscation in other contexts, and of course a lot of broken promises in the context ofthis current war." [109]

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