11JC 3rd Review Meeting

12 May 2009 Ukraine presentation

Olena Mykolaichuk, Chairperson of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

Nuclear Safety in Ukraine 25 years after Chernobyl

November 2011

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Presentation outline

I. Historical background

II. Basic information about nuclear power and nuclear safety regulatory regime in Ukraine

III. Nuclear safety of existing NPPs in Ukraine

IV. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Energy between EU and Ukraine

V. 2010 Follow Up IRRS mission

VI. Fukushima: Lessons Learnt

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I. Historical background

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Nuclear Power Reactors of “Soviet” Design (1/2)

• December 18, 1945 – letter of Dr. P.Kapitsa to then Head of USSR Government V.Molotov

• 1946 – the first documentary evidences about the beginning of activity in USSR as for possibility of graphite reactor with water cooling energy application

• 1948 – the first discussions as for three reactor modifications • 1949 – approval of the ToR for designing of the “pilot nuclear

plant”• June 27, 1954 – the first NPP start-up in Obninsk

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• Starting 1973 17 NPP Units of RBMK type were constructed in former USSR, 11 of which are still in operation (all – in RF)

• RBMK-1000 (LNPP-1) - 1973• 2nd generation of RBMK

(LNPP-3) - 1979• RBMK-1500 (INPP-1) - 1984• In Ukraine the last RBMK-

type reactor was shut down in 2000, in Lithuania – in 2009

• Starting 1964 66 VVER Units were constructed all over the world, 51 of which are still in operation

• VVER-210 (NVNPP-1) –1964

• VVER-365 (NVNPP-2) - 1969• VVER-440 (NVNPP-3) - 1971• 2nd generation of VVER-440

(Loviisa NPP) - 1977• VVER-1000 (NVNPP-5) -

1980• VVER-440/B-213 (RNPP-1) -

1980• VVER-1000/B-320 (ZNPP-1)

-1984

Nuclear Power Reactors of “Soviet” Design (2/2)

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Evolution of NPP Safety regulation (1/2)

Starting period – general technical norms and rules + special requirements to materials and constructions + Sanitary rules of radioactive substances and other radioactive sources management (SP-333-60)

1965 – creation of NCRP1968 – Sanitary rules for NPP design1969 – NRB-69 + start of the Loviisa NPP project (integration of

Western design approach and regulations)1971-73 – first OPB AS1972 – set of documents (Rules of AEU, norms of strength calculation,

OP, PK, OSP-72)1974 – first PBYa AS (PBYa-04-74) + Model action plan of personnel

and population protection in case of NPP accident

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Evolution of NPP Safety regulation (2/2)

• 1976 – NRB-76• 1978 – Requirements for NPP site selection• 1979 – SPAES-79• 1982 – new edition of OPB-82• 1983 – establishment of Gosatomenergonadzor of USSR – the first

independent nuclear regulator in the USSR• 1985 – SPORO-85• 1985 – introduction of systematic approach to the development of

nuclear and radiation safety norms and rules• 1987 – Provisions on the order of investigation and registration of

NPP events • 1988-89 – new editions of OPB, PBYa RU AS etc.

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Chornobyl NPP accident

• 4th ChNPP Unit – RBMK-type + 2 steam generators of 500MVt (e) each, commissioned in December 1983

• According to the schedule the unit had to be stopped on 25 April1986 for 40 day of planned outage

• Before planned operation shutdown it was agreed to perform tests at No8 steam generator in order to improve power-production characteristics under transition modes

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Reasons, circumstances and consequences of ChNPP accident

• Report of Governmental Commission for investigation of ChNPPaccident reasons (June 1986)

• ChNPP accident and its consequences. Information prepared for IAEA expert meeting (25-29 August 1986, Vienna)

• Final meeting report for investigation of reasons and consequences of ChNPP accident (INSAG-1, 1988)

• International ChNPP project. Examination of radiological consequences and assessment of protective measures. Report of International Consultative Committee (1991)

• The reasons and consequences of ChNPP accident at Unit 4 on 26 April 1986. Report of USSR Gosatomenergonadzor commission (1991)

• ChNPP accident: INSAG-1 update (INSAG-7, 1992)

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• The Plant in the process of design did not correspond to a number of safety standards and even had a dangerous characteristics;

• Inadequacy of safety analysis, minor attention to independent safety reviews;

• Operational procedures do not consider properly the safety analysis; • Inadequate and non-efficient exchange of safety important

information;• Inadequate understanding by operators of the safety aspects of its

own NPP;• Inadmissible attitude by the operators to the formal requirements of

operation procedures and testing; • Inefficient safety regulation regime that is not able to withstand the

pressure of the industry;• General lack of safety culture as at the national level as well as at

the level of operator.

INSAG-7 about fundamental problems that impacted the accident

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International programs on NPP safety analysis of “soviet” design

• The request of the USSR Government to the IAEA in September 1991 to conduct independent review of safety of different models of VVER and RBMK reactors;

• First Report for VVER-440/V-230 – issued in 1992;• Similar reports for different modifications of VVER and RBMK –

issued in 1992- 1994;• TACIS Project for all generations of all RBMK reactors – final

report issued in 1996;• Conclusions as for safety shortages and recommendations how to

overcome them were used for the development of relevant action programs on safety enhancement.

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International legal instruments introduced after Chornobyl

• Introduction of peer pressure mechanisms

• Convention on nuclear safety – 1994

– First Review Meeting – 1999

– Fifth Review Meeting – 2011

– As for now all countries with NPPs in operation except Iran are Parties to the Convention

– Extraordinary Review Meeting – August 2012

• Joint Convention on the safety of management of spent nuclear fuel and the safety of management of radioactive waste -1997

– First Review Meeting– 2003

– Forth Review Meeting– 2012

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II. Basic information about nuclear power and nuclear safety regulatory regime in Ukraine

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Operating Nuclear Power Plants of Ukraine

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Rivno NPP2 VVER-4402 VVER-1000

Khmelnitskya NPP2 VVER -1000

South-Ukraine NPP3 VVER-1000

Zaporizhzhya NPP6 VVER-1000

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Four Nuclear Power Plants / 15 units with total 13 835 MWe Installed Capacity

NPPs UNITS REACTOR TYPES

CAPASITY(MWe)

BEGINNING ofCONSTRUCTION

CONNECTION to the GRID/COMISSIONING

ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP

1 WWER-1000/320 1000 04.1980 10.12.1984

2 WWER-1000/320 1000 04.1981 22.07.1985

3 WWER-1000/320 1000 04.1982 10.12.1986

4 WWER-1000/320 1000 01.1984 18.12.1987

5 WWER-1000/320 1000 07.1985 14.08.1989

6 WWER-1000/320 1000 06.1986 19.10.1995

SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP

1 WWER-1000/302 1000 03.1977 31.12.1982

2 WWER-1000/338 1000 10.1979 06.01.1985

3 WWER-1000/320 1000 02.1985 20.09.1989

RIVNE NPP 1 WWER-440/213 415 08.1976 22.12.1980

2 WWER-440/213 420 10.1977 22.12.1981

3 WWER-1000/320 1000 02.1981 21.12.1986

4 WWER-1000/320 1000 - 10.10.2004/06.06.2006

KHMELNITSKY NPP 1 WWER-1000/320 1000 11.1981 22.12.1987

2 WWER-1000/320 1000 - 07.08.2004/15.12.2005

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Governmental Infrastructure

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Basic legal framework

�Law on Radioactive Waste Management;

�Law on Settlement of Nuclear Safety Issues (establishing Decommissioning Fund);

�Law on Licensing in the Nuclear Energy Field;

�Law on Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety;

�Law on Procedure for Making Decisions on Siting, Design and Construction of Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Waste Management Facilities of National Importance;

� Law on National Special Ecological Program on Radioactive Waste Management;

�Law on Revising Certain Laws of Ukraine on Radioactive Waste Management (establishing National Radioactive Waste Fund).

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Decreasing number of events

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Public information and public involvement in decision making (1/2)

• openness and transparency of decision-making:

– public hearings and/or local referendum before any significant governmental decision concerning nuclear facility, SF storage or radwaste repository (last example –Centralised ISF);

– all decisions on licensing of the above facilities are to be discussed at open SNRCU Board meeting (last example –licensing of Lot 3 operation);

– “hot phone lines” (SNRCU – 1 hour twice a month), web-sites with interactive features, annual reports available to public in paper and electronic format

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Public information and public involvement in decision making (2/2)

• SNRCU Public Council:– 12 representatives of national and local NGOs (most are far from

nuclear-friendly) and national and local media;

– all draft legislation and regulations passed review, if significant number of comments received – public hearings being held;

– topical issues are discussed with SNRCU top management on request;

• Annual Topical Meetings on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (beginning of December):

– 4 panel discussions on topics suggested by SNRCU and NGOs each year;

– NGOs participation as members of Programme Committee, moderatorsand panelists;

– feedback on recommendations

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III. Nuclear safety of existing NPPs in Ukraine

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Evolution of Safety Upgrade Approach

Safety Upgrade of Ukrainian Safety Upgrade of Ukrainian NPPsNPPs

“Old” units “New” units (K2R4)

Comprehensive Program of NPP Modernization and Safety Upgrade + topical Action Plans (Upgrade Package)

Safety Upgrade Concept for existing NPP Units+ Action Plans (Upgrade Package)

K2R4 Modernization Programme

United NPP Safety Upgrade Programme

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Implementation of K2R4 MP at Khmelnitsky-2

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Before comissioning 1st outage 2nd outage 3rd outage 4th outage

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Implementation of K2R4 MP at Rovno-4

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Before commissioning 1st outage 2nd outage 3rd outage 4th outage

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First implementation of holisticapproach to safety upgrade

Total: 389 measures (pilot and adopted) to be implemented at 13 units.

Implemented by 01/01/2006: 33%.

Comprehensive Program of Modernization and Safety Upgrade of NPP Units

(endorsed by Cabinet of Ministers’ Order of 29 August 2002)Implementation period – 2002-2005

Nuclear Safety Convention (article 6)

Requirements of national regulationsintroduced after units’ commissioning

IAEA Issues Books– IAEA-EBP-WWER-05,IAEA-EBP-WWER-14, IAEA-EBP-WWER-03

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Lessons learned from the Program implementation

April-August 2005 – review of implementation status of the Comprehensive Program and elaboration of proposal for safety improvement activities after 2005

December 2005 – approval of the Safety Upgrade Concept for Existing NPP Units, thus identifying the following areas for safety upgrade for period 2006-2010:– LOCA from primary to secondary side– Dependent and common cause failures– Secondary heat removal– Pressurized thermal shock and cold overpressure– Primary heat removal and pressure control– Containment reliability– Emergency power supply – Improvement of emergency processes control– Elaboration of safety analysis

Action Plan to implement the Concept approved jointly by the SNRCU and Ministry of Fuel and Energy in January 2006

Regulatory monitoring over the Concept implementation and annual review of implementation status

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Next step in safety upgrade

Total: 250 pilot measures and 472 adopted measures at 13 NPP Units.

Implementation approved by SNRIU as of 08 November 2011: 232 pilot measures (93%), 380 adopted measures (81%).

Safety Upgrade Concept for Existing NPP Units(endorsed by Cabinet of Ministers’ Order of 13 Dec 2005)

Implementation Period – 2006-2010

Safety Analysis Feedback IAEA Issues Books

Feedback from implementation of Upgrade Package

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Implementation of safety improvement measures/ Ongoing activities

United NPP Safety Upgrade Programunder implementation

досвід реалізації«Концепції підвищення безпеки діючихенергоблоків атомних електростанцій»

Strengthening of requirements of national regulations as introduced during 2005-09

Outcomes of Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project:- severe accidents considerations;

- seismic design basis re-evaluation

Outcomes of implementation of Upgrade Package and

K2R4 Modernization Program

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United NPP Safety Upgrade Program

• Scope:– VVER-1000/320 – 90 measures

– VVER-1000/302,338 – 61 measures

– VVER-1000/213 – 62 measures

• List of safety measures was reviewed and agreed by Riskaudit

• Implementation Period: 2010/2011-2017

• To be amended to implement results of “stress-tests”

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IV. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Energy between EU and Ukraine

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Independent Safety Evaluation of existing NPPs /Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project

December 1, 2005 – Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Energy between EU and Ukraine signed, providing that safety evaluation of existing NPPs is to be conducted

March 2007 – ToR of Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project on safety evaluation of existing NPPs agreed, including 4 Tasks to be implemented on the basis of IAEA safety review services:

– Task 1 – Design Safety – DSR;– Task 2 – Operational Safety – OSART;– Task 3 – Waste Safety – especially designed missions;– Task 4 – Regulatory Issues – IRRS.

June 2008 – first IAEA mission under project came to Ukraine (IRRS)

April 2009 – reporting approach agreed May 2010 – final project report prepared

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/Design Safety (1/3)

• Unit information:– Khmelnitsky 2 – VVER 1000/320 (commissioned - August

2004);– Modernization Program under implementation

• Mission information:– 13-24 October 2008– Review Team: Gary Johnson/Peter Kelm + 8 experts

• Main findings:– Full compliance with most NS-R-1 requirements;– Non full compliance but good progress in areas of:

• Equipment qualification • Consideration of severe accidents• Control of containment hydrogen concentration• Waste storage

– Non compliance as for seismic design margin

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/Design Safety (2/3)

• Unit information:– Rovno 1 – VVER 440/213 (commissioned - December 1980);– Upgrade Package under implementation (near completion);– Preparation for lifetime extension

• Mission information:– 12-23 January 2009– Review Team: John Preston/Peter Kelm + 8 experts

• Main findings:– Full compliance with most NS-R-1 requirements;– Non full compliance but good progress in areas of:

• Equipment qualification • Consideration of severe accidents• Seismic design margin• Demonstration of plant safety characteristics

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/Design Safety (3/3)

• Unit information:– South Ukraine 1 – VVER 1000/302 (commissioned - December

1982);– Upgrade Package under implementation;– Preparation for lifetime extension

• Mission information:– 2-11 February 2009– Review Team: Gary Johnson/Ervin Liska + 8 experts

• Main findings:– Full compliance with most NS-R-1 requirements;– Non full compliance but good progress in areas of:

• Equipment qualification • Consideration of severe accidents• Protection against internal events and common cause failures• Probabilistic risk assessment• Seismic design margin

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/Operational Safety

• OSART missions, including follow-ups

• Conclusions as presented by IAEA Task Leader at April 2009 Steering Committee meeting:

– There are no issues at any of the plants which have been determined to have “insufficient progress to date”

– Results indicate good alignment of actions taken with other plants worldwide

– High degree of cooperation between plant personnel and OSART/EM teams

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/Waste and Decommissioning

• Specially designed review approach:– Considering separate NPPs but not separate units;– Self-assessment completed;– Missions to SUNPP, KhNPP, RNPP, ZhNPP completed.

• Conclusions as presented by IAEA Task Leader at April 2009 Steering Committee meeting:– The review team found that all requirements are complied with– It was noted that particular attention over the next years should

be paid to:• Clearance criteria;• Waste acceptance criteria;• Refinement of end-point criteria for decommissioning;• Interdependencies between units in operation and under

decommissioning

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/IRRS Mission (1/2)

• Mission information:

– 8-20 June 2008;

– IRRS Review Team: 13 senior regulatory experts from 9 Member States, 1 representative from the EC Joint Research Centre, 1 observer from Japan, 5 IAEA staff members;

– Scope: Full scope mission;

– Policy issues: 1) application of risk informed decision making in the regulatory process; 2) the regulatory process for authorizing new build NPPs;

• Results:

– 20 recommendations, 34 suggestions and 14 good practices

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Joint IAEA-EU-Ukraine project/IRRS Mission (2/2)

• Plan of actions for 2008-11 to implement most recommendations and suggestions of the mission is approved by the Governmental Decree of 8 October 2008 #1307;

• Actions already completed (examples):

– SNRCU and Ministry of Health issued Joint Order on Coordinated Actions registered by the Ministry of Justice in March 2009 (R3, S12);

– Special bonuses established for SNRCU HQ and regional inspectors by Governmental Decree of September 2008 (S18);

– National Programme on Radioactive Waste Management has been approved by Parliament and put into force (R14);

– Top level quality management document explaining values, mission, vision and goals has been issued and communicated to all levels of SNRCU staff (S33)

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V. 2010 Follow Up IRRS Mission

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• Conducted November 22-26, 2010 (2 years, 5 months after the IRRS)

• Expert team of 9 members, lead by Dana Drabova (SUJB, Czech Republic), and 3 IAEA staff members

• Interviews with SNRCU and SSTC staff, meetings with other governmental bodies, First Vice Prime Minister, Public Board

• Policy discussions on building new power units, sharing responsibilities with other authorities, self-assessment

• mission report is available at http://www.snrc.gov.ua/nuclear/doccatalog/document?id=161824

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2010 Follow Up mission:General

• Experts concluded that:

�Efficient interaction with Parliament and key Ministries established;

�SNRCU organizational structure improved;

�SNRCU role strengthened, independence of SNRCU TSO ensured;

�Strategy of the Ukrainian Government on RWM put into force by Laws of Ukraine;

�SNRCU QMS considerably improved, etc.

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2010 Follow Up mission:Conclusions

• Implementation of recommendations and suggestions of 2008 IRRS mission verified:� 8 out of 20 recommendations completely implemented, 12 under

implementation;� 18 out of 34 suggestions completely implemented, 15 under

implementation • Topics with ‘full success’:

� Responsibilities and Functions of the Regulatory Body;� Development of Regulations and Guides;� General Safety Provisions for RWM and Decommissioning;�Clearance Regime for Radwaste and Discharge of RM;�Near-Surface Disposal of Radwaste

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Status of IRRS-2008implementation (1/2)

• Implementation of recommendations and suggestions of 2008 IRRS mission is still in progress:� 10 recommendations;� 15 suggestions

• 1 recommendation has been completed after the follow-up mission:�Specialized agency was established to deal with the long-term

management of radioactive waste by President’s Decree on December 9, 2010 (R15)

• 1 recommendation (R1 on consistency of legislation) and 1 suggestion (S1 on governmental support to Regulator) are by nature ‘permanent advise to the Government’

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Status of IRRS-2008implementation (2/2)

• new recommendation (1):� proper financing for the establishment of dosimetryservices and

associated facilities • new suggestions (4):

� consistency and gap analysis of existing legislation to be conducted;

�maintain the already achieved level of regulatory independence;� provide SNRCU with adequate financial resources;� proper financing for replacement of obsolete equipment being

used in radiology and radiotherapy

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New Recommendation and Suggestions

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VI. Fukushima: Lessons Learnt

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Efforts/Response to Fukushima-1 events (1/3)

• Information submitted by Regulator to general public on daily basis, explanations provided as requested;

• Regulator and Operator started joint efforts to identify safety issues for each site to start safety reassessment in the light of Fukushima accident, the relevant methodology and schedule being coordinated with so-called EU stress-tests;

• Issues to be covered include the follows:– capability to mitigate consequences of severe adverse effects of

extreme external events (site specific);– capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to site;– capability to mitigate a prolonged loss of the ultimate heat sink;– accident management for core melt accidents and accident with

loss of coolant in spent fuel storage

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Efforts: Response to Fukushima-1 events (2/3)

• Short term actions (within 6 months) being discussed� 72-hour blackout

• Primary circuit intact (feed-up from off-site mobile source –already under way)

• LOCA (e.g.: failure-to-close of pressurizer safety valve) (boron water mobile sources to be considered)

� Hydrogen build-up and detonation• Containment venting (reconstruction of existing ventilation

systems)• Recombiners(already under way)

� Spent fuel pool adverse conditions• Cooling (feed-up from mobile source to be considered)• Criticality (regulations already require 0,95 subcriticality

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Efforts: Response to Fukushima-1 events (3/3)

• Long term actions being discussed� Revision (prioritization and amendment) of Integrated Safety

Improvement Program for Ukrainian NPPs:• Seismic issues (additional site investigation and seismic PSA)

(new issue)• Severe accidents analysis and SAMG development (up-rate

priority)• Reassessment of external hazards including their combination

(new issue) • Severe accident impact for multi-unit NPPs (new issue) • Completion of installation of NPP off-site real-time

radiological monitoring systems (up-rate priority)� Review of emergency preparedness and response arrangements

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Fukushima’s Reflections in the National Nuclear Policy

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• April 8, 2011 – special meeting of National Council on Security & Defense, chaired by President of Ukraine Mr. Yanukovich– Joining “stress-tests”;– Strengthening the Regulator by Law;– Review and revision of nuclear safety regulations

• October 18, 2011- draft Law on Nuclear Safety Regulator approved by Parliament as a basis

• October 20, 2011 – Parliament amended State Budget – 2011 to provide additional funding to Regulator

• November 3, 2011 – public presentation and approval of “stress-tests”results for Chornobyl NPP

• November 24-25, 2011 – public presentation and public discussion on results of “stress-tests” for operating NPPs

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Thank you for your attention

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