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NUCLEAR FUELPERFORMANCE
Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
February 24, 2005
ACRONYM
* ALARA* BWR* CFR* GDC* ISG* LTA* LOCA* PWR* RCS* RIA* SRP* UFSAR
As low as reasonably achievableBoiling-water reactorCode of Federal Regulations10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A General Design CriterionInterim Staff GuidanceLead Test AssemblyLoss-of-Coolant AccidentPressurized-water reactorReactor Coolant SystemReactivity Initiated AccidentStandard Review Plan (NUREG-0800)Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
2
00w AGENDA
* Activities on Fuel Behavior, Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research (RES)- Dr. Farouk Eltawila
* Oversight and Guidance, Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR)- Frank Akstulewicz
3
Plug
FUNCTIONS OF FUEL RODCLADDING
Often considered to be the firstbarrier for retention of fissionproducts
Provides structural integrity toensure coolable core geometry
Gap-* PWR Fuel Pelletswith Dished Ends
5
Ns REG&L
A04" 0
5- 0Sn ..p~ 9
FUEL PELLETS RETAIN MOST FISSIONPRODUCTS AT OPERATING
TEMPERATURES
U02 fuel pellets consist of crystallinegrains with porosity
Fission products can be trapped inthe pores and within the grains.
Only a few percent of the volatilefission products are released fromthe pellets during normal operation.
Temperatures near core melt areneeded to get large releases of fissionproducts trapped in the UO2 pellets.
v
_pes REGOj
420RESEARCH FOCUSED ON
POTENTIALLY RISK-SIGNIFICANT REACTOR EVENTS
Significant fission products occur onlywhen temperature approaches fuelmelting.
Only two ways to melt fuel:
1. Too much power: ReactivityInsertion Accident (RIA)
2. Not enough cooling: Loss ofcoolant accident (LOCA)
7
e stREGULATORY CRITERIA FOR1AJ REACTIVITY-INITIATED
ACCIDENTS (RIAs)Test FK-9 Regulatory limit developed in 1974 with data on fresh andTop Ldvlpdwt rs
low-burnup fuel (Reg. Guide 1.77).
Tests in early 1990s (France and Japan) showed largeeffect of burnup from cladding corrosion.
Research Information Letter (No. 0401) provided anU-.
assessment of RIAs in operating reactors based on recentdata for high-burnup fuel.
RES currently assisting NRR with review of industrysubmittal on this subject.
90, 0RBottom Regulatory Guide 1.77 to be revised.
8
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REGULATORY CRITERIA FORLOSS-OF-COOLANTACCIDENTS (LOCAs)
Regulatory limits (10 CFR 50.46(b)) on cladding temperatureand oxidation developed in 1973 based on data fromunirradiated Zircaloy tubes.
Burnup effects and alloy effects are expected based oncurrent understanding.
Major research effort is underway at Argonne by NRC withindustry cooperation. Laboratories in other countries arealso investigating.
Technical basis for performance-based cladding criteria istargeted for September, 2005.
I .I
to
9
SE;T% ,EC?&,(
*ARG1 ANALYTICAL CAPABILITYAd5 FOR HIGH-BURNUP FUEL
Calculations needed for NRRreviews (fuel temperature, rodpressure, fission gas release, andvendor code audits).
Calculations needed to plan testsand understand results.
NRC's fuel rod computer codes,FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN, areupdated for new cladding alloys,higher burnups, and other newconditions
10
r'~REQ'1g4,
I.. 0REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS FORDESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS
* Technical Specifications limit coolantactivity- Maintain design basis accident site boundary
dose consequences per 10 CFR 50.67Maintain design basis accident control roomdose. consequences per GDC1 9
12
4.
,RREGAL RE G ULATO RY
X REQUIREMENTS FORt*< PLANT OPERATION
Radiation Protection Programs have beendeveloped to achieve occupational and publicdoses as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA)- Licensees comply with occupational and public
exposure limits per 10 CFR Part 20- Licensees perform offsite dose projections and
control gaseous and liquid effluent systems to satisfyALARA design objectives per 1 0 CFR Part 50Appendix I
13
CURRENT FUELRELIABILITY STATISTICS
Current Statistics PWR BWR
Number of Plants 68 35
Number of Fuel Rods with Defects 22 9Number of Plants with Fuel Defects 14 8
% of Plants with Fuel Rod Failures 21 % 23%
Estimated fuel rod defect rate 6.7 4.3(failed rods per million)
14
<oe~~oNRR OVERSIGHT ANDGUIDANCE
* Meet periodically with fuel vendors* Review and approve fuel design changes.
- Establish limits on fuel duty, oxidation, andburnupEncourage Lead Test Assemblies (LTAs)Require mechanical and thermal/hydraulictesting
15
q CONCLUSIONS
* Radioactive control programs ensureoccupational and public exposure ismaintained ALARA.
* Staff continues to monitor fuelperformance
* Staff reviews fuel design changes* Staff and industry oversight continue to
maintain high fuel reliability* Important role of defense-in-depth
16
4 I . I
NUCLEAR FUELPERFORMANCE
INTRODUCTION I OVERVIEW
Joe SheppardPresident & CEO, STPNOC
Chairman, FRP Executive Committee
OUTLINE
* Materials Initiative Overview
* Fuel Reliability Program
* Fuel Performance Trends
* Industry Focus Areas
* Overall Impact and Assessment
2
ACRONYMSAOA -APSR-CNO -EPRI -FMEA-FRED -
FRP -GWe -MRP -NDE -NEI -PCI -SGMP-
Axial offset anomalyAxial Power Shaping RodsChief Nuclear OfficerElectric Power Research InstituteFailure Modes and Effects AnalysisFuel Reliability Data BaseFuel Reliability ProgramGigawatt electricPWR Materials Reliability ProgramNondestructive ExaminationNuclear Energy InstitutePellet-Clad InteractionSteam Generator Management Program
3
MATERIALS INITIATIVEOVERVIEW
* In 2003, industry recognized need forunited effort on materials issues
° CNOs endorsed NEI 03-08
* > $59.5M industry-sponsored R&D$1 OM for EPRI FRP
4
INITIATIVE (cont'd)
* Purpose is to provide
Consistent management process
-Materials issues prioritization
- Proactive, integrated, coordinatedapproaches-Implementation oversight
5
J.
INITIATIVE (cont'd)
X NEI 03-08 committed licensees to- Fund materials programs
Supply talent-Act in united manner
* Management structure created
6
NEI 03-08 STRUCTURE
Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee(All CNOs)
| Materials Executive Oversight Groupl(Selected CNOs)
I IMaterials Technical Advisory Group
(Issue Program Chairs, etc.)
Issue Programs (MRP, SGMP, etc.), Owners Groups,Fuel Reliability Program
7
ISSUE PROGRAMS
* BWR Vessel & Internals Program
* PWR Materials Reliability Program
* Steam Generator ManagementProgram
8
PROGRAMS (cont'd)
* Fuel Reliability Program
* NSSS Owners Groups (materialsprograms)
* Chemistry, Corrosion, NDE
9
FUEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM
* 1998 - Robust Fuel Program focused onfuel design and performance
* 2003 - Fuel Reliability Programrefocused on fuel reliability to supportMaterials Initiative
* Ob ective is highly reliable fuel withzero defects
10
FRP (cont'd)
* Four specific focus areas- Root cause investigations of
failures-BWR crud and water chemistryPWR crud and water chemistryRegulatory interface
11
FUEL PERFORMANCE TRENDS
* Several US plants still experiencingfuel defects
* Number of assemblies with fueldefects declined in 2004
* Objective is highly reliable fuel withzero defects
12
Fuel ReliabilityPercentage of Units Reporting Zero Defects
10090
8070
8583 83 84
76 77 787471
Cn.-I'
0)0.
Wu -
50 -I I
so46
I
4030
I
2010
0 I T T T T T T T
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
13
2004 FAILURE MECHANISMS
BWR - PCI/suspect 7- Debris
- Unknown/not inspected35
PWR - Fretting 22- Unknown/not inspected 13
14
* FRED now contains complete fuelperformance and failure trends
* All US nuclear plants will have accessto facilitate mandatory data entry
* International FRP members in Feb 2005
* Access for fuel vendors in 2005 Q1
15
FMEAJ Consequences
AOA GuidelinesUT CleaningBOA Code
Results
PoolsideHot CellCrud ScrapesChemical Analysis
InitiatingConditions
FRP ScopePartial FRP Scope
Operational GuidelinesT/H Models & PWR Dist
Models 10CFR50Vendor ScopeChemistryGuidelines
17
OVERALL IMPACTAND ASSESSMENT
* FRP and industry efforts are starting tohave positive effect on overall reliability
Most fuel defects represent a very smallfraction of limits that could affect offsitedoses
18
ASSESSMENT (cont'd)
* Licensees and vendors are takingaggressive action to correct issues
* Fuel defects cause operational issuesand'have economic consequences
* Overall objective is highly reliable fuelthat operates defect free
19
INTRODUCTION
* EPRI provides technical expertise,project management for FRP
* EPRI focus is R&D to support FRPobjectives
21
FUEL DEFECT INVESTIGATIONS
e Key aspects
Confirm performance margins- Support fuel defect root cause
investigations
* Performed in cooperation with licenseeand fuel vendor
22
INVESTIGATIONS (cont'd)
* Focus on poolside inspections and hotcell examinations
X Plant performance results entered inFRED
23
HOT CELL INVESTIGATIONS
* Most definitive, but most costly andtime consuming
* Can provide very illuminating results
24
POOLSIDE EXAMINATIONS
e Faster; less expensive; can beperformed more frequently than hotcell investigations
* EPRI developing better poolsidetechniques; early results arepromising
26
CRUD CROSS SECTIONS
Steam chimney onwater side
Crystals containingSi, Zn, Al on fuel
~ side near failure
-~I" Kiyu r -&u A VM- - F q
27
SUM MARY
* Only a brief snapshot of some EPRIactivities
* Projects yielding results; performanceimproving
* Close licensee and vendor involvementhas been critical to success
28
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We experienced an unacceptablenumber of fuel defects in Exelonunits. Although Exelon performanceis consistent with industry trends inthe past three years, our goal is zerodefects.
33
Fuel ReliabilityPercentage of Units Reporting Zero Defects
100 -90 -80-70 -
8583 83 84
76 77 A 78'471
60-WC80CL
505040
46I
II
302010
0 T T Tr T T T
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
34
2004 FUEL FAILURE MODES
Braidwood - flaw assisted PCI
Dresden - foreign material or PCI
LaSalle - foreign material and flawassisted PCI
Limerick - undetermined
35
FAILURE MODES (cont'd)
Quad Cities 1 - 2 PCI, 1 undetermined
Quad Cities 2- PCI
Three Mile - likely PCI
36
ACTIONS TAKEN
e LaSalle 1 &2 - removed leaking fuel
* Placed previous fuel design in lowduty locations
* Quad Cities 1 - replaced 233 fuelassemblies susceptible to failure
* Instituted ramp rate controls
37
ACTIONS (cont'd)
* Performed hot cell investigation ofLaSalle failures
* Employed conservative managementof BWR defects
* Strengthened vendor oversight
* Increased involvement with industry
38
FUEL DEFECT IMPACTS
* Dose increases not significant
* No significant changes in radiationlevels
Surveillances continued on schedule- Maintenance conducted per template
39
IMPACTS (cont'd)
* Sites met or exceeded onlinecorrective maintenance goals
* Utilized FRP results to support dosereduction efforts-Zinc addition-Ultrasonic fuel cleaning
40