NUCLEAR ENERGY AFTER FUKUSHIMA R · radioactive caesium (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012, June 28). Radioactive pollution of the marine environment has also occurred in the

SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY 156 STCEES 12 E rev. 1 bis Original: English

NATO Parl iamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ON

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

NUCLEAR ENERGY AFTER FUKUSHIMA

REPORT

PHILIPPE VITEL (FRANCE) RAPPORTEUR

International Secretariat November 2012

Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int

156 STCEES 12 E rev. 1 bis

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1

II. THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT .................................................................. 2 A. JAPAN’S TRIPLE CATASTROPHE ............................................................................... 2 B. FAILURES, CHALLENGES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 4

III. NUCLEAR ENERGY OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE ON STATUS AND TRENDS ............. 6 A. GLOBAL ENERGY STATUS AND TRENDS ................................................................. 6 B. GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY TRENDS ....................................................................... 8 C. THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY SINCE FUKUSHIMA ................................... 11

IV. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENTS ............................ 15

V. CONCLUSION AND POINTS FOR DISCUSSION .................................................... 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 20


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I. INTRODUCTION 1. In 2011, the disaster at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station shocked the world like only the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and in Chernobyl (1986) had before. The Fukushima accident has been catastrophic, but not on the same scale as the Chernobyl disaster. So far, no casualties caused by radiation exposure have been reported, and many experts believe that the long-term health impacts will be comparatively minor. According to experts from the US National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the risk of getting cancer for those exposed would increase by about 0.002%, and the risk of dying from cancer would rise by 0.001% (Landers & Johnson, 2012). Others, however, say that the effects of radiation on human health are still unknown in many important respects and could be more severe. Indeed, near Fukushima many people will receive low levels of radiation for very long periods of time. Also, radioactivity in concentrations above the Japanese regulatory limits have been detected in some food produced in affected areas. Consequently, there is a risk of exposure for Japanese citizens. Currently, for example, rice planting has been prohibited on 10,500 hectares around Fukushima (Asahi Shimbun, 2012). Moreover, according to the latest official food monitoring data, 1.3% of samples taken in Japan were found to be above the provisional regulation values for radioactive caesium (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012, June 28). Radioactive pollution of the marine environment has also occurred in the direct vicinity of the nuclear power plant, but to date, no long-term impact is expected. The economic impact of the nuclear accident alone is difficult to calculate. Before the earthquake and tsunami, the Tohoku region, which was most affected, produced about 2.5% of the total Japanese economy. The impact of the earthquake in terms of damaged capital stock was US$ 204 billion, equivalent to 4.0% of Japan’s total stock. In sum, even though the Fukushima accident may not have been as catastrophic as first thought, it could still alter the world’s nuclear future just as much as Chernobyl did. 2. Nuclear power is a legitimate subject for the NATO PA, in part because of its evident links with energy and environmental security. It is therefore essential that the Science and Technology Committee (STC) examines the Fukushima nuclear accident and its consequences and once again takes a closer look at the status and trends of nuclear energy. Already in 2011, the STC followed these issues closely. At the 2011 Spring Session, the committee extraordinarily invited the Japanese Parliamentary Observer Delegation, to underline the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s commitment to stand by this indispensable partner. A speaker also updated the committee on the accident and its effects. Furthermore, these issues were extensively discussed on committee visits. 3. The last report on nuclear energy by the STC was released in 2009, in the form of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security (STCEES). At the time, many believed that a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was underway, spurred by the growth in global energy demand, the challenges of energy security, and the efforts to avert catastrophic climate change, combined with improved international and national safety regulations and nuclear energy’s increasing cost effectiveness. This report, prepared for the Annual Session in Prague, Czech Republic, revisits some of the issues discussed in the 2009 report. It has been amended on the back of discussions which took place at the Spring Session in Tallinn, Estonia in May 2012 and updated as a result of events since. 4. Fundamentally, what is the debate? Do we still trust nuclear energy as an essential source of energy, after Fukushima again showed the risk of this technology, or do we believe that we should invest in other energy technologies, especially renewable energies? The debate is eminently political because it has large consequences for the organisation of our societies. For example, nuclear energy requires a centralized energy policy, managed by the state and its scientists and specialists, and controlled by independent organs. In contrast, renewable energies can be operated with decentralized management. Another question concerns our model of energy consumption. More humans on Earth, more activities, more technologies (like communication


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networks) require energy, but until now economic growth has always meant increases in production and in consumption of energy. Can we find a model that puts an end to this trend?

II. THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

A. JAPAN’S TRIPLE CATASTROPHE 5. On 11 March 2011, an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 occurred about 70 kilometres off Japan’s northeast coast. It was the most powerful earthquake in the country’s recorded history, causing a massive tsunami. Between 15 and 30 minutes after the earthquake, waves that reached 30 metres in height in some locations crashed into Japan’s main island, overwhelming existing seawalls, devastating entire communities, and leading to the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi. 6. The Fukushima Daiichi plant was one of the oldest nuclear power stations in Japan, having started commercial electricity generation in 1971. With its six reactors capable of generating about 4.7 GW of electrical power, it was among the 25 largest nuclear power plants in the world. The complex was built on the coastline to provide easy access to large amounts of seawater used to cool the reactors. The plant’s operator, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), had designed the plant to withstand a tsunami with waves of up to 5.7 metres in height (revised from 3.1 metres in 2002). The waves hitting the shore in the wake of this particular earthquake were over 13 metres high, however, and in some locations they reached up to 17 metres above sea level when hitting the plant. 7. At the time of the earthquake, only three of the six reactors were operating. The others were undergoing routine maintenance. When the earthquake hit, all three operating units shut down as designed. After a shutdown, the temperature and pressure in a reactor needs to be lowered in a controlled fashion. Before the tsunami hit, this worked in two of the reactors, but, for reasons still unknown, the temperature and pressure dropped too rapidly in the third reactor. 8. When the tsunami reached the reactors, 11 out of 12 emergency diesel generators failed. Since the earthquake had already knocked out the external power to the nuclear plant, this soon led to complete power failures, so-called ‘station blackouts’, in all but one reactor (which was one of the reactors shut down for maintenance). The three reactors operating before the tsunami hit began to lose the capability to cool their nuclear cores, and the water in these reactors started to boil, exposing the fuel rods. Partial meltdowns of the nuclear fuel were the result. When this was detected, the main objective was to avoid further damage to the fuel rods, so that they would not penetrate their containment chambers. As a response, on 12 March 2011, plant operators started venting the reactors and pumping sea water into the units. 9. These measures to lower the temperature and pressure in the reactors resulted in the release of radioactive material into the air. The Japanese government estimated that the amount of radiation released into the atmosphere was about 15% of the amount released during the Chernobyl accident. In addition, at least 100,000 but perhaps up to 300,000 tons of contaminated water leaked into the sea. Most of this water was only lightly radioactive, however. In fact, most of it was dumped into the sea on purpose in order to avoid other problems. 10. During the early days of the crisis, hydrogen, which was produced through a reaction between the exposed fuel rods and the water steam, also produced a series of explosions in three reactors. Despite these adverse conditions, operators continued to pump water into the reactors, and on 21 March 2011, they managed to reconnect external power to the plant. All of these actions prevented the complete meltdown of the nuclear fuel.


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11. On 17 April, TEPCO published a first initial roadmap for managing the nuclear accident, which aimed at stabilizing cooling conditions in the reactors and fuel pools as well as at mitigating the release of radioactive materials. Following the roadmap, alternative cooling systems had been installed in four of the reactors by 10 August, leading to a stabilization of water temperature. By mid-November, the release of radioactive materials was under control, and one month later, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced the end of the nuclear crisis. 12. Japan has now begun to tackle the longer-term challenges of the nuclear accident. The Japanese authorities believe that a final settlement will take at least four decades to complete. In the next few years, the latest action plan, the Roadmap towards Settlement of the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, foresees the following steps (Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, 2011): - improvement of cooling system reliability; - treatment of contaminated waters; - decreasing of radioactive discharge; - waste management and decontamination at the site; and - removal of spent fuel rods from storage pools in the affected reactors. 13. Once these steps have been completed, a new roadmap will be developed in order to begin the removal of the melted fuel rods. This will be done under difficult radiological conditions and will necessitate extensive use of robots. 14. Even though the last roadmap has been positively received, the announcement that the situation has been stabilized was criticized by some experts who argue that the Fukushima complex is still vulnerable to large aftershocks (Tabuchi, 2011). Indeed, radioactive leaks and a steep rise in temperature in one reactor were reported in the beginning of February 2012. Although the situation was brought under control shortly after, Japan’s Environment and Nuclear Crisis Minister, Goshi Hosno, recognised the need “to consider matters in an even more careful way” (United Press International, 2012). 15. The consequences of the nuclear accident for the inhabitants in the affected zones have been massive. The high levels of radiation in the area surrounding Fukushima led the Japanese government to evacuate the population within 20 km of the station. At the height of the evacuation, over 170,000 people were displaced in addition to the 320,000 people who had already been displaced by the earthquake and tsunami. At the one-year anniversary of the accident, more than 62,000 inhabitants of the Fukushima area were still unable to return to their homes (Oda, 2012). 16. The Japanese government aims to have cleaned up the areas around Fukushima two years after the accident, in order to enable residents to return home, but some experts consider this to be unrealistic. For example, the government is planning to replace much of the topsoil from an area covering 930 square miles, an area roughly the size of Luxemburg, an effort which the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) thinks impractical. At present, the lack of a storage site with enough space for the contaminated dirt has stalled the cleanup. According to the government, the cleanup could exceed US$ 257 billion (Saoshiro, 2011). 17. Of course, inside the evacuated zone radioactive levels were unacceptably high, but even outside this area, unsafe levels have been detected in agricultural land, water, and even in the food chain. Still, according to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, prompt crisis management averted catastrophic consequences. Indeed, no radiation casualties were reported, and experts expect only a small health impact on the population. One expert believes that the Fukushima accident could lead to about 1,000 extra cancer deaths in the affected population (von Hippel, 2011). A new study by two researchers at Stanford University, estimates that there will be 130 cancer-related fatalities worldwide, with lower- and higher-bound


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estimates of 15 and 1,300 (Ten Hoeve and Jacobson, 2012). However, negative psychological effects on the population around Fukushima could be considerable unless properly dealt with, he argues. Ultimately, the long-term effects of the accident are still difficult to estimate.

B. FAILURES, CHALLENGES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18. Japan faced an unprecedented situation, as it was the subject of not merely one, but three catastrophic events at the same time. It would be unrealistic to expect a flawless crisis response. Nevertheless, major criticisms of the crisis response and, more importantly, of crisis prevention measures have been raised against the Japanese authorities and the plant’s operator. 19. During the crisis, a number of human errors were committed. TEPCO initially failed to recognise the extent of the crisis. According to its own interim report published on 26 December 2011, the company recognised that it had failed to identify a problem in the cooling system on the day of the tsunami, missing an important opportunity to delay the core meltdown in one reactor by an earlier injection of water. Furthermore, a delay in venting another reactor caused a rupture of the so-called ‘wet well’, which contains cooling water for the reactor core. This led to the release of a considerable amount of contaminated water. Also, the poor co-ordination amongst national and local authorities and the unwillingness of Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s government to assume responsibility has been criticised. Indeed, Mr Kan stepped down in August 2011, not least because of criticisms of his crisis management. Struggles between TEPCO and the government about who had the necessary authority for certain actions took place, which complicated the crisis response (Funabashi & Kitazawa, 2012). Indeed, a general lack of leadership, management skills, and communication failures has been highlighted. 20. Most criticisms have been levelled at the Japanese crisis prevention measures. It is clear that regulatory policies failed in some critical aspects. As already pointed out, the Japanese authorities and TEPCO underestimated the maximum height of a tsunami that could hit Fukushima Daiichi: TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) failed to recognize the risks of a large tsunami that occurs approximately once every 1,000 years; TEPCO conducted inadequate computer modeling for tsunami risks; and NISA did not follow up to review these simulations (Acton & Hibbs, 2012). 21. Even beyond the failure to recognize the tsunami risks, a lack in additional safety measures meant that the effects of the tsunami on the power plant were more severe than they could have been otherwise. One analyst summarizes the six most severe regulatory failures in the following way (Lyman, 2011): - “Station blackouts lasted far longer than regulators assumed. - Strategies to prevent core damage or hydrogen explosions were far less successful than

expected. - Lack of accurate or functional instrumentation posed far greater challenges than projected. - Restoration of stable core cooling was far more difficult and took far longer than assumed. - Management of contaminated cooling water was a much more serious issue than expected. - Significant levels of radiation exposure occurred much farther from the release site than

projected.” 22. A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that one incident, in particular, should have led to a reconsideration of Japanese safety measures (Acton & Hibbs, 2012): the 1999 flooding incident at a French nuclear plant at Blayais near Bordeaux, which overwhelmed its sea walls, cut off external power supplies, and led to other safety failures. European countries reacted by increasing nuclear safety measures. In France alone, 110 million euros were invested. Had Japan, which knew about these safety overhauls, put in


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place similar defences, the Fukushima plant would have stood a better chance of averting the 2011 disaster or at least to reduce its scale. 23. Many underlying reasons for these regulatory failures exist, but a number of reasons have been highlighted by experts. For one, Japanese authorities, companies, and interest groups had been building up a myth of the absolute safety of nuclear power for decades, in part to overcome the anti-nuclear sentiment stemming from the nuclear attacks in the Second World War (Funabashi & Kitazawa, 2012). However, regulatory governance problems probably weighed even more heavily (Acton & Hibbs, 2012): the lack of independence on NISA’s part from government agencies that promote nuclear power as well as from the nuclear industry; the focus on earthquakes to the detriment of other risks; bureaucratic and professional rigidities; and the failure to utilise local knowledge. Indeed, the Carnegie study argues that, ultimately, “the Fukushima accident does not reveal a previously unknown fatal flaw associated with nuclear power. Rather, it underscores the importance of periodically re-evaluating plant safety in light of dynamic external threats and of evolving best practices, as well as the need for an effective regulator to oversee this process.” 24. The Japanese authorities have recognized many of these flaws. Tatsujiro Suzuki, the vice-chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, has summarised the Japanese government’s report to the IAEA by pointing out that Japan will improve, and in part has already improved, crisis prevention and response mechanisms, including the reform of the safety regulatory infrastructure (Suzuki, 2011). Indeed, the Japanese government planned to launch the new independent nuclear safety agency under the Ministry of Environment in September 2012. 25. In the summer of 2012, three large-scale investigations into the Fukushima accident were released: by TEPCO; by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, established by the Japanese government; and by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee, set up by the National Diet of Japan. While they all addressed the issues and problems mentioned above, the tone of their assessment was very different from each other. While the chairman of the TEPCO committee, executive vice president Masao Yamazaki, admitted that they did not have the measures in place to prevent the accident, “all who were related to the nuclear plant could not predict an occurrence of

the event which was far beyond our expectation” (Kobayashi, 2012). 26. The chairman of the government-sponsored inquiry, Yotaro Hatamura, Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo, indirectly criticised both TEPCO and the Japanese authorities, by saying that “[t]he direct cause of the latest accident can be boiled down to nothing but the fact that everything was structured and operated on the assumption ‘there would never be complete power loss for a long time’” (Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2012). He thus offered seven lessons learned from Fukushima: - “Possible phenomena occur. Phenomena that are considered impossible also occur.” - “We do not see what we don’t want to see. We see what we want to see.” - “Consider every possibility and make full preparations.” - “Creating a framework alone does not ensure functionality. Framework can be created, but

objectives cannot be shared.” - “Everything changes; respond flexibly to changes.” - “Acknowledge the presence of dangers, and create a culture that encourages straightforward

discussion about risks” - “It is important to acknowledge the significance of making judgments and taking action by

looking with our own eyes and thinking with our own brain, and to nurture that kind of capability.”


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27. Very much in contrast, the Diet-organised committee’s verdict was much more strongly critical. Its chairman, Kiyoshi Kurokawa of the Tokyo National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, argued that the disaster was “profoundly manmade” (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee, 2012). He argued that the “fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.” Going forward, it is the Rapporteur’s hope that the many lessons of the Fukushima accident will be learnt and acted upon with utmost diligence at every level, both nationally and internationally.

III. NUCLEAR ENERGY OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE ON STATUS AND TRENDS

A. GLOBAL ENERGY STATUS AND TRENDS 28. After suffering a slowdown in 2009, the world’s primary energy consumption, i.e. the consumption of energy from natural resources, experienced the strongest shift since 1973 in 2010 (BP, 2011). According to the well-respected BP Statistical Review of World Energy, it grew by 5.1% in 2010 (BP, 2012c). This rebound was fuelled by economic recovery as well as rapid growth in emerging economies. However, in 2011, the last year for which there is complete data, it grew by only 2.5%, which is close to the historical average, however. Energy consumption by countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) fell from 2010 to 2011 by 0.8% (contrasting with a 3.5% growth from 2009 to 2010). The OECD accounts for 45% of global consumption today. NATO member states consume roughly 35% of the global share. China is the largest energy consumer with a share of 21.5%, closely followed by the United States (18.5%). The region which experienced the largest percentage growth was yet again the Asia Pacific region, consuming 5.4% more primary energy than in 2010. 29. During 2010, almost all types of primary energy consumption experienced robust growth, but growth slowed down almost across the board in 2011 (BP, 2011; BP, 2012c). Consumption of oil, the foremost source of primary energy with a 33.1% share, rose by only 0.7% in 2011, compared with 3.1% in 2010, losing market share for the twelfth year in a row. Coal consumption experienced the largest increase since 2003 with 7.6% growth in 2010 and was the only fossil fuel with above-average growth in 2011 with a growth of 5.4%, accounting for 30.3%. In part, this was due to increased coal exports from the United States to Europe. Consumption of natural gas, the third source of energy with 24%, was up by 7.4% in 2010, but grew only by 2.2% in 2011, due to below-average growth everywhere except in the United States. Still, it is unlikely that the so-called ‘golden age of natural gas’ will stop anytime soon. Production of hydroelectricity grew by 5.3% in 2010, but only by 1.3% in 2011, for a share of 6.4% of the world’s energy consumption. Nuclear energy consumption, which accounts for 4.9% of the total energy consumption, grew by 2% in 2010, which is the largest increase since 2004. France was responsible for the largest volumetric increase, with an increase of 4.4%. However, on the back of the Fukushima accident and the decisions taken in Germany, worldwide nuclear output fell by a record 4.3% in 2011 (BP, 2012b). Japan’s nuclear output fell by 44.3% and Germany’s by 23.2%. Despite the large increase of fossil fuel consumption, renewable energies (excluding hydroelectricity) had a record year in 2010, with consumption growing by 15.5% and reaching an estimated 1.8% share in global energy consumption (BP, 2011). In 2011, renewable energy growth still rose by an above-average 17.7% (BP, 2012c). 30. Worldwide electricity generation grew by 6% in 2010, mainly driven by Asia, which accounted for 54% of the overall increase, but growth slowed in 2011 to 3.1% (BP, 2011; BP, 2012a). Fossil fuels were still the preferred sources of electricity generation. In 2009 (the last data year available from the IEA), coal accounted for 40.3% of the world’s electricity output, while natural gas and oil generated 21.4% and 5.1% respectively (IEA, 2012). Nuclear power provided about 13.4% of


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global electricity generation. Renewable sources and hydropower delivered about 19.8% of world’s electricity supply. 31. Analysts of global energy trends have noted that events following the Fukushima accident have shown that global energy markets are becoming increasingly flexible. Even in the wake of the Fukushima shock to the market, Japan managed to increase energy production, substitute fuels and trading patterns rather quickly. As Japan switched from nuclear energy to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), LNG was diverted from Europe towards the Asia Pacific region, which was in turn offset by increased coal exports from the United States, which could easily afford to export the coal because natural gas production soared as a result of the shale gas boom. 32. In its annual World Energy Outlook, the IEA looked at three scenarios for long-term world energy trends (International Energy Agency, 2011). First, the New Policies Scenario is based upon current government energy commitments and plans; second, the Current Policies Scenario is based upon the assumption that no changes to current policies and measures occur; and third, the 450 Scenario is based upon energy commitments and plans which would keep a fifty-fifty chance of limiting global temperature change to two degrees Celsius (compared to pre-industrial levels). The figure and table below show two pictures of the predicted world primary energy demand in the three scenarios.1 Between 2009 and 2035, the demand for energy will increase by 40% in the New Policies Scenario; by 50.1% in the Current Policies Scenario; and by 22.5% in the 450 Scenario. About 90% of the growth in demand will stem from non-OECD countries. In the New Policies Scenario, the report’s main scenario, the share of fossil fuel consumption will fall by 6 percentage points by 2035, from about 81% to 75%. Demand for natural gas will experience a continuous surge, while oil and coal consumption will be more or less stable. Renewable energy, despite experiencing faster growth than any other energy type, will not meet any fossil fuel consumption figures. Wind and hydropower will lead the increase in renewable energy, accounting for half of the new electric capacity installed until 2035. The generation of nuclear power will increase by 70% on a global level, led by large expansions in China, India, Russia, and South Korea.

Figure 1: World primary energy demand according to three IEA scenarios

1 The figure and table are taken from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011 (pp. 70-71), with the

express permission of the IEA.


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Table 1: World primary energy demand by fuel and scenario according to three IEA

scenarios [in Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe)]

B. GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY TRENDS

33. Currently, 435 nuclear power plants are in operation in 30 countries, with an installed electric net capacity of 370 GW. In terms of plant numbers, the top six countries are the United States (104 reactors), France (58), Japan (50), Russia (33), South Korea (21), and India (20). 34. In the European Union (EU), nuclear power accounts for almost 34% of electricity production, and in OECD countries it provides 24% (IAEA, n.d.). Half of the countries with nuclear power are located in Europe, which also accounts for half of world’s nuclear energy production. OECD countries generate 83.2% of world’s nuclear power. Russia (6.2%), China (3.5%), Ukraine (3.2%), and Taiwan (1.5%) account for most of the rest. In 15 out of the 30 countries with nuclear plants, nuclear energy provides for at least one-quarter of their total electricity consumption. 35. Within NATO, fourteen members have nuclear power generation, accounting for 65.8% of the world’s nuclear power consumption (BP, 2011). The allies with the highest shares of nuclear energy in their national energy mix are France (74.1%), Slovakia (51.8%), Belgium (51.1%), Hungary (42%), and Slovenia (37.2%) (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2012). The United States, France, Germany, and Canada are the largest producers in absolute numbers. Among NATO members which do not possess nuclear plants, it is notable that Italy gets 10% and Denmark 8% of their power from nuclear plants outside their borders (World Nuclear Association, 2011). 36. In 2012, there are more reactor units under construction than in any year since 1988. At present, 16 countries are building 66 new nuclear plants with a total net capacity of over 65 GW. Most projects are under construction in China (26), Russia (11), India (7), and South Korea (4); Slovakia, Taiwan, and the Ukraine each have two projects under construction, and Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Pakistan, and the United States each have one. In addition, many countries are planning to build new nuclear complexes in the future, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Indonesia, Iran, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. It is common to encounter construction delays of 10 years or more, which makes it difficult to assess the real progress on some of these projects (Schneider, Froggatt, & Thomas, 2011b). Indeed, 12 of the 66 reactors have been listed as under construction for more than 20 years, and another 35 reactors do not have official start-up dates (Schneider, Froggatt, & Thomas, 2011a). 37. The average operational age of world’s nuclear plants is 26 years. According to the IAEA, 5% of the world’s nuclear reactors have been in operation for more than 40 years, and 32% for


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more than 30 years (Agence France-Presse, 2012). After Fukushima, the viability of such long operational lifetime has been questioned in some quarters. However, other countries, such as France, Spain, and the United States, have granted extensions to nuclear units, which are over 40 years old. The United States, for example, has approved life extension to 66 of its 104 reactors, from the original 40 years to 60 years (IEA, 2011). Indeed, leading analysts suggest that “the number of reactors in operation will decline over the years to come (even if the installed capacity level could be maintained) unless lifetime extensions beyond 40 years become a widespread standard” (Schneider, Froggatt, & Thomas, 2011a). 38. Nuclear power plants around the world are both owned by private and public enterprises. At present, the nuclear markets in China, France, India, South Korea, and Russia are almost entirely controlled by state-owned companies. In other countries such as Germany, Spain, and the United States, private companies control the nuclear markets. The French public company Areva is considered the world’s largest nuclear conglomerate. The company has built or is constructing over 100 reactors worldwide and has about 3.4 billion euros invested in the nuclear business. Next in the ranking is Hitachi-General Electric Nuclear Energy, a global alliance that merged the nuclear divisions of two of the largest energy companies of Japan and the United States. Third follows the leading Russian nuclear company, the state corporation Rosatom, which ensures 40% of world’s service market on uranium enrichment and 17% of the nuclear fuel market. Other big companies are EDF, a French private company (although 85% of the stocks are owned by the French government), which operates 58 reactors in France and, through a subsidiary, eight nuclear power stations in the UK; the state-owned Korea Electric Power Company, which operates 21 power plants in South Korea and provides 98% of Korean electricity production; as well as the China National Nuclear Corporation, which operates China’s 14 nuclear plants. 39. The economics of nuclear power are influenced by a variety of many variables that make calculations very difficult. Investment costs for building a nuclear plant, for example, vary significantly from one country to another. Also, nuclear power plant projects need extensive and complex infrastructure, for example large water supplies and waste management facilities. Therefore, government subsidies are essential in this regard. On the other hand, it has been suggested that operating costs for nuclear plants are much lower compared to coal and gas-fired plants. Operating expenditures of OECD nuclear plants are about a third of those for coal-fired plants, and between a quarter and a fifth of gas-fired ones. And, furthermore, nuclear fuel costs are lower. The amount of uranium needed to produce large quantities of electricity is much lower than the fuel needed for coal and gas fired plants, and it has the advantage of being highly concentrated and easily transported. According to the US Nuclear Energy Institute, the total fuel costs for a gas-fired plant are 89%, for a coal-fired plant 78%, and for a nuclear station only about 14%. 40. Currently, the economics of nuclear plants are not favourable. As one analyst underlines, even before the Fukushima accident, the cost of building nuclear power plants began escalating due to competition for resources and manufacturing capacity” (Hibbs, 2012). In less than a decade, so-called overnight cost estimates, i.e. assuming that no interest is incurred during construction, have risen from US$ 1,200 per KW to US$ 3,000-5,000 per KW. When one includes the cost of borrowing capital, it has been suggested that a pair of nuclear reactor units costs about US$ 10-15 billion (Hibbs, 2012). 41. Often, estimates of building nuclear plants leaves out key costs, such as waste management and dismantlement. Indeed, independent, but nuclear-friendly, analysts have suggested that the industry should factor in all relevant costs in order to give the public more believable estimates. However, the expenses associated with spent-fuel disposal and decommissioning of nuclear plants are difficult to measure. So far, no plant has been completely dismantled, and the disposal of radioactive waste of those in process is still on-going. To eliminate spent nuclear fuel could take as few as 50 years or as many as 150 years. Estimate of decommissioning costs vary widely as well. The World Nuclear Association claims that such costs amount to about 9-15% of the initial capital


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investment. In contrast, the Worldwatch Institute suggests that decommissioning could reach several billion dollars for a large plant. German nuclear companies have made a total of 30 billion euros in provision for costs related to the cost of dismantling the plants and disposing of radioactive materials (Reuters, 2012). 42. Perhaps the most interesting question is the price of electricity generated by nuclear power that the customer has to pay, but this is even harder to calculate and naturally country-dependent. According to OECD electricity cost projections for 2010, the price for electricity generated by nuclear power is generally cheaper than coal and renewables prices, but more expensive than gas (see Table 2). This indicates that nuclear power is cost competitive if there is no direct access to low-cost fossil fuels, especially natural gas. Indeed, the availability of cheaper natural gas and renewable energies, in combination with the economic and financial crisis, has meant that the nuclear industry was very reluctant to invest in new plants in recent years (Heung Chang, 2011). While the number of construction starts has been on the rise, most other nuclear industry indicators are negative, which was the case even before Fukushima. As one study suggests, “[e]ven if reactors can be operated for an average of 40 years, 74 new plants would have to come on line by 2015 to maintain the status quo, which is impossible given current constraints on fabricating reactor components” (Schneider, Froggatt, & Thomas, 2011a). The study goes on to suggest that the post-Fukushima changes away from nuclear in some of the big producing countries “could accelerate the decline of a rapidly aging industry.” Another expert argues that it is not Asia, but “Western Europe - which produces about half its electricity with reactors - that may tip the balance on whether a sustainable global nuclear expansion goes forward” (Hibbs, 2012). As already mentioned, the IEA operates with the assumption, under the New Policies Scenario, that nuclear power generation will grow by 70% by 2035 because of construction in China, India and South Korea. The IAEA, in its Nuclear Technology Review 2012, put forward a low and a high projection for the growth of nuclear power: “In the updated low projection, the world’s installed nuclear power capacity grows from 369 gigawatts (GW(e)) at the end of 2011 to 501 GW(e) in 2030, down 8% from what was projected last year [35.8% growth]. In the updated high projection, capacity grows to 746 GW(e) in 2030, down 7% from last year’s projection [102.2% growth]” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012, August 1). This leads us to answer the question of how the Fukushima accident has impacted nuclear power policies around the world.


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Table 2: OECD Electricity Generating Cost Projections for Year 2010 on - 5% discount rate, US cents/kWh (World Nuclear Association, 2011)

2

Country Nuclear Coal Coal with Carbon Capture and

Storage Combined Cycle Gas Turbine

On-shore Wind

Belgium 6.1 8.2 - 9.0 9.6

Czech Republic

7.0 8.5-9.4 8.8-9.3 9.2 14.6

France 5.6 - - - 9.0

Germany 5.0 7.0-7.9 6.8-8.5 8.5 10.6

Hungary 8.2 - - - -

Japan 5.0 8.8 - 10.5 -

Korea 2.9-3.3 6.6-6.8 - 9.1 -

Netherlands 6.3 8.2 - 7.8 8.6

Slovakia 6.3 12.0 - - -

Switzerland 5.5-7.8 - - 9.4 16.3

USA 4.9 7.2-7.5 6.8 7.7 4.8

China* 3.0-3.6 5.5 - 4.9 5.1-8.9

Russia* 4.3 7.5 8.7 7.1 6.3

Electric Power Research Institute (USA)

4.8 7.2 - 7.9 6.2

Eurelectric 6.0 6.3-7.4 7.5 8.6 11.3

C. THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY SINCE FUKUSHIMA 43. Japan’s nuclear crisis raised public concerns and anti-nuclear sentiment across the globe, most notably in OECD and NATO member countries, where public acceptance is crucial to the continuing reliance on nuclear power. However, more than a year and a half after the Fukushima accident, it appears that its impact on nuclear policies has been much more limited than expected. It is clear, nonetheless, that there is no unity within EU or NATO countries, as some choose the nuclear way as others prefer other sources of energy. 44. Naturally, the Fukushima nuclear accident has massively affected Japanese politics, even though its longer-term effects are yet unclear. Before the accident, nuclear energy from its 54 reactors accounted for 29.2% of Japan’s electricity production. In August 2012, only two out of 54 reactors were in use because all plants have to be inspected. Indeed, in mid-2012, Japan was briefly without nuclear power for the first time in 42 years. After the Fukushima crisis Japan suffered several energy supply shortages which have inflicted serious harm to its already vulnerable economy (Vivoda, 2011). Indeed, the situation is making Japanese industries less competitive. According to a series of surveys published by the Japanese Newspaper Nikkei Shinbun, many corporations are planning to relocate their manufacturing plants offshore (Aldrich, 2012). As a consequence, Japan’s exports plummeted during 2011, and in January 2012 the authorities announced the country’s first annual trade deficit since 1963 (The Economist, 2012). The first half of 2012 also saw Japan’s largest trade deficit ever, with US$ 37.3 billion.

2 Based on OECD/IEA data.* Note that “[f]or China and Russia: 2.5c is added to coal and 1.3c to gas as

carbon emission cost to enable sensible comparison with other data in those fuel/technology categories, though within those countries coal and gas will in fact be cheaper than the Table above suggests” (World Nuclear Association, 2011).


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45. The Japanese government’s 2010 Basic Energy Plan aimed to build nine new nuclear reactors by 2020 and at least 14 more by 2030 (de Wit & Keneko, 2011). In the aftermath of the accident, however, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan said Japan “needs to start from scratch” on its long-term energy policy (Fackler, May 2011). To that end, on 26 August, a new bill was passed with the objective of expanding investment in renewable energies (de Wit, 2011). The government of current Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, wants to move towards lowering the country’s reliance on nuclear energy as much as possible as well, but underlines that Japan should restart nuclear reactors as soon as possible to meet current shortages. Being the world’s fifth largest energy consumer, the lack of a strong renewable energy sector and the interruption of nuclear power has led Japan to rely on imported fossil fuels in order to meet its electricity demand. According to industry analysts, Japanese oil and gas imports will experience annual rises of 8% to 13%. This will, naturally, increase greenhouse gas emissions considerably, lead to a rise in electricity prices, and decrease the rate of electricity sales (Vivoda, 2011). Indeed, the Japanese Ministry of Environment estimates that Japan will emit 15% more greenhouse gases in 2012 than in 1990 (Associated Press, 2012). 46. On 14 September 2012, the new mid-to-long term “Innovative Strategy for Energy and Environment” was announced, which was elaborated by the Japanese government’s Energy and Environment Council. The primary objective of the strategy was to formulate new targets for the country’s energy mix and measures to decrease the countries’ reliance on nuclear energy. After a country-wide debate about the future of nuclear power in light of the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese authorities announced that the new policy favoured the zero nuclear option, wishing to phase out nuclear power by 2040. The core principles of the new strategy are (1) a limit of 40 years of operations for existing nuclear power plants; (2) control of the restarting of power plants by the newly established independent regulatory agency (which will also implement higher safety measures); and (3) no new construction of nuclear power plants (Lambrecht, 2012). The aim of the strategy is to diversify Japan’s energy mix by increasing its reliance on renewable energy (which should represent up to 30% of the total mix by 2030) and fossil fuels as well as by improving energy efficiency. However, this controversial energy strategy was not endorsed by the whole cabinet. The commitment to a complete phase-out and the strategy’s recommendations will therefore simply be “taken into consideration” and become a starting point for a debate on Japan’s energy future (Powernews, 2012). Nevertheless, the new energy strategy demonstrates Japan’s will to invest in renewable energy and draw lessons from the Fukushima disaster. This major turnaround could be a response to the rising anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. Today, weekly protests are staged, including a large-scale demonstration with 75,000 to 200,000 protesters, depending on the source (Dickie, 2012). Recently, a Pew Research Center poll found that 70% of the Japanese favour a reduction in reliance on nuclear power (Pew Research Center, 2012). Furthermore, a Green Party was founded and anti-nuclear politicians have gained in popularity. 47. Besides Japan, the biggest political impact could be felt in Europe. Indeed, just two weeks after the accident, the European Council called for a complete safety review of all EU nuclear plants through so-called ‘stress tests’. The stress tests are designed to check the resistance of 143 European reactors to nuclear disasters and “man-made failures and actions”, such as “plane crashes and explosions close to nuclear plants.” Given the EU’s limited powers of oversight in nuclear power, national governments conducted the checks voluntarily. Some have criticized that this has led to an operational bias because often power operators were tasked with the assessments. On 4 October 2012, the European Commission released the final results of the stress tests, which confirms the high safety standards of most EU power plants, but expressed the need for improvements in almost all of them. According to the investigation, not all the IAEA safety standards and international best practices for safety are implemented in all EU States. The stress tests recommend numerous specific technical improvements and drew the following recommendations in light of the Fukushima incident (European Commission, 2012):


13

- “Earthquake and flooding risk. Current standards for risk calculation are not applied in 54 reactors (for earthquake risk) and respectively 62 reactors (for flooding risk) out of the 145 checked. The risk calculation should be based on a 10 000 year time frame, instead of the much shorter time periods sometimes used.

- On-site seismic instruments to measure and alert of possible earthquakes should be available at every nuclear power plant. These instruments should be installed or improved in 121 reactors.

- Containment filtered venting systems to allow safe depressurizing of the reactor containment in case of an accident, should be in place. 32 reactors are not yet equipped with these systems.

- Equipment to fight severe accidents should be stored in places protected even in the event of general devastation and from where it can be quickly obtained. This is not the case for 81 reactors in the EU.

- A backup emergency control room should be available in case the main control room becomes inhabitable in case of an accident. These are not yet available in 24 reactors.”

Action plans for the implementation of the recommendations should be available by the end of 2012, and the Commission aims to report on the implementation by June 2014. The Commission also wishes to present a revision of the current nuclear safety directive in early 2013, as the European legal framework for nuclear safety was also reviewed as part of the stress tests. 48. Undoubtedly, the biggest change in nuclear policy has taken place in Germany, where an extensive popular debate on nuclear energy has taken place for decades. Six months before the Fukushima accident, the German government had released its new 2010 Energy Concept, which extended the lifetime of nuclear reactors by an average of 12 years. This represented a reversal of a 2002 decision by a previous government to shut down all nuclear stations by 2021. It should be noted, however, that even in the 2010 Energy Concept, nuclear energy was seen as a bridge technology towards ‘the age of renewable energy’. The government as well as big private companies like Siemens were clearly focused on renewable energy and were investing heavily in this sector, which is also seen as a source of economic and technological progress. After the Fukushima accident, the German government decided to re-visit the 2010 Energy Concept, and it imposed a three-month suspension of operations in eight of its oldest nuclear plants (which was later made permanent). The government mandated an Ethics Commission on Safe Energy Supply to examine what future nuclear energy should have in the country. It came to the conclusion that an exit from nuclear energy was already feasible within a decade. The German government then decided to shut down all remaining reactors by 2022. Some critics have argued that this step was ill-advised, but the vast majority of the population and all parties are supporting the nuclear exit. The nuclear policies approved after Fukushima have indeed made Germany a net importer of electricity (EurActiv, 2012). 49. Elsewhere in Europe, some changes took place as well. In Italy, a referendum on the return to nuclear energy (abandoned in 1987) scheduled before the Fukushima accident, was held in June 2011. The results were overwhelming and perhaps unsurprising: 94.1% of the votes were against re-launching the nuclear programme. Moreover, Switzerland has decided to phase out its nuclear plants by 2034, and Belgium has reached an agreement to abandon nuclear power by 2025. The Belgian government has recently announced that the lifetime of one reactor (Tihange 1) needs to be prolonged to ensure energy security. This should not affect the overall timeline. At the time of writing, it is still unclear how cracks in the reactor vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, which were discovered in the summer of 2012, will affect current plans. The reactors remain shut down for further inspection. 50. Beyond these major decisions, in the 15 NATO member states with nuclear power or with plans to develop nuclear power, support for nuclear energy has been reaffirmed by governments to varying degrees. In July 2011, the UK Parliament, for example, voted in favour of nuclear energy,


14

with an overwhelming majority of 267 votes for and only 14 against it. The UK plans to build a new generation of British nuclear power stations, and it is expected to inaugurate the first of a planned eight reactors by 2018. However, this timeline could be starting to slip, as, for example, EDF has put construction plans for a reactor at Hinkley Point on hold. At the time of writing, the UK government is discussing the provisions of a new energy bill, which will be introduced in parliament in the fall of 2012. A part of the bill is an electricity market reform, where feed-in tariffs should incentivise companies to invest in low-carbon electricity generation, including nuclear power. However, there is considerable uncertainty over this mechanism from different sides, which the government has recognised and is addressing. 51. In France, nuclear power accounts for 74.1% of its electricity production, and it is also the world’s largest net exporter of electricity. The French stress test has underlined that France’s nuclear plants are generally safe, but has revealed some vulnerabilities to extreme events. Government authorities are strengthening safety measures, and the operators are investing heavily into reinforcements, with EDF, for example, investing 10 billion euros. During the 2012 French presidential and parliamentary elections the parties laid out their diverging views on nuclear energy. The two main political parties in particular have different views on nuclear energy. In February 2012, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) extended the life of French nuclear plants beyond 40 years, and the party’s policy is to keep nuclear energy at around 75% of its electricity production over the next decades. In contrast, the Socialist Party, under the new President François Hollande, proposed, during the 2012 campaigns, to reduce the share down to 50% by 2025 by substituting nuclear energy with renewable energies and improving energy efficiency. In terms of the other parties, the Left Front proposes a debate and referendum on nuclear energy, the Greens (Europe Ecologie Les verts) want an exit in about 20 years’ time, the National Front is suggesting a nuclear exit but only in the long term, and the Democratic Movement suggests lowering the share of nuclear energy in the national mix as well. After the presidential election, the President indicated, at the Environmental Conference that took place on 14-15 September 2012 in Paris, the main guidelines of his views on the energy transition including reinforcing the share of the renewables in the energy mix. With regard to nuclear energy, he only added that the Fessenheim plant would be closed before the end of 2016. More precise directions remain to be defined. 52. In the aftermath of Japan’s nuclear crisis, U.S. Secretary of Energy stated that the Obama Administration continues to support the expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Just 11 months after the Fukushima accident, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the construction of two nuclear reactors in Georgia. This was the first permit issued since 1978, and the new plant is expected to be operational as soon as 2016. Shortly after, in March 2012, the construction of two further reactors in South Carolina was approved by the NRC. These reactors are expected to be operational in 2016 and 2019 respectively. The US Department of Energy’s long-term goal is to increase nuclear capacity by about 10 GW by 2035, about a 10% increase. However, the abundance of inexpensive natural gas and the increasing costs of nuclear construction do not bode well for this long-term goal at the moment. In March 2012, on the basis of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, the US NRC ordered a first set of safety improvements to be implemented by the operators by the end of 2016. It is also studying two other sets of safety requirements. Currently, the NRC will not issue final decisions on licensing new reactors and license renewal applications. This is in reaction to a June 2012 decision by a US Court of Appeals, which had struck down the Commission’s so-called waste confidence provision. Until now, the NRC assumed that fuel waste stored at nuclear power plants would be safe for decades without individually assessing the associated risks, which the court ruled insufficient. However, this will not affect hearings and other licensing work, and the NRC is currently working on adapting to the court ruling. It should also be noted that a minor incident at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station occurred in January 2012. Faulty computer modelling meant that certain tubes broke much earlier than expected, releasing a small amount of radioactive steam which posed no danger to people or the environment. In the summer of 2012, the repair costs thus


15

far amounted to US$ 165 million, and it is unclear when or if the damaged reactors will come online again (Blood, 2012). 53. Government support also remains strong in Turkey (which plans three reactors), the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania (all three have two new reactors planned or under construction), Slovenia (which seeks a 20-year life extension for the Krsko nuclear plant), Poland (which plans to commission its first reactor by 2025), and Lithuania, as well as Slovakia and the Netherlands. Regarding Lithuania, while the government had re-committed to nuclear power, a non-binding consultative referendum was held alongside the parliamentary elections on 14 October 2012, where 64.8% of the voters rejected the government’s plans for the construction of a new nuclear power plant. It remains to be seen how this will affect Lithuania’s nuclear plans. In Bulgaria, construction of the Belene nuclear power plant was discontinued because of a disagreement over costs between the government and the investors. However, in late August 2012, the government has picked Westinghouse to prepare a proposal for a new reactor at the Kozloduy site, where the country’s two operational reactors are based. 54. China, South Korea, and India, beside Japan the biggest Asian nuclear powers, have not changed their nuclear policies of substantial expansion. Commitment also remains strong in countries such as Bangladesh, Belarus, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, who all have substantial nuclear power plans. Peru is the rare exception of a country where nuclear power plans have been stopped. 55. On the international level, at the 2011 G8 Summit in Deauville, France, the G8 urged the world “to draw all the lessons” from the Fukushima accident and “noted the necessity to consider strengthening the Convention on Nuclear Safety [adopted in 1994] and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [adopted in 1986], as well as upgrading norms and standards of nuclear safety.” At the 2012 G8 summit, the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group again addressed the implications of the Fukushima disaster. In particular, the Group welcomed and endorsed the IAEA’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (Action Plan). The IAEA Action Plan was developed at a 2011 Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and aims “to strengthen nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and radiation protection of people and the environment worldwide” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). The Action Plan proposed measures in 12 areas: safety assessments; IAEA peer reviews; emergency preparedness and response; national regulatory bodies; operating organisations; IAEA safety standards; the international legal framework; member states planning to start nuclear power programmes; capacity building; protection of people and the environment; communication and information dissemination; as well as research and development. Of particular note is that the Action Plan recommends exploring ways to enhance the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Member states should also “consider proposals made to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.” Progress on the Action Plan was assessed in September 2012 at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting and the General Conference and will be re-assessed at a Fukushima Ministerial Conference in Nuclear Safety to be held in Fukushima in mid-December 2012.

IV. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENTS 56. In nuclear power reactor design, one commonly distinguishes four generations. Three of these generations are operating in the world, and a fourth one is under development. The prototypes which launched civil nuclear power are referred to as Generation I reactors. These reactors were not suitable for large-scale electricity production, and only a few units were built.


16

Only one Generation I commercial plant is still in use, the Wylfa nuclear power station in Wales, and it is scheduled to cease power generation in 2012 (Goldberg & Rosner, 2011)3. 57. Generation II reactors began operation in the late 1960s, with an original design life of 40 years. They comprise the bulk of the world’s nuclear plants. Many of the units currently under construction or planned will employ this design. These reactors use traditional ‘active safety’ mechanisms, which require the intervention of an operator or computers in case of an emergency. These reactors are considered secure and reliable, but the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident suggest that increased safety is needed in terms of plant location, containment structures, and cooling capabilities. Also, these reactors have raised concerns regarding nuclear waste management and require large capital investments. 58. The first Generation III reactor has been operating in Japan since 1996, and several countries have plans to introduce this generation of reactors in the near future. Only four Generation III units are in operation, but many nuclear plants under construction or planned will be of this generation. Generation III reactor designs essentially evolved from the previous generation, but have increased fuel and thermal efficiency as well as longer life times (up to 60 years). These reactors are based on standardised designs, and employ better safety systems. As a result, costs and construction time have been reduced, improving cost effectiveness. In addition, these units are more flexible because they can more easily adapt their operational capacity in response to fluctuations in customer electricity consumption, thus optimizing the power generation. Generation III reactors are also considerably safer due to the introduction of ‘passive safety’ features, which rely on natural phenomena, such as gravity and natural responses to changes in temperature or pressure, in order to slow down or terminate nuclear reactions in a reactor. 59. Reactors of the fourth generation could become available for commercial introduction between 2015 and 2030. A key player in the development of this new wave of reactors is the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), a task force representing thirteen governments committed to jointly develop the next generation of nuclear technology.4 France, Japan, and the United States meet about 80% of the research and development costs under this joint project, which seeks to develop more efficient designs to decrease capital costs and, at the same time, increase the safety, security, sustainability, and management capacity of nuclear reactors. It has identified and selected six prototypes of Generation IV reactors for further development. 60. The epithermal Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) has great potential for the minimization of radiotoxic nuclear waste as well as improvement of nuclear safety. As the only Generation IV reactor design, the MSR takes advantage of using liquid fuel, which could eliminate radiation damage in the core produced by fuel burn-up and fully recycle spent nuclear fuel (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2010). Currently, two different projects investigate the viability of this system: the EVOL project, a joint venture between EURATOM and France, as well as the Russian MOSART project (Boussier, 2011). The Chinese Academy of Sciences has also announced that it will fund development efforts of an MSR (Shiga, 2011). GIF expects to establish the viability of the MSR by 2018 (Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform, 2012). According to the US Department of Energy, the concept remains too immature for confident economic analysis (Holcomb, 2011). 61. The two thermal prototypes, the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) and the Supercritical Water Reactor (SCWR), are considered evolutionary steps in the development of high-temperature and high-pressure reactors. The VHTR design aims for substantial reductions in

3 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from Goldberg & Rosner, 2011.

4 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, the

United Kingdom, and the United States.


17

CO2 gas emissions and nuclear waste, while improving economics. Also, research is being done to utilise the high temperatures generated by VHTRs to produce hydrogen for industrial use, for example. Despite timetables for deployment being pushed back by the economic and financial crisis, the progress of a Chinese demonstration plant gives cause for some optimism (Kelly, 2012). The SCWR, on the other hand, is promising because of its high thermal efficiency. Since 2006, a joint project by Canada, EURATOM, and Japan has been underway. A fuel qualification test is currently being designed and licensed, and a technology demonstration could be achieved by 2020. 62. The remaining three Generation IV prototypes are so-called Fast Neutron Reactors (FNRs), a technology which is the most advanced of Generation IV technology. FNRs will be smaller and simpler than current types and extremely effective in terms of extracting the maximum amount of energy out of the nuclear fuel. Conventional units use about 1% of the energy potential of uranium, while FNRs are designed to up to 60%. These reactors can also use nuclear fuel that has been recycled an unlimited number of times. Most conventional reactors can only use fuel that has been recycled no more than once. This, of course, minimizes the production of radioactive waste. However, FNR technology is not without risks. Their use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a possible proliferation risk. In fact, developing such reactors runs counter to the professed goals at the Nuclear Summits in Washington DC (2010) and Seoul (2012). In Seoul, world leaders again encouraged “States to take measures to minimize the use of HEU” (2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, 2012). What is more, such reactors also produce very large amounts of weapon-grade plutonium. Undoubtedly, these concerns need to be addressed before proceeding with the commercial development of FNR. 63. Among FNRs, interest by the GIF has been focused on the Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR). With the cumulative experience of some 390 years of operation among different SFRs, it is believed this design offers the shortest path towards becoming economically competitive. In fact, owing to the relative maturity of this technology, commercial deployment is targeted for 2020. However, further research on the fuel cycle and reactor system is still necessary, and costs need to be brought down. Presently, various collaborative activities are being conducted by the GIF, China, and Russia (Hahn, et al., 2011). 64. The Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) possesses excellent material management capabilities. As fuel, it can use depleted uranium or thorium, which is three to five times more abundant than uranium, and burn by-products, thus optimizing fuel efficiency and waste management. LFR technology is already at an advanced stage. An EU-funded project has been designing a LFR demonstrator, named Alfred, since 2010. In February 2012, the Italian Technology Agency, the Italian company ANSALDO, and the Russian Institute for Nuclear Research signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the Alfred Consortium. This consortium aims to bring together organisations interested in the development and construction of the demonstrator. As of today, Alfred is undergoing safety analysis, and the results are expected by end 2012. If the test delivers positive results, Romania could host the reactor (Alemberti, Takahashi, Smirnov, & Smith, 2012). Industrial deployment of this technology is envisaged in two stages: by 2025 for reactors operating with relatively low temperature and density; and by 2035 for more advanced high temperature designs (Generation IV International Forum, 2012). 65. There is a renewed interest for thorium plants from some operators, which calls for a special mention. Thorium was used in prototype reactors in the early nuclear age, but arguably lost out against uranium reactors because thorium reactors do not produce plutonium, essential for building nuclear weapons. The principle of thorium reactor is that the fuel, barely radioactive itself, is continuously turned into Uranium-233 (U-233), which fissions and thereby generates more U-233. There are clear advantages of this process. As Thorium is dissolved in liquid salts, no cooling water is needed, reducing the risk of the kind of explosions that occurred during the


18

Fukushima accident. As already noted, liquid fuel also lowers the radioactive waste because the fuel can be used until almost all its radioactive components have reacted or decayed into non-radioactive material. Liquid fuel is also not flammable (Shiga, 2011). Furthermore, research efforts are underway to explore whether thorium reactors can be combined with particle accelerators which produce neutrons that can further fission the nuclear waste, transmuting this waste into other radioactive products that have a much shorter half-life than today’s radioactive waste (Crow, 2012). An EU-funded project in Belgium, called the Multipurpose Hybrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications, could show the way, as it explores radioactive waste transmutation. Still, there are problems and hurdles in developing thorium reactors (Ferguson, 2011). The corrosiveness of the fuel is problematic. Uranium-232, a highly radioactive by-product, would increase safety and handling costs. And general safety research has yet to start in earnest. Furthermore, there are large costs associated with a complete switch to thorium fuel, and the technology still needs many years of research and development. 66. Of the six Generation IV prototypes, the Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) is the only one with no operating antecedent. Since 2010, EURATOM has been co-ordinating the GoFastR project, a consortium of 22 partners that researches GFR viability until the end of 2012 (Stainsby, 2010). If successful, the consortium will start the licensing and construction phase of the Allegro demonstration reactor, to be sited in the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Slovakia (Liska & Cognet, 2011). As of April 2012, the project is on schedule (Budapest Business Journal, 2012). 67. To summarise, Generation IV reactors are design concepts that require further research and development. According to most sources, the biggest challenges will be licensing among member countries of the GIF, dealing with the HEU issue, and ensuring reliability of the technology without compromising the economics of the system. However, if any of the prototypes finally proves to be feasible, they could indeed revolutionise nuclear power. 68. In other nuclear developments, over the last number of years increasing interest in so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMR) has risen. With power capacities between 10 MW and 300 MW, these reactors would match the majority of non-nuclear power plants. An advantage would be that SMRs would be factory-built as modular components, and then shipped to their final destination for assembly. All these factors would permit the installation of SMRs in locations with grid limitations, on sites where it is physically impossible to accommodate large plants, or during times when the capital needed for larger plants is unavailable (Matzie, 2009). Many companies are working on Generation III SMR designs, but there is also considerable research into Generation IV SMRs. Generation III designs would carry fewer risks and could be deployed earlier, but Generation IV systems would be able to deliver smaller and more efficient reactors (Goldberg & Rosner, 2011). In March 2012, the US Department of Energy signed agreements with different companies for the construction of demonstration SMRs, ranging from 45 MW to 225 MW power capacities. China has already started building two 250 MW demonstrators, and South Africa, Russia, and India also develop advanced modular projects. The commercial deployment of these devices could occur over the next ten years. 69. Further off in the future, nuclear fusion offers substantial advantages over today’s fission systems. In essence, nuclear fusion merges light atoms to form a heavier element, for example fusing hydrogen isotopes to form helium. As a result, very large amounts of energy are released. Indeed, the process replicates what takes place in the sun. Fusion reactors are also highly efficient in waste management and production, and they do not generate weapons-grade plutonium. In addition, the supply of raw fuel is virtually unlimited. However, creating the required conditions for fusion is extraordinarily difficult, and the scientific community faces very challenging technological and economic hurdles. Still, some progress has been made. In 2006, China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States launched the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, aiming to demonstrate that it is possible to produce commercial energy from fusion. Sited in the south of France, this international task force is building

http://myrrha.sckcen.be/

http://myrrha.sckcen.be/


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the world’s largest and most advanced experimental nuclear fusion reactor. Economic difficulties have arisen since the financial crisis broke out, and construction has suffered delays. Nevertheless, ITER is expected to be fully operational by 2020. 70. At the moment, several experimental Generation IV reactors and nuclear fusion projects are operating around the world. However, the effects of the Fukushima nuclear accident and the difficult economic situation in many industrialized countries may slow down or even halt investments in some of the longer-term projects. Particularly in NATO member states, public acceptance will be crucial in determining the inclusion of nuclear research in the governments’ energy agenda.

V. CONCLUSION AND POINTS FOR DISCUSSION 71. Nuclear energy is essentially a political choice. This is why the Rapporteur has tried to show the different options of several sovereign countries. The fact that only three major accidents have occurred since the era of civil nuclear energy began can be considered as a remarkable result, showing a safe and cheap form of energy, but the opinion of those who raise the harsh human consequences of such accidents must also be respected. Undoubtedly, the way to renewable energy has a future, and many countries are investing heavily in it, for example China, Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the United States. 72. To the Rapporteur, it remains clear that nuclear energy can contribute to crucial goals of energy and environmental security. For one, nuclear power makes countries less dependent on foreign sources of energy, a key goal for many states, also in the Alliance. Moreover, nuclear energy possesses important advantages compared to fossil fuels: CO2 and other pollutant emissions are minimal; it does not use natural resources that are rapidly being diminished; and electricity prices from nuclear energy are more stable. CO2 emissions reached record heights in 2010, and the latest data suggests that this growth continued in 2011, albeit at a slower rate (BP, 2012). According to the IEA, this puts the world on a path towards a long-term temperature increase of 3.5°C (IEA, 2011). Therefore, nuclear energy can be a rational choice. 73. Naturally, nuclear energy is not without risks. As the Fukushima accident has shown, extreme natural phenomena pose a threat to the safety of nuclear reactors. This is why nuclear safety regulation and enforcement must be improved, and the member states of the Alliance are well on their way. International efforts on nuclear safety, especially the IAEA’s Action Plan, must be reinforced. Indeed, the 2009 STCEES report on The Nuclear Renaissance [183 STCEES 09 E] already called for this, and this is one area where international co-operation could yield large benefits with comparatively low investment. Undoubtedly, the risks associated with nuclear waste management should also be studied further.

74. Of course, whether or not countries develop nuclear energy or whether or not to expand its use is an entirely national decision, and countries face very different domestic situations. Still, the Rapporteur believes that a genuine discussion in an Alliance context about energy security, including the role of nuclear energy in the overall mix, is warranted. It can lead to mutual understanding of policies and enables member states to react appropriately to changes in energy policies in other member states. Indeed, NATO has a role in Allied energy security. As NATO has underlined in recent years, the Alliance can add value in energy security by information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional co-operation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure. The Rapporteur is therefore looking forward to an informative discussion about the future of nuclear energy in the Alliance and worldwide.


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