Nuclear Disposal

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Nuclear Disposal

Part I: History, International Status &

Disposal Conditions…

Seminar on regulations and technology of waste management and disposal in Germany

March 28th, 2018 in Taipei

Dr. J. Shang

Slide 1

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1

Contents

Introduction

2 Status of nuclear disposal

Slide 2

5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad

3 Safety requirements and long-term safety case

4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben

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Contents

Introduction


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3 Safety requirements and long-term safety case


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Options for possible repositories - suitability

Sea or ocean

• Water pollution

• London Dumping Convention

1972

Arctic or Antarctic

• Instable system

• Climate change & ice melting

• Antarctic Treaty 1959

Space

• Expensive

• Risk of launch failure

• Outer Space Treaty 1967

Source: www.clker.com

Slide 4

http://www.clker.com/cliparts/8/u/Y/s/n/h/rocket-dark-blue-window-md.png

http://www.clker.com/cliparts/c/3/a/f/119498920855513921snow.svg.med.png

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• HABOG (The Netherlands)

• ATC (Spain)

Options for possible repositories – suitability

Repository

• Massive building with technical barriers

• Continous protection

• Long-term storage

Storage

• Interim or long-term storage

• LLW, MLW or HLW

Examples

At Surface

Source: TÜV SÜD ET

Slide 5

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Options for possible repositories – suitability

Deep geological depositoriesCharacteristics

• Safety through geological stable system

• Host rock and technical barriers

• Storage of LLW, ILW & HLW

Rock salt

• Very low permeability, high thermal conductivity

• E. g. Germany, USA, Russia

Claystone

• Low permeability, low dissolution behaviour

• E. g. Switzerland, France, GB

Crystalline rock/granite

• High strength, low dissolution behaviour

• E. g. Finland, China, Korea

Source: TÜV SÜD ET

Slide 6

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Public opinion

• Provide information to public:

– Risks and suitability

– Security precautions

– Prospects like working places

• Importance of public support particularly of residents

Slide 7

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Public opinion – case study

Positive reaction – Finland (Olkiluoto)

Expectations:

• Work places

• Higher wealth

• Trust in politics

Acceptance:

• Local council: ~ 70 %

• Residents: ~ 60 %

repository in construction

Negative reaction – Germany (Gorleben)

Expectations:

• Negative influence of radiation

• Diseases

• Distrust in politics

Acceptance:

• Protests since 1979

• Suitability not clear/accepted

repository?

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Contents

Introduction


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3 Safety requirments and long-term safety case


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Repositories overview

Planning

Under

construction

Operation

Closed

Country LLW/ILW repositories HLW repositories

Belgium 1

Canada 1

Denmark 1

Germany 2 1

Finland 2

France 1 2

Great Britain 2

Japan 1

Republic of Korea 1

Spain 1

Sweden 1

Switzerland 1

USA 2 8

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Worldwide overview – international rules

• IAEA : – Safety Standards: Particularly for radioactive waste & repository,

recommendations without legally binding

– “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on

the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management“ (1997)

• ICRP :– Recommendations about handling with repositories

• EU directive:– “Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste” (2011)

Slide 11

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Finland - overview

Status quo

• Nuclear energy since 1977

• Nuclear reactors:

– 4 operational

– 1 under construction

– 1 planned

• 2 repositories for LLW/ILW in Loviisa and

Olkiluto

• Waste management company: Posiva Oy

• Encapsulation plant and repository for HLW

• Isle before mainland

• Spent fuels stored in 400 – 450 m depth

• Bedrock: migmatic gneiss

ONKALO - Olkiluoto

Source: POSIVA

Slide 12

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Finland - Olkiluoto

• Preparatory works since 1980s– 1983 – 1985: screening studies over Finland– 1985 – 1992: preliminary site investigations– 1993 – 2000: detailed site investigations (for 4 sites)

all 4 were suitable

• 2000: Olkiluoto island is selected for repository because of highestlocal consent

• 2015 : construction licence obtained

• 2020: submission of the operationlicence application

• 2023: scheduled start of the repository

Source: POSIVA

Slide 13

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Finland - Olkiluoto

Multiple barrier concept:

Number Barrier Protection (before)

Final disposal canister (copper & cast iron) Mechanical stress (bedrock)

& Betonite barrier & tunnel backfillJolts and slows down water

movement

BedrockChanges above & normal

living environment

1

2 3

4

1

2 4

3

Source: POSIVA

Slide 14

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The Netherlands - overview

Status quo



– 1 operational

– 1 permanent shutdown

• Amount of waste:

– HLW 90 m3

– LILW 11.000 m3

• Waste management company: COVRA

HABOG

• At surface

• Long-term interim storage

• For HLW

Source: TÜV SÜD ET, COVRA

Slide 15

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• COVRA: need to collect enough waste & money

100 years storage in buildings, then deep diposal

• HABOG facility:– Dry storage vault

– Wall 1.7 m reinforced concrete

– Passive cooling system

– Drums get into one of 120 concrete tubes filled with argon

The Netherlands - HABOG

Source: COVRA

Slide 16

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USA - overview

Status quo



– 100 operational


– 33 permanent shutdown

• Waste management agency:

DOE

Regional compacts

• 10 interstate disposal

compacts approved by

congress

• 8 operating licenses

• 4 active regional compacts

• For LLW

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

(WIPP)

• Salt mine

• Storage since 1999

• For TRU

• Allowed Capacity:

180.000 m3

Source: NRC & DOE, TÜV SÜD ET

Slide 17

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USA - Yucca Mountain (YM)

• New strategy for Repository

– Foundation of the “Blue-Ribbon Commission on America’s

Nuclear Future”

– Development of a new legal framework with public participation

– 2012 Recommendation: start a new site election procedure

• Result: Yucca Mountain is still a potential repository for HLW

but there is local resistance

Source: NEI

Slide 18

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USA - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

Accidents Feburary 2014• 5th February: a salt hauler truck cought fire

workers evacuated & WIPP shut down

• 14th February:

– A Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) alarmed at night shift

airborne radioacitivity

– Next day: Low levels of radioactive decontamination

were detected at surface

• DoE: established two Accident Investigations Boards

– to assess and to improve the safety systems

– Cause of radioactivity: exothermic reaction

in one drum

Source: DOE

Slide 19

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Republic of Korea - overview

Status quo



– 24 operational


• Waste management company: KORAD

• Underground silos

• Construction began in 2006

• In operation since 2015

• For LLW/MLW

• Capacity: 800.000 drums

Wolsong

Source: KRMC, TÜV SÜD ET

Slide 20

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Republic of Korea - Wolsong

• Troubles with siting of repository (LILW) in the Republic of Korea

1986 – 2005: 9 attempts failed, because of strong protests

2004 – 2006: 10. attempt: Wolsong (Gyeongju-city)

in consent with residents (89.5 %)

• Wolsong: underground silo type (80 m -130 m below surface)

Source: KRMC

Slide 21

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France – Sites with radioactive waste

Slide 22

Licensing authority

Project developer

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France Disposal strategy

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Disposal strategy▪VLLW: Final storage on

the surface since 2003

▪LLW-long-lived: Final

storage in the flat

underground planned (15-

200 m)

▪LLW / ILW-short-lived:

Final storage on the

surface since 1992

▪ILW-long-lived / HLW:

Final storage in the deep

underground (500 m)

planned

Source: ANDRA, Project Owner File, 2013

TÜV SÜD Slide 24

CIGEO-Repository for HLW & ILW-long-lived

Source: ANDRA, OECD-RWMC-49, 2016

• Depth ca. 500 m under surface, area ca. 15 km²

• Licensing application ca. 2018, granting of license ca. 2021

• Expected beginning of the industrial pilot phase ca. 2025

• Beginning of storage ca. 2030

• Reversibility of the decision during the whole process

• Gradual decisions for the extension of the repository

• Storage of the waste with the possibility of retrieval

• Planned operation time > 100 years

• Keep open before final closure of the repository

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Contents

Introduction


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Safety requirements on repository for HLW, BMUB on 30th Sept. 2010.

• Safety level of repositroy for heat-generating radioactive waste in deep geological formations,

to fulfill the requirements of the atomic act

• License procedure for the (selected) site

Safety requirments and long-term safety case

• Safety objectives

• Safety principles

• Stepwise approach and optimization

• Protection against damage from ionizing radiation

• Safety analyses for operation and long-term safety case

• Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase

• Safety management for construction and operation of the repository

• Documentation

TÜV SÜD Slide 27

General safety objectives

1. Protection of human and environment against ionizing

radiation and other harmful effects of these waste

2. Avoidance of unreasonable burden and commitments for future generations

2. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and of Radioactive Waste

Management 1997

Safety principles

• Radioactive and other harmful substances have to be concentrated and enclosed in the effective

containment zone

• Only slight increase of the natural radiation exposure on the long term

• No danger for the diversity of species

• No resource competition

• No higher pollution abroad permitted than in Germany

• No interventions or maintenance after closure

• Fast construction of the repository

• Secured and timely financing for construction and operation incl. decommissioning of the

repository

General safety objectives & safety principles

TÜV SÜD Slide 28

Stepwise approach and optimization

Before essential decisions for the further approach are made, a optimization on

the basis of safety analyses and safety evaluations with an examination of

possible alternatives have to be done

• Optimization of the repository concept and design due to the long construction

and operation phases

• Regular security check during operation phase (every 10 years)

Protection against damage from ionizing radiation in the after-closure phase

• Guarantee of integrity of the effective containment zone in the after-closure phase

• Additional radiation exposure shall only appear in a limited area, so that as little persons of a

generation as possible may be concerned

• It has to be proved, that for probable developments through release of radionuclides, for

individual persons of the population only a additional effective dose in the area of 10

microsievert per year could appear

• For less probable developments in the after-closure phase a additional effective dose for

humans not exceed 0,1 millisievert per year

Approach/optimization & protection against damage from ionizing radiation

TÜV SÜD Slide 29

Protection against damage from ionizing radiation in the after-closure phase

• For improbable developments no rate is determined for reasonable risks or reasonable radiation

exposure. There, possibilities for optimization with acceptable efforts have to be proved.

• For developments due to unintentional intrusion, no rate is determined for reasonable risks or

reasonable radiation exposure.

Long-term safety case

• Safety analysis for all operating conditions of the repository

• Site-specific long-term safety certification for 1 m years

• Integrity of effective containment zone

• The in each case underlying repository design

• The quality assured collection of data and information from site exploration, research and

development

• The comprehensive identification and analysis of safety relevant scenarios and its classification in

the probability classes

• The identification, characterization and modeling of safety relevant processes

• The representation and implementation of a systematic strategy for identification, evaluation and

handling of uncertainties

Protection against damage from ionizing radiation & Long-term safety case

TÜV SÜD Slide 30

Long-term statement to the integrity of the effective containment zone:

• The integrity of the effective containment zone have to be ensured over a detection period of 1

million years

• Therefore the applicant have to show that:

• the formation of such secondary water paths within the effective containment zone, which

can lead to the penetration or leakage of possibly polluted aqueous solutions, is excluded

• present pore water does not participate at the hydrogeological cycle outside the effective

containment zone in the sense of the water rights

• For salt and clay rocks following criteria have to be proved additionally:

• the expected straining may not exceed the dilatancy stability of the effective containment

zone outside the bulking zone

• the expected fluid pressures may not exceed the fluid pressure straining of the effective

containment zone in a way that leads to a raised access of groundwater into the effective

containment zone

• the barrier effectiveness of the effective containment zone may not be impermissible

influenced through the temperature progression of the waste

Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase

TÜV SÜD Slide 31

Long-term statement to the integrity of the effective containment zone:

Proof of robustness of the technical components of the repository system:

The long-term robustness have to be predicted and presented on the basis of theoretical

thoughts.

The creation, construction and function of technical barriers have to be tested, if they take over

significant safety functions and if they underlie special requirements and there are no recognized

engineering rules.

Exclusion of criticality: It is to show, that self-sustaining chain reactions at probable as well as at

less probable developments are excluded

Requirements on the safety concept

• Minimization of the perforation of the effective containment zone

• Consideration of geological attenuation zone at determination for effective containment zone

• Separation of storage- and drivage areas

• Minimization of open storage areas

• Decommissioning concept have to exist at initial operation

• Multiple barrier system

Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase

TÜV SÜD Slide 32

Schematic presentation of the effect duration of different barriers

(Example repository system in salt / clay rock )

Time / Years

Geological barrier

Shaft- and route sealing

Compacted route stowing

Fuel element cask

Waste matrix

TÜV SÜD Slide 33

Repository design:

For the safety of the repository during the operation phase and including the decommissioning, the

reliability and robustness of the safety functions have to be proved. Following four safety levels have

to be considered:

• Normal operation – measures avoid the appearance of operation disturbance

• Abnormal operation – measures avoid the appearance of design basis incidents

• Design basis incidents – measures control design basis incidents

• Events beyond the design basis – measures reduce the entrance probability or the environment

impacts

• The piercing of the effective containment zone with shafts, drivages or bore holes have to be

minimized

• For the determination of the borders of the effective containment zone, a adequate depth position

as well as a adequate distance to geological disturbances have to be met

• The handling of waste packages have to be separated from the mining work

• The amount of open storage areas should be kept low. These are to be loaded quickly, then

backfilled and sealed securely against the mine.

Safety management for construction and operation of the repository

TÜV SÜD Slide 34

Repository design:

1. Retrievability and recoverability:

• During operation phase until the closure of the shafts or ramps the retrieval of the waste casks

have to be possible.

• The manageability of the waste casks at a eventual recoverability from the decommissened and

closed repository have to be possible for a time period of 500 years.

• Measures, that are taken to ensure the possibilities for the retrieval or salvage, may not influence

the passive safety barriers and therewith the long-term safety.

2. Multi-barrier system:

The containment capacity of the repository have to be based on different barriers with diverse safety

functions. Relating the reliability of the inclusion, the interaction of these barriers in their redundancy

and diversity have to optimated.


TÜV SÜD Slide 35

Repository design:

3. Decommissioning concept

Before the initial operation of the repository, a realizable and checked decommissioning concept have

to exist. It has to be ensured that the personnel, financial and technical conditions allow a eventual

necessary short-term implementation of the decommissioning concept.

In line with the every ten years performed safety check, the decommissioning concept has to be

checked after the state of science and technology and further developed if necessary.

4. Safety management:

• The applicant/operator has to establish a safety management, which is maintained during all

phases of the repository project until the closing of the decommissioning. It gives the verification

and continuous improvement of the safety the highest priority.

• For the realisation of the safety management, a safety management system has to be arranged. It

has to contain all determinations, regulations and organisational tools for the execution of safety

relevant operations and processes.

• The safety management system is an integral part of the whole management system.

• Safety management have to be constructed as a learning system.

•


TÜV SÜD Slide 36

4. Safety management:

• Establishment of safety management system

• For all project phases

• Responsibility at operator organisation

• Clear organisational structure

• Suitable employee selection (knowledge, reliability…)

• Validity for all parties, also for external organisations which act as external company, deliverer or

contractor for the applicant/operator

• The organisational structure of the applicant / operator has to be aligned on the safety targets:

• Determination of clear responsibilities for contents and processes

• Promote the stepwise optimization of the project in consideration of the continuous gaining of

information and findings

• Support of the internal and external, disciplinary and interdisciplinary exchange

• Pursue a transparent approach for the extraction, processing and documentation of data and

results

• Promote self-critical behavior and a critical questioning attitude of all employees as well as a

trusting handling in all areas within the organization


TÜV SÜD Slide 37

• All data and documents relevant for the safety statement have to be documented until the

decommissioning is finalized. This includes:

• the mine surveying data of the repository, including their historical development

• all relevant information about the stored waste, including their safety technical significant

properties

• the planned and taken technical measures at construction, storage operation and

decommissioning of the repository

• the results of all measuring programs

• all made forecasts for developments in the repository mine and its surrounding area

• all made proofs for operational safety and long-term safety.

• The set of documents has to be updated regularly. For the form and place of the storage it has to

be ensured that all sets of documents are accessible at every time and with currently available

technic without substantial effort. Complete sets of documents have to be stored at at least two

different suitable places. Documentation to be kept after the closure of the repository must

• contain all data and documents from the operation-documentation that may be relevant to the

information of future generations

• especially contain information, which area in the surrounding area of the repository mine have

to be protected against human interventions in the deep underground respectively which

interventions have to be provided with special conditions.

Documentation

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Contents

Introduction


Slide 38




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Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany

Source: VGB


Former exploration mine for nuclear waste GORLEBEN

Rock Salt

HAW

Repository for nuclear waste MORSLEBEN (Rock Salt)

Former repository for low and intermediate level

radioactive waste in GDR

Interstratifation complete

Status: Closedown

Repository for nuclear waste KONRAD (Iron Ore/Clay))

Repository for low and intermediate level radioactive

waste

Status: Construction; Commissioning: 2022

Former test repository for nuclear waste ASSE II (Rock Salt)

Former test repository for low and intermediate level

radioactive waste in Germany (1965-1978)

Research activity (1979-1995)

Status: decommissioning and retrieval (ca. 200.000 m3)

Slide 39

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Germany - overview

ERAM (Morsleben)

• Former potash &

salt mine

• Storage: 1971-1991

&1994-1998

• 37.000 m3

LLW/MLW

Asse II

• Former potash &

salt mine

• Storage: 1965-1978

• 47.000 m3

LLW/MLW

Konrad

• Former iron ore

mine

• Planned

completion: 2027

• ~300.000 m3

LLW/MLW

Gorleben

• Salt dome

• Possible repository

for HLW

• Protest of residents

Source: Deutsches Atomforum e. V., GNS

Slide 40

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Germany - overview

Inventory KONRAD

Maximum storage 5*1018 Bq

Inventory 1 CASTOR

Maximum storage 1*1018 Bq (type V/19)

Source: BfS

Inventory ASSE II

Storage 3*1015 Bq (01.01.2010)

Inventory MORSLEBEN

3*1014 Bq

Slide 41

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Former Repository Morsleben for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3

1970: Site selection GDR

1986: Commissioning

1990: FRG

1998: Stop of the storage

2001: BfS decision: Decommissioning

2009: Plan-approval procedure

(13000 objections)

2013: ESK Safety review

Volume: 36.754 m3

Activity: β/γ: 9,6 x 1013 Bq / α:1,8 x 1014 Bq

Repository Morsleben

Slide 42

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Repositoriy Morsleben

Slide 43

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Former Repository ASSE II for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3

1909 - 1964 : Rock salt mine

1965 - 1967: exploration for

1967 - 1978: operation

1995 – 2008: Closedown

2009: Stop operation

2010: decision for „retrieval“

2013: act for acceleration of retrieval

2033: Begin of retrival

Former Repository ASSE II

Slide 44

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Asse II

Source: GNS, BfS

Slide 45

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Source: VGB

Repository Konrad for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3

1965 - 1976 : Iron mine

1976 - 1982: exploration

1982 - 2002: Plan-approval procedure (20 a)

2007: Ende of the legal process for

objections

Status: Construction

2027: Commissioning

Volume: 303.000 m3

Activity: b/g: 2 x 1018 Bq; a: 1,5 x1017

Repository Konrad

Slide 46

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Repository Konrad

Slide 47

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Source: VGB

Possible repository Gorleben for Radwaste with heat generation > 2 kW/m3

Worldwide biggest examination program for repository

(HLW)

Exploration underground (since 1986):

Construction of Slot 1 & 2 and connection

2000: government decided moratorium for 10

years

because of doubts (after 5 years already

eliminated)

Since 2010 further examination, but complaints

in 2012

Exploration aboveground (1979 – 1983):

Recording of 477 km seismic profiles

322 vertical drillings (measurement of ground

water)

44 salt mirror cuts

4 deep boreholes

2 pilot shaft drilling

2013/2017 StandAG: keep mine open until further

exploration because of selection process

„Repository“ Gorleben

Slide 48

Bild: Fice / Wikipedia

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Possible repository Gorleben

Slide 49

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Contents

Introduction


Slide 50




TÜV SÜD Slide 51

Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad

F1060

Cask/Container Length or

Diameter

(mm)

Width

(mm)

Height

(mm)

Volume

m3

Concrete packaging I 1060 - 13701 1,2

Concrete packaging II 1060 - 15102/3 1,3

cast-iron packaging I 900 - 1150 0,7

cast-iron packaging II 1060 - 15004 1,34

cast-iron packaging III 1000 - 1240 1,0

Container I 1600 1700 14505 3,95

Container II 1600 1700 1700 4,6

Container III 3000 1700 1700 8,7

Container IV 3000 1700 14506 7,47

Container V 3200 2000 1700 10,9

Container VI 1600 2000 1700 5,4

TÜV SÜD Slide 52

Conditions for repository Konrad

TÜV SÜD Slide 53


Radioactive half-life of 44 radionuclides (<10 days)

TÜV SÜD Slide 54


List II: Guaranteed values for

radionuclides and radionuclide

groups per waste container

(Bq/Container)

TÜV SÜD Slide 55


List 3: activity limiting values for

radionuclides and no specified

a, b or g emitter per waste

container (Bq/Container)

TÜV SÜD Slide 56


List 4: activity limiting values

for radionuclides per waste


TÜV SÜD Slide 57


List 4: activity limiting values

for radionuclides per waste


TÜV SÜD Slide 58


List 5: activity values for




TÜV SÜD Slide 59






TÜV SÜD Slide 60



radionuclides per waste


TÜV SÜD Slide 61





TÜV SÜD Slide 62





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List 7a: activity values of fissile materials (no Uranium)

per waste container (Bq/Container)

TÜV SÜD Slide 65


List 7b: Mass of fissile materials (no Uranium)

per waste container (Bq/Container)

TÜV SÜD Slide 66


List 8: max. activity of radionuclides at the end of the

operating phase of Konrad repository

TÜV SÜD Slide 67


List 9: mean activity concentration of radionuclides (Bq/m3)

TÜV SÜD Slide 68


List 10: Permissible

radionuclides for repository

Konrad

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Thank you for your attention

Slide 69

Documents

Nuclear Disposal