NPR 1.2: A Chronology of the Missile Technology … CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME T he Missile Technology Control Regime ... ing nation serves as chairman …

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 199466

Deborah A. Ozga

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSILETECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) isan informal, non-treaty association of states that havean established policy or interest in limiting the spread

of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR's origins dateback to the 1970s, when the U.S. government became awareof dangers posed by the missile programs of developing na-tions. Several events, including South Korea's 1978 ballisticmissile test, Iraq's attempt in 1979 to purchase retired rocketstages from Italy, India's July 1980 SLV-3 test, and the formerGerman firm OTRAC's 1981 testing of a rocket in Libya,contributed particularly to U.S. apprehensions.2

The concerns of the United States were translated into aReagan administration initiative that resulted ultimately inan agreement by seven founding members to limit the spreadof missiles and missile technology and in the release of guide-lines on April 16, 1987. According to the guidelines, theMTCR's original purpose was to "reduce the risks of nuclearproliferation by placing controls on equipment and technol-ogy transfers which contribute to the development of un-manned, nuclear-weapon delivery systems." Over time, thatgoal was expanded to "limit the risks of proliferation of weap-ons of mass destruction by controlling transfers that couldmake a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons."3

The MTCR currently provides the central institutional ar-rangement, as well as the base international norm, for deal-ing with missile proliferation. But while the internationalcommunity now recognizes the spread of missiles and mis-sile technology as a crucial security issue, the sweeping po-litical changes witnessed over the last three years demand are-examination of the regime's focus, strengths, weaknesses,

and ability to combat missile proliferation in a new, rapidly-changing international order. China's and North Korea'scontinuing aid to foreign states' missile programs increasesthe importance that a well functioning regime is in place todeal with missile proliferation issues. This report is in-tended to provide the necessary background data with whichto undertake this reassessment.

GUIDELINES AND ANNEX

At its founding, MTCR members released guidelines ex-plaining the regime's general principles and an annex defin-ing certain technologies to be controlled. The original guide-lines established that MTCR members would refrain fromexporting annex items on a voluntary and independent basis.The guidelines also outlined the basic criteria to assess mis-sile-related export applications, such as nuclear prolifera-tion concerns, the nature of the recipient state's missile andspace programs, the item's significance in the developmentof a nuclear weapons delivery system, end-use assessmentof the item, and any relevant multilateral agreements. At thesame time, a wide spectrum of activities were permitted,including provisions for educational exchanges, researchprograms, and servicing agreements. According to the guide-lines, the MTCR was not intended to impinge upon the peace-ful use of advanced missile technology, national space pro-grams, or international space cooperation efforts "as long assuch programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons de-livery systems."4

The guideline update in January 1993 extended the regime

by Deborah A. Ozga1

Deborah A. Ozga is Project Manager of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of theProgram for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

OVERVIEW

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 67

Deborah A. Ozga

significantly to cover not only delivery systems for nuclearweapons but also for other weapons of mass destruction.The new guidelines added that there is a "strong presump-tion" to deny an export if an MTCR member judges that amissile, whether or not listed in the annex, is "intended" foruse in weapons of mass destruction delivery systems. Intheory, the changes establish substantially tightened controlparameters, since chemical and biological warheads can beplaced on small rocket systems that fall well below the pre-vious 500 kg. and 300 km. parameters.

The current technical annex contains 20 item groups di-vided into two categories. Category I consists of completemissile systems and subsystems as well as specially designedproduction equipment and technology for these systems.5

In regards to Category I exports, the guidelines state "therewill be a strong presumption to deny such transfers (...)."6

They also require that "Until further notice, the transfer ofCategory I production facilities will not be authorized."7

Other Category I transfers will be authorized on "rare occa-sions" where a government secures binding intergovernmen-tal end-use assurances from the recipient. Category II itemsconsist of less sensitive components and technologies, mostof which have dual-use applications.8 These items may beexported by MTCR members, provided that the importingstate furnishes sufficient end-use guarantees for the item.

Two critical control parameters established by the annexare the 300 km. range limit and the 500 kg. payload limit.According to a Canadian government release, the 500 kgpayload limit recognizes that emerging nuclear states arelikely to develop initially relatively-heavy, and rather crude,nuclear weapons. The 300 km. range correlates to distancesin a majority of strategic theaters of conflict where nuclearmissile use might be considered. This range was also con-sidered to be a convenient, workable, and achievable param-eter around which international export controls could be es-tablished.9

ORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS

Meetings:MTCR members conduct three types of meetings: plenary,

technical, and special. MTCR members meet at least once ayear for a plenary session to exchange intelligence informa-tion regarding missile proliferation developments, to discussproliferation policy issues, and to explore ways of improvingthe regime's performance. At technical meetings, represen-tatives examine the regime's specific control parameters torefine and expand the annex. Special meetings have beencalled for recruitment purposes; two such instances were

meetings for non-MTCR Western European states and forthe newly-democratized nations of the Eastern bloc.

Member states volunteer to host MTCR meetings. The host-ing nation serves as chairman and determines the meeting'sagenda. France acts as the regular Secretariat, fulfilling theregime's normal administrative functions, which includeserving as the point of contact. Decisions taken by mem-bers--such as approval of membership applications and an-nex changes--require a consensus vote. Due to intelligencesharing among members, records of meetings and negotia-tions remain confidential.

Membership:Full member states are those nations that either joined the

regime at its inception, later submitted applications that wereapproved for membership, or were directly recruited by theregime to participate in its closed circle. (See page 6 for alist of MTCR member states.) The recruitment process ofteninvolves seminars, dialogue in the form of bilateral consulta-tions, and fact-finding missions by MTCR delegations. Re-cruiting attempts have included, for example, U.S. efforts toobtain some form of participation in the regime by the So-viet Union. Similarly, Japan has approached (sometimes withother MTCR members) China, North Korea, Argentina, Bra-zil, as well as the former Soviet Union, encouraging them toadopt MTCR guidelines.10 It should be noted that since theend of the Cold War and the advent of the Persian Gulfcrisis, membership size has dramatically increased. Thir-teen of the MTCR's current members joined between Au-gust 1990 and June 1993.

Decisions regarding a state's application to join the MTCRare made on a confidential, case-by-case basis. MTCR mem-bers generally judge applicants on the effectiveness of a state'sexport controls, its contribution to the regime, and its prolif-eration record. Backing and assistance from an influentialmember can also be helpful in gaining membership. Allmembers must approve of an applicant before it is admittedto the regime.

Adherence:Since its onset, the MTCR has welcomed adherence to its

guidelines by all states. The definition of "adherence," how-ever, varies widely. A state, such as South Africa, can adoptexport controls based on MTCR guidelines and proclaimitself to be an adherent. This does not necessarily imply thatmembers will automatically recognize the "adhering" nationas an adherent; each member state has its own policy fordetermining whether a nation is an official adherent. Forexample, the United States has in the past only recognized


Deborah A. Ozga

adherent status after a bilateral accord has been reached. Itsefforts with Russia and Israel are both cases in point.11 Rec-ognition of adherent status by the U.S. government is par-ticularly critical, as its sanction laws are triggered when non-MTCR participants transfer controlled goods to other non-participants.

Some states volunteer their adherence while others arepressured into announcing that they will observe the guide-lines. In some cases, nations which formulate their exportcontrols around the MTCR or adhere because of nationalinterests, do in fact later become formal members, as didSweden, Argentina, and Hungary. On occasion, states suchas China, Israel, and South Africa have expressed supportor interest in the MTCR only after members began to scru-tinize them for missile proliferating behavior or had actuallyimposed sanctions on these countries.

Membership Rationale:The most-often cited rationale for participation is a state's

desire to accede to global nonproliferation norms. Thereare, however, numerous other economic and political ration-ales for joining or seeking to join the MTCR. For thosenations with few or no highly developed missile-related tech-nology industries, there is a desire to avoid being targeted asa point of transhipment. Ireland and New Zealand have bothcited this as a reason for joining the regime.There is another perception among applicants that MTCRmembership will ease access to controlled dual-use tech-nologies. While full membership may promote some formsof technological cooperation, such as within the EuropeanSpace Agency (ESA), it will not automatically reduce orremove certain export controls, as can be seen with intra-COCOM transfer arrangements. Under current U.S. exportlaw, end-use guarantees of MTCR items are required for allnations, except Canada.12 However, it should be noted, thatother members address technology transfers differently. Theirassumption is that membership in the MTCR and other ex-port control regimes implies that a prospective importingnation shares a concern regarding missile proliferation is-sues. Hence, such a nation is less likely to engage in prolif-erating behavior and thus access to dual-use technology iseased.

MTCR participation can also be politically motivated, asinvolvement implies association with a select group of de-veloped states. A nation that endorses arms control and alignsitself with nonproliferation regimes demonstrates its will-ingness to participate as a member in good faith in the inter-national community. Finally, declaring support for the MTCRalso serves as a tactic to decrease political pressure or re-

move sanctions when a nation comes under criticism for itsexport policies.

Rationales for states not to join or adhere to the regimeinclude: the MTCR is seen as a medium for economicallydeveloped nations to defend their space industries; it is aninstrument designed to suppress developing nations fromdeveloping militarily; some aspects of the agreement are am-biguous and arbitrary; trade among members is not restricted;and, it has no applicability to a nation's industry. India hasprominently made known its objections to the MTCR, citingthe regime's "discriminatory" nature and narrow approachto the global arms race, its function as an impediment to theeconomic progress of developing states, and the self-righ-teous attitudes of regime members.13

Plenary Group#1: September 8-9, 1988, Rome, Italy.#2: December 5-6, 1989, London, England#3: July 18-20, 1990, Ottawa, Canada.#4: March 19-20, 1991, Tokyo, Japan.#5: November 4-7, 1991, Washington, D.C, United

States.#6: June 29 - July 2, 1992, Oslo, Norway.#7: March 8-11, 1993, Canberra, Australia.#8: November 29 - December 3, 1993, Interlaken,

Switzerland.#9. October 1994, Sweden (Scheduled)

Technical Working Group#1: January 1991, Federal Republic of Germany.#2: March 18, 1991, Federal Republic of Germany.#3: May 1991, Paris, France.#4: April 1992, Rome, Italy.#5: September 1993, London, United Kingdom.

Special#1: c. 1988, European meeting for European non-

MTCR participants.#2: March 30, 1992, Warsaw, Poland for newly

independent nations of Eastern Europe.#3: June 1993, Vienna, Austria for exchanging

informa tion on missile technology export licensing and enforcement systems.

MTCR MEETINGS


Deborah A. Ozga

Implementation:Due to the leading role of the United States in the MTCR's

development and its position in the international system, theUnited States is not surprisingly a dominant actor relative toother members in regime implementation. At its inception,MTCR restrictions were "virtually identical" to the previ-ously established U.S. export restrictions, and by securingthe participation of other states in the regime, the UnitedStates in essence institutionalized its policy on missile pro-liferation on an international level.14 The United States hasactively promoted its nonproliferation policy through theMTCR. It has vigorously pursued bilateral MTCR-relateddiscussions with Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, Italy,and the former Soviet Union in order to promote its missilenonproliferation policy. In the summer of 1992, the UnitedStates also called on all members to establish controls whichreflect those declared in the December 1990 Enhanced Pro-liferation Control Initiative (EPCI).15 More recently, theClinton administration introduced a new nonproliferationpolicy which stated that Washington would encourage allMTCR members to adopt policies as "vigilant" as that of theUnited States.

The United States stands out among members in promot-ing MTCR enforcement. It enacted a sanctions law in 1990that is triggered when non-MTCR participants transfer itemscovered by the MTCR to other non-MTCR participants. Thislaw has been invoked on six different occasions. Conversely,most other members use a low-key approach in dealing withthe MTCR on a public level. Even at its founding, France,Italy, and West Germany did not publicly announce theirparticipation in the regime.16 As a low-profile group, mem-bers take care not to criticize the organization openly orexpress issues of contention. Likewise, members do not ex-press criticism or sympathy regarding U.S. MTCR sanction-ing activity, unless they are directly involved in the transac-tion. Other members, such as Japan, have avoided usingeconomic sanctions as a policy tool and prefer to pursuediplomatic discussions.

MTCR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

In several instances, the MTCR has proven to be an effec-tive instrument in combatting missile proliferation. It hasbeen credited with countering missile proliferation by caus-ing missile program dismantlement, cancellation, conver-sion, schedule delays, as well as increasing development costsand parts scarcity.17 Specific successes include the disman-tling of Argentina's Condor II project, the cancellation oftwo Brazilian systems (Avibras's SS series and Orbita's MB

series), and delays in India's missile program. Israel, once atarget of the MTCR, is now an adherent. The regime isalso credited with delaying China's sales of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan as well as having encouraged Ger-many to improve its export control enforcement legislation.18

While it cannot ultimately prevent a country from develop-ing a missile program, it can slow down the rate of technol-ogy diffusion.19

The MTCR has also brought major supplier nations closertogether in coordinating and standardizing their export con-trol policies and operations.20 It fosters dialogue amongmembers and serves to warn indigenous missile developersthat their programs are not going unnoticed. The MTCRhas brought to the forefront the idea of national accountabil-ity in export behavior as well as increasing awareness ofarms transfer issues. Likewise, the MTCR should be cred-ited as a serious effort to discourage other nations from de-veloping missile programs or engaging in the proliferationof related technologies.

The MTCR does, however, have a number of importantshortcomings, most of which have been highlighted in thenonproliferation literature. Briefly, these weaknesses in-clude:21

- The MTCR has a limited membership.- As a supplier regime, the MTCR is seen by some as

discriminatory in nature, antagonizing relations between developed and developing nations.

- Disputes arise among members in defining how andwhen the transfer of missile technologies for peaceful purposes should take place.

- In practice, members implement the guidelines inconsistently.

- Since the MTCR does not have treaty status, it isnonbinding and not enforceable.

- Certain guidelines may be criticized as vague andopen to interpretation.

- Membership provides target states with no specificpositive incentive to forgo development of a missileprogram.

- The regime offers no economic or security benefits.- There is no medium for collective response in the

event of a violation.- The regime cannot address every aspect of missile

technology proliferation due to the technology's na-ture (i.e., smaller systems are regularly traded onworld markets).

Fortunately, the MTCR is an evolving instrument and members are attempting to confront some of these weaknesses.Ongoing efforts to increase the effectiveness and relevance


Deborah A. Ozga

reducting world arsenals to the zero ballistic missile level25 ;creating an international clearinghouse for dual-use exports26 ;creating a World Space Organization to include an interna-tional inspection system for the launch of space objects27 ;establishing of an international launch notification center (toinclude ballistic missile tests)28 ; creating a warhead inspec-tion regime29 ; developing confidence building measures30 ;and consolidating the MTCR with other regimes--such asthe London Suppliers Group--to form a super regime. Muchcould also be learned from other nonproliferation or confi-dence-building regimes. The Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the UN ArmsTrade Register, and the Conference on Security and Coop-eration in Europe can provide insights into new possibilitieswith respect to what is achievable in the realms of safe-guarding, inspections, transparency reporting, and crisis pre-vention.

Regardless of the approach, reconstituting the MTCR tocreate a sound instrument to address future missile prolif-eration issues would need to include:

- A legally binding instrument that provides clearlywritten export guidelines on which states can basenational export controls. (It should be fairly narrowin interpretation.)

- A mechanism to provide recourse in the event ofregime violations or guideline interpretation disputes.

- A means of facilitating and guaranteeing dual-usetechnology transfers that provides access to stateswishing to utilize missile technology for peacefulpurposes.

- A mechanism for addressing the security concernsof suppliers through the utilization of safeguardingagencies and verification techniques.

- An avenue to promote negotiations for missile reductions.

- Increased transparency in the exports of sensitivetechnologies. (One possibility that would compliment the current practice of providing denial notifications and occasional courtesy notification of Category I scheduled transfers, would be providing advance notification of all MTCR-controlled item transfers.)

- A shifting of the organization's rationale from a supplier/export barrier regime to center on creating abroad international effort to discourage missile proliferation and support peaceful uses of technology.

These approaches take into consideration many of the weak-nesses of the current regime. A more formal structure willdiscourage violations by implying greater national commit-

of the regime include expanding the membership, increasing the frequency of MTCR-related discussions, and tightening technical controls. However, many of these approachesmay be experiencing diminishing returns. While expandingthe membership is desirable, most nations that would bereadily accepted by the MTCR are already members.22 Fewother nations, at this point, have an export infrastructureand a nonproliferation record that would in the short termmeet relevant membership standards. Proliferation discus-sions are very important, but without greater action, theirimpact can be minimal. Moreover, further efforts to tightenthe regime would likely require addressing technologies as-sociated with smaller missile systems, that are regularly ex-ported by regime members to non-members. Additional modi-fications to the regime will likely be necessary if the MTCRis to do more in the future than simply reduce the rate oftechnological diffusion over the long term.

THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

In discussing the MTCR's future, one first must focus onthe regime's future goal or purpose. By reducing the rate ofmissile technology diffusion, the MTCR buys time againstfurther missile proliferation; absent other supporting pres-sures, however, the MTCR cannot alone prevent a state fromdeveloping a missile program. If member states are satisfiedwith this "delaying" role, the MTCR's limited growth po-tential need not be of concern. If, however, the MTCR in-tends to address areas such as defining and encouraging theso-called "peaceful uses" of missile technology, increasingmembership, and discouraging states from developing theirown missile programs, then it is time to reexamine theMTCR's limits and ambiguities.

In rethinking the regime, certain issues need to be givenconsideration. Missile proliferation involves two parties, buy-ers and sellers. Hence, the regime must aim to promotemaximum membership development, encompassing in someform all potential suppliers and recipients. With technologi-cal diffusion ever-present, the members need to examine howto promote peaceful uses of that technology internationally.Standardized methods for providing end-use guarantees needto be developed so that suppliers feel confident that theirexports will not be diverted. Finally, international norms ofcommercial cooperation, trust, and disarmament should befostered.23

There are numerous possibilities for either reshaping theMTCR or integrating broader export control and arms con-trol options into the regime. Some proposals include inter-nationalizing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty24 ;


Deborah A. Ozga

ment and obligations. Missile arsenal reduction talks, confi-dence building measures through export transparency, andthe promotion of norms discouraging missile program de-velopment while encouraging peaceful uses of missile tech-

Original members Adherence33

1. Federal Republic of Germany (04/04/87)2. France (04/04/87)3. Italy (04/04/87)4. United Kingdom (04/04/87)5. United States (04/04/87)6. Canada (04/04/87)7. Japan (04/04/87)

Acceding Members (Formal)8. Spain (11/05/89)9. Netherlands (05/22/90)10. Belgium (07/11/90)11. Luxembourg (07/18/90)12. Australia (08/01/90)13. New Zealand (11/01/90)14. Denmark (11/15/90)15. Norway (01/01/91)16. Austria (02/13/91)17. Sweden (09/16/91)18. Finland (10/11/91)19. Portugal (05/11/92)20. Switzerland (05/19/92)21. Greece (06/22/92)22. Ireland (06/22/92)23. Iceland (03/09/93)24. Argentina (Fall '93)25. Hungary (Fall '93)34

Other35

Israel: (1/1/92) Became an adherent and subsequentlyapplied for membership. Adherence is recog-nized by the United States.

China: (2/1/92) Provided the U.S. government a writ-ten commitment to abide by the MTCR.36

Brazil: (2/92) Expressed interest in regime participa-tion.

Romania: (Spring 92) Applied for membership.South Africa: (11/92) Declared itself to be an adhrent.Russia: (11/1/93) Pledged to the United States that it

would adhere.

MTCR MEMBER STATES nology contribute to promoting overall international systemstability.31 Finally, reformulation will enable the MTCR toconfront a greater variety of missile proliferation issues andwill provide support for regulating international dual-usetechnology trade in other areas.

While this strategy does have advantages, there are highhurdles to surmount. Safeguarding of technology with cur-rently available techniques may prove to be a difficult task.32

Supplier states will argue that they have a right not to sellmissile technology if they so choose in order to protect com-mercial and security interests, while developing nations willargue that they have a right to develop missiles for legitimatedefense and economic needs, especially if other nations re-tain their own missile capabilities. In addition, reshapingthe MTCR will undoubtably require a long renegotiationprocess; consensus may not be achievable and political sup-port may not be forthcoming. Finally, some members maynot want to institutionalize the regime further. For instance,they may view rigid export controls as hampering their high-tech export promotion efforts. On the other hand, institu-tionalization of what some members view as lenient controlswould legitimize "dangerous" transfers to nominally civilianspace programs.

Of those items mentioned above, the most critical point isthe safeguarding of missile technology. Some exporting na-tions will not be prone to accepting a safeguard arrangementuntil they are confident that exported technology will not besubject to diversion. On the other hand, few nations appearwilling to renounce their space and missile programs. If cur-rent methods for safeguarding missile technology fail to of-fer sufficient confidence for exporting nations to proceedwith transfers, then an increase in confidence levels mayneed to be developed first.

The other difficulties highlighted above require new po-litical thinking befitting a new security environment. TheMTCR must, in itself, become a confidence building mea-sure (CBM). Presently, intra-regime transfers are conductedwith an implicit assumption that no contribution to prolif-eration is occurring through these transactions. While a cer-tain standard of export controls is maintained among mem-bers, intra-MTCR transfers occur because there is confidencein the recipient's utilization of the received item. Ideally,confidence levels and commercial relationships need to beraised so that those developing nations eager to participatein technology trade may do so as easily as MTCR members.

Because the MTCR was never created with the intention ofbecoming missile proliferation's panacea, it cannot be ex-pected to be the only instrument for dealing with the prob-lem of missile proliferation. The organization, after six years


Deborah A. Ozga

of formal existence, has now matured as a nonproliferationregime. Left as is, the MTCR will remain an instrument thataddresses only certain aspects of the missile proliferationproblem. The MTCR has the potential to affect significantlynot only missile proliferation, but also the shape of worldspace and dual-use technology markets. However, it remainsto be seen whether members will simply endorse a stricteradministration of the status quo, or whether they will havethe collective will and vision necessary to press for the cre-ation of a stronger and more vibrant organization.

1 The author would like to express her appreciation to Timothy V.McCarthy for his contribution to this report.2 Jürgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, "The National Implementation of theMissile Technology Control Regime -- The US and German Experiences,"in Hans Günter Brauch et al., eds., Controlling the Development andSpread of Military Technology, (Amsterdam: Vu University Press), 1992,p. 240.3 Italics added. For the development of guideline expansion see attachedchronology entry 1/29/91; 6/29-7/2/92, and 1/7/93.4 U.S. Government, "Missile Technology Control Regime," Fact SheetTo Accompany Public Announcement," 4/16/87.5 Complete systems include rockets, ballistic missiles, space-launchvehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, andreconnaissance drones. Complete subsystems encompass rocket stages,reentry vehicles, rocket engines, and guidance systems.6 U.S. Government, op. cit.7 Ibid.8 Original Category II technologies include propulsion components,propellants, production equipment and technology for propellants,structural composite technology, pyrolytic deposition and densificationequipment, structural materials, navigation instrumentation, flight controlsystems, avionics equipment, launch support equipment, analog and digitalcomputers, analog-to-digital converters, test facilities, and speciallydesigned software. Items later added to Category II are: devices andsoftware for reduced observables, devices for rocket protection againstnuclear effects, and complete rocket systems and subsystems not coveredin Item 1 capable of a maximum range equal or superior to 300 km.9 Government of Canada, Missile Technology Control Regime,Background Paper, April 16, 1987.10 Government of Japan, Press Release, 11/29/92.11 In the case of Israel, see attached chronology entry 9/91; in the case ofRussia, see 7/15/93.12 The Clinton administration issued a new policy to grant MTCR membersincreased access to missile technologies. See attached chronology entry9/27/93.13 Timothy V. McCarthy, "India: Emerging Missile Power," in WilliamC. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar:The New Suppliers' Network, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 220-221.14 Aaron Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Controlof Ballistic Missile Proliferation to the Middle East, (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1989), pp. 13-15.15 EPCI applies controls on exports when the exporter "knows" or isinformed by the government that the export is destined for use in a missile,chemical or biological weapons, or is destined for projects engaged insuch activities.

16 Karp, op. cit., p. 15.17 For example see attached chronology entry 3/88.18 John H. Henshaw, The Origins of COCOM: Lessons for ContemporaryProliferation Control Regimes, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. StimsonCenter, 1993), p. 24.19 During the first 29 months of the MTCR's existence, the United Statesdenied 29 licenses (three by the Commerce Department and 26 by theState Department). Other MTCR members reported 13 license denials.("U.S. Efforts to control the Transfer of Nuclear Capable MissileTechnology," General Accounting Office Report, NSIAD-90-176, 6/90,pp. 113-126. For further discussion of the MTCR's impact upon missiletechnology development, see Pérecles Gasparini Alves, Access to OuterSpace Technologies: Implications for International Security, (Geneva:United Nations for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 15, 1992).20 See attached chronology entry 6/93.21 See Kathleen C. Bailey, "Missile Proliferation: Demand-Side Policiesare Needed," in Jean-François Rioux, ed., Limiting the Proliferation ofWeapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, (Ottawa: Carleton UniversityPress, 1992), pp. 127-136; Peter Jones, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation:Events in 1991," in Verification Report 1992, J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie,ed. (London: Verification Technology Information Centre, 1992), pp.113-121; Karp, op. cit; Joseph Pilat, "Controlling Missiles: Post-ColdWar Prospects for the MTCR," paper presented at The New Role ofInternational Organizations in Nonproliferation Workshop, MontereyInstitute of International Studies, Monterey, California, August 27-29,1993.22 Argentina, recently invited to join, is a non-West European, developingstate. It represents a new category of nations which is logically next inline to join the MTCR. One should note, however, that membership didnot come easily. The extent of time between Argentina's declaration ofinterest in joining the MTCR in 1991 and its invitation to officially join inMarch 1993 is significantly longer than the application turnover of itsWestern European counterparts.23 For further discussion on international norms see Aaron Karp, "BallisticMissiles and the MTCR," in Jean-François Rioux, ed., Limiting theProliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, (Ottawa:Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 113-126.24 See Bailey, op cit.25 See Lora Lumpe, "Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World," Centerfor International Security at Maryland, Project on Rethinking ArmsControl, Paper No. 3, March 1993.26 See United Nations, General Assembly, The Role of Science andTechnology in the Context of International Security, Disarmament andOther Related Fields, A/CN.10/145, April 25, 1991.27 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: Bulgaria, ByelorussianSoviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic,Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Unionof Soviet socialist Republics: Draft Resolution, A/C.1/42/L.14, October23, 1987.28 United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations, General Assembly,International Cooperation in Space Activities for Enhancing Security inthe Post-Cold-War Era, A/48/221, July 1, 1993.29 John Pike, "Space Power Interests: American Perspectives," paperpresented at the Ballistic Missile and Space Workshop, Monterey Instituteof International Studies, Monterey, California, June 6, 1993.30 France proposed to collect and analyze national legislation, regulationsand export, control procedures of MTCR members to address concernsassociated with dual-use technology transfers. (Péricles Gasparini Alves,Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for InternationalSecurity, Research Paper No. 15, UNIDIR/92/77, 1992, pp. 127-128.)


Deborah A. Ozga

31 For a discussion on confidence building measures see United Nations,General Assembly, Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparencyin International Transfers of Conventional Arms: Report of the Secretary-General, A/46/301, September 9, 1991.32 Brian G. Chow provides an in-depth study of the difficulty insafeguarding missile technology. One of several arguments is that if anation were to break out of a missile control treaty, the time needed todevelop a long-range missile could be a matter of only months. (Brian G.Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs, R-4179-USDP, (SantaMonica, California: Rand, 1993). Likewise, Argentina and Brazil proposedthe establishment of a set of regulations over the international trade ofsensitive technology. The plan was immediately criticized for the difficultyin achieving agreement on adequate mechanisms for verification. For adiscussion see Péricles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer SpaceTechnologies: Implications for International Security, Research Paper No.15, UNIDIR/92/77, 1992, pp. 125-128. Also see United Nations, GeneralAssembly, The Role of Science and Technology in the Context ofInternational Security, Disarmament and Other Related Fields:International Transfer of Sensitive Technologies, Working Paper Submittedby Argentina and Brazil, A/CN.10/145, April 25, 1991.33 "Adherence" date is the date in which a state fully implements MTCRguidelines; the MTCR Secretariat -- which provided these dates to theauthor -- considers this to be the date of official membership.34 Argentina and Hungary were welcomed at the 11/29-12/3/93 plenarymeeting as full members. Their official dates of adherence are not yetavailable.35 Nations which have either made a declaration of adherence or expressedstrong interest in the Regime.36 China is not viewed by all MTCR members to be an adherent, since ithas refused to embrace the 1/7/93 Guideline changes. However, theWestern European Union recognizes China's commitment while notingreports of its questionable export behavior. (Canadian official, interviewby author, 5/93; Technological and Aerospace Committee, Assembly ofWestern European Union, Anti-Missile Defence for Europe - GuidelinesDrawn from the Symposium, No. 1363, 5/17/93, p. 5, 8.)


Deborah A. Ozga

equipment and technology. The selectgroup is considered to be in the bestposition to determine how to standard-ize national export controls. The So-viet Union is not invited to participate.4

19836/83 The first multilateral meeting be-tween all seven original members takesplace.5

19853/85 Canada, France, the Federal Re-public of Germany, Japan, Italy, theUnited Kingdom, and the United Statesreach a consensus on controlling theproliferation of missiles and their tech-nologies. Members agree to implementMTCR export restrictions before theyofficially go into effect. The consensusincludes controls on strictly militarytechnologies as well as on dual-usegoods. Public announcement of theMTCR agreement is delayed whenFrance demands U.S. concessions onthe 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga.6

198612/86 According to the Canadian gov-ernment, members reach "full conver-gent views" regarding the content of theMTCR guidelines.7

19874/16/87 With an exchange of diplomaticnotes, Canada, France, the Federal Re-public of Germany, Italy, Japan, theUnited Kingdom, and the United Statesformally establish the Missile Technol-ogy Control Regime (MTCR) and pub-licly release the guidelines and annex

for sensitive missile- relevant transfers.France, Italy, and the Federal Republicof Germany do not issue a formal state-ment regarding their participation in theregime.8

Fall 1987 American and British offi-cials say that the defense division of theRome-based National Industrial Appli-cations Company (SNIA-BPD) is sup-plying missile technology forArgentina's Condor II project in viola-tion of the MTCR. U.S. authorities pres-sure Italy to stop the sale of the missiletechnology to Argentina by blocking thesale of U.S. technology to SNIA.Germany's participation in the CondorII project is also criticized by both theU.S. and U.K. governments.9

1988c. 1988 A European-lead MTCR meet-ing is held for European non-MTCRparticipants.10

3/88 The Brazilian Air Force an-nounces that it is unable to constructthe VLS launch vehicle before 1992 dueto MTCR restrictions on transfers ofrocket/missile components.11

4/88 After Italy addresses U.S.concerns regarding SNIA's technologysales to Argentina, the United Statesresumes exporting technology to SNIABPD.12

9/8-9/88 The first MTCR policy groupmeeting takes place in Rome. Membersdiscuss emerging missile programsincluding Argentina's Condor II,Brazil's Sonda IV, and Israel's JerichoII. Members agree to hold regularmeetings to sustain and fortify theregime.13

19721972 The United States becomes awareof the potential threat posed by missilesand missile technology proliferation aswell as by increased international com-petition in the space launch industry.The government issues policy directiveNSDM-187, which bans the export ofSLV technology and establishes the pro-cess of reviewing export requests on anindividual basis. The United States,however, offers other nations its launchservices at cost. The policy directive is

19811981 The United States establishes aninter-agency task force to study thespread of missiles and related technolo-gies in order to make recommendationson reducing nuclear-capable missileproliferation.2

198211/82 The U.S. government establishesa new policy on missile proliferationwhen President Reagan signs NationalSecurity Council Decision Directive 70,which calls for investigating methodsto control such proliferation. The di-rective provides a framework for nego-tiations with the British governmentregarding missile proliferation issues.3

Late 82- early 83 The United Statesinitiates bilateral negotiations with theU.K. regarding missile proliferation.France, the Federal Republic of Ger-many, Italy, Canada, and Japan join inclosed negotiations shortly thereafter.According to the Canadian government,participation in the discussions is basedon whether a nation is considered to bea major supplier of missile-related

CHRONOLOGY


Deborah A. Ozga

5/89 Novosti quotes Soviet Deputy For-eign Minister Victor Karpov as beingin favor of lowering current MTCR pay-load and range levels to 200 kg. and150 km. Soviet officials express dis-satisfaction with restrictions currentlyin force, describing them as "inadequateand imperfect." They also express dis-satisfaction with the lack of restrictionson technology transfers between MTCRmembers.20

6/22/89 U.S. Senator Jeff Bingamanproposes S. 1227, which calls for sanc-tions against U.S. and foreign violatorsof the regime, stricter interpretation ofMTCR provisions and increased mem-bership.21

7/89 Citing a possible violation of theMTCR, the U.S. State Department is-sues a strong protest to the French gov-ernment over the proposed transfer ofArianespace's Viking rocket motor tech-nology and the dispatch of a team ofrocket experts to Brazil. The Frenchinitially appear to withdraw from thedeal, but when China makes severalovertures to Brazil, France begins to re-evaluate the sale.22

7/89 U.S. Senators John McCain andAlbert Gore propose S.1421 (wider inscope than S. 1227, mentioned above),which establishes MTCR sanctions andstrengthens the U.S. export licensingsystem. The bill is opposed by both theCommerce Department and the StateDepartment. The Bush administrationcomplains that the sanctions are toobroad and that they impinge on thePresident's right to review missile saleson a case-by-case basis. In discussingthe proposal, Senator Richard Lugarcomments, "The United States routinelydiscusses with its partners the activi-ties of some of their companies whichmay be involved in missile proliferation.In general, the MTCR partners are very

open in these discussions. But the ques-tion must be posed: Would such part-ners be as willing to share sensitive in-formation on missile-related activitiesof their own companies if such a shar-ing could lead to U.S. sanctions?"23

7/30/89 Italian authorities file chargesagainst nine former SNIA-BPD employ-ees for illegally exporting missile tech-nology to Argentina's Condor IIproject.24

10/31/89 McCain and Gore circulate arevised version of S. 1421, addressingMTCR-related sanctions, to be submit-ted on 11/2/89 as S. 1830. The newversion deletes two requirements con-tained in the original bill: (1) a prohi-bition against imports from an MTCRviolator; and (2) a requirement that allmissile-related export license applica-tions not covered by the U.S. MunitionsList be reviewed by the Secretary ofState in consultation with the Secretaryof Defense. McCain calls the MTCRagreement "nearly toothless." HenrySokolski, acting deputy for nonprolif-eration policy at the Pentagon echoesSenators Lugar's earlier concerns incriticizing the bill, saying: "Partnerswho might wish to consult with us onmissile-related activities of their owncompanies would be unlikely to do soif the result would be to invite U.S. sanc-tions against those companies."25

10/89 U.S. Vice President Dan Quaylecomments that the chief problem in theMTCR is the lack of more adherents.He calls upon all European Commu-nity members to join the regime.26

10/89 Commenting on the controversyover France's plans to transfer Vikingrocket motor technology to Brazil, aFrench Embassy spokesman states thatthe MTCR agreement explicitly permitstransfer of missile technology under

9/26/88 At a U.S.-Soviet meeting inWashington, the United States beginsdiscussion with the Soviet Union regard-ing the MTCR agreement in an effortto promote Soviet cooperation with theregime.14

12/1-2/88 In Moscow, the United Statesagain holds discussions with the SovietUnion on missile nonproliferation andthe MTCR.15

19892/9/89 U.S. Representative Howard L.Berman introduces HR. 963 (the Mis-sile Technology Control Act of 1989)requiring the President to levy at leastone of three types of sanctions on U.S.or foreign businesses for violating theMTCR. Although the legislation ispassed overwhelmingly in the House inJuly 1989, it does not survive as anamendment at the House-Senate con-ference committee review of the 1990Defense Authorization Bill.16

4/89 Spain announces that it will ad-here to MTCR guidelines.17

5/2/89 In Congressional testimony,U.S. Ambassador Holmes testifies that:"In nearly all of our high level contactswith the PRC in 1988 and so far in 1989,we have stressed the dangers of missileproliferation and sought Chinese re-straint in their export programs. Webelieve the Chinese understand our con-cerns and hope they will show restraintin transfers of missiles and technologycovered by the MTCR ... we are con-tinuing to talk to them."18

5/89 Secretary of State James Bakermeets with Soviet Foreign MinisterEduard Shevardnadze in Moscow andattempts to persuade the Soviet Unionto join the MTCR.19


Deborah A. Ozga

certain circumstances, and that Francewould provide the technology to Brazilonly in the presence of adequate safe-guards to insure that the technology isused in a peaceful manner. U.S. offi-cials note that the technology could beused to produce ballistic missiles andthat Brazil has a history of developingmilitary rockets from its civilian spaceprogram. A spokesperson from the Bra-zilian Embassy comments that Brazilwould not employ the technology formilitary ends, but rather for the "peace-ful space industry in Brazil, which wethink we have a right to do."27

U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman commentson French President Mitterand's deci-sion to approve the sale, saying "If theproposed French technology transfergoes through, the MTCR will be effec-tively a dead letter." British officials,also concerned over the sale, assert thatFrance has deliberately interpreted theMTCR in a loose fashion.

According to reports, the deal mayforce a reevaluation of the regime byMTCR members. The regime is alreadyundergoing scrutiny in Europe as MTCRmembers believe that the U.S. Congressis attempting to reduce European for-eign military sales. Reportedly, the U.S.Congress is pressuring the Administra-tion to impose sanctions on Europeancompanies that violate the regime.28

10/89 France proposes to sell Indiacryogenic engine technology, saying thatsuch a sale is not against MTCR regu-lations. The United States protests theoffer as a violation of the MTCR agree-ment and threatens France with eco-nomic sanctions.29

11/19/89 U.S. Senator Heinz introducesS. 1924, which addresses the U.S ex-port control system's handling of MTCRitems and establishes sanctions againstviolators. In discussing the bill, Heinzalso points out the MTCR's weaknesses:

lack of enforcement authority, limitedmembership, lack of consistency inimplementation, and disagreement onwhich nations should become membersand under what circumstances. Heinzcalls for bilateral initiatives on the partof the United States to obtain commit-ments from China, the Soviet Union,India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Argen-tina, and Brazil to MTCR adherence.30

12/5-6/89 The second MTCR plenarymeeting takes place in London. Par-ticipants include Canada, France, theFederal Republic of Germany, Italy, Ja-pan, Spain, the United Kingdom, andthe United States. Spain becomes theeighth nation and first non-originalmember to participate in the MTCR.Participants discuss membership expan-sion and reaffirm their decision to holdregular meetings. British, Canadian, andAmerican officials pressure France tocancel the Viking sale to Brazil.31

12/19/89 In Paris, the United Statesdiscusses missile nonproliferation andthe MTCR with the Soviet Union.32

19902/10/90 A joint communique, issued bySoviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadzeand U.S. Secretary of State Baker statesthat the United States and the SovietUnion "both adhere to the export guide-lines of the existing regime relating tomissiles, which applies to missiles ca-pable of delivering at least 500 kilo-grams of payload to a range of at least300 kilometers." The Soviet Unionreportedly will maintain its policy ofexporting Scud-Bs to Afghanistan untilthe conflict in that country is resolved.33

4/25/90 The governments of Belgium,Luxembourg,and the Netherlands issuea joint statement announcing their in-tention to join the MTCR. Their par-

ticipation brings the regime's total mem-bership to 11. The Benelux nations ex-press the hope that those EC nationswhich are not members will join in thenear future.34

4/90 During ministerial meetings inWashington, the Soviet Union report-edly asked the United States to explorean issue with other MTCR memberswhich relates to Soviet MTCR mem-bership: whether or not the SovietUnion will be accorded the informationsharing rights associated with MTCRprovisions.35

5/90 The United States blocks re-ex-port of Brazilian missile componentspreviously shipped to the United Statesfor thermal treatment. The U.S. gov-ernment holds the shipment to reviewthe export license in terms of MTCRcompliance, thus implying concern overthe parts' end-use in Brazil's missileprogram.36

5/31- 6/3/90 At the U.S.-Soviet sum-mit meeting in Washington, the SovietUnion signs the Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation in which it supports MTCR"objectives" and agrees to observe itsprovisions. U.S. Secretary of StateJames Baker later testifies on 6/13/90that "We are discussing with the Sovi-ets and our MTCR partners ways bywhich the Soviet Union could associateitself even more closely with the re-gime."37

7/90 Australia joins the MTCR. Aus-tralian Foreign Minister Gareth Evansand Defense Minister Robert Ray issuea statement noting that Australia's par-ticipation in the MTCR is to "help con-trol the proliferation not only of nuclear-armed missiles but also a wide range ofmissiles regardless of the type of war-head carried(...).Australian participa-tion will be consistent with our strong


Deborah A. Ozga

support for export controls on sensitivemilitary items, particularly those relatedto chemical or nuclear weapons. It alsoreflects Australia's concern about theproliferation of nuclear, chemical andconventional weapons." Australia'simplementation of the guidelines beginsAugust 1, 1990.38

7/17-20/90 The third MTCR policymeeting takes place in Ottawa, Canada.The eight MTCR members attend, alongwith new members: Australia, Belgium,Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Inannouncing the meeting, Secretary ofState for Canadian External Affairs JoeClark states that "Canada attaches greatimportance to the Missile TechnologyControl Regime as an essential compo-nent of our efforts to work for peaceand security. It is important we do allthat we can to ensure that destabilizingweapons systems do not spring up innew locations at a time when greatprogress is being made in improvingEast-West relations."39 France becomesthe Secretariat for MTCR affairs.

Members debate the Soviet Union'sapplication for full membership to theregime and survey technical and admin-istrative hurdles associated with man-aging MTCR guidelines. They considerchanges in reporting methods, the com-prehensiveness of the MTCR guidelinesand annex, and better ways to coordi-nate the exchange of relevant informa-tion. As a result, partners establish anMTCR Technical Working Group to fur-ther address these issues, and decide tostrengthen and update the annex. Mem-bers conclude that to date the MTCR iseffective in fulfilling the purposes forwhich it had been designed and issuean appeal for all other nations to ad-here.40

8/90 The U.S. State Department ap-proves the release of thermally-treatedmissile casings to Brazil.41

8/90 France takes up its duties as theMTCR Secretariat.42

9/19/90 Representative Berman'samendment to HR 4739, requiring thePresident to levy U.S. sanctions forMTCR violations, is passed by theHouse of Representatives. In defendingthe amendment, Berman notes that"[E]very day we see an example of howusually Western companies evade theprinciples embodied in the MTCR-- sofar without punishment....The companymost responsible for helping the Iraqimissile program does millions of dol-lars of business with the UnitedStates."43

9/90 Israel Aircraft Industries is nego-tiating with the U.S. government to de-termine if the proposed Missile Tech-nology Control Act of 1990 (MTCA)will hinder activities associated with theShavit space launch program.44

10/90 The MTCA, which requires thePresident to penalize individuals, com-panies or governments that violate theMTCR, is passed by House and Senateconferees.45

11/5/90 Congress amends the ExportAdministration Act of 1979 when itpasses the MTCA as part of the Na-tional Defense Authorization Bill forFiscal Year 1991 (HR 4739). Underthe MTCA (Title XVII of Public Law101-510), the President must impose notless than one of the following sanctionsfor a period of two-five years: denial ofU.S. export licenses, prohibition of con-tracting with the U.S. government, and/or a prohibition on procuring productsor services from the U.S. government.The President, if he informs Congress,may waive sanctions if: (1) the productor service is necessary for national se-curity; (2) the recipient of the sanctionsis the sole source supplier of a product/

service; (3) the product/service is sup-plied to the U.S. government, or is sup-plied under a defense co-productionagreement or a NATO Program of Co-operation.46

11/15/90 Denmark announces that ithas joined the MTCR. Copenhagenstates that the decision to join resultsfrom the increasing numbers of coun-tries acquiring missile technology andthe consequences of such activities,many of which have been brought intofocus by the Persian Gulf crisis. Whileit does not have a highly developed mis-sile industry, Denmark does not wishto be a point of technology transship-ment. Licenses for Category I items willbe addressed by the Ministry of Jus-tice, while Category II items will behandled by the Chamber of Commerceand Industry in cooperation with theMinistry of Justice.47

12/90 Austria's parliament(Nationalrat) makes the decision to jointhe MTCR.48

Late 90 The British Government offi-cially informs British Aerospace (BAe)that its participation in a joint venturewith Arab British Dynamics (ABD) iscontrary to the government's commit-ment to the MTCR. The Cairo-basedABD was reported to be involved indeveloping and producing Scud-B mis-siles for the Egyptian military. BAeeventually removes its personnel work-ing in Egypt and withdraws from theventure in 8/92.49

19911/29/91 New Zealand's Minister forDisarmament and Arms Control Hon.D.A.M. Graham announces that hisgovernment "has arranged to take partin the MTCR," and that "New Zealand'sparticipation in the MTCR complements


Deborah A. Ozga

our efforts to halt nuclear proliferationand to eliminate chemical weapons." Hecontinues, "There is nothing to suggestthat New Zealand is involved in sup-plying missile technology. But we donot want to tempt arms traders to useNew Zealand as a point of transfer byhaving less stringent controls than othercountries."50 According to Graham, hisgovernment hopes all nations involvedin missile-related transfers (in particu-lar key exporters like the Soviet Unionand China) that are not participants inthe MTCR, will observe the MTCR'sexport restraints. Graham also com-ments that the New Zealand governmentmade its decision to adhere to the re-gime before the outbreak of the PersianGulf crisis. Implementation of the newmissile technology export controls be-comes effective on 11/1/91.51

1/91 The first MTCR technical meet-ing takes place in Germany.52

1/91 Norway adheres to the MTCR.Oslo views the step as "an importantsupplement to existing rules governingits exports of strategic equipment, ser-vices and technology. Its adherence isalso an indication of Norway's supportfor international efforts aimed at reduc-ing the proliferation of nuclear weap-ons."53

2/91 Austria gives formal notificationof its participation in the MTCR.54

2/91 India's A.P.J. Kalam, Director ofDefense Research & Development Labo-ratory and head of the Integrated GuidedMissile Development Program, notesthat one of the program's aims is tocombat the MTCR.55

2/91 Mahmoud Karen, Egypt's repre-sentative to the U.N. Conference on Dis-armament in Geneva, calls for multina-tional efforts to strengthen the MTCR.56

3/7/91 The Finnish Council of Stateincorporates MTCR export controls intoits Decree on the Export and Transit ofDefense Material. The controls will be-come effective on 4/1/91.57

3/11/91 The Bush administration re-leases a list of technology and equip-ment sold to Iraq by U.S. firms between1985 and 1990. Export of some of theseitems should have been restricted, sincethe U.S. government decided to imple-ment MTCR export controls in 1986,before the agreement was formerly an-nounced. The release, however, claimsthat "no license applications for anyMTCR items have been approved forexport to Iraq."58

3/10-12/91 After U.S. Assistant Sec-retary of State Richard Solomon meetswith Chinese officials, he comments,"There are many countries, and Chinais one, that have a defense industry thats[sic] pretty expensive. Obviously, salesabroad help to subsidize the domesticarms industry...[but] the Chinese haveindicated that they will honor those[MTCR] parameters." The purpose ofSolomon's visit was to protest China'smissile sales to Pakistan.59

3/18/91 A second MTCR technicalmeeting takes place. Japanese represen-tatives note that some clauses of theagreement are open to different inter-pretations by participant nations. Mem-bers discuss issues concerning annexand guideline clarity. Members agreeto some guideline clarifications.60

3/19-20/91 The fourth MTCR meetingtakes place in Tokyo. The seven origi-nal members attend, along with Aus-tralia, Belgium, the Netherlands, andSpain. Austria, Denmark, NewZealand, and Norway participate for thefirst time. Luxembourg does not send adelegation. Canada recommends that the

meeting focus on expanding the "Equip-ment and Technology Annex" since "theAnnex might usefully be amended toaccount for the differing parameters(distance and payload) necessary for thedelivery of chemical and biologicalweapons."61

Per the Canadian suggestion, mem-bers agree to expand the annex. Dis-cussions revolve around wideningMTCR "objectives" to include chemi-cal and biological weapon delivery sys-tems. Members agree to revise the"Equipment and Technology Annex"before the close of 1991 as the currenttext (from the mid-1980s) fails to ad-dress many important technological de-velopments. While some proposedmodifications are adopted at the meet-ing, time constraints dictate that not allof the issues requiring clarification areaddressed.

In view of the Gulf War, memberscite the importance of stricter verifica-tion. Japanese Deputy Foreign Minis-ter Koji Watanabe notes that, "the veryfact that Scud missiles were launchedagainst friendly and peaceful countriesuntil a fortnight ago...brings us onceagain the urgency of the proliferationissue of mass destruction weapons."62

On Japan's initiative, members make anappeal for all nations to adhere to theagreement. Japan also agrees officiallyto discuss membership with China.

In addition, Canada recommends thatmembers assess which nations might beencouraged to adhere to the exportguidelines. The membership of Turkeyand other European states is discussed.63

3/27/91 In response to the calls for hiscountry's adherence, Chinese ForeignMinister Qian Qichen states, "Thosecountries that did not attend the meet-ing should not be called upon to as-sume corresponding obligations to anagreement reached among some othercountries."64


Deborah A. Ozga

3/91 Sweden bases its missile tech-nology export controls on MTCR guide-lines.65

4/23/91 Leonid Sharin, Acting Chairof the Supreme Soviet Committee forDefense and National Security, notes So-viet interest in MTCR participation, pro-vided that COCOM export restrictionsto the Soviet Union are dropped.66

5/5/91 Argentine Defense MinisterErman Gonzalez reports that Argentinais studying the possibility of joining theMTCR.67

Early 5/91 The United States meetswith China regarding proliferation is-sues and encourages China to followMTCR guidelines. In response to U.S.pressure not to sell M-9 and M-11 mis-siles, Chinese Foreign Minister QianQichen states that China did not par-ticipate in the creation of the MTCRand "should not be called upon to as-sume corresponding obligations."68

5/27/91 President Bush announces thathe will impose sanctions on China forselling M-11 missile parts and technol-ogy to Pakistan. Sanctions required bythe Arms Export Control Act and theExport Administration Act are placedon the China Great Wall Industry Cor-poration and the China Precision Ma-chinery Import Export Corporation.They include a ban on cooperation withChina in space launch activities and thedenial of a sale of 20 high-speed com-puters with missile applications valuedat $30 million. Some Chinese officialsrespond that M-11 transfers are not cov-ered by the MTCR guidelines becausethe M-11's range is not more than 186miles (300 km.). However, the firm thatmarkets the M-11, the Precision Ma-chinery Import-Export Corporation,had earlier issued a sales brochure de-scribing the M-11 missile as being able

to carry an 800 kg. warhead to a rangeof 180 miles. Sanctions are implementedon June 16, 1991.69

5/28/91 Argentine Defense MinisterAntonio Erman Gonzales announcesthat Argentina will follow MTCR guide-lines and will cancel the Condor IIproject. He states that "this is thehealthiest attitude that Argentina couldadopt in order to show that we are notengaged in an arms race."70 Followingthe announcement, Argentina asks cur-rent MTCR members for advice onregulatory issues which need to beimplemented so that Buenos Aires willbe in accordance with MTCR guide-lines. In unofficial discussions with Ar-gentina, MTCR members show a will-ingness to provide assistance.71

5/91 A third MTCR technical meetingis held in Paris. Participants review andupdate the MTCR annex in preparationfor a November policy group meeting.72

5/30/91 The Office of the President ofthe French Republic releases its "Planfor Arms Control and Disarmament,"in which France recognizes the role ofthe MTCR in arms control, but pointsout that the current regime is only astep towards a more general agreement.France calls for a broader agreementwith geographic enlargement, increasedcontrol, universal applicability to allmembers, establishment of rules for in-ternational cooperation for civilian useof space, and prevention of technologyleakage from civilian to militaryprojects. France proposes the develop-ment of confidence-building measures,including the establishment of a "codeof good conduct" and a mechanism forthe notification of space launches.73

6/91 Chinese officials inform U.S.Undersecretary of State Reginald

Bartholomew that Beijing is consider-ing joining the MTCR.74

7/1/91 Sweden introduces legislation(sfs 1991:341 and 1991:343) prohibit-ing the export of civilian products thatcan be used in weapons of mass destruc-tion, including products and equipmentemployed in missiles equipped withnuclear warheads. Stockholm cites thegrowing risk of proliferation of tech-nologies that can be used for NBC weap-ons as its rationale for joining.75

7/8/91 Sanctions announced by U.S.President Bush on two Chinese entities(China Great Wall Industry Corpora-tion and the China Precision Machin-ery Import-Export Corporation) and onePakistani entity (Space and Upper At-mosphere Research Commission) be-come official. These entities will bedenied license applications to exportitems covered by the MTCR Annex fortwo years.76

9/5/91 Sweden joins the MTCR. Ac-cording to a Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs document, as a result of partici-pating in the MTCR, Sweden will gainaccess to information needed for imple-menting export control legislation thatit had already adopted. Presumably, bytaking these steps, Sweden will alsoavoid discrimination against its indus-tries and research institutions that seekto import goods from MTCR memberstates. Minister for Foreign Trade AnitaGradin comments on Sweden's non-pro-liferation policy initiatives, stating: "Itis important for Sweden to participatein the international endeavor to preventthe proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction. This is a major aspect of ourpolicy of disarmament and is also justi-fied by the threat to regional stabilitywhich can result from the proliferationof technologies for weapons of massdestruction, as has been shown in the


Deborah A. Ozga

Middle East and the Gulf area."77

9/91 Israeli Defense Ministry DirectorGeneral David Ivri meets with Penta-gon officials in Washington to discussthe MTCR agreement. Israel reportedlyagrees to accept the conditions of theregime. According to Israeli sources, theUnited States threatens to sanction Is-rael if it fails to comply with theMTCR.78

9/27/91 The United States invokessanctions against South Africa's Arma-ments Corporation (Armscor) for en-gaging in missile proliferation activi-ties. The two-year sanctions will pre-vent Armscor from receiving U.S. ex-ports of items covered by the ArmsExport Control Act and the Export Ad-ministration Act, disqualify them fromacquiring U.S. government contracts,and proscribe U.S. firms from import-ing Armscor merchandise. The U.S.sanctions were allegedly triggered byIsraeli aid to South Africa in develop-ing ballistic missiles and supplying keycomponents.79

9/91 Finland announces its intentionto join the MTCR, bringing the num-ber of formal members to 18. Accord-ing to a Finnish government official,the decision to join the MTCR is basedon the fact that, historically, Finland hascooperated and coordinated its exportcontrols with the United States and itsallies. According to the same official,joining the MTCR is a part of Finland'seconomic policy, to help meet Helsinki'sneed to secure Western technology forindustrial development. Finally, the factthat Finland will become a full mem-ber of the European Space Agencymakes MTCR membership useful, assome exchanges of information areeasier when all members operate underthe same export control system.80

10/3/91 Bowing to U.S. pressure, Is-rael announces its intention to abide byMTCR restrictions by the end of 1991.In exchange, the United States waivessanctions against Israel for aiding SouthAfrica's ballistic missile developmentefforts. According to published reports,Israel was hoping to evade the adoptionof MTCR guidelines until the end of1992, when its missile-related agree-ments with both South Africa and Chinawould have been fully executed. Accord-ing to Ha'Aretz, the Director-Generalof the Israeli Defense Ministry M. DavidIvri stated that a refusal by Israel toadhere to the MTCR would risk pre-cipitating American sanctions againstIsrael.81

10/11/91 In response to U.S. sanctionsagainst Armscor, South African ForeignAffairs Minister Pik Botha meets withU.S. Assistant Secretary of State forAfrican Affairs Herman Cohen and la-bels the sanctions as being "unfair."However, Botha does voice SouthAfrica's interest in the MTCR saying,"If we cannot be full members surelythey can create another form of mem-bership. We want to belong to the cluband be part of an organization whichcan together control and perhaps ex-change technology and knowledge withone another."82

10/14/91 According to officials fromthe Israeli government's Rafael Arma-ment Development Authority, the ex-pected adoption of MTCR guidelines byIsrael will not hinder the sale of theArrow ATBM or other warhead tech-nology abroad.83

10/91 A multilateral group of MTCRrepresentatives meets with Russian of-ficials in Moscow to discuss missile pro-liferation.84

10/91 The Bush Administration ex-presses its intention to lift some restric-tions placed on Israeli defense exportsin light of Israel's willingness to signthe MTCR.85

11/4-7/91 The MTCR's fifth plenarymeeting takes place in Washington.Finland and Sweden attend for the firsttime. Participants examine the criteriafor evaluating membership applicationsand search for a means to expand mem-bership.

Members discuss expanding the re-gime to cover all types of weapons ofmass destruction, but they reject theconcept of lowering system range thresh-olds. Members also examine adjustingcurrent guideline parameters, recogniz-ing the need to allow for legitimate trans-fer of missile technology for peacefuluses. Reportedly, current MTCR guide-lines are viewed by some member statesas excessively restrictive.

The revised and updated MTCR An-nex from the previous technical meet-ing is adopted. In many cases notes areadded at the end of each item section;the notes contain definitions or furtherclarifications of technical parameters.The new version of the annex containsdefinitions for "microcircuit" and "ra-diation hardened," while "productionequipment" is expanded to apply notonly to serial production, but all pro-duction. A new terminology sectionclarifies the terms "specially designed,""designed or modified," "usable in,"and "capable of," which are usedthroughout the new annex's item sec-tions. These terms provide a more spe-cific description to determine the ex-tent to which an item is dedicated to-ward missile applications. In manycases, the term "designed or modified"replaces "specifically designed" to en-compass a greater range of dual-useitems. New Item 17 (materials, devicesand specially designed software for re-


Deborah A. Ozga

duced observables) and Item 18 (devicesfor use in protecting rocket systems andunmanned air vehicles against nucleareffects), are added to the annex. Mem-bers approve Item 19 (complete rocketsystems and unmanned air vehicles notcovered in Item 1 with a range equal orgreater than 300 km.) but do not imple-ment it. Argentina requests that the UnitedStates officially communicateArgentina's adherence to the MTCR andrequest an invitation to the sixth ple-nary meeting. According to the FelixMenicocci, Third Secretary in the Ar-gentine Foreign Ministry, Directoratefor International Security, Nuclear, andSpace Affairs, there was "considerablesatisfaction on the part of the membersregarding Argentina's decision to jointhe regime..."86

11/17/91 Secretary of State Baker an-nounces that his visit to China produceda Chinese verbal agreement to adhereto MTCR guidelines. In exchange, theUnited States will remove sanctionsplaced on two Chinese firms in 6/91.Mr. Baker interprets the agreement topreclude M-9 and M-11 sales. However,China's official News Agency andBeijing Review says only that China"may consider observing the MTCRguidelines and parameters in actualtransfers."87 Before accepting the guide-lines, China argues that the M-11,which carries an 800 kg. payload a rangeof 290 km. fell below the regime's re-strictions. The U.S. response is thatlowering the M-11's payload would ex-tend the range to fall within the juris-diction of the MTCR.88

12/20/91 U.S. State Departmentspokesman Richard Boucher reports thatthe United States will lift restrictionsimposed in 6/91 when Beijing agreesto adopt safeguards against missile pro-liferation.89

12/24/91 The Israeli Ministry of De-fense (MOD) announces that "Israel isjoining today the sixteen nations whichdecided to adhere to the guidelines ofthe international Missile TechnologyControl Regime(...).Israel is the firstcountry in the Middle East to partici-pate in the Missile Technology ControlRegime, in order to curb the prolifera-tion of such platforms." According tothe statement, in one week the Ministerof Defense will sign a proclamation ofcommodities and services (#6752-1991)to implement MTCR controls by amend-ing the Control of Commodities andServices Order. The far-reaching regu-lations prohibit researchers from lec-turing on any of their missile-relatedwork. Under the proclamation ratifiedby the Knesset, the MOD must approveall missile technology exports, and theMinistry of Commerce and Trade mustlicense all dual-use technology trade.The MOD Security Assistance and De-fense Export Department (Sibat) willbe responsible for implementing the newcontrols. The changes also include es-tablishment of an interdepartmentaltechnical committee in the MOD foridentifying and monitoring MTCRitems, creation of a joint MOD-Minis-try of Industry and Commerce advisorycommittee to coordinate the control ofdual-use items, and the utilization ofdata processing procedures and systemsto address MTCR items licensing.Israel's adherence begins on January 1,1992.90

1992

1/92 During Undersecretary of StateBartholomew's visit to Moscow, Rus-sian officials reaffirm the Soviet Union'sprior commitment to observe MTCRguidelines.91

1/30/92 In an interview, Third Secre-tary in the Argentine Foreign Ministry,Directorate for International Security,Nuclear, and Space Affairs FelixClementino Menicocci comments thatArgentina considers the MTCR non-dis-criminatory and wants to limit thespread of missile technology. He alsonotes that there are no privateArgentinean firms in the missile busi-ness and that "Argentina does not wantto be used for the development of mis-sile technology that will be used by oth-ers as has been done in the past andthat it does not want to be categorizedwith nations engaged in missile prolif-eration activities.92

2/1/92 Chinese Foreign Minister QianQichen furnishes written confirmationto the U.S. government that China willfollow MTCR "guidelines and param-eters," provided that the United Stateslifts sanctions on the export ofsupercomputer and satellite technologiesto China.93

2/7/92 Argentine Defense Minister An-tonio Gonzalez reveals that in order topave the way for Argentina to join theMTCR, a U.S. team is monitoring thedismantling of the Condor II missileprogram. The team is apparently moni-toring the transfer of the program fromthe Air Force to the civilian sector orthe National Space Activities Commis-sion (CNAE).94

2/11/92 A U.S. delegation visits SouthAfrica to address Pretoria's participa-tion in the MTCR. Minister of ForeignAffairs Botha states that "[I]t is the in-tention of the South African governmentto adhere to the guidelines of the MTCRas a prelude to its possible member-ship."95

2/17/92 The Swiss Bundesrat passesan ordinance on the export and trans-


Deborah A. Ozga

portation of goods and technologies hav-ing application in NBC weapons andmissiles, which includes acceptingmembership in the MTCR. The ordi-nance, which goes into effect on Febru-ary 18, 1993, also includes the MTCRcontrol list. Upon passing the ordinance,the Swiss government files a formalrequest to join the MTCR.96

2/21/92 U.S. Department of Statespokesperson Margaret Tutwiler an-nounces that the United States intendsto lift sanctions imposed on China inJune 1991, with the expectation that inresponse China will announce its ad-herence to the guidelines and param-eters of the MTCR.97

2/24/92 Speaking before the U.S. For-eign Operations Subcommittee of theHouse Appropriations Committee, Sec-retary of State James Baker states thatChinese non-compliance with the termsof the MTCR would not effect China'sMFN status but would trigger the re-imposition of sanctions.98

2/92 In anticipation of Brazil's adher-ence to the MTCR, the Brazilian Con-gress takes up legislation designed toharmonize Brazil's export controls.99

3/27/92 The U.S. sanctions two NorthKorean enterprises (Lyongaksan Ma-chineries and Equipment ExportCorp. and Changgwang Credit Corp.)and an Iranian entity (Ministry of De-fense and Armed Forces Logistics) fortheir involvement in missile prolifera-tion activities. Sanctions imposed for aperiod of two years include: 1) suspen-sion of U.S. export licenses for con-trolled items; 2) denial of licenses tothe above mentioned firms and certainNorth Korean government bureaus in-volved in missile proliferation; 3) de-nial of US government contracts withthe sanctioned entities; 4) denial of im-

ports from the sanctioned entities intothe United States.100

3/13/92 U.S. Assistant Secretary ofState Richard A. Clarke, in a statementbefore the Subcommittee on Technol-ogy and National Security of the JointEconomic Committee, says that theUnited States and its "non-proliferationpartners" have initiatives underway tocounteract proliferation, including U.S.efforts to enlist Portugal, Greece, Ire-land, Switzerland, Iceland, and Turkeyinto joining the MTCR. He notes that adialogue has also been opened withEastern Europe, the former Soviet re-publics, Argentina, and Brazil. TheUnited States is also discussing adher-ence to MTCR guidelines with SouthAfrica.101

3/92 The Finnish government estab-lishes a task force, under the leadershipof the Ministry for Foreign Affairs andchaired by Ambassador Antero Viertiö,to investigate the obligations that fall toFinland resulting from participation invarious export control regimes, includ-ing the MTCR. The task force eventu-ally recommends that an export controlunit in the Ministry of Trade and In-dustry be established to handle all li-censes relating to dual-use goods andtechnologies covered by the MTCRAnnex and COCOM regulations. Thetask force also advises that Finnish ex-port control legislation be amendedgradually.102

Spring 1992 Romania applies forMTCR membership.103

3/30/92 As part of an active outreachprogram for non-members, a specialMTCR meeting is held in Warsaw toinform East European countries, theBaltic states, and former Soviet Unionrepublics on export controls.104

4/92 Brasília welcomes a team ofMTCR representatives to discuss Bra-zilian participation in the regime.105

4/3/92 U.S. Ambassador to China J.Stapleton Roy warns Beijing that itsagreement to abide by the MTCR im-plies "no grandfather clause" and thatthe agreement precludes China fromshipping M-11s to Pakistan or M-9s toSyria.106

4/9/92 The Argentine National Assem-bly adopts legislation (Decree 603/92)that controls materials, equipment, tech-nology, and chemicals that could be usedin the development and production ofmissiles. Argentine President CarlosMenem says the measure will "allowresponsible control of exports of sensi-tive items." Argentina says it "will fight"for formal acceptance into the MTCRat the forthcoming Oslo meeting.107

4/92 In response to Argentina's requestto join the MTCR, an MTCR missionis sent to Argentina to assess those ex-port control measures it has alreadytaken. The mission, consisting of Eliza-beth Varville (USA), Phillippe Thiebaud(France), Toshio Kunikata (Japan) andSten Lundbo (Norway), submits its re-port to the MTCR Oslo plenary. Re-sponse to the report is positive, butmembership is not extended.108

4/92-5/92 The United States threatensRussia and India with sanctions if Mos-cow follows through on a deal to sellcryogenic rocket engines to New Delhi.U.S. officials claim the contract violatesMTCR guidelines, which Russia hasagreed to enforce. Russian and Indianofficials deny violation of the regime,claiming the engines cannot be used formilitary purposes. ISRO chairman, Dr.U. R. Rao criticizes the MTCR callingthe guidelines arbitrary and ill-definedand points out that MTCR controls on


Deborah A. Ozga

launch vehicles with a range of 300 km.and 500 kg. payload would includespace launch vehicles such as the Aug-mented Satellite Launch Vehicle(ASLV). Glavkosmos official NikolaiSemyonov accuses Washington of at-tempting to destroy Russia's space in-dustry and says: "When working outthe contract, we used the Missile Tech-nology Control Regime guidelines inreaching the contract with India...whatis more, Indian partners said at the startand later confirmed that they would useour technology exclusively for peacefulpurposes."109 Glavkosmos ChairmanAleksandr Dunayev says that both Rus-sia and India have called for an interna-tional inspection to determine that thedeal did indeed comply with the termsof the MTCR. The United States doesnot respond to the proposal, but sendsa U.S team to Russia to examine thesituation.110

4/92 A technical meeting is held inRome to address the issue of how theregime could cover delivery systems thatcarry chemical and biological warheads.The result of that meeting is the devel-opment of criteria to determine whetheran import is intended for peaceful usesor a weapons program (the so-called"intent test.")111

5/92 North Korean Foreign MinisterKim Yong Nam notes, "It would be noproblem for our country to associateitself with [the MTCR] because we op-pose the proliferation of missiles."112

5/1/92 Hungary claims to have imple-mented controls similar to MTCR guide-lines.113

5/4-5/92 At a meeting in Helsinki, theForeign Ministers of Denmark, Finland,Iceland, Norway, and Sweden issue astatement on the "Non-Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction." The

document expresses support for furtherstrengthening of multilateral coopera-tion in export controls and supports in-ternational treaties which set interna-tional export control parameters formissile technology and ban or limit theproliferation of weapons of mass de-struction. In addition, it points to ne-gotiations between major weapons ex-porters and the realization of a UN armstrade register as keys to successful inlimiting the trade in conventional weap-ons. Noted also is Iceland's consider-ation of joining the MTCR. The otherfour states are already party to the re-gime.114

5/8/92 Russian First Deputy Ministerof Foreign Economic Relations SergeiGlazyev comments that for Russia tojoin the MTCR, sanctions and barriersagainst Russia maintained by COCOMmust be removed. In a letter to Presi-dent Yeltsin, the Chairman of the Rus-sian Parliament expresses similar sen-timents. Glazyev also notes that in re-sponse to the Russian leadership's an-nouncement of its intention to join theregime, the United States had demandedcancellation of the Glavkosmos-ISROcryogenic contract.115

5/11/92 The U.S. sanctions the IndianSpace Research Organization (ISRO)and Russia's Glavkosmos for two yearson the grounds that ISRO's contract topurchase Russian cryogenic rocket tech-nology violates MTCR guidelines. Ac-cording to the U.S. Department of State,"the MTCR partners all have concludedthat the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal is in-consistent with the MTCR Guide-lines."116

5/11/92 Portugal joins the MTCR.117

5/12/92 First Deputy Minister for For-eign Economic Relations Sergei Glazyevurges Russia to reconsider joining the

MTCR, warning that if Russia were tobecome bound to the MTCR, it wouldfind itself under double U.S. controlthrough the MTCR and COCOM. Hesuggests that Russian adherence to theMTCR be made contingent on the re-moval of COCOM restrictions on spacetechnology imports.118

5/29/92 During a meeting on MiddleEast arms control issues of the perma-nent five members of the U.N. SecurityCouncil, agreement is reached on "in-terim guidelines concerning transfers ofweapons of mass destruction." Theagreement publicly commits China toabide by MTCR guidelines. However,it is noteworthy that the interim exportguidelines point only to China's "sup-port for" the MTCR instead of a con-crete agreement to observe its limits.119

6/16/92 The U.S. Department of Com-merce, in amending the Export Admin-istration Regulations (EAR) withSupplement No. 6 to Part 778, notespositive non-proliferation steps on thepart of Brazil, including a visit toBrasília in 4/92 by MTCR representa-tives. Nevertheless, it rejects dual-usetransfers.120

6/22/92 Greece joins the MTCR.121

6/29-7/2/92 An MTCR plenary meet-ing is held in Oslo, Norway. The 22participants are: Australia, Austria, Bel-gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxem-bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States, withGreece, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzer-land participating for the first time.

Ireland accedes to the MTCR duringthe Oslo plenary meeting. Accordingto the Irish government, Ireland "doesnot produce any Category I items andonly a few of the Category II items.


Deborah A. Ozga

However, it was considered importantfor Ireland to adhere to the MTCRguidelines to ensure that it could not beused as an intermediate destination inorder to circumvent the MTCR controlsapplied by other countries. Also, withthe advent of the single market in theEC, it is desirable that all of the twelveEC nations should have the same ex-port controls vis-a-vis third countriesto avoid distortions in intra-Communitytrade."122 The government also notesthat Ireland's membership demonstratesits continued commitment to nuclearnonproliferation.

Members agree that the guidelines forsensitive missile-relevant transfersadopted on 4/16/87 continue to be animportant mechanism for preventingproliferation of missiles capable of car-rying nuclear weapons and agree to ex-tend the guidelines so that the scope ofthe regime addresses missiles able tocarry biological and chemical weapons.While no items are added to the controllist, new licensing and control proce-dures are adopted to address weaknessesof the regime. The group approves aset of retransfer controls on MTCR-re-lated equipment and technologywhereby authorization for reexport ofall MTCR controlled items would berequired. U.S. Under Secretary of Com-merce for Export Administration, JoanMcEntee, praises the changes as a mean-ingful triumph. Discussion also toucheson the issue of licensing among MTCRcountries and on the impact of EC uni-fication on European implementation ofMTCR export controls.

The U.S. delegation calls for MTCRmembers to implement export controlson all item transfers to countries thatare"known" to have suspicious missileprojects. Reportedly, MTCR memberssupport the U.S. initiative but did notapprove the idea for incorporation intothe guidelines.123

7/7/92 The United States imposes sanc-tions on both Syria and North Koreaunder terms of the U.S. Missile Tech-nology Control Act. Entities sanctionedare Lyongaksan Machineries and Equip-ment Export Corporation (North Ko-rea), Changgwang Credit Corporation(North Korea), the Syrian ScientificResearch Center , and the Ministry ofDefense (Syria). The above entities andNorth Korean government bureaus as-sociated with missile-related activitieswill be denied the following: U.S. ex-port licenses for items regulated underthe Export Administration Act of 1979;U.S. government contracts; and U.S.import licenses. (This is the second timethat the North Korean enterprises namedabove have been sanctioned by theUnited States.)124

7/11/92 In a press release on theMTCR, the Japanese government notesthe value of the regime in strengthen-ing missile nonproliferation. It alsostates that Japan had implemented strictexport controls through careful exami-nation of end-use and end-users andthrough the exchange of informationwith other MTCR members. The releasealso notes that Japan, sometimes alongwith other MTCR members, had ap-proached China, North Korea, Argen-tina, Brazil, and the states of the formerSoviet Union regarding the adoption ofMTCR guidelines.125

7/17/92 Under pressure from theUnited States, France announces that itcannot provide any rocket technologyto the Indian Space Research Organiza-tion (ISRO) unless India first joins theMTCR. French General Blondeau,Head of International Affairs at the De-partment of Space, explains that the re-strictions apply to launcher technol-ogy.126

7/24/92 The French Embassy in

Buenos Aires notifies the ArgentineMinistry of Foreign Affairs that MTCRmembers approved of Argentine Decree603/92 and subsequent measures takenby the Argentine government. TheMTCR expresses a desire to continuedialogue with Argentina and points outthat such communication is conduciveto Argentina's participation in theMTCR.127

7/26/92 Israeli defense officials say thatEuropean countries, led by France,thwarted Israel's attempts to join theMTCR. They claim that the barring ofIsrael was also conducted with the tacitconsent of the United States.128

7/92 The United States reiterates itscall for MTCR Partners and all govern-ments to adopt MTCR guidelines as partof their national policy and encouragesall nations to establish effective missiletechnology export controls, includingappropriate laws, regulations, and pro-visions for the education of exportersand customs officials.129

7/92 U.S. Assistant Secretary of Com-merce for Export Administration JimLeMunyon states that extended MTCRguidelines will not significantly affectthe parameters of missile technologyitems contained in the U.S. CommerceControl List and that Commerce wouldsimply pursue a modified missile licens-ing policy.130

7/92 According to Dr. U. R. Rao, chair-man of the Indian Space Research Or-ganization, the MTCR is "blatantly dis-criminatory." However, he sees that theMTCR may possibly be a "mixed bless-ing in disguise" in the case of India'sIntegrated Guided Missile DevelopmentProgramme as well as for ISRO since "the highly publicizedsanctions may bring to the fore nationalresolve and may actually help India."131


Deborah A. Ozga

8/92 The Icelandic government is re-ported to be considering the possibilityof participation in the MTCR.132

8/12/92 U.S. Senator Joseph Biden in-troduces the Weapons Proliferation Con-tainment Act of 1992 (S. 3193), callingfor the U.S. directors of the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Develop-ment, the International DevelopmentAssociation, the Inter-American Devel-opment Bank, and the Asian Develop-ment Bank to vote against any loan orutilization of funds to any nation thatcommits a material breach or violationof various nonproliferation regimes, in-cluding the MTCR.133

8/27/92 Senator John McCain and Rep-resentative Howard L. Berman, two ofthe original authors of the Missile Tech-nology Control Act, send a memo toActing Assistant Secretary of State forExport Administration JamesLeMunyon to articulate their interpre-tation of how the MTCR sanction legis-lation should be implemented. Theyreject denying export licenses to sanc-tion importing entities when there areno indications that the items to be ex-ported are useful for missile prolifera-tion purposes. They also note that imple-mentation of MTCR sanctions againstISRO has caused confusion and con-cern among U.S. exporters.134

9/12/92 The U.S. State Department,in announcing the decision to lift 6/91sanctions of satellites and satellite com-ponent exports to China, states that "theadministration carefully monitored Chi-nese compliance with guidelines and pa-rameters of the missile technology con-trol regime (MTCR) and concluded thatChinese behavior is consistent with itsobligations."135

9/18/92 Marketing Director Ferdi Starkof the South African firm Denel states

that there are limits to what the firmwould sell to China and that "althoughwe have not signed the [MTCR], we willnot sell anything covered by it." Chinais understood to have sought guidancetechnology from South Africa.136

9/92 China threatens to withdraw fromits agreement to abide by the MTCRand not to export ballistic missiles tothe Middle East in response to the U.S.decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. A U.S.official notes, "We don't hold a lot offaith in their adherence to the MTCR inthe first place."137

9/28-30/92 Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narashima Rao visits France to in-vestigate French statements on its new"independent" stand on the MTCR.However, France actually expresses a"hardened" response in support of theMTCR. French Foreign Minister RolandDumas notes that while France under-stands India's desire to acquire technol-ogy for peaceful uses, France also wants"to see a great country like India asso-ciating itself with the consensus in thefield of nonproliferation."138

10/1/92 In the Resolution of Ratifica-tion of the START Treaty, the U.S. Sen-ate urges the President to seek adher-ence to the MTCR by Belarus,Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.139

10/92 China's Defense Ministry plansto set up a new office to handle arma-ments transactions and to satisfy inter-national agencies that China is abidingby accords such as the MTCR.140

10/92 The Commission of the Euro-pean Communities proposes the creationof an EC Council regulation to controlcertain dual-use exports. A control listis being drawn up to include the revisedMTCR Annex as well as the COCOM

Core list, the Australia Group Controllist, and the Nuclear Suppliers Grouplist.141

10/92 Pentagon sources report thatthere are "indications" that the Chineseare violating the MTCR by discussingM-9 and M-11 exports with Pakistanand Syria. Officials also fear that Chinamay be discussing "nuclear missile"exports with Iran.142

11/92 According to a statement re-leased by the South African Departmentof Foreign Affairs, South Africa alreadyadheres to MTCR guidelines. A draftbill regarding the nonproliferation ofweapons of mass destruction is due tobe tabled in the South African Parlia-ment in 1993.143

11/92 A WEU report notes that sev-eral non-MTCR countries are develop-ing ballistic missile technology for ex-port to the Third World. The report callsfor perfecting and extending theMTCR.144

11/92 Nine former SNIA-BPD employ-ees are cleared of all charges of ille-gally transferring missile technology toArgentina's Condor II project. Chargeswere dropped on the basis that the de-fendants' activities took place before theItalian government implemented 1990legislation on arms and military tech-nology exports.145

12/18/92 Hungary officially applies forMTCR membership, and the govern-ment adopts Decree 166/1992 (XII.18),to modify Budapest's export controlregulations. The decree implements theOslo guidelines of the MTCR and addsthe list of MTCR controlled items toHungary's national list (Annex 9 ofGovernmental Decree 61/1990(X.1)).146


Deborah A. Ozga

12/23/92 United States and Russia ap-prove a joint venture between LockheedMissiles & Space Co. and KhrunichevEnterprise to commercially launch theProton 1 which includes an agreementby Khrunichev to follow MTCR regu-lations and laws.147

12/92 The U.S. State Department in-vestigates reports that China violated itsMTCR pledges delivering 24 M-11 mis-siles to Pakistan.148

12/92 Van Vann Diepen, Director ofthe Office of Weapons ProliferationPolicy in the U.S. Department of State,distributes a set of questions during anMTCR Task Force fact-finding meetingof the Defense Trade Advisory Group.The questions are designed to serve asa guide for exporters when they com-plete applications or make inquiries thatmay be forwarded by the Missile Tech-nology Export Committee.149

19931/7/93 MTCR members reveal andimplement new MTCR guidelines, toextend the regime's scope to ballisticmissiles that are able to carry biologi-cal and chemical weapons. The newguidelines do not alter the establishedpayload or range limits, but instead re-strict the sale of any missile or un-manned aircraft to a country thought tobe developing weapons of mass destruc-tion. No changes to the annex are made.

According to some U.S. governmentsources, the guideline changes will havea "tangible impact" on U.S. munitionsexport controls but will not significantlyalter dual-use controls. Until revisionsto the U.S. Munitions List are complete,the Bureau of Export Administrationdoes not plan to formulate any changesin regulations to implement the MTCRchanges.150

1/11/93 Russian President Boris Yeltsinissues a presidential order (N 20-RP)'On Introducing Controls over the Ex-port from the Russian Federation ofEquipment, Materials, and TechnologiesUsed in the Manufacture of MissileWeapons.' The order confirms a list ofmissile equipment, materials, and tech-nologies requiring an export license.The list controls exports of unmannedatmospheric vehicles and missile sys-tems able to carry a payload greater than500 kg. to a range of more than 300km., as well as specified missile com-ponents, technology, know-how, and ma-terials.151

1/15/93 Russian and U.S. State De-partment delegations meet to discussU.S. claims that the Glavkosmos/ISROcryogenic deal violates the MTCR. Thedelegations are led by SergeiTschuvakhin and Robert Einhorn re-spectively. The meeting fails to yield aresolution on the issue. The UnitedStates notes that it is considering sanc-tions on other Russian entities associ-ated with the transaction, including the"Salyut" design office. The two sidesdo settle U.S. petitions for the creationof a "black list" of nations that will bebarred from all missile technology trans-fers. The two parties also agree not toexport missile technology contributingto delivery weapons of mass destruc-tion.152

2/23/93 Iceland passes regulation No.70/1993 to become the 23rd memberof the MTCR. The decision to join isbased on Iceland's support for disar-mament and arms control and its desireto coordinate export control lists withtrading partners.153

2/24/93 CIA Director James Woolseytestifies at a Senate hearing that bothRussia and Ukraine are displaying "a

growing willingness to sell missile tech-nology prohibited by the Missile Tech-nology Control Regime." Citing thecryogenic engine deal with India andRussia's attempts to advertise a deriva-tive of an SS-23 missile as a civilianrocket, Woolsey also suggests thatRussia's export controls are inconsis-tent with MTCR guidelines.154

3/8-11/9 The seventh MTCR plenarymeeting is held in Canberra. Iceland isvoted in as the 23rd member. Austra-lian Minister for Foreign Affairs andTrade Gareth Evans opens the meetingby calling for a global norm to back theMTCR in treaty form. Evans also notesNorth Korea's lack of interest in theMTCR. All partners conclude that theextended guidelines, established at theOslo plenary, continue to be an impor-tant mechanism for the prevention ofmissile proliferation. Weaknesses of theregime are discussed, including the in-creased risk of proliferation from theinability of former Soviet republics toenforce export controls. Members alsoconclude that the future direction of theregime be given further detailed con-sideration, "taking into account theirconcern about continuing exports ofmissiles and technology by non-mem-ber suppliers." Members approve an-nex Item 20 (complete subsystems forItem 19) and set a 7/1/93 implementa-tion date.

The United States backs Argentina'sapplication to become an MTCR fullmember. (Its application for member-ship is enhanced after it makes an agree-ment to allow its missile production fa-cility to be inspected by the UnitedStates). Members extend Argentina aninvitation to join provided that it relin-quishes its Condor equipment. Hungaryis also invited to become a partner, pro-vided that is Scud missiles and relatedequipment are destroyed. Both member-ships are established in accordance with


Deborah A. Ozga

arrangements made with the members,which includes "a satisfactory elimina-tion of missile components."155

3/17/93 In reference to the MTCR,South African Foreign Minister PikBotha states: "We want to be part of it,then we can play a role, then we arepart of the club (...).The United Statescan be assured there would be no trans-fers which could ever harm or damageUnited States interests." Botha alsonotes during his Washington visit thatrather than dismantling its missile pro-gram, South Africa is making plans forits commercialization.156

3/30/93 According to a U.S. Pentagonofficial, Defense and State Departmentofficials are considering the idea of al-lowing "special exemptions" (or a re-definition of Israel's status regarding theMTCR) in order to facilitate the exportof U.S. technology to Israel. Congres-sional investigators have questioned howthe joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow project con-forms with U.S. commitments to pro-tect key missile technologies. A U.S.meeting is scheduled for May 9-10,1993, to address MTCR constraintswhile seeking to improve "strategic re-lations" between the two countries.157

3/31/93 Israeli defense attache to Wash-ington, Major General Giora Romm,states that Israel would like to becomea full member of the MTCR, but de-clines to give further details.158

3/31/93 To date, the Brazilian Con-gress has not taken up the government's2/92 MTCR legislation. According toa Brazilian Embassy official, the delayis not based on political objections tothe legislation, but rather on internaldomestic difficulties that have taken pre-cedence over the issue.159

4/4/93 At a summit meeting inVancouver, U.S. President Clinton andRussian President Yeltsin issue a jointstatement that states, "The Presidentsagreed that it is necessary to achievethe earliest possible resolution of ques-tions about cooperation in nonprolifera-tion of missiles and missile technologyin all its aspects, in accordance withthe principles of existing internationalagreements."160

4/13-16/93 Francois BarryDelongchamps, Chief of the Office ofStrategic Affairs and Disarmament inFrance's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,cites the difficulties that MTCR mem-bers encounter with the regime's imple-mentation, noting that most MTCR tech-nologies are dual-use. Delongchamps adds that the MTCR continues a dia-logue with South Korea, which has ex-pressed interest in the regime.161

4/93 U.S. intelligence sources disclosethat China sold key missile componentsto Iran in violation of the MTCR.162

5/1/93 Ukrainian Deputy Minister ofForeign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk com-ments that Ukraine, as one of the larg-est producers of missiles, hopes to de-velop a future for its space industry.While it is interested in observing theexisting norms and standards in thefield, Kiev is also concerned that itsnational interests in the missile produc-ing industry be met adequately. Tarasyuknotes that Ukraine "had experiencedprotectionist measures" from some gov-ernments and considered these measuresunfair. He says that under such circum-stances, Ukraine would not join exist-ing missile proliferation regimes anddemands that, "Ukraine must be treatedas a partner and not a subject." In re-sponse to the question of whetherUkraine would join the MTCR if it wereoffered equal partnership, Tarasyuk says,

"We do not use our missile productionfor any external use as a principal, sowe rejected this demand as absolutelyunfair and uncivilized(...).We will join[the] MTCR on the condition thatUkraine be on equal terms, a partner in[the] missile technology worldmarket...because we have capabilitiesand would like these capabilities to beused for the benefit of the Ukrainianpeople." He concludes by saying thatUkraine is considering two options inregards to joining MTCR, but does notgive specifics.163

5/17/93 Russian government officialTschuvakhin says that he hopes to seethe MTCR "strengthen[ed] and renderedmore effective" but challenges several"ambiguities" of the regime that permitmissile proliferation whithin the West-ern alliance and European Community.In his opinion, such ambiguities makeit difficult for Russia to participate inthe regime despite Russian PresidentYeltsin's declaration that Russia wouldadhere to the MTCR in principle.164

5/27/93 U.S. President Clinton an-nounces his policies toward China, in-cluding instructions to "relevant offi-cials" to obtain Chinese compliancewith the MTCR.165

6/93 During an "experts meeting" inVienna, MTCR representatives ex-change information on their missile ex-port licensing and enforcement systems.The meeting focuses on the "nuts andbolts of administering MTCR controls"rather than on policy issues. One U.S.official says that the meeting is an ef-fort to standardize MTCR controlsamong partners, noting that "all theparticipating countries agree that a for-mal forum for discussing common con-trol and enforcement problems is criti-cal to our mission."166


Deborah A. Ozga

6/16/93 The U.S. State Department de-termines that Moscow-based KB Salyutis associated directly with the contractto sell cryogenic engines to India, whileother companies are also associated in-directly with the deal. As a result, theUnited States decides to impose sanc-tions on Russian producers of spacetechnologies for violating the MTCR.The sanctions are waived until July 15in order to allow the U.S. and Russiangovernments to make a final effort toresolve their differences over the cryo-genic deal with India.167

6/30/93 South African Acting StatePresident Pik Botha states that his coun-try is abandoning the development of aspace-launch vehicle, which should pavethe way for accession to the MTCR. Healso notes, "The United States currentlymaintains strict sanctions against Deneland all its affiliates. We trust that thesesanctions...can soon be lifted." Accord-ing to a statement by Denel, studiesshow that South Africa's membershipin the MTCR "could play an importantrole in international relations."168

7/1/93 A U.N. Secretary-General re-port notes: "States have taken steps, bothindividually and multilaterally, to haltthe proliferation of advanced militarytechnologies, most notably through theMissile Technology Control Regime andother supply-side controls. However,these measures raise international po-litical problems because they are per-ceived by many countries of the worldto be inequitable. The international com-munity must devise more equitable andcomprehensive approaches to the prob-lem of ensuring that space technologyis used for peaceful purposes and notfor destruction. As with other elementsof proliferation control and disarma-ment, any controls must be non-dis-criminatory and generally acceptable,if they are to be effective."169

7/1/93 MTCR members implement theamended guidelines and annex items 19and 20, (covering production facilitiesand production equipment for individualrocket stages and designated rocket pro-pellant engines). All members must in-form the Secretariat regarding theirimplementation status.170

7/15/93 Russia commits itself to MTCRadherence. The pledge is part of a com-promise between the United States andRussia that settles the dispute over Rus-sian sales of cryogenic technology toIndia. In return for not transferringmanufacturing technology, greater U.S.-Russian space cooperation is expected.Russia will supply India, only with com-pleted engines. Russian officials indi-cated that they require until 11/1/93 toadjust their export controls to reflectregime mandates.171

7/21/93 The Russian Parliament passesa resolution declaring that internationalnegotiations and agreements regardingthe MTCR must be ratified by the Su-preme Soviet of the Russian Federation.It also declares its intention to conductparliamentary hearings on the decisionto join the regime. Opponents of theagreement state that the Russian delega-tion was not authorized to make such acommitment.172

7/22/93 Glavkosmos officials arguethat Russian membership in the MTCRrequires ratification by Parliament anda decision to alter the Indian contractneeds a special decision of the govern-ment. In an interview, Glavkosmosspokesman Nikolai Semyonov alsostates, "We shall not stop fulfilling our obligations under the [In-dian] contract until there is a govern-ment decision to the contrary."173

7/25/93 During a meeting with Chi-nese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen,

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Chris-topher warns China that its sale of M-11 missile technology and componentsto Pakistan may activate U.S. sanctions.Qian denies that Beijing violated MTCRGuidelines and calls the charges "sim-ply fabricated."174

8/93 U.S. Senators John McCain andJeff Bingaman request that State Depart-ment Inspector General Sherman Funkinvestigate the alleged failure of the de-partment to "comply properly" withMTCA sanction laws. Both senatorsclaim that the Clinton Administrationhas "ignored" reports that Russia andChina have engaged in illegal missile-related activities with nations of prolif-eration concern. In a letter to Funk, thesenators suggest that in 1990 the StateDepartment misled the public when itdeclared that it had made an error ingiving a license to a Chicago-based firmto export hardened rocket missile cas-ings to Brazil.175

8/93 U.S. President Clinton is report-edly ready to approve a presidential re-view directive that would relax restric-tions on U.S. space technology exportsfor nations that participate in the MTCR.In discussions with Congress, NationalSecurity Council officials recommendthat U.S. rocket technology export re-strictions should be lowered in order toentice more nations to join the regime.Several senators argue against the newpolicy, saying that a loophole in theMTCR would be created since newmembers "would be free to export bal-listic missile technology under the guiseof 'peaceful' space launch technology."The State Department, a supporter ofthe new policy, wants to alter the agree-ment "into an intent-based agreement"to resemble the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty.176


Deborah A. Ozga

8/17/93 Russian delegate to the UNConference on Disarmament ValeriiZemskov announces that Russia is giv-ing serious consideration to joining theMTCR. He notes, however, that Russiawants the "discriminatory" COCOMtrade restrictions lifted in return.177

8/18/93 Indian Prime Minister Rao tellsparliament that the deal to sell rockettechnology to Russia is not dead andthat India will not give up its right toacquire missile and space technology.Indian officials are reportedly consid-ering whether the country should pur-sue an indigenous cryogenic rocket en-gine.178

8/25/93 U.S. Undersecretary of StateLynn Davis informs "certain" Chineseand Pakistani entities that the UnitedStates determined that they had engagedin missile-related transfers requiring theimposition of sanctions under U.S. law.The United States applies Category IIsanctions, which require denial of newexport licenses for MTCR Annex itemsand a denial of U.S. government con-tracts relating to MTCR Annex items for a period oftwo years. The sanctions will affect 10entities in China and Pakistan's DefenseMinistry.179

9/93 The Chinese government threat-ens to withdraw its commitment to theMTCR in response to U.S. sanctionsplaced on China for exporting of M-11missiles to Pakistan.180

9/93 "Officials close to the MTCR"voice concern that the Russian "Com-plex" company's offer to sell the Startlaunch system violates the MTCR. TheStart system, based on the SS-25, is afive-stage space launch vehicle able toplace a 600 kg. payload into a 700 km.polar orbit.181

9/21-22/93 An MTCR technical meet-ing takes place in London. Participantsdiscuss the implementation of the re-vised guidelines issued in January 1993and examine the comprehensiveness ofthe annex's technical parameters. Themeeting's agenda includes some issuescarried over from the meeting inCanberra and matters originating fromsubsequent discussions. 182

9/93 U.S. President Clinton is expectedto be close to approving PresidentialReview Directive 8 (PRD-8), whichdetails U.S. missile proliferation policy.PRD-8 reportedly proposes that if a stateadheres to the MTCR, the Non-Prolif-eration Treaty and the internationalNBC warfare conventions, it would thenbe eligible to acquire SLV technologyunder safeguards. While the policy iscriticized that it will increase the risksof missile proliferations, administrationofficials say that the new policy wouldnot "materially" change the way the U.S.government addresses export licensingrequests for space launch technology.183

9/27/93 U.S. President Clinton issuesa new policy regarding U.S. efforts toprevent the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and their delivery sys-tems. The new policy calls for strongsupport for the MTCR, noting that theUnited States "will support prudentexpansion of the MTCR's membershipto include additional countries that sub-scribe to international nonproliferationstandards, enforce effective export con-trols and abandon offensive ballisticmissile programs." Washington will notsupport the development or acquisitionof space-launch vehicles by non-MTCRmembers and will not encourage newmembers to develop new space launchvehicle programs, which "raise ques-tions on both nonproliferation and eco-nomic viability grounds." In regardsto exports of MTCR-controlled items

to MTCR members for peaceful spacelaunch programs, the United States willconsider each situation on a case-by-case basis. Finally, Washington willconsider whether additional constraintsor safeguards could diminish the riskof the misuse of space launch technol-ogy and "will seek adoption by allMTCR partners of policies as vigilantas our own."184

11/29-12/3/93 The eighth MTCR ple-nary session takes place in Interlaken,Switzerland. Hungary and Argentina arewelcomed as new members. The meet-ing focuses on the future planning ofthe regime. Partners agree to redoubletheir efforts in persuading potential ex-porters outside of the regime to abideby the regime's guidelines and plan toencourage proliferating countries to actmore responsibly.185

(DOC numbers refer to those sources which canbe found in the International Missile ProliferationProject database.)

1 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the ThirdWorld," International Security, Winter 1984/85,Vol.9, No. 3, pp. 178-179.2 Jürgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, "TheNational Implementation of the MissileTechnology Control Regime - The US andGerman Experiences," in Hans Günter Brauchet al., eds., Controlling the Development andSpread of Military Technology, (Amsterdam: VuUniversity Press), 1992, p. 236.3 John J. Fialka, "Allies to Curb Flow of MissileTechnology," Wall Street Journal, 4/17/87, p.11; Aaron Karp, The United States and the SovietUnion and the Control of Ballistic MissileProliferation to the Middle East, (Boulder:Westview Press, 1989), p. 13.4 Government of Canada, Missile TechnologyControl Regime, Background Paper, 4/16/87;Scheffran and Karp (note 2), p. 240.5 U.S. government official, interview by author,7/93.6 Aaron Karp, The United States and the SovietUnion and the Control of Ballistic MissileProliferation to the Middle East, New York:Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989,pp. 13-14; Richard H. Speier, "The MissileTechnology Control Regime," in Trevor Findlay,ed., Chemical Weapons and Missile


Deborah A. Ozga

Proliferation, (Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1991), p. 115.7 Government of Canada, Missile TechnologyControl Regime, Background Paper, 4/16/87.8 Government of Canada, Department ofExternal Affairs, Communique, 4/16/87, No.069; Karp (note 3), p. 15.9 John Wyles, "Fiat Link Suspected in CondorMissile Probe," Financial Times, 7/31/89, p. 2;FBIS-WEU-88-156, 9/26/88, p. 13; OriginalSource: ANSA (Rome), 9/24/88.10 U.S. government official, interview by author,5/93.11 Scott D. Tollefson, Brazil, The United States,and the Missile Technology Control Regime,NPS-56-90-006, Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, California, 3/90, p. 34.12 FBIS-WEU-88-156, 9/26/88, p. 13; OriginalSource: ANSA (Rome), 9/24/88.13 The Arms Control Association, "The MissileTechnology Control Regime," Fact Sheet, 3/92;Karp (note 3), p. 19.14 William C. Potter and Adam Stulberg, "TheSoviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles,Survival, November/December 1990, p. 547;"Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington,"Department of State Bulletin, 11/88, Vol. 88,No. 2140, pp. 28-31.15 U.S. Efforts to Control the Transfer ofNuclear-Capable Missile Technology, GeneralAccounting Office, NSIAD-90-176, 6/1/90, p.16.16 Ibid.; Congressional Record, 2/9/89, pp.E354-E355; Rachel Schmidt, U.S. ExportControl Policy and The Missile TechnologyControl Regime, (Santa Monica: The RANDCorporation, 1/90), pp. 41-42.17 Genneral Accounting Office (note 15), p. 22.18 U.S. Congress, Ballistic and Cruise MissileProliferation in the Third World, Hearing beforethe Subcommittee on Defense Industry andTechnology, Committee on Armed Services,Senate, 5/2/89, H. Allen Holmes testimony, pp.12, 29-30.19 Karp (note 3), p. 19.20 "Iraq Heavy Missile Launch 'Definitely' notCondor II," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly,1/29-2/4/90, p. 1, (DOC 62).21 Congressional Record, 8/4/89, p. S10231;U.S. Congress, Hearing before the Committeeon Foreign Relations United States Senate, 10/31/89, pp. 32-33.22 For a detailed description of the Frenchproposal see Congressional Record, 10/7/89,p. S12992-S12995. See also Veronica Couto,FBIS-LAT-89-205, 10/25/89, p. 42; OriginalSource: Gazeta Mercantil, 9/23/89, p. 16;Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Tries to Stop Brazil'sMissile Technology Deal," New York Times,10/19/89, p. A6; Ivo Dawnay, Financial Times,

36 U.S. Department of State, Heat Treatment ofBrazilian Rocket Motors, Press Release, 12/24/90, (DOC 820); Paulo Sotero, ProliferationIssues, 10/15/90, p. 17; Original Source: OEstado de Sao Paulo, 9/8/90, p. 9, (DOC 811).37 James A. Baker testimony, U.S. Congress,First Post-Cold War Superpower Summit, May1990, Hearing before the House Committee onForeign Affairs, 6/13/90, p. 95; "Prevent aBallistic Missile Fire Sale," Defense News, 2/17/92, pp. 31-32, (DOC 1624); Erik Wemple,"Fighting an Uphill Battle: Missile TechnologyExport Controls," Export Control News, 10/25/90, p. 9.38 Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 7/16/90.39 "Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting," TheDisarmament Bulletin, Fall 1990, p. 27.40 The Arms Control Association, (note 13); TheDisarmament Bulletin (note 39), p. 27; U.S.Department of State, MTCR MembershipChronology, undated.41 Paulo Sotero, Proliferation Issues, 10/15/90,p. 17; O Estado de Sao Paulo, 9/8/90, p. 9,(DOC 811).42 MTCR Secretariat, 8/93.43 Congressional Record, 9/19/90, pp. H7830-H7843.44 Craig Covault, "Israeli Rocket Proposed toNASA for U.S. Commercial Booster Project,"Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10/1/90,pp. 100-101.45 Nayan Chanda, Wall Street Journal, 5/1/91,p. A10, (DOC 612); Gary Milhollin and GerardWhite, "Tug of war over High-Tech Exports,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3/91, pp. 7-8,(DOC 202); Wall Street Journal, 10/19/90, p.A1.46 Congressional Information Service, CIS/IndexLegislative Histories, January-December 1990,(Betheseda: Congressional Information Service,1991), pp. 342-344; Congressional Record, 9/19/90, p. H7830.47 Royal Government of Denmark, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Press Release, 11/15/90; RoyalGovernment of Denmark, "Udvidet Kontrol MedMissilteknologi," Export, 1/29/93.48 Austrian government official, interview byauthor, 3/93.49 "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAePullout," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9/5/93, p. 31,(DOC 2421).50 Government of New Zealand, Minister forDisarmament and Arms Control, New ZealandAdopts Missile Controls, Press Statement, 1/29/91.51 Government of New Zealand, Ministry ofExternal Relations & Trade, MTCR: ExportPolicy, Background Paper, undated; Governmentof New Zealand, Minister for Disarmament and

10/24/89, p. 8.23 Congressional Record, 8/3/89, p. 12074.Congressional Record, 8/4/89, p. 10231. EricEhrmann and Christopher Barton, The ChristianScience Monitor, 3/19/91, p. 19;24 FBIS-WEU-89-151, 8/8/89, P. 6; OriginalSource: L'Unita, 7/30/89, p. 6.25 Congressional Record, 11/2/89, p. S 14603;Congressional Research Service, CongressionalResearch Bill Digest, 101 Congress, 1st Session1989, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Vol. 1 of 2, pp. A-203, A-403;Michael R. Gordon, "Clash Erupts on Ways toHalt Spread of Missiles," New York Times, 11/1/89, p. 10.26 Nuclear Developments, 10/26/89, pp. 43-44;Original Source: The Sunday Correspondent,10/8/89, p. 1, (DOC 1110).27 Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Tries to StopBrazil's Missile Technology Deal," New YorkTimes, 10/19/89, p. A6.28 Ultimately, the U.S. is able to halt the Frenchtransfer plan. Robert K. Ackerman, "FrenchRocket Technology Transfer," Signal, 11/89,reprinted in the Congressional Record, 10/7/89,p. S12992; Congressional Record, 10/7/89, p.S12992-S12995; Veronica Couto, FBIS-LAT-89-205, 10/25/89, p. 42; Original Source: GazetaMercantil, 9/23/89, p. 16; Dawnay (note 22),p. 8.; Alan Freedman and Victor Mallet, "UnitedStates Seeks Full EC Membership of MissileTreaty," Financial Times, reprinted inCongressional Record, 10/6/89, p. S12994.29 Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, "SpaceVehicles Pose Ballistic Threat," Defense News,5/18/92, p. 31, (DOC 1432); Aleksandr Vasilev,Proliferation Issues, 5/14/92, p. 32-33; OriginalSource: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 4/18/92, p. 5,(DOC 2206).30 Congressional Record, 11/19/89, p. S16225.31 Karp (note 3), p. 14; Aaron Karp, SIPRIYearbook 1990: World Armaments andDisarmament, (New York: Oxford UniversityPress), 1990, pp. 369-391; "MTCR List to beRevised," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3/30/91, p.470.32 Potter and Stulberg (note 14), p. 547; GeneralAccounting Office (note 17), U.S. Efforts toControl the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable MissileTechnology, p. 16.33 Potter and Stulberg (note 14), p. 548; "Sovietsto Adhere to MTCR Limits Except inAfghanistan," Defense & Foreign AffairsWeekly, 2/26/90, p. 2, (DOC 199). Statementalso contained in FBIS-SOV-90-029, 2/12/90,P. 20-22; Original Source: Tass (Moscow), 2/10/90.34 Government of Belgium, Communique dePresse du Benelux Relatif au MTCR, 4/25/90.35 Potter and Stulberg (note 14), p. 548.


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Arms Control (note 50), 1/29/91.52 The Arms Control Association, (note 13).53 Government of Norway, Royal Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Press Release, 11/12/90.54 Nuclear Developments, 5/20/91, p. 24;Original Source: Wiener Zeitung, (Vienna), 4/18/91, p. 4, (DOC 454).55 Edmond Dantes, "Missiles in Gulf BuoyIndia's Development Drive," Defense News, 2/25/91, p. 3, (DOC 452); Trevor Findlay,"Defending Mother India," Pacific Research, 5/91, pp. 13-14, (DOC 564).56 George Leopold, "Arms Control Experts EyeMultinational Effort to Stabilize Gulf," DefenseNews, 2/25/91, p. 30, (DOC 469).57 Finnish government official, letter to author,2/24/93.58 Alan Friedman, "The Middle East:Washington Gave Green Light to Iraq Sales,"Financial Times, 3/28/91, pp. 86-91. (DOC614); Gary Milhollin, Licensing MassDestruction, US Exports to Iraq: 1985-1990,Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,6/91, pp. 1-26, (DOC 634).59 George Leopold, "China Markets Missile ToMiddle East Buyers," Defense News, 4/8/91,pp. 1, 29; James L. Tyson, "China Will IgnoreUS Pressure to Stop Selling its Missiles,"Christian Science Monitor, 3/29/91, p. 6, (DOC318).60 Arms Control Reporter, 6/91, p. 706.B.56,(DOC 631).61 "MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo," TheDisarmament Bulletin, Spring 1991, p. 1062 Arms Control Reporter, (note 60).63 The Arms Control Association, (note 13);Arms Control Reporter (note 60), p. 706.B.56;Government of Japan, Press Release, 11/29/92.The Disarmament Bulletin (note 61), p. 10;Nuclear Developments, 5/20/91, p. 24; OriginalSource: Wiener Zeitung, (Vienna), 4/18/91, p.4, (DOC 454); Holly Porteous, Jane's DefenceWeekly, 3/30/91, p. 470, (DOC 673).64 Arms Control Reporter (note 60), p. 706.B.57.65 Arms Control Reporter (note 60), p. 706.B.57.66 Ilya Kiselev, FBIS-SOV-91-085, 5/2/91, p.1; Original Source: IAN Press Release, 4/23/91.67 Nuclear Developments, 5/31/91, pp. 17-18;Original Source: La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 5/5/91, pp. 1, 4, (DOC 526).68 Nayan Chanda, "As U.S.-China RelationsDeteriorate, Bush Sends Envoy on SalvageMission," Wall Street Journal, 5/1/91, p. A10,(DOC 612); R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. to Press Chinato Halt Missile Sales," Washington Post, 6/11/91, p. A14, (DOC 678).69 Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Renewing TradePrivileges for China, but Adds Missile Curbs,"New York Times, pp. A1, A4, (DOC 683); Elaine

Sciolino, "U.S. Lifts its Sanctions on China overHigh-Technology Transfers," New York Times,2/22/92, pp. 1, 5, (DOC 1692); Gerald F. Seib,"Bush to Renew Favored Status for China Trade,"Wall Street Journal, 5/28/91, pp. A3, A6, (DOC609); Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. to Press China to HaltMissile Sales," The Washington Post, 6/11/91,p. A14, (DOC 678); U.S. Government, FederalRegister, Vol. 57, No. 67, 4/7/92, p. 11768, (DOC2241); White House, Office of the Press Secretary,Fact Sheet, 6/16/91.70 The Arms Control Reporter, (note 60), p.706.B.60; Original Source: La Prensa (BuenosAires), 5/5/91.71 The Arms Control Association, (note 13);Missile Monitor, Spring 1992, pp. 10-11.72 The Arms Control Association, (note 13).73 FBIS-LA-91-104, 5/30/91, p. 25-29; OriginalSource: Argentina Televisora (Buenos Aires), 5/28/91; FBIS-LA-91-088, p. 22; Original Source:La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 5/5/91, pp. 1, 4;Government of France, Plan for Arms Controland Disarmament, 6/3/91.74 "China Weighs Signing 2 Pacts," New YorkTimes, 6/19/91, p. A6, (DOC 503).75 Government of Sweden, Swedish Ministry forForeign Affairs, Documents on Swedish ForeignPolicy, 1991, Stockholm, 1992.76 Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 137, 7/17/91, p.32601.77 Government of Sweden (note 75).78 Avi Bnayahu, Proliferation Issues, 10/29/91,pp. 39-40; Original Source: 'Al Hamishmar (TelAviv), 10/3/91, pp. 1, 4, (DOC 719); JacksonDiehl, "Israel, Pressed by U.S. Puts Limits on itsExport of Missile Technology," Washington Post,10/4/91, p. A21, (DOC 742); Milavnews, 11/91, p. 19 (DOC 713); Neal Sandler, "USA BringsIsrael into Line on MTCR," Jane's DefenceWeekly, 10/12/91, p. 644, (DOC 728).79 Federal Register, 10/15/91, Vol. 56, No. 199,p. 51734, (DOC 1350); Milavnews, 11/91, p. 18-19, (DOC 713).80 Finnish government official, author interview,2/93.81 Jackson Diehl, "Israel, Pressed by U.S. PutsLimits on its Export of Missile Technology,"Washington Post, 10/4/91, p. A21, (DOC 742);"Israel 'Accepte' le Report par le Congres duDebat sur les Garanties Bancaires," AgenceFrance Presse, 10/3/91; Jo Strich, "Les RelationsIsraelo-Americaines sous le Signe de la Defiance,"Agence France Presse, 10/12/91; DanielWilliams, "Israel Agrees to Limit Missile DataTransfers," Los Angeles Times, 10/4/91, p. A4,(DOC 723); Jon Wolfsthal, "Israel Accepts MTCRGuidelines," Arms Control Today, 11/91, p. 20,(DOC 1113).82 Adrienne Carlisle, "Further on Botha'sRemarks," Proliferation Issues, 10/29/91, p. 2;

Original Source: Saga (Johannesburg), 10/21/91,(DOC 1226); Freek Swart, Beeld (Johannesberg),3/4/92, p. 6.83 Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, "MTCR DoesNot Block Israeli Warhead Sales," Defense News,10/14/91, p. 4, (DOC 1296).84 Reginald Bartholomew, "Curbing DestabilizingArms Transfers," The DISARM Journal, Summer1992, p. 45.85 Bnayahu (note 78), pp. 39-40.86 Missile Monitor, Spring 1992, pp. 10-11, 76;"MTCR Partners Meet in Washington,"Disarmament Bulletin, No 18. Winter 1991/92,p. 13; U.S. Department of State, The WashingtonMTCR Plenary: Press Line, 11/8/91; JonWolfsthal, "Israel Accepts MTCR Guidelines,"Arms Control Today, 11/91, p. 20, (DOC 1113)."Prevent a Ballistic Missile Fire Sale," DefenseNews, 2/17/92, pp. 31-32, (DOC 1624); U.S.Department of State, MTCR MembershipChronology, undated.87 Beijing Review, 11/25/91-12/1/91, p. 7.88 "China Poised to Sign Treaty," Jane 's DefenceWeekly, 1/11/92, p. 44, (DOC 910); Thomas L.Friedman, "Baker's China Trip Fails to ProducePledge on Rights," New York Times, 11/18/91,p. A1, A5, (DOC 1060); Milavnews, 12/91, p.2. (DOC 1162); Don Oberdorfer, "Bush to MeetChinese Premier at U.N., Washington Post, 1/17/92, p. A24, (DOC 1699); Jon Wolfsthal,"Suspected Chinese Missile Sale OvershadowsU.S. Trade Visit," Arms Control Today, 12/92,p. 22.89 "China May be Able to Get U.S. MissileTechnology," Wall Street Journal, 12/23/91, p.A6, (DOC 1005).90 Arms Sales Monitor, No. 11-12, 1-2/92, p. 3,(DOC 1626); On Levi, Proliferation Issues, 1/31/92, p. 23; Original Source: Davar, 12/25/91,p. 1, (DOC 1759); Gerald M. Steinberg,International Missile Trade (forthcoming); Stateof Israel, Spokesman of the Ministry of Defense,Press Release, A/3888, 12/24/91, (DOC 1319).91 Arms Sales Monitor, No. 11-12, 1-2/92, p. 4,(DOC 1521).92 "Argentina's Perspectives on MissileProliferation: An Interview with Felix Menicocci,"Missile Monitor, Spring 1992, pp. 10-11.93 Andrew Lawler, "Congress Cautious on LiftingSatellite Ban Against China," Space News, 2/16/92, pp. 1, 29, (DOC 1109); Elaine Sciolino,"U.S. Lifts Its Sanctions on China Over High-Technology Transfers," New York Times, 2/22/92, pp. 1, 5, (DOC 1692); U.S. Department ofState, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Statement of Margaret Tutwiler/Spokesman, 2/21/92, (DOC 1438).94 Proliferation Issues, 2/21/92, p. 6; OriginalSource: Telam, 2/7/92, (DOC 1368).95 Government of South Africa, Embassy of South


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Africa, Press Release, 5/26/92, (DOC 1351).96 Government of Switzerland, "Exportkontrollengegen Weiterverbreitung von ABC-Massenvernichtungswaffen," Press Release, Bern,2/17/92; Government of Switzerland,"Verordnung über die Aus- und Durchfuhr vonWaren und Technologien im Bereich der ABC-Waffen und Raketen," Amtliche Sammlung desBundesrechts, 2/18/92, No. 6, 2/12/92.97 U.S. Department of State, 2/21/92, "China --Lifting of Missile Sanctions, Press Release, 2/21/92.98 Arms Sales Monitor, No. 11-12, 1-2/92, P. 5,(DOC 2199).99 Brazilian government official, interview byauthor, 3/93.100 Federal Register, 4/7/92, p. 11767-11768,(DOC 1514).101 Statement of Richard A. Clarke Before theJoint Economic Committee, Subcommittee onTechnology and National Security, 3/13/92, (DOC2062).102 Government of Finland, Press Release, 1/26/93.103 "MTCR Expands Role and Membership,"Disarmament Newsletter, February-March 1993.104 Reginald Bartholomew, p. 40; "MTCR,"Pacific Research, 5/92, p. 28, (DOC 2293).105 Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 116, 6/16/92,p. 26773, (DOC 2004).106 Paul Lewis, Defense News, 4/6/92, pp. 3, 44,(DOC 1850).107 FBIS-LAT-92-1078, 6/3/92, pp. 22-23;Original Source: Clarin, 6/2/92, p. 4, (DOC2291); Proliferation Issues, 5/14/92, pp. 10-11;Original Source: Noticias Argentinas, 4/27/92,(DOC 2125).108 Government of Argentina, Argentina's NonProliferation Policy, Report delivered by theBureau of International Security, Nuclear, andSpace Affairs, 1992; Arms Control Reporter, 3/93, p. 706.B.111.109 Executive New Service, 5/13/92; OriginalSource: Reuter, (DOC 2285).110 Proliferation Issues, 6/3/92, p. 15; OriginalSource: Interfax, 5/21/92, (DOC 2065); MikailMayorov and Igor Proshnev, Proliferation Issues,5/20/92, pp. 11-12; Original Source: Interfax, 5/8/92, (DOC 2172); Proliferation Issues, 5/20/92,pp. 10-11; Original Source: Rossiyskiye Vesti,(Moscow), 5/8/92, p. 3, (DOC 2223); VladimirSkosyrev, Proliferation Issues, 5/14/92, pp. 33-34; Original Source: Izvestiya, 5/6/92, pp. 1, 6,(DOC 1738); "We Will Develop Technology:ISRO Chief," HINDU, 5/23/92, p. 5, (DOC1962).111 U.S. governmental official, interview by author,7/93.112 Preliminary Report: Carnegie EndowmentDelegation Visit to Pyongyang, DPRK, 4/28/92-

5/4/92, (DOC 1920).113 "Hungarian Control System Modeled onWestern Structure," Export Control News, 7/30/92, pp. 8, 10, (DOC 2585).114 Disarmament Newsletter, 8-9/92, p. 5, (DOC2292).115 Proliferation Issues, 5/20/92, pp. 10-11;Original Source: Rossiyskiye Vesti, (Moscow),5/8/92, p. 3, (DOC 223); Oleg Shchedrov,"Russian Parliament Chief Seeks Rocket DealCompromise," Executive News Service, 5/27/92;Original Source: Reuter, 5/27/92.116 U.S. Department of State, Office of theAssistant Secretary, Statement by RichardBoucher/Deputy Spokesman, 5/11/92, (DOC1352).117 MTCR Secretariat, 8/93.118 "Rocket Deal 'Does Not Violate MTCR',"Hindu, 5/23/92, p. 9, (DOC 2078).119 Carol Giacomo, "US Says Arms Talks MayMake Only Modest Gains," Executive NewsService, 6/1/92; Original Source: Reuter, 5/29/92, (DOC 2075); Lee Feinstein "Third Round ofArms Sales Talks Fails to Resolve NotificationIssue," Arms Control Today, 6/92, p. 21.120 Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 116, 6/16/92,p. 26773, (DOC 2004).121 MTCR Secretariat, 8/93.122 Irish government official, letter to author, 2/26/93.123 Government of Norway, Norwegian Ministryof Foreign Affairs Press Release, 6/2/92;"MTCR," Pacific Research, 5/92, p. 28, (DOC2293); Irish government official (note 122);"MTCR Expands Role and Membership,"Disarmament Newsletter, February/March 1993,p. 13; "MTCR Adjusts Scope of RegimeControls," Export Control News, 7/30/92, pp. 5-6, (DOC 2284); "MTCR Plenary Meeting 6/29/92-7/2/92," PPNN Newsbrief, Autumn 1992, p.15, (DOC 2283).124 Federal Register, 7/7/92, pp. 29924-29925.125 Government of Japan, Press Release, 11/29/92.126 Proliferation Issues, 7/22/92, p. 19; OriginalSource: All India Radio Network (Delhi), 7/17/92, (DOC 2522); Proliferation Issues, 9/1/92, p.17; Original Source: The Statesman (Calcutta),7/18/92, p. 1, (DOC 2559); N. Gopaf Raj, "IndiaTrying to Enter European Space Market," Hindu,7/25/92, p. 9, (DOC 2523).127 Government of Argentina, Bureau ofInternational Security, Argentina's Non-Proliferation Policy, 1992.128 Proliferation Issues, 7/31/92, p. 13; OriginalSource: Ha'Aretz (Tel Aviv), 7/26/92, p. A1, A8,(DOC 2528).129 U.S. Office of Press Secretary, White HouseNon-Proliferation Initiative Fact Sheet, 7/15/92,(DOC 2719).

130 Export Control News, 7/30/92, pp. 5-6, (DOC2284).131 Proliferation Issues, 9/1/92, p. 15; OriginalSource: The Sunday Times of India, (Bombay),7/26/92, p. 11, (DOC 2658).132 Disarmament Newsletter, 8-9/92, p. 5, (DOC2292).133 Congressional Record, 8/12/92, S12652-S12655.134 John McCain, U.S. Senator and Howard L.Berman, U.S. Representative, letter to JamesLeMunyon, Acting Assistant Secretary of Statefor Export Administration, 8/27/92.135 FBIS-CHI-92-178, 9/14/92, p. 11; OriginalSource: Xinhua (Beijing), 9/12/92.136 Paul Lewis, "S. African Industry Targets Asia,"Defense News, 9/28/92, pp. 1, 34, (DOC 2338).137 Paul Lewis, "Chinese Ire at U.S. Could PromptMore Arms Sales to Iran," Defense News, 9/14-20/92, p. 19.138 K.K. Katyal, Proliferation Issues, 11/13/92,pp. 12-13; Original Source: The Hindu (Madras),10/12/92, p. 8, (DOC 2834).139 Congressional Record, 10/1/92, pp. S15955-15957, (DOC 2695).140 Proliferation Issues, 10/9/92, p. 1; OriginalSource: South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),2/10/92, p. 13, (2849).141 John Thurlow, "European Export Controls Post1992," Export Control News, 10/31/92, pp. 5-7.142 Barbara Starr, "MiG Buy May Lead to ChineseCopies," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10/10/92, p. 18.143 Proliferation Issues, 1/15/93, p. 2; OriginalSource: Armed Forces (Johannesburg), 11/25/92, p. 25.144 Technological and Aerospace Committee,Western European Union, Anti-Ballistic MissileDefence, No. 1339, 11/6/92, pp. 2, 15.145 Italian government official, letter to author, 6/2/93.146 Government of Hungary, Government DecreeNo. 61/1990, 12/18/92; Government Decree No.166/1992, 12/18/92.147 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Lockheed, Khrunichevto Market Proton Launcher," Aviation Week &Space Technology, 1/4/93, pp. 24-25, (3480).148 Jon Wolfsthal, "Suspected Chinese Missile SaleOvershadows U.S. Trade Visit," Arms ControlToday, 12/92, p. 22.149 SIA Newsnotes, 12/92, Vol. 6, Issue 4, p. 3.150 Export Control News, 1/28/93, pp. 2-3.Executive News Service, 1/8/93; Original Source:United Press International, 1/7/93; ExecutiveNews Service, 1/8/93; Original Source: Reuter,1/7/93.151 FBIS-S0V-93-040, 3/3/93, pp. 1-21; OriginalSource: Rasporyazheniye Prezidenta RossiyskoyFederatsii (Moscow), 1/21/93, pp. 1-59; FBIS-SOV-93-015, 1/26/93, p. 31; Original Source:


Deborah A. Ozga

Rossiyskiye Vesti, 1/22/93, p. 1; ProliferationIssues, 1/27/93 , p. 18; Original Source: Interfax,1/14/93.152 FBIS-SOV-93-012, 1/21/93, pp. 3-4; OriginalSource: Interfax, 1/15/93; FBIS-SOV-93-041, 3/4/93, pp. 10-11; Original Source: RossiyskiyeVesti, 3/3/93, p. 2.153 Government of Iceland, Ministry for ForeignAffairs, Press Release, 3/11/93.154 James Woolsey testimony, U.S. Congress, ToExamine Nuclear, Biological and ChemicalWeapons Proliferation Threats of the 1990s,Hearing before Senate Governmental AffairsCommittee, 2/24/93.155 "Missile Technology: Looking beyond supply-Side Control," The Disarmament Bulletin,Summer 93, p. 5; Government of Australia, PressRelease, 3/11/93; Government of Australia,Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade,Controlling Missile Proliferation, News Release,No. M50, 3/9/93; "Canberra MTCR Meeting,"Pacific Research, 5/93, p. 20; U.S. Departmentof State, MTCR Membership Chronology,undated.156 Arms Control Reporter, 3/93, p. 706.B.111;Original Source: Reuter, 3/17/93.157 George Leopold and Barbara Opall, "MissileControls Cloud U.S. Ties With Israel," DefenseNews, 4/12-18/93, pp. 1, 28, (3128).158 Ibid.159 Brazilian government official, interview byauthor, 3/93.160 U.S. Government, Joint Statement of thePresidents of the United States and the RussianFederation: Vancouver Declaration, PressRelease, 4/4/93.161 Francois Barry Delongchamps, Chief, Officeof Strategic Affairs and Disarmament, Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Government of France,presentation to a conference in Kyoto, 4/13-16/93.162 Lally Weymouth, "Thinking Out a ChinaPolicy," Washington Post, 4/12/93, p. A19.163 Boris, Tarasyuk, Deputy Minister for ForeignAffairs of Ukraine, presentation at a conference"Ukraine in the International Arena," 5/1/93,Stanford University, Stanford, California.164 Technological and Aerospace Committee,Assembly of Western European Union, Anti-Missile Defence for Europe - Guidelines Drawnfrom the Symposium, No. 1363, 5/17/93, p. 14.165 Daniel William and R. Jeffrey Smith,"President to Extend China's Favored TradeStatus," Washington Post, 5/28/93, pp. A1, A34.166 "'Experts' Confer on Missile Confer on MissileControls," Export Control News, 6/24/93, Vol.7, No. 5, p. 13.

167 Andrew Lawler, "U.S. May Slap NewSanctions on Russia," Space News, 7/12-18/93,pp. 1, 20; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. to PutSanctions on Russians for Missile Sales,"International Herald Tribune, 6/26/93;"Washington Imposes Sanctions Against Russianexporters of Missile Technologies," Commersant,7/7/93, p. 5.168 The Permanent Mission of South Africa to theUnited Nations, Space Industry in South Africa,Press Release, No. 22/93, New York, 6/30/93.169 United Nations, General Assembly,International Cooperation in Space Activities forEnhancing Security in the Post-Cold-War Era:Report of the Secretary-General, 7/1/93, A/48/221, p. 6.170 Arms Control Reporter, 9/93; U.S. Departmentof State, MTCR Membership Chronology,undated; U.S. Government, Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR) Equipment andTechnology Annex, 7/1/93.171 Andrew Lawler, "U.S., Russia Ink Trio ofCooperation Pacts, Space News, 7/26-8/1, p. 6;Carla Anne Robbins and Barbara Rosewicz,"Russia Joins Pact Limiting Spread of BallisticMissiles," Wall Street Journal, 7/19/93, p. A11;R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "U.S.,Russia Settle Dispute on Selling Rocket Engines,Technology to India," Washington Post, 7/17/93,p. A12.172 "O Ratifikatzii Mezhdynarodnikh Dogovorovu Coglashenii, Kasayuschikhsya RezhimaKontrolya za Raketnimi Tekhnologuyami 1262",Vedemostyi Verkhovnoge Soveta, 8/12/93, No.32, p. 2171.173 Daniel Sneider, "Russian Move to Join MTCRStirs Protest," Defense News, 7/26-8/1/93, p. 6;Daniel Sneider, "Yeltsin Decision to Join MTCRDraws Criticism in Moscow," Space News, 7/26-8/1/93, p. 3.174 John M. Goshko and William Branigin, "U.S.Warns China of Sanctions for Missile Exports toPakistan," Washington Post, 7/26/93, p. A10;Warren Stroebel, "U.S. Warns of Sanctions forChina's Missile Sales," Washington Times, 7/26/93, p. A1.175 Export Control News, 8/26/93, pp. 14-15.176 Ben Iannotta, "Administration to Relax RocketExport Rules," Space News, 8/16-22/93, pp. 1,20.177 Stephen Foye, RFE/RL News Briefs, 8/16-20/93, p. 4.178 Vivek Raghuvahshi, "Indian Officials DebateIndigenous Cryogenic Effort," Space News, 8/2-8/93, p. 17; "Rao Says Technology Deal is NotYet Dead," Space News, 8/23-29/93, p. 2.179 "U.S. Economic Sanctions Against China,

Pak.," The Hindu, 9/4/93, p. 9; U.S. Departmentof State, China/Pakistan: M-11 Missile Sanctions,8/25, 1993.180 "China Hits Back Over US Sanctions," FlightInternational, 9/1-7/93, p. 6.181 "Russian SS-25s head for MTCR Row," FlightInternational, 9/15-21/93, p. 4.182 The Arms Control Reporter, 10/93, p.706.B.148; U.S. government official, interviewby author, 10/93.183 Andrew Lawler, "Directive Calls for TightControl of Missile exports," Space News, 9/13-19/93, p. 3; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Ready toPropose New Limits on Materials for NuclearWeapons, 9/23/93, p. A4; "USA to Pitch PRD-8against the Threat of Proliferation," Jane's DefenceWeekly, 9/4/93, p. 24.184 U.S. Government, The White House, Officeof the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, 9/27/93.185 U.S. Government, Press Release: MissileTechnology Control Regime Meets in Switzerland,12/3/93.