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Army Field Support BrigadesLessons Learned in a Multifunctional Medical BattalionSustaining a BCT in Southern Iraq
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2010
The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command
Supports Disaster Relief
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700-10-6Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy
WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG
InternationalRecruitingSummit —DonaldD.Copley,Jr.,andJuliaC.Bobick
Commentary:TheLogisticsBranch:Multifunctional andFunctional—LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson
DeployinganExpeditionarySustainmentCommand toSupportDisasterRelief—MajorPaulR.Hayes
ASeriesofFirsts:The3dESCinOperationUnifiedResponse —MajorPaulR.Hayes
45thSustainmentBrigade:SupplyDistributioninAfghanistan —MajorKerryDennard,MajorChristineA.Haffey, andMajorRayFerguson
45thSustainmentBrigade:Echelons-Above-Brigade ConvoyManagementinAfghanistan —MajorMichaelJ.HarrisandCaptainEricP.Roby,USMC
45thSustainmentBrigade:AerialDeliveryinAfghanistan —ChiefWarrantOfficer2MichelleG.Charge
ConvoySupportTeams —LieutenantColonelStevenL.Updike,USAR
AFSBsandRDECOM:StrengtheningtheMaterielEnterprise —MajorO’NealA.Williams,Jr.
NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCananAFSBDoforMe? —MajorCamillaA.Wood
TheCapabilitiesoftheArmyFieldSupportBrigade’s Acquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirectorate —LieutenantColonelStevenG.VanRiper
SustainingaBCTinSouthernIraq —LieutenantColonelMichaelB.Siegl
ANeglectedPrincipleofWarinLogisticsAdvising —MajorJamesJ.Zacchino,Jr.
ContractOversightontheBattlefield —LieutenantColonelPeterW.Butts
TheBatteryManagerMaintenanceProgram —LieutenantColonelAnthonyW.Adams,KYARNG
SupportOperations:LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctional MedicalBattalion—LieutenantColonelDouglasH.Galuszka andSergeantMajorDavidFranco
PB700–10–06VOLUME42ISSUE6NOVEMBER–DECEMBER2010www.alu.army.mil/alog
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Cover:TheU.S.responsetoJanuary’sdevastatingearthquakeinHaitirequiredthe3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)todeployintoanexpeditionaryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.Toexecutethisno-noticemission,thecommand’sSoldiershadtoadapttoconditionsforwhichtheirpreviousdeploymentstoOperationIraqiFreedomofferedfewprecedents.Thearticlesbeginningonpages4 and9describehowthecommanddeployedandoperatedinHaitiandthenumerous“firsts”ithadtoaccomplishinordertosucceed.Inthecoverphoto,3dESCequipmentboundforHaitiisloadedontoaC−17GlobemastertransportatLouisvilleInternationalAirportinKentuckyon27January.(Photo by Kentucky Air National Guard)
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ContainersforHaiti:ProvidingTransportation andTemporaryInfrastructure—ThomasCatchings
UsingLessonsLearnedforContractinginHaiti —LarryD.McCaskill
ContractingSupportBrigadeRespondstoHaitiMission —LieutenantColonelAmericusM.GillIII
MedicalEquipmentConcentrationSites:AManagementSolution forArmyReserveMedicalEquipmentRepairandTrainingNeeds —LieutenantColonelPaulWakefield,USAR(Ret.)
ImprovementStrategiesforLogisticsAutomationSupport —CaptainAndrewM.Sawyer,ChiefWarrantOfficer2Rosung D.Petty,andStaffSergeantJonathanC.Shaw
FixingtheCurrentReserveComponentsPayProcess —MajorNolandI.Flores,CAARNG
ArmySeeksClaimantsUnderRetroactiveStop-Loss SpecialPayProgram—RobertPidgeon
WhereAreWeGoing?TheFutureofJointLogistics —MajorRobertP.Mann
BulkPetroleumManningRequirementsinanESC —CaptainShariS.Bowen
ExpeditingClassIXDeliveriesinIraq —FirstLieutenantAlexysM.Myers
ADayintheLifeofaDALogisticsIntern —AlisonSilverioandSusannahTobey
1stInfantryDivisionRecognizesBenefits ofLogisticsReportingTool—SergeantBenjaminKibbey,USAR
WritingforArmy Sustainment
JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
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BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman
Major General James L. HodgeCommander
ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand
MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson
DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy
Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy
totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology
Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral
ArmyMaterielCommand
Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget
AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller
Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral
Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross
TheQuartermasterGeneral
Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance
Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation
Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander
ArmySoldierSupportInstitute
Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral
ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand
Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral
ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand
ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY
Colonel Mark McCormickPresident
STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor
Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor
Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant
GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.
ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.
ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:
GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy
ChiefofStaff
Official:
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bimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.
Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.
Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede
officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.
Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.
Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.
Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.
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2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Brigadier General Philipe Ponties, Assistant Manager for Recruitment
and Vocational Training for the French Army Human
Resource Management Command tries out a video
game at the Elizabethton, Kentucky, recruiting center.
(Photo by Julia Bobick, RecruiterJournal)
InternationalRecruitingSummitby DonalD D. Copley, Jr., anD Julia C. bobiCk
uringthethirdweekofMarch2010,theArmy RecruitingandRetentionSchoolandrecruiting representativesfromninenationsgatheredattheU.S.ArmyRecruitingCommand(USAREC)head-quartersatFortKnox,Kentucky,toengageforthefirsttimeinopendialogaboutrecruitingprocessesandtechnologies.
“Thecommandhasalwaysreceivedforeignvisitorsinterestedinlearningabouthowwerecruit,”saidRickAyer,directoroftheUSARECcommander’sinitia-tivesgroupandcoordinatorforthecommand’sfirstInternationalRecruitingSummit.AyeraddedthattheRecruitingandRetentionSchoolatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,hasrunaprogramforyearsthatsendsrecruit-ingofficersandnoncommissionedofficerstoothercountriestoteachrecruitingpracticesandtohelpestab-lishvolunteerforces.Yet,theArmyhadneverconductedaformalrecruitingandretentionworkshoporconfer-encewithothernations.
DuringavisittotheRecruitingandRetentionSchool,MajorGeneralDonaldM.Campbell,Jr.,theUSARECcommandinggeneral,discussedthelargenumberofinternationalvisitorstoboththerecruitingcommandandtheschoolhousewithBrigadierGeneralMarkA.McAlister,theArmySoldierSupportInstitutecommander.Together,theydevelopedtheideaofiniti-atingaforuminwhichtheArmyanditsinternationalpartnerscouldcollaborateandexchangeideas.
USARECinvited15countriestoparticipate—somethatalreadyhadbeenworkingwiththecommandortheRecruitingandRetentionSchoolandsomethathadapproachedtheDepartmentoftheArmyandtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandtolearnmoreaboutrecruiting.Someoftheinvitednationshadbeenrecruitingforall-volunteerforcesforsometime,whileothershadnotyetestablishedall-volunteerforces.Ninenationssentrepresentatives:Afghanistan,Estonia,France,Germany,Greece,theNetherlands,Romania,Taiwan,andtheUnitedKingdom.
LieutenantGeneralBenjaminC.Freakley,command-inggeneraloftheArmyAccessionsCommand,toldsum-mitattendeesthattheU.S.all-volunteerforcehasbeenaroundforover40years.“We’velearnedalotalongthepathwaytosustaininganall-volunteerforce....Itiscrit-icallyimportanttousthatwesharelessonslearnedwithourpartnersandallies[and]wewanttolearnfromyou.”Freakleyreinforcedtheideaoftheopenforumduringhisremarkstothegroupviavideoteleconference.
The3-dayeventcenteredonfiveprimaryareas:therecruitingprocessandoperations;marketintelligence;marketing,publicaffairs,andoutreach;manningtheforce;andtrainingtherecruitingforce.Inthemornings,thegroupdiscussedchallengescommontomanyofthecountries.However,theyonlyhadtimetodelvebriefly
intopotentialsolutionstoindividualissuesbecauseofthetightlypackedschedule.
Intheafternoons,therep-resentativestouredtheArmyAccessionsSupportBrigadeonpost,theElizabethtownRecruitingStation,theLouisvilleMilitaryEntranceProcessingStation,andthecommand’srecruitingopera-tionsandcyberrecruitingcenters.
“We’reallinthesamebusiness,we’reopentogoodideasandwillingtoshareideasthatwork,”saidBrigadierJ.T.Jackson,UnitedKingdomDirectorofRecruitingandTraining(Operations).Jackson,whohadpreviouslyvisitedthecommandaspartofarecruitingpartnershipexchange,saidthatafterseeingUSAREC’sPartnershipforYouthSuccessprogram,theUnitedKingdomhadbegunworkingonchangingthewayitmarketsitsarmy.Inthepast,itsarmyhadbeenpro-motedasacareer.Henoted,however,thatindoingsoitwasmissingoutondevelopinglinkswithbusinessandindustrytosellarmyserviceasashort-termjobwithfuturepotential,astheU.S.ArmyisdoingwiththePartnershipforYouthSuccess.
Campbellcalledtheevent“beyondhiswildestdreamssuccessful.”Headdedthathehopedthiscollab-orationwouldfosterrelationshipsnotpreviouslyreal-izedandservebothUSARECanditsrecruitingpartnerswellinestablishingandmodernizingrecruitingbusinesspractices.“Justaswedoamongfriendsinourpersonallives,weareactingassoundingboardsforeachothertoensurewedotherightthingefficientlyandaccuratelyintherecruitingprocesses,”hesaid.
Campbellstatedthathewouldlikethesummittobecomeanannualeventandwelcomedtheopportunitytohostitagainnextyear.
DonalD D. Copley, Jr., is the DireCtor of training anD personnel Development at the reCruiting anD retention sChool at fort JaCk-son, south Carolina.
Julia C. BoBiCk is a writer-eDitor for RecRuiteR JouRnal at fort knox, kentuCky.
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readwithinterestthearticleontheLogisticsOfficer CorpsintheSeptember−October2010issueof Army Sustainmentmagazine.Itcontainedgoodthoughts(although,asapointofclarity,theLogisticsCorpsdidnotbecomea“branch”on1January2008;rather,theLogistics(LG)Branchwascreatedonthatdateandbecamethefourthbranch,alongwithQuar-termaster[QM],Ordnance[OD],andTransportation[TC],oftheLogisticsCorps).Ithinkthisarticlewasverytimely.
However,I’vesatthroughsomebriefingsrecentlyandlistenedtosomeexchangesonthistopic,andIamalittleconcernedthat,asaninstitution,wehavenotyetgraspedwhatweputintoplaceon1January2008.IhearlogisticsofficerscontinuingtobeunsureastowhethertheyareOD(orQMorTC)—orLG.Ofmoreconcernisthenotionthatanylogisticsofficercandoanyjob,sowhypayattentiontoanofficer’sfunctionalareaofexpertise?
So,letmetakethecentralthemeofthearticleandhighlightsomeofthekeypointsforall.
Logisticsofficers(nomatterwhatregimenttheywereaccessedthrough)areLGupongraduatingfromtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse(CLC3)—Period.Ourintentisfortheofficertothinkofhimselffirstandforemostasamultifunctionallogistician.(Anexceptionistheexplosiveordnancedisposal[EOD]officer,who,becauseoftheuniquerequirementsofthatcriticalfunction,werotatebetweenEODandammunitionassignments.)
However—andthisisveryimportant—every LG officer is required to have a functional area of exper-tise.Youcangenerallytellwhatthatareaofexpertiseisbytheregimentalinsigniathattheofficerwearsandtheregiment(TC,OD,orQM)withwhichheorsheassociates.Wewantthis!Itiscrucialtothehealthof
ourLogisticsOfficerCorps!ItisnotabadthingforLGofficerstoassociatethemselveswiththeirregimentandbeproudoftheparticularfunctionalexpertisethatthey,asmembersofthatregiment,bringtothetable.
Whatthatmeans(orshouldmean)totheofficeristhatifheisamemberof(forexample)theOrdnanceRegiment,hebringsanexpertiseinthingsmainte-nanceandmunitionsthatnootherofficercanbringtothetable.Italsomeansthattheofficermustcontinueinself-studyandlookfordevelopmentalopportuni-tiestosharpenthatexpertisethroughouthiscareer.AssignmentandprofessionaldevelopmentmanagersintheArmyHumanResourcesCommandcanhelpbyensuringthatofficersrotatebetweenmultifunctionaljobsandfunctionaljobsasmuchaspossiblethrough-outtheircareers.(Irealizethisishardertodothemoreseniortheofficeris,butpersonnelmanagersmustnonethelessfactorinhowlongtheofficerhasbeenawayfromafunctionalassignment,thesamewaytheyworktoensuremultifunctionalopportunities).
Ifyoulookathowwecodedthepositionsforlogis-ticsofficersontablesoforganizationandequipmentandtablesofdistributionandallowances(andwe’verescrubbedthisthreetimesinthepast4years,hon-ingittoaprettygoodreflectionoftheskillseachjobreallyrequires;thechartsintheSeptember−Octoberarticlemakethisclear),they are not all coded 90A!Wecouldhavedonethat,butwedeliberatelydidnotbecausewerecognizethefactthatjobsremainoutthere(thoughtheyareaminorityofthetotallogisticsjobs,especiallyatthemoreseniorgrades)thataremorefunctionalthanmultifunctionalandthusrequireaparticularskillandexperience.
Yes,itisabsolutelyrightthatanyLGofficershouldbeabletodoanyjobcoded90A.(AnexceptionagainistheEODofficer.)ButweshouldavoidtakingthepositionthatanyLGofficer,regardlessofregiment,candoanyandallfunctionallycodedjobs.
Ihopethismakessense.It’salllaidoutinDepart-mentoftheArmyPamphlet600−3,CommissionedOfficerProfessionalDevelopmentandCareerManage-ment.However,ifyouhavequestions,pleasebringthemuponthenet.Healthydebateanddialogandquestionsmakeusbetter.Disagreementisnotdisrespect!
ArmyLogisticians—AlwaysThere—AlwaysReady!
lieutenant general mitChell h. stevenson is the Deputy Chief of staff, g−4, Department of the army.
TheLogisticsBranch:MultifunctionalandFunctional
by lieutenant General MitChell h. StevenSon
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COMMENTARY
Any LG officer should be able to do any job coded 90A. But we should avoid taking the position that
any LG officer, regardless of regiment, can do any
and all functionally coded jobs.
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ithaunithistorystretchingbacktothe KoreanWar,the3dSustainmentCommand (Expeditionary)(ESC)hasoftendeployedtoprovidelogisticsexpertiseandsustainmenttothewarfighter.Since2003,the3dESChasdeployedthreetimestosupportOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)andmoveditsheadquartersfromGermanytoFortKnox,Kentucky.Butthroughoutitsrichhistory,the3dESChasneverbeencalledontodeployintoanexpedition-aryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.
Buton12January2010,adevastatingearthquakeintheCaribbeannationofHaitiledtoexactlythatscenario.TosupportOperationUnifiedResponse,theU.S.military’smissiontoassistthesufferingpeopleofHaiti,the3dESCdeployedintoanimma-turetheaterthatchallengedtheresourcefulnessofitsSoldiersandrequiredthemtoaccomplishanumberofunit“firsts.”Thisarticleandtheonethatfollows
tellthestoryofhowthe3dESCdeployedtoandoperatedinHaiti.
TimingoftheOperationWhenthe7.0-magnitudeearthquakestruckHaiti,
the3dESCwas25daysawayfromcompletingthe180-dayresetphaseoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycleafterreturningfroma15-monthdeploymenttoIraq.AlthoughtheunitinitiallyreceivednoorderstodeploytoHaiti,itwasarealpossibil-itythattheskillsandcapabilitiesoftheonlyactive-componentESCinthecontinentalUnitedStatesatthetimewouldbeneededforhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.
AsexpectedintheARFORGENresetphase,theunit’savailablestrengthwasinflux.TheESCcouldfillonlyabout50percentofrequiredjoint-manningdocumentpositionsneededtomantheJointLogisticsCommand(JLC).Mostoftheunit’sequipmentwasoutofreset,but
DeployinganExpeditionarySustainmentCommandtoSupportDisasterReliefby MaJor paul r. hayeS
W
The damage to Haiti’s Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince is just an example of the devastation caused by the earthquake of 12 January. (Photo by SFC Dave McClain)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 5
thecommandhadnotyetfilledshortagesintentageandotherassociatedfieldlife-supportequipment.WhentheearthquakehitHaition12January,the3dESCwasfeel-ingtheeffectsofmanning,equipment,andtraininglimi-tationsstemmingfromtheturbulenceofreset.
DevelopingtheTaskOrganizationOnly4daysaftertheearthquake,the3dESC
headquartersbeganitscontributiontothehumanitar-ianassistanceanddisasterreliefeffortinearnest.On16January,thefirstelementsofthecommandwerecommittedtotheHaitireliefeffort.The3dESC’scommandinggeneralandseveralplannersdepartedFortKnoxfortheU.S.SouthernCommand(SOUTH-COM)headquartersinMiami,Florida,tocontributetothesustainmentplanningeffortforaU.S.militaryresponsetotheHaitidisaster.
InwhatwasafirstfortheESCheadquarters,theirworkwasguidednotbyacontingencyplanorcombat
ordersbutbywhattheplannersanticipatedmightbeneededinHaititosupportitspeopleinatimeofcrisis.Relyingonthemodularstructureandstandardizationofsustainmentforcesacrossthemilitary,theplannerseffectivelyresearchedunitcapabilitiesandappliedthemtotheanticipatedrequirements.Thisultimatelysavedplanningtimeandensuredthattheproperunitswererequestedtodeployinsupportofthemission.
Thankstoexisting3dESCtrainingandreadi-nessauthorityrelationships,theunit’splannerswerefamiliarwiththereadinesslevelsandavailabilityofmanyofthesustainmentunitsthatwerelaterselect-edforcontingencydeploymenttoHaiti.Asrecep-tion,staging,andonwardmovementcommenced,theESCheadquartersalsoobservedtheeffectivenessofexistingcommandandcontrolrelationshipstomakedailysustainmentoperationsmoreefficient.Theseobservationssettheconditionsforeffectiveemploy-mentofArmywatercraftinsupportofjointlogistics
The massive earthquake in Haiti in January presented the Soldiers of the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command with an unprecedented challenge: deploying to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in an expeditionary environment.
6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
over-the-shoreoperationsandtheuseofmortuaryaffairsteamsinsupportofJointTaskForce-HaitiandDepartmentofStaterecoveryoperations.
PrioritizingLogisticsForceFlowOneofthechallengesfacedby3dESCplannersin
theearlystagesoftheoperationwassettingprioritiesfortheforceflowintoHaiti.Withlogisticsforcescom-petingforpriorityairflowintoHaiti,sustainmentandhumanitarianassistancerequirementsquicklyoutpacedlogisticscapabilityontheground.
Inadditiontodeployingitsownheadquarters,the3dESCfacedthedauntingtaskofprioritizingandadvocatingforthedeploymentofallsustainmentforc-esintotheaterthatwouldconstitutetheJLC.ThelastsustainmentforcesdidnotarriveinHaitiuntil7Febru-ary—25daysaftertheearthquake.
DeploymentfromFortKnoxWhileelementsofthe3dESCwereengagedin
planningatSOUTHCOM,theremainderofthehead-quartersreadieditselftodeploytoHaiti.Between13Januaryand3February,the3dESCheadquartersdeployedpersonnelandequipmentfromFortKnox.
Thedeploymentbeganon13January,whenone3dESCplannerdeployedtoFortBragg,NorthCarolina,tosupporttheXVIIIAirborneCorps’planningefforts.On16January,six3dESCpersonnel,includingthecommander,deployedtoHaitiviatheSOUTHCOMheadquartersinMiami,followedbythedeputycom-manderandoperationssergeantmajoron17January.On27January,the3dESCadvancepartyof31Sol-diersdeployedtoHaitionaC−17Globemastertrans-port,withthe60-SoldiermainbodydeployingaboardanotherC−17on3February.
Althoughthiswasnotthefirsttimetheheadquartershaddeployed,itwasthefirsttimetheheadquartershaddeployedinacontingencyandanexpeditionaryframe-work.Conditionedbydeployingintoamaturetheater
ofoperations(OIFin2003,2005,and2008)withlongleadtimes,theunithadneverbeforedeployedonshortnoticeorduringtheresetphaseofARFORGEN.
Butwhilethisfirstcontingencyandexpedition-arydeploymentfromFortKnoxhaditschallenges,itprovedthattheunit’sSoldierswereadaptiveandinno-vative.Despitealackofrapiddeploymentexperience,bothwithintheunitandwithintheFortKnoxinstal-lationstaff,theESCwasabletosuccessfullymeetthechallengesofreset,prepareSoldiersandequipmentformovement,anddeploybymilitaryairlifttoHaititoprovidesustainmentanddistributionexpertisetothereliefefforts.
AnExpeditionaryEnvironment:NotOIFAnotherfirstforthe3dESCwasdeployingintoa
theaterthatwasnotmature.Naturaldisastersoccurwithoutnoticeandposesignificantchallenges.Com-paredwithdeploymentstoIraqandAfghanistan,wheremanyfactorswere“knowns,”limitedinformationontheoverallsituationinHaitiwasavailableinitiallyandtheinfrastructuretosupporttheunitwasaustere.
AlthoughU.S.involvementinHaitiisnotuncom-monhistorically,the3dESCmaintainednoinforma-tiononthesecuritysituationandinfrastructureinHaiti.Fromthetimeoftheearthquakeuntilthefinalunitelementsdeployedon3February,thestaffcon-tinuallyconductedmissionanalysisandintelligencepreparationoftheoperationalenvironment.Thiseffortprovidedthecommanderwiththebestinforma-tionavailableonthesecuritysituationfollowingtheearthquake,infrastructurecapabilitieswithintheareaaffectedbytheearthquake,andtheunit’scapabilitiestoprovidesupporttothehumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.
Whenthe3dESCwasnotifiedfordeployment,itappointedliaisonofficerswiththeXVIIIAirborneCorpsandSOUTHCOMtoassisttheheadquarterswithrequestsforforcesandmatchinglogisticscapa-
bilitieswithemergingrequire-ments.ThecommandalsocoordinatedwithUnitedNationsforcesandnumerousinter-nationalaidorganizationstoaccomplishsupportanddistrib-uteaidoncedeployed.
Equipment is loaded on a 7th Sustainment Brigade landing craft utility at Fort Eustis, Virginia, on 16 January in preparation for deployment to Haiti. The 3d ESC had never been challenged before to deploy on short notice or during the reset phase of ARFORGEN. (Photo by SFC Kelly Jo Bridgwater)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 7
Toaccomplishthemission,the3dESCrequiredrobustnetworkconnectivity,whichwasnotorganictotheunit.Theunitexperiencedcommunicationschallengescreatedbyoperatingundernumerousele-ments,resultinginlimitedconnectivitytosupportallrequirements.Frommaintainingsituationalawareness,coordinatingrequirements,andobtainingworkspaceandnetworkaccesstoimprovinglivingconditions,theaustereenvironmentinPort-au-Prince,Haiti’scapitalcity,presentednumerouschallengestotheunit.
FirstTestofSoldierFieldCraftSkillsHaitiprovedtobeafirsttestoffieldcraftskillsfor
manySoldierswithinthe3dESC.Essentially,itwasbacktothebasicsinArmyfieldcraft.ManyoftheSol-dierswithinthecommandhaddeployedatleastoncetoOIForOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF).There,Soldiersupportfunctions,suchascontainerizedshowerunits,diningfacilities(manyservingfoodanddrinks18hoursaday),laundryservice,gyms,movietheaters,internetcafés,andlibraries,areroutinelyprovidedbyunitsorcontractors.Forthemostpart,dutyinIraqandAfghanistanisrelativelycomfortablebecausemanyper-sonnelandagenciesworkdiligentlytoprovidequalityservicesforSoldiersduringa12-monthdeployment.
ConditionsweredifferentinHaiti.Servicessuchaslaundryandbath,diningfacilities,internetcafés,andgymswerenotprovided.ForyoungSoldiersorthosewhohaddeployedonlytomaturetheaters,beinginformedthattheyhadtopackadditionalitems,likeasmallboxofsoappowder(notliquid),clothespins,andaclothesline,wasaneye-openingexperience.
ThecommandrealizedearlythatsomeSoldiers(evenyoungsergeants)hadnevererectedageneralpurpose
mediumtent,emplacedcon-certinawire,washedtheirownclothesby
hand,oreatenonlymealsready-to-eatfor30-plusdays.InadditiontoprovidingdirectsupporttothousandsofHaitiansdesperatelyinneedofassistance,Soldierswerealsotryingtosurvivetheelementsthemselves.
Theinstitutionalknowledgepossessedbyseniornoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)withDesertShieldandStormexperiencehelpedteachyoungSoldiershowtosurviveandstayhealthyinthehot,unforgivingclimate.Forthecommand’smostseniorNCOs—ser-geantsmajor,mastersergeants,andveryseasonedser-geantsfirstclass—itwastrulyanopportunitytoteach,coach,andmentorSoldiersonbasicfieldstandardsandcampplanningandestablishment.
Soldiersalsoreceivedtraininginbuildingfieldshowers,washingclothesinthefield,andmaintain-ingtheessentialsoffieldsanitation.Theknowledgegainedthroughthisdeploymentreinforcedtheimpor-tanceofbasicArmyfieldcrafttrainingandprovedthatthistrainingiscriticaltodevelopingadaptiveSoldiers.Inall,3dESCSoldiersprovedadaptiveandreadytotackletheaustereconditionsinHaiti.Asatestamenttotheirresilienceandspirit,17Soldiersreenlistedduringthefirst-ever3dESCmassreenlistmentceremonyinPort-au-Princeon27February.
FirstDeploymentWithoutTPEOperationUnifiedResponsewasthe3dESC’s
firstdeploymentinwhichitdidnotfallinontheater-providedequipment(TPE).Infact,allunitssupport-ingtheoperationdeployedwiththeirorganizationalpropertybookequipment.Forthe3dESC,someofitsequipmentwasstillintheArmy’sleft-behindequip-mentprogram.Withoutknowingthespecificrequire-mentsofthemission,unitleadersdetermined,based
In contrast to Iraq, only the most basic field services were available to troops in Haiti. The lack of support functions meant that Haiti provided a first test of field craft skills for many Soldiers in the 3d ESC. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes, 3d ESC PAO)
8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ontheirexperience,whatequipmentwouldmostlikelybeused.Complicatingeffortswasthefactthatthe3dESChadnotdeployeditsorganicequipmentsincetheearlyrotationsofOIF.
Theunithadtobuilditsloadplansandunitdeployedlistwithoutknowingtheoperationalenviron-mentinHaiti.WhileallunitsintheArmyarediffer-ent,the3dESChadbecomeaccustomedtodrawingTPEinmaturetheaterstoexecuteitsmissionwhiledeployed.ThemissioninHaitiprovedthat,regard-lessofwhetherornotdeployingunitsaregoingtobedrawingTPE,unitsstillneedtoplacetheirequipmentreadinesshighontheirlistofpriorities.
FirstTestoftheESC’sMTOEAnotherunexpectedfirstduringOperationUnified
Responsewasthetestingofthe3dESC’smodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE).CouldtheESCdeploytoanexpeditionaryenvironmentwithpersonnelandequipmentauthorizedonitscurrentMTOEandsuccessfullyexecuteitsmission?
Haitiwasanimmature,austeretheaterofopera-tions,whichmeantthatunitshadtodeploysolelywiththeirauthorized,availableMTOEequipment.Theimpactofthisequipmentsetonoperationswasimme-diatelyfeltontheESC’sarrivalinHaiti.
Forexample,ESCsarenotorganicallyequippedwithsignalsupportotherthanthepersonnelintheirG−6sec-tion.Doctrinally,theyshouldbesupportedbyanexpe-ditionarysignalbattalion.DuringOperationUnifiedResponse,theJLCinitiallyhadnothingtoprovidecom-municationsfortheusersinitsheadquartersexceptforservicesprovidedbytheMulti-MediaCommunicationsSystem(MMCS)broughttothetheaterbytheArmyMaterielCommandelementattachedtotheJLC.
TheMMCSprovidedalimitednumberofvoiceanddatalines.Thatwasenoughfortheearlyarriving
elementstobegincommunicatingwithjointtaskforceelements.Laterinthedeployment,theXVIIIAirborneCorpsJ−6workedwiththeJointCommunicationsSupportElement(JCSE)toprovideateamwithorgan-icsatelliteequipmenttoaugmenttheheadquarters.
ThepurposeoftheJCSEteamwasnottoprovideapermanentcommunicationssolutionfortheJLCbuttoprovideenoughNIPRNET(Non-secureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork),SIPRNET(SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork),VOIP(VoiceoverInter-netProtocol),andvideoteleconferencingcapabilityforthecommandtoreachinitialoperatingcapabil-ity.Oncethe24thAirExpeditionaryGrouparrivedinHaiti,itprovideda“lineofsightshot”acrosstheairfieldthatpermittedmoreuseraccesstovoiceanddataservices.
Thismissionwasalsothefirstinwhichthe3dESCwasforcedtouseitsorganicequipmentsinceithadrelocatedfromGermanytoKentucky.TheOEFandOIFmodelallowsunitstoconsiderTPEsetsaspartoftheirplanningassumptions.SinceHaitihadnoTPE,unitswererequiredtodeployastheywere.
Outsideofcommunication,thegreatestimpactwasfeltinlifesupport,includingtents,generators,andlightsets.Someofthisequipmenthadnotbeenusedforoverayearandpresentedasteeplearningcurveforthosesettingupandoperatingitforthefirsttime.Fortunately,theESCwasabletousesometemporarylife-supportequipmentsetsbelongingtotheFederalEmergencyManagementAgencythatwereavailableattheHaitiAirporttoaddressrequirementshortfalls.TheESCalsoreliedonexperiencedseniorNCOstoprovideonsitetrainingtoSoldierswhohadnotexperi-encedthisleveloffieldcraftbefore.
ConditionedbymultipledeploymentstoIraq,the3dESCwasforcedtoadaptandlearnhowtodeployintoanaustereenvironmentinsupportofhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.Althoughtheylackedexperienceinthisarea,theadaptiveSoldiersofthecommandwereabletodeployfromresetandtacklechallengingmissionsandconditionsinHaiti.Throughoutitspreparationsandactualdeployment,thecommandwasabletocontinuallysettheconditionsforsuccessfulsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.
Whilethecontingencydeploymenttoanexpedition-aryenvironmentresultedinanumberoffirstsforthecommand,anumberofotherfirstswouldenablejointforcestoprovidetheinitialrelieftotheHaitianpeople.Thearticlebeginningonpage9examinesthecontri-butionsofthe3dESCtoreliefoperations.
maJor paul r. hayes is the puBliC affairs offiCer of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) at fort knox, kentuCky. the CommanD woulD like to thank the many inDiviDuals who Con-triButeD to this artiCle.
Rains increased the importance of field sanitation skills. (Photo by SFC Dave McClain)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 9
eforedeployingtoHaitiinresponsetothe devastating12January2010earthquake,the3d SustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)hadneverdeployedintoanexpeditionaryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.AfteritsmainbodyarrivedinHaition4February2010,the3dESCquicklyrealizedthatthescopeandfocusofitslogisticsmissionwasverydiffer-entfromitspreviousdeploymentstoIraq.WithadaptiveSoldiersandadiversecollectionoflogisticsunits,thecommandaccomplishedaseriesofhistoricfirsts.
MortuaryAffairsTeamsOperationUnifiedResponseinHaitiwasthefirst
timeArmymortuaryaffairsassetsandtheDepart-mentofHealthandHumanServices(DHHS)Disas-terMortuaryOperationalResponseTeam(DMORT)operatedjointlytolocate,recover,identify,andreturntheremainsofU.S.citizenstothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)forfinaldisposition.OperatingfromthePort-au-Princeairport,theArmymortuaryaffairspersonnelandDMORTsuccessfullyreturnedtheremainsof34U.S.citizenskilledinHaiti.
EveryaspectoftheeffortwasanopportunitytolearnandimprovetheinteroperabilityofArmymortuaryaffairsandDHHSassets.ThemajorlearningeventsduringOperationUnifiedResponseinvolvedunderstanding
ASeriesofFirsts:The3dESCinOperationUnifiedResponse
by MaJor paul r. hayeS
B thecriticalroleofatheatermortuaryaffairsoffice,inte-gratingArmymortuaryaffairspolicyandprocedureswithDHHSpolicyandprocedures,andunderstandingthecapabilitiesandoperationaldifferencesbetweenDMORTandArmymortuaryaffairsassets.
Ineverymilitaryoperation,atheatermortuaryaffairsofficemustbeestablishedintheinitialplanningstages.Thisappliestobothconventionalandhumani-tarianassistanceoperations.Initially,norequirementexistedforatheatermortuaryaffairsofficeinHaiti.Asaresult,recoveryoperationsweretemporarilyhin-deredwhiledecisionsweremadeaboutthedispositionoflocal-nationalremainsandwhichagencywouldtaketheleadincoordinatingrecoveryoperations.After-actionreviewcommentsindicaterecoveryoperationsinHaitiwouldhavebeengreatlyimprovedifatheatermortuaryaffairsofficehadbeenimmediatelyestab-lishedtofunctionasthecentralagentforArmymortu-aryaffairswhileliaisingwiththeIncidentCommandSystem(ICS).
ICSoperationsdifferfromconventionalArmymortuaryaffairsoperationsinbothdoctrineandpro-cedures.Ingeneral,ICSoperationsrespondtocata-strophicemergencieswithintheUnitedStateswhileArmymortuaryaffairsoperationsareconductedout-sideCONUS.OperationsinHaititooktheICSmissionbeyondU.S.borders.
A landing craft utility from the 7th Sustainment Brigade makes its way into Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes)
10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Inviewofthisexpandedroleandinpreparationforthelikeli-hoodoffutureoperationsofasimilarnature,Armymortu-aryaffairsunitsshoulddevelopatrainingandoperationsrela-tionshipwithDHHS.Bothagenciesneedtobefamiliarwiththepoli-ciesandproce-duresthatare
specifictoeachorganizationandunderstandhowpolicydifferencescouldaffectcombinedefforts.Bothorganizationsneedtounderstandtheother’scapabili-tiesandshortcomingsinordertoprovidecomplemen-tarysupportinfutureoperations.
DMORTprovidedthemortuaryaffairsSoldierswithauniqueopportunityfortechnicalgrowthandhands-onexperienceintheremainsidentificationpro-cess.Armymortuaryaffairsproceduresallowforthepreservationandexpeditiousevacuationofforensicmediafromatheaterofoperationsforfurtherreview.InHaiti,DMORTteamsworkingwithArmymortuaryaffairsSoldiersconductedin-theaterforensicreviewsthatledtothepositiveidentificationofremains.The3dESCmortuaryaffairspersonnelhadneverbeforecompletedforensicreviewspriortorepatriation.
SupporttotheWorldFoodProgramOneofthemostimportantmissionsthatthe3dESC
performedinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponsewaslogisticssupporttotheWorldFoodProgram’sfooddistributionoperation.Duringthisoperation,Sol-diersfromthe119thInlandCargoTransferCompany(ICTC),servingunderthecommandandcontrolofthe530thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB),supervisedtheloading,movementtothehumanitariansupportarea(HSA),transloading,andstagingofrice.
Asthe530thCSSBdepletedexistingwarehousestocksofrice,the10thTransportationBattaliondeliv-eredtheadditionalvolumerequiredtoprovidericetotheHaitianpopulation.The97thTransportationCompanyoffloadedincomingvessels,andthe119thICTCtrans-
loadedthericeontotrucks.Soldiersfromthe10thTransportationCompanyaugmentedexistinglocalciviliantransportationandmovedricetotheHSA.
Nongovernmentalorganizations,withtheassistanceofU.S.andUnitedNationssecurity,tookthericefromtheHSAtodistributionpointsthroughoutPort-au-Prince.Over2.98millionpeoplereceivedaweek’sworthofrice(atotalof12,432metrictons),mitigat-ingthesufferingoftheHaitianpeopleandprovidingafoundationforstabilizationandrecovery.
ArmyWatercraftCommandandControlNeverbeforehadthe3dESCbeenresponsiblefor
Armywatercraftcommandandcontrolandmanage-ment.ThischangedwithOperationUnifiedResponse.The3dESCprovidedthecommandandcontrolofArmywatercraftperformingtheexpeditionaryjointlogisticsover-the-shoreandhumanitarianaidanddisasterreliefmissions.Watercraftledbythe10thTransportationBattalionunderthe7thSustainmentBrigadecompleted103missionsandloggedover32,000nauticalmilesinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.The97thTransportationCompanyprovidedsixlandingcraftutility,andthe335thTransportationCompanyprovidedalogisticssupportvessel.
AlongwiththeircounterpartsfromNavyBeachGroupTwo,theseSoldiersandwatercraftprovidedcriticallyneededship-to-shoredownloadandhelpedmitigatetheoperationalimpactofaportdevastatedbytheearthquake.The492dTransportationDetachment(HarbormasterOperations)coordinatedwaterborneoperations,andthe73dTransportationCompanypro-videdlarge-tugcapabilities.SomeofthemoreuniquewatercraftmissionsincludedcarryingtrucksloadedwithreliefsuppliesandferryingArmyveterinarianstodifferentcitiesaroundHaititovaccinateanimalsinsupportoftheHaitianMinistryofAgriculture.Travelingtolocationsbygroundwasoftenimpossiblebecauseearthquakedamagemaderoutesimpassable.
HealthServiceSupportMissionsAnotherfirstfortheESCwasmanaginghealth
servicesupportinahumanitarianassistanceopera-tion.Giventhenumberofcasualties,medicalcarewasoneofthefirstessentialservicesrequiredtoaidthecitizensofHaiti.ThemedicalpersonnelactivatedinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponseweredirectedtodeploywitha30-daysupplyofsurgicalandmedicalequipment,includingmedical-gradeoxygentanks.
KellyUSA,locatedinSanAntonio,Texas,wasdes-ignatedasthetheaterleadagentformedicalmateriel.Thiscompanyassumedresponsibilityforproviding
A member of the deployment/redeployment coordination cell briefs redeployment operations during a rehearsal of concept drill at Joint Logistics Command headquarters. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 11
directclassVIII(medicalmateriel)supporttoactivegroundforces.Afterreceivingtherequisition,KellyUSAcoordinatedshipmentthroughdirectliaisonwithU.S.ArmySouth(ARSOUTH)andtheDefenseLogis-ticsAgency(DLA).ARSOUTHandDLAcoordinatedthepackagingandtransportationofsuppliesfromCONUStoPort-au-Prince.
The583dMedicalLogisticsCompany,JointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF-Haiti),theJointLogisticsCommand(JLC),the56thMultifunctionalMedicalBattalion(MMB),theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelop-ment,andanumberofnongovernmentalagenciesworkedtogethertoprovidelogisticsadviceandsupporttotheHaitianPROMESS[ProgramonEssentialMedi-cinesandSupply]medicalwarehouse.Withthesupportandrelentlessdedicationofthosemilitaryorganizations,thePROMESSwarehousewasabletodevelopandimprovesystemsforday-to-dayoperations,resultinginmoreexpeditiousandefficientcustomerservice.
HealthServiceSupportCommandandControlAnotherfirstfortheESCasitformedtheJLCwas
assumingcommandandcontrolofthe56thMMBheadquartersandothermedicalunits,suchastheJointTaskForce-BravoMedicalDetachment.NeverbeforehadtheESCcommandedandcontrolledmedicalunitsaspartofitsmissionset.The56thMMBbroughtatotalofeightmedicaldetachmentswithnumerouskeyassetsintotheater.Oneoftheseelementswasamedi-callogisticssupportelement.
Theheadquartersforthiselementwasthe583dMedi-calLogisticsCompany(MLC),whichincludedateamof83medicalsupplysubject-matterexpertswhoarrived4weeksintotheoperation.The583dMLCwasdesignatedasthetheatersingleintegratedmedicallogisticsmanager.AllmedicalunitsoperatingintheaterorderedclassVIIIitemsthroughthe583dMLCusingtheDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupportCustomerAssistanceModule.The583dMLCassumedsoleresponsibilityforcommu-nicatingdirectlywithKellyUSA.
The583dMLCalsoprovidedmedicalmaintenance,oxygentankrefill,andclassVIIIdistributionoversightandmanagementfortheentirejointoperationalarea.Theinvolvementofthe583dMLCinthemedicalsupplychainmadeforasmoothertransitionfromtheautomatedsystemtothehandsofthecustomer.TheunitprovidedthesuppliesnecessaryforuninterruptedhealthcarewhileremainingagoodstewardofGovern-mentfunds.
ContractManagementCellAnothernondoctrinalmissiontheESCperformedin
Haitiinvolvedmanagingcontractsacrossthejointoper-ationalarea.On9February,theJLCassumedcontractmanagementoversightresponsibilityforallJTF-Haitiserviceandsupplycontracts.Forthefirsttimeinthe
unit’shistory,the3dESCestablishedacontractmanage-mentcell(CMC),whichservedasaconduitbetweenRegionalContractingCommand-HaitiandJTF-Haiti.
TheCMCwasresponsibleforreviewingrequire-mentpackets,preparingunitrequestsforjointacquisi-tionreviewboardapproval,andoverseeingcontractmanagementonceacontractwasestablished.TheCMCprocessedover89contractsandobligatedover$2.55million,withover$1.65milliongoingtohost-nationbusinesses.
Deployment/RedeploymentCoordinationCellOn17February,JTF-HaititaskedtheJLCtoestab-
lishadeployment/redeploymentcoordinationcell(DRCC)nolaterthan21February.TheDRCC’smis-sionwastocommandandcontrolredeploymentopera-tionsandsupport,manage,deconflict,andmonitorunitredeploymentactivities.TheDRCC’skeytasksweretosynchronizethemovementofredeployingper-sonnelandequipmentamongunitstagingareas,theseaportofembarkation,andtheaerialportofembar-kation;validateunitmovementdocumentation;andmonitorandcloseunitlinenumbers.
TheDRCCoperatedundertheguidanceoftheJLCsupportoperationsofficerandconsistedofseveralper-sonnelfromvarioussectionswithintheJLC.Thecellwasaugmentedwithredeployingunitliaisonofficers,personnelfromvariousJLCsubordinateunits,andamilitarypolicecompanytaskedtoprovidecustomssupport.
Onshortnoticeandwithlimitedpersonnelandresources,theDRCCestablishedcapabilitiescriticaltothesuccessfulredeploymentofunitssupportingOpera-tionUnifiedResponse.TheDRCCmissionwasafirstforthe3dESC,andwhentheunittransferredJLCrespon-sibilitytothe377thTheaterSustainmentCommand,theDRCChadprocessed,staged,andshippedover500piecesofequipmentandredeployedhundredsofperson-nelfromseveralbattalion-sizedorsmallerunits.
Althoughitwasnotdoctrinallyorganized,equipped,ormannedtoaccomplishmanyofitsmissionsinHaiti,the3dESCwasabletoestablishoperationsandsupportOperationUnifiedResponsewithindaysofreceivingdeploymentnotification.Despitelack-ingexperienceinhumanitarianassistanceanddisas-terreliefoperations,the3dESC—thankstoSoldierresiliencyandadaptiveleadership—arrivedinHaiti,assumedamissionforwhichithadnotpreviouslytrained,andprovidedmuch-neededsupporttojointforcesandtheHaitianpeople.
maJor paul r. hayes is the puBliC affairs offiCer of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) at fort knox, kentuCky. the CommanD woulD like to thank the many inDiviDuals who ContriButeD to this artiCle.
12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
fghanistanisnotIraq.Soldiersdeploying toAfghanistanshouldnottrytoimposewhat theylearnedandexperiencedinIraqinAfghan-istan.Thatisacommonmisconceptionamongmostnewofficersandnoncommissionedofficersarrivinginthetheater.MosthavenotdeployedtoAfghanistanbeforeanduseIraqasamodelforhowAfghanistanoperationsshouldrun.ButAfghanistanisverydiffer-entfromIraq.TheterrainandclimateinAfghanistanmakeitoneofthemostlogisticallychallengingenvi-ronmentsintheworld.AndeverythingmovesmuchslowerinAfghanistan,soeveryonedeployedtheremustbepatient.
TheaterOrganizationUntilrecently,Afghanistanwasdividedintofour
regionalcommands:East,North,South,andWest.[RegionalCommandSouth-WestwascarvedoutofRegionalCommandSouthinJune.]Currently,asignifi-cantnumberofservicemembersandcoalitionforcesoperateintheCombinedJointOperationsArea(CJOA).
TheCJOAhasonesustainmentbrigade,withthe45thSustainmentBrigadeassumingresponsibilityfromthe101stSustainmentBrigadeon7February2009andtransferringauthoritytothe82dSustain-mentBrigadeon31December2009.Thesustainmentbrigadeisanaggregateofdifferentunitsthatincludespecialtroops,finance,humanresources,rigger,andmortuaryaffairscollectionpointunits.
Threecombatsustainmentsupportbattalions(CSSBs)werespreadthroughoutAfghanistan,witheachprovidingareasupporttoitscustomers.Onaverage,eachCSSBhastwotruckcompaniesandaninlandcargotransfercompanytoprovidecargotransfercapabilitiesatthecentralreceivingandship-pingpoints;reception,staging,andonwardintegrationyards;andairfields.
Taskforcebasesupportbattalionsprovidedirectsup-porttotheunitswithintheirbrigadesandanyattachedcoalitionforces.The45thSustainmentBrigadesup-portedhundredsofforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)andcombatoutposts(COPs)throughoutthetheater.
TerrainandWeatherTheterrainofAfghanistanisachallengetomilitary
operations.Iraqis,forthemostpart,aflatcountrycomparedtoAfghanistan.InAfghanistan,Regional
CommandEastandportionsofRegionalCommandWestaremountainous,withelevationsreaching12,000feetabovesealevel.Kabul,thecapital,isat5,900feetandissetinabowlsurroundedbymuchhighermoun-tains.ManyoftheFOBsandCOPsinRegionalCom-mandEastareinaustereandmountainouslocationsandcannotberesuppliedbygroundformanymonthsoftheyearbecauseofbadweather.Groundmovementtotheselocationsistenuousandslowatbest.
Theweatherandterrainmustbeconsideredinallphasesofoperations,fromtacticalmovementstosimplelogisticsresupply.WinterinAfghanistanadverselyaffectslogisticsforatleast5months,fromthebegin-ningofNovemberintoMarch.ManyofthesmallerlocationsofU.S.forcesdependoncontainerizeddeliv-erysystem(CDS)andlow-costlow-altitude(LCLA)airdropsorslingloadsforresupply.Throughoutthesummer,atleast15COPsareresuppliedbyair,andthisnumbermorethandoublesduringthewinterastheheavysnowsclosethemountainpassesleadingtothem.
Inthespring,thesnowmeltsandrunoffcreatesthepotentialforflashfloodsinvalleysandlow-lyingareas.Floodsdepositwaterandmudonroadwaysandwashoutbridges,leavingCOPsisolatedfromgroundresupply.
Bycontrast,muchofRegionalCommandSouthandportionsofRegionalCommandWestareflatdes-ertandthegroundiscoveredwith“moondust.”Duststormsarecommon,andtheheatisintense.TheheatinHelmandprovinceinRegionalCommandSouthhov-ersaround90to120degreesformuchoftheyear.Thisheatadverselyaffectsalllogistics,fromtheairliftcapa-bilitiesofrotary-andfixed-wingairtransporttorefrig-eratedunitsandgenerators.Theshelflifeofwaterandfuelbagslyinguncoveredonthedesertfloorisdrasti-callyreducedinsummerheat.Personnelsufferthroughthetemperatureswhileridinginmine-resistantambush-protectedvehicles,workingintheirtacticaloperationscenters,andsleepingintentsorwoodenstructureswhileair-conditioningunitsstruggletokeepthemcool.
groundMovementandResupplyTheroadsysteminAfghanistanisalmostnonexis-
tentincomparisontoIraq.Mostroadsareunimprovedandpothole-marked.Manyoftheseroadsarenotwideenoughfortwovehiclestopassatatime,andvehiclesmusttravelextremelyslowlyastheywindthroughmountainousterrain.
45thSustainmentBrigade:SupplyDistributioninAfghanistan
Aby MaJor kerry DennarD, MaJor ChriStine a. haffey, anD MaJor ray ferGuSon
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 13
Thepriorityoftruckingis“AfghanFirst.”The45thSustainmentBrigadeusedhost-nationtrucksfor90percentofitssupplymovements.Thebri-gade’smovementcontrolbattalionoversawanindef-initedelivery/indefinitequantity(IDIQ)contractthatprovidesformovementofdrycargoandfuelacrosstheCJOA.Thecontractcurrentlyemployseighthost-nationtruckingcompaniesandwillberevisedtoincludemorecompanies,whichwillincreaseresponsivenessandcompetitioninsupport-ingU.S.forces.
UndertheIDIQcontract,AfghantruckersdeliversuppliesatamuchslowerpacethanU.S.SoldiersexperiencedinIraq.ThemajorityoftheIDIQtrucksdonothavein-transitvisibility,anddeterminingthelocationsofthesetrucksisdifficultatbest.
Thelocal-nationaltruckdriversalsodonotworkduringmanyMuslimholidays.RamadanandEidal-Adhaareprimeexamplesofholidaysthataffecttransittimesforhost-nationtrucks.Mosttruckdriv-ersdidnotdriveforanaverageof6daysduringEidal-Adhain2009.Plannersandsupportoperationsofficersmustconsiderthesemovementstoppagesduringtheirlogisticsplanning.Theyshouldplanaccordinglyandordertrucksandsuppliesweeksinadvancetoensurethattheyarriveattheirfinaldes-tinationsbeforeholidayperiods.
Afghanistanisalandlockedcountry,andsup-pliesandequipmentarriveintheCJOAfromtwoseparategrounddirections.ThemajorityofsuppliesandequipmentarriveatthePortofKarachi,Paki-stan,andarethenshippedupthePakistangroundlineofcommunication(GLOC)throughtwobordercrossingsintoAfghanistan.U.S.personnelarenotauthorizedtoworkatthePortofKarachiorany-wherealongthePakistanGLOC.TheenemythreatinPakistanalsoaffectsboththetimelineandarrivalofsupplies.SensitiveitemsandoversizedequipmentarenotauthorizedontheGLOCbecauseofsecurityconcernsandheightrestrictionsonbridges.
SuppliesalsoaretransportedthroughtheNorth-ernDistributionNetwork(NDN).Thesesuppliesare
shippedfromthecountriesnorthofAfghanistan.NomilitaryitemsorequipmentaretransportedontheNDN;themajorityofitemsmovedonthisrouteareclassIV(constructionandbarriersmaterials)con-tainersandfuel.
InAfghanistan,unitsmustproperlyforecastandorderitemsandsuppliesinatimelymanner.Theaver-agetimeforitemstoarriveatthePortofKarachifromtheUnitedStatesviaoceanmovementisapproximately2months.Thesuppliesthentakeanadditional21daystomovefromtheporttothemainhubsintheCJOA.
Thetimelyforecastingofsuppliesandequipmentiscrucial.Ifanitemisnotonhandatasupplysupportactivity,thechancesareslimthatitwillarrivewhenrequiredunlessitisflownintocountry.
ThecomplexnatureoflogisticsinAfghanistanisextremelychallengingbecauseofitslandlockedloca-tion,mountainousterrain,weather,andthecontinuousmilitarythreat.Ourheavydependenceonhost-nationtruckingrequiresearlyforecasting,planning,andpatience.
SustainingSoldiersthroughouttheCJOArequiresanapproachthatisdifferentfromthesustainmentmethodsusedinIraq.Thisapproachmustbeadaptiveandmultimodaltosolvechallengesandkeepthewarf-ighterssupplied.
maJor BenJamin k. “kerry” DennarD is the support operations offiCer for the 524th ComBat sustainment support Battalion. he serveD as the general supply offiCer in the Joint logistiCs CommanD During the 45th sustainment BrigaDe’s Deployment to afghanistan. he holDs a B.s. Degree in politiCal sCienCe from georgia College anD state university anD is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, anD the army CommanD anD general staff College.
maJor Christine a. haffey is the support operations offiCer for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe. in afghanistan, she serveD as the Deputy support operations offiCer in the Joint logistiCs CommanD. she holDs a B.a. Degree in elementary eDuCation from paCifiC lutheran university anD a master of managerial logistiCs Degree from north Dakota state university. she is a graDuate of the transportation offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool.
maJor DonalD r. “ray” ferguson is the BrigaDe operations offiCer, J−3, of the 45th sustainment BrigaDe. he holDs a B.B.a. Degree in logistiCs/intermoDal transportation from georgia southern university anD an m.B.a. Degree with a ConCentra-tion in logistiCs from touro university. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD intermeDiate level eDuCation.
The timely forecasting of supplies and equipment
is crucial. If an item is not on hand at a supply
support activity, the chances are slim that it
will arrive when required unless it is flown into
country.
14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ogisticssupportrequirementsinAfghanistan grewvastlyduringthe45thSustainment Brigade’s2009deploymentinsupportofOpera-tionEnduringFreedom.Astrooplevelsincreasedandcontractorsarrivedbythehundreds,thedemandforsuppliesandservicesincreasedexponentially.Althoughmostlogisticstransportationrequirementswere,andstillare,filledbytheAfghanistanhost-nationtruck(HNT)industry,theneedforU.S.Armytacticaltruckmovesbecameurgent.
Asaresult,thebrigadeexpandeditstacticalconvoyoperationsand,intheprocess,overcamethechallengesposedbyaustereenvironments,improvisedexplosivedevices,andimpassableroadsininclementweathertomeetthelogisticsneedsofthewarfighters.
growingSupportofConvoysWhenthe45thSustainmentBrigadeassumed
responsibilityfortheJointLogisticsCommandinAfghanistanfromthe101stSustainmentBrigadeon7February2009,echelons-above-brigade(EAB)convoyoperationswerevirtuallynonexistent.Nopalletizedloadsystem(PLS)companiesorothertacticaltrans-portationassetswereavailable.UnitsdependedontheHNTindustryforalloftheirgroundsustainment.
Atthetimeofthebrigades’transferofauthority,convoyswereexclusivelyforescortmissionsandpri-marilyoriginatedfromKandaharAirfieldinsupportofU.S.andcoalitionforcesacross200milesofsouthernAfghanistan.Therequirementformoresecureconvoyswasimmediatelyrecognizedwhenitbecamemanda-torytoescortallHNTsthatcarriedsensitiveitems.MoresecureconvoysensuredthespeedandsecurityofcriticalclassVII(majorenditems)astheymadetheirwaytoassignedunits.
Overthenext4months,the45thSustainmentBri-gadereceived73mine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclesand60PLStrucksaswellasthe32dTransportationCompany(PLS).Thebrigade’sprimaryeffortwastoestablishcargo-haulingcapabilitiestoaugmenttheHNTindustryandprovidesecureandreliabletransportationforclassV(ammunition),high-priority,andsensitive-itemshipments.
Throughoutthebrigade’sdeployment,thetheatercontinuedtomatureandlogisticsconvoysexpandedacrossallofRegionalCommandEast,Regional
CommandSouth,andRegionalCommandWest.Tomeettheincreasingdemand,thebrigadegrewfrom1combatsustainmentsupportbattalion(CSSB),1move-mentcontrolbattalion,and1specialtroopsbattalion(STB)with11companiesand7movementcontrolteams(approximately1,300personnel)to3CSSBs,1STB,and27companiesanddetachments(approxi-mately3,200personnel).
CoordinatingOperationsToprovidecommandandcontrolofthenewly
arrivedtacticaltransportationassets,thebrigadeinitiallydevelopedanoperationspositionintheJ−3thatwasresponsibleforallconvoyoperationalrequirements.
Thebrigadealsostoodupabattalionheadquartersandmadetheoperationspositiondirectlyresponsibleforallbattlespacecoordination,externalsupportrequests,contingencyoperationsplan(CONOP)devel-opment,andtrackingforRegionalCommandEast.Theoperationssectionaddedaconvoyoperationsnon-commissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC)toassistinperformingtheincreasingdutiesofmanagingallEABconvoyoperationsinRegionalCommandSouth.
AstherequirementscontinuedtogrowinRegionalCommandSouth,thebrigadestoodupacoordinationcellinKandaharthatmanagedandcoordinatedexter-nalsupportforsouthernconvoys.Thiscellprovidedface-to-faceinteractionwithmultiplecoalition,UnitedNations,andU.S.forces.Itestablishedpositiverela-tionshipsanddirectcoordinationwithallcoalitionandU.S.commands,whichmadeiteasiertogetsupportwhenneeded.
Theoperationscellincludedabrigadechiefofoperations(acaptain),adeputychiefofoperations(alieutenant),anoperationsNCOIC(asergeantfirstclass),andanassistantoperationsNCOIC(astaffser-geant).Thecellevolvedintoafullteamdedicatedtosynchronizingeffortsamongbattalions,highercom-mands,andexternalsupportandcross-battlespacecoordination,withalldutiesandresponsibilitiesunderthechiefofoperations.
ConvoyProcessesAllconvoyswereplannedandmanagedbytheoper-
ationscell.Aconvoymovementtrackerwasprovidedbyeachbattalionandthebrigadesupportoperations
Echelons-Above-BrigadeConvoyManagementinAfghanistan
L
by MaJor MiChael J. harriS anD Captain eriC p. roby, uSMC
AMMO=AmmunitionCJOA =Combinedjoint operationsareaCO =CompanyCSSB =Combatsustainment supportbattalionDet =DetachmentDS =DirectsupportF =ForwardFLE =Forwardlogistics elementFM =Financialmanagement
HHC =Headquartersand headquarterscompanyHR =HumanresourcesICTC =Inlandcargotransfer companyJLC =JointLogistics CommandMACP =Mortuaryaffairs collectionpointMAINT=MaintenanceMCB =Movementcontrol battalion
MCT =Movementcontrol teamOPCON=OperationalcontrolPLS =PalletizedloadsystemPlt =PlatoonPOL =Petroleum,oils, andlubricantsQM =QuartermasterRC(E) =RegionalCommand EastRC(S) =RegionalCommand South
RC(S/W)=RegionalCommand South/WestRC(W) = RegionalCommand WestSTB = Supporttroops battalionSUP = SupportTRK = TruckUAV = Unmannedaerial vehicle
Legend
The year 2009 was one of growth for the 45th Sustainment Brigade. The chart above shows how the brigade looked at the beginning of 2009, and the chart below portrays the array of forces at the end of the year.
16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
(SPO)officer;thesewerecompiledintoabrigadeconvoyoperationaltracker.Theexternalcoordinationgenerallystarted96to72hoursbeforetheexecutionofeachconvoy.Theoperationscellinitiatedexternalsupportrequestsbasedonthisinformationwhilewait-ingforthefinalizedCONOP.
Withinformationgatheredfromthemovementtrackers,coordinationforrouteclearancepackages,rotary-wing(AH−64ApacheandOH−58KiowaWar-riorhelicopter)support,fixed-wingcloseairsupport,andintelligence-gathering,surveillance,andrecon-naissanceresourceswereconductedwithbattlespaceownersandthe82dAirborneDivisionandRegionalCommandSouthheadquarters.
ConvoysthattraveledthroughKabulorKanda-harCityrequiredapprovalanddeconflictionwithotherlargeconvoysandtrafficpatterns.Requestsforconvoystotraversethesecitiesweresenttothe82dAirborneDivision’sheadquarters,theCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan,andRegionalCommandSouthheadquartersforapprovalanddeconfliction.
TheplanforthelogisticsconvoywasdevelopedintoaCONOPbyeachbattalionandapprovedbythebattalioncommanderbeforeitwasforwardedtothebrigade.The45thSustainmentBrigadeoperationssec-tionreviewedmissiondetailsandcomparedthemtoinformationreceived72to96hoursbeforeexecutingandfinalizingcoordinationrequirements.
Theoperationssectionconductedthefinalcoor-dinationstepstoensurethatbattlespaceownerswereawareoflogisticsconvoystravelingthroughtheirbat-tlespaces.Twenty-fourhoursbeforeexecutionoftheconvoy,theCONOPwasforwardedtothebattledesksofallbattlespaceownersalongtheconvoyroute.
Additionalcoordinationwasneededwhenconvoyscrossedregionalcommandsbecausetheseconvoyswereviewedasjointregionalcommandoperationsandrequiredtheregionalcommander’sapproval.Toobtainthisapproval,CONOPswereverifiedandforwardedtoregionalcommands.
Duringtheexecutionofconvoys,the45thSustain-mentBrigademonitoredalltheater-levelsustainmentlogisticsconvoysacrossAfghanistan.Asatheaterlogisticsconvoytraversedabattlespace,thebattlespaceownerswereresponsibleforquickreactionforcesandexplosiveordnancedisposalsupportfortheconvoy.
FrictionPointsTheHNTswereinverypoorconditionandunreli-
able.Theycontinuallymissedshowtimesatbases,brokedown,ortraveledatverylowspeeds.Theseproblemsnormallycausedlogisticsconvoystomissexternalsupportlinkupsthatwerereferencedincross-battlespacecoordinationplans.TheHNTswereneededtopromoteanAfghan-firstmethodologyand
toalleviatealargeportionofthelift-capacityburden,buttheycausedtremendousstrainonexternalsup-port,whichusuallywasreservedforblockedtime.Oncethetimelinewasthrownoff,allcoordinationusuallywasnegated.
Aconvoycouldrequireupto16differentrequeststoexecute,includingrequestsforexternalsupportfromfourdifferentbattlespaceownersanddivisionheadquarters,varioustriptickets,andrequiredAfghanNationalPoliceescortsinsomeareas.Eachbattlespaceowner’srequestsvariedinformatandcontent.Theprocessdoubledortripledifaconvoywascanceled,shiftedtimes,orchangedunits.
Withlimitedassetsandresourcesacrossallbat-tlespaces,requestingtoomanyresourcesandchangingthematthelastminutecausedalossincoverageandwastedresources.Sincetheexternalsupport(rotary-wingaircraft)wasdedicatedandthemissionplan-ningwasalreadycompletedtosupportthelogisticsconvoys,thehelicoptershadtofindsomeoneelsetosupportorreturntobase.Thisonlystrainedanalreadystressedasset.
HNTs’maintenance,reliability,andspeedwerealwaysplanningfactorswhenrequestingexternalsup-port.Ensuringthattheappropriateplanningfactors(distance,speed,numberofHNTs)wereconsideredwhenplanningamissionwascrucial.Allrequestshadtobelimitedtoidentifiedthreatareasonly.ResourceswerelimitedandwereonlyrequestedwhentheS−2indicatedanincreasedneed.
AsmoreforcesflowintoAfghanistan,convoyoper-ationscontinuetogrowandthemodelwilltransformtomeettheneedsofthesustainmentbrigadeandbat-tlespaceowners.Thekeytologisticsoperationsman-agementinAfghanistanistoremainflexibleandadaptaslogisticscapabilitiescontinuetoexpandtosupportthewarfighter.TheHNTindustryinAfghanistanwillcontinuetoimproveasinfrastructureisdevelopedandthequalityoftrucksincreases.The82dSustainmentBrigade,the43dSustainmentBrigade,andotherunitstocomewillcapitalizeonlessonslearnedfromtheini-tialtheater-levellogisticsoperations.
maJor miChael J. harris is attenDing the army CommanD anD general staff College. he was the s−3 Chief of operations for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe when he Cowrote this artiCle. he holDs a B.s. Degree in exerCise sCienCe from ColumBus state university anD an m.s. Degree in aDministration from Central miChigan university.
Captain eriC p. roBy, usmC, is the operations offiCer of the marine Corps DetaChment at fort lee, virginia. he was the Deputy Chief of operations for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe when he Cowrote this artiCle. he holDs a B.s. Degree in transportation anD logistiCs from the ohio state university.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 17
romFebruary2009throughtheendofthat year,the45thSustainmentBrigadewasrespon- sibleformanagingalloftheaerialdropsinAfghanistanandsustainingmorethan68,000Soldiers(equivalentto19brigades)withequipmentandsup-plies.Duringthistime,morethan16millionpoundsofsuppliesweredroppedtokeepthewar-fightersus-tainedandtomaintainmomentumonthebattlefield.Thisarticlediscussesthecomplexitiesofpreparingandexecutingthoseairdrops.
Mostofthesuppliesweredroppedfromtheairdropaircraftofchoice,theC−17GlobemasterIIItransport.TheC−17’scapabilitiesmeettheneedsofOperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistan.Successfulairdropmissionstakedaysofplanning,rigging,andcommuni-catingtoensure100-percentsuccess.AcombinationofArmy,MarineCorps,andAirForceunits,commoditymanagers,riggers,andairfieldpersonnelconductedaerialdeliveriesonaregularschedule.
Receivingunitsmustkeepaninventoryoftheirdaysofsupplyandanticipatewhentheywillneedtoberesupplied.Theoverallresupplyprocessmaytakedaysorweeks,dependingonthecommodityandtheamountofitthatneedstobedropped.Oncearequire-mentisvalidatedbytheunit,alogisticsairmovementrequestissentthroughthesupportingbrigadesupportbattaliontothe45thSustainmentBrigadesupport
operations(SPO)officeforprocessing.Oncetherequestisopened,ahostofpeopleareinvolvedintheexecutionoftherequestedresupply.
ArmyandMarineCorpsairdropplannersscheduletheloadsfordeliverywhileAirForcecrewscontendwithterrain,timehacks,andanexhaustivesched-uleastheyexecutedailyairdrops.[“Timehacks”arewhenallpartiesinvolvedinanoperationsetastandardtimethateveryonewillfollow.]Theriggerskeeppacewiththenever-endingdemandforsuppliesthathavetobebundledandriggedforeachdropwhiletheairfieldpersonnelcoordinateactionsaseachplaneisloaded.Riggerstranslatetherequire-mentsintobundlecounts,themobilitycontrolteamassignsamissionnumberorITARS(intertheaterairliftrequestsystem)numberforeachairlift,andtheairmobilitydivisionallocateseachaircraftforaspecificairdropmission.
Dropdayisbusyforthereceivinggroundunitbecauseitmustgatherarecoveryteam,establishcom-municationswiththeaircraft,andsecurethedropzone.Groundrecoveryunitsmustalsocontendwithmountainousterrain,mud,snow,andtheenemyastheycollectthedrops,whichmaytakedaysorhoursdependingontheirsituationontheground.NothingiseasyinAfghanistan.Challengesaresocomplexthatdifferentparachutesystemsaretestedtofindtheopti-
malsolution.Anexampleofgettingtherightparachuteforthemissionwastheresupplyofahigh-altitudesite.
Thesitewasnestledbetween7,000-foot-highmountainsandhadaverysmallpatchoflandforreceivingairdrops,soresup-plyingitonaweeklybasis
Container delivery system bundles airdropped from an Air Force C−17 Globemaster III descend to the drop zone in Afghanistan. The C−17 was the aircraft of choice for aerial resupply. (Photo by SSgt Angelita Lawrence, USAF)
45thSustainmentBrigade:AerialDeliveryinAfghanistan
by Chief Warrant offiCer 2 MiChelle G. CharGe
F
17
18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
wasdifficult.ThelogicalchoiceforaparachuteshouldhavebeentheGlobalPositioningSystem-guidedJointPrecisionAerialDeliverySystem(JPADS),whichcanensuretheaccuracyofeachdrop.
JPADSwasdesignedtobepreciseonlandingandshouldeasilylandatthesite’sdropzone,butthecloseproximityofthesurroundingmountainsinter-feredwithitsabilitytomaneuvertheparachutetoitsintendeddestination.Theconventionalhigh-velocityparachutesystemprovedtobethebetterandmoresuc-cessfulchoiceforresupplyingthesite.ThissituationillustrateshowterrainplaysakeyroleindeterminingwhichparachutetouseinAfghanistan.
ToimproveJPADSforuseinAfghanistan,aJointUrgentOperationalNeedsStatementhasbeensub-mittedtorequestsoftwareupgradesthatwillbetternegotiatecomplexcontoursandimproveairdropsbyreducingdeliveryerrorstowithin25metersoftheirtargets.Inthefuture,JPADSmaybetheparachuteofchoiceformountainousterrainwithsmalldropzones.Butfornow,theconventionalhigh-velocityparachutesystemsareaccomplishingthemission.
InanexhaustiveefforttoreachthewarfightersnomatterwheretheyareinAfghanistan,the45th
SustainmentBrigadealsocontractedforCASAC−212airplanestodeliverthesmallerlow-cost,low-altituderesupplybundlestoremoteFOBs,convoys,andevenpatrolsonthemove.Donewithlaser-precisionaccuracy,suppliesaredroppedfromvaryingaltitudes.Theseaircrafthavetheabilitytodeliver2,200poundsofsuppliestolocationswherelargeraircraftareunabletogo.ThesecontractedaircraftwerecriticaltosustainingthesmallunitsinAfghanistan.
Withthe45thSustainmentBrigaderedeployedtoitshomedutystationatSchofieldBarracks,Hawaii,itcanlookbackknowingthatitair-serviceditscoalitionforcestothebestofitsability.Thebrigadeprovidedthemwithwhattheyneededinordertopre-servemomentumonthebattlefieldandtoserveandprotecttheAfghanpeople.AerialdeliveryremainsahugecapabilityinsupportingthewarfighterinAfghanistan.
Chief warrant offiCer 2 miChelle g. Charge was the support operations aerial Delivery operations offiCer for the 45th sustain-ment BrigaDe at Bagram airfielD, afghanistan. she is pursuing a B.s. Degree in soCial sCienCe.
Low-cost-low-altitude resupply bundles land inside the drop zone during an aerial resupply mission in Afghanistan. The 45th Sustainment Brigade contracted for CASA C−212 airplanes to deliver these smaller bundles to remote forward operating bases, convoys, and patrols. (Photo by SSgt Angelita Lawrence, USAF)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 19
hehardworkofU.S.ArmyCentralCommand logisticiansonthebattlefieldisoftenunnoticed becausetheireffortsareconsideredsimplyrou-tine,everydayactivitiesforlogisticspersonnel.ButthoselogisticiansarethelinchpinoftheresponsibledrawdowninIraqandthebuildupinAfghanistan.
SupportingLogisticsConvoysOnesimplebutinnovativetechniquethatlogisti-
ciansemploytoachievesuccessonthebattlefieldistheconvoysupportteam(CST).PersonnelassignedtothesustainmentbrigadeinKuwaitanditssubordinatetransportationbattalionsdonotseetheCSTasdifficultorremarkablebecausethistechniquehasexistedformanydeploymentcycles.Butsomeforward-thinkinglogisticianinthesustainmentcommunityhadareasonforrethinkingArmyproceduresanddevelopingthismechanismtoaccomplishthemission.
ThesustainmentbrigadeinKuwaitexecutesacompositetechniquetoaccomplishthesustainmentmission.ThetechniqueinvolvesCSTsandlogisticsconvoys.TheCSTsarelocatedatoutlyingforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)andhavetheprimarypur-poseofassistinglogisticsconvoysinmakingtheroundtriptowithdrawequipmentandcargofromIraq.CSTsaredetachmentsthatconsistofaboutthreetofivepersonnelwhocoordinatemaintenanceofbroken-downvehiclesandlifesupport,includingovernightlodgingandFOBtransportation(suchasbetweenlodginganddiningfacilities),forthecon-voymembers.
MaintenanceSupportThebiggestchallenge—andcertainlyamajorsuc-
cess—fortheCSTismaintenancesupport.CSTsattheFOBshavebenchstockclassIX(repairparts)formechanicstouseforpreplannedorforecastedrepairs(basedonhistoricaldata),buttheseCSTsdonothaveanyassignedmechanics.TheunitmechanicsarelocatedinKuwaitbecausethenumberofmechanicsislimitedandmostofthemarethoroughlyoccupiedwithunitorganizationalmaintenanceoperations.
TheCSTsareprovidedwithbenchstockateachFOBbecausetheydonothaveunitidentificationcodesorDepartmentofDefenseactivityaddresscodes.TheCSTsalsodonothaveaprescribedloadlist(PLL)toensurethattheirpartsaredelivered,sotheymustcoordinatewiththesustainmentbrigade’scommandandcontrolelementstosynchronizedeliv-eryofparts.
Thebattalionmaintenanceofficer(BMO)providesonemechanictorideineachlogisticsconvoyincaseofanyunforeseenbreakdowns.Upto35convoysmaybetravelingonthemainsupplyrouteatanygiventime,limitingthenumberofmechanicsavailabletomaintaintheunit’svehiclesattheFOB.
TheCSTssupporttheBMObyprovidingforwardsupportandhaveoversightattheFOBtocoordinateforothermechanicstoperformtheactualrepairs.TheCSTscoordinatewiththeFOBmayor’scellforlifesupportandthedirectorateoflogisticsformaintenancesupportbutusetheFOB’sassetstoaccomplishthemaintenancetaskswithouttaskingmechanicsunneces-sarilytosupporttheconvoys.
Anextensivespreadsheetismaintainedformanag-ingclassIXandincludesthepartsforbothtruckbat-talionsinthebrigade.Therepairpartsaretakenfromthesustainmentbrigade’sPLLandsenttoIraqwiththeconvoysonaroutinetimeline.PartsforallvehiclesaremaintainedasbenchstockatallCSTlocationsandaretrackedbythebrigadewithguidancefromthetwoBMOsinKuwait.
TheCSTconceptisuniqueandcanbeexecutedwithoutreorganizingaunit’stableoforganizationandequipment.Manyunitsshouldconsiderthisoptioninfuturelogisticsplanning,especiallyinremotelocationssuchasareasinAfghanistan.Thistypeofforwardthinkingandexecutionisexactlythetypeoflessonslearnedthatweneedtopassontoourmilitaryleadersforuseinfutureconflicts.
Justasairlinepassengersmaytakeforgrantedthehardworkthatairlinepersonnelputintotransportingpassengersseamlesslyfromplacetoplace,anArmylogistician’scomplexoperationofmovingsuppliesmaygounnoticed.ItmayseemsimpleandroutinetoemploytheCST,butthistechniquehassavedtheArmymoney,lives,andresources.
lieutenant Colonel steven l. upDike, usar, is assigneD to the Center for army lessons learneD as a theater oBserva-tion DetaChment offiCer at the 1st theater support CommanD in kuwait. he is a graDuate of the naval CommanD anD staff College, air CommanD anD staff College, army CommanD anD general staff College, Defense strategy Course, anD assoCiate logistiCs exeCutive Development Course. he has a BaChelor of sCienCe Degree in eConomiCs from the university of missouri-rolla anD a masters of arts honors Degree in transportation anD logis-tiCs management from the ameriCan military university.
ConvoySupportTeamsby lieutenant Colonel Steven l. upDike, uSar
T
20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
he402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade’s(AFSB’s) Acquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirector- ate(ALT−D)hastheuniquemissionofintegrat-ingandsynchronizingacquisitionandtechnologysup-portwithaccountabilityandsustainmentinsupportoftheMaterielEnterpriseinthebrigade’sareaofresponsi-bility(Iraq,Kuwait,andQatar).Nowthatthetheaterisdownsizing,ALT−D’smissionhasexpandedtoincludesynchronizingaccountabilityoftechnologyinsertionduringretrogradeoperationstopreventlossordestruc-tionofequipment.
Inordertoaccomplishitsmission,ALT−Dhasbuiltstrongpartnershipswithin-theaterprogrammanagers(PMs),theResearch,DevelopmentandEngineeringCommand(RDECOM)seniorcommandrepresentative(SCR),andtheotherlife-cycleman-agementcommand(LCMC)representativesinthebrigade.ThesepartnershipsstrengthentheMaterielEnterpriseandcreatesynergyamongtheLCMCs,RDECOM,andthe402dAFSB.
WorkingWiththeSCRWithintheAFSB,thepersonnelinALT−Dwork
closelywiththeRDECOMSCR.TheSCR(whoresidesinthebrigadeheadquarters)isresponsibleforcoordinatingwithallRDECOMagencies,laboratories,andcentersandforcollectingdataonvehicleswithinthetheaterforhisparentagency,theArmyMaterielSystemsAnalysisActivity.
The402dAFSB’sscienceadvisercomplementstheSCR’seffortsbyapplyinghisexpertise;thesci-enceadviserdoesthisthroughdirectcoordinationwithsupportedunitsonvarioustechnologicalchal-lengesthroughoutthetheater.ThescienceadviserandtheSCRworktogethertogatherSoldiers’requirementsandresolvemanyunforeseenprob-lemswiththenewtechnologiesthatsupportthewarfighters.
OneexampleofhowtheSCRandthescienceadvisercollaboratedwaswhentheyassistedanengi-neercompany(Stryker)deployedfromFortLewis,Washington,indevelopingalightingkitthatprovided
bettervisibilityduringnight-timerouteclearancemissions.Oncethiscapabilitygapwasidentified,theSCRandthescienceadviserworkedquicklytomeettheSoldiers’requirement.Inconjunctionwithdevelopingadesign,theyalsosubmittedarequestforinformationtobothRDECOMheadquartersandPMStrykertoassistindevelopinganArmy-fundedlight-ingsystem.
ThescienceadviserandtheSCRusedthecapabili-tiesoftheweldingshopofthe1stBattalion,402dAFSB.ThetwomenprovidedtheweldingteamwithdiagramsandtemplatestobuildthenewStrykerlightingbracketset.Theselightingbracketsweredesignedtosupportanexistinglightingsystemusedbytheengineercompany.TheengineersareusingthesebracketsonalimitedbasisuntilPMStrykerdevelopsalightingkitthataddressestheunit’srequirements.
Duringasubsequentvideoteleconference(VTC)withRDECOMheadquarters,thescienceadviserinformedtheparticipantsthatthelightingbracketshadbeencreatedanddistributedtotheengineercompanyinIraq.Sincethe402dAFSBhadalreadydevelopedthelightingbracketprototypesforStrykervehicleswithandwithoutslatarmor,theTaskForcePaladinliaisonofficer,whowasaparticipantintheVTC,requestedthattheAFSBhelptodevelopabetterStrykerlightingsystemforunitssupportingOperationEnduringFreedom.
Thefollowingday,theRDECOMSCRemailedtheengineeringdrawingsandshippedprototypebracketsdirectlytothe401stAFSBinAfghanistanforfabrica-tionanddistributiontoTaskForcePaladin.Currently,RDECOMispreparedtoproducemorelightingbrack-etstosupportthedemandfromboththeaters.
CoordinatingWiththeSTATThelightingkitillustratesthepartnership
betweentheAFSBandRDECOM.ThispartnershipisfurtherenhancedthroughthesupportprovidedtoRDECOM’sScienceandTechnologyAssistanceTeam(STAT).
AFSBsandRDECOM:StrengtheningtheMaterielEnterprise
by MaJor o’neal a. WilliaMS, Jr.
T
Army field support brigades work with the Research, Development and Engineering Command and other partners in theater to meet Soldiers’ materiel requirements.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 21
The402dAFSBhasanagreementwithRDECOMtosupporttheSTATwithlifesupport(suchashous-ing,useofvehicles,accountability,computers,andphones)andofficespace.NotonlydoestheAFSBsupporttheSTATadministratively,italsosupportstheteaminitsmissiontoassistthewarfightersinarticulatingtheirrequirementstoDepartmentoftheArmyheadquarters,RDECOM’slaboratoriesandcenters,andtheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology(ASA[ALT])community.
TheAFSBassiststheSTAT’soperationaleffortsthroughthebrigade’sscienceadviser.AlongwiththeScienceandTechnologyAcquisitionCorpsadviser(STACA),theAFSBandthescienceadvisercanvastheentireIraqitheatertoaddressSoldiers’requestsforinformation,challenges,andimprovementsatthecom-pany,brigade,anddivisionlevels.Thisgroupofhigh-lytrainedindividualsalsofieldsquestionsandacceptschallengesfromotherservices,deliveringsolutionstothewarfightersquicklyandacrossallphasesofanoperation.
PartneringforTheaterSupportHowisitpossibleforasciencecoterietoaddress
technologyissuesacrossanentiretheater?Theanswerisnotascomplicatedasonemightthink.TheAFSBscienceadviser,theSTACA,thecorpsscienceadviser,andtheSTATcoverspecificareasonthebattlefield,andeachhasspecificresponsibilities.Onspecialoccasions,eachofficerhastheabilitytocoveranotherofficer’sareaofresponsibility.
Toassistinthisoveralleffort,theAFSBscienceadviserisresponsibleforgatheringrequirementsthroughlogisticssupportelementsandbrigadelogistics
supportteams.Workingwiththeseelementsallowsthescienceadvisertogatherrequirementsfromallcombatunitsonthebattlefieldthroughsustainmentandmaintenancechannels.
TheSTATisembeddedinthedivisionheadquar-ters,whichgivesitdirectaccesstodivisionalunits.However,itsreachgoesfartherthanjustthedivi-sion;theSTAThasamedicaladviserwhocangatherrequirementsfromallmedicalfacilitiesinthetheater.
ThecorpsscienceadviserandtheSTACAworkcloselytogethertofieldrequirementsanddirectthoserequirementsthroughcorpsleadersforapprovalandexecutionwithcommandemphasis.Althoughtheybothresideinthecorpsheadquarters,theyhavedif-feringroles.
Sincethecorpsscienceadviser(whotypicallyresidesintheC−3/J−3ForceManagementDirector-ate)caninterfacedirectlywiththecorpscommanderandcorpsstaffsections,hehasthebackingtoinflu-encetheeffortsofexternalsupportingagencies,suchastheRapidEquippingForce,theArmyTestandEvaluationCommand,andscienceandtechnologyagencies(RDECOMheadquartersandresearchanddevelopmentcenters).Thecorpsscienceadviserisalsothefocalpointforalldivisionalrequirements.(TheSTAThasaccesstoonlyonedivision.)Withallthesemovingpieces,anelementthatcanunifyalltheseeffortsisneeded.
TheSTACAisthatunifyingagent,providingsyn-ergytoallscienceandtechnologyeffortsinthethe-ater.Sinceheresidesonthecorpsstaff,theSTACAuseshispositiontoorganizerequirementsfromtheSTAT,thecorpsscienceadviser,andtheAFSBsci-enceadviser.Thisallowsforsynchronizationofeffortandreducesredundancyinsubmittingopera-tionalneedstatements,formalrequestsforinforma-tion,andotherrequirementsdocuments.
Thecoordination,levelofcommitmenttoSoldiers,andconsistentdialogamongkeyRDECOMagenciesandorganizations,theSTAT,theSTACA,scienceadvisers,PMs,AFSBs,andtheASA(ALT)demon-stratehowtheMaterielEnterprisesupportsthewar-fightersinthefield.FromtheAFSBstoRDECOMtothePMs,theseentitieshaveforgedanalliancethatconvertsSoldiers’requirementsintomaterielsolu-tions,thusincreasingtheirsurvivability,lethality,andmobilityonthebattlefield.
maJor o’neal a. williams, Jr., is the BrigaDe sCienCe aDviser of the 402D army fielD support BrigaDe. he holDs a B.s. Degree in eleCtriCal engineering from howarD university anD a level-2 CertifiCation in systems planning, researCh, Development, anD engi-neering anD is a lean six sigma green Belt.
How is it possible for a science coterie to address technology
issues across an entire theater? The answer is not as complicated
as one might think. The AFSB science adviser, the STACA, the corps science adviser, and
the STAT cover specific areas on the battlefield,
and each has specific responsibilities.
22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ntoday’sbattlefield,havingasingleinterface forsustainmentlogisticsoperationsbetweenthe fieldandthematerieldeveloperisofimmeasur-ablevalue.Thisinterfacenotonlyprovidesastand-alonelogisticscapabilitythatsupportsthewarfighter,butitalsoputsintoeffectamaterielenterpriseconceptthatintegratesacquisition,logistics,andtechnologytoprotect,equip,andsustainjointandcoalitionforcesinsupportofthetheaterofoperations.
IntheIraqitheater,the402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade(AFSB)isthatinterface.Usinganinter-nalassetknownastheAcquisition,LogisticsandTechnologyDirectorate(ALT−D),theAFSBcancoordinatebetweenthewarfighterandthematerieldevelopertofacilitateallfieldingtasksandcoordi-natewithexternalentities.TheALT−Dhasseveralfocusareas,butoneofitsprimaryareasofresponsi-bilityistosupporttheintegration,accountability,andsustainmentofnewlyfieldedequipmentwithintheareaofoperations.
Thedirectorate’seffortshavemanymovingpieces,includingplanningandcoordinatingforlifesupport,facilities,andcommunications;shippingandreceiv-ingequipment;personnelsupport;andsustainmentplanning.ALT−D’sabilitytoorchestratetheseactionsnotonlyprovidesasubstantialbenefittoU.S.Forces-Iraqbutalsoprovidesprogramexecutiveofficers(PEOs)andprogrammanagers(PMs)a“nocost”ini-tialentrypointforcoordinatingessentialfielding.
CoordinatingFieldingsAllfieldingswithintheaterbeginandendwith
theU.S.Forces-IraqJ−3ForceModernizationDivi-sion,whichdirectlycoordinateswithU.S.divisionstoensureappropriatesynchronizationinsupportofthewarfighter’smission.Fieldingcoordinationisiniti-atedwithanotificationofintentissuedbythePMtotheIraqitheater.ThisactiontriggerssubsequentplanningmeetingsthatincludeU.S.Forces-Iraq,theAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyliaisonofficer,andtheAFSBALT−D.
Onceplanningbegins,severalkeytasksandcom-monissuestendtoarise.(Seechartatright.)ByusingtheAFSB,thePEOandPMcansupporttheoverallintent—tomeetthewarfightingcommanders’require-ments—whilefillingresourcegapsthroughthereceiptandretentionofessentialassets.
Pre-ExecutionDocumentationEssentialpre-executiondocumentationisneeded
tosupportasuccessfulfielding.Thisdocumentationincludesthefollowing:oAtechnologydevelopmentplan,whichisprovided
bythePMtoensurethatessentialfieldinginforma-tionisavailable.
oAmemorandumofnotification,inwhichthespe-cificfieldingrequirementsareoutlined.
oAdistributionplan,whichprovidesapictureanddescriptionofthesystembeingfielded,asummaryofthefieldingplan(includingsustainmentrequirements),andtheprioritizedunitanddivisiondistribution.Oncethisinformationhasbeenprovided,afield-
ingscheduleisdeterminedandcoordinatedamongthevariousU.S.divisions.
AccountabilityAccountabilityoftheater-providedequipment
(TPE)ismanagedbythetheaterpropertybookoffice(TPBO).TheTPBOcelliscolocatedwiththe402dAFSB’s2dBattalionandincludesachiefwarrantofficerastheaccountableofficer,aGovernmentcivilianemployeeappointedasthedeputyaccount-ableofficer,andcontractedPropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhanced(PBUSE)technicians.Currently,13theaterpropertybook(TPB)teamsarelocated
NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCananAFSBDoforMe?
by MaJor CaMilla a. WooD
O
NewEquipmentFieldingKeyTasks
oIdentifynewfieldingefforts(fromJointImprovisedExplosiveDeviceDefeatOrganization,RapidEquippingForce,programmanagersandprogramexecutiveofficers).
oAssessadequacyofsustainmentplans.oIdentifyandplansupportrequirementsfor— −Accountability(theater-providedequipment). −Facilities. −Equipment. −Lifesupport. −Contractedlogisticssupportmanagement. −Transportation. −Rangesupport.oDevelopconceptofsupportplans.oDevelopandpublishfieldingandsustainmentorders
(fragmentaryorders).
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 23
throughouttheIraqitheatertosupportunitswithTPEpropertyaccountability.
AllTPEmustbedocumentedontheTPB,andPMsarerequiredtoestablishahand-receiptaccountwithinPBUSE.Beforeequipmentisbroughtintothetheater,itisimperativethatPMspopulateequip-menttobefieldedintoPBUSEusingderivativeunitidentificationcodes.TheTPBOisatremendousassetandcanprovidealistofunitTPBaccounts;asampleDepartmentoftheArmyForm3161,RequestforIssueorTurn-In;andapointofcontactlistforallTPBOsincountry.
TherelationshipbetweenthewarfighterandAFSBprovidesPEOsandPMswithtimelyandmanageableaccountabilityoffieldedequipment,thussupportingtheirabilitytomeetscheduleandcostrequirementsflawlessly.
ExecutionSupportTheavailabilityofsupportduringthefieldingpro-
cessisatoppriorityformanyPMoffices.Theques-tionsmostPMswanttohaveansweredconcernthelifesupportandresourcesavailabletosupporttheneedsoftheirtheaterrepresentatives.AFSBpersonnelunder-standthatresourcesoftencanbethedeterminingforceinthesuccessorfailureofaparticularfielding,sotheAFSBisposturedtoprovidecoordinatedsupporttoavarietyofareas.
Life support. HowwillPEOandPMpersonnelbesupported?TheAFSBstaffisavailabletocoordinateforlifesupportandhousingonforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)thathaveapermanentAFSBfootprint.Existinghousingisprovided,asspaceisavailable,forshort-durationprojectswithsmallnumbersofpeople.Forlargeorlong-termprojectswhererequirementsexceedavailablespace,theAFSBcancoordinateforhousinginsupportofthePEOandPM.
Oncelargeorlong-termprojectcoordinationiscompleted,theprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM),basedontheaterfiscalpolicies,mayberesponsibleforprovidingfundingtopurchasethehousingunitsidentified.ThesehousingunitswillbemanagedbytheAFSBandwillbeavailableforreallocationorreas-signmentfollowingcompletionoftheproject.
OnFOBswheretheAFSBdoesnothaveaperma-nentfootprint,thebrigadehasestablishedlogisticssupportelements(LSEs)andbrigadelogisticssup-portteams(BLSTs),whichareresponsibleforcoor-dinatinglifesupportwiththetenantoperationalunitormayor’scell.
Facilities.WherewillPEOandPMpersonnelwork?TheAFSBalsocoordinatesfacilitiesforinstallationfieldingmissionsthroughoutthetheater.Thebrigadeusesexistingfacilitiestomeetmissionrequirementstothemaximumextentpossibleatnocosttotheprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM).TheAFSBiscapableof
coordinatinglandacquisitionandfacilityconstructionifexistingfacilitiesarenotavailableordonotmeetmissionrequirements.Basedontheaterfiscalpolicies,theprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM)mayberespon-sibleforprovidingfunding.
Special equipment.IfthePEOorPMhasspecialequipmentrequirements,howwilltheybesupported?TheAFSBcanobtainspecialequipment,suchasfork-liftsandoverheadlifts,forfieldingmissionsthrough-outthetheater.ThebrigaderecognizesthatthePEOorPMisresponsibleforensuringthatitspersonnelaretrainedandlicensedtooperateanyspecialequipmentrequiredtocompletethemission.
TheAFSBusesexistingequipmenttomeetmis-sionrequirementstothemaximumextentpossibleatnocosttotheprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM).Ifexistingequipmentisnotavailableordoesnotmeetmissionrequirements,theAFSBwillcoordinatefortheacquisitionofthespecialequipmentatacosttotheprojectsponsor.Thebrigadeisposturedtomanageallspecialequipmentandcanensureitsreallocationorreassignmentfollowingtheproject’scompletion.
Communication support.HowwillthePEOorPMcommunicatewithitspersonneloncetheybeginfieldingtothewarfighter?CommunicationsupportisavailablewithpropercoordinationonFOBswheretheAFSBhasapermanentfootprint.Thebrigadehasanumberofphonesandcomputersthatcanbeusedonashort-termbasisbyprojectpersonnelwhenresourcesareavailable.
IndividualschoosingtousetheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)networkmusthaveatleastafavor-ablenationalagencycheckonfileinordertoobtainaNIPRNET(Non-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork)accountandasecretclearanceifaSIPRNET(SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork)accountisrequired.PEOandPMpersonnelmaychoosetobringtheirowncomputers(desktoporlaptop),buttheymust
Equipment shipping and receiving is
an important part of the entire fielding
process. As equipment is processed into the theater, it is imperative that it
is tracked down to the lowest level
of command.
24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
understandthatconfigurationcontrolwillremainwiththeAFSB.
Equipment shipping and receiving.WhodoesthePEOorPMcoordinatewithtoensureequipmentisreceivedasitcomesintothetheater?Equipmentship-pingandreceivingisanimportantpartoftheentirefieldingprocess.Asequipmentisprocessedintothetheater,itisimperativethatitistrackeddowntothelowestlevelofcommand.Transportationcontrolnum-bersandradiofrequencyidentificationtagsallowtheAFSBtotrackandidentifythelocationofequipmentasitisbeingprocessedintothetheater.
AFSBpersonnelcancoordinateshipping,receiving,andtemporarystorageofequipmentthatisusedforfielding,equipmentupgrade,orsustainmentoperationswithinthetheater.Thissupportiseasilymanagedat
locationswheretheAFSBhasapermanentfootprint.ForthoselocationswhereanAFSBfootprintisnotestablished,thebrigadeispreparedtocoordinatenec-essarylogisticssupport.
Personnel transportation. Whattypeoftransporta-tionsupportisavailableaspersonneltravelthroughoutthetheaterinsupportofanupcomingfielding?Per-sonnelsupportinganAMCmission(fielding,training,sustainment,orliaisonvisits)cancontacttheAMCliaisondeskuponarrivalatAliAlSalemAirBaseinKuwaittocoordinatetransportationintothetheater.
Inthe402dAFSB,twoemergencyoperationscen-tersinIraq(onelocatedinBaghdadatVictoryBaseComplexandoneatJointBaseBalad)canprovidemovementassistance.Theadministrativesupportper-sonnelwithintheLSEsandBLSTsalsocanassistinarrangingtransportationtothevariousFOBlocationsoncepersonnelareinthetheater.
NewEquipmentTrainingBeforeequipmentisofficiallysignedovertoaunit,
newequipmenttraining(NET)mustbeconducted
inconjunctionwiththematerielfielding.NETistheresponsibilityoftheappropriatePEOorPMandfacilitatesthetransferofknowledgeaboutequipmentuseandsupportrequirementsfromthematerieldevel-opertotheusers,trainers,andmaintainersofthenewequipment.
ThePEOandPMNETteamscancoordinatewiththeAFSBtoarrangeNETsupporttothegainingunitsforbothoperationandmaintenancetraining.NETteamsareattachedtotheAFSB,effectivewhentheyarriveattheairportorseaportofdebarkation,forpersonnelaccountability,tacticallogistics(includingmovement),lifesupport,andintegrationintothelocalforceprotectionorsecurityplan.
TransitiontoSustainmentSustainmentsupportshouldbeanintegralpartof
anyfieldingprocess.WiththeAFSB’sassistance,PEOsandPMscanuseexistingmaintenanceandsustainmentcontractvehicleswhenplanningforlong-termsustainment.Inmanyinstances,limiteddepot-levelrepaircapabilitiesexistatseveraloftheforwardrepairactivities.Itcanbeverybeneficialtoplanforlimiteddepot-levelsustainmentinthetheaterratherthanhavingtotransportallitemsrequiringdepot-levelrepairbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates.
TheAFSBcanassistincoordinatinglong-termsustainmentsupportwiththelife-cyclemanagementcommands.Itcanalsoaidindevelopingasustainmentplanthatisresponsivetowarfighterneedsbasedontheuniqueoperationalconstraintsthatexistinthethe-ater.TheAFSBalsoprovidespersonnelwhofunctionascontractingofficer’srepresentativestoprovidein-countryoperationaloversightofsustainmentcontractsandfieldservicerepresentatives.
TheAFSBprovidesmanysupportcapabilitiestoPEOsandPMs.Theextensiveprocessneededtofieldanindividualpieceofequipmentrequiresasystematicapproachthatincludeseverythingfromaccountabilityandfieldingcoordinationtosustainmentrequirements.ThistypeofknowledgeandexpertiseprovidesPEOsandPMs,thewarfighter,andU.S.Forces-Iraqacom-bined“one-stopshop”forfindingsubject-matterexpertsandfieldingpointsofcontactwhocananswersthewho,what,when,where,andhowquestionsthatinevitablyariseduringnewequipmentfielding.
maJor Camilla a. wooD is the assistant DireCtor of aCQuisi-tion, logistiCs, anD teChnology in the 402D army fielD support BrigaDe. she is level-3 CertifieD in program management anD previously serveD as assistant program manager for the patriot aDvanCeD CapaBility-3 program offiCe anD non-line of sight launCh system proJeCt offiCe. she holDs a B.a. Degree from south Carolina state university anD an m.s. Degree in aDminis-tration from Central miChigan university.
NET is the responsibility of the appropriate
PEO or PM and facilitates the transfer
of knowledge about equipment use and
support requirements from the materiel
developer to the users, trainers, and maintainers
of the new equipment.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 25
fyourunitispreparingtodeploy,hasdeployed, orisinanyotherphaseoftheArmyForce Generationprocess,termslikeONS,JUONS,REF,FOA,OPNET,andFLMNEThavebecomeapartofyourdailyvernacular.Whatcanyoudotounderstandthisstrangecollectionofacronyms?Whatabouttheinevitablefielding,sustainment,andsupportstrategyrequirements?Istheresomeoneorsomeorganizationtohelpyoucompletethetasksassociatedwithcoor-dinatingandsynchronizingtheseefforts?
AnArmyfieldsupportbrigade(AFSB)canhelp.SevenAFSBsoperateinthecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)andoutsideCONUS.TwooftheAFSBsareforwarddeployedtoSouthwestAsia,oneinsup-portofOperationIraqiFreedomandtheotherinsupportofOperationEnduringFreedom.TheAFSBsareassignedtotheArmySustainmentCommandandperformacriticalroleastheArmyMaterielCom-mand’sfacetothefield.TheyroundouttheMaterielEnterpriseattheoperationallevel,providingtacticalcommanderswithlogisticsandsustainmentsupportnottypicallyprovidedbysustainmentbrigadesorexpeditionarysustainmentcommands.
EachAFSBmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentincludespositionsforoneareaofconcen-tration(AOC)51Z(acquisitions)acquisitionofficer(O−5),oneAOC51A(systemsdevelopment)acquisi-tionofficer(O−4),andoneAOC51S(researchandengineering)scienceandtechnologyofficer(O−4).Thesethreeofficersformthecoreofwhatisusuallycalledtheacquisition,logistics,andtechnologydirec-torate(ALT−D).
Thisdirectorate’smissionandcorecompetenciesvaryfromAFSBtoAFSBdependingontheoperatingenvironment,supportedunits,andcommandfocus.Buttheyalwaysincludeintegratingandsynchroniz-ingwiththeAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology(ASA[ALT]),programexecutiveofficers(PEOs)andprogrammanagers(PMs),andthewarfightertoensurethatfielding,operationalassessments,andotheracquisi-tion-centricactivitiesaresuccessfulwithinsupportedunits.TheofficersandstaffintheALT−Dcanpro-videdirectsupportandstaffcoordinationforyourunit’sacquisition,logistics,andtechnologyefforts.
OperationalNeedsStatementsIdeally,yourunitwillhavealltheequipment
itneedstoaccomplishitsassignedmission;themission-essentialequipmentlist(MEEL)willbe100-percentsourced,andyouwillbeabletoeffi-cientlyandeffectivelycoveryourbattlespace.Unfor-tunately,thisistheexceptionratherthantherule.ConstantlychangingoperationalenvironmentsandevolvingmissionsetsrendereventhebestMEELsinadequateinsomecriticalareas.Theseinadequaciescancausecapabilitygapsthatcanadverselyaffectaunit’sabilitytoaccomplishthemission.
Thefirstconsiderationwhentryingtoovercomeagapshouldbereallocationofequipmentwithinyourcommandorthenexthighercommandtomakeupforanyshortages.Ifthisisnotaviableoption,anopera-tionalneedsstatement(ONS)orjointurgentopera-tionalneedsstatement(JUONS)(thelatterifyouareinajointbattlespace)isthenextstepinattemptingtomitigatethecapabilitygap.
Eachcommandhasslightlydifferentprocessesforcompiling,staffing,andforwardinganONSorJUONS.YourAFSB(whetherinsideoroutsideCONUS)canassistindeterminingifanotherONSorJUONSalreadyexiststhatdescribesyourcapabilitygap,iftechnologyexiststhatcansatisfyyourrequire-ments,andifyourONSorJUONScontainsthecriti-calelementsforacceptance.ONSandJUONSeffortsareusuallyassignedtothescienceandtechnologyofficerintheAFSB.
SubmittingatechnicallycorrectONSorJUONSisacriticalstepandwilleliminatestop-and-gostaffdelaysthatcouldpreventyourunitfromreceivingneededequipment.AlthougheveryeffortwillbemadetosatisfyanONSorJUONSasquicklyaspos-sible,itcansometimestakeweekstoreceiveequip-mentthatsatisfiesyourrequirement.Ifyourneedisurgent,considerusingtheRapidEquippingForce(REF).
RapidEquippingForceAnalternativetotheONSorJUONSistheREF
andits10Linerrequirementsdocument.Don’tcon-fusetheREFwithRFI,theRapidFieldingInitiative.TheREFisanorganizationcharteredtoconduct
TheCapabilitiesoftheArmyFieldSupportBrigade’sAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirectorate
by lieutenant Colonel Steven G. van riper
I
26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
pinpointfieldingsofcriticalequipmenttodeployingordeployedunits.The10-LinerisadocumentusedbytheREFtocaptureaveryspecificrequirementfromdeployingordeployedunits.Thescienceandtechnologyofficercanreviewthe10-Linerandcom-municatewiththeREF.
Afterreceivingthe10-Liner,theREFwillattempttosatisfyyourrequirementsbyusingcommercialoff-the-shelf(COTS)ormodified-COTSsystemsorequipment.TheREFcanpotentiallymeettherequire-mentinamuchshortertimethanthe“normal”acqui-sitionprocess.
EquipmentprovidedbytheREFisnotfree,soyoushouldexpectthegeartoshowuponyourpropertybook.TheREFwillusuallyissueequip-menttobrigade-sizedorsmallerunits;insomecases,itwillissueitemsingreaterquantities.TheREFmayrequestyourparticipationinaforwardoperationalassessment(FOA)torecordyourcom-ments,asanenduser,ontheequipment’seffec-tiveness.InordertoassistyourunitduringaREFfieldingandFOA,theALT−DcancontinuetoliaisewiththeREFteamandcanactasacollectionpointforFOAquestionnaires.
Insomecases,aREF-fieldeditemcanbetransi-tionedintowhatiscalleda“programofrecord.”ThiscanhappenwhentheFOAisexceptionallyfavorableorwhendemandbecomessolargethatREFmanage-mentandfundingbecomesinadequate.Whenthisoccurs,theprogramisassignedtoaPM,providedafundingline,andsubjectedtotheadministrativerequirementsoftheformalacquisitionprocess.IfaREFinitiativeachievesprogramofrecordstatus,theALT−DcancomplementPMactivitiesbysynchro-nizingthefieldingplanwithoperationalcommit-mentsandschedules.
FieldingPlanFromthegainingunit’sperspective,thefielding
planisprobablythemostimportantcomponentofthe
acquisitionprocess.Thegainingunitisreallynotinter-estedinthechallengesthePMfaceswithcontracting,designing,producing,anddeliveringthenewsystem.Whattheunitdoescareaboutiswhenitwillbereceiv-ingtheequipmentandhowmanyitwillreceive.
Dependingonprocessesusedbyyourhigherhead-quartersandyourassignedAFSB,thefieldingplanmaybeastand-alonedocumentordistributedasanopera-tionorder(OPORD)orfragmentaryorder(FRAGO).Ineithercase,theALT−Dcanprovidevitalinputthroughnormalstaffingorthroughimmediatecommunicationtoensurethatunitfieldingexpectationsandrequirementsaresynchronizedwiththesystem’sproductionrate,deliveryschedule,anddistributionplan.
TheALT−Dwillcoordinatewithappropriatehigh-erheadquartersstaffsectionsandthePMtoensurethatessentialelementsofthefieldingplan(sched-ules,issuelocations,gainingunitresponsibilities,andtransportationrequirements)areincludedintheinstructionsprovidedtothereceivingunit.
Fieldingsseldominvolvesingle-pointdistributionfromafullyequippedwarehouseordeprocessingsite.Theytypicallyincludeseveralgeographicallydis-persedfieldingsites,differinglevelsofinfrastructure,andvaryingquantitiesforissue.TheALT−DandthePMcanmanagethesefieldingnuancesandgreatlysimplifytheprocessforthegainingunit.
TheALT−Dalsocanassistwithassetvisibilityandpropertyaccountability,ensuringthatPMscom-plywithallPropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhancedrequirementsforequipmentissueandtransfer.TheALT−Dcancoordinatetoensurethatfieldservicerepresentatives(FSRs)arepresenttoassistinaccep-tanceinspectionsandfinalissueoftheequipment.
Theexecutionofthefieldingplansetsthecondi-tionsforallfollow-onactivitiesassociatedwithanewsystem.UsingtheALT−D’scapabilitieswillensurethatthefieldingplanissynchronizedwithyourunit’sexpectationsandrequirements.Second,ifnotequallyimportantintermsofunitpriorities,isnewequipmenttraining(NET).
NewEquipmentTrainingItseemsobviousthatNET,specificallyopera-
tornewequipmenttraining(OPNET)orfield-levelmaintenancenewequipmenttraining(FLMNET),wouldberequiredasaunitreceivesnewequipment,butsomeunitsdonotsynchronizeNETwiththeirdailytasksandbattlerhythm.NETisanessentialpartoffieldingandmustbedonerightthefirsttime.WithoutNET,newequipmentcaneasilybecomepaperweights,motorpoolqueens,orjustlabeled“toohardtouse”bySoldiers.
TheALT−DcanensuretheNETisbothefficientandeffectivebyforwardingunitexpectations,timeavailable,andotherunit-uniquetrainingrequirements
NET is an essential part of fielding and
must be done right the first time. Without NET, new equipment can easily
become paperweights, motor pool queens, or just labeled “too hard
to use” by Soldiers.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 27
directlytothePM.ThesectioncanalsoprovidethePMwithunittrainingschedulesortimelinesthatmayrequirechangestoNETtimesandlocations.
TheALT−DcanverifythattheNETplanisincludedinanyOPORDorFRAGOthatprescribesfieldingandwillfacilitateuniqueNETrequirements,likewarehousestoragespace,classroomcoordina-tion,housing,andinstructoraccountability.WhenconductingNETinadeployedenvironment,theALT−Dcantrackaninstructor’scountryclearanceandcallforwardrequestsandarrangeforhousingandintertheaterandintratheatertransportation.
ChallengesinevitablyemergeduringeventhebestplannedNETevents.TheALT−Dcan“runinterfer-ence”withthePMtomitigateanyproblemsthatmayarise.ThisunburdenstheunitacceptingthefieldingandallowsittostayfocusedonthemanyongoingpredeploymenttrainingactivitiesthatarenodoubtoccurringatthesametimeastheNET.Problemscanbeastrivialasnothavingenoughhandoutsorasseri-ousasrealizingthewrongsoftwareversionisloadedintoanewcommunicationssystem.
Inrarecases,communicationbetweentheALT−DandthePMisnoteffective.Ifthisoccurs,theAFSBcommandercanengageseniorleadersintheMate-rialEnterprisefordirectassistance.Inanyevent,theALT−DwillbethesinglefacetoyourunitforNETandothertrainingactivities.AfterasuccessfulinitialfieldingandNET,theALT−DwillbeginworkingwithyourunitandPMtoensureaneffectivesupportstrategyisimplemented.
SupportStrategyIftheprogrammanagementoffice(PMO)has
doneitshomework,yournewgearshouldeitherbefullysupportedbyfield-levelmaintenanceandtheArmysupplysystem,comewithFSRsaspartofacontractorlogisticssupport(CLS)program,orfea-tureacombinationofArmymaintenanceandFSRsandCLS.
IfFSRsandCLSareinvolved,theAFSBcanprovideagreatdealofassistancewithtracking,managing,
andgeneralsupportoftheFSRsandtheiruniquetoolandfacilityrequirements.SincetheALT−Dcaninter-facedirectlywithyourstaffofficersandtheend-userSoldiers,thesupportstrategywillbetailoredtoyourspecificneedsandoperationalenvironment.ThisinteractionallowstheAFSBtoworkwiththePMOasthesupportstrategychangesovertime.
Asyourunitusesthenewequipmentmore,usability,reliability,andmaintainabilityissuesundoubtedlywillemerge.TheALT−DcanactastheconduitbetweenyouandthePMOtoensurethatanysuggestionsforimprovementsareproperlypreparedandpresented.Inmanycases,thePMOwillsendanassistantprogrammanagertomonitortheinitialfieldingandrecorduserfeedback.TheAFSBcanprovidesupporttotheassistantprogrammanagerinthesamewayitsupportsFSRs,therebyreducingtheburdenonyourcommand.Thissynchronizedeffortamongthecustomerunit,theAFSB,thePMO,andFSRsisessentialtoensuringthattheweeksandmonthsfollowingtheinitialfieldingareapositiveexperienceforeveryoneinvolved.
TheALT−DintheAFSBprovidesauniqueser-vice.Havingabasicunderstandingofthecorecom-petenciesoftheALT−Dwillallowcommandersandstaffofficerstomaximizetheirabilitytoeffectivelystateoperationalrequirements,choosethebestfield-ingandtrainingplans,andensureapropertransitiontosustainmentoperations.
TheALT−D’scapabilitiescanbeappliedtothetactical,operational,andinsomecases,strategiclevel.Tacticalunitsseekingamaterielsolutionforacapabilitygapcanleveragetheskillsetsofthesci-enceandtechnologyofficerforliaisonwiththeREFteamsandfollow-onONSdevelopment.Operationalcommanderscanunburdentheirstaffsbyempower-ingtheAFSBtoconductthedetailedPEOandPMcoordinationtasksnecessaryforsuccessfulfieldings.Lastly,atthestrategiclevel,theALT−Dcanperformacquisition-andtechnology-relatedliaisontasks.
YoushouldincludetheAFSBwhenyourbattalion,brigade,ordivisionisconsidering,orisinthemiddleof,requirementsgeneration,fieldings,orliaisonwithPEOsorPMs.EngagingtheAFSBALT−D’scapabili-tieswilllinkyourcommandwiththeMaterielEnter-priseandenablesuccessfulacquisition,logistics,andtechnologyactivities.
lieutenant Colonel steven g. van riper is the DireCtor of aCQuisition, logistiCs, anD teChnology in the 402D army fielD sup-port BrigaDe. he is CertifieD as level iii in program management anD level ii in systems planning, researCh, Development, anD engi-neering-systems engineering. he holDs an m.s. Degree from the naval postgraDuate sChool anD is a memBer of the army aCQuisi-tion Corps. he was previously assigneD as an assistant program manager in the teChnology appliCations program offiCe.
The ALT-D can act as the conduit between you and
the PMO to ensure that any suggestions for improvements are
properly prepared and presented.
28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
nAugust2008,the2dBrigadeCombatTeam (BCT),4thInfantryDivision,deployedfromFort Carson,Colorado,toIraqforOperationIraqiFree-dom(OIF)08–10.Thebrigadeexpectedtobeexecut-ingcombatoperationsbutinstead,becauseoftheoperationalenvironment,beganstabilityoperationsintheMulti-NationalDivision-Central(MND–C)areaofoperations.
MND–C,whichwasredesignatedasMulti-NationalDivision-South,wasanareathatspannedIraqfromthesouthernpartofBaghdadtoBasranearthebordersofKuwaitandIran.The2dBCTestablishedoperationsinnumerouslocationsthatrangedfrombuilt-upareaslikeKalsu,Echo,andBasratosmalloutpoststhatwereconstructedwhileplatoon-andcompany-sizedunitsweremovingintothearea.Inthisenvironment,the204thBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB)conductedsus-tainmentsupportoperationsforthe2dBCT.
MND–C’snonlinear,contiguousoperationalenvironmentchallengedtheBSB’slogisticscapa-bilities.AlthoughthemodularstructureoftheBSB(withitsforwardsupportcompanies[FSCs]attachedtotheBCT’smaneuverbattalions)provid-edtheenhancedcapabilityandflexibilityrequiredtosupportthedynamicnatureoftheBCT’smis-sions,theBSB’slogisticianshadtoworkthroughsomeuniquechallenges.
SplitOperationsIntheinitialstagesofthedeployment,the204th
BSBsupportedthe2dBCT,whichhadover4,500personnelinover10locationsthatwerespreadacross13,500squaremilesinmultipleprovinces.Theasym-metricalnatureoftheareaofoperationsrequiredsplitoperations,withtheBSBatForwardOperatingBase(FOB)Kalsusupportingoneorganic2dBCTbat-talionandover15area-supportorganizations.ABSBlogisticstaskforce(LTF),consistingofelementsofthebasecompaniesoftheBSBandthemedicalcom-pany,waslocatedatCampEchoalongwiththeBCTheadquarters,twooftheBCT’sbattalions,andarea-supportunits.
ThesplitoperationsoptimizedthecapabilitiesoftheBSBtomitigatethecomparativeweaknessesintheIraqisustainmentsupportinfrastructure.However,thesplitoperationsplacedstressontheBSB’spersonnelandequipmentavailability,especiallyinthebegin-ningstagesofthedeployment.TheyrequiredtheBSBtooperatemultiplelogisticsnodes,includingclassI(subsistence)warehousesandfieldfeeding;classesII
(clothingandindividualequipment),IV(constructionandbarriermaterials),andIX(repairparts)operations;ammunitiontransferholdingpointoperations;andcentralreceivingandshippingpointoperationsatbothKalsuandEcho.
WhileatKalsu,theBSBoperatedasupplysup-portactivity(SSA)withover6,000itemsworthmorethan$40million;itwasoneofthelargestSSAsinMND–C.TheBSBalsooperatedalevelIImedicalfacilityatCampEcho.
RealignmentsandRelocationsBecauseachangingenvironmentandanadaptive
enemynecessitatedchangesinlinesofoperationsandrealignmentof2dBCTforces,the204thBSBassistedintherelocationofequipmentandpersonnel.Italsocontinuedsustainmentreplenishmentoperationsdur-ingrealignments,closures,andtransfersofoutlyinglocationstotheIraqisandfollow-onforces.Thenewlocationsrequiredincreasedsupplystockstoensurecontinuingsustainmentsupportwhentheweatherorthethreatofenemyattackpreventedthedispatchoflogisticsconvoys.
Throughouteachrelocation,theBSB’splanningandexecutionofsustainmentoperationsensuredthateveryBCTunitorarea-supportunitreceivedthesustainmentsupportneededtoaccomplishitsoperationalmis-sion.TherealignmentoftheBCTtoBasraprovincerequiredtheBSBtorelocateinitiallyfromFOBKalsutoCampEchoandthentoBasra.ThesustainmentoftheBCTandtheBSBduringtheserelocationswasfacilitatedbythedoctrinaluseoftheLTF,whichini-tiallyrelocatedfromCampEchotoContingencyOper-atingBase(COB)Adder(Tallil)andthentoBasra.
In“leapfrog”fashion,theBSBrelocatedtoEchowhiletheLTF,establishedatEcho,continuedtoprovidesustainmentsupporttoallBCTandarea-supportunits.OncetheBSBwasestablishedatEcho,theLTFrelocatedsouthtoCOBAdder,whereitestablishedlogisticsoperationstoensurecontinu-ityofsustainmentsupport.Finally,8monthsintothedeployment,theBSBandLTFwerebothestab-lishedatBasra.
TherelocationtoBasrapresentedgreaterlogisticschallengesastheBSBtookonanevenhigherhead-count,morelogisticsnodes,andmoreoutlyingloca-tionstosupport.Atitspeak,duringatransitionofforcesbetweenBritishunitsandthe2dBCT,theBasraclassIwarehousesupportedanoverallheadcountof8,500personneland17outlyinglocations.
SustainingaBCTinSouthernIraq
Iby lieutenant Colonel MiChael b. SieGl
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 29
TheBSBoperatedonediningfacilitythatsupported7,500personnel.TheBSBalsoinventoriedandsignedforanSSAtosupportallBCTandarea-supportunits.Forthisendeavor,theBSBrelocatedtheBuccaSSAtoBasra.Themoverequireddedicatedline-haulassetsfromthesustainmentbrigadetorelocatetheautho-rizedstockagelistandtheSSA’sstructuralanddigitalequipment.Within2weeksofrelocatingtheSSA,theBSBestablishedSSAoperationswith2,500lineitemsworthover$18million.
SPOOrganizationThesupportoperations(SPO)officerwasplaced
inchargeoftheLTF,whichestablisheditselfinitiallyatEchowiththeBCTheadquarterswhilethemajori-tyoftheBSBremainedatKalsu.TheLTFoperationscellwascomposedprimarilyofafewSPOperson-nelandsomenoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)andSoldiersfromthebasecompaniesthatformedtheLTF.Essentially,theLTFoperationscenterbecametheBSB’sforwardoperationscenter.However,theBSB’sautomationarchitectureandmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentdidnotfacilitatetwooperationscenters.
Reorganizationandcross-trainingofpersonnelintheSPOsectionwerenecessarytofacilitatethedualoperationsatKalsuandEcho.Unfortunately,becausesplitoperationswerenotconsideredfortheSPOsec-tionwhileathomestation(inpart,becausethebat-taliondidnotknowthefinalforcearrayforIraquntiltheBCTarrivedintheater),theSPOsectionhadonlyreceivedminimalcross-training.
Thelackofcross-trainingwasexacerbatedbythefactthatmanyofthepersonnelintheSPOsectionwerenewtotheirpositions.Sothefocuswasonget-tingthepersonneltrainedfortheirassignedpositions.On-the-jobtrainingandmaximizingthetalentsofthepersonnel,evenifthetaskswereoutsidetheirmili-taryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs),werecriticaltoaccomplishingthemission.
TransportationandLogisticsConvoysIngeneral,the204thBSBanditsFSCsexecuted
logisticsasoutlinedincurrentdoctrine.TheFSCswereabletosupporttheoutlyinglocationswithminimalsupportfromtheBSBaccordingtotheBCTconceptofsupport.However,someadditionalorganictransportationequipmentwasneededsotheBCTcouldmoveclassVII(majorenditems)aroundtheareaofoperations.
TheBSBandFSCsdidnothaveallofthetrans-portationequipmentneededforoperationsinIraq.Heavyequipmenttransport(HET)vehiclesandtrail-erswereessentialinfacilitatingtheBCT’smanyrelocations.Theaterlogisticsunits(thesustainmentbrigade)andlocalcontractorsprovidedmanyofthe
heavy-haultrucks,buttheyhadtroublefillingtheBCT’snumeroustransportationrequirements.SotheBSBobtainedHETsthroughtheater-providedequip-ment(TPE)sothatitcouldprovideresponsivetrans-portationsupportfortheBCT’srelocations.HETsshouldbeanorganicBSBassetineveryheavyBCT.
AlthoughtheBSBandFSCswereabletoreceivesomeTPE,someitems,suchaspalletizedloadsys-temflatracks,weredifficulttoobtain.TheBCTattemptedtobringallofitsflatracksfromhomesta-tion,butonlyaportionoftheflatrackswereapprovedfordeploymenttoIraq.Therationalewasthatfla-trackswereavailableintheater,butittookmonthstoacquireenoughflatrackstomeettheBCT’srequire-ment.Thisdelayhinderedlogisticsoperations,espe-ciallybecauseunitscouldnotdoflatrackexchangesof20-footMILVANs[military-owned,demountablecontainers].Unfortunately,MILVANscannotbeplacedoncontainerizedroll-in/roll-outplatforms,whichwerereadilyavailableintheater.
Nothavingenoughflatracksforflatrackexchang-esmeantthattheBCThadagreaterrequirementformaterials-handlingequipment(MHE),espe-ciallyrough-terraincontainerhandlers(RTCHs)andcranes,tomoveMILVANsonandofftheflatracks.TherequirementforMHEwasespeciallycriticalinoutlyinglocations.Partofthesolutionwastocon-tractforMHEwithlocalvendors.TheBSBSPOsectionservedasthecontractingofficer’srepresen-tativefortheMHEcontractinBasra.InlocationswherenoRTCHsorcraneswereavailable,unitsmaximizedtheuseofthecontainerhandlingunitandsometimestheM88mediumrecoveryvehicletomovecontainers.
Earlyinthebattalion’sresetbeforedeployment,theBSBcommanderdecidedtocreateaconvoysecuritydetachment(CSD)thateventuallybecamea45-personplatoonwith3squads.Eachsquadcon-sistedoffourguntrucksthatoperatedasateamtoprovidesecurityforthebattalion’slogisticsconvoys.
TheinitialtrainingfortheCSDoccurredinDecember2008athomestation,withateamfromFortKnoxfacilitatingtheguntrucktraining.ThistrainingenabledtheCSDtolearntheessentialskillsofmaneuvering,communicating,andshooting.BecauseallBSBconvoysweresecuredbytheCSD,theformationoftheCSDanditstrainingwascriti-cal.Infact,theBSBconvoysweremoreoftenlimit-edbytheavailabilityoftheCSDtoprovidesecuritythanbytheavailabilityoftransportationassetstohaulsupplies.
DigitalSystemsandEnablersTheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSystem
(BCS3)isintendedtoprovideandmanagethelogisticscommonoperationalpicture(LCOP)intheBCT.One
30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ofBCS3’sfunctionsistocapturethelogisticsstatusofsubordinateunitsandprovidesituationalawarenessofthestateoflogisticssupplieswithinbattalions.
However,BCS3wasnotusedinMND–Cbythe2dBCT,thesustainmentbrigade,ortheexpeditionarysustainmentcommand.TheLCOPfortheBCTsus-tainmentcellandSPOsectionwasmanagedthroughordinarycomputerswithSecretInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(SIPRNET)andNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(NIPRNET)connectivityandprocessedandtransmittedaslogisticsstatusreportsthroughMicrosoftOfficeprograms.
Beforedeploying,theBCTcommandhadempha-sizedtheuseofBCS3astheArmylogisticsmanage-mentsystem.However,twofactorspreventedtheBCTfrommaximizingtheuseofBCS3inIraq.First,BCS3isnotuser-friendlyorveryintuitive.Second,higher-levelunitsdidnotemphasizetheuseofBCS3.BecausesubordinateunitswerenotrequiredtouseBCS3,theyrevertedtousingreportsthatweremoreuser-friendly.
OneoftheBCT’sautomationcapabilitygapswastheshortageofbothSIPRNETandNIPRNETlaptops.Sincealllogisticsreportingwasconductedthroughcomputers,computersandconnectivitywereessentialforlogisticsoperations.
BothSIPRNETandNIPRNETInternetconnectivityfortheLTFwasfacilitatedbythelocaldirectorateofinformationmanagementatCampEcho.Ifthatcon-nectivityhadnotbeenpresent,theLTFwouldhavehadtorelyonlinkingwiththebattalionorBCThead-quarterslocatedatEchoforJointNetworkNodeorCommandPostNode(CPN)capabilitysincetheBSBonlyhadoneCPN.ThiswouldhaveseverelylimitedthecapabilityoftheLTFsincemostactionswerecon-ductedovertheInternetandthetacticalnetworkhadlimitedports.
SustainmentSupportfortheBCTDoctrineprovidesaframeworkforactionthathelps
mitigateuncertaintywithouteliminatingit,butitcan-notanticipatethedynamicresultsoftheinteractionofforceswithinanareaofoperations.Doctrinecannotbeprescriptive;itwillnotaccuratelyreflectanevolving,chaotic,nonlinearenvironment.Nevertheless,doctri-nalprocesseshelpformulateconceptsofsupportandplansthatmatchthecontextandcircumstanceswithinaunit’sareaofoperations.
ChangestotheBCT’sorganizationandthemovetowarddistribution-basedlogisticswithpulsedopera-tionsforreplenishmenthavemodifiedtheBCT’slogisticsinfrastructure.However,FOBoperationsandhowforcesarearrayedwithinanonlinearenvironmentprecludethesoleuseofdistribution-basedlogisticsattheBCTlevel.Supply-pointdistributionwasusedintheFOBenvironmentquitefrequently.
Oneofthe204thBSB’sprimarytaskswastodevelopaconceptofsupportthatsustainedthecom-batoutposts(COPs)andjointsecuritystations(JSSs)intheareaofoperations.Whilesomeoftheseloca-tionswereresuppliedbytheFSCs,otherswereresup-pliedbytheBSB.AcquiringservicesandequipmentforimprovingthequalityoflifeatCOPsandJSSsbecametheresponsibilityofboththebrigadeS–4andSPOsections.
Intheinitialstages,astheS–4sectionrespondedtothelargecontractualrequirementsofsupportingtheoutlyinglocations(aswellasthemainFOBlocations),theBSBprovidedmanyofitsownorganicelectric-itygeneratorstothemaneuverunitstobridgepowergenerationgaps.TheBSBalsoprocuredwaterandfuelbagstohelpbuildupstoragecapacitiesattheCOPsandJSSstoreducethefrequencyoflogisticsconvoystothosesites.
ContractingtofillcapabilitygapswascriticalandrequiredeithertheSPOorbrigadeS–4sectiontohavepersonnelwithtrainingincontracting.WhilethebrigadeS–4procuredthereefers[refrigeratedvans]fortheBCT,theBSBensuredthatthereeferswereequitablydistributedandfullysupportedthefieldfeedingplan.
ThebaselifesustainmentoftheCOPsandJSSswasanorganizedeffortbytheBCT’sforceprotectioncell(brigadeengineers),S–4,andBSB(primarilyfortransportationsupport).BecauseCOPsandJSSsmaybelocatedincities,buildingupsustainmentstocksattheselocationstoreducethefrequencyofresup-plywasthebestmethodtolowerthevisibilityofthecoalitionpresenceinthecities.TheBSBplannedona5-to-7-daycontingencystockageofmostsuppliesatthelocations.Thisensuredcontinuityofsuppliesintheeventofcontingenciesandemergencies,suchaswhenresupplyoperationswerehinderedbyweatheroroperations.
However,stockageatsomeofthelocationswaslimitedbyspaceandequipment.Forrations,reefercapacitywasthebiggestlimitingfactor.Insomelocations,20-footreefersweretoolarge.Inthosesit-uations,unitspurchasedsmallerfreezersandrefrig-eratorslocallytomaximizetheavailablespace.
TheBSBoriginallyusedasynchronizationmeet-ingtocoordinatesuppliesandlogisticsconvoysched-ulesbasedonoperationsandintelligenceupdates.WhensplitoperationswereconductedatKalsuandEcho,theamountofinformationthathadtobedis-cussedandsynchronizedwasmanageablewithinthetimeallottedforthesynchronizationmeeting.How-ever,whentheBSBconsolidatedatBasraandallunitsweresupportedoutofonelocation,theconvoysynchronizationmeetingbecameimmersedindeter-miningsustainmentrequirementsandlessfocusedonoperationsandintelligence.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 31
Asaresult,theBSBcreatedthecommoditiesmeeting.Thisensuredthattheconvoysynchroniza-tionmeeting(heldimmediatelyafterthecommoditiesmeeting)remainedfocusedonoperations.Thecom-moditiesmeetingwasdedicatedtodeterminingunits’supplyandservicerequirementsoutto7days.Likeatrainingmeeting,theintentwastoidentifyrequire-mentsandapplyresourcesandcapabilitiestothoserequirements.Inthiscase,themeetingfocusedonsup-pliesandtransportationassets.
ClassIOperationsOneofthe204thBSB’smajorchallengeswith
fieldfeedingoperationsinBasrawasthesheersizeofthetask.Atitspeak,thenumberofmouthstofeedwas8,500—doublethesizeofwhattheBSB’sclassIsectionnormallysupported.Manyoftheperson-nelwerenewtothefieldfeedingsectionrightbeforedeploymentandhadnotbeentrainedinclassIopera-tions.MostoftheMOS92As(automatedlogisticalspecialists)hadpreviouslyworkedonlyinclassIXoperations,soclassIoperationswerenewformanyofthem.
Becauseoftheenormousrequirement,theclassIsectionwasaugmentedwithSoldiersfromothersec-tions.Iffieldfeedingoperationshadrevolvedaroundmodularboxesofmealsready-to-eatandunitizedgrouprations,theclassImissionwouldhavebeenmucheasier,despitetheheadcount.However,thefieldfeedingsectionhadtofillrequirementsforavarietyofsupplementsandmenuoptionsthatrivaledthoseaton-postdiningfacilities.MOS92ASoldiersshouldreceivemorein-depthfieldfeedingtrainingatadvancedindividualtrainingandotherArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandschoolsandshouldcross-trainwithMOS92G(foodservicespecialist)Soldiers.
OtherprimaryobstaclestotheclassImissionwereashortageofreefersandinsufficientreefermainte-nance.Althoughtheprocurementofreeferswasiniti-atedbeforethebrigadeenteredIraq,ittookseveralmonthstoreceivethematCampEchoandFOBKalsu.Manyofthereeferswerelocallymadeandsubstandardandrequiredconstantmaintenance.Becausethereeferswerelocallyproduced,theArmymechanicsinitiallyhadadifficulttimemaintainingthembecauseofalackofmanualsandpropertools.
EachBCTshouldhaveafleetofreefersandorganicArmymechanicstrainedinreefermaintenancerobustenoughtofillrequirements.Thisfleetofreeferswouldprovidetheinitialcapabilitytoholdfrozenfoods,freshfruitsandvegetables,andice.
MaintenanceThe2dBCT,likeallbrigadeswithmine-resistant
ambush-protectedvehicles(MRAPs)inIraq,hadprob-lemswiththeMRAP’sfiresuppressionsystem(FSS)
bottles,sensors,andpowerbackups.WhilesomeofthoseproblemshadtobeaddressedattheArmylevel,the204thBSBensuredtheoperationalreadinessofthe2dBCT’sMRAPs.Specifically,theBSBworkedtodevelopanorganiccapabilitywithintheunittorefillMRAPFSSbottlesinsteadofrelyingsolelyontheArmyMaterielCommand’srefillstations.The204thBSBwasthefirstunittohavesuchacapabilityinMND–C.
HavingtheorganicrefillcapabilityallowedtheBSBtohelptheBCTtomaintaincombat-readyplatforms.TheBSBsharedthisknowledgewithotherBCTstoensuretheoperationalreadinessofallMRAPsinMND–C.Nevertheless,supplypartsfortheMRAPs,especiallysensors,FSSbottles,andpowerbackups,continuedtobeaproblemsinceMRAPpartssupplywasstillcontractedandthoseitemswerenotavailablethroughtheArmysupplysystem.
TheBSBworkedwithrepresentativesfromtheDefenseLogisticsAgencytoget100refillkitsshippeddirectlytotheBSB.Oncetherefillkitswerereceived,theBSBwasabletomaketheMRAPsfullymissioncapable.Beforeattemptinganytypeoffiresuppres-sionrecharging,personnelmustreceivepropertrainingbyexperiencedtechnicians,andthelocalfiredepart-mentshouldapproveFSSrechargingstationsbeforerefilloperationscommence.
Duringitsdeployment,the204thBSBcompletednearly1,000sustainmentmissionsthatcoveredapproximately39,000miles.TheBSBanditsFSCsconductedsustainmentreplenishmentoperationstodelivermorethan1.1milliongallonsofwater,200,000poundsofice,300,000gallonsoffuel,40tonsofammunition,and482palletsofclassIX.
The2dBCTdealtwithmultiplerelocationsandsupportrequirementsthatgreatlyexceededthosetypicalforaheavyBCT’sBSB.Butthe204thBSBintegratednondoctrinalanddoctrinalsolutionstoovercomeobstaclestosustainmentsupportoperationsfortheBCT.TheconstraintsoftheareaofoperationsrequiredtheingenuityandflexibilityoftheBSB’sleadersandSoldiers.TheteamworkexhibitedbyallofthelogisticsplayersintheBCTensuredthatsustain-mentsupportoperationscontinuedunabatedthroughalloperations.
lieutenant Colonel miChael B. siegl is the Deputy g–4 of the 2D infantry Division at Camp reD ClouD, repuBliC of korea. he was the exeCutive offiCer anD support operations offiCer of the 204th BrigaDe support Battalion, 2D BrigaDe ComBat team, 4th infantry Division, During operation iraQi freeDom 08–10. he has a B.a. Degree from stanforD university anD an m.a. Degree from georgetown university. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD army CommanD anD general staff College.
32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ariousmilitarytransitionteamsarepartnered withIraqipolice,airforce,andarmyunitsto developIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)capabilities.However,aleadingchallengeinthecontinueddevelop-mentofISFcapabilitiesrestsinthecoalition’scapacitytoorganizethetrainingandadvisingmissionatthetac-ticalandoperationallevelsunderonecommand.
ThecurrentstructureoftheISFlogisticsdevelop-mentpartnershipcomprisesseveralcommandsatvariouslevels,eachwithadifferentfocus.Althoughthecommandsshareavisionforaself-sustainingISF,theoperationalstrategy,sourcingofadviserskillsets,adviserpreparation,andcommandemphasisdifferbasedontheneedsoftheIraqiechelonwithwhichthetransitionteamispartnered.Despiteuni-fiedaction,theabsenceofunityofcommandlimitstheIraqis’abilitytodevelopinitiativesandsustainIraqilogisticsinthelongterm.
AnAttempttoUnifyEffortInOctober2009,theprimaryunitsassistingwith
IraqiArmylogisticsdevelopmentintheBaghdadareaofresponsibilitywereMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I),Multi-NationalDivision-Baghdad(MND–B),Multi-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC–I),andthe10thSustain-mentBrigade.TheseorganizationshadISFlogisticssectionsandsubordinatetraining,advising,andtransitionteamspartneredwiththeIraqiArmyfromthedepottothefoxhole.AttheMNC–Ilevel,sym-posiumswereheldquarterlytointegratecommandsandtoachieveunityofeffort.
The10thSustainmentBrigadeconductedquarterlyreviewswiththeexpeditionarysustainmentcommand,itshigherheadquarters,toassessmetricsandsharebestpracticesamongthesustainmentbrigade’stransi-tionteams.MeetingswerealsoheldwithinMND–BandMNSTC–Itodiscusschallengesandattainabletargets,butresourcesandeffortsacrossthelogistics-developmentspectrumwerenotsynchronized.AstheIraqiArmywasbeingredeveloped,logisticseffortswerenotalignedwiththedevelopmentandcapabili-ties.Theunityofeffortwasattemptedattheactionofficerandstafflevel,butnotamongcommanders.
CommandRelationshipsAccordingtoFieldManual3–0,Operations,com-
mandrelationshipsprovidethebasisforunityof
commandandunityofeffortinoperations.MND–BwaspartneredwithIraqiArmydivisions.Sustain-mentbrigadeswerepartneredwithIraqiArmydivi-sionsupportmaintenanceunitsandthedivision’smotortransportationregiment.MNSTC–Iwaspart-neredwiththeIraqiArmydepot-andnational-levelentities.Thesecommandsreceivedguidancefromandreportedtodifferentcommanders.
Therelationshipsamongthevariousorganiza-tionswerefurthercomplicatedbythefrustrationofconstantchangesofindividualsandteamsredeploy-ing,whichledtobreaksinmomentumandgapsincontinuity.Thenumerousdifferencesindevelop-mentmetrics,teamcapabilities,andcommander-establishedprioritiesalsocreatedchallenges.
Tomitigatetheselimitations,the10thSus-tainmentBrigade’sISFlogisticstransitionteamsoughttostreamlinetheIraqiArmy’srepairpartsrequisitionprocessandmaintenancedoctrinebysynchronizing,coordinating,andintegratingthepartsdistributionandmaintenanceproceduresfromMND–B-partneredunitsthrough10thSustainmentBrigade-partneredunitsandonwardtoMNSTC–I-advisedagencies.
GainsinIraqiArmyefficiencyandsystemconfi-dencewereminimal.Instead,thegreaterresultsoftheinitiativeweremilitarytransitionteamsunder-miningoutsidecommands,frictionfromtransitionteamswith10thSustainmentBrigadeexpectations,advisoryteamsandunitswithdifferentprioritiesandagendas,andtheneedforunityofcommand.Thecurrentstructuredidnotpromotethedevelop-mentofIraqiArmylogistics.
ANeedforOneCommandCollectively,U.S.transitionteamswerenot
enablingIraqisolutionstoIraqiproblems.Unitsnotsynchronizedandalignedwiththelong-termdevel-opmentstrategyattemptedtofurtherIraqiArmylogisticsbycoordinating,supplying,andbasicallydoingtheircounterpart’sworktowardself-sustain-ment.CoordinationandcooperationtowardcommonobjectivesarenotenoughfortrainingandadvisingorganizationstoeffectivelyengagetheIraqiArmy.
Logisticsdevelopmenteffortsandordersmustbemanagedunderoneresponsiblecommander.Ouradvisers,partneredthroughoutmilitaryandGovern-mentactivities,musthavereportingrequirements,
ANeglectedPrincipleofWarinLogisticsAdvising
by MaJor JaMeS J. ZaCChino, Jr.
V
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 33
engagementcriteria,developmentmetrics,partner-shipstandards,trainingresources,andsynchronizedpartnershipdevelopmentanddirectionalignedunderonecommand.Initiativesmustconnecttoeachotherandleadtolong-termgoals.Elementsoftheadvisorymissionmustbesynchronizedinordertocoordinatedevelopmenteffortsthroughoutpartneredechelons.Unityofcommandisfundamental.Thisrelationshipisessentialformaximizinglogisticsdevelopmentefforts.
AsU.S.militarycapabilitieschangewithastrategicreductionofforces,advisingresourcesandrequirementswilladjustinIraq.ThisshiftinU.S.forcesdemandsmorerelianceontheISFtoprovidesecurityandstabilityforIraq’sgovernmentandpeople.TheadvisorymissionwillonlyincreaseastheArmyposturesitselftohelpbuildthelogisticsskillsofotherforeignmilitariesandimprovethestabilityofdevelopingcountries.
Unityofcommandisanecessaryprincipleinsyn-chronizingtheresourcesandeffortsoftheadvisorymission.Thisprincipleofwarmustbeincorporated
inthetacticalandoperationallogisticsdevelopmentstrategy.
TheeffortsoftheU.S.Army’strainingandadviso-rytransitionteamplayanincreasinglycriticalroleaswedevelopthecapabilitiesofforeignforcestowardself-sustainmentandgovernmentstability.Sustainedlogisticsisessentialforanyorganization’slong-termsurvival.Neglectingunityofcommandseverelylimitstrainingandadvisorycapabilitiesinlogisticsdevelopment.
maJor James J. ZaCChino, Jr., is the support operations offi-Cer for the 548th ComBat sustainment support Battalion, 10th sustainment BrigaDe, at fort Drum, new york. he was previously assigneD as a logistiCs transition team Chief During the BrigaDe’s Deployment to iraQ. he holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in eConomiCs anD an m.B.a. Degree from rutgers university. he is a graDuate of the multinational logistiCs Course, Joint Course on logistiCs, petroleum offiCer Course, support operations Course, Conven-tional forCes europe arms inspeCtor/esCort Course, ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course.
This chart depicts the complexity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) development mission and shows the agencies and levels with which the 10th Sustainment Brigade ISF Cell interacts. The way ahead for ISF self-reliance requires a unified effort of constant, consistent advising backed with sound Iraqi doctrine and policies. Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, the multinational divisions, the expeditionary sustainment command, and U.S. agencies, such as the Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and Army Training and Doctrine Command, and contractors all play a direct role in working toward ISF logistics self-reliance. The lines in this diagram separate coalition units from their Iraqi counterparts.
AMC = ArmyMaterielCommandBSB = BrigadesupportbattalionDCOSLOG=DeputyChiefofStaff, LogisticsDLA = DefenseLogisticsAgencyEME = ElectricalandMechanical EngineeringDirectorateGTR = GeneralTransportRegimentHSC = Headquartersandservice companyISF = IraqiSecurityForcesLMAT = Logisticsmilitaryadvisory teamLTAT = Logisticstrainingadvisory teamMiTT = MilitarytransitionteamMND–B = Multi-NationalDivision- BaghdadMNF–I = Multi-NationalForces-IraqMNF–W = Multi-NationalForces-WestMNC–I = Multi-NationalCorps-IraqMNSTC–I = Multi-NationalSecurity TransitionCommandIraqMTR = Motortransportation regimentT/P = TransportationandProvisions Directorate
Legend
34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
oldiersandDepartmentoftheArmycivilians whooverseecontractorsonthebattlefield mustfullyunderstandthemagnitudeandimportanceoftheirresponsibilities.ArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)contractingofficerrepresentatives(CORs)orcontractingofficertechnicalrepresenta-tives(COTRs),suchasthoseassignedtotheArmySustainmentCommandorArmyfieldsupportbri-gadesandtheirrespectivebattalions,areresponsibleforensuringthatcontractorsstrictlyabidebytheircontractedperformanceworkstatements(PWSs),ful-fillArmymissionrequirements,andupholdGovern-mentinterests.
Todefine,safeguard,andexecutetheircontractoversightrolesandresponsibilities,theseSoldiersandciviliansmustattendtheCORcourseofferedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversityorDefenseAcquisitionUniversity.Likewise,theymustbecomewell-versedintheFederalAcquisitionRegulationandtheDefenseFederalAcquisitionRegulation,whichdefinetheGov-ernment’srulesforcontractedbusiness.
TeamEffortandLoyaltiesBecausetheArmydoesnothavethetotalpersonnel
strengthormaterielcapacitytosatisfyallofitscurrentmissionrequirements,contractorsdelivertherequisitemanpower,equipment,andexpertisetosatisfyArmydemandsandprovidepracticalapplicationstoaccom-plishmilitarysupportandsustainmentmissions.Meld-ingcontractorsintotheArmy’smissionsgeneratesacombatmultiplierthatenablesmilitarypersonneltomeetotheroperationalrequirements.
ThroughtheCORcourse,Governmentemployeesgainanunderstandingofhowtomanagerelationshipswithcontractorsintheworkplaceandduringdeploy-mentsandhumanitarianassistancemissions.TheGov-ernmentemployeeandcontractorrelationshipformstheteameffortrequiredformissionsuccess.Bothenti-tiesmustworkcloselytogetheranddevelopgoodbusi-nessandpartnershippractices.
However,despitetheirmutualmission-focusedapproachtosatisfyingArmyrequirements,contrac-torsandGovernmentemployeeseachhavedifferentloyalties,andtheseloyaltiesarethedrivingforcebehindtheiroverallpurposeandmotivation.Contrac-torsseektosatisfyshareholders’expectationswhilemaintaininggoodworkingandcustomerrelationshipswiththeGovernmentandposturingthemselvesto
bidonandwinthenextcontract.SoldiersandArmyciviliansdefendandupholdtheConstitution(Govern-mentinterests),executemilitaryorders,andsupportthecommander’sintent.AlthoughcontractorsandGovernmentemployeeshavedifferentloyalties,theyarebothchargedandboundtoexecutetheArmy’smissionathand.
ContractOversightontheBattlefield
by lieutenant Colonel peter W. buttS
S
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 35
Above: A mechanic washes off an M1151 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle outside the 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar.
At right: An auto body repairman and painter from Nepal applies a coat of Tan 686A, a paint meant for desert camouflage, on the wheels of a Stryker armored combat vehicle inside a booth at Camp As Sayliyah. (Photos by Dustin Senger)
36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
RelationshipandProcessDevelopmentSo,howdoestheGovernmentmonitorandpro-
videvigilantcontractoversightwhileinfluencingthecontractortomaintainateam-effortattitude?First,GovernmentemployeesusethecontractagreementandPWS(whichoutlineswhatthecontractormustaccomplishunderthecontract)toensurethatthecontractorsupportsandsustainstheArmy’smission.Thecontractingofficer(KO)administersthecontract,andtheCORsandCOTRsbecometheKO’seyesandearsinthefieldtoensurecontractorcompliance.Acost-reimbursablecontractisapopularGovernmentcontractandisusedespeciallywhentheendresultortimeneededtomeetmilitarymissionrequirementsisuncertainorhardtodefine.
Second,sothattheGovernmentcanavoidopera-tionalriskinmeetinguncertainmilitaryrequire-ments,thecontractormaybecontractedtofulfilla“securityblanket”role.However,tooverseeandemploythissecurityblanketandreducefinancial
risk,theGovernmentmustmakesurethatthecon-tractoractuallyanddiligentlyfulfillsthetermsout-linedinthePWS.
Sinceacost-reimbursablecontractprovidesnofinancialincentiveforthecontractortoachievespendingorperformanceefficiencies,SoldiersandArmycivilianswithspecifictechnicalexpertisebecomethehonestbrokersforGovernmentinterests,executecontractoversight,andensurethatthecon-tractorisperforminginaccordancewiththePWS.Withoutthiskeenoversight,Governmentdollars,time,andresourcesaresubjecttowaste.
ThesheriffattheforefrontofthePWSandcon-tractoversightmissionistheunit’squalityassurancerepresentative(QAR).TheQAR,alongwiththeunitCORsandCOTRs,developsthequalityassurancesurveillanceplan(QASP),whichincludesthecontractandthePWSchecklistidentifyingthetasks,policies,andproceduresthatthecontractormustperformandexecutefortheGovernment.
Two mechanics install turret parts inside a vehicle at the 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar. (Photo by Dustin Senger)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 37
TheQASPenablesandguidestheunit’sCORsandCOTRstoobserveandvalidatespecificcontractorper-formanceactions.Assuch,CORsissuewarningsorcor-rectiveactionrequests(CARs)thatdocumentcontractordeficiencieswhileperformingor,insomecases,notperformingtasksidentifiedinthePWS.TheseCARsarereportabletotheKOandareregularlyreviewedtodetermineoverallcontractorperformance.TheCARscanaffecttheGovernment’sdecisiontosustainorrelievethecontractorfromthatparticularcontract.
ThePitfalls:FraternizationandComplacencyTwolikelysituationscouldarisefromtheGovern-
mentemployeeandcontractorteam-effortrelationship:fraternizationandcomplacency.ThesetwopitfallscanunderminemissionsuccessorcauseafailureifCORsorCOTRsdonotprovidethecontractoversightneededtosafeguardGovernmentinterests.
FraternizationoccurswhenaGovernmentemployeeandacontractorwhoareinvolvedinthesamecontractcongeniallysocializeinanymanner.DespitethecloserelationshipsthatcandevelopamongGovernmentemployeesandcontractorssupportingtheteameffort,Governmentemployeesmustunderstandthatbefriend-ingorhelpingacontractor,includingevengivinghimarideinapersonalorGovernmentvehicle,couldbemisconstruedaspreferentialtreatmentandcouldcauseabreakdowninthecontractoversightprocess.
Moreover,anoutwardlyawkwardrelationshipcoulddevelopfromcongeniallysocializingandcausetheGovernmentemployeetolosetheabilitytoobjectivelyoverseethecontractor’sperformance.ThisrelationshipcouldresultinunduecontractorinfluenceortheGov-ernmentemployee’sapprehensiontoexecutepropercontractoversight.Stayingpurelyobjectivethrough-outthecontractoversightmissionenablesCORsandCOTRstoexecutetheirindividualrolesandrespon-sibilitiesandkeeptheirmindsontheGovernment’sbusiness.
ComplacencybyeitherthecontractorortheGov-ernmentemployee,orboth,canoccurforvariousreasonsandultimatelycanchipawayatthebedrockofestablishedPWSrequirements.TheGovernmentemployee’sfailuretoremainvigilantandfollowtheQASPcanresultfromsimplytrustingthecontractortoperformandexecutecontractedworkinsteadofapply-ingdiligent,longstandingoversightforthatcontract,asrequired.
InarecentGovernmentcontractsituation,formorethanayear,acontractorhadbeencomplacentandhadnotbeenproperlyfulfillingitscontractualobligations
outlinedinthePWS.Sothecontractedcompany’sleaderssurveyedthesituationand,inconjunctionwiththeGovernment,relieved,suspended,orreassignedmorethan30contractedpersonnel,includingfirst-linemanagersandavicepresident.Thisactionwasexecutedimmediatelytocleanupacontractsituationgoneawryandtofulfillthecontractor’sobligationtotheGovernment’smission.
Thecompletesuccessofacost-reimbursablecon-tractreliesheavilyonGovernmentpersonnelbeingschool-trainedasCORsandCOTRsandhavingafirmunderstandingofhowpropercontractoversightleadstoGovernmentmoneybeingwellspentratherthanwasted.Withoutthisengrainedknowledgeofcontractoversight,theGovernmentcouldbeavictimoffraud,waste,andabuse.
AcontractordependsontheGovernmentforbusi-nessandwantstoperformthejobwelltoretainthecontractandmeetshareholderexpectations.Com-mandersareresponsibleformakingsurethattheircontractsareproperlyexecuted.ArmycommandersareresponsibleformakingsurethattheircontractorsproperlyexecutethecontractaccordingtothePWSandthattheirKOssustainefficientcontractoversight.WhenGovernmentemployeesareCOR-coursetrainedandhaveasolidunderstandingofhowtoexecutetheircontractoversightrolesandresponsibilities,Govern-mentsuccessprevailsandtheteamwins.
lieutenant Colonel peter w. Butts CommanDs the 1st Bat-talion, 401st army fielD support BrigaDe, whiCh oversees army pre-positioneD stoCks 5 at Camp as sayliyah, Qatar. he holDs a Degree in CommuniCations from the university of nevaDa, las vegas, anD a master’s Degree in Business aDministration from Baker university.
A mechanic from Nepal hands tools to a mechanic from India inside the 1st Battalion, 401st Army
Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah. (Photo by Dustin Senger)
38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
oorlymanagedvehiclebatterymaintenance canleadtoearlyfailureandunnecessary replacementcosts.Itcanalsotakeawaytimefromamechanic’sdailyscheduleandhisabilitytoperformothertasks,suchasgeneraltroubleshootingandrepair.Ultimately,poorbatterymaintenancewillaffectthereadinessofaunit’srollingstock.
AsthesurfacemaintenancemanagerfortheKen-tuckyArmyNationalGuard(KYARNG),Ihaveinstitutedabatterymanagermaintenance(BMM)programwiththeongoingconsultationofaprivatecontractor,PulseTechProductsCorporation.Pulse-Techincorporatesits“smart”chargerandmaintenancetechnologyintotheBMMprogramandprovidesstrongcustomerserviceandsupport.
Theresultshavebeenimpressiveandrewarding.BeforehavingaccesstoPulseTech’ssmarttechnologyandconsultationservices,theKYARNGexclusivelyusedflooded-cell(wet)batteries.Theaveragelife-spanforatypicalflooded-cellbatteryis2yearsontrackedvehiclesand3yearsonwheeledvehicles.IntheKYARNG,whichhas292full-timemaintenancepersonneland40temporaryworkersspreadamong13maintenanceshops,wehadaveragedabout2,000newbatteriesannually.
AgMBatteriesTwoyearsago,webeganswitchingtothenew
Hawkerabsorbedglassmat(AGM)batteriesandinstitutedourBMMprogramwiththehelpofPulse-Tech.Sincethen,wehavehadtoreplacelessthan5percentofourinventoryof2,500Hawkerbatteries,representinga90-percentreductioninyear-to-yearreplacements.Wealsoestimatethatwehavegained1man-yearofavailableproductivetimebecausewespendlesstimereplacingandmaintainingbatteries.AlthoughthecostofAGMbatteriesishigherthanthecostoftheflooded-cellbatterieswepreviouslyused,AGMbatterieslastlonger,performbetter,andcanbesafelyshippedbyair,readytouse.
TokeepthoseAGMbatteriesatpeakperformance,weemployavarietyofhigh-techsmarttools,includ-inganalyticaltestersandchargingsystems,suchasheavy-dutyrollingchargersandpalletchargers.Alongwiththetechnology,wehaveinstitutedaroutine“cradle-to-grave”maintenanceprogramthatclearlydefinesproceduresforhandlingandsafety,
preventiveandcorrectivemaintenance,testinganddiagnostics,charging,andreplacement.
ACustomizedBMMProgramTheKYARNGBMMprogramcoversawidevari-
etyoftrackedandwheeledequipment,includingmultiplelaunchrocketsystems,howitzers,armoredpersonnelcarriers,engineerequipment(bulldozers,scrapers,dumptrucks,andfront-endloaders),heavyequipmenttransporters,palletizedloadsystems,heavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltrucks,andhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles.Withapproximately3,500vehicles,trailers,andgenerators,weneededamaintenanceplancustomizedspecificallytomatchouruniqueblendofbatteryserviceandmaintenanceequipment,batteryinventory,andvehicleusage.
RoyJohnson,aretiredArmywarrantofficerandPulse-Tech’smilitaryliaisonwhomIfirstmetataconferencein2007,quicklypointedoutthat“onesizedoesn’tfitall”whenitcomestobatterymaintenance.UsingPul-seTech’sArmyBMMprogram,whichthecompanyhasrefinedthroughoutits20-yearpartnershipwiththemili-tary,weworkedforseveralmonthswithRoytocreateacustomprogramthatbestsuitedKYARNGneeds.
Throughcongressionalplus-upfunds,theCommuni-cations-ElectronicsResearch,Development,andEngi-neeringCenterprovidedbatterytestersandchargers,andtheKYARNGpurchasedadditionalequipmenttoroundouttheprogram.Intotal,weacquiredPulse-Tech’sMBT–1batterytester,490PTbatteryanalyzer,PulseCharger/WorldVersion,Pro-HDheavy-dutyrollingcharger,HDpalletcharger,RediPulse
TheBatteryManagerMaintenanceProgram
Pby lieutenant Colonel anthony W. aDaMS, kyarnG
According to the Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, the eight major reasons for premature battery failure include—
l Insufficientruntime.l Batteryself-discharge.l Temperaturefailure.l Dirtybatterycases.l Intermixingofbatteries.l Operatorerror.l Faultyelectricalsystems.l Physicaldamage.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 39
Pro-12charge/maintenancesystem,andotherbatterymobileshopandserviceequipment.However,itwasPul-seTech’songoingconsultationsandseminarsthattaughtusabattery’srealcapabilities.PulseTechprovidedonsite,hands-ontrainingtomaximizethebenefitsofchargingandmaintenanceequipment(evenifitwasnottheirbrand).
Oneofthebestexamplesofbenefitsthroughthiscol-laborationwasthedevelopmentoftheMATES(ManeuverandTrainingEquipmentSite)BatteryRoomGuidebook,whichcoversnewbatteryturn-inprocedures,batteryworksheets,constantchargemaintenance,stateofcharge,typesofequipmentutilized,andhard-to-chargebatteries.
Theguidebookoutlinesourproceduresformain-tainingvehiclebatteries.Forexample,whennewbat-teriesarrive,theyareplacedontheRediPulsePro-12palletcharger,whichdesulfatestheplatesandbringsthebatteriestoacompletestateofcharge.Thentheyarereadyforuse.Twelvebatteriesarekeptchargedatalltimes;whenoneistakenoffthechargertobeused,itisimmediatelyreplacedwithanother.
Whenavehicleisbroughtintotheshop,thebatteriesaretestedtoensurethattheyareholdingachargewithin0.2voltsofeachother.Whenthatisverified,thePro-HDchargerishookeduptothevehicle’sslaverecep-tacle.ThePro-HDreturnsthebatteriestoalike-newstatewithouthavingtoremovethebatteriesfromthevehicle.Oncethebatteriesarecharged,theyarecheckedforserviceabilitywiththeadvancedbatteryanalyzer.Ifabatterydoesnottesttostandard,itisreplaced.Thatreplacedbatterythenstartstheprocessoveragain.
ReducingWasteByusingPulseTechequipmentwithsmarttechnol-
ogy,wecanreducewaste.PulseTechequipmentresultsintherehabilitationandreturntoserviceofmany“bad”batteriesthathadlosttheirchargewhilebeingstockpiledinwarehouses.
Asabatteryagesthroughuseorthroughsittingunusedforalongperiodoftime,leadsulfatecrystalsenlargeandcanbuildupexcessivelytothepointthattheycreateaphysicalbarrieracrossthesurfaceoftheplate.Beforelong,
thisbuildupcanbecomesodensethatabatterycannolon-geracceptorreleaseenergy,soitbecomesadeadbattery.
Inthepast,these“bad”batterieswerestockpiledanddiscardedratherthanevaluatedandrestoredtoservice.Pulsetechnologyhaschangedthewaywelookatbatterylifecycles.
Pulsetechnology,developedbyPulseTechandpat-entedin1989,removesandpreventsthebuildupofdamaginglead-sulfatedepositsonbatteryplatesinanonharmfulwaysothatabatterycanaccept,store,andreleasemaximumpowerallthetime.Whatmakespulsetechnologysouniqueandeffectiveistheappli-cationofadistinctpulsewaveform.Thiswaveformhasastrictlycontrolledrisetime,pulsewidth,frequency,andamplitudeofcurrentandvoltagepulse.Nootherknownbatterychargingormaintenancesystemhasthesespecificcharacteristics.
AlthoughtheKYARNGBMMprogramisessentiallydesignedforkeepinggood,newbatteriesinpeakcondi-tionforalongerperiodoftime,wehavealsolearnedhowtorecoverbatteriesthatwillnotacceptandholdachargeusingconventionalmethodsandequipment.Wedothisusingnewhigh-techbatterychargingandmain-tenancesystemsthatusepulsetechnology.
TheKYARNGnowpaysmoreforbatteries,buttheylastlonger.Wedonotknowexactlyhowmuchlongeryet,butwecanalreadyseethecostsavingsintheamountofmoneyspentonreplacementbatteries.Wealsospendlesstimeworkingwithbatteries,whichallowsmechanicstobemoreproductiveinperformingmechanicaltroubleshootingandrepairs.Andbecauseofthat,ourSoldiershavegreaterconfidenceintheperformanceoftheirequipment.
lieutenant Colonel anthony w. aDams, kyarng, serves as the surfaCe maintenanCe manager for the kentuCky army national guarD. he has a BaChelor of arts Degree in english anD philosophy from Centre College anD is a graDuate of the orDnanCe offiCer aDvanCeD Course, the ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, the army CommanD anD general staff College, anD the Joint logistiCs Course.
Although the cost of AGM batteries is higher
than the cost of the flooded-cell batteries
we previously used, AGM batteries last longer,
perform better, and can be safely shipped by air,
ready to use.
We also spend less time working with batteries, which allows mechanics to be more productive in performing mechanical
troubleshooting and repairs. And because of that, our
Soldiers have greater confidence in the performance
of their equipment.
40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
spartofthegreatertransformationeffort conductedbytheArmyinthelastdecade, theArmyMedicalDepartment(AMEDD)cre-atedanewunitcalledthemultifunctionalmedicalbattalion(MMB),whichincludesasupportopera-tions(SPO)section.WethinkthattheMMB’sSPOorganizationisapoorlyunderstoodandoftenunde-rusedstaffsection.AliteraturereviewhasfoundonlytwoarticlesthatdiscusstheMMBSPOsection.Neitherarticleisdedicatedtothisnewstaffsection;theyonlybrieflymentiontheSPOsectionanditscapabilities.Inthisarticle,wewillattempttoexplaintherolesandfunctionsofthenewMMBSPOsectionanddiscussthelessonswelearnedwhileleadingaSPOsectioningarrisonandduringadeployment.
ReplacingStovepipedUnitsTheMMBcomprisesportionsoftheformerarea
support,evacuation,medicallogistics,dental,andveterinarybattalions.TheMMBconceptwasadoptedfromthemultifunctionallogisticsbattalionsformerlyfoundindivisionsandbrigadecombatteams:thefor-wardsupportbattalionandthemainsupportbattalion.
Previously,thestovepipedmedicaldepartmentbattalionsoperatedthesamewayastheoldlogis-ticsbattalions.Ingarrison,thebattalionswerefunctionallyaligned,butamedicaltaskforcewasnormallycreatedduringadeployment.TheMMBwasdevelopedtomakethisadhocdeploymenttaskforceorganizationpermanent,justastheinnovativeforwardsupportandmainsupportbattalionsdid.Thisapproachhelpsfosterstrongerrelationshipsamongthespecialtiesandensuresthatthebattalionheadquarterspersonnelwillbeexperiencedenoughtoproperlycommandandcontrolsubordinateunits,regardlessoftheirspecialty.
TheMMBdoesnothaveasetmodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE)otherthanthatoftheheadquartersandheadquartersdetachment.TheMMBhasnoletteredsubordinateunits.Allunitsassignedtoitarestand-alone,numberedcompaniesanddetachmentsthatareassignedtotheMMBinatailoredpackageforaspecificdeploymentmission.
Thekeytocommandingandcontrollingthediversenumberandtypesofmedicalcompaniesanddetach-mentsassignedtothebattalionisastaffsectionthat
alsowasoriginallydevelopedinmultifunctionallogis-ticsunits—theSPOsection.
SPOSectionOrganizationTheSPOsectionhasthesamemissionineithera
multifunctionallogisticsormultifunctionalmedicalbattalion:toplan,coordinate,andenabletheexter-nalsupportprovidedbythebattalion’ssubordinateunits.ThetraditionalS-shopstaffsfocusoninternalpersonnel,supply,maintenance,training,andopera-tionsissuesforthebattalion.TheSPOsectionandtheS-shopshavedistinct,separatefunctionsandfocuses,thoughtheyrequireconsiderablecoordination.
TheMMBS-shopsanswertothebattalionexecu-tiveofficer(amedicalservicecorpsmajor),whereastheSPOsectionreportstotheSPOofficer(alsoamedicalservicecorpsmajor).Traditionally,battalionshaveanexecutiveofficer(amajor)andanS–3opera-tionsofficer(amajor),whobothreportdirectlytothebattalioncommander.TheexecutiveofficerhandlesalladministrativemattersforthebattalionwhiletheS–3handlestrainingandplanning.
SPOStaffingTheSPOsectionwasaddedtologisticsunitsto
coordinatetheexternalsupportthatthebattalionpro-vided.Becauseoftheimportanceofthissection,theS–3positionwasdowngradedtoacaptainandtheSPOofficer-in-charge(OIC)wasmadeamajor.ThissamerankstructurewasbuiltintotheMMBs,witheachmajoransweringdirectlytothebattalioncom-mander.
TheMMBSPOsection(with29ofthe77autho-rizedheadquartersandheadquartersdetachmentposi-tions)wasallottedasergeantmajorasthesection’snoncommissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC).Previ-ously,operationssergeantsmajorwereonlyautho-rizedatthebrigadelevel,sothisisaverysignificantadditiontoabattalionstaff.Therankprovidesanexperiencednoncommissionedofficer(NCO)whohasgreatauthoritytohelpoverseethediverseandcriticalSPOsection.
TheSPOsectionisstructuredtohaveanassortmentofsubject-matterexpertscapableofprovidingover-sightforanymedicalcompany,detachment,orteamthatcouldbeassignedtotheMMB.Theseexperts’
SupportOperations:LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctionalMedicalBattalion
A
by lieutenant Colonel DouGlaS h. GaluSZka anD SerGeant MaJor DaviD franCo
specialtiesincludemedicalmaintenance,medicalsupply,behavioralhealth,veterinaryservices,patientadministration,opticalfabrication,laboratoryservices,preventivemedicine,dentistry,medicaloperationsandplanning,evacuation,andpracticalnursing.
Therankstructureissetuptoensurethatexperi-encedpersonnelareassignedtotheSPOsection.ThemostjuniorauthorizedrankforSPONCOsisstaffsergeant,andmostoftheNCOslotsaresergeantfirstclass.Alloftheofficerslotsareauthorizedatcaptainorchiefwarrantofficer3.Thisstructureprovidestherequisiteexpertisetoproperlyplanandmanagethesupportprovidedbysubordinateunits.ItalsogivesthestaffofficersandNCOsahighlevelofauthoritywhenprovidingguidanceandenforcingstandards.ThishighrankstructurehasprovencriticaltotheSPOsection’ssuccess.
NamingtheSectionUnitleadersdebatedaboutwhattocalltheSPO
sectionafterourunit,the421stEvacuationBattalion,wasredesignatedasthe421stMMBinJune2007atWiesbadenArmyAirfield,Germany.TheMTOEreferstothesectionasforcehealthprotection(FHP).FieldManualInterim(FMI)4–02.121,Multifunction-alMedicalBattalion,usesFHPtodescribetheoverallmissionoftheMMB:“TheFHPsystemencompassesthepromotionofwellnessandpreventive,curative,andrehabilitativemedicalservices...[and]isacon-tinuumfrompointofinjuryorwoundingthroughsuccessivelevelsofcare.”TheFMIdoesnotcallthe
sectiontheFHP,butusestheterm“medicalsupportoperations.”
Theterm“forcehealthprotection”isconfusingsinceitwascommonlyusedinthepasttodescribepreventivemedicineefforts;outsideunitsdidnotunderstandourcapabilitiesandthoughtweweresolelyfocusedonpre-ventivemedicine.ThetermusedintheFMIwasadopt-ed,buttheword“medical”wasdroppedforconvenienceaswellastoalignuswiththesectioninthebrigadesup-portbattalionsthatcoordinatesexternalsupport—sup-portoperations.ThesectionOICisknownastheSPOandtheNCOICastheSPOsergeantmajor.
TheMTOEandFMIarealsodifferentinwhattheynametheSPOsubsections.TheMTOElistsmedicallogistics,medicaloperations,preventivemedicine,andmentalhealthsubsections,whiletheFMIlistsmedicallogistics,medicaloperations,andclinicaloperationsassubsections.
ThesectionpersonnellistedintheMTOEandtheFMIalsodiffer.Forexample,theMTOEliststhemilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)68WM6,practicalnurse,inmedicaloperations,butintheFMI,thepositionislistedinclinicaloperations.The421stMMBdecidedtousetheFMIstructureofthreesub-sections—medicaloperations,clinicaloperations,andmedicallogistics—withacaptainOICandamastersergeantNCOICforeach.
MTOEDeficienciesTheMMBshouldbeauthorizedaProfessional
FillerSystem(PROFIS)battalionsurgeon(preferably
421stMultifunctionalMedicalBattalionOrganizationChart
BattalionCommander
Chaplain
S–1OrderlyRoom
SupportOperations
MedicalOperations
MedicalLogistics
ClinicalOperations
FoodServices
Maintenance
S–2/3
S–4
S–5
CommandSergeantMajor
ExecutiveOfficer HeadquartersandHeadquartersDetachment
42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
alieutenantcolonel)forthespecialstaff.Somemis-sionswillnotrequirethispositiontobefilled;oth-erswill.HavingthisauthorizationontheMTOEwouldenablethebattalioncommandertorequestafillwithouthavingtojustifytheneedtotheArmyForcesCommandandArmyMedicalCommand(aswasrequiredforthedeploymenttoIraq).IthasbeensuggestedthatanurseandapharmacistshouldalsobelistedasPROFIS.Theseofficerscertainlycouldmakecontributions,butwiththesergeantfirstclasspharmacytechnicianandmastersergeantpracticalnursetoteamwithaPROFISbattalionsurgeon,thebattalionwouldhavetheexpertiseneededtoaccom-plishitsmission.
TheMTOEhasnoauthorizedtentage,lightsets,orotheritemsneededinfieldoperationsforthe29SPOSoldiers.Itauthorizesonlysix9-millimeterpistolsfortheentireheadquartersdetachment,withonlyoneavailableintheSPOsection.TheSPO,SPOsergeantmajor,andchiefwarrantofficer3shouldbeprovidedpistols.ItisalsoadvisabletoprovideeachofthethreesubsectionOICsandNCOICswithapis-tolbecauseoftheirrankandresponsibilityinordertoalignthembetterwiththeircounterpartsintheS-shops.
Transportationisanotherissue.Currently,onlytwohigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesandtwo2½-tontrucksareauthorized.Evenwiththeidealconfigurationandtypesofvehicles,theSPOsec-tioncouldonlytransporthalfofitspersonnelatonetime—adifficultsituationifthebattalionismaneu-veringduringacampaign.
DevelopingSPO’sRoleintheBattalionTheadditionoftheSPOsectiontotheMMBwas
astepforwardinplanningandoversight,butthetransformationwasnotcompletedatthehigherlevelsofcommand.LogisticsbattalionSPOsectionscoor-dinatewithsimilarlystructuredsectionsinthesus-tainmentbrigade.ThisisnotthecasewiththeMMBSPOsection;noSPOsectionexistsinanymedicalbrigadeormedicalcommand.WhentheMMBSPOsectionneedstocoordinateeffortswiththemedi-calbrigadeormedicalcommand,ithastoworkwiththreeseparatesections:G–3,G–4,andclinicalopera-tions.Thisleadstomanychallengesinconsistencyofguidanceandcoordinationofefforts.
Becausesubordinateunitsandhigherheadquar-tersaremorefamiliarwiththeS-shopsthantheyarewiththeSPOsection,manySPO-relatedissuesarereferredtoandworkedbytheS-shops.TheFMIactu-allycontributestothisconfusion.ItstatesthattheSPOsectionneedstoworkwiththeS-shopsbecausetheS–1willprovidepersonnelcasualtyestimates,theS–2/3willgathermedicalintelligenceandprovideclinicalinputforFHPestimatesandplans,andthe
S–4willprovidesupportforallclassVIII(medicalmateriel)requirements.
CombiningtheSPOsectionwiththeS-shopsdividestheresponsibilityforplanning,coordination,andoversightoftheexternalsupportprovidedbythesubordinateunitsbetweentheSPOsectionandtheS-shopsandonlyleadstoconfusion.TheentirereasonforcreatingtheSPOsectionwastounifythecoordinationofexternalsupportunderonesectionwhereclinical,logistics,andoperationalrequirementscanbeplannedandtracked.HavingitanyotherwaynullifiestheneedfortheSPOsection.
The421stMMBSPOsectionperformedallofthefunctionsmentionedabove.Itfoundthatcreatingclearanddistinctlinesofresponsibilitywasneces-sary.Allinternaladministrative,training,andopera-tionalmatters,suchasawards,evaluationreports,ranges,convoys,unitstatusreports,propertybook,andgroundmaintenance,aretheresponsibilityoftheS-shops.Allexternalsupportprovidedandplannedfor,suchasborrowedmilitarymanpowermemoran-dumsofagreement,expertfieldmedicalbadgetrain-ing,MOS68W(healthcarespecialist)sustainment,medicalmaintenanceoversight,medicaltaskings,medicalsupportplanning,workloaddatacollection,subject-matterexpertguidance,andmedicalmain-tenance,istheresponsibilityoftheSPOsection.Inshort,anythingthatdealsspecificallywithamedicalfunctionorcapabilityistheSPOsection’sconcern;everythingelseisworkedbytheS-shops.
Ingarrison,theSPOsectionneedstoactivelyseekoutprojectstokeepexercisingitsplanningandcoordinatingskills.Inthegarrisonenvironment,theS-shopsnaturallybecomethefocusoftheheadquar-ters’efforts.Personnelandpropertyadministration,equipmentmaintenance,andSoldiertrainingneedtobeconsistentlyexecutedtoensurethatsubordinateunitsarereadytooperateproperlywheninthefield.ButtheSPOsectioncannotbecomemerelyaperson-nelmineforNCOsandofficerstoconductadditionaldutiesandtaskingsbecause,inthefield,theSPOsectionbecomesthefocusoftheheadquarterseffortsandmustbepreparedtomeetthoseresponsibilities.
Itisimportanttoseekouteventstoplanandcoor-dinate,suchasplanningandexecutinganexpertfieldmedicalbadgetrainingevent,conductingMOS68Wsustainmenttraining,orconductingacombatlifesav-erclass.Forexample,whilethe421stMMBsubordi-nateunitswerestillgoingthroughtransformationinGermany,theSPOsectionwastheleadforplanningtherebasing,inactivation,ortransitiontoTDA(tableofdistributionandallowances)missionsformedicallogistics,preventivemedicine,veterinary,andoptom-etryunits.
TheSPOsectionshouldalsobetheplanners,maintrainers,andevaluatorsforsubordinateunitsgoing
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 43
throughmissionreadinessexercisesorresetevalua-tions.Theabilityofsubordinateunitstoconducttheirmedicalmissions,whichinvolveallaspectsoffieldcraftandmedicalskills,isnaturallytheresponsibil-ityoftheSPOsectionwithitslargenumberofseniorsubject-matterexperts.
Coordinatingthesubordinateunits’effortswasachallengeinthemonthsfollowingthe421st’sconver-siontoanMMB.Infact,thebattalion’sdeploymentmissionreadinessexercisewasthefirsttimetheSPOsectionplannedandcoordinatedfunctionsforsubor-dinateunitsinthefield.Withthe421stMMBcom-mander’ssupport,theeffortsoftheSPOofficersandNCOsatthemissionreadinessexercisedisplayedthefullcapabilitiesofthisrobuststaffsection.
PreparingforDeploymentThenewSPOandSPOsergeantmajorwere
assignedtothesectioninthesummerof2007.With
adeploymentplannedfor2008,fillingtheautho-rizedSPOpersonnelslotswascritical.TheSPOandbattalionleadersfilledtheseslotsthroughfrequentcommunicationwithpersonnelmanagersatthebri-gade,regionalmedicalcommand,andArmyHumanResourcesCommand.
Fillingthelow-densityMOSpositionswasapar-ticularchallengesincethesepositionsareforseniorNCOsandthiswasanewtypeofunitwithwhichtheywereunfamiliar.ButtheseexpertsweredeemedcriticaltothemissionthattheunitwouldinheritinIraq.Inparticular,theopticalfabricationtechnician,pharmacytechnician,andpracticalnursepositionswere“mustfills”forthedeployment.BythemissionreadinessexerciseinAugust2008,mostoftheposi-tionswerefilled,thoughseveralSoldiersarriveddur-ingthepredeploymentblockleave.
The44thMedicalCommandallottedthe421stMMBaslotonitsIraqpredeploymentsitesurvey
421stMultifunctionalMedicalBattalionSupportOperationsDeploymentOrganizationChart
OfficerinChargeMajorChiefOperationsNCO
SergeantMajor
BattalionSurgeonSpecialStaffColonelandLieutenantColonel
MedicalLogistics MedicalOperations/CivilMilitaryOperations ClinicalLogistics
MedicalLogisticsSergeantSpecialist
MedicalLogisticsSergeantSpecialist
EnvironmentalScienceOfficerFirstLieutenant(1LT)
PatientAdministrationOfficer
1LT
PracticalNurseSFC
DentalNCOSFC
MedicalLabNCOSFC
MentalHealthSSg
MentalHealthSSg
Evacuation/Civilian/MilitaryOperationsOfficer
1LT
SeniorOperationsNCOMSg
MedicalOperationsNCOSFC
SeniorOpticalLabNCOSFC
SeniorVeterinaryNCOSFC
PreventiveMedicineNCOSSg
MedicalOperationsNCOSSg
MedicalLogisticsSergeantSSg
MedicalMaintenanceNCOSFC
StockControlOfficerCaptain
BattalionMaintenanceOfficer
ChiefWarrantOfficer4
SeniorMedicalLogisticsSergeantMasterSergeant(MSg)
PharmacyNCOSergeantFirstClass(SFC)
PlansandOperationsOfficerCaptain
PlansandOperationsOfficerCaptain
RearDetachment
PatientAdministrationNoncommissionedOfficer
StaffSergeant(SSg)
SupportManagementOfficerBudgetOfficer
Captain
VeterinaryNCOMovementControlNCO
SSg
DetailedtoMovementControlCenter
DetailedtoS–4
44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
team.TheSPOwasselectedtofillthisslot.ThetripgavehimfirsthandknowledgeoftheexactnatureoftheMMB’supcomingmission.Thevisitstohealth,optometry,anddentalclinics;groundambulancesquads;andthebattalionheadquarterswerevalu-able.Thediscussionswiththe261stMMBSPOandS-shopsectionsregardingtheirtrainingadviceandconcernsenabledthe421stMMBtotailoritsprede-ploymenttrainingplantomatchthemissionitwouldexecute.
The421stMMBHeadquartersandHeadquartersDetachmentdeployedtoBalad,Iraq,inthefallof2008.TheSPOOICandtheNCOICofthemedicaloperationssectionwereintheadvancepartytohelpensurethehandofffromthe261stMMBwaswellcoordinatedfromthestart.
421stMMBMissioninIraqSeveralrotationsearlier,thetwoMMBsinIraq
hadalignedtheirmissionsfunctionally.Insteadofhavingsubordinateunitsassignedforallofthespe-cialties,eachMMBwasassignedalloftheunitsofalimitednumberofspecialties,thusenablingtheMMBstafftofocusitsefforts.Thispracticecontin-uedduringthe421stMMBdeployment.Themis-sionofthe421stMMBwastocommandandcontrolfiveareasupportmedicalcompanies,twodentalcompanies,twogroundambulancecompanies,fouroptometrydetachments,andoneheadandnecksurgi-calteam.(Oursisterbattalion,the111thMMB,wasresponsibleforthemedicallogistics,veterinary,com-batoperationalstresscontrol,andpreventivemedi-cinemissions.)
The421stMMB’sunitswerescatteredfromMosulinthenorthtoBasrainthesouthandfromBaghdadtoAlAsadinthewestatatotalof30sites.Althoughthemissionofeachsubordinateunitwasimportant,theprimaryfocusofthe421stMMBwaslevelIImedical,dental,andoptometryclinics.
Tactics,Techniques,andProceduresWiththeSPOsectionbeingsuchaneworganiza-
tionforAMEDD,notwodeployedMMBSPOsec-tionshavebeenstructuredthesame.Eachhasbeen
tailoredtothemissionbasedontheavailableperson-nelandthecomfortlevelofthebattalioncommanderandtheSPO.Inthe421stMMB,weusedtheFMIstructureofthreesubordinatesections—medicaloperations,clinicaloperations,andmedicallogis-tics—ashadthebattalionwereplaced.
Medical operations.The421stMMBvariedfromitspredecessorsbyensuringthatthemedicalopera-tionssectionwasnotintegratedintotheS–3,wherethesetwosectionscouldnotbedistinguishedfromeachother.The421stmedicaloperationssectionwaskeptseparatetoensuretheresponsibilityforplanningandtaskingformedicalmissionswasmaintainedintheSPOsection.
However,theS–3shopissuedallorderscom-ingfromtheheadquarters.WithintheSPOsection,allorderscametothemedicaloperationssectionforreviewand,onceapprovedbytheSPOandSPOsergeantmajor,werepassedtotheS–3forformatreviewandissue.
ThepreventivemedicineofficerandNCOwereplacedinthemedicaloperationssection.Sincethe421stMMBmissiondidnotincludetheaterpreven-tivemedicine,thesepersonnelwereonlyinvolvedparttimeinpreventivemedicineissues.Therestoftheirtimewasspentassistingwithmedicalopera-tionsfunctionsandbattalionextraduties,suchasthesafetyofficer.
Anadditiontothemedicaloperationsmissionwascivil-militaryoperations(CMO).SinceallofthetrainingsupportcoordinatedfortheIraqisbythe421stwasmedicalinnature(wewerenotinvolvedinanymedicalhumanitarianassistanceefforts),CMOwasbroughtintotheSPOsection.Sincethe421stMMBhadnoairevacuationplanningmission,theevacuationpilotofthemedicaloperationssectionwasmadethebattalionCMOofficer.Heworkedcloselywiththecivilian,contractedculturalexpert,whowasanIraqi-Americanphysician.TheeffortsoftheseindividualsmadetheCMOmissionasuccess,particularlyinbuildingapartnershipwiththeIraqiGroundForcesCommandsurgeon’scell.TheymetthegoaloforganizingtwomedicalCMOtrainingeventseachmonth.
The MMB is a modular organization, which is tailored based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. The command will include modular units specifically tailored to provide medical logistics support, Level I and II area medical support, ground evacuation, preventive medicine, combat and operational stress control, dental, and veterinary medicine.
—Major General George W. Weightman
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 45
Clinical operations. Theclinicaloperationssectionwasthemedicaladministrationsectionofthebat-talion.Itcollecteddailyworkloadstatistics;updatedandwrotestandingoperatingproceduresonsuchdiversetopicsaspatientsafety,laboratorycontrols,andinfectioncontrol;andwrotefragmentaryordersthatthestaffdraftedintheirareasofexpertise.Thissectionalsoworkedverycloselywiththebattalionsurgeoninthebattalion’sefforttostandardizecareacrossthebattlefield,anever-endingtaskasunitscameandwentinthetheater.
Medical logistics.Themedicallogisticssectionwasresponsibleformedicalsupply,pharmacy,andmedicalmaintenanceoversight.Medicalsupplyper-sonnelassistedwithresearchingrequireditemsanddraftinglettersofjustificationforequipment,assistedwithDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSup-portCustomerAssistanceModule(DCAM)order-ingissues,andreviewedthemonthlyreconciliationreports.Thepharmacytechnicianmanagedandsetthestandardsforthepharmacytechniciansworkingintheclinics.ThesurgeonandthisNCOinteractedfrequentlytoensurethattheproperproceduresfornarcoticsstorageandissuewerebeingfollowed.
Medicalmaintenancepersonnelreviewedmedicalequipmentpurchaserequests,arrangedforopera-tionalfloatequipment,scheduledservices,andstan-dardizedequipmentmodelsacrossthebattlefieldtomakemaintenancesimpler.Thissectionalsooversawclinicrenovationandconstructionbyassistingthebasemayor’scellswithlettersofjustification,havingfloorplansdrawn,andvalidatingandarrangingforfurnitureandequipmentpurchases.
SPOBattleBriefTheSPOsectionpreviouslyhadnoforumfor
presentinginformationtothebattalioncommanderregardingthemedicalsupportprovidedbysubordi-nateunits.AbiweeklySPObattleupdatebriefwasdevelopedtopresentplans,taskings,subject-matterexpertissues,andworkloadstothebattalioncom-manderandthesubordinateunitcommandersthroughanonlineAdobeBreezesession.Thisprovedtobeacriticalimprovementforthebattalion.Previously,onlygeneraladministrativeissues,suchasofficerefficiencyratings,awards,andthepropertybook,werediscussedatbattalioncommandandstaffmeet-ings.WiththeSPObattleupdatebrief,informationonmedicalsupporteffortswasshared,andtheimpor-tantmedicalmissionsofthebattalionandthesub-ordinateunitswerebetterunderstoodbyall,whichgreatlyhelpedwithplanninganddecisionmaking.
Duringthedeployment,greatstridesweremadeinstandardizinghealthcarethroughoutthetaskforce’sareaofoperations.Quarterlystaffassis-tancevisits,newstandingoperatingprocedures,an
enhancedpeerreviewprogram,andtheSPObattleupdatebriefingwerethemostpowerfultoolsusedtoraisethequalityofcareandenforcestandardizationintheclinics.
Overall,TaskForce421stMMBsuccessfullyconducted170,000primarycareand54,000dentalvisitsand43,000optometryexaminations;completed6,000radiologystudiesand28,000labprocedures;fabricated36,000pairsofglasses;filled87,000pre-scriptions;providedmedicalsupportfor720logisticsconvoys;andexecuted22CMOtrainingevents.Thiswascertainlyateameffortinwhichallthestaffsec-tionsandsubordinateunitscontributed,buttheSPOsectionplayedasignificantroleineachoftheseachievements.
TheSPOsectionhasprovenitsworthtotheMMBingarrisonandatwar.TheexpertisecontainedinthesectionmakesitflexibleandexperiencedenoughtomeetthediversechallengesthatanMMBmayface.TheSPOsection’svarietyoftasksandrequire-mentsisgreaterthaninanyotherstaffsectioninanAMEDDfieldunit.Thesuccessorfailureofthebat-talionislargelydeterminedbytheperformanceoftheSPOsection.
TheSPOsectionpositions(suchasmedicalopera-tionsofficer,medicallogisticsofficer,andclinicaloperationsNCOIC)shouldbeasvaluedandsoughtafterinthefutureasthetraditionalS-shoppositionsarenow.TheSPOsectionneedstobebetterunder-stood,supported,andvaluedinAMEDD.ThisgreaterunderstandingwillfostermorecapableandbetterintegratedSPOsectionsinalloftheMMBs.
lieutenant Colonel Douglas h. galusZka was the support operations offiCer for the 421st multifunCtional meDiCal Bat-talion while stationeD at wiesBaDen army airfielD, germany, anD DeployeD to Joint Base BalaD, iraQ. he holDs a B.a. Degree in history from miChigan state university, an m.a. Degree in puBliC aDministration from the university of marylanD-europe, an m.h.a. Degree from Baylor university, anD m.m.a.s. Degrees in military history anD theater operations from the army CommanD anD general staff College. he is a fellow of the ameriCan College of healthCare exeCutives anD is a graDuate of the ameDD BasiC Course, the ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, the army CommanD anD general staff Col-lege, anD the sChool of aDvanCeD military stuDies.
sergeant maJor DaviD franCo is the support operations ser-geant maJor for the 421st multifunCtional meDiCal Battalion stationeD at wiesBaDen army airfielD, germany, anD Cowrote this artiCle while DeployeD to Joint Base BalaD, iraQ. he holDs a B.s. Degree in Business management from the university of marylanD-university College anD has Been inDuCteD into the orDer of military meDiCal merit.he is a graDuate of the first sergeant’s Course anD the sergeants maJor aCaDemy.
46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
perationUnifiedResponseprovidedover- whelmingsupporttoHaitiafterthenation sufferedacatastrophicearthquakeinJanuary2010.OncetheUnitedStatespledgeditssupport,theMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mand(SDDC)GlobalContainerManagement(GCM)Divisionbegantheinitialplanningtoprovidecontain-ersnotonlyforthetransportationofhumanitarianaidbutalsotoserveastemporarystorageandofficespaceforthejointreliefeffortinHaiti.
SDDC’sGCMstaffvisualizedthissupportthroughtheconceptof“OneContainerataTime”.Usingtheconcept,GCMstaffassessedtheusesonecontainercouldprovidewhileonthegroundinHaitiinadditiontoitstraditionaltransportationrole.
GCM,theprogrammanagerfortheMasterContainerLeasingContractfortheDepartmentofDefense,immediatelyactivatedoneofSDDC’slarg-estcontainer-leasingcontractstoobtain1,525dryandrefrigerated20-footcontainers.Thesecontainerswere
ContainersforHaiti:ProvidingTransportationandTemporaryInfrastructure
by thoMaS CatChinGS
O
The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Global Container Management Division shipped containers with food and supplies to Haiti in support of relief efforts after the 12 January earthquake there. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) turned containers that had been emptied into classrooms. (Photos by Janice Laurente, USAID)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 47
Haitian school children pose outside one of the first newly built classrooms constructed through a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) project. The classrooms took 4 weeks to construct and were built from shipping containers provided by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. Each classroom will last up to 10 years. (Photo by Janice Laurente, USAID)
deliveredtolocationsacrossthesouthernstatestosup-porttheWorldFoodProgram,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theArmyandAirForceExchangeService,theMilitaryPostalServiceAgency,andnongovernmentalorganizations.
GCMalsosentouta“callforsupport”toallofthearmedservicestofillthecontainerrequirement.InanswertotheGCMcall,theArmymovedmorethan60containersandtheNavysupplied4refrigeratedcontain-ers,1power-supplygenerator,andmorethan30modularcontainersforhousingandofficespacetothePortofJacksonville,Florida.
TheGCMoperationssectionbeganworkingwithJointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF–H)andtheU.S.South-ernCommandtoestablishthreeessentialcomponentsofcontainermanagementduringOperationUnifiedResponse:standingoperatingprocedures,metricsforaccountability,andcontainer-trackingmethods.
GCM’ssystemsectionimmediatelymettheneedforcontainertrackingandcostaccountabilitybyquicklymodifyingtheU.S.CentralCommand’ssystemofrecordforcontainertracking,theIntegratedBookingSystemContainerManagementModule(IBS–CMM).UsingthismodifiedversionofIBS–CMM,GCMsavedtaxpay-ersmorethan$27,000incommercialcontainerfeesandlong-termcostsforsustainingthereliefeffort.
GCMmetthecontainerstorageandtransportationneeds,butitrealizedthatitwouldneedtodeployitsteamforwardtoJacksonvilleandtoHaititoworkwithotherorganizationsinmanagingandtrackingthesecontainers.Onceinitialcoordinationwasmadeand
theequipmentandteamswereinplace,GCMshifteditseffortstothenextcriticalneedforsupport.GCMapproachedthismissioninthesamewayasithasotherdeploymentsandapplieditsexperienceinthemultipleusesofcontainerstomeetHaiti’sneeds.
Acontainerisnotonlythepreferredmodeoftrans-portforsupplies,itisarguablythebestalternativeformobilestorage,office,andlivingaccommodationsinareaswheretheinfrastructureeitherdoesnotexistorisbeingrebuilt.InHaiti,containersarenowprovid-ingtemporaryinfrastructureforoffices,houses,andschools.GCMisworkingwithJTF–H,U.S.Govern-mentagencies,andHaitiangovernmentagenciestomeetthisrequirement.
ThesamecontainersthatwereusedtoquicklygettheessentialneedsforhumansurvivaltoHaitiarenowusedtosupporttheeducationofHaitianchil-dren.ContainersthatbroughtwaterorfoodtoHaitinowholddesksandchalkboards.Approximately300containersremainonthegroundtoprovidetemporaryfacilitiesinsupportofHaitiasitcontinuestorebuilditsinfrastructure.
thomas CatChings is the programs anD system program manager for gloBal Container management with the military surfaCe Deploy-ment anD DistriBution CommanD at fort eustis, virginia. he holDs a B.a. Degree from alaBama state university anD a master’s Degree in Business management with a military foCus from touro university anD is a lean six sigma BlaCk Belt. he is a graDuate of the army Com-manD anD general staff College’s Civilian aDvanCeD Course anD the Civilian eDuCation system founDation anD BasiC Courses.
48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
embersoftheExpeditionaryContracting Command(ECC)nullifiedpotential problemsduringtheircontingencydeploy-mentinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse,theHaitihumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefmis-sion.Theydidsobyusinglessonslearnedfrompre-viousdeploymentsaswellasbycapturingnewones.
ThefirstECCSoldierarrivedinHaitiwithin48hoursofthedevastating7.0earthquakeon12January.DuringOperationUnifiedResponse,ECCcontractedforsupplies,services,andequipmenttosupportmili-taryandFederalrespondersaswellasHaitiansaffect-edbytheearthquake.Thecommandhelpedtodelivermorethan15millionmealstotheHaitianpeopleina10-dayperiodandestablisheddistributionpointsforlocalfamiliestoreceive25-and30-poundbagsofrice,beans,andcookingoils.Contractingeffortsalsohelpedturndangerousrudimentarysheltersintosaferareaswithtentsandroutinedeliveryofwaterandmeals.
“Wetookadvantageofalotoflessonslearnedfrompreviousdeployments,”saidBrigadierGeneralJosephL.Bass,commandinggeneraloftheECC.“Wedidn’tdothesetypesofthingsearlyoninOper-ationIraqiFreedomorOperationEnduringFreedom.However,welearnedthoselessonsandbroughtthesecapabilitiestoHaitiearlyon.Wewereveryproactivefromthebeginning,deployingtherightpersonnelmixneededtoprovidequalityassurance,legal,poli-cy,andotherareaswherewecouldaddressissuesonthefrontendratherthanafterthey’vebeendone.”
GeneralBassaddedthatestablishingcontractingreach-backsupportstateside,bringinginLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramplannersinthebegin-ningstages,andworkingwithunitstoestablishcoali-tionandjointacquisitionreviewboardswerelessonslearnedfrompreviousmilitarydeploymentstosup-portoperationsinKuwait,Iraq,andAfghanistan.
TheRockIslandContractingCenterinIllinoisprovidedsupportonanon-callbasis,whichallowedcontingencycontractingofficerstoconcentrateonimmediateonsiterequirementsandleavecomplexactionsforthecontractingcenterstateside.Bytheendofthemission,theECChadcreatedmorethan380contractingactionsvaluedatalmost$12million.
Inadditiontoemployinglessonslearned,con-tractingofficersalsoidentifiedareaswherechal-lengesstillexist.Whencontingencycontractingofficers(CCOs)arrivedinHaiti,theyreliedheavilyonsupportfromoutsideunitsandagenciesforbasiclife-supportservices.Toeasetheinitialburden,theECChasdevelopedpre-positioneddeployableequipmentpackagesforitscontractingteamsaspartofanearly-entryequipmentcapability.
TheECCalsoidentified,basedonpastlessonslearned,thatacontractreviewthresholdneedstobeestablishedearlytoallowCCOstoadjusttotheadministrativerequirementsofcontractingopera-tionsinadeployedenvironment.Thisallowsover-sight,managementcontrol,andqualitycontrolofhigh-dollarcontractactions.
Thefactthatthesimplifiedacquisitionthresh-oldincreasesfrom$100,000to$1millionduringadeclaredcontingencyoperationdoesnotmeanthatallCCOsshouldbeissueda$1millionwarrant.WarrantsneedtobeissuedbasedonCCOexperi-enceandthedollaramountofactionsneededtocompletethemission.
“Justaswegatheredlessonslearnedfromprevi-ousdeployments,wehavegatheredsomefromtheHaitideploymentthatshouldhelpusthenexttimewedeploy,”saidGeneralBass.
Oneofthoselessonsisthatthetrainingandexpe-rienceneededtocreateknowledgeableCCOstaketime.Inordertoimprovethisprocess,GeneralBassandhisstaffwanttocreatestandardizedreach-backsupportforcontingencyoperationsandarelookingtoestablishareach-backcenterofexcellenceforglobalcontingenciesthatwouldaligncontractingcontactsregionallywiththecombatantcommandsandthecontractingsupportbrigades.Thecenterofexcel-lencewouldintegratethereach-backpointsofcontactintotrainingeventsandexercises,createalogisticsplanningteamforcontracting,andprovideassistanceforimmediateorcomplexrequirements.
larry D. mCCaskill is a puBliC affairs speCialist with the army ContraCting CommanD. he is a graDuate of QueensBorough Community College anD has more than 25 years of experienCe as an army puBliC affairs professional.
UsingLessonsLearnedforContractinginHaiti
by larry D. MCCaSkill
M
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 49
scriticalcomponentsofcrisisresponse, contingencycontractingofficersareoften calledintohelpwithdisasterreliefoperations,whichwasthecaseimmediatelyafteranearthquakehitthenationofHaitiinJanuary.The410thContract-ingSupportBrigade’s(CSB’s)initialresponsetothedisasterwastonotifyandprovidecommander’sguid-ancetoMajorRalphBarnes,theteamleaderofthe678thContingencyContractingTeambasedinMiami,Florida.Hedeployedwithin24hourstosupportOper-ationUnifiedResponseandwasthefirstcontingencycontractingofficeronthegroundinHaiti.
Thisfastresponserepresentsaparadigmshiftinnotonlythereadinessoftheacquisitioncorpsbutalsothevisibilityofthecapabilitiesofcontingencycontract-ing.TherequestforacontractingofficercamedirectlyfromthecommandinggeneralofJointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF-Haiti),whowasalreadyontheground.Whatfol-lowedwasthefirstdeploymentofExpeditionaryCon-tractingCommandassetssincethecommandachievedfulloperationalcapabilityinOctober2009.
The410thCSB’sabilitytodeployacontingencycon-tractingofficerwithin24hoursindicatesitsfocus.TheteamthatdeployedtoHaitiservedasadirectcontract-ingassettotheJTF-Haiticommanderandasthe410thCSB’sassessmentteamtodeterminefollow-oncapa-bilities.InconjunctionwithdiscussionswiththeU.S.SouthernCommand,andwhileworkingthroughthemilitarydecisionmakingprocess,the410thCSBdecid-edtoadoptaphaseddeploymentapproachwiththeendstatebeingafairlyrobustorganizationalstructure.
TheresultwasthecreationoftheCSBforwardele-mentandtheRegionalContractingCenter-Haiti(RCC-Haiti).Theintentwastoprojectaforwardcommandandcontrolcapabilitythatwouldhaveon-the-groundvisibilityandavoidanumberofcontractingrisksthathaveplaguedpastexpeditionaryoperations.TheCSBforwardelementincludedanArmycolonel,ajudgeadvocatespecializingincontractlaw,andpolicyandqualityassurancepersonnel.Becauseofthisstructure,the410thCSBwasdesignatedtheleadforcontractingandgivenresponsibilityforcoordinatingthejointcon-tractingmissionandpersonnel.
Aswithanycontingency,actionstakenwerebasedmoreonacrisismanagementmodelthanonestablishedprocedures.However,theresultsofoperationswithoutestablishedprocedureswereincompleterequirements,
inefficiencies,andredundancies.Fortunately,thecon-tractingofficers,whohadexperiencefromIraqandAfghanistan,quicklyassessedtheneedtoestablishoperatingprocedures.IncoordinationwithU.S.ArmySouth(theexecutiveagentforlogisticsandfinance),RCC-HaitiassistedJTF-Haitiinestablishingprocessesforcreatingajointacquisitionreviewboardandguid-anceforfieldorderingofficersandpayingagents.Thiswasdonewithinthefirst3weeksofthedeployment—anextraordinaryaccomplishment.
Afterthe410thCSBstructureandprocessesguidedtheinitialcontractingenvironment,the410thquicklyturneditsattentiontoriskmanagement.Mostoftheattentionturnedtoestablishingprogramsforcontract-ingofficer’srepresentative(COR)managementandqualityassurance.
TosupportRCC-Haiti,thequalityassuranceteamontheground,whichconsistedoftheExpeditionaryContractingCommandqualityassurancemanagerandthe410thCSBqualityassurancespecialist,establishedacomprehensiveCORmanagementprogram.TheprogramfocusedontrainingandtechnicalassistancesupportfortheCORsinHaiti.Theteamprovidedtechnicalsurveillanceonnumerouscontractsuntiltheunit’sCORsweretrainedandinplace.Threeformalclasseswerepresented,and67CORssuccessfullycompletedthecourse.TheCORmanagementprogramenabledproperlytrainedCORstoprovideon-the-groundtechnicalmonitoringofthecontracts,ensuringthatSoldiersreceivedcontractedsuppliesandservicestomeettheirmissionrequirements.
The410thCSBcontinuestosupportoperationsinHaiti,andalthoughthebrigadeismakingimprovementsbasedonmanyotherobservations,theserepresentsomelessonslearnedincontractingoperationsinacontin-gencyenvironment.AstheExpeditionaryContractingCommandfocusesonitsfuturecapabilities,theareasofdeployment,integration,andriskmitigationlearnedfromOperationUnifiedResponsewillonlyservetomakefutureoperationalcontractsupportmoreeffective.
lieutenant Colonel ameriCus m. gill iii is a memBer of the army aCQuisition Corps, serves as the s–3 for the 412th Con-traCting support BrigaDe at fort sam houston, texas, anD was assigneD to the 410th ContraCting support BrigaDe when he wrote this artiCle. he holDs an m.B.a. from the university of texas at arlington anD is level-3 CertifieD in ContraCting.
ContractingSupportBrigadeRespondstoHaitiMission
by lieutenant Colonel aMeriCuS M. Gill iii
A
50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heArmyReservehasaseriousproblem.It faileda2008audit,conductedbythe GovernmentAccountabilityOfficeandtheArmyAuditAgency,ofitsmedicalequipmentmaintenanceprogram.Theprogram’sfailureswerealsothefocusofaRANDCorporationstudythatwaspresentedattheAugust2009FORSCOM(ArmyForcesCommand)CombatSupportHospital(CSH)Conference.ThestudyshowedthatmostofthemedicalequipmentsetsintheArmyReservearenotmissioncapable.
ThesustainmentandmaintenanceofReservecomponentmedicalequipmentsetshavetakenabackseattootherprioritiesandhavenotreceivedappropriateattentionandfunding.Moreover,theexistingmedicalequipmentsetsaretoolargeandcumbersomeforunitstomaintainproperly.
OperationalChangesItwasalsonotedduringtheFORSCOMconfer-
encethat,effectiveimmediately,regionaltrainingsites-medical(RTS–MEDs)willnolongerprovidemedicalmaintenancesupporttoCSHs.However,theywillprovidesupporttosmallmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentmedicalunitsthatdonothaveorganicmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)68Abiomedicalequipmenttechnicians(BMETs).
Currently,medicallogisticscompaniesaretaskedtoprovidemedicalmaintenancesupporttoCSHsthathaveinsufficientornoBMETsassigned.ThispracticefreesupRTS–MEDBMETstodoabetterjobofsupportingthecollectivetrainingneedsofActiveandReservecomponentunits.
PotentialProblemsUnfortunately,underthecurrentsystem,Reserve
componentCSHsdonothaveaviablewaytorepair
andmaintainmedicalequipmentwithoutRTS–MEDsupport.NotrainingprogramiscurrentlyinplaceforBMETpersonneltoreceiveadditionalMOStrainingaftertheycompletebasicmedicalequip-menttrainingduringadvancedindividualtraining.
Giventhesecircumstances,itisclearthatthecurrentsystemformaintainingbiomedicalequip-mentinfieldunitsisinadequate.TheArmyReservemustestablishasystemthatwillprovidequalityMOStrainingofBMETs.Italsoneedsasystemthatwillallowunitstotrack,repair,maintain,andreplaceunserviceablemedicalequipmenttomeetmedicalequipmentreadinessrequirements.
BasicEquipmentConcentrationSitesToaccomplishthis,theU.S.ArmyReserveCom-
mand(USARC)andtheArmyMedicalDepartmentshouldfollowtheRANDstudyrecommendationsanddevelopnewmedicalbasicequipmentsetsthatarelimitedtotheminimumamountofequip-mentthatunitsneedtoconductmedicaltrainingathomestation.Becauseofconstraintsontrainingandmaintenanceassets,basicequipmentsetsfortheArmyReserveshouldnotexceed20piecesofdurableandnonexpendablemedicalitems.
Tobestmanagecurrentandprojectedmedicalequipmentrepairandtrainingrequirements,theArmyReserveshouldadopttheOrdnanceCorps’modelofareamaintenanceactivitiesandequipmentconcentrationsitesforthemaintenanceandsustain-mentofmedicalequipmentitemsthatarenotpartoftheproposedbasicequipmentsets.Wecouldcallthese“medicalequipmentconcentrationsites.”
Usingthismodel,theArmyReservecouldestab-lishfourmedicalequipmentconcentrationsitesinthecontinentalUnitedStates(twointhe807thMedicalDeploymentSupportCommand[MDSC]
MedicalEquipmentConcentrationSites:AManagementSolutionforArmyReserveMedicalEquipmentRepairandTrainingNeeds
by lieutenant Colonel paul WakefielD, uSar (ret.)
T
The author suggests medical equipment concentration sites as a possible solution to the Army Reserve’s deficiencies found by the Army Audit Agency.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 51
areaofresponsibility,atOgden,Utah,andSeagov-ille,Texas,andtwointhe3dMDSCareaofrespon-sibility,atFortDix,NewJersey,andGulfport,Mississippi).ArmyReservemedicalunitswouldstoreallexistingmedicalequipmentsets(minustheproposedbarebonesbasicequipmentsets)atthesemedicalequipmentconcentrationsites.
SiteStaffingRequirementsThetwoMDSCswouldstaffeachmedical
equipmentconcentrationsitewithfourorf iveActiveGuard/Reserve(AGR)medicalmaintenancepersonnel,threeorfourAGRmedicallogisticssupportpersonnel,threeAGRmaterials-handlingpersonnel,andthreemilitarytechnicianadmin-istrativepersonnel.Thesespaces,intendedtoaugmenttheunitsthatconductthemedicalequip-mentconcentrationsitemission,wouldcomefromauthorizedfull-timeunit-supportpositionslocatedinotherArmyReservemedicallogisticscompa-nies.Troopprogramunit(TPU)medicallogisticspersonnel(MOS68Aand68J,medicallogisticsspecialist)wouldaugmentthisfull-timeunitsup-portstaffonwarriortrainingweekendsandduringextendedcombattraining(formerlycalledannualtraining).
Mostimportantly,eachmedicalequipmentcon-centrationsiteshouldincludeatleasttwoBMETciviliancontractors.Thesepositionsarekeytothesuccessofthissupportconcept.Withoutciviliancontractorsupport,themedicalrepaircapabilitiesatmedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswillceaseorbecomeunsustainablewhenwemobilizetheAGRorTPUlogisticspersonnelassignedtoconductthemedicalequipmentconcentrationsitemission.ThetotalannualcostforUSARCtofundtwofull-timeciviliancontractorsateachsitewouldbeanesti-mated$640,000to$800,000annually.
SiteFacilityRequirementsEachmedicalequipmentconcentrationsitefacil-
ityshouldconsistofatleast12,000squarefeetofenvironmentallycontrolledwarehousespacewithshippingdockcapabilitiesandanintegratedmedi-calmaintenanceshopdesignedandequippedtosupportthefullscopeofArmyReservemedicalequipment.Themedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteshouldhavethenecessarytools;test,measure-ment,anddiagnosticequipment;materials-handlingequipment;andmedicalrepairpartstoconductpropermaintenanceoperations.
ThesemedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswouldenabletheArmyReservetoprovideReservecomponentmedicallogisticspersonnelwithqualitymission-relatedMOStrainingopportunitiesdur-ingwarriortrainingweekendsandextendedcom-battraining.BMETpersonnelassignedtomedicallogisticscompaniesthatperformhands-on-trainingmissionswouldalsoreceivetrainingopportunitieswhilesupportingcustomers.
USARCshouldfundandincorporatemedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswithfull-timenon-deployableciviliancontractpersonnel,whoaresupportedbyAGR,militarytechnician,andTPUmedicallogisticspersonnel.Bydoingthis,medi-calmaintenancereadinesslevelswouldimprovedramatically,andunitscouldfocuslessonmainte-nanceandmoreontrainingrequirements,especiallyduringthecriticaltrain-upphaseoftheArmyForceGenerationcycle.
ThecontractorsupportoptionwouldprovidecontinuityofservicetononmobilizedReservecom-ponentmedicalunitswhenunitswiththemedicalequipmentconcentrationsitemissionmobilize.
Themedicalequipmentconcentrationsitecon-ceptprovidesrealtrainingopportunitiesforallReservecomponentmedicallogisticspersonnel,especiallywhentheconceptisusedinconjunctionwithexistinghands-on-trainingmissionrequire-ments.ThesebenefitsareworththenominaladdedcontractcostsbecausetheprogramwillfixthemedicalequipmentreadinessproblemandprovideawayfortheArmyReservemedicalcommunitytoremaintrained,ready,andrelevant.
lieutenant Colonel paul wakefielD, usar (ret.), is a proJeCt management professional. he was the Chief of the forCe Development offiCe, 807th meDiCal Deployment sup-port CommanD, when he wrote this artiCle. he holDs a BaCh-elor’s Degree in spanish from weBer state university anD a master’s Degree in aDministration anD management from lin-DenwooD university.
The Army Reserve must establish a system that
will provide quality MOS training of BMETs. It also needs a system that will allow units
to track, repair, maintain, and replace unserviceable
medical equipment to meet medical equipment readiness requirements.
52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heSustainmentAutomationSupportManag- mentOffice(SASMO),615thAviationSupport Battalion,isresponsibleforprovidingdedicatedautomationsupporttothevariouslogisticsautomationsystemsofthe1stAirCavalryBrigade,1stCavalryDivision.SASMOprovidestechnicalassistanceandcustomersupporttosustainStandardArmyManage-mentInformationSystems(STAMISs).[Editor’snote:SASMOwasknownastheCombatServiceSupportAutomationSupportManagementOffice(CSSAMO)untilJanuary.]
SASMOcomprisesSoldiersfromvariousback-grounds,including—oMilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)15T,UH–60
helicopterrepairers.oMOS15R,AH–64attackhelicopterrepairers.oMOS92A,automatedlogisticalspecialists.oMOS88N,transportationmanagementcoordinators.oMOS25F,networkswitchingsystemsoperator-
maintainers.oMOS25B,informationsystemsoperator-analysts.EachSoldierbringsMOSknowledgeandexperiencetosupporteitheraspecificlogisticsautomationsystemortheSTAMISnetwork.
ProblemsDuringOperationsWhenthe615thAviationSupportBattalion
deployedtoOperationIraqiFreedom09–11,SASMOwasstillknownasCSSAMO.Itsabilitytoprovidequalityautomationsupportforthebrigade’ssustain-mentpersonnelwashinderedforseveralreasons,whichwereprimarilyrelatedtothelackofpersonneltosupportsplit-basedoperationsandnewlogistics
automationsystems.Asaresult,thebattalionfacedconsiderablechallenges.
Thebrigadewasrequiredtoconductsplit-basedoperationsatmultipleforwardoperatingbases.ThisconceptofdecentralizedoperationsrequiredCSSAMOtosupportmultiplelogisticsautomationsystemsatvariouslocations.However,CSSAMOwasdesignedforcentralizedoperations.CSSAMO’smanningdoesnotprovideenoughpersonneltosupporttheconceptofdecentralizedoperations.ThedilemmaforthebattalionwashowtoemployCSSAMO’slimitedpersonneltoeffectivelysupportabrigadeoperatingatmultiplelocationsinawidelydispersedarea.
Thebrigadereceivednewlogisticssystemsforcondition-basedmaintenance(CBM)thatenabledavi-ationunitstorepaircomponentsbasedonthecom-ponent’sactualcondition.Unfortunately,theCBMtrainingwentdirectlytothefieldedbattalionwithoutCSSAMOinvolvement.WithouttrainingontheCBMsystems,CSSAMOcouldnotproperlysupportthem.Consequently,thosebattalionsdidnotbelievethatCSSAMOhadtheabilitytosupportthem.
RecommendedImprovementStrategiesInJuly2009,the615thAviationSupportBat-
talion’sleadersdecidedtoimproveCSSAMO.Theyfocusedonthreeimprovementstrategies:involveandempower,fosteranatmosphereofcontinuousimprovementandlearning,andgrowrelationshipsbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMO.
Involve and empower. ThebattaliondividedCSSAMOintotwoteamstoincreaseSoldiers’involvementinlearningotherlogisticsautomationsystems.EachteamconsistedofamixtureofSol-dierswithdifferentbackgrounds.AvarietyofSTA-MISproblemsweregiventoeachteamtosolve.TheintentofthisstrategywastoproducecompetentandversatileCSSAMOSoldierswhocouldaddressvari-ousissues.
ToempowerSoldiers,decisionmakingauthoritywasdelegatedtoteamleaders.Thisincreasedjuniorleaders’levelsofresponsibilityinsolvingSTAMISproblems.Theempowermentofjuniorleaderswasinstrumentalduringthebrigade’sSTAMISnetwork
ImprovementStrategiesforLogisticsAutomationSupport
by Captain anDreW M. SaWyer, Chief Warrant offiCer 2 roSunG D. petty, anD Staff SerGeant Jonathan C. ShaW
T
The dilemma for the battalion was how to
employ CSSAMO’s limited personnel to effectively
support a brigade operating at multiple locations in a widely
dispersed area.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 53
upgrade.Duringthismission,twonon-signalspecial-istsplannedandconfigured14satelliteterminalstoensureconnectivityforbothaviationandgroundvehiclemaintenance.Thisleaderdevelopmentstrate-gyhelpedtopreparejuniorleaderstomakedecisionsontheirown.
Foster an atmosphere of continuous improvement and learning.TheabilitytoresolvecomplexSTA-MISproblemsrequiredSoldierstohaveknowledgeofSTAMISsandautomationingeneral.Thebattaliondevelopedatrainingprogramthatfocusedoncontinu-ouslearningandimprovementforlong-termsuccess.ThepurposewastobroadenandsustainCSSAMOSoldiers’technicalskills.
Thetrainingprograminvolvedformaltrainingcoursesinconjunctionwithon-the-jobtraining.ThebattalionusedtrainingcoursesfromBaghdadSignalUniversity,theU.S.ArmyCentralCommandSignalUniversity,andtheAutomatedLogisticsAssistanceTeam-Iraq.FromAugusttoDecember2009,CSSA-MOconductedover800hoursoftrainingonvarioussubjectsthatincludedcomputerhardwaremainte-nance,informationassurance,computernetworking,andvariouslogisticsautomationsystems.Crosstrain-ingconductedinsmallgroupsreinforcedtheformaltraining.Thispracticegaveunprecedentedbenefitstothesupportofthebrigade’ssplit-basedoperations.
Asaresultofthetrainingprogram,CSSAMOSol-dierspossessedtheaptitudeandtechnicalexpertisetosupportmultiplelogisticsautomationsystems,ratherthanjustone.Thiswascrucialwhenthebrigadedeployedanaviationtaskforcetoanotherforwardoperatingbase.ItsmissionrequiredCSSAMOtosup-portfivedifferentlogisticsautomationsystemsandestablishaSTAMISnetwork.Traditionally,themis-sionwouldrequireCSSAMOtosendfiveorsixSol-dierstosupporttheaviationtaskforce.Becauseofthetrainingprogram,CSSAMOsupportedtheavia-tiontaskforcewithonlytwoSoldiers.ThetrainingprogramsuccessfullyincreasedCSSAMO’sflexibilityandcapabilitytosupportsplit-basedoperations.
Grow relationships between the battalions and CSSAMO. Thebrigadedevelopedasenseofuncer-taintyaboutCSSAMO’sabilitytoprovideautomation
supportforCBMtechnologies.The615thAviationSupportBattalionembeddedCSSAMOSoldierswiththe1–227AttackReconnaissanceBattalionand3–227AssaultHelicopterBattalion.ThegoalsofembeddingSoldiersweretoprovideon-the-jobexperienceinsup-portingtheCBMsystemsandtobuildtrustbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMO.
TheCSSAMOSoldierslearnedhowtheCBMsys-temssupportedthebrigade’saviationmaintenancebyworkingfortheaviationmaintenanceofficerofthebattalioninwhichtheywereembedded.TheyalsoworkedwiththevariousCBMtechnicalrepresentativestoprovideassistanceforusers.ThisallowedtheCSSA-MOSoldierstoarticulateandresolvenumerousCBMerrors.AsCSSAMOincreaseditsabilitytosupportCBMtechnologies,thetrustbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMOimproved.
CSSAMO’ssuccessinsupportinglogisticsautoma-tionsystemswasthankstoleaderscontinuouslyseek-ingwaystodevelopSoldiers.ItsabilitytoprovidededicatedautomationsupportforSTAMISsinfuturefull-spectrumoperationsneedsappropriateSoldierdevelopmentprogramstobesuccessful.
Captain anDrew m. sawyer is the s–6 for the 615th aviation support Battalion at fort hooD, texas. he is prior enlisteD anD a graDuate of the primary leaDership Development Course, the BasiC nonComissioneD offiCer Course, the engineer offiCer BasiC Course, the signal offiCer aDvanCeD Course, anD the information systems management Course. he holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in Computer information sCienCe from ColumBia College.
Chief warrant offiCer 2 rosung D. petty is a supply system teChniCian. he was stationeD with the 675th aviation support Bat-talion when this artiCle was written.
staff sergeant Jonathan C. shaw is the sustainment automa-tion support management offiCe nonCommissioneD offiCer-in-Charge, heaDQuarters support Company, 615th aviation support Battalion, at fort hooD, texas. he is a graDuate of the primary leaDership Development Course anD BasiC nonCommissioneD offi-Cer Course anD holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in Business aDministra-tion from the university of hartforD.
The goals of embedding Soldiers were to provide
on-the-job experience in supporting the CBM
systems and to build trust between the battalions
and the CSSAMO section.
CSSAMO’s success in supporting logistics
automation systems was thanks to leaders continuously seeking
ways to develop Soldiers.
54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ayingSoldierstheirdues”isacommon sayinginmilitaryandpoliticalcircles.But whenitcomestoactuallypayingSoldierstheirhard-earnedentitlements,itisoftenextremelyhardtodo,especiallyiftheSoldierinquestionisadeployedReservecomponents(RC)Soldier.
ThecurrentpayprocessfortheArmyNationalGuard(ARNG)andU.S.ArmyReserve(USAR)hasevolvedintoacumbersomeandcomplexsystem,andfew,ifany,personnelinmilitarypaydepartmentsfullyunderstanditsbreadth,scope,andweaknesses.Whatisworse,nei-therSoldiersnorthemilitarypaydepartmentscanexpectguaranteed,timely,andaccuratepaymentsofentitledbenefits.Meanwhile,Soldiersandtheirfamiliesareoftenleftwonderingifallentitledbenefitsarepaid—andthatisneveragoodsituation,particularlyduringthesehardeconomictimes.
PayProblemsThesedeficienciesinpayandallotmentshavebeen
welldocumentedinpastU.S.GovernmentAccount-abilityOffice(GAO)auditsoftheARNGandUSARmobilizationpayprocess.Thepayproblemshaverangedfrompaymentsdelayedover30daystonumerousover-paymentsandunderpaymentstomobilizedmembersoftheARNGandUSAR.
InanARNGstudyreleasedinNovember2003,GAOanalyzedthepayproblemsof481ARNGSoldiersdur-ingan18-monthperiodfrom1October2001through31March2003.Thetotaldollaramountoftheirpayproblemsduringthecourseoftheirdeploymentswasestimatedasoverpaymentsof$691,000,underpaymentsof$67,000,andlatepaymentsof$245,000.Outofthe481Soldiers,450hadatleastonepayproblemduringthecourseoftheirdeployment;thisaccountedfor93.6per-centofthetotalnumberofSoldiersinthestudy.
These481Soldierswerepartof6ARNGunitsthatincluded3SpecialForcesunitsand3militarypoliceunits.Theseunits,eachfromadifferentstate,haddistinctmissionsandweredeployedtovariouslocations(includ-ingGuantanamoBay,Cuba;Afghanistan;Iraq;andtwolocationsinthecontinentalUnitedStates)duringtheirmobilizationperiods.
FixingtheCurrentReserveComponentsPayProcess
Tomakemattersworse,payproblemsassociatedwiththeARNGandUSARpayprocessgrewexponentiallyastheroleofRCunitsincreasedaftertheterroristattacksof11September2001.IntheIraqconflictalone,ARNGandUSARunitshavebeensoheavilyinvolvedthatover18,000ofthe155,000SoldiersintheregioninJanuary2008wereRCsoldiers.
PayrollSystemDeficienciesTheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)andtheArmy
havebeenawareofthesemillion-dollarpayproblemsassociatedwiththeARNGandUSARpaysystemeversincethelargeRCroleinOperationsDesertShieldandDesertStorm.A1993GAOauditfoundmillionsofdol-larsinoverpaymentsandotherproblemsassociatedwithArmypayrollsasRCpersonnelreturnedfromthosemilitaryoperations.AkeyfactorthatcontributedtotheimproperpaymentswasthelargenumberofSoldiersbeingpaidfromtheArmy’sactive-dutypayrollsystem.
Basedonthisstudy,theArmydecidedin1995toprocesspaytomobilizedARNGSoldiersfromtheDefenseJointMilitaryPaySystem-ReserveComponent(DJMS–RC)systemratherthantheActiveArmypay-rollsystem.Althoughthis1995decisionwasintendedtobetemporarypendingtheadoptionofanintegratedsystemtopaybothActiveandRCpersonnel,DJMS–RCisstillusedintheArmy’smilitarypayprocessformobilizedRCSoldiers.UseofDJMS–RCwasbasedon
by MaJor nolanD i. floreS, CaarnG
“P
the classes of Pay PRoblems
class Definition
a a DePaRtment of Defense (DoD) Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) in excess of $1,000,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).
b a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $200,000 oR moRe but less than $1,000,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).
c a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $10,000 oR moRe but less than $200,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).
D a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $2,000 oR moRe but less than $10,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).
This author-developed tool (based on Army Regulation 37–104–4, Military Pay and Allowances Policy)
defines pay problems experienced by Reserve component Soldiers. A tool like this should be
used to identify and address pay problems.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 55
thepremisethatitprovidesthebestservicetoRCSol-diers.Nevertheless,significantpayproblemscontinuetoaffectRCSoldierstoday.
LackofProgramIntegrationMostofthepayproblemsareassociatedwiththe
lackofintegratedsystemsintheRCSoldiers’paypro-cess.SinceDJMS–RCdoesnotrecognizetransactionsintheARNGandUSARpersonnelsystems,personneldatainputsthataffectpaytoSoldiersarenotreflectedintheDJMS–RCpaysystem.Personneltransactionsthataffectpaymayincludepromotions,demotions,andmaritalstatus.Thelackofintegrationbetweenpersonnelandpaysystemsresultsinerraticmanualentryoftransactionsintomultiple,nonintegratedsys-temsandnumerousover-andunder-paymentsandlatepaymentstomobilizedRCSoldiers.
DODattemptedtodevelopasolutiontothelackofintegratedsystemsthatcausepaydeficienciesthroughtheproposedDefenseIntegratedMilitaryHumanResourcesSystem(DIMHRS).DIMHRSwasintendedtoprovidethearmedserviceswithanintegrated,mul-ticomponentpersonnelandpaysystem.DIMHRSwasalsosupposedtoaddresstheproblemsthatoccurwhenRCSoldiersarecalleduptoactivedutyandarelostinthesystem.GettinglostinthesystemandinaccurateentriesobviouslyaffectSoldiers’pay,creditforser-vice,andbenefits.However,developmentofDIMHRSencounteredmajortechnicalproblems,andDODcan-celledtheprograminMarch2010.
GAOhasreportedthatseveralorganizationswithkeyrolesinpaymentstomobilizedARNGSoldiershaveissuedtheirownimplementingregulations,poli-cies,andprocedures.TheseburdensomepoliciesandproceduresidentifiedinaGAOauditstudyhavecon-tributedtopayerrorsforARNGSoldiers.Becauseofalackofclearguidance,someU.S.PropertyandFis-calOfficelocationshaveestablishedinformal,undoc-umentedreconciliationpractices.Forexample,sincenowrittenrequirementsexistforconductinganddocu-mentingmonthlyreconciliationsofpayandpersonnelmismatchreports,reconciliationsareperformedadhocorbyinformalmeansbyeachofficelocation.
Short-TermSolutionsMostofthequalityassurancemethodsthatthe
Armyhasinplacearereactivemeasures,suchasauditsandpayandpersonnelmismatchreportscom-pletedafterthefact.Sincemostofthepayproblemsarenotidentifiedbeforehand,itisimportanttohaveastandardized,best-practiceapproachasaproactivemethodforcurtailingpayproblems.Therefore,thetimeittakestoprocessthepayandpersonnelmis-matchreportsneedstobestandardizedacrossall54stateandterritorialU.S.PropertyandFiscalOffices.Timelyreportprocessingalsoneedstobeimplement-
edacrossUSARunitpayoffices.Tobeeffective,mili-tarypaytechniciansneedthepropertrainingbeforethisapproachisimplemented.
Inordertoidentifypayproblems,DODandtheArmymilitarypayfacilitiesneedtoadaptatoolthatclassifiesthetypesofpayproblems.Thistoolshouldallowmilitarypayfacilitiesandauditingagenciestoidentifythetypeofpayproblemtheyarefacing.Thistoolalsowillallowtheauditorandmilitarypayfacilitytoapplytheappropriatefinancialguidelines,depend-ingontheclassofpaydeficiencyencountered.ThechartatleftshowsamodelthatDODcanimplementtoidentifythetypesofpayproblems.
Long-TermSolutionTheArmyshouldconsiderimplementingtheMarine
CorpsTotalForceSystem(MCTFS)asalong-termsolutiontotheproblemofmilitarypaydiscrepancies.MCTFSistheonlyintegratedmilitarypayandperson-nelsysteminDOD.Usingasingletransaction,MCTFSupdatesbothpayandpersonnelrecords.Forexample,whenaMarineispromoted,thesystemprocessingthepromotiontransactionwithinMCTFSincludesalltheprogrammingneededtoensurethatbothpayandpersonnelinformationareupdatedconcurrentlybythesingleinputofthepromotiontransaction.
MCTFSisavastimprovementovertheArmy’stroublesomeDJMS–RCpayrollsystem.MCTFSpaysservicemembersaccuratelyandontimeandcontainsaccuratedataforbothActiveandReserveMarinesinregardtostateandFederaltaxes,residencyinforma-tion,entitlementsandallowances,specialincentivepay,andallotments.Theintegrationofpayandpersonnelmeansfewerresourcesareneededtoperformsimpleinputreportprocedures,payandpersonnelfunctionsareintegratedseamlessly,andseparatesystemshavenosynchronizationproblems.
DODandtheArmytriedunsuccessfullytoimple-mentDIMHRS.WithalltheresourcesandeffortputintoanunprovensystemlikeDIMHRS,DODcouldhaveexpandedontheprovensuccessofMCTFS.TheRCSoldiershavepaidtheirdueswithcommitment,dedication,andsacrifice.ItistimeforUncleSamtopayRCSoldierstheirhard-earnedentitlementswithaccuracyandtimeliness.
maJor nolanD i. flores, Caarng, is the exeCutive offiCer for the heaDQuarters support Company, 640th aviation support Bat-talion, California army national guarD. he holDs a master of military arts anD sCienCes Degree from the army CommanD anD general staff College anD an m.B.a. Degree from the ameriCan interContinental university anD is a graDuate of the human resourCes BasiC Course, the fielD artillery Captains Career Course, the senior transportation offiCer QualifiCation Course, the reserve Component theater sustain-ment Course, anD the army CommanD anD general staff College.
56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
he2009WarSupplementalAppropriationsAct directedallofthemilitaryservicestopay membersfortimeservedfrom11September2001to30September2009underthestop-lossauthor-itycontainedinTitle10,section12305,oftheU.S.Code.Theretroactivestop-lossspecialpay(RSLSP)claimperiodendedon30September2008;anotherprogramhadpreviouslybeenestablishedtopayclaim-antsforeligibleperiodsfrom1October2008tothepresent.Thoseeligiblereceive$500foreachmonthservedinstop-lossstatus.TheArmyestimatesthat120,000Soldiers,veterans,andsurvivorsqualifyforRSLSP,whichisbyfarthehighestestimatefromanyservice.
TheWarSupplementalAppropriationsAct,passedinJune2009,stipulatedthattheArmyshouldbegintoacceptandprocessRSLSPclaimson21October2009.ThisgavetheCompensationandEntitlementsBranchintheOfficeoftheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−1,just5monthstodesignaprocessforcollecting,reviewing,andpayingclaims.
DeterminingWhoIsEligibleTheArmyfacedanumberofchallengesbeforethe
RSLSPprogramofficiallybegan.Theunderlyingissuewastheverynotionofstop-loss.FromtheArmy’sper-spective,stop-losswasaforcemanagementtool,notacompensationtool.Thatis,trackingindividualstop-lossforthepurposeoffuturecompensationwasnotofparamountimportance.
G−1workedtoestablishalistof“known”stop-lossSoldiersfromtheprescribedperiodtoprovideanesti-mateforCongressandastartingpointfortheArmy’sRSLSPprogram.Whilethe“known”listprovedtobereasonablyaccurate,itdidnotalwaysprovidepreciseinformationfordeterminingthetimeanindividualservedinastop-lossstatus.Inresponse,theArmymovedforwardbyestablishingaspecialprogramman-agementofficetohandleRSLSPclaims.
WorkattheRSLSPProgramManagementOffice(PMO)beganinearnestbeforetheofficiallaunchdate.TheArmydevelopedandlaunchedaweb-basede-fileapplicationforthoseeligibletosubmitclaimsandreleased
eligibilityrequirementsthroughanumberofmediaannouncementsandanAllArmyActivitiesmessage.
AccordingtoaG−1factsheet,thoseeligibleinclude—
Servicemembers,includingmembersoftheReservecomponentsandformerandretiredmem-berswho,atanytimebetween11September2001and30September2008,servedonactivedutywhiletheirenlistmentorperiodofobligatedser-vicewasextendedorwhoseeligibilityforretire-mentwassuspendedfromoneofthefollowing:o Contractualexpirationoftermofservice(ETS),expirationofactiveservice(EAS),orReserveendofcurrentcontract(RECC);oro Anapprovedseparationdatebasedonanunqualifiedresignationrequestorreleasefromactiveduty(REFRAD)order;oro Anapprovedretirementbasedonlengthofservice.ServicememberswhoweredischargedorreleasedfromtheArmedForcesunderotherthanhonorableconditionsarenotpermittedtoreceiveretroactivestop-lossspecialpay.
ThePMOestablishedacasemanagementteamtobeginreviewingandprocessingclaimsforpayment.Anumberofissueshavebecomeapparentascasemanagersworktoreconcilepersonnelrecordswithanindividual’sclaimedstop-lossperiod.Issuessuchasextensions,bonuses,andbeneficiarystatus,alongwithothervariables,complicatetheadjudicationprocess.Asaresult,inmanyinstances,casemanagersworkcloselywithclaimantstodevelopandestablishtheirstop-losstimeline.
EncouragingClaimsAsthecasemanagementteamworkedtoprocess
claims,itbecameobviousthattheArmyfacedagreaterchallengethansimplyreviewingrecords.Overthefirst2monthsoftheprogram,about20,000com-pleteclaimswerefiled.However,claimsubmissionsdroppedsteeplyoverthenextfewmonthsandtheArmybegantheprogram’sthirdquarterfarshortofthenumberofclaimsexpected.Giventhelowclaimtotals,
ArmySeeksClaimantsUnderRetroactiveStop-LossSpecialPayProgram
by robert piDGeon
T
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 57
theArmyfocusedonidentifyingandnotifyingthoseeligibleforthepay.
AnumberofobstaclescomplicatedtheprocessofnotifyingformerSoldierseligibleforRSLSP.Theprogrameligibilitydatescoveredmostofadecade,andmanyofthosetheArmyneededtoreachhadbeenseparatedorretiredformanyyears.ThePMOdevelopedadirectmailplantosendlettersofnotifi-cationtoover80,000peopleontheknownlistdirect-ingthemtoapplyforthespecialpay.Toensurethehighestlevelofaccuracy,thePMOconductedacom-prehensivesearchtoidentifycurrentaddressesforallthoseontheknownlistandcreatedanenvelopeandletterdesignedtoelicitaresponse.
Inadditiontocreatingandsendingthenotifica-tions,thePMOconceivedauniqueworkflowtopro-cessapplicationsthroughanautomatedweb-basedsystemknownasthe“quickclaim”process.Thechartaboveillustratestheimpactonthenumberofclaimsofthedirectmailcampaignandthequickclaimsubmissionoption.Thequickclaimprocessallowsthosereceivingalettertoenterthesystemthroughaspecifiedwebsitetoexaminetheirstop-lossdatesasprovidedbytheArmy.TheclaimantthencanchoosetoaccepttheArmy’sfindingandbepaidwithoutsubmittingdocumentationorrejecttheArmy’sdeterminationandfileanewclaim.Over40percentofthosesentnotificationshavefileda
claim—themajorityacceptingtheArmy’sdetermina-tionoftheirstop-losstime.
TheRSLSPPMOcontinuestoworktowardidentify-ingandnotifyingthoseeligibleforRSLSP.Alongwiththedirectmailcampaign,theArmyhasworkedcloselywiththeU.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairsandveteranandmilitaryserviceorganizationstopublicizetheprogram.ThePMOhasalsoworkedwiththeG−1PublicAffairsOfficeandOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforPublicAffairstoestablishastrongsocialmediapres-encefortheprogram.Thesecombinedeffortshavegener-atedover55,000claimsasofAugust2010.Thedeadlineforsubmittingapplicationswas21October2010.
TheArmyhastakengreatcaretoensurethattheRSLSPprogramisasuccess.TherequirementfromCongressistomakecertainthatthemoneyappropriatedforthisprojectreachesthoseforwhomitisintended.ThePMOstrivestobediligentinadjudicatingclaimsandhasgonetogreatlengthstoidentifyandnotifythoseeligible.ThecontinuedsuccessoftheRSLSPpro-gramdemonstratestheArmy’sdedicationtoSoldiers.
roBert piDgeon is the DireCtor of CommuniCations for the retroaCtive stop-loss speCial pay program management offiCe, offiCe of the Deputy Chief of staff, g−1. he holDs a master of mass CommuniCation Degree from the university of south Carolina.
58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
umerousreportsfrommanyorganizationshavediscussedtheinefficiencyofthemilitary logisticssystem.Inresponsetothesereports,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)has undertakenmanyinitiativestocreatealogisticssystemthatisbothmoreresponsiveandmoreeffectiveinsupportingajointforcecommander.CreatingsuchasystemwillbecomemoreimportantinthefuturesincewecanexpectadecreaseinDODfundingto3.5percentofthegrossdomesticproduct.1Adiscussionamongprofessionallogisticiansabouttheseinitiativesisneededinordertoidentifypossiblesolutions.
Ibelievethatachievingthegoalofajointlogisticssystemrequirestheestablishmentofanewfunctionalcommand.Toaccomplishthis,thecurrentsupplysystemwillhavetobeover-hauledandserviceparochialismwillhavetobeovercome.SomewouldsaythatthiswillviolateTitle10oftheU.S.Code,whichestablishestherolesandmissionsoftheArmedForces.How-ever,thenewfunctionalcommandwouldbepaidforbyeachmilitaryservicefortheservice(supplychainmanagement)provided.
ConfusionOverDefiningTermsAfterreceivingabriefingonthedraftJointSupplyJointIntegratingConceptfromthe
DefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),IunderstandtherequirementtocreateonesupplyprocessownerforDOD.2Thisrequirementisinlinewiththebestbusinesspracticesoftheprivatesectorandisthelinchpinincreatingafactory-to-foxholesupplychain.3
TheexecutivesummaryofJointPublication(JP)4−0,JointLogistics,states,“Supplychainmanagementsynchronizestheprocesses,resources,andeffortsofkeyglobalproviderstomeetCCDR[combatantcommander]requirements.”4ThisappearstobeinconflictwiththeSeptem-ber2003designationoftheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM)asthedistributionprocessownerforDOD.Onitswebsite,TRANSCOMstatesthatitistoserve“asthesingleentitytodirectandsuperviseexecutionofthestrategicdistributionsystem”inorderto“improvetheoverallefficiencyandinteroperabilityofdistributionrelatedactivities—deployment,sustain-mentandredeploymentsupportduringpeaceandwar.”The“sustainment”portionofthisisatleastapartofsupplychainmanagement.
Thisbecomesveryconfusingwhenthedefinitionsofdistributionandsupplychainmanage-mentareputtogether.DODdefinesdistributionasthe“operationalprocessofsynchronizingallelementsofthelogisticsystemtodeliverthe‘rightthings’tothe‘rightplace’atthe‘righttime’tosupportthegeographiccombatantcommander.”5DODdefinessupplychainmanagementas“across-functionalapproachtoprocuring,producing,anddeliveringproductsandservicestocustomers.Thebroadmanagementscopeincludessub-suppliers,suppliers,internalinformation,andfundsflow.”6Thusdistributionandsupplychainmanagementbothsharetheconceptofdeliveringsuppliestosomeone.
WhereAreWegoing?TheFutureofJointLogistics
by MaJor robert p. Mann
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
N
1CurrentDODfundingisapproximately4.8percent.DavisS.Welch,DirectorofInvestmentfortheDeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforBudget,ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeFuturesDayPanel,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,29October2009.
2ColonelMartinBinder,DefenseLogisticsAgencyJ−314,JointSupplyJointIntegratingConceptPresentationtoArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,22October2009.
3Supplychain:1)startingwithunprocessedrawmaterialsandendingwiththefinalcustomerusingthefinishedgoods,thesupplychainlinksmanycompaniestogether.2)thematerialandinformationalinterchangesinthelogisticalprocessstretchingfromacquisitionofrawmaterialstodeliv-eryoffinishedproductstotheenduser.Allvendors,serviceproviders,andcustomersarelinksinthesupplychain.CouncilofSupplyChainManage-mentProfessionals,Glossary of Terms,http://cscmp.org/digital/glossary/glossary.asp,accessed23October2009.
4IntroductiontoJP4−0,JointLogistics,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,18July2008,p.x.5JP1−02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,12April2001,asamended
through31October2009,p.167.6Ibid.,p.524.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 59
ItappearsthatDODislookingforasupplychainsupportedbyadistributionsystemtosustainjointforcecommanders.Forthepurposeofthisarticle,Iwillmod-ifytheDODsupplychainmanagementdefinitionasfollows:Supplychainmanagementisacross-functionalapproachtoprocuring,producing,anddeliveringtherightthingstotherightplaceattherighttimetocus-tomers.Thebroadmanagementscopeincludessubsup-pliers,suppliers,internalinformation,andfundsflow.7
Thisdefinitionaddressesthegoaloftryingtoachievethe“perfectorder.”8Italsodeletes“deliveringservices”becausethattermimpliestasksmoreassociatedwithforcestructurethanwithdeliveringacommodity.
ASupplyProcessOwner:USLOgCOMDefiningtheDODsupplysystemasasupplychain
leadstotheassumptionthatthereshouldbeonesupplychainmanagerinordertoconformtothebestbusinesspractices.So,afour-starorganizationshouldberesponsibleforleadingsupplychainmanagement.Thisjointorganiza-tionshouldhaveaformal,approvedstructurewithrepre-sentativesfromeachserviceandnotbeabureauorboardoftheJointStaff.Itshouldoverseeallaspectsofequip-mentandsupplies,fromdevelopmentthroughdisposal.
TheestablishmentofaU.S.LogisticsCommand(USLOGCOM)isoneapproachtothisorganization.
(Seechartatleft.)ThiswouldbeafunctionalcommandandpartoftheUnifiedCommandPlan.USLOG-COM’smissionwouldbetocontrolthebusinesspracticesandlife-cyclemanagementoftheservicesandtodirectdistributionofallsuppliestotheservicesandthecombatantcom-manders.USLOGCOMwouldhavetwomajorcomponents:TRANS-COM,whichwouldbeasub-unifiedcommand,responsiblefordistributionasdefinedinJP1−02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,andintegratedlife-cyclemanagers(ILMs),whowouldprovidethesup-pliesforTRANSCOMtodeliverwhatisneededratherthanwhatisonhand.
TheILMscouldbeorganizedintofunctionalgroups(ground,air,sea,andC4ISR[command,control,
communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance])ratherthanbycomponent(Army,MarineCorps,Navy,andAirForce)togainefficien-ciesinmanagementandoversightaswellasprovideastructurethatwouldresultinincreasedinteroperabilityacrosstheservices.Forinstance,ifallcommandandcontrolandautomatedsystemsweredevelopedinoneorganization,thatorganizationcouldprovideacommonarchitectureandcommoncomponentsthatwouldassistinnetworkingandmaintenanceoperations.
USLOGCOMwouldreceiveinputfromaservicewhenthatservicehadidentifiedamaterielshortfall.Theservicewouldpasstherequirements,whetherneworexisting,toUSLOGCOM,whichthenwoulddevelopthematerielsolutionandprovidethecosttotheser-vice.Theservicethenwouldhavetoseekorprovidefundinginordertocontinuewiththedevelopmentandproductionoftheequipment.Ifthematerielsolutionexisted,theILMswouldidentifythesourceofsup-plyandprovideittotheserviceforafee.TheILMswouldberequiredtomanagetheentirelife-cycleoftheequipment,includingtheprocurementandmanage-mentofrepairparts.Thiswouldcreateasingleinterfacebetweensuppliersandcustomers.
Asthesingleinterface,theILMswouldbethesup-plychainmanagersfortheircommodities,analyzing
7Thisdefinitionisinlinewiththedefinitionofsupplychainmanagement(SCM)bytheCouncilofSupplyChainManagementProfessionals:“SupplyChainManagementencompassestheplanningandmanagementofallactivitiesinvolvedinsourcingandprocurement,conversion,andalllogisticsmanagementactivities.Importantly,italsoincludescoordinationandcollaborationwithchannelpartners,whichcanbesuppliers,intermediaries,third-partyserviceproviders,andcustomers.Inessence,supplychainmanagementintegratessupplyanddemandmanagementwithinandacrosscompanies.SupplyChainManagementisanintegratingfunctionwithprimaryresponsibilityforlinkingmajorbusinessfunctionsandbusinessprocesseswithinandacrosscompaniesintoacohesiveandhigh-performingbusinessmodel.Itincludesallofthelogisticsmanagementactivitiesnotedabove,aswellasmanufacturingoperations,anditdrivescoordinationofprocessesandactivitieswithandacrossmarketing,sales,productdesign,financeandinformationtechnology.”CouncilofSupplyChainManagementProfessionals,Glossary of Terms,http://cscmp.org/digital/glossary/glossary.asp,accessed23October2009.
8Binder,22October2009.
60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
demandsfromacrossDODandthenprogrammingreplenishmentorreplacementfromsuppliers.TheILMswouldneedtheabilitytoshiftDODstocksasneededtomeetrequirements.Thiswouldrequireanaccuratecommonoperationalpicture(COP)sotheILMscouldmakeaccuratedecisionsonsourcingsolutions.TheCOPwouldhavetoextendfromthesuppliers’sourcesofsupplydowntotheendusersinordertoanticipaterequirementsandshortfalls.
TRANSCOMwouldberesponsiblefordeliveringsuppliesthroughthesupplychaintotheservicesandsupportedcommanders.Realistically,thisresponsibil-itywouldnotextendtothe“foxhole.”ItisunrealistictoholdUSLOGCOMandTRANSCOMresponsiblefordeliveringdirectlytothefoxholewithoutgivingthemthecapabilitytocontroltheorganicdistributionofassetsatallechelons.Thisisatopicthatshouldbeaddressedseparately,thoughitisrealistictoexpectthejointforcecommandertodesignatealocationwherethetransferofresponsibilityandaccountabilityoccursasfarforwardaspossible.
TRANSCOMandthesupportedcommanderswouldberequiredtoestablishin-transitvisibilityallthewaytothefoxhole.ThiswouldenableUSLOG-COMandtheILMsto“see”wheresupplieswerelocatedenroutesotheycouldmakeaccuratedeci-sionsaboutwheretodirectshipmentsasprioritiesandrequirementschange.ThiswouldfeedtheILMs’COP.
ImprovingLogisticsInfrastructureDODshouldcontinuetoupgradethelogistics
automationinfrastructure.TheupgradeofDLAnational-levelsystemsandtheintroductionofajoint,Army,MarineCorps,Navy,andAirForceGlobalCombatSupportSystem(GCSS)wouldbenefitalllogisticiansatalllevels.Thiswouldgivetheservicesanditemmanagerstheabilitytomaintainvisibilityofsuppliesmoreefficientlyandeffectively.Whilepro-grammanagerbriefingsandwebsitesdiscussthepro-jectedcapabilitiesofGCSS,onethingmusthappeninordertocreateasupplychain:AllsystemsmustbeabletocommunicateandsharedatasotheILMscanhavevisibilityfromthefactorytothefoxhole.
ForUSLOGCOMtohavetheabilitytodirectthetransferofequipmentandsuppliesamongorganiza-tionsandservices,financialmanagementsystemsmustbeintegratedintoGCSS.Whenarequisitionisplacedintothesupplysystem,thebestsourceofsup-plymustbeidentified.Forexample,ifanAirForceengineerunitoperatingintheaterordersapartforahigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle,theitemmanagermustbeabletodirectthatacolocatedArmy,MarineCorps,orNavysupplysupportactivityfilltherequestautomatically(basedontheestablishmentofsupportrelationshipsandareferralsystembasedonajointconceptofsupport).
CanWeOvercomeParochialism?Tobeabletoimplementchange,DODmustbea
learningorganizationandovercomeserviceandfunc-tionalparochialism.Itwillbehardforacommanderatmost,ifnotall,levelstotrustanotherorganizationtoprovidesupplychainmanagementandallowittomovesupplieswithinandfromhisorganization.Itwilltaketimeforthesupportedorganizationstotrustandtrulyembracesupplychainmanagement.Itwillalsotakeleaderswhounderstandthatthischangewillallowustomoreefficientlyuseourresources,whichwillbecomeconstrainedinthefuture.
Toachievethistrustmorequickly,wemustlookattheprofessionaldevelopmentoftheindividualschargedwithoperatingaglobalsupplychain.Ibelievethatlogisticiansfromacrosstheservicesmustbegroundedinthedoctrinethatsupportstheirforce.Alllogisticiansshouldtraininjointoperationsandjointlogisticsduringtheircompany-gradeprofessionalmilitaryeducation.FortheArmy,thiswouldgivelogisticiansoperatingintheechelonsabovebrigadeanunderstandingofhowandwhytheysupportjointforces.
Anadditionalsteptowardgivingthesupportedcom-mandersconfidenceinthisprocessistocreatesupplychainmanagercareerprofessionalpositionswithinDOD.Thiscouldbedoneassimplyascreatinganaddi-tionalskillidentifieroraseparatefunctionalarea.Theselogisticiansshouldberequiredtoearnanadvanceddegreeinsupplychainmanagementandachieveaccred-itedstatuswithaprofessionalsupplychainmanagementorganization,suchastheInstituteforSupplyManage-mentorSOLE—TheInternationalSocietyofLogistics.Certificationmustberequiredtoensurethatthecorrectpersonisplacedinsupplychainmanagerpositions.ThiswouldenableUSLOGCOMtomaintainthebestbusi-nesspracticesandrealizethegreatestefficiencies.
DODmustbepreparedtoadoptbetterpracticesinsupportingthewarfighteraswefaceafuturewithreducedbudgetsandconstrainedresources.Areorga-nizationtocreateasupplyprocessownersupportedbyadistributionprocessownerwouldincurashort-termcost,butitwouldachieveanincreaseineffectivenessandefficiencyoverthelongtermbyfollowingbestbusinesspractices.Thecreationofaunifiedcommandthatsupportstheservicesandthejointforcecom-manderwouldnotrequireanactofCongressandcouldbedonebyovercomingservicecultures.Drivenfromthetop,thischangewouldbeacceptedacrossDODandwouldbebeneficialforall.
maJor roBert p. mann is an organiZational integrator in the offiCe of the Deputy Chief of staff, g−3/5/7, Department of the army. he wrote this artiCle while attenDing the army CommanD anD general staff College. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, the ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, anD the logistiCs exeCutive Development Course.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 61
he3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary) (3dESC)hasrecommendedthattheArmy CombinedArmsSupportCommandchangethemanningauthorizationsofthebulkpetroleumsectionoftheESC’ssupplyandservicesbranch.TheESCmadethisrequestbecauseitsmodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE)doesnotadequatelycorrespondtoitsoperationaldemands.
DuringOperationIraqiFreedom,the3dESC’sclassIIIB(bulkpetroleum)sectionoperatedunderthedoctrinalrequirementsforatheatersustainmentcommandpetro-leumsection.Itwasresponsibleforplanning,synchroniz-ing,andcoordinatingallexternalfuelsupportthroughthecommandandcontroloffivesustainmentbrigades,managingfueldistributioninIraqbybalancingtheexist-ingdistributioncapabilitiestomeetcurrentandprojectedoperationalrequirements,andultimatelyprovidingupto2milliongallonsofbulkpetroleumdailytodeployedunits.
TheESC’sbulkpetroleumteamcoordinateddailywiththemobilitysections,themovementcontrolbattalion,thesustainmentbrigades,thesub-areapetroleumofficer(forward),theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)JointPetroleumOffice,theMulti-NationalCorps-IraqC–4,theDefenseEnergySupportCenter,andseveralotherfuel-communityentities.Thisensuredthecontinuityoffueldistributionandmanagement.
ThesectionwasalsoresponsibleforconductingsitevisitstoensurethataccurateprocedureswerebeingfollowedatthebulkpetroleumfarmsthroughoutIraq.PersonnelhadtobeonsitewhenrequiredbytheESCsupportoperationsofficer,thecommandinggeneral,andonoccasion,atthespecificrequestoftheCENTCOMjointpetroleumofficertoguaranteepetroleumoperationswereconductedsuitably.
Simultaneously,constructionofbolted-steeltankfacili-tieswasinprogressattwoofthedirectsupportlocations,JointBaseBaladandContingencyOperatingBase(COB)Speicher.Theprojectsrequiredvisitsfromasubject-matterexpertfromthebulkpetroleumsectionwhocouldfullyunderstandtheproposedconstructionandensurethatitwouldbesufficientforbulkfuelfarmoperations.TheprojectsalsokeptthesectionengagedwithLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramcontractorstoensurethatthemissionwascompletedwiththedesiredequipment.ThismissionlaterincludedoverseeingconstructionofabulkfuelfarmatCOBBasrathatsupportedMulti-NationalDivision-Southasitmoveditsheadquarters.
BulkPetroleumManningRequirementsinanESC
by Captain Shari S. boWen
T Otherrequirementsthatreducedstaffavailabilityinthebulkpetroleumsectionwereobligationstoparticipateintheannualfuelsconferenceandrestandrecuperationleave.Toreducesomeburdenonthesection,bulkwaterdutieswereshiftedtotheclassI(subsistence)sectionsincewaterproductionandconsumptionfellundertheclassIrealmofresponsibility.
AccordingtotheMTOE,theESC’sbulkpetroleumsectionstaffshouldincludeacaptainasthepetroleumofficer,asergeantfirstclassasthepetroleumsupplysergeant,andastaffsergeantasawatertreatmentsuper-visor.TheMTOEalsocallsforamajortobethesupplymanagementofficer;however,intheMTOEthispositionbelongstothesupplyandservicesbranchandnotdirectlytothebulkpetroleumsection.
BecauseofthesizeoftheareaofresponsibilityandthenumberofforcesbeingsupportedinIraq,theforceauthorizedtothesectionbytheMTOEwasinadequateforsuccess.TheESC’sbulkpetroleumsectionassumedadditionalpersonnel,includingawarrantofficerpetro-leumtechnician,whobytheMTOEwasassignedtothedistributionintegrationsbranch.
Thebranchhadbeenestablishedwithinthesupportoperationssectiontosynchronizerequirementsbetweenthecommoditiesandtheirfinaldestinations.However,theESCfoundthathavingthesubject-matterexpertsinthedistributionintegrationsbranchinsteadofassignedtospecifiedcommoditieshaddisadvantages.Thebulkpetro-leumsectionalsoreceivedautomatedlogisticalspecialistSoldiers,intheranksofsergeantfirstclassandstaffser-geant,fromothersectionstoguaranteesuccess.
Thevastnumberofdailymissionsprovedtorequirealieutenantcolonel,amajor,acaptain,apetroleumtechni-cian,andfourpetroleumsupplyspecialists(onemastersergeant,twosergeantsfirstclass,andonestaffsergeant)tosuccessfullyachievethebulkpetroleummission.IproposethatbeforeanymoreESCsperformexpeditionarymissions,theirMTOEsbechangedtoensurethatthedistributionoffuel,themostcriticalsupplycommodity,isnotinterrupted.
Captain shari s. Bowen was the petroleum supply offiCer in Charge of the Class iii (Bulk petroleum) seCtion of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) when she wrote this artiCle. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in english from the university of marylanD anD a master’s Degree in instruCtional teChnology from ameriCan interCon-tinental university anD is pursuing a DoCtorate of management in orga-niZational leaDership from the university of phoenix. she is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course.
62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heflowofclassIX(repairparts)isanintegral partofthemaintenanceprocess.Without parts,faultswillnotgetfixed.Thelongerittakesarepairparttoarrive,thelongerapieceofequipmentisnotmissioncapable(NMC).
MybrigadewaslocatedatForwardOperatingBase(FOB)MarezinMosul,Iraq.MosulislocatedinnorthernIraq,approximately172milesfromLogis-ticsSupportAreaAnacondainBalad,Iraq,and560milesfromKuwait.ThesetwobasesarehubsforclassIX.Mostpartseithercomefromorgothroughtheselocations.
TheaverageamountoftimeittakesforaparttocomefromKuwaitis24days,andtheaverageamountoftimeittakesforaparttoarrivefromBaladis14days.Thishashadanenormouseffectonourcombatpower.Onaverage,NMCequipmentremainsthatwayformorethan20daysbecauseofthesluggishflowofclassIXparts.
Severalthingscanbedonetohelpmitigatethisslowflowofrepairparts.
ShareAmongUnitsTheeasiestwaytospeeduptotheflowofclassIX
inIraqistouseunitresources.Everybattalionmain-tenanceprogramhasabattalionmaintenancetechni-cian.ThiswarrantofficerusuallyhasmanyresourcesavailabletohimbecausetheWarrantOfficerCorpsisverytightlyknit.
The026report(EquipmentDeadlinedOverXXDaysbyBattalionReport)withtheentirebrigade’slistofNMCequipmentisemailedtoeverybattalion.Eachbattalionmaintenancetechnicianshouldreadtheentirelisttoensurethathedoesnothaveapartthatasisterunitneeds.Ifhedoeshaveapartthatanotherunitneeds,heshouldhand-carryormailittothatunit.Whenunitswithinthebrigadelookoutforeachother,theytendtohavesmaller026reports.
ExpeditingClassIXDeliveriesinIraqby firSt lieutenant alexyS M. MyerS
T Hi-PriOthersolutionstothisissuehavegoneupourbri-
gade’schannelstobrigade.Onesolutionthatthesupportoperationsshopusesiscalleda“hi-pri”(highpriority).Ourbrigadestandardistodoahi-priiftheestimatedshippingdateontheinitialdocumentexceeds6months.
Atthatpoint,thebattalionmaintenanceclerkcon-ductsresearchtoidentifythesupplysupportactivity(SSA)thathasthepart.ThisinformationispassedfromthebattalionmaintenancetechnicianthroughthematerielofficerandtheSSAtechniciantotheroutingcodegeo-graphicmanager,whowillthencalluptheSSAtechni-cianatthelocationofthepartanddoarequisition.
Orderingaparthi-priissimilartodoingawalk-throughatanSSAexternaltotheunit.(Note:IfapartisnotlocatedinanyexternalSSAsincountry,thenthebrigadewillnotmarkthedocumentashi-pri.)
LiaisonOfficerArguablythebestsolutiontotheslowreceiptof
repairpartsistokeepaliaisonofficer(LNO)atthehublocation.Mybrigade’sLNOwaslocatedinBalad.ThisLNOshouldbeanoncommissionedofficerorofficerwhoknowsandunderstandsthesupplysystem.Hewouldberesponsibleformailingpartstothebat-talionsinthebrigadespreadacrossIraq.
OnereasonittakespartssolongtogetfromBaladtoMosulisthattheunitsthatpackthecontainersgoingtospecificFOBswaituntilacontaineriscom-pletelyfullofpartsbeforesendingthecontainernorth.(Itisawasteofresourcestoshipahalf-emptycon-tainer.)WithanLNO,however,partscanbewalkedthroughthehubSSAinBaladandmaileddirectlytoapointofcontactatthereceivingunit.ThisprocessundoubtedlyexpeditestheflowofclassIXpartsinIraq.AnLNOshoulddefinitelybeusedbyallunits.
TheflowofclassIXpartscanbeincrediblyslowinIraq.However,manysolutionsareavailabletohelpmitigatethisproblem.Beforedeploying,considerthatthismightbeanissueandthinkofwaystohelpyourunit.Maintainingequipmentisanextremelyimportantpartofmissionsuccess,andmaintenanceisincompletewithoutclassIXparts.
first lieutenant alexys m. myers is the maintenanCe Con-trol offiCer for the 1st Battalion, 9th fielD artillery regi-ment, 2D heavy BrigaDe ComBat team, 3D infantry Division. she was DeployeD to iraQ when she wrote this artiCle. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in frenCh anD spanish from the uniteD states military aCaDemy.
One reason it takes parts so long to get from Balad to Mosul is that the units that pack the containers going to specific FOBs wait until a container is completely full of
parts before sending the container north.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 63
epartmentoftheArmy(DA)logisticsinterns neverknowwhattasksmaymakeuptheir trainingday.Oneminutetheymaybeworkingatadesk,andthenextminutetheycouldberidinginaBradleyinfantryfightingvehicleorjumpingoutofanairplane.Nomatterwhatdailytaskstheyundertake,theyaregainingvaluablehands-onexperiencewhilelearningmoreabouttheircustomer—theSoldier.
WeareDAlogisticsmanagementspecialistinternswhowereassignedtoYumaProvingGround,Arizona,aspartofouron-the-jobtraining(OJT).DuringourOJT,wereceivedlogisticstraininginsupply,maintenance,andtransportation.On3Feb-ruary2010,wealsoparticipatedinatandemjumpattheMilitaryFreefallSchoollocatedatYumaProvingGround.TheMilitaryFreefallSchool,partoftheArmyJohnF.KennedySpecialWarfareCenterandSchool,isajointforcesfacilityandthepremiertrainingsiteforhighaltitude-lowopening(HALO)parachutingtechniques.ThisiswhereU.S.SpecialOperationsForcespersonnelgotoqualifyashigh-altitudeparachutists.
BeforeheadingtoArizonaforactualairtime,Sol-diersbeginclassesatFortBragg,NorthCarolina.Inthefirstweek,theylearnhowtopackaparachute,rigextraequipment,and“fly”inaverticalwindtunnel.Thiswindtunnelteachesthemtheproperbodyposi-tionthatisneededforfreefallandthebasicsofpara-chutecanopycontrol.
Havinglearnedthebasictechniques,theyheadtoYumaProvingGroundformoretraining,whichincludesactualairtime.Eachinstructorisresponsiblefortwostudentswhoarerelativelycloseinbodytypetohisown.Whilegravityaffectseverythingatthe
ADayintheLifeofaDALogisticsIntern
by aliSon Silverio anD SuSannah tobey
D samerate,differentbodytypesfallfasterthanothersbasedontheirweightandexposedsurfacearea.
ForSoldiers,thetrainingculminatesinthefourthweekwithafreefallsimulatingacombatmission.WeobservedSoldierswhohadneverjumpedbeforeprogresstobeingabletojumpwithagroupof7or8othersfrom12,500feet,atnight,withaweaponandcombatpack.OncetheSoldiersopenedtheirparachutes,theyflewinaformationandlandedtogether—justastheywouldincombat.
AfterobservingtheSoldiersjump,wejumpedintandemwithinstructors.Weusedthesamegear,sig-nals,andtechniquesthattheSoldiersnormallydobutinatandemmode.Sincewewereuptoit,theinstruc-torsmadethejumpalittlemorechallengingbydoingabackwardsflipaftertheywereoutoftheairplane.
Foroveraminute,wewereinthefreefallposition,withourarmsoutandourlegsbentup,tocreateanevensurfaceagainsttheforceofthewindpushingagainstus.Atabout6,000feet,thetandemjumpmasterspulledthechute,andwewereabletogentlyfallwhiletakinginagreatpanoramicviewofthebeautifulmountainsanddes-ertlandscapethatmakeupYumaProvingGround.
Welandedsafely,andalthoughwehadbeenappre-hensiveaboutjumpingoutofanairplane,weagreedthatitwasthemostadventurousandexcitingexperi-encewehadeverhad.ThetandemjumpgaveusacloserlookatandagreaterappreciationfortheworldofSpecialOperationsForces.
ThisisjustoneexampleofaDAlogisticsintern’sexperience.MoreinformationontheDALogisticsInternProgramisavailableontheCivilianLogisticsCareerManagementOffice(CLCMO)websiteathttp://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/CLCMO/orbycon-tactingtheCLCMOofficeatlinda.sawvell@us.army.milorbyphoneat(309)782–7986.
alison silverio is a Department of the army (Da) logistiCs management speCialist intern. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in puBliC aDministration with a minor in spanish from virginia state university. she is a graDuate of the intern logistiCs stuDies pro-gram anD is Currently working on a Defense aCQuisition university (Dau) level 1 CertifiCation.
susannah toBey is Da logistiCs management speCialist intern. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in international Business anD rus-sian from the university of wyoming. she is a graDuate of the intern logistiCs stuDies program anD is Currently pursuing a Dau level 1 CertifiCation.
We observed Soldiers who had never jumped
before progress to being able to jump with a group
of 7 or 8 others from 12,500 feet, at night,
with a weapon and combat pack.
64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heArmyisimplementingarevolutionary systemthatallowscommandersandlogistics Soldiersatalllevelstoseeinrealtimewhattheyhaveandwheretheyhaveit.TheLogisticsReportingTool(LRT)cantrackeverythingfrombottledwatertomissilesandnonstandardequipment(suchassportutilityvehicles)tobarracksoccupancy.Softwaredevelopersrefinedthetoolaroundtheneedsoflogisticians(asdefinedbythem)anddeliveredsolutionstofitthoseneeds.
TheefforttohaveLRTwidelyembracedbytheArmyisbeingspearheadedbythe1stInfantryDivisionG–3inIraq.Thesectionbegantheeffortbycoordinat-ingwithboththe36thSustainmentBrigade,whichwasresponsibleforlogisticsthroughoutsouthernIraqwhenthe“BigRedOne”cametothetheater,andthe13thExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC),whichwasthetheater-levellogisticscommand.The1stInfan-tryDivisionassumedcommandandcontrolofU.S.Division-Southon1February2010,andinMarch,Cap-tainDavidShafferbeganworkingtoputLRTintousebythedivisionanditssubordinateunitsintheater.
LRTisasmallpartoftheBattleCommandSustain-mentSupportSystem(BCS3),whichhashadmixedreviewsbecauseofexperiencesSoldiershadwiththeearlier,unrefinedversionofthesystem.BCS3isnowmanagedbytheBoeingsubsidiaryTapestrySolutions,Inc.,anditisafarcryfromthesoftwaremostSoldiersremember.However,convincingSoldiersofthishasbeenabitofabattle,accordingtoShaffer.
Initially,ShafferwasalsoskepticalbecauseofanencounterhehadwithanearlierversionofBCS3in2006.Shortlyaftertakingontheproject,hecalledLarryWise,afieldserviceengineer(FSE)forTapestrySolutions,Inc.,andaretiredArmycommandsergeantmajor.Accordingtothetwo,theirfirstmeetingwastheresultofa“heateddiscussion”andachallengefromWiseforShaffertovisitContingencyOperatingBaseAddertohavesomeofhisperceptionscorrected.
OnceWisehadthechancetowalkShaffer,anexperi-encedlogistician,throughthetremendousfunctionalitytheprogramoffered,ShafferbecameanLRTbeliever.Shaffer,Wise,andeveryallytheycouldfindthenworkedtogainacceptanceofLRT.Thekeytoprogresscamefromwork-ingdirectlywiththelogisticianswhoneededtousethesoftware.“Yougettheminthere,andyougetthemtostopthinkingabouteverythingtheydon’twanttodoandgetthemlookingatwhattheyneedtodo,”Wisesaid.
ChiefWarrantOfficerKristie-MarieDean,thesus-tainmentautomationsupportmanagementchiefforthe
1stInfantryDivisionRecognizesBenefitsofLogisticsReportingTool
by SerGeant benJaMin kibbey, uSar
T 36thSustainmentBrigade,saidthatthecurrentLRTisnotablydifferentfromtheoriginalsoftware.“It’smorefunctional,easiertoputitonline,[does]not[have]somanysteps,[is]moreuser-friendly,andusestermsthatdealmorewithmilitarytermsandnotcivilianterms,”saidDean.
ColonelSeanRyan,the36thSustainmentBrigadecommander,isfamiliarwiththeissuesShafferandWiseencountered.Asacivilian,Ryanworkswiththeimple-mentationofsoftwareincorporateenvironments.WhenhefirstencounteredtheLRTduringthe36thSustain-mentBrigade’smobilization,Ryanimmediatelysawtheusefulnessoftheprogram.“Ihadtodoalotofconvinc-ingthatweweregoingtodothis,”Ryansaid.“Having[Shaffer]comein,andhavingthatsupportfromthedivision,gavemethemomentumthatIneededtopushitforward.”
Ryannotedthatheknowsfromexperiencethatanysoftwareisgoingtohaveissueswhenitisfirstfielded.Theonlyansweristogetintotheprogramandidentifythebugs.“We’vespentmillionsofdollarstofieldthesesystems,andIjustfeltitwasmydutytodoaproofofconcepttostartreallyunderstandinghowtoutilizeit[and]figureoutwhatthetrueshortfallsare.”
GregMiller,aretiredlogisticssergeantmajorandtheBCS3FSEembeddedwiththe13thESC,saidtheLRThascomealongwayfromtheoriginalsystemintro-ducedin2004.“It’sanoutstandingtool,”Millersaid.“Itstartsfromthebottomendwiththeuser,andassoonastheuserinputs,everybodycanseeit.”TheinformationenteredatthefieldlevelisviewableallthewaybackintheUnitedStatesonlysecondslater,givingcommandersatalllevelsanimmediateandrealisticpictureofwhatisontheground.
MillersaidLRTalsosavestimeandeffortandputslogisticiansbacktoworkdoinglogisticsworkinsteadofPowerPointslidesandExcelspreadsheets.“Dependingontheleveloftheunit,theunitsprobablyspend3to4ormoreman-hoursperdaycollectingtheirreports,”Millersaid.“That’s28man-hours[aweek];that’sahalfapersonthatyou’vegivenbacktotheunit.”
“It’sgoingtofree-upalotoftimeforSoldiers,”saidChiefWarrantOfficerDean.“It’sgoingtotakethetimedownbelowtoenterthedata,butoncethatdataisentered,itjustbecomesalogisticaltoolforustoanalyze.”
sergeant BenJamin kiBBey, usar, is a memBer of the 367th moBile puBliC affairs DetaChment, army reserve. he was assigneD to multi-national Division-south in iraQ when he wrote this artiCle.
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 65
ChiefofStaffEmphasizesImportanceofPropertyAccountability
TheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,GeneralGeorgeW.Casey,Jr.,hasdirectedthatapropertyaccount-abilitycampaignbeconductedtoensurethatacultureofgoodsupplydisciplineandpropertyaccountabilityexitsacrosstheArmyateverylevel.TheChiefofStaffchargedtheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,DepartmentoftheArmy,withdevelopinganenduringcampaign.
Inhismessageestablishingthecampaign,GeneralCaseystated,“Propertyaccountabilityiseverycom-mander’sresponsibility.AswefocusonexecutingtheIraqdrawdownandbuild-upinAfghanistan,aswellascontinueddeploymentsworldwide,itisimperativethatwemaintaingoodaccountabilityofallArmyproperty.Wemustknowwhatwehaveandwhereitis—withoutexception.”
Thekeytasksofthecampaignareto—oReinforceexistingpoliciesanddirectiveswith
subordinates.oReestablishcommanders’organizationinspection
programs.oMentorleadersateverylevelongoodsupplydisci-
plineandpropertyaccountability.oRedistributeorturninexcessmateriel.oEstablishmechanismstomonitorcompliancewith
goodsupplyprocedures.ThedesiredgoalisforallArmypropertytobe
accountedfor,excesspropertytobeturnedinandredistributedtoimprovereadiness,andprogramstobeinplacetoinspectandmonitorcompliance.
Formoreinformationonthepropertyaccountabilitycampaign,visithttps://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1143486.
InteragencyLogisticsSymposiumHighlightsDisasterReliefSupport
ThebiennialInteragencyLogisticsSymposium,heldinJuneattheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANS-COM)headquartersatScottAirForceBase,Illinois,focusedonlogisticsrelatedtohumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefefforts.Participantsincludedmorethan140individualsfrom50organizations,includingGovernmentandnongovernmentalagencies,combatantcommands,industry,andacademia.
PersonneloftheU.S.SouthernCommand,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency,andtheU.S.Embas-syinHaitidiscussedtheirexperiencesandlessonslearnedinrespondingtothedevastatingJanuaryearth-quakeinHaiti.
Thesymposiumalsofeaturedasupply-chainmodelingandsimulationexercisethatusedashared-workspacecapabilitycalledtheSmallGroupScenarioTrainer(SGST).Attendeesplayedtherolesofdifferent
stakeholdersconfrontedwithadisasterscenariobor-rowedfromtheMilitarySealiftCommand’sSealift2010exerciseandusedSGSTtoplanandexecuteacoordinatedinteragencyresponse.
“Theeventwasveryinformativeandprovidedauniqueopportunitytounderstandinteragencychal-lenges,”observedAdamYearwood,assistantforsealiftandmobility,OfficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforTransportationPolicy.“Akeytake-awayisthatweneedtoimprovecollaborationbetweenallstakeholders.”
NewStrategyWillguideAcquisitionofTacticalWheeledVehicles
TheArmyhassenttoCongressareportdetailinganacquisitionstrategyfortacticalwheeledvehicles,includingmine-resistantambush-protectedvehicles,through2025.
Accordingtothereport,“Findingtherightbalanceandmixof[tacticalwheeledvehicles]requirestheArmytocontinuallyassessandadjustinvestments.Managingthisfleeteffectivelygoesbeyondsimplybuyingnewvehiclesastheexistingvehiclesagebeyondtheiruse-fullife.Wewilluseacombinationofnewprocurement,repair(sustainment),recapitalization(recap),anddives-turetoachieveourstrategicobjectivebyaddressingthereadinessandmissionissuesofthefleet.”
Theacquisitionstrategycallsforsustainmentandrecapitalizationof50,000up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles(HMMWVs)andthedivestitureofupto50,000agingHMMWVs,whichwillbereplacedbynewjointlighttacticalvehicles.
TheArmywillalsocontinuetobuynewtrucksinthefamilyofmediumtacticalvehicles,while44,000truckswillbesustainedthroughresetandupto28,000agingtruckswillberetiredordivested.ThestrategycallsfordivestitureofallM352½-tontrucksbytheendoffiscalyear2011.
Thereportoutlinesalong-termarmorstrategyunderwhichtacticaltruckswillbebuiltusinganA-kit/B-kitmodulararmorapproach.Thisapproachwillmeettheneedtoprotecttrucksonnonlinearbattlefieldswhereallvehiclesarenowtargetsofenemyfireandimprovisedexplosivedevices.TheA-kit/B-kitapproachwillallowprotectionoftruckstobeadjustedaccordingtothepotentialthreatstheywillface.
Asthereportdescribestheapproach,“TheA-kitisdesignedtoacceptadditionalarmorintheformofaB-kit.TheA-kit/B-kitconceptallowstheArmyflex-ibilityinseveralareas:thearmorB-kitcanbetakenoffwhennotneeded—reducingunnecessarywearandtearonthevehicles;theArmycancontinuetopursueupgradesinarmorprotection—adaptingB-kitstomatchthethreat;andtheversatilityoftheB-kit
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enablesthetransferofarmorfromunittounit[which]makesarmorrequirementsaffordablebypoolingassetsversusbuyingarmorthatisonlyforonevehicle.”
Theoveralltacticalwheeledvehicleacquisitionstrategyisdesignedtoprovidemaximumflexibilitytorespondtochangesincombatcircumstances,incorpo-ratetechnologicalchanges,andbuynewermaterials.
AirdropsinAfghanistanBreakRecordsAirdropmissionsinAfghanistancontinuetobreak
recordsasmoreU.S.unitsarriveinthecountry.Inspiteofcommunicationglitchesandotherproblemsencounteredonthesemissions,duringa12-weekperi-odearlythisyear,500bundlestotaling450tonsweredroppedeachweek.
InApril,unitssetarecordwiththedeliveryofmorethan2,700bundles.On7April,unitssetasingle-dayrecordof200bundles,totaling160tonsofsuppliesdelivered.Forcomparison,duringtheDecember1944BattleoftheBulgeinWorldWarII,482tonsofsup-pliesweredroppedina2-dayperiod.InVietnam,dur-ingthebattleofKheSahn,294tonsweredroppedina77-dayperiod.
AccordingtoAirForceColonelKeithBoone,whohasmanagedAfghanistanairdropssincelastyear,air-portrates“havebeensteadilyincreasingsincesustain-mentairdropoperationsbeganin2005.”BoonesaysthatthismakesthemissioninAfghanistanthelongestaerialdeliverymissioninthehistoryofmilitary
operations.“Withtheexceptionofabout5days,wehavehadatleast1dropeverydaysinceIhavebeenhere,andIsuspectthatistrueforthepast2years.”
“Lotsofgreatinnovations[are]happeningintheater,”saidAirForceBrigadierGeneralBarbaraFaulkenberry,whorecentlyservedasdirectorofmobilityforcesandcommanderoftheAirMobilityCommand’s15thExpeditionaryMobilityTaskForce.“Theendresultiswe’reprovidingwhatthewarfighterneeds,whenheneedsit,andwhereheneedsit.”
Amongthoseinnovationsarethejointprecisionairdropsystem(JPADS),theimprovedcontainerdeliverysystem(ICDS),andthemostrecentdevel-opment,theC–130-based“low-cost,low-altitude”(LCLA)combatairdropusedtoresupplySoldiersatforwardoperatingbases.
JPADSusesaglobalpositioningsystem,steerableparachutes,andanonboardcomputertoguideloadstoadesignatedpointonadropzone.ItintegratestheArmy’sprecisionandextendedglideairdropsystemandtheAirForce’sprecisionairdropsystemprogram.ICDSallowsforimprovedprecisionbyfactoringinaltitude,windspeed,winddirection,terrainandothercircumstancesthatmightaffectthedrop.Alow-cost,low-altitudeair-dropisaccomplishedbydroppingbundlesweighing80to500pounds,withpre-packedexpendableparachutes,ingroupsofuptofourbundlesperpass.
“TheLCLAdropswillmeettheneedsofasmallersubsetoftheunits,”Boonesaid.“Thisisasignificant
Army Receives First Palletized Load System A1s
In August, the Army received its first shipment of the palletized load system (PLS) A1s from Oshkosh Defense, a division of the Oshkosh Corporation. The vehicles feature design improvements that make it more secure and robust than its predecessor. The Army is slated to receive 725 PLS A1s by September 2011. (Photo by Oshkosh Defense)
NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 67
stepforwardinourabilitytosustainthoseengagedincounterinsurgencyoperationsthroughoutAfghanistan.”
AircraftthatlandandoffloadsupplieswillcontinuetobethemainmethodofsupplyingSoldiers,accord-ingtoBoone.Butwherethistypeofoperationisnotpossible,supplieswillbedeliveredthroughcontainerdeliverysystemairdrops.
U.S.CentralCommandCombinedAirandSpaceOperationsCenterofficialssay97percentofairdropshavebeenontargetasofJuly2010.
“Tacticalairlifthasneverbeensoresponsive,soagileinour[tactics,techniquesandprocedures],andcriticalinafight,”Faulkenberrysaid.“Airdropisenablingthesmall,dispersed[counterinsurgency]unittoengageandoperate.ThisApril,wedropped4,860,000poundstogroundforceswhoneededthefood,fuel,orammo.Itistakingair-groundteamworktosucceed,andtogether,we’remakingourhistory.”
ArmyHoldsFirstMobilitySystemsConferenceMorethan280attendeestookpartintheArmy’s
firstmobilitysystemsconference,heldfrom5to7AprilinNewportNews,Virginia.TheArmyproductmanagers(PMs)fortransportationinformationsys-tems,joint-automaticidentificationtechnology,andtheMovementTrackingSystemandtheproductdirectoroftheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSys-tem(BCS3)cosponsoredtheevent,whichprovidedavenuefordiscussionandcollaborationonproductcon-nectivityandsystemcommonalities.
Seventy-fivepercentoftheparticipantswerefromtheusercommunityandreceivedanend-to-enddem-onstrationofinformationflowbetweenthetranspor-tationcoordinators.ApaneldiscussiononcurrentoperationsinAfghanistanwasalsoheld,alongwithworkshopsonairmovementrequestprocedures,auto-maticmovementflowtrackingin-transitvisibility,BCS3trainingsimulation,theCargoMovementOper-ationsSystem,andothersubjects.
EnvironmentalHotlineEstablishedforArmyAviationandMissileCommand
TheArmyAviationandMissileCommand(AMCOM)hascreatedahotlinetoanswerquestionsaboutenvironmentalissues.Thehotlinestaffcaniden-tifycurrentlyapprovedsubstitutematerialsandprovideexpertiseindepotmaintenanceworkrequirementsandinformationontechnicalmanualsandprocesses.
Thehotlinewasputinplacetoresolveissuespertainingtoobsoleteproducts,hazardousmaterialalternatives,regulatoryguidance,andalternativetechnologiestoreducetheenvironmentalburdenonAMCOMmaintenanceorganizations.TheAMCOM
DefenseWorkinggrouponNondestructiveTestingThe58thDefenseWorkingGrouponNonde-
structiveTesting(DWGNDT)willmeetfrom7to9DecemberinFortWorth,Texas.Thisyear’seventishostedbytheAirForceNondestructiveInspectionProgramOfficeatTinkerAirForceBase,Oklahoma.
TheDWGNDTisameetingofengineers,sci-entists,technicians,andmanagersfromU.S.com-mandsandGovernmentactivitiesresponsibleforthedevelopmentandapplicationofnondestructivetest-ingmethodsinresearch,engineering,maintenance,andqualityassurance.AllparticipantsmustbeU.S.citizens.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheDWGNDTwebsiteatwww.dwgndt.org.
DefenseLogisticsandDefenseLogisticsMedicalThisyear,WorldwideBusinessResearchwillhold
itsDefenseLogisticsMedicalconferenceaspartofDefenseLogistics2010from30Novemberto3DecemberinArlington,Virginia.
ThefocusofDefenseLogisticsMedicalistheimprovementofmedicallogisticsprocessestoensuretimelydeliveryofmedicalsupporttothewarfighter.Theconferencewillhighlightcold-chainstorageandtransportationandend-to-endsupplychainmanage-mentchallengesfortheArmy,MarineCorps,andNavycommunities.
DefenseLogisticswillconcentrateonadaptingtoanewbudgetenvironmentwithoutsacrificingsupporttothewarfighter.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheconferencewebsite,www.defenselog.com.
UPCOMING EvENTS
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA-DOC) Pamphlet 525–3–1,TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept,publishedinAugust,explainshowtocomplywithandexecuteguidancefromtheArmyCapstoneConcept.Thepamphletservesasabridgebetweenthecapstoneconceptandthewarfightingfunctionalconcepts.ItwillalsoguiderevisionstoArmydoctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadershipandeducation,personnel,andfacilities(DOTMLPF)from2016to2028.ThesechangeswillbeneededinorderfortheArmytofunctioninachallengingenvironmentwithjoint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinationalpartners,whowillbekeyplayersinfuturewarfare.
ThepamphletisavailableattheTRADOCwebsiteatwww.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.
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EnvironmentalHotlineisavailable24hoursaday,7daysaweek,andcanbereachedbycalling(256)424–[email protected].
ArmyRespondstoFloodsinPakistanTheDepartmentofDefenseannouncedon27
Augustthat10CH–47Chinookand8UH–60BlackHawkhelicoptersfromthe16thCombatAviationBri-gadeinFortWainwright,Alaska,werejoiningreliefeffortstoaidfloodvictimsinPakistan.
TheU.S.militaryinitiallysent15helicoptersand3C–130Herculesaircrafttosupportreliefeffortsthat,asoftheendofAugust,hadtransported2millionpoundsofhumanitarianassistancesuppliesandrescued7,000people.Inthemonthfollowingtheflood,theUnitedStatesprovided$150milliontosupportimmediatereliefeffortsandsetasideanadditional$50milliontore-establishcommunitiesaffectedbythefloods.
HeadquartersforU.S.TransportationCommandReadyforaMovingWorkforce
TheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM)hasofficiallyopeneditsnewheadquartersfacilityatScottAirForceBase,Illinois.Theproject,aresultofthe2005BaseClosureandRealignment(BRAC)Commissionrecommendations,colocatestheMili-tarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC)withTRANSCOMandtheAirMobilityCom-mand(AMC).SDDCisnotonlymovinginwithAMC;itisalsoconsolidatingthreeelementspreviously
housedatthreedifferentinstallationsinVirginiatoonecampusandreducingTRANSCOM’sfootprint.
AccordingtoStevenCoyle,TRANSCOMdirec-torofBRACtransformation,themovebringsthecommandasavingsof$1.2billionandrequired$130millioninimprovementsandupgradestocur-rentcommandfacilities.TheupgradesincludeanewfusioncenterthatwillsynchronizeTRANSCOM’sglobalstrategicmobilityoperationsandhousetheJointDistributionProcessandAnalysisCenter.TheheadquartersisalsohometothenewJointIntelligenceOperationsCenterforTransportation,whichwillpro-videin-depthintelligenceanalysisfortheFusionCen-ter.Theintelligencecenterishousedina$20millionadditionfundedbytheDefenseIntelligenceAgency.
TheAcquisitionCenterofExcellenceisalsoapartofthenewheadquartersandincorporatesthecom-mercialcontractactivitiesofTRANSCOM,AMC,andSDDC.AMC’sandSDDC’scontractingfunctionswerepreviouslyconsolidatedandhaveprovensuccessful.Ajointbillingcenterwillalsoimprovesupportbycon-solidatingcomptrollerbillingandcollectionactivities.
OtheradditionstotheexpandingTRANSCOMcampusincludeupgradesandreconfigurationstoScottAirForceBasetohousetheAT21[AgileTrans-portationforthe21stCentury]EnterpriseIntegrationLaboratory.Infiscalyear2012,theGlobalPatientMovementRequirementsCenterandtheDefenseTransportationCoordinationInitiativeOffice/Distribu-tionPortfolioManagementbranchwillrelocatetothecampusfromleasedfacilitiesoffbase.
DefenseLogisticsAgencyRenamesUnitstoHighlightUnityofLogisticsMission
NavyViceAdmiralAlanThompson,thedirectoroftheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),announcedaninitiativeinJulydesignedtocreateunityamongDLAlogisticsunites.Theplan,called“WeAreDLA,”isaunified,single-agencyapproachthatunitesagencysegmentsregard-lessoftheirgeographiclocationandmission.Undertheplan,DLAunitswillassumethefollowingnewnames:
FormerName NewName
DefenseSupplyCenterColumbus DLALandandMaritime
DefenseSupplyCenterPhiladelphia DLATroopSupport
DefenseSupplyCenterRichmond DLAAviation
DefenseEnergySupportCenter DLAEnergy
DefenseReutilizationandMarketingService
DLADispositionServices
DefenseDistributionCenter DLADistribution
DefenseLogisticsInformationService
DLALogisticsInformationService
DocumentAutomationandProductionService
DLADocumentServices
DefenseAutomaticAddressingSystemCenter
DLATransactionServices
DefenseNationalStockpileCenter DLAStrategicMaterials
DLAEuropeandAfrica DLAEurope&Africa
DLACentral DLACentral
DLAPacific DLAPacific
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