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1 A Tale of Two Interpretations

1. As Georges Dicker puts it, “Hume’s influence on contemporary epistemology and metaphysics is second to none ... ” (1998, ix). Note, too, that Hume’s impact extends beyond philosophy. For consider the following passage from Einstein’s letter to Moritz Schlick:

Your representations that the theory of rel. [relativity] suggests itself in positivism, yet without requiring it, are also very right. In this also you saw correctly that this line of thought had a great influence on my efforts, and more specifically, E. Mach, and even more so Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature I had studied avidly and with admiration shortly before discovering the theory of relativity. It is very possible that without these philosophical studies I would not have arrived at the solution (Einstein 1998, 161).

2. For a brief overview of Hume’s connection to naturalized epistemology, see Morris (2008, 472–3).

3. For the sake of convenience, I sometimes refer to the “traditional reading of Hume as a sceptic” as, e.g., “the sceptical reading of Hume” or simply “the sceptical reading”. Moreover, I often refer to those who read Hume as a sceptic as, e.g., “the sceptical interpreters of Hume” or “the sceptical inter-preters”. By the same token, I sometimes refer to those who read Hume as a naturalist as, e.g., “the naturalist interpreters of Hume” or simply “the natu-ralist interpreters”. And the reading that the naturalist interpreters support I refer to as, e.g., “the naturalist reading” or “the naturalist interpretation”.

4. This is not to say, though, that dissenting voices were entirely absent. Spencer and some other nineteenth-century thinkers interpreted Hume as a natu-ralist (see Pakaluk 1989, 454, n. 25).

5. Some of these earlier interpreters clearly saw that Hume was more than simply a sceptical thinker. For more on this topic, see Paul Russell (2008, ch. 2).

6. For more on this Russellian rehabilitation, see Garrett’s (2005, xxviii–xxix) introduction to the Kemp Smith work.

7. In Russell’s words: “David Hume ... developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible. He represents ... a dead end. ... I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume’s system may be discoverable” (1947, 685).

8. A. J. Ayer’s famous Language, Truth and Logic, for example, explicitly patterns itself after a significant part of Hume’s philosophy: “The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume. Like Hume, I divide all genuine propositions into

Notes

158 Notes

two classes: those which, in his terminology, concern ‘relations of ideas’ and those which concern ‘matters of fact’” (1952, 31).

9. An exception that appears to prove the rule is Ayer (1980). For some scathing criticisms of Ayer, see Flew (1986, 119) and Capaldi, King and Livingston (1991, 255). For a recent plea not to dismiss the positivist readings so quickly, see Williams (2004, 269–70).

10. Although Loeb explicitly restricts his claims about not interpreting Hume as a sceptic to the reasoning of Treatise I.iii.6 (Loeb 2006, 322), his overall argument rests upon Hume thinking that some beliefs are “justified” (Loeb’s term), which would presumably undermine any radically sceptical interpre-tation of Hume.

11. Even when those who see some sceptical leanings in Hume, such as Fogelin (1985), are accused of ignoring “the historical context of Hume’s writings”, the main criticism lodged is expository or philosophical: “The main diffi-culty with Fogelin’s book is trying to see exactly what Fogelin means by scep-ticism ... ” (Capaldi, King, and Livingston 1991, 257).

12. For a discussion of the relevant epistemological issues here, see Meeker (2004).

13. Recall that I have only claimed that there is an analogy between theory construction (and appraisal) in science and interpretation construction in philosophy. I am not claiming that they are identical. So it is not part of my view that refutability, a virtue of scientific hypotheses according to Quine and Ullian (1970, 79), is a virtue of an interpretive framework in philosophy. Nevertheless, in drawing on some of the theoretical virtues in scientific theorizing, I am attempting to construct something resembling a naturalistic theory of philosophical interpretation. In Chapter 8 I also appeal to some results on cognitive science to bolster my interpretation of Hume. Such an appeal to the scientific theories to help understand a philosopher’s thoughts is also, I take it, in line with a naturalistic theory of philosophical interpreta-tion. Of course, such attempts to build a naturalistic theory of anything are plagued by many philosophical problems, some of which I soon discuss.

14. Note that (PIP) is an interpretive principle, one similar to Michael Huemer’s perceptual rule of Phenomenal Conservatism (see Huemer 2001, 99).

15. When Loeb writes about the “scholarly consensus” that the traditional interpretation of Hume as an inductive sceptic is “mistaken”, he sometimes appears to back off the claim that dissent is “untenable” and claims instead that “no serious historical work on Hume can ignore the case against the tradition” (Loeb 2008, 109). This claim fits well with my judgement that anyone proposing an overall reading of Hume as a sceptic (and not just about induction) needs to deal with the alternative interpretations that function as a defeater.

16. Even more specifically, according to Loeb:The amendments involve omitting wrongheaded arguments and theses to which Hume commits himself. ... The amendments I propose abandon a number of Hume’s destructive claims and in some cases remove obsta-cles to Hume adopting more positive positions. ... I propose the amend-ments in order to show how a suitably revised version of Book I would have left Hume’s constructive epistemological theory in a considerably stronger position (2002, viii–ix).

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17. These comments apply to standards for a communal philosophical debate. These remarks are not necessarily meant to apply to the justification any particular individual may possess in developing an interpretation of Hume.

18. Although Loeb is correct that there have always been a few “hold-outs” (Loeb mentions in particular Penelhum 1992 and Winkler 1999), the scep-tical reading of Hume has welcomed some more recent, important defenders, such as Baxter (2008) and Schliesser (2008).

19. In another context this complaint is also specifically made about the “intel-lectual and textual surgery” (Capaldi, King and Livingston 1981, 168) performed on Hume’s works: “The surgery not only rips the life out of the text but it leaves a seemingly endless variety of Frankenstein monsters to stalk the philosophical journals. Succeeding generations then proceed to practice on the cadaver left by preceding generations. Hence is born the Hume industry” (Capaldi, King and Livingston 1981, 168–9).

20. Interestingly enough, even the “Just Say No” sign is not what it seems. Tom Sorell describes an e-mail exchange with the philosopher who alleg-edly posted the sign (Gilbert Harman) and relates that Harman’s views “ ... certainly do not express the deep hostility toward the history of philos-ophy that I ascribed to Harman on the basis of the gossip about the sign on his door” (Sorell 2005b, 44). The story of this sign seems to have taken on a life of its own. John Cottingham mentions the slogan appearing “on car stickers on some American campuses” (Cottingham 2005, 25). I suspect that much of the alleged conflict between analytic philosophers and historians of philosophy rests on misunderstandings and is flamed by misleading stories such as this sign saga.

21. Daniel Garber protests that “ ... in order to mine the past for arguments and positions of contemporary interest, as the collegial historian of philosophy [e.g., Bennett] wants to do, we must read the history of philosophy through our own philosophical categories” (Garber 2005, 18). It is not clear why a collegial historian must apply contemporary categories to historical texts. Couldn’t one try to discover how historical categories differ from contem-porary ones for the purpose of detecting hidden presuppositions in our own approaches?

22. For complaints about Hume’s discussion of scepticism in EHU along these lines, see Norton (2002, 379) and Millican (2002b, 62).

23. We should also not ignore the continuity between contemporary sceptical discussions and historical ones. Richard Popkin, probably one of the fore-most historians of scepticism of all time, characterizes ancient scepticism in terms of a lack of knowledge and sufficient evidence (Popkin 2003, xvii). Even more remarkably, consider his portrayal of scepticism in the early modern period: “ ... scepticism meaning a philosophical view that raises doubts about the adequacy or reliability of the evidence that could be offered to justify a proposition” (Popkin 2003, xxi).

24. Others also distinguish broadly between scepticism about knowledge and scepticism about belief (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1983b, 118–19). My distinction also somewhat resembles Fogelin’s distinction between theoretical and prescriptive scepticism (see his 1983 and 1985). According to Fogelin theo-retical scepticism amounts to the claim that “[t]here are no rational grounds for judgments of kind A” while prescriptive scepticism amounts to the claim

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that “[o]ne ought not to assent to judgments of kind A” (1983, 398). One of the most important differences between Fogelin’s classification and mine, as will be seen, is that my epistemic scepticism is a broader category than Fogelin’s theoretical scepticism, allowing for several subcategories that may include his theoretical scepticism.

25. It is also compatible with a denial of Fogelin’s theoretical or prescriptive scepticism.

26. On my interpretation, Hume is making a universal claim about all of our beliefs. This stands in contrast to one of Stroud’s points: “Hume’s theory ... shows that most [emphasis added] of our beliefs must [Stroud’s emphasis] be wrong or unreasonable ... ” (Stroud 1991, 276).

27. For two interesting examples, see Pitt (1988, 5) and Wilson (2008, 375, 520, 682).

28. It is important to note that Hume’s use of this concept is not an isolated case in the Treatise:

To justify still farther this account of the second species of probability ... I shall propose the following considerations, without fearing to give offence by that air of subtilty, which attends them. Just reasoning ought still, perhaps, to retain its force, however subtile; in the same manner as matter preserves its solidity in the air, and fire, and animal spirits, as well as in the grosser and more sensible forms (T1.3.12.13, 135; emphasis added).

2 Fallibility Gains a Foothold: A Model for Understanding Humean Scepticism

1. For an overview of this section, see Owen (forthcoming).2. I refer later to Quine’s critical argument against the analytic/synthetic distinc-

tion as a collapse of the distinction without claiming it is impossible to draw this distinction in a legitimate way.

3. “Doubt” and “uncertainty” are used interchangeably in, e.g., T1.4.1.6, 182.4. Hume does sometimes use “knowledge” in a very loose sense to refer to

assent to matters of fact (e.g., T1.3.8.14, 104; EHU 12.29). But when he is explicitly discussing the nature of knowledge (e.g., in the passages we have examined), he is very careful to rule out empirical propositions as candidates for knowledge.

5. Kemp Smith likewise usefully makes this distinction in connection with what Hume says about knowledge (2005/1941, 359).

6. Of course, most philosophers historically did not have such a label available to them. The point is that those who, like Hume, have a highly exalted view of what knowledge entails (e.g., certainty) seem committed to something like the KK thesis.

7. While it might seem odd on its face to claim that Hume believes that there are necessary truths given his empiricism and phenomenalism, Dorothy Coleman argues that “ ... although mathematical concepts are derived from experience, Hume could still consistently maintain that necessary, a priori relations exist between the empirical concepts” (1979, 117). Moreover the traditional interpretation that for Hume mathematical truths are analytic

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and the newer reading that for Hume mathematical truths are synthetic a priori agree that for Hume mathematical truths are necessary truths. For an overview of Hume interpretation on this issue and a defence of the claim that for Hume mathematics is synthetic a priori, see Coleman (1979).

8. Morris (1989, 43–6) also takes issue with Fogelin’s discussion. But the extent to which he thinks that this reasoning is Hume’s or is a parody of an intel-lectualist opponent is unclear.

9. Along these lines, Hume argues that “ ... knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly into each other, and that because they will not divide, but must be either entirely present, or entirely absent ... ” (T1.4.1.3, 181).

10. For a defence of Hume’s reasoning here, see Dauer (1996, 212–13).11. Another way to put Hume’s argument is as follows:

[Hume’s] strategy is to construct a sorites series between a case in which the condition intuitively grasping a mathematical claim clearly obtains and one in which it clearly fails to obtain, and then to argue that such a series cannot exist for an epistemically certain condition. Certainty must fail close to the boundary between cases where the condition intuitively grasping a mathematical claim obtains and cases where it does not, just on the obtaining side. (Meeker and Poston 2010, 229)

Interpreting the argument along these lines allows one to see some inter-esting parallels between Hume’s argument and Timothy Williamson’s (2000) anti-luminosity argument. For a much more detailed comparison, see Meeker and Poston (2010).

12. Robin Jeshion provides a nice summary of contemporary arguments about mathematics that are similar to Hume’s. She argues that “[t]he Humean view fails to recognize that individuals who reason through proofs, even lengthy proofs, normally possess non-sensory based justification for having knowl-edge of the derived theorem” (1997, 87). I do not think that Hume need be read as denying non-sensory-based groundings for simple mathematical beliefs; but if Hume holds that knowledge requires certainty, then Jeshion’s claims for mathematical knowledge are not incompatible with Hume’s first argument because she freely admits that on her view mathematical reasoning is not indubitable or infallible (1997, 87–8).

13. I do not mean to imply that subjective probability is for Hume a mathemat-ical probability in the Bayesian sense. As Barry Gower puts it,

... though it is hard to tell how, exactly, Hume wanted probabilities to be measured, it is plain that he thought of them as measurable. It is equally plain that his system of measurement is, by modern criteria and also by most eighteenth-century criteria, non-standard. This means ... that the problems in applying Bayesian analyses to those of Hume’s arguments which appeal to probabilistic considerations are greater than have been acknowledged. (1991, 17)

Hume’s views on probability will be discussed more in the next chapter.14. Passmore claims that this is one passage in which “ ... Hume lapses into

inconsistencies of the most startling character” (1980, 133).15. Owen claims that the “usual” way to understand Hume’s claim is as follows:

“any claim that one has knowledge that p must be replaced by a claim that one has only probable belief that p” (Owen 1999, 182). Note that even on

162 Notes

Owen’s characterization of the apparent meaning of Hume’s texts, humans have no certain knowledge, only probable belief. This reading of course is in line with certainty E-scepticism.

16. This second point was actually brought to my attention by David Owen. It takes an extraordinary type of generosity to help one’s critics improve their arguments. I am deeply indebted to him in many ways.

17. According to Owen, “On this view, the conclusion of Hume’s argument is not that we can be certain that knowledge never obtains, but only that we cannot be certain just when it does. But we do have a highly probable belief, on various occasions, that it does. This seems to be a sustainable, indeed plausible, position for a cautious sceptic to take” (1999, 183).

18. It is worth emphasizing again that this distinction is not unprecedented, as Kemp Smith also makes it in connection with what Hume says about knowl-edge (2005/1941, 359).

19. As Michael Pakaluk puts it, “But in denying any special kind of knowledge distinct from empirical, Quine effectively renders all knowledge that of causes and effects” (1989, 453).

20. Interestingly enough, Quine himself also finds his points to be similar to the ones Hume makes in this part of the Treatise: “Still, Hume has a point – if none of the probabilities are (except subjectively) any good at all, which is his posi-tion. A check of figures is at once an EMPIRICAL [emphasis added] judgment which can go wrong; we cannot get beyond causal, non-arithmetical support here. At best, trusting memory (which is itself of the nature of causal infer-ence ... )” (Quine 2008, 97). For more on Quine’s thoughts on these matters, see Meeker (2011).

21. A similar point applies if part of Hume’s argument is structurally similar to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. For more on this similarity, see Meeker and Poston (2010, 235).

22. Immerwahr claims that “[i]n the Enquiry certainty is permitted to the skeptic so long as it is limited to relations of ideas” (1976, 233).

3 Fallibility’s Ultimate Epistemic Consequence

1. Although Fogelin (1983 and 1985) at one time also argued for a compre-hensive, unified reading of Hume’s radical scepticism, his more recent writ-ings represent a marked divergence from my view. That is, Fogelin contends that Hume’s philosophy amounts to a “radical perspectivalism” (1993, 113). Hume’s writings thus present perspectives that are mutually incompatible, which makes it difficult to provide a single interpretation of Hume’s writ-ings. According to Fogelin: “ ... it becomes very difficult to see how, on his own terms, we can assign beliefs, degrees of belief and epistemic assessments of beliefs to him in an unequivocal, across-the-board, way” (1998, 165). Fogelin later argues that “ ... there are four contrasting Humes, or at least four contrasting voices of Hume, inhabiting Hume’s writings” (2009, 6). I take it that this is merely a restatement of the perspectivalist reading because Fogelin also claims that he makes “no claims for originality on particular points” (2009, 9). Although I agree with Fogelin that perspective is very important to Hume insofar as he emphasizes the contingency and particularity of various

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philosophical judgments (which will be explained more fully in Chapter 8), I contend that we can make an across-the-board assignment of beliefs and epistemic assessments of those beliefs. That is, we can say that Hume is an epistemic egalitarian across the board. In other words, on my view there is one perspective that is constant throughout Hume’s writings: radically global epistemic egalitarianism.

2. More specifically, we can say that the type of defeater to which Hume has drawn our attention is an undercutting defeater, as opposed to a rebutting defeater. Here is Pollock’s definition of an undercutting defeater: “If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is an undercutting defeater for this reason if and only if R is a defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and R is a reason for S to deny that P would be true unless Q were true” (1986, 39). But we can leave aside these details for the purposes of our discussion. A similar discussion of defeaters is found in Pollock and Cruz (1999, 36–7, 196).

3. Does it matter if we say “(virtually) zero” instead of “zero”? Not according to Fred Wilson:

“Vanishingly small” will do as well as “zero” in undermining belief and evidence. Moreover, given that no mathematician of that age was ever clear on the distinction between zero and the vanishingly small, that is, on the nature of infinitesimals, it is a harsh judge indeed that will condemn Hume for a similar failure of understanding. (1983, 102)

See also Imlay (1981, 126), DeWitt (1985, 131), Morris (1989, 51) and Dauer (1996, 214).

4. Others who briefly but explicitly endorse this “‘evidence’ as ‘evidentness’” thesis include Michael Lynch (1996, 103) and Bennett (2001, 315).

5. For a recent treatment of where the discussion of miracles might have origi-nally been placed in the Treatise, see Morris (2006, 92, n. 3).

6. Ainslie, e. g., appeals to Owen to defend his own reading of “evidence” as “evidentness” (see Ainslie 2003, 255). Antonia Lolordo also relies heavily on Owen’s reasoning here (see Lolordo 2000, 427).

7. Granted, the analogy is not perfect. One disanalogy is that Hume believes that human fallibility undermines the justification for our beliefs even if we do not consider it. On the other hand, (iv) is a defeater only if one is aware of it. The point of this comparison is, not to draw a perfect parallel, but to illustrate one plausible way of understanding how evidential relations work in the context of defeasible reasoning.

8. One could compare Hume’s talk of “new” evidence with a widening of one’s perspective from what Thomas Kelly calls a “narrow” sense of evidence (roughly speaking, “data”) to a “broad” sense of evidence (see 2008, 627–8), which “ ... includes everything of which one is aware that makes a difference to what one is justified in believing” (2008, 628).

9. Allison states briefly that the “principle of charity” requires that we adopt the Garrett-Owen thesis of “‘evidence’ as ‘evidentness’” lest we make Hume’s argument a “morass” (2008, 380, n. 25). Once again, the next few sections will explain why Hume’s argument is not a “morass”.

10. John Biro provides a representative illustration of this general interpretation:

... for two centuries after its publication, Hume’s philosophy was construed, essentially, perhaps entirely, as negative. His enquiries were

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seen as undertaken in a spirit of scepticism. ... The barrage of arguments in the first book of the Treatise, apparently questioning the very possibility of knowing anything about the world and about ourselves, was seen as directed not against various philosophical doctrines on these subjects (as these arguments are construed, increasingly, today), but against the very possibility of such knowledge. That such scepticism is on the face of it incompatible with the project Hume announced in the Introduction to the work was either not noticed or dismissed as unproblematic by the simple expedient of not taking him at his word. (1993, 36–7)

Peter Millican (2002b, 42) and Dauer (1996, 217) also advocate such a view. We should note that, for our purposes, I shall use the terms “rationalist” and “intellectualist” interchangeably.

11. Another recent reductio-style reading comes from Paul Russell’s fascinating book. While Baier and others claim that Hume is attacking “rationalist” ideas, Russell contends that the target is somewhat different:

... in order to clear the ground to build the edifice of secular morality, Hume had to undertake a systematic skeptical attack on those theological doctrines and principles that threatened such a project. The varied and seemingly unrelated skeptical arguments Hume advances in the Treatise are in fact held together by his overarching concern to discredit and refute Christian metaphysics and morals. (2008, 269)

While Russell’s account of Hume’s intended target is consistent with my general account, I contend that Hume’s sceptical arguments are not limited in scope. Interestingly, I could find no explicit discussion of Hume’s “Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason” in Russell’s book.

12. Fred Wilson’s (1983) and (1985) were also important attempts to understand I.iv.1.

13. While it is indeed difficult to characterize fully what an intellectualist/rationalist model of belief would look like, at the very least a rationalist would hold that we should, generally speaking, be able to follow the evidence where it leads. An intellectualist would presumably not deny that some people form beliefs that run counter to the evidence they possess. But the intellectualist would insist that in philosophical contexts, when we bracket emotional impediments that often blind us in our everyday lives, we should be able to believe in accord with the evidence. I shall return to this issue in Chapter 8.

14. As I argued above, it seems obvious that when Hume employs the term “evidence” in I.iv.1, he is speaking of “evidential grounds”, not “evidentness”. I shall therefore continue to speak in these terms. All of my points about “evidence”, though, are easily translated into points about “probability”. But because it is easier to employ the term “evidence” in these contexts, I shall continue to do so.

15. We will discuss some recent psychological evidence supporting Hume’s posi-tion on the relationship between belief and evidence in Chapter 8.

16. It is worth reiterating that it is our fallibility that generates the epistemic demand we reflect; the reflection itself does not generate the problem. Consider again, then, the argument from the second chapter. If one performs an extremely complex calculation and is absolutely certain that it is correct, Hume would say that this certainty is unjustified because one should have

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reflected on the fallibility of the faculties that did the calculating, not because one actually did reflect.

17. Ainslie suggests, along the lines of the reductio reading, that this sceptical problem arises from the “philosophical” point of view that “‘pursues our reason’ independently of any other motivation” (Ainslie 2003, 263). One problem with this interpretation is that Hume explicitly says that we are “pursuing our reason” because it is fallible. The fallibility of reason casts a shadow on all of our intellectual endeavours in “philosophy and common life”, catapulting this issue to the centre of our lives in many ways. As Hume recognizes, this is not some abstract academic exercise devoid of any practical implication, contrary to what Ainslie suggests. This same problem arises for Allison’s similar view that “ ... Hume’s skepticism is directed not at first-order empirical reasoning per se, but at second-order philosophical attempts to ground such reasoning systematically within the logical space of reasons ... ” (Allison 2008, 4).

18. Some emphasize Hume’s concluding phrase, “in that manner”, and contend that Hume is only disparaging attempts to justify reason “by appeal to a system” (Wilson 2008, 690). This reading overlooks how Hume himself talks about his own “hypothesis” about reason in these contexts. In any event, the next chapter will examine some attempts to read Hume as providing a “non-systematic” justification of reason.

19. But it is understandable enough to cause Hume some consternation in his study. After referring back to this argument at the end of book I, he admits that “ ... I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty” (T1.4.7.8, 269).

20. By the same token, in considering the argument of this section, Mikael Karlsson makes the following comment: “I am about as far away as ever from understanding Hume on these points. Could Hume really have argued so badly? Could he have overlooked such obvious errors and contradicted himself so glaringly? I doubt it” (1990, 127). We should note that this nega-tive view persists into the twenty-first century. For instance, Louis Loeb candidly claims that the argument is “wrongheaded ... [and] ill-conceived” (2004, 356). Even more unflatteringly, in discussing Hume’s “notorious” probability argument, Michael Ridge remarks, “Any attempt to present the argument as even remotely plausible would go beyond the present scope and moreover in my view the argument cannot be rescued” (2003, 196, n. 6).

21. In 1952 C. I. Lewis and Hans Reichenbach clashed over a philosophical point that bears an interesting resemblance to one way to understand Hume’s itera-tive probability argument. In short, Lewis (1952) argued that for a proposi-tion to be probable, some proposition must be certain. So it follows that if no proposition is certain (endorsed by Hume’s certainty E-scepticism), then no proposition is probable (endorsed by Hume’s epistemic egalitarianism). Although Reichenbach persuaded most philosophers that Lewis was wrong on this point, George Schlesinger has argued that Lewis’s point has more merit than most realize (1991, 39–46). This issue crops up again in Chapter 8.

22. For an extended and technical Bayesian discussion of I.iv.1 and various related issues, see Vickers (2000).

166 Notes

23. Even if one still thinks that Hume was at least a proto-Bayesian, it is possible to defend the mathematical plausibility of the case for (4). Others have employed Bayesian arguments that have a similar outcome to the non-Bayesian reading. One example: Fred Wilson compares Hume’s iterative probability argument to reasoning about the evidentiary force of hearsay evidence (1983, 122), noting that legal theorists like Bentham similarly contended that chains of such testimony approach zero (1983, 123). With the testimonial analogy in hand, Wilson argues that “ ... it is not hard ... to generate Hume’s sceptic’s regress of probabilities, through some elementary applications of the prob-ability calculus” (1983, 105). For a criticism of Wilson’s analogy, see DeWitt (1985, 133–6). In the end DeWitt admits that “ ... it is not terribly critical whether Hume intended his probability argument of I,iv,1 to be of the same form as the hearsay argument ... ” because he agrees that “ ... there is a recon-struction of Hume’s argument, consistent with Hume’s text, which is valid and contains no obviously false premisses” (1985, 136).

4 Belief without Evidence

1. As we shall see, Hume treats “custom” and “habit” as synonymous in the Treatise. Interestingly enough, in the first Enquiry he also considers them synonymous when he talks of the principle of “CUSTOM or HABIT” (5.5).

2. If there is any substantive difference between a feeling and a sentiment for Hume, it does not affect the point that if belief is nothing but a feeling and/or sentiment, then no belief possesses any epistemic merit.

3. Waxman claims that “ ... most commentators seem loath to admit that these affections are, in any essential way, operative in his account of human under-standing, much less that they are its primary determinants” (1998, 235). Perhaps this reluctance can be partially explained by Hume’s own admitted inability to express his view as clearly as he would like.

4. Some may object that simply because our beliefs derive from taste, it does not follow that they are standardless; for Hume tries to provide a standard in “Of the Standard of Taste”. This essay poses numerous interpretive prob-lems. For example, what exactly is the standard of taste according to Hume? Whether we identify Hume’s answer as universal assent or the joint verdict of true judges, it is very difficult to see how these standards undermine the reasoning leading to epistemic egalitarianism. Presumably there is no joint verdict of judges that will help in our epistemic endeavours, let alone any universal assent upon which we can depend. More generally, because senti-ments, which are the verdicts of taste, lack truth value, it is extraordinarily difficult to fathom how any standard of taste would place us in a position to avoid epistemic egalitarianism.

5. To the best of my knowledge, the only current commentator who suggests that Hume embraces the radically sceptical implications of this passage is Baxter (2008, 11). Waxman (1998, 244, 260) cites but does not discuss this passage in any detail.

6. Annette Baier argues that one horn of this dilemma is generated only if one adopts certain (proto-?) “Kantian” principles (1991, 14). The text itself does not seem to suggest this Kantian assumption. The dilemma, rather,

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is generated by considering the “understanding when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles”. For a more thorough criticism of Baier’s reading of this passage, see Wayne Waxman (1994, 280, n. 1).

7. This is clearly how Garrett understands TP. He claims that by adopting TP Hume “ ... implies that some beliefs ... do have rational support and should receive our assent” (2004a, 86–7; emphasis added).

8. Although Hume more often talks in terms of ideas and impressions, it is easier to state my interpretation of his principle in terms of propositions. Note that Hume himself at times talks in terms of “propositions” (see T1.4.7.7, 267). So my way of characterizing this principle seems acceptable from a Humean point of view.

9. Hume himself compares thinking with breathing in the following passage: “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel ... ” (T1.4.1.7, 183).

10. As one might expect, Morris (2000a, 108) and Owen (1999, 217) appeal to TP to support their interpretations. This passage is also invoked at a key point to justify Hume’s naturalism in Mounce (1999, 60) and to undermine “solitary scepticism” in Stanistreet (2002, 214). Moreover, Wilson likewise emphasizes the significance of this passage (2008, 322, 630, 766). For other recent discus-sions of this text, see Buckle (2008, 31) and Fogelin (2009, 132).

11. Kail, for instance, speaks approvingly of Garrett’s discussion of TP (2007, 70). Allison also places great emphasis on TP, admitting that there is “consider-able overlap” between his reading of TP and Garrett’s (Allison 2008, 393, n. 15). This specific overlap is to be expected, because Allison admits up front that he “generally sides” with the view “most fully developed by Don Garrett and David Owen” (Allison 2008, 2).

12. As Hume puts it when referring to the argument in “Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason”: “Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism [Pyrrhonism], has really disputed without an antagonist ... ” (T1.4.1.7, 183).

13. Strangely, Garrett partially quotes from these two sentences (in reverse order) to support his interpretation (1997, 235). He states that those who regain their “good humour” will then follow Hume in his future philosophical spec-ulations. This is quite implausible as a matter of fact and as an interpretation of Hume.

14. Fred Wilson does not, as far as I can tell, consider the possibility that Hume appeals to pragmatic principles after endorsing epistemic egalitarianism and rejecting D-scepticism. For he argues that Hume’s repudiation of total scepti-cism opens a way to acquire beliefs that possess positive epistemic status. Wilson’s reasoning is as follows: presuming that ought implies can, if the total sceptic (D-sceptic) claims that we ought to suspend belief, then the sceptic is logically implying that we can suspend belief. Because we cannot but form beliefs, it follows that the sceptic’s claim that we ought to suspend belief is undermined. That is, the fact that we must believe justifies our believing. This must implies ought principle plays a large role in Wilson (2008; see, e.g., 309, 315, 316, 399, 418–20, 424, 435, 442, 443, 448, 453, 498, 520, 532). Wilson at times interprets the ought as what is “reasonable” (e.g., 309) or “cogni-tively virtuous” (e.g., 316), implying that the ought is epistemic instead of pragmatic. Other times he is more explicit that the ought is epistemic: “ ... the

168 Notes

responsible knower accepts inescapable perceptual judgements [musts] as rationally binding [oughts] and that it is our epistemic duty to accept them” (Wilson 2008, 435; Wilson’s emphasis). It is not clear why Hume or anyone else should accept must implies epistemic ought instead of must implies pragmatic ought.

15. See many of the essays in Alston (1989). For some critical discussion of these issues, see Meeker (2003).

16. Garrett seems to suggest that sceptical reasonings along the lines of I.iv.1 are weak because they are unconvincing. But we have seen that even Garrett admits that they are convincing to a degree. Moreover, if TP rules out only reasoning as allegedly “unconvincing” as that found in I.iv.1, it still sanc-tions the “justification” of all actual beliefs because an idea must be some-what convincing to be a belief.

17. Wilson (2008) draws heavily on his (1997). Curiosity plays a large role in this latter work as well (Wilson 2008, 306, 317, 540–1, 631, 729).

18. See Fred Wilson (1997, 327ff). Others have recently paid much greater atten-tion to the importance of these rules for constructing a naturalistic inter-pretation. Morris (2000b, 305–22) thinks that these rules are important for understanding Hume’s normative naturalism. But he does not, as far as I can tell, show how they are supposed to be operative in I.iv.7. Allison (2008, 323) also believes that the rules are important for a proper understanding of TP.

19. A similar problem affects Wilson’s later discussion (2008, 343).20. Wilson elsewhere seems to attribute a different error in causal reasoning to

Hume (see Wilson 2008, 629).21. A similar problem arises for Morris’s reading of I.iv.7 and I.iv.1. He points

out (1989) that Hume’s iterative probability argument is a reductio of a certain theory of belief. As we saw in the last chapter, though, this only shows that Hume rejected D-scepticism. So Morris’s original reading failed to establish his naturalistic reading as superior to a sceptical epistemic egali-tarian one. Morris seems to recognize this later and offers a slightly different assessment:

Maintaining that we should train ourselves to make these assessments more comfortably is ridiculous; the iteration of assessments never ends. Instead, we ought to ask why should we think that we are rationally or epistemically required to make these assessments? The answer lies not in the usefulness or reasonableness for promoting any of the ends of human life, but in the artificial strictures of a mistaken philosophical theory of cognition. Reject the theory; reject the requirement. (2000a, 105)

Morris offers no textual evidence that Hume is rejecting “the epistemic stand-ards that intellectualist philosophers laid down as requirements for justified belief” (2000a, 106). If Hume is, then once again the iterative probability argument has a serious error: it assumes an incorrect epistemic standard. Because Hume explicitly denies that there is an error, we have good reason to reject Morris’s claim.

5 Endorsing Epistemic Egalitarianism

1. Besides the first Enquiry, only Hume’s Dialogue concerning Natural Religion and A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh explicitly address

Notes 169

epistemological issues that bear on the question of whether Hume was a sceptic or a naturalist. We will discuss both later in this chapter. One might suspect that Hume’s essay “The Sceptic” could throw light on this subject. But this essay is rarely discussed partly because it “ ... is more directly concerned with human motives and conduct than with metaphysical and epistemo-logical issues ... [and] the four essays in the set, which also includes ‘The Platonist,’ ‘The Stoic,’ and ‘The Epicurean,’ are written in assumed voices rather than as direct expressions of the views of their author ... ” (Schmidt 2003, 158). Wright argues that we can find Hume’s views in this essay (1986, 407–10). But his brief discussion of the essay does not, as far as I can tell, provide a defeater for my reading of Hume. Another interesting discussion of this essay is found in Livingston (1998, 168–72), which also seems consistent with my interpretation. Moreover, I can find nothing in “The Sceptic” that weakens my case. So I shall not discuss it any further here.

2. See, e.g., Norton (2002, 379). Moreover, even Peter Millican, one of the most prominent contemporary backers of the claim that the Enquiry is philosophi-cally superior to the Treatise, admits that “the final section of the Enquiry ... is the most difficult to interpret, presenting a wide variety of sceptical argu-ments whose ultimate purpose is sometimes hard to discern ... ” (2002b, 62).

3. See, e.g., Jones (1982, 169–73). For a discussion of this tradition of commen-tary, see McCormick (1999).

4. I thus agree with McCormick’s (1999) continuity thesis. But in contrast to my view that Hume’s radical scepticism is equally present in the Enquiry as well as the Treatise, she adamantly denies that Hume ever affirms radical scepti-cism (1999, 434). For an argument that Hume’s “Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses” (T1.4.2, 187–218) is very similar to Hume’s thoughts on scep-ticism in the Enquiry, see Butler (2008). For a different view supporting the overall unity of Hume’s writings, see Robison (2006).

5. See, e.g., Wright (1995, 347–8). Immerwahr echoes a similar theme: “ ... the best reason for thinking that Hume is dissatisfied with this argument [of I.iv.1] is that it is the only major argument of Book I of the Treatise not repeated in his later writings” (1976, 234). Likewise David Owens argues that Hume dropped his “dubious probabilistic reasoning” of I.iv.1 when he wrote EHU (2000, 129).

6. Although Garrett believes that Hume’s omission is due to a changed perspec-tive, he recognizes that Hume could have omitted them “ ... because he deems the arguments too complicated and out of the way for the purposes of the Enquiry” (1997, 240).

7. I am thus staking out a position on Hume’s mature position on scepticism, not simply his early views. Some who prefer the Enquiry welcome such argu-ments: “ ... if our concern is with Hume’s own mature position, then the status of the Treatise is to be settled only by carefully surveying its doctrines in the light of later works” (Buckle 2001, 11).

8. But to what extent is Hume’s scepticism truly a version of antecedent scepti-cism? According to Fogelin, Hume’s arguments about induction and reason qualify because they are a priori arguments (1985, 7). Fogelin’s classifica-tion here is puzzling. For Hume’s argument in I.iv.1 begins, not with some a priori principle, but with the realization that we can be wrong. This realiza-tion of fallibility suggests that Hume’s scepticism with regard to reason is,

170 Notes

to some extent, a form of consequent scepticism. David Owens (2000) puts the point persuasively: “In ... ‘Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason’, Hume attacks ... deductive inference – but not by requiring some antecedent proof that deductive inference is a reliable cognitive mechanism. ... Instead, Hume allows us to employ deductive inference ab initio and then argues that it undermines itself” (128).

9. Consider in this context the following comment on Hume’s passage about acceptable antecedent scepticism:

Reason, then, becomes something very different for those who reject the Platonic-Aristotelian-rationalist notion that there are forms or essences or abstract ideas that can yield knowledge in the sense of scientia, infallible knowledge. We are now in the realm where there is only opinion. ... (Wilson 2008, 177)

It is odd that Wilson should take this passage as an obvious repudiation of rationalist notions when Hume’s text explicitly talks about “self-evident principles”, which is as rationalist a term as one is to encounter in the history of philosophy. Of course, Wilson could be correct in not taking this passage literally. But surely we need an explanation as to why the “self-evident prin-ciples” are really not self-evident.

10. I thus disagree with the following statement: “The notion of mitigated or academic scepticism as a clear alternative to Pyrrhonism does not appear explicitly in the Treatise at all. ... Looking back from the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is perfectly clear and unequivocal on the point [emphasis added], it appears that mitigated scepticism was the position to which Hume was tacitly committed in the earlier book, or at least the one towards which he was moving” (Noxon 1973, 114–15). More specifically, I disagree with the implication that the Enquiry is perfectly clear as to its nature and its relationship to Pyrrhonian scepticism.

11. Wilson does at one point claim that we should understand this passage from the first Enquiry in light of these rules (see Wilson 2008, 343).

12. Some classic studies include Popkin (1951) and Burnyeat (1983b). For a more recent discussion of Pyrrhonism in general, with some reference to Hume, see Annas (2000), Johnsen (2001) and Baxter (2008, ch. 1).

13. Once again, Hume’s rejection of D-scepticism in the Treatise is also clear in the following passage: “If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought ... it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate in a suspense of judgment. But ... reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which ’tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy” (T1.4.1.8, 184).

14. I suspect that many miss the importance of this point because they conflate epistemic egalitarianism and D-scepticism. For example, Immerwahr runs the two together in the following characterization of Pyrrhonian scepticism: “According to the Pyrrhonians we can have neither certain knowledge nor probable knowledge [clearly a statement of epistemic egalitarianism]. ... For the Pyrrhonian skeptic we must totally suspend judgment [D-scepticism] and let our lives be guided by nature and custom” (1976, 228).

15. Generally speaking, Hume’s letters are of limited value in discerning his views, as Claudia Schmidt points out: “ ... it is important to note that Hume tended to adjust the tone and content of each letter according to its intended

Notes 171

reader, and that he generally valued goodwill and courtesy over argument and persuasion in written exchanges with his friends, and even with his critics” (Schmidt 2003, 9). But this was no ordinary “letter”: it was an anony-mously published pamphlet. So Garrett could mount some case that this letter accurately reflects Hume’s views. Once again, though, such a case cannot be simply assumed, especially given Penelhum’s point.

16. Keith Lehrer explicitly discusses Hume under the heading of naturalized epis-temology. This is how Lehrer justifies this classification: “What is a natural-istic theory? It is one in which all the terms used in the analysis are ones that describe phenomena of nature, such as causation, for example, or that can be reduced to such terms. Hume’s theory of belief was naturalistic in this sense. He restricted his account of human knowledge to relations of causa-tion, contiguity, and resemblance” (1989a, 154).

17. Michael Pakaluk offers the following advice: “ ... contemporary naturalists who are interested in reconstructing a version of Hume’s naturalism, less the theory of ideas to which it is so inextricably bound, may perhaps best begin in this project by turning first to the philosophy of Quine” (Pakaluk 1989, 456).

6 Scepticism and the “Nature” of Naturalized Epistemology

1. John Biro, e.g., claims that scepticism is incompatible with Hume’s project (1993, 36–7).

2. According to Stephen Stich, “ ... it is my contention that there is no defensible naturalistic criterion [i.e., a criterion to identify a claim as naturalistic], just as there is no defensible criterion of empirical meaningfulness” (1996, 197). It is worth noting that Stich is not a lone voice crying in the wilderness. Joining the chorus of those who find it perplexingly difficult to define “natu-ralism” are Barry Stroud (1996, 43–4), Bas van Fraassen (1996, 172), Alvin Goldman (1994, 303) and Peter Strawson (1985, 1).

3. For more on the connection between science and philosophy in episte-mology, see Maffie (1990).

4. David Lewis strangely thinks that changing to the name “physicalism” is “pedantry” or “a tacky marketing ploy ... ” (1994, 413).

5. See Melnyk (2003).6. As the biologist Lewis Wolpert puts it, “ ... being wrong is a constant feature

of scientific method” (1994, 39).7. For other statements of Hempel’s dilemma, see Crook and Gillett (2001, 334)

and Judisch (2008, 300). For Hempel’s own statement of the problem, see Hempel (1980).

8. Fallibilism is clearly a key theme in Quine’s argument leading up to natural-ized epistemology: “The Cartesian quest for certainty had been the remote motivation of epistemology ... but that quest was seen as a lost cause” (1969, 74). Quine’s fallibilism is famously evident elsewhere as well: “ ... no state-ment is immune from revision. Revision of even the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what is the difference in principle between such a shift and

172 Notes

the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?” (1980, 43). For more on this general theme in Quine, see Gibson (2004b, 9). For the general fallibilism of naturalized epistemology, see Kitcher (1992, 73).

9. This qualification allows for the possibility that some cogito-like beliefs, such as there are thoughts, could be infallibly correct. The vast majority of our beliefs, though, do not come close to being candidates for infallibility.

10. Here epistemic possibility is to be understood as distinct from logical or broadly metaphysical possibility. Consider some beliefs about math and logic: if you say it is epistemically possible that such beliefs could be wrong, you are not denying that the beliefs express necessary truths. Instead you are saying, roughly speaking, that for all you know, future evidence could cast doubt on your beliefs about such necessary truths. While this idea is admit-tedly in need of refinement, the basic gist is clear enough to allow one to identify with ease the fallibilism of naturalized epistemologists.

11. As Stewart Cohen puts it, “The acceptance of fallibilism is virtually universal” (1988, 91). Cohen’s use of the term “fallibilism” is a bit different from mine. For him a fallibilist is one who claims that S can know p on the basis of r even if r does not entail p (1988, 91).

12. Consider how Gibson summarizes Quine’s naturalism in two theses (Gibson 2004b, 6): “First, there is no successful first philosophy – that is, there is no experiential or a priori ground outside of science upon which science can be justified or rationally reconstructed. Second, it is up to science to tell us what there is (ontology) and how we come to know what there is (epis-temology).” According to Quine, then, science not only provides our best guide to forming beliefs about what there is and how we know what there is but also requires no non-scientific justification to have authority as such a guide. For more on the relationship between science and naturalized episte-mology see Kitcher (1992, 113).

13. Consider in this connection Janet Broughton’s characterization of Hume’s science: “ ... in a limited way the science of man functions as a First Philosophy: in advance of undertaking our study of human nature, we must allow for the general possibility that our discoveries about human nature will require us to revise or retract our ideas or reasoning in any field of study ... ” (2003, 7).

14. Bas C. van Fraassen (2002, 53; see also 1996, 173).15. Bas C. van Fraassen (2002, 59; cf. 1996, 170). He adds that this proposal is not

new: “To the Vienna and Berlin circles my proposal would not have sounded alien; quite the contrary. In much of their work they expressed precisely the contention that empiricism is a stance rather than a factual thesis or theory” (2002, 49).

16. Thus, van Fraassen argues that “[m]aterialism and naturalism as embraced in contemporary analytic philosophy have nothing to them but a certain attitude, a spirit of deference to the content of physics” (2002, 190).

17. Crook and Gillet (2001) likewise raise this problem for Melnyk’s “currentism” (see 341–2).

18. Others have noted a similar problem: ... since Melnyk holds that rival theories need to be formulated and also holds that [future] theories ... are not (yet) formulated, he does not take it as a threat to his version of physicalism. However, in making this move

Notes 173

(i.e., ruling out theories that are not formulated) Melnyk, rather than arguing for the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma is, in effect, begging the question in favor of it. (Montero 1999, 190)

19. For more on this theme, see Williams (2004, 285).20. See Crook and Gillet (2001, 345).21. Even if one holds out hope for a completed science that is much better estab-

lished than anything we currently possess, this hoped-for future is presum-ably a long way off and thus epistemically unhelpful at present.

22. In certain respects, my reading of Hume’s epistemology bears a striking struc-tural similarity to Donald Livingston’s reading of Hume’s political views. Here is how he puts it:

The moral world is a narrative unity of ancestors, contemporaries, and posterity. For reform to be rational it must be possible that we know what we are doing, and for this we need standards. But the standards of thought for the moral world are structured by narrative associations and are vulnerable to the future. In such a world we can be said to know what we are doing only if we can understand the future significance of our acts, and this we cannot do: “It affords a violent prejudice against almost every science, that no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or foretell the remote consequences of things” [E, “Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic”, 48]. The future is open and constantly threatens to break through the narrative cords that hold the moral world together and to upset established institutions: “It is not fully known what degree of refinement, either in virtue or vice, human nature is suscep-tible of, nor what may be expected of mankind from any great revolu-tion in their education, customs, or principles” [E, “Of Civil Liberty” 89]. And even if we knew what was to happen, we could not know now what narrative associations either we or generations yet unborn would place on those events after having lived through them. (Livingston 1984, 342)

Just as the vulnerability of the moral world means that we do not know what we are doing, the vulnerability of the scientific world means that we cannot consistently pledge allegiance to contemporary science and be fallibilists. After all, no matter how much positive epistemic status contem-porary science may appear to possess, as fallibilists we must leave open the possibility of a scientific revolution that would, on scientific grounds, upend all of our purported “knowledge”. A commitment to future science and its potentially revolutionary results threatens to leave us in the scep-tical dark.

23. Melnyk embraces the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma partly because of the obvious sceptical consequences that flow from the second horn of the dilemma: “ ... if our formulation of physicalism lacks content determinable now by us, then we would have no warrant for taking any scientific find-ings actually available to us as evidence for (or evidence against) physicalism, and no way, indeed, of telling what would count as evidence for (or against) the thesis” (2003, 12). By the same token, if our epistemic guidance is deter-mined by future science, we have no way of telling what would count as evidence for (or against) any belief.

24. For more on the significance of this passage, see Chapter 8.

174 Notes

25. It is important to emphasize here that Hume’s reasoning about cognition rests on not only his own fallibility but also the fallibility of other humans and their social groups and institutions. Hume’s scepticism, in other words, derives in part from the inescapable fallibility of the social nature of human cognition. For a different view of Hume and the social nature of cognition, see Baier (1991 and 2000).

26. Quine’s stance on this issue is not entirely clear. Robert Fogelin notes that in a videotaped conversation, Quine does not say that Cartesian doubts are impossible; he just claims that they lack “naturalistic plausibility” and “ ... simply don’t have a place in honest inquiry” (Fogelin 2004, 44). For another interesting discussion of these issues, see Stroud (1984, 227–34).

27. Similarly, David Owen articulates this view in arguing for a naturalist inter-pretation of Hume: “[Hume’s] method is that of the scientist. ... Such a method presupposes the availability of probable reasoning and an account of how it functions ... ” (1999, 146).

28. Invoking Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science, Michael Rea argues similarly that naturalism should be understood as, not a particular philosophical posi-tion, but a general research program comprising “a set of methodological dispositions” (2002, 22). Interestingly enough, Leon Horsten compares van Fraassen’s stance with Lakatos’s research program as well (2004, 96).

29. For a fuller characterization of his empirical stance, see van Fraassen (2002, 47).

30. As he puts it, “ ... only the confusion of theses held with attitudes expressed, which yields false consciousness, can account for the conviction that science requires or implies materialism” (2002, 60).

31. Similarly, he unapologetically declares, “I take it to be a hallmark of the empiricist tradition that empirical science is placed on a sort of pedestal, as paradigm for rational inquiry” (2002, 224; see also 2004, 179).

32. More perplexingly, van Fraassen seems to sabotage his own view of ration-ality when he says that some sabotaging may be rational, if one adopts, say, the views of Graham Priest (2004, 184).

33. How well Hume really understood the physics of his day is a matter of dispute (see Schliesser 2008 for an excellent survey of the issues involved here). But it seems clear that he is attempting to model his rules on the content of certain scientific views as he understands them. As Crane and Mellor point out (1990, 186), causal interactions were at one time thought to require contact. Hume incorporates this thesis into a norm of causal reasoning.

34. The psychological tests in this area have spawned voluminous philosophical commentary. For an opinionated overview, see Stein (1996).

35. Kornblith also suggests that Aristotle’s thoughts on these topics are impor-tant (1993, 6), although he does not, as far as I can tell, pursue such a sugges-tion in this particular book.

36. For an interesting discussion of this well-established phenomenon of “belief polarization”, see Kelly (2008).

37. As the biologist Wolpert puts it, “ ... both the ideas that science generates and the way in which science is carried out are entirely counterintuitive and against common sense” (1994, 1). I take it that Wolpert presumes that natu-ralness is related to intuitiveness and common sense. Robert McCauley more explicitly concentrates on maturationally natural cognition, which is found

Notes 175

in humans cross-culturally without any training (e.g., being able to identify another person’s emotions by observing facial expressions), and claims that science for the most part is maturationally unnatural (McCauley 2011, 5–7).

38. We will return to the issue of how to understand the psychological results relevant to these epistemological topics in Chapter 8.

39. For an interesting view along such lines from a famous biologist, see Stent (1975).

40. In a similar vein, Marshall Swain notes that when externalism was first proposed, it “was associated primarily with the work of causal and reli-ability theorists, also known as ‘naturalistic’ epistemologists” (1988, 461). Lest one think that this portrayal is idiosyncratic to Pollock and Swain, here is how David Armstrong, one of the first proponents of exter-nalism, characterizes this view: “According to ‘Externalist’ accounts of non-inferential knowledge, what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural [my emphasis] relation which holds between the belief-state ... and the situation which makes the belief true” (1973, 157).

7 Hume’s Naturalistic Internalism

1. Note that philosophers have begun to explore the internalism/externalism issue with respect to Hume’s ethics. See, for instance, Brown (1988).

2. This difficulty has not been overlooked. Richard Fumerton, for instance, notes that “ ... although the [internalism/externalism] controversy seems to strike deep at the heart of fundamental epistemological issues, I am not certain that it has been clearly defined. It seems to me that philosophers are choosing sides without a thorough understanding of what the respective views entail” (1988, 443).

3. For a full defence of this characterization of internalism, see Kihyeon Kim (1993). Another interpretation of the internalist/externalist distinction in accord with my initial characterization appears in Thomas D. Senor (1996). Even more recently, Duncan Pritchard has defined internalism about justifi-cation as follows: “For all agents, ϕ, an agent’s belief that ϕ is justified if, and only if, the agent is able to know the facts that determine that justification by reflection alone” (2005, 42).

4. It is worth noting that this initial depiction of the internalism/externalism debate seems to be fairly common. Thus Laurence BonJour:

The most generally accepted account of this distinction is that a theory of justification is internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be epistemically justified for a given person be cogni-tively accessible to that person, internal to his cognitive perspective; and externalist, if it allows that at least some of the justifying factors need not be thus accessible, so that they can be external to the believer’s cogni-tive perspective, beyond his ken. However, epistemologists often use the distinction between internalist and externalist theories of justification without offering any very explicit explication. (1994, 132)

5. For an interesting attempt to read Hume’s thoughts on testimony as indica-tive of an externalist epistemology, see Saul Traiger (1993 and 1994).

176 Notes

6. Some of the more prominent attempts to read Hume’s argument as a reductio have already been explored in Chapter 3.

7. Such a characterization is not unprecedented in the epistemological litera-ture. This is how Alvin Goldman (1979, 11) depicts process types that are assessed for reliability. Moreover, this is how John Pollock (1986, 21–3) portrays internalism and externalism.

8. Interestingly enough, this is roughly how John Pollock characterizes the essential feature of externalism: “Externalism is the denial of internalism. According to externalism, more than just the internal states of the believer enter into the justification of beliefs” (1986, 23).

9. For more on this general theme, see James Sennett (1992).10. A similar suggestion appears at about the same time in Costa (1981).11. Note that Dauer has more recently reiterated that his reading is a possible

externalist solution to Hume’s scepticism (1996, 229).12. Another example is Frederick Schmitt, who makes the “bold” claim that

“ ... Hume subscribes to reliabilism” (1992, 54). In fact, he summarizes “Hume’s positive epistemology” concisely as follows: “Operations are justified when reliable” (1992, 83). For a similar reading, see Falkenstein (1997, 47–8).

13. The subjective nature of Humean probability was discussed in Chapter 2.14. This understanding of the internalism/externalism distinction quickly

undermines Loeb’s anti-internalist view of Hume at the start. Loeb defines internalism as follows: “According to epistemological internalism, the justi-fication of a belief depends exclusively upon the beliefs one holds or ... upon the beliefs that are available, beliefs one could hold” (2006, 333; emphasis added). By the same token, he defines externalist theories as follows: “According to [externalist] theories, the epistemic status of a belief depends, at least in part, on naturalistic facts about the mechanism that produces it” (2006, 334; emphasis added). Note that he identifies internalism as a radical thesis (RI) and externalism as a moderate thesis (PE). But his arguments for (PE) do not show that (PI) is false. Hume could hold that some externalist factor is necessary for justification or positive epistemic status – and thus satisfy (PE) – without presupposing that it is sufficient, which he would need to do to rule out (PI). Moreover, his arguments do not show that (PI) cannot lead to scepticism.

15. It is worth noting that some commentators have argued that proper function-alism is an appropriate label for different aspects of Hume’s philosophy. For instance, Jessica Spector emphasizes that Hume conceived of himself as an anatomist and contends that anatomical investigations necessarily involve functional assessments; in particular, she argues (2003) that this anatomical/proper functionalist perspective sheds light on his censure of cruelty.

16. Several other philosophers have also hinted at the appropriateness of proper functionalist readings of certain aspects of Hume’s epistemology. See, for example, Jonathan Bennett (2000, 139) and Edward Craig (1987, 81).

17. For the full statement of his theory, see Plantinga (1993b, 194).18. See, for instance, Andre (1993) and Logan (1996).19. In his own words: “ ... the account of warrant I propose is an example of

naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; the only kind of normativity that it invokes figures in such sciences as biology and psychology” (1993b, 194).

Notes 177

20. Hume invokes a similar argument in EHU 4.6 and DNR 145–6.21. Hume puts the principle thus: “That all our simple ideas in their first appearance

are deriv’d from simple impressions, which correspond to them, and which they exactly represent” (T1.1.1.7, 4). Hume almost immediately proposes the infa-mous “missing shade of blue” counterexample to this principle. Nevertheless, despite this “proof” undermining the principle, he says: “ ... the instance is so particular and singular, that ’tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim” (T1.1.1.10, 6).

22. Strictly speaking, Hume says only that the motion of the second ball could be “suggested” to him. So one could object that while Hume allowed that it is conceivable/possible that an idea of motion be formed in him, it is not a belief about motion. But recall that for Hume belief is just a forceful idea. So if it be possible to form an idea, then it is surely possible for the idea to be enlivened. Hence Hume clearly would have to allow that it is possible to form such a belief.

23. The counterfactual nature of Hume’s argument is absolutely cataclysmic to the “exceptionless causal generalization” reading. If this reading is correct, Hume is saying only that, given the human condition, it is not causally possible that humans form beliefs without experience. But in these coun-terfactual situations, Hume is allowing that even if humans could causally form beliefs without experience, such beliefs would still be deficient in such possible circumstances. So his point must go beyond the “exceptionless causal generalization” reading.

24. For his ardent opposition to both internalism and evidentialism, see Plantinga’s (1993a, ch. 1 and 182–4) and (1993b, 185–93).

25. Recall Schmitt’s “bold” claim that “ ... Hume subscribes to reliabilism” (1992, 54). Once again, the argument of this section shows that Hume is no protore-liabilist. For Hume’s “Adam” case reveals that even a belief produced by a reliable mechanism possesses no positive epistemic status simply because, without experience, such a cognizer would lack the requisite internalistic features that would provide a “foundation” for such a belief. This point also undermines Dauer’s (1980) attempt to join Hume with Goldman’s early externalist views.

26. Jack Lyons adopts a novel framework explicitly modelled after Goldman and Pollock when interpreting Hume (2001, 248–9, 272). For a discussion of how Hume’s epistemology relates to Pollock and Goldman, see Meeker (2001).

8 Philosophy after Scepticism

1. Samir Okasha similarly states that “scepticism is not a doctrine that anyone could seriously consider accepting” (2003, 610).

2. Robert Fogelin at times likewise suggests that Hume should be considered “a sensible fellow” whose “ ... scepticism may be nothing more than a version of fallibilism, the appropriately cautious attitude of a hard-working social scientist attempting to ‘introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’” (Fogelin 1993, 113). This suggestion seems in line with Wilson’s contention that radical scepticism is simply not a reasonable posi-tion and any sensible person would not endorse it.

178 Notes

3. Here is another more recent articulation of this worry: “Profound, pervasive doubts would preclude any inquiry whatsoever. ... [Hume] exerts considerable effort to discover and explain how the mind operates. An extreme skeptic could not embark on this sort of enterprise ... ” (Durland 2011, 72).

4. The intuition here is probably closely related to the recent discussion of the “knowledge is the norm of assertion” issue. For the classic statement of this position, see Williamson (2000, 241).

5. Michael Huemer argues that universal scepticism is self-refuting (see Huemer 2001, 27–31).

6. Some even interpret Quine in a similar way: “Quine is not trying to present an argument for his radical conclusions [e.g., behaviourism and naturalism]; rather, he is using a variety of rhetorical and dialectical methods to persuade philosophers that their old ways of thinking are, in a certain way, empty” (Crane 2003, 503).

7. For an interesting discussion of Hume’s rhetoric, see Box (1990).8. To reiterate, on my view Hume’s naturalism / naturalized epistemology leads

to his sceptical conclusions. That is, the sceptical conclusion that no belief possesses any epistemic merit cannot be avoided by “any system” (T1.4.2.57, 218), including the science of human nature.

Although Don Baxter similarly interprets Hume as a radical sceptic, on his view Hume’s scepticism does not derive from the science of human nature but from arguments made independently of such a naturalistic investigation (see Baxter 2008, ch. 1). For Baxter, Hume pursues the science of human nature only after deciding to ignore various sceptical problems. As a result, Hume’s seeming endorsement of many scientific claims about the external world, induction and so on is to be understood conditionally. If one adopts the science of human nature, such claims possess what Baxter calls “ersatz epistemic warrant” (Baxter 2008, 101, n. 17). But such ersatz epistemic warrant is not genuine epistemic merit on Baxter’s view. So while we agree that, for Hume, all beliefs lack epistemic merit, we disagree on whether or not such epistemic egalitarianism is a consequence of the science of human nature. Overall, though, our agreement on the overall Hume-as-sceptic inter-pretation is much more significant than our disagreement on the source of his scepticism. (Thanks to Don Baxter for extended discussions on the rela-tionship between our two views.)

9. Interestingly, some provide general arguments that we should expect to find contradictions in Hume’s writings. On this view, my attempt to provide a consistent reading of Hume’s radical scepticism and his naturalism may seem misguided. For some intriguing discussion of this general issue, see Fogelin (1998) and Jacobson (2000b).

10. Janet Broughton has recently argued for a reading of Hume’s radical scep-ticism that is similar to mine. But, drawing on her 2004 work, she argues that Hume’s continuing commitment to constructive naturalism means that “we must regard his naturalism and skepticism as incompatible” (2008, 432, cf. 435–6). On my view, Hume’s scepticism and naturalism are not incompatible.

11. For a defence of this view, see Rosen (2001). For critical discussion of this view, see Christensen (2007).

Notes 179

12. Interestingly, Peter Lopston has made the more general claim that “ ... incom-patible [Hume] interpretations are typically forwarded with astonishing confidence by their proponents ... ” (1998, 313).

13. Alvin Plantinga describes this attitude as pervasive at Yale during his graduate student days even if it was never explicitly embraced in print (see Plantinga 1995, 191).

14. For a similar view, see Christensen (2007).15. Of course, it is questionable whether cognitive psychology itself can, without

any philosophical interpretation, make any judgments about the justification of human presumptions. But cognitive psychology does seem to line up with Hume’s general picture of the place of presumptions in human cognition.

16. Boyer in several places (e.g., 2000, 277, 285, 292) contrasts natural/natural-ized epistemology with “natural metaphysics”. Because “metaphysics”, like the term “epistemology”, connotes a heavily theoretical enterprise, I prefer the term “presumptivism” to emphasize its non-theoretical roots.

17. As we saw Morris point out in Chapter 3, Hume is clearly attacking the “intel-lectualist” view of belief that generally takes human belief to be responsive to evidence.

18. In particular, Boyer claims that the studies undermine important aspects of the “natural epistemologies” of Ruth Millikan and Hilary Kornblith (2000, 285).

19. As we saw in Chapter 6, Kornblith focuses on the tests concerning logic.20. Perhaps it would be helpful to compare my reading briefly to the view

of Graciela De Pierris. Just as I allow that Hume’s take on various issues is determined by domain-specific presumptions, she claims that we can understand Hume’s scepticism and naturalism in terms of “perspective” or “standpoints”. For her, there is not one Hume but two. That is, the sceptical/Pyrrhonian Hume and the naturalistic Hume are two “mutually independent and opposing standpoints” (De Pierris 2002, 500; cf. De Pierris 2001). Insofar as she still allows for some radical scepticism in Hume, her view is clearly similar to mine. But on my view, the naturalistic side of Hume leads to the sceptical conclusions and then Hume carries on despite the sceptical conclu-sions. In other words, I do not take these as mutually independent and opposing standpoints: they are, rather, complementary and compatible. For a similar comparison to Fogelin’s view, see Chapter 3, n. 1. A perspectival view analogous to those espoused by Fogelin and De Pierris also appears in, e.g., Russell (2008, 370–1, n. 9). For some interesting criticisms of these views, see Durland (2011, 86–8).

180

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191

Ainslie, Donald,163n6,165n17 analytic philosophy, 9–11, 159n20,

172n16analytic/synthetic distinction, 26,

39–42Annas, Julia, 3, 170n12Anselm, 59antecedent scepticism, 89–97, 101,

169n8, 170n9Armstrong, David, 137–8, 175n40Ayer, A. J., 157n8, 158n9Ayers, Michael, 10

Baconian approach to probability, 63Baier, Annette, 55, 140, 164n11,

166n6, 174n25Baxter, Don, 159n18, 166n5, 170n12,

178n8Bayesians, 63, 161n13, 165n12,

166n23Beattie, James, 2, 19, 21, 57, 154Beauchamp, Tom, 20Beebee, Helen, 126belief, 18–19, 22–23, 36–39, 42

custom as source of, 56, 66–67, 70, 72, 121, 130

epistemically justified, 8, 16–19, 22–3, 26, 45–48, 50, 52, 54, 61, 69, 75–6, 80–1, 102–4, 110–3, 120, 122–7, 135–6, 141, 143, 145, 148–9, 151–4, 158n10, 159n23, 160n28, 161n12, 163n7, 163n8, 167n14, 168n14, 168n21, 175n3, 175n4, 176n8, 176n12, 176n14, 179n15

evidence for, 43, 46–47, 57–58extinction of, 22, 43, 46–8, 51,

57–58, 62–3, 85, 98, 123fallibility of, 22, 44–54, 58, 64, 70,

94, 112, 115, 118, 141, 145, 153, 154–55, 163n7, 164n16, 165n17, 169n8, 174n25

Hume’s theory of, 65–86intellectualist conception of, 55–61,

64meta-representational, 152–3suspension of, 56, 60, 76, 100, 143,

149, 170n13and the Title Principle, 73–81without evidence, 65–86

Bennett, Jonathan, 10, 25, 34, 40, 159n21, 163n4, 176n16

Berkeley, George, 2, 3, 12, 157n7, 157n8Biro, John, 8, 11, 12, 163n10, 171n1BonJour, Laurence, 135–6, 175n4Boyer, Pascal, 151, 152, 153, 179n16,

179n18Broughton, Janet, 172n13, 178n10

Capaldi, Nicholas, 15, 43, 55, 158n9, 158n11, 159n19

causal epistemology, 126causal inferences, 127–8

and counterfactual claims, 133–8, 177n23

and functionalism, 128–33causal rules, 81–5, 94–5, 115, 119causality, 1, 117, 127–8certainty, 25–32, 35, 38, 41–2, 45certainty E-scepticism, 16–7, 19–21,

26, 29, 31, 35–7, 41, 42, 45–6, 142, 162n15, 165n21

cognitive science, 23, 116–21, 151, 153, 155, 158n13, 179n15

Cohen, L.J., 63Cohen, Stewart, 172n11Coleman, Dorothy, 63, 160n7common sense, 94, 144, 174n37consequent scepticism, 90–1, 170n8conservatism principle, 6,81, 158n14Continuity Problem, 35, 41–2, 169n4continuity thesis, 88–91counterfactual claims, 133–8currentism, 110, 172n17

Index

192 Index

custom, 56, 66–7, 70, 72, 121, 130, 166n1

Dauer, Frances, 125,126, 127, 161n10, 163n3, 164n10, 176n11,177n25

De Pierris, Graciela, 179n20defeaters, 13, 30, 35, 47, 81, 84, 95,

154–5, 163n2demonstrative knowledge, 22, 29–31,

33–4, 35, 45–6, 92Descartes, Rene, 11, 89–90, 145design plan, 128–9, 131Dialogues concerning Natural Religion

(Hume), 23, 99, 126, 168n1Dicker, Georges, 157n1doubt, 14–6, 18–20, 26–8, 31–2,

34–5, 38, 41, 45–7, 61, 76, 89–90, 93–4, 97, 100–1, 112, 154, 159n23,160n3, 172n10, 174n26, 178n3

doxasic scepticism (D-scepticism), 16–7, 19–22, 64–5, 72, 73, 76, 78, 82, 85, 89–91, 96–101, 143, 150, 152, 167n14, 168n21, 170n13, 170n14

Einstein, Albert, 157n1Elga, Adam, 148, 150empirical evidence, 14, 39empiricism, 2, 113–16, 133,157n8,

160n7, 172n15Enquiry concerning Human

Understanding (Hume), 14–5, 17-18, 27-28, 41, 84, 87–103, 129–30, 131, 134

Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Hume), 18

epistemic egalitarianism, 17, 19–23, 26, 43, 44, 48, 50, 54, 62–5, 69, 71–75, 80–103, 112–3, 120, 141–6, 149–50, 153–6

epistemic merit, 16–17, 72–3, 79–81, 82, 112, 141, 150–5, 166n2, 178n8

epistemic possibility, 172n10epistemic scepticism (E-scepticism),

16–21, 26, 31, 37, 41, 42, 45–6, 141, 142

“Epistemology Naturalized” (Quine), 1, 11

equal weight view, 148error-attribution problem, 85–6, 98–9An Essay on the Nature and

Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Beattie), 19

Euclid, 27, 41, 42evidence, 43, 44, 50–4, 57–8, 63,

164n14belief without, 65–86extinction of, 22, 43, 46–8, 51,

57–8, 62–3, 85, 98, 123evidential grounds, 49–54evidentialism, 137, 149, 177n24evidentness, 48–54, 63–4, 163n4,

163n6, 163n9, 164n14experience, 130–7externalism, 121, 122–28, 135–8,

175n40, 176n14see also internalism/externalism

debate

fact, and ideas, 39–42fallibilism, 107–8, 110–11, 112, 116,

155, 171n8, 172n10, 177n2fallibility, 22, 29–35, 39, 42–50, 58,

70–71, 94, 145, 164n16, 165n17, 169n8

false consciousness, 113–6, 174n30feeling, 69–74, 141, 145 , 153, 166n2Feldman, Richard, 148–50Fogelin, Robert, 15, 31, 43, 55,

158n11, 159n24, 162n1, 167n10, 169n8, 174n26, 177n2, 178n9, 179n20

Frances, Bryan, 139, 147Friedman, Michael, 113Fumerton, Richard, 175n2functionalism, proper, 128–33, 136–7,

176n15 future science, 110–12, 116, 173n21,

173n22, 173n23

Garber, Daniel, 159n21Garrett, Don, 10, 11, 13, 14, 48–9,

66, 73, 77, 78–81, 86, 98, 100–1, 157n6, 167n7, 167n11, 167n13, 168n16, 169n6, 171n15

Gibson, Roger, 172n12

Index 193

Giere, Ronald, 113global scepticism, 31, 112, 142, 150God, 2, 13, 59, 129Goldbach’s Conjecture, 28, 33Goldman, Alvin, 35, 126, 138, 171n2,

176n7, 177n25, 177n26Gower, Barry, 63, 161n13Green, T. H., 2

habit, 66–67, 68, 166n1Harris, John, 15Hegelianism, 2Hempel’s dilemma, 105, 106, 107–13,

120, 171n7,173n23historical context, 3–4, 10–13Howson, Colin, 113Huemer, Michael, 158n13, 178n5human nature, 70, 71, 73, 76,

98,109–10, 131,178n8Hume, David

on certainty, 14–5, 26–32, 41–2on doubt, 14–5, 18–20, 27–8as epistemic egalitarian, 19, 22, 23,

26, 43, 44, 48, 50, 62–5, 71–3, 84–103, 155–6

on fallibility, 29–30, 32–5, 44–50, 58–9, 70–1

impact of, 1, 157n1internalism of, 122–38interpretations of, 1–11, 43–4and iterative probability argument,

43–64, 73, 84–6, 88, 99, 112, 144–5, 165n20, 165n21, 166n23, 168n21

on knowledge, 26–32, 36–9, 160n4, 160n5

naturalist reading of, 2–11, 14, 21, 55–61, 98, 102–3, 154

and naturalized epistemology, 104–21

positivist reading of, 2, 158n9on probability, 17, 19, 27 33–9,

41–2, 45–50, 62–4, 93, 126–7, 161n13, 164n14, 166n23

on Pyrrhonism, 76, 96–103reductio-style reading of, 55–64sceptical reading of, 2–4, 7–9, 13,

14–22, 61–2, 68–70, 154scepticism of, 88–103, 139–56

theory of belief, 65–86and the Title Principle, 73–81,

83–84Hutcheson, Frances, 3hypotheses, 82–83, 86

idealism, 2ideas, and fact, 39–42Incommensurability Difficulty, 35–36,

38–42infallibility, 28–9, 33–9, 47, 110–1,

172n9intellectualist model, 57–59, 61–62,

64, 98–99, 164n13internalism, 122–5, 135–6, 175n3internalism/externalism debate,

121–38, 175n1, 175n4, 176n14interpretation

issues in, 4–9naturalized, 1–4

interpretive frameworks, 4–9iterative probability argument, 43–64,

73, 84–6, 88, 99, 112, 144–5, 165n20, 165n21, 166n23, 168n21

just reasoning, 18justifiably certain, 29–31, 35, 38, 42, 45justification

E-scepticism, 16–17epistemic, 8, 16–9, 22-2–3, 26,

45–8, 50, 52, 54, 61, 69, 75–6, 80–1, 102–4, 110–3, 120, 122–7, 135–6, 141, 143, 145, 148–9, 151–4, 158n10, 159n23, 160n28, 161n12, 163n7, 163n8, 167n14, 168n14, 168n21, 175n3, 175n4, 176n8, 176n12, 176n14, 179n15

interpretive, 4–8, 21, 35, 36, 40, 42, 44, 50–1, 64, 69, 84, 87, 96, 101–2, 154–6, 159n17

pragmatic, 73–6, 78–9, 81, 153, 167n14

Kail, P.J.E., 10, 167n11Kant, Immanuel, 2Karlsson, Mikael, 165n20Kelly, Thomas, 163n8, 174n36Kemp Smith, Norman, 2, 40, 43–44,

87, 157n6, 160n5, 162n18

194 Index

Kim, Kihyeon, 175n3KK principle, 28, 30, 31, 37, 160n6Klein, Peter, 15knowledge, 15–9, 25–8, 30, 35–42, 82,

143, 160n3, 161n9and belief, 37–8demonstrative, 22, 29–31, 33–5,

46, 92and probability, 35–9

Kornblith, Hilary, 116–8, 120, 174n35

Lakatos, Imre, 174n28Lehrer, Keith, 7, 171n16Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 12A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend

in Edinburgh (Hume), 100, 168n1Lewis, C. I., 143, 165n21Lewis, David, 171n4lively reasoning, 73, 74, 76, 77, 81–2Livingston, Donald, 15,55, 158n9,

158n11, 159n19, 169n1, 173n22

Locke, John, 2, 3, 9, 11, 117Loeb, Louis, 1, 3, 4, 6–7, 102, 104,

112, 121, 122, 158n10, 158n15, 158n16, 159n18, 165n20, 176n14

Lopston, Peter, 179n12Lyons, Jack, 177n26

materialism, 23, 105–9, 113–6, 174n30

mathematical reasoning, 28–32, 48, 92–3, 161n12

mathematics, 13, 28–29, 33, 48, 160n7

McCauley, Robert, 119, 174n37Melnyk, Andrew, 106, 108–9, 171n5,

172n17, 172n18, 173n23meta-representational beliefs, 152–3Mill, John Stuart, 2Millican, Peter, 7, 89, 94, 159n22,

164n10, 169n2mitigated/academical scepticism, 3,

21, 93–6, 98–9, 101, 170n10Monteiro, João Paulo, 3Morris, William E., 43, 55–62, 70,

73, 98, 157n2, 161n8, 163n3, 163n5, 167n10, 168n18, 168n2, 179n17

natural sciences, 1, 106, 112naturalism, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21–3, 104–10,

112–5, 119, 122, 150, 155, 171n2, 172n16, 174n28, 178n10

naturalized epistemology, 9, 11, 22–4, 102–21, 139, 144, 149, 151, 155, 157n2, 171n16, 171n8, 172n10, 172n12, 178n8, 179n16

naturalized interpretation, 1–4naturalized presumptivism, 150–3,

154, 155Newton, Isaac, 3, 12Norton, David, 15, 94, 159n22, 169n2

objective certainty, 32objective probability, 33, 34, 41, 46,

48“Of Scepticism with Regard to

Reason” (Hume), 8, 25, 41, 43, 55, 64, 71–2, 82, 84, 85, 89, 92, 96, 98, 124, 127, 140–1, 143, 154, 164n11, 167n12, 170n8

“Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses” (Hume), 61, 169n4

“Of the Standard of Taste” (Hume), 111, 145–46, 166n4

Okasha, Samir, 177n1ontological argument, 59Owen, David, 25, 36, 37, 40, 42, 48,

50–54, 62, 67, 161n15, 162n16, 162n17, 163n6, 163n9, 167n10, 167n11, 169n8, 174n27

Owens, David, 169n5, 170n8

Pakaluk, Michael, 157n4, 162n19, 171n17

parity E-scepticism, 17–18, 21, 141partial externalism, 125, 176n14partial internalism, 125, 126, 127,

135, 138, 176n14Pears, David, 22, 69, 70, 84, 87Penelhum, Terence, 43, 101, 159n18,

171n15Philosophical Defeaters (PD), 13, 41,

51, 79, 154philosophy

disagreements in, 146–50history of, 9–14after scepticism, 139–56

Index 195

physicalism, 23, 105–10, 155, 171n4, 172n18, 173n23

physics, 39, 105–6, 108–9, 115, 117, 152, 172n16, 174n33

Plantinga, Alvin, 11, 13, 128–29, 131, 132, 136–7, 176n17, 177n24, 179n13

Poland, Jeffrey, 110Pollock, John, 30, 121, 163n2,

175n40, 176n7, 176n8, 177n26Popkin, Richard, 14, 159n23, 170n12positive epistemic status, 16, 17, 19,

20, 26, 45, 68, 73, 80–1, 91, 111, 124, 134, 136, 138, 153, 167n14, 173n23, 177n25

pragmatism, 73–6presumptivism, 150–3, 154, 155Primary Interpretive Principle (PIP),

5–6, 8, 20, 21, 35, 36, 42, 44, 50, 64, 69, 84, 101, 154, 158n14

Principle of Empiricism, 133Pritchard, Duncan, 175n3probability, 25–39, 41, 62, 93, 126–7,

142, 161n9Baconian conception of, 63iterative probability argument,

43–64, 73, 84–6, 88objective, 48subjective, 48

proofs, 12, 27, 29, 31, 161n12propensity language, 75proper functionalism, 128, 136–37,

176n15psychologism, 40psychology, 23, 102, 107, 116–21,

129, 151, 153, 154, 176n19, 179n15

Pyrrhonism, 68, 72–3, 76, 88, 93–4, 96–103, 154, 167n12, 170n10, 170n12, 70n14, 179n20

Quine, 1, 6 11, 38–39, 40, 42, 62, 102, 107, 113, 158n13, 160n2, 162n19,162n20, 171n17, 171n8, 172n12, 174n26, 178n6

radical externalism, 125, 126, 137, 138

radical internalism, 124, 125, 176n14

radical scepticism, 6, 17, 21–25, 41, 44, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 95–6, 101, 110, 112, 116, 120, 139, 143, 144, 146, 148, 154, 162n1, 169n4, 177n2, 178n8, 178n9, 178n10, 179n20

rationalism, 55, 58–59, 62, 64rationality, 13, 16, 46, 49, 114, 115,

116, 126, 174n32rationality E-scepticism, 16reductio strategy, 55–64reflection, 30, 47–48, 58, 94, 123, 145,

147, 152, 164n16Reichenbach, Hans, 115, 165n21Reid, Thomas, 2, 32–3, 34, 35, 51, 54reliabilism, 120, 128, 176n12, 177n25religion, 100, 149Ridge, Michael, 165n20Robinson, Abraham, 12Russell, Bertrand, 2, 157n7Russell, Paul, 157n5, 164n11, 179n20

scepticism, 2–4, 8–23, 32–35, 43, 65, 68, 69, 88–90

about belief, 159n24about knowledge, 159n24antecedent, 89–97, 101, 169n8,

170n9consequent, 90–91, 170n8D-scepticism, 16–1, 19–22, 64–5, 72,

73, 76, 78, 82, 85, 89–91, 96–101, 143, 150, 152, 167n14, 168n21, 170n13, 170n14

E-scepticism, 16–21, 26, 31, 37, 41, 42, 45–6, 141, 142

global, 31, 112, 142, 150mitigated/academical, 3, 21, 93–6,

98–9, 101, 170n10and naturalized epistemology,

104–21philosophy after, 139–56and pragmatism, 73–6radical, 6, 17, 21–5, 41, 44, 87, 88,

89, 93, 94, 95–6, 101, 110, 112, 116, 120, 139, 143, 144, 146, 148, 154, 162n1, 169n4, 177n2, 178n8, 178n9, 178n10, 179n20

total, 21, 65, 71–3, 76, 90, 96–7, 167n12, 167n14

196 Index

Schlick, Moritz, 157n1Schmidt, Claudia, 169n1, 170n15Schmitt, Frederick, 6, 7, 176n12,

177n25science, 5, 20, 39, 71, 102, 105, 106,

107, 108, 110–16, 119–20, 145, 147, 153, 155, 158n13, 171n3, 172n12, 173n22, 173n23, 174n37

scientific epistemology, 112–3self-evident principles, 91–2, 170n9self-referential paradox, 119, 142–4,

146sentiment, 68, 69, 71, 84, 119, 144,

166n2sentimentalist thesis, 76, 145Sorell, Tom, 10, 159n20Sorenson, Roy, 12Sosa, Ernest, 131, 132Spector, Jessica, 176n15Stich, Stephen, 171n2Stove, D. C., 62Stroud, Barry, 43, 160n26, 171n2,

174n26subjective certainty, 32subjective probability, 33, 34, 35, 41,

46, 48, 50, 126–7, 161n13Swain, Marshall, 175n40synthetic statements, 39–42

taste, 69, 118, 119, 166n4Textual Defeaters (TD), 13, 41, 154Title Principle (TP), 66, 73–81, 83–85,

98, 102, 154, 167n7, 167n10, 167n11, 168n16, 168n18

total scepticism, 21, 65, 71–3, 76, 90, 96–7, 167n12, 167n14

A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume), 1, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20–3, 26, 34, 41–2, 49, 50, 55, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 77, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94–101, 107, 128, 141, 144, 146, 147, 149, 157n1, 163n5, 164n10, 169n2, 169n5, 170n10

uncertainty, 14, 15, 16, 27, 29, 30–31, 35, 41, 93, 160n3

Unger, Peter, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 155

universal doubt, 19, 20, 89, 154

van Fraassen, Bas, 105, 107–8, 113–6, 117, 171n2, 172n14, 172n15, 172n16, 174n28, 174n29, 174n32

Waxman, Wayne, 7, 139–40, 166n3, 166n5, 167n6

Weierstrass, Karl, 12White, Morton, 40Wilson, Catherine, 12, 13, 102Wilson, Fred, 82–3, 85, 94, 139–40,

147, 160n27, 163n3, 164n12, 165n18, 166n23, 167n10, 167n14, 168n17, 168n18, 168n19, 168n20, 170n9, 170n11, 177n2

Wolpert, Lewis, 171n6, 174n37Wright, John, 94, 98, 169n1,169n5