IS THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DISINTEGRATING? 1 33

difficult, as both Carter and Reagan had to learn, to cam- paign against government when you are the government. An antigovernment government by its very nature cannot hope to accomplish much. Since it is the Republicans who are most likely these days to take the antigovern- ment line, Republican administrations are unlikely to pile up impressive records of achievement. It is also rel- atively easy for the Republicans to cling to ideologically coherent programs as long as they are out of power. The realities of running a government inevitably lead to a loss of ideological virginity--Reagan's enormous budget de- ficit being a prime case in point.

As for Democrats of the future, they, too, should be lineal descendants of today's Democrats. Bumham views the Democratic party as hopelessly degenerate, but have the Democrats ever been a cohesive, ideologically driven political force? As Will Rogers put it, " I belong to no organized party. 1 am a Democrat." The Demo- crats, as a party, are incapable of coping with the pres- sing problems to which Burnham points; but the Demo- crats, as a party, have always been incapable of coping with difficult problems. Why should we expect anything different from one of the oddest political coalitions ever assembled? They will continue in their time-honored tradition of blundering along, winning some elections, losing others, solving some problems, creating others.

It is an integral part of the American mentality to pre- sume that problems can be solved and that big problems demand big solutions. Burnham's argument displays just

those characteristics: he imagines that a large-scale fix of one sort or another--dictatorship or socialism--will emerge in response to the large-scale problems the sys- tem faces, thereby ending the system as presently con- stituted with a Big Bang. In my view, the system is far less likely to end with a bang than it is to continue with a whimper. This is neither a sigh of satisfaction nor a shriek of outrage, but rather a plaintive expression of resignation.

I could not agree more than I do with Burnham's doubt about whether "electing Walter F. Mondale in 1984 will solve anything of fundamental importance," but what are we to make of this? I am reminded of a one-liner that circulated in the late 1960s: "They told me that if I voted for Barry Goldwater in '64 we'd be in a major land war in Asia within two years; I did, and we were." There is little that is new in all this--the irresponsibility of politi- cal parties and the unsolvability of large problems--and, unlike Burnham, I see no compelling reason to suppose that this will change greatly within the foreseeable fu- ture. []

Lee Sigelman & professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky. He has writ- ten extensively on a range of political issues, with much of his work focused on public opinion in the United States.

Not Quite Godzilla

Robert Weissberg

T he picture painted by Walter Dean Burnham can be

seen several different ways. To me it bears a close resemblance to what might be called the "1950s Japanese horror movie" scenario. Here are the essential ingredients. Usa, the location of our epic, appears to be a peaceful city, but appearances are deceiving. A crisis is about to erupt. The local factory is secretly polluting the water, miners are tunneling deeper and deeper despite warnings of a collapse, and traditional morality is being flaunted. Few speak out because bribes, payoffs, coer- cion, and high wages keep the peace. Suddenly, quite by

accident, a sleeping behemoth--Rightwinga Gopa-- is awakened from its thousand-year slumber. Described in ancient legends, the Rightwinga Gopa supposedly van- ished eons ago, sunk in the Great Depression. No such thing could survive, say the experts, but an angered and very hungry beast is now on a rampage. Schools, hospi- tals, and day-care centers are consumed. Enlightened civilization is threatened. The once mighty defensive demo-force is impotent as a result of constant bickering and indecisive leadership. So corrupt has demo become that some members join the enraged beast in an orgy of

3 4 / S O C I E T Y �9 J U L Y / A U G U S T 1984

destruction. The show ends with much devastation and a moral message: only if we change our ways can we be free of monsters. The wages of political, economic, and moral sin is the reawakening of prehistoric monsters.

Though we may all enjoy Japanese consumer goods, I suggest that our political life is not yet modeled on their 1950s horror movies. The Burnham analysis of post- 1960s events and the likely consequences of Reagan's 1980 election is open to serious question. I find three flaws in Burnham's description: (1) the existence of con- verging crises in American life; (2) the alleged collapse of the Democratic party; and (3) the capacity of the Re- publicans, as embodied by Ronald Reagan and his con- servative followers, to implement their programs. Burn- ham's arguments are exaggerated or insupportable. A dictatorship or successful socialist movement may emerge sometime in the future, but the analysis offered by Burnham is far from convincing. Personally, I am still more worried about the possibility of Godzilla.

The roots of the upcoming political upheaval sup- posedly lie in four worsening and interrelated crises. The economy can no longer support a policy of simultaneous capital accumulation (essential to capitalism) and gov- ernment payouts to clamoring groups grown accustomed to the public trough. These domestic economic problems are worsened by our inability to exert muscle overseas. Gone are the days when we could control the world oil market by threatening or bribing greedy Third World re- gimes. On the cultural level, the morality of ascetic Prot- estantism has given way to hedonism--a further blow to

capitalism. The politics of a strong party system has de- generated into a politics of hoards of narrowly defined interest groups, each clamoring for its selfish objectives. Policy thus becomes fragmented, feeble and uncoordi- nated, even in areas of vital national concern such as energy.

These characterizations contain a degree of truth. No contemporary administration will enjoy the easy budget- ary expansion of the 1960s, nor can the Central Intelli- gence Agency remove unfriendly leaders as conveniently as before. Having granted these assertions a degree of validity, we must ask: do they add up to a situation that could result in a genuine political upheaval? How serious are these four crises?

What makes something a "crisis" (let alone a "fun- damental crisis")? If we define a crisis as an event of major consequences requiring a quick decision, the Cuban missile crisis or the Iranian hostage crisis are bonafide crises. The gradual cannibalization of working capital for hedonistic consumption would not qualify as a crisis. It is a problem, or an issue, more akin to soil ero- sion, water pollution, the aging of our population, bad loans to foreign nations, Middle Eastern instability, nu- clear proliferation, and exposure to microwave radiation. To call something like family instability a "crisis" im- plies a set of crucial decisions that must be confronted. This suggests grave consequences if no immediate action

is taken. For Burnham a crisis is a problem that is be- lieved to be very serious, but its importance is not self- evident. There are probably several hundred festering problems which, if allowed to run the most horrible course imaginable, could destroy Western civilization, let alone bring us socialism.

Even if we judge these "crises" to be potentially seri- ous threats to the political status quo, there is no compel- ling reason to believe that they must become progres- sively worse. This is not a degenerative cancerlike

Socialism is not the way to spell economic and political relief.

affliction about which the only dispute is over how long the patient has to live. Some problems are probably solv- able through simple acts of Congress. For example, a few changes in the tax code could inject much needed capital into declining industries, discourage some types of immediate economic gratification and halt the growth of political action committees (PACs). Such a change would not require a dictatorship or stir up class warfare. Other elements of these crises are the sort that more or less periodically afflict us and then disappear for a while--like a bad cold. The values of hard work, sobri- ety, and family have survived everything from allowing women to work, public nudity, the banning of school prayers, and "the pill." Our traditional work-ethic cul- ture is making a comeback in the hard economic times of the 1980s. Internationally we will probably never recap- ture our post-World War II greatness, but recent events show that neither the dollar nor United States political influence must inevitably decline. A collapse of oil prices, a weakening of Japanese industry, and worldwide food shortages--all possible--could resolve many of our crises.

Burnham's reasoning that our economic crises and internal political bickering can be cured by democratic socialism is also open to serious question. The experi- ences of socialist governments in Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany suggest that socialism is not the way to spell economic and political relief. As events in the Soviet Union have well demonstrated, centralization of all political and economic power does not make so- cialism work any better. It is equally plausible to claim that socialism will exacerbate our "crisis ."

Even if the crises get worse, is Burnham's view of our future credible? A prediction of a dictatorship or a so- cialist regime ignores the present inertia in the political

thinking of both ordinary citizens and leaders. For better or worse, nearly everyone accepts the constitutional order and the party system as a given. In a national emergency we might tolerate a Lincoln or a Roosevelt overreaching formally prescribed powers, or the Demo- crats advocating public control of private business, but this acceptance is strictly temporary. Any review of re- cent proposals for change--at both the mass and elite level--shows the tenacity of existing arrangements. We have not considered changes in the electoral system, the balance between the executive and legislative branches, the role of the judiciary, or the organization of political parties. Proposed changes inevitably stress changes in personnel, new programs, or largely administrative re- forms.

The crises described by Burnham are problems, not crises. Whether they are more serious than all the other problems we now face is an unanswered question. Even if they are as serious as alleged, they are not irrevocably leading us toward some upheaval. If this doomsday should arrive, it is unlikely that the constitutional system and the two major political parties will be destroyed by a radicalized citizenry. I am not suggesting that everything is perfectly fine and Burnham is crying wolf. Surely there are some major problems on our agenda (for exam- ple, unemployment). It is the alleged inevitable worsen- ing and the consequences of these problems that I am questioning.

The economic, military, cultural, and political crises may have contributed to Reaganomics, but these were not sufficient in and of themselves, according to Burn- ham. What permitted Reagan's victory, his subsequent success in Congress, and the likely upheaval to come was the collapse of the Democratic party. It was a col- lapse on all fronts--the usual Democratic voters de- fected, potential supporters (such as workers, the poor, and so on) stayed home on election day; party officials were unable to fashion a coherent ideology, and party leaders in Congress could not stop massive defections. The prospects for a Democratic revival look dim--its leaders remain committed to an outmoded, unattractive middle-class ideology while historic partisan loyalties become increasingly tenuous. The Democratic party is both a victim of Burnham's crises and an unwilling cause of their consequences.

Burnham's characterizations have some truth. The 1980 election will not go down in history as a great Democratic moment, but to argue that Carter's defeat signified the collapse of a once strong leftist alternative is going more than a bit too far. Such an assessment is faulty on at least two accounts: (1) it exaggerates the strength of the Democratic party in some past "Golden Era" and (2) it distorts the traditional ideological character of the Democrats and oversimplifies the nature of the United States party system. Bluntly, and contrary to what Burnham argues, the 1980 election for the Democrats was the sort of periodic collapse that is nor-

IS THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DISINTEGRATING? / 35

mal for both major parties given the decentralized, fluid, nonideological character of our elections. It does not herald the end of something; it shows that things remain pretty much the same.

A party that receives the support of a mere 22.6 per- cent of the electorate hardly appears to be dominant. The impression is that the party has fallen on particularly hard times. The truth is that aside from the Roosevelt land- slides of the 1930s, the Democrats never dominated the way the current harbingers of doom would have us be- lieve. The two-to-one advantage in partisanship never produced domination, even when ticket splitting was less common. Where decisive majorities occurred (such as in Congress), this outcome owed as much to the biases of our electoral system as it did to Democratic voting strength.

Consider the Democratic successes in the period bounded by Truman's 1948 victory and Johnson's 1964 landslide. The average Democratic proportion of the presidential vote was 49.34 percent, only a hair better than the GOP figure of 49.14 percent. In two cases dur- ing this "Golden Era"- -1952 and 1956---the Democrats received 45 percent or less of the total vote for president. In House elections during this period the Democrats won an average 53 percent of the popular vote. Compare this with the figure of 54.6 percent for House elections from 1976 to 1982, the alleged period of Democratic collapse.

Nor does a review of data on party identification indi- cate a Democratic collapse. Between 1952 and 1964 election studies conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies showed that the proportion of people viewing themselves

Reagan's early major successes in the House depended on the support of

conservative Democrats.

as either strong or weak Democrats ranged from 44 per- cent in 1956 to 51 percent in 1964. The comparable range for GOP identifiers was 24 percent in 1964 to 29 percent in 1956 and 1958. On average during this period there were some 1.5 Democrats to every one Republican identifier. From 1976 to 1980 the proportion of Demo- cratic identifiers declined about 4.6 percent compared to the figures between 1952 and 1964. This decline was matched by a decline among Republicans. From 1976 to 1980 on average there were some 1.8 Democrats for every Republican. The growth of the independent group may be signaling "dealignment," but these figures in no

3 6 / S O C I E T Y �9 J U L Y / A U G U S T 1984

way show a Democratic "dealignment" in conjunction with a Republican resurgence.

Burnham argues not only that the Democrats are no longer able to deliver, but that the party can no longer exercise its proper role as the American Left. Here again we find an assessment based on a faulty view of the past. It also rests on some gross oversimplication of how American party politics operates. An occasional group or personality happy to label themselves as "Lef t " has been visible in the Democratic party. Virtually every modern Democratic presidential nominating convention has seen platform battles over various "leftist" causes. A few leftish planks may have even been adopted. Left oriented Democratic candidates have also emerged from time to time. Even so, if we define "Lef t " in terms of using government to redistribute wealth or achieve some form of economic justice, this element is clearly mar- ginal to both the party-in-the-electorate and the party- in-government. That the people thinking of themselves,

Any review of recent proposals for change shows the tenacity of existing

arrangements.

in some sense, as being "Le f t " also think of themselves as Democrats hardly makes the Democratic party the American Left. If one must use European political ter- minology (and we probably should not), the Democrats are a centerist party with a left wing.

A more useful assessment of both parties is as oppor- tunistic organizations constantly searching for issues that are useful for winning elections. Because the parties dif- fer in their traditional clienteles, limits exist on the search for issues (Republicans, for example, could not alienate certain business interests). At times, when such a move may be believed to be electorally advantageous, Democratic candidates may sound leftish. In the late 1960s, for example, several prominent Democrats openly talked over state mandated full employment, womb-to-womb health care, the reduction of income gaps, and other "leftist" policies. Today, these same people may be giving speeches on industrial productiv- ity, the bloated Washington bureaucracy, and the need to help United States corporations. Such a shift is not an abandonment of historic leftist ideology; it is merely another opportunistic attempt to win elections.

As for the argument that some of the current Demo- cratic woes are traceable to its misplaced middle-class appeals, this is just plain wrong. The idea of somehow

mobilizing the "natural Left" constituency--the poor and other disadvantaged groups allegedly too alienated to vote--is a virtually hopeless proposition. Even if the dis- advantaged could be fashioned into a participating Left, they would constitute far less than a majority and would be treated harshly by the biases of the electoral system. If anything, the opposite argument is correct: attracting

middle-class voters usually means electoral success for the Democratic party. The presidential victories of 1960, 1964, and 1976 were all associated with an increase in middle-class voting over the previous elections. The 1972 election, when the Democrats occasionally sounded almost like a doctrinaire party of the Left, was a disaster and a genuine lesson not easily forgotten.

It is hard to say that Godzilla is on the loose because the once dominant leftist Democratic party collapsed. The Democrats may have prevailed more often than not, but the 1980 defeat was hardly unique in the post-World War II era. As for the party being a party of the Left or a would-be Left party, this is nonsense. The party has had some leftist elements, but it is not a Left party. Within certain boundaries, it is an opportunistic, pragmatic or- ganization. This means that, barring a 1972-1ike period of craziness, it is unlikely to become a doctrinaire party of the Left.

Will Reagan and his right-wing ideologues "change the entire face of American politics" and precipitate a "general crisis of the regime"? Burnham believes that they are "well on their way." The president and his con- gressional supporters will have some impact, and on certain issues this may be dramatic, but such changes should not be confused with an overthrow of the estab- lished order. A few legislative successes do not make a revolution.

Conventional wisdom regarding the likelihood of making major changes in our political system is casually dismissed by Burnham as "ancient chestnuts." Such wisdom nevertheless remains valid despite suffering the indignity of endless repetition to college freshmen. This wisdom holds that our government is organized to thwart extensive change. Institutional arrangements (such as checks and balances) and customs (such as judical re- view) fragment and decentralize power. Positive action requires the cooperation of many people, each with their own powers, objectives, and responsibilities. Obstruc- tive action is much easier, and defeat can only rarely be overcome. Even a president receiving a clear electoral mandate must contend with numerous congressional committees, two houses of Congress, a potentially hos- tile Supreme Court, and innumerable bureaucracies each with their own mandates and ambitions. Add to this a federal system in which major politics (such as for edu- cation, crime, and public welfare) are handled at all levels of government.

Reagan's programs are not doomed from the start. The system is designed to thwart rapid and sweeping changes, not to guarantee continued political inertia.

IS THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DISINTEGRATING? / 37

Presidents, especially during their early "honeymoon period," have regularly achieved a degree of success. Eventually "the system" catches up with them: legisla- tive-executive conflicts multiply, appeals for complete support of the president's program are more easily dis- missed, talk of the president's electoral mandate van-

Reagan has discovered that he cannot command policy into existence.

ishes, and bargaining over modest changes becomes the political norm. This is a deeply rooted and reappearing feature of our political process, and there is no reason to believe that Ronald Reagan and his ideologues will es- cape it.

The easiest way to see how "the system" can frustrate an ambitious president is to examine how easily policy coalition in Congress can be undone. Recall that Rea- gan's early major successes in the House depended on the support of conservative Democrats (the so-called Boll Weevils). By early 1982 most of these defectors were making peace with the House Democratic leader- ship and putting distance between themselves and Rea- gan. One proposed budget drafted by the conservative Democratic caucus--the Boll Weevil caucus--calls for a $30 billion defense cut over three years, protection of federal job training and education programs, and repeal of various probusiness tax cuts. Talk of the Boll Weevils changing parties has stopped entirely.

Added to this coalition breakup is the significant change in the House brought about by the 1982 midterm election. (Such midterm losses are typical in our system of staggered elections.) Examination of who lost and the makeup of newcomers shows that the Reagan program is in deep u'ouble. Twenty-six incumbent Republicans were replaced by Democrats. Twenty-four of these defeated Republicans had supported the President in his two great successes: the budget-cut bill and the tax-cut legislation. The Democrats replacing these defeated Republicans and other newly elected Democrats are, as a group, com- paratively liberal. A CBS News~New York Times inter- view with these newcomers found that 62 percent fa- vored canceling the scheduled 1983 tax cut and 83 per- cent favored cutting scheduled increases in military spending. An Associated Press/NBC survey suggests a net loss of forty votes for Reagan's conservative ideol- ogy as a result of House turnover. Given the closeness of Reagan's past victories, it is unrealistic to expect a repeat of past successes.

Although the 1982 midterm election may have made

Reagan's attempt to "change the entire face of American politics" nearly impossible, failures in Reagan's efforts were discernible well before. In several instances what originally appeared to be clear-cut decisions with suffi- cient political support proved more difficult than ex- pected. Natural gas deregulatiovi for example, has run into numerous obstacles and is presently becoming a festering regulatory nightmare. The elimination of the departments of energy and education have also proven to be not as simple as once imagined. The much heralded "New Federalism" has run into a multitude of obstacles and currently appears to be in limbo. Administrative ef- forts to reduce government regulation involving the handicapped, nursing homes, and child labor encoun- tered strong and successful opposition from members of Congress concerned about both the substance of the is- sues and institutional prerogatives in setting regulatory policy.

More visible have been the administration's problems with social security and tax legislation. In both instances, the political and economic facts of life have limited a possible one-sided class warfare on the American public. Despite the huge sums involved and the deepening fi- nancial problems, public and congressional pressures have prevented Reagan from even seriously discussing changes in social security, let alone making cutbacks. Similarly, public and congressional concerns over huge deficits resulted in the passage of a $98.3 billion tax in- crease over three years. (This package included tax with- holding on interest and dividends, hardly an idea de- signed to please business people.) On the so-called social issues the defeat of right-wing ideologues is even more clear-cut. Abortion and school prayer never got out of the Senate, the one chamber in which success was most likely. The House continues to block various proposals to limit busing.

The best testimony to the failure of the once feared Reagan-right-wing-monolith may be the growing doubts expressed by its own supporters. The disarray and bick- ering that once seemed an exclusive Democratic trait now seems to infect the Reaganites. For example, Tom Bethell writing in the National Review in 1982 accused Reagan of being no better than Carter in the crucial areas of the growth of government (even excluding defense spending), tax policy, and regulation. Many other card- carrying Reaganites have become disillusioned with the President's unwillingness to be more active on the social issues or with his indecision in dealing with the Soviet Union. More pragmatic fellow travelers are now disen- chanted in the face of growing unemployment, continued high interest rates, and industrial stagnation. What once looked like a unified, deeply committed phalanx is now just another set of loosely allied and occasionally divided interests.

I am not suggesting that beyond a few initial successes the Reagan program has been a complete flop. As prom- ised, defense spending has been increased, several social

38 / SOCIETY �9 J U L Y / A U G U S T 1984

welfare programs have been sharply cut, regulatory agencies are now on the defensive, and we are a little more hard-line in our dealings with the Russians. Things are different from the days of the Carter administration, but the successes do not constitute the successful im- plementation of a grand fight-wing ideological program. Reagan has achieved a small number of outright vic- tories, a modest number of partial victories, and he has lost numerous battles. He has not "been engaged in comprehensive changes in public policy." All signs point to even less success in the future. It also remains to be seen whether some of his legislative successes even- tually turn out as intended.

The reason for all of this can be summarized as "the system." Like all other presidents, Reagan has discov- ered that he cannot command policy into existence. Even when the opposition is weakened, divided, and disor- ganized, there are limits to what can be accomplished. Sooner or later fragile coalitions become undone, other public officials pursue their own goals, bureaucracies re- sist change, and outside, uncontrollable events disrupt calculations and plans. It is incremental politics as usual, not a revolution.

Apparently, Reagan's victory and his initial legislative successes are not the beginning of a "crisis of the re- gime." Plans to welcome the upcoming dictatorship and/or socialist revolution may be a little premature. Nor should one take out insurance against the collapse of capitalism or the demise of the work ethic. The status

quo, for better or worse, seems reasonably safe. Fears of Godzilla have again proven unfounded.

Why has Burnham's vision of a Reagan-precipitated "crisis of the regime" drawn so much attention despite the weak evidence and speculative arguments? The lure of Burnham's analysis is that it vehemently condemns the Reagan program while skipping over the failures of many liberal programs and policies closely associated with the Democra t ic party. Reagan and his coconspirators will bring a stormy period characterized by one-sided class warfare, military adventurisms, and an institutional collapse that may well lead to a dictator- ship. The intellectual merit of Reagan's ideas, the failure of the ideas they are supposed to replace, and the reasons for the appeal of these ideas are not part of the analysis. Reagan is bad because, given the underlying "crises" of our system, Reaganism will lead to disaster. The possi- bility that the origins of these crises lie in liberal policies is likewise a nonsubject. Stripped of some economic and social characterization, Bumham's analysis is little more than a polemic intended to reassure those who know that Reagan is evil but cannot quite say why he is a mon- ster. []

Robert Weissberg is associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois, Urbana. He has also taught at Cornell University. His publications include many articles and books on American politics, and he is currently researching the nonverbal communication of political ideology.

The Eclipse of the Democratic Party Revisited

Walter Dean Burnham

i n some my essay, "The Eclipse of the Demo- respect, s cratic Party, looks better to me now than it did when

it was written. For Ronald Reagan is running for re- election; it appears that Walter F. Mondale will be his Democratic opponent; and, at least as of early 1984, the odds appear considerably better than even that Reagan will be reelected. In considering the article as a whole, it is easy to see why a number of my colleagues comment- ing on it complain that I painted a canvas in very vivid, not to say crude, colors. I certainly did. The essay was not written in a scholarly context. It was a kind ofcri de

coeur, aimed at provoking discussions within the ex- majority party and among its friends about *he deeper significance of what they and the rest of us have been living through. Inevitably, when one has an urge to communicate but very limited space and time to work with, oversimplifications arise and academic qualifiers disappear. That must be chalked up to the risks of the trade.

Readers should be assured that I am conversant with the survey evidence pointing to a decline in Republican as well as Democratic party identification. I am also