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1
NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MARCH 18, 2015
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OPENING REMARKS
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to address you today, which is my first as the 10th
Commander of United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to be here to convey our appreciation
for your indispensable support and to provide an update on our nation’s special operations forces
(SOF). During my remarks, I will describe USSOCOM’s posture, purpose, and mission in the
context of the emerging strategic environment. I will then share my priorities and concerns, and
explain how we will accomplish our assigned missions and prepare for an uncertain future.
SOF ETHIC and CULTURE
I would like to begin by commending the extraordinary efforts made by our special
operations forces to keep our nation safe. USSOCOM’s highly specialized military and civilian
personnel, our “quiet professionals,” are asked to respond to our nation’s most complex,
demanding, and high-risk challenges. Building this skilled and specialized force is a demanding,
time-intensive process. Every day, our forces put forth an extraordinary level of effort and
personal sacrifice, while enduring grueling physical and mental demands to meet mission
requirements. They deserve our admiration and gratitude, along with all of our Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines. They are all part of a team doing essential work on behalf of our nation.
The SOF commitment to excellence is imperative in accomplishing what our nation has
asked of these dedicated men and women – I am proud to serve as their commander.
USSOCOM is a values-based organization – always mindful that our personal and professional
conduct reflects not only on ourselves, but also on our nation. We will continue to earn the high
level of trust that our leaders have placed in us by maintaining an open dialogue on the
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challenges we face, providing our best military advice, and remaining responsible stewards of
U.S. tax dollars.
USSOCOM’s MISSION
As you know, Congress created USSOCOM in 1987 and gave it distinct Service-like
responsibilities, which makes it unique among the nine Unified Combatant Commands. Under
U.S. Code Title 10, Sections 164 and 167, it is my responsibility, as the Commander of
USSOCOM, to organize, train, and equip SOF for current and future challenges. Our mission is
to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to support persistent,
networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operations to protect and
advance our nation’s interests.
As global security challenges become increasingly interconnected and interdependent,
USSOCOM is investing in our own connections, deepening our relationships with the GCCs, our
international partners, and with U.S. national security decision-makers at home. These
relationships are helping us build common understandings of shared threats and facilitate
cooperation.
In short, USSOCOM sees its role as an indispensable supporting command to our GCCs,
working seamlessly with interagency and international partners to provide capabilities critical to
addressing emerging problems and securing our nation’s interests. Ultimately, the best indicator
of our success will be the success of the GCCs.
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TODAY’S US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE
Since assuming command in August 2014, I have had the opportunity to travel to every
GCC to consult with the commanders and visit with our forward deployed special operations
units. I would like to give you a snapshot of U.S. SOF and the range of missions they are
executing, and describe their experience as part of today’s military.
Today, our United States Special Operations Forces are comprised of over 69,000 men
and women serving as operators, enablers, and support personnel. The SOF community is made
up of our nation’s finest leaders and organizational teams. Within the force of “quiet
professionals” are Army Special Forces, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams), Air Commandos,
Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, Marine Raiders, civil affairs personnel, psychological
operations personnel, acquisition experts, logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners,
communicators, and other specialists who are instrumental in fulfilling our mission. We also
rely heavily upon our Guard and Reserve units, as well as government civilians and contractors.
Our SOF are deployed to more than 80 countries worldwide, filling GCC requirements
and supporting 10 named operations. In addition to the nearly 3,500 personnel we have stationed
forward, we also have over 7,000 service members deployed in support of a variety of GCC
requirements on any given day. These requirements span the range of our core activities as
directed by the Secretary of Defense. From working with indigenous forces and local
governments to improve local security, to high-risk counterterrorism operations – SOF are in
vital roles performing essential tasks. They provide critical linkages to our security partners and
must be prepared to handle a wide range of contingencies, despite a small footprint in their areas
of responsibility. These missions are often complicated, demanding, and high-risk.
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Because of the unique skill set SOF possess, we are seeing increasing demand for these
units across the GCCs. The typical operator is older than counterparts in the conventional forces,
has attended multiple advanced tactical schools, and has received specialized cultural and
language training. This depth of experience and range of expertise has been in high demand
since 9/11. Over the last 14 years, the average service member in SOF has deployed between 4
to 10 times –with most toward the higher end of that range – and has frequently had less than 12
months at home between deployments. About 50% of our force is married with children and
have sacrificed a great deal of time with their families. High operational tempo has put a strain
on both our operators and their families, and most, if not all, of our SOF operators have lost
friends both overseas and at home. Our SOF warriors have performed their duties superbly, but
not without stress or loss; we have sustained over 2,500 wounded and killed in action. We now
have approximately 7,500 members in our SOF Wounded Warrior program, many of them due to
the “invisible wounds” of traumatic stress. We have a great deal of work to do to ensure these
men and women receive proper care.
On the positive side, the pressure exerted over this time has created a self-confident,
mature, knowledgeable, and agile force that has a greater awareness of what is important to our
nation. The range of experience and expertise in special operations forces make them uniquely
suited to deal with many of the complex challenges we see emerging in the security environment.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
We are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology into an increasing
number of cultures and societies is driving change in the strategic environment. The Cold War
suppressed political mobilization in a variety of ways. The removal of those constraints, coupled
with technology, is creating both challenges and opportunities. Adversaries can now easily
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access tools that range from advanced weapons systems and cyber capabilities to improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), which are providing an expanding variety of coercive options. Yet we
also see opportunities emerging as networked populations are seeking improvements in
governance, security, and economic opportunity. Power and influence are now diffusing to a
range of actors, both state and non-state, who have not traditionally wielded it. Many
governments are struggling to adjust to the new realities. For the foreseeable future, instability
will be driven by conflicts within and across state boundaries as much as it will be driven by
conflicts between states themselves.
Within states, it is becoming much easier for aggrieved populations to network, organize,
and demand change to the status quo; we have seen this in a number of locations across the
world. Populations are increasingly challenging the legitimacy of their governments and
demanding change on a range of issues. Governments unwilling or unable to accommodate
change will face increasing pressure from dissatisfied segments of their populations. Traditional
responses to control these situations may provide temporary respite, but too often fail to address
the underlying grievances, which can lead to further instability.
Across state boundaries, violent non-state actors such as ISIL are exploiting local
grievances among populations to advance their own horrific ends. Their methods routinely
violate international norms and challenge regional governments’ capabilities to respond. These
groups rely upon their ability to build common identities with sub-sets of disaffected populations
and magnify the potential for violence. Other non-state actors have more criminal inclinations
and avoid law enforcement while building their power and influence.
Between states, technological advancement is providing rising powers more options to
pursue their interests. In some cases, countries are seeking to expand their claims of sovereignty
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outside of recognized borders. In other cases, they are sponsoring and relying upon non-state
actors to act on their behalf abroad. Traditional approaches to deterrence are increasingly
inadequate – particularly as some states are becoming adept at avoiding conventional military
responses while advancing their interests through a combination of coercion, targeted violence,
and exploitation of local issues. Russia is taking this approach and is systematically
undermining neighboring governments and complicating international responses to its aggressive
actions.
There are two clear implications of these environmental conditions. First, the diffusion
of power is decreasing the ability of any state, acting alone, to control outcomes unilaterally.
Globalization has created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working with a
variety of security partners can we begin to address these issues.
Second, our success in this environment will be determined by our ability to adequately
navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional peace-or-war construct. Actors taking a
“gray zone” approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of
actual fighting. In this “gray zone,” we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of the
conflict, the parties involved, and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These
conflicts defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we
prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S.
interests.
SOF’s ROLE in this ENVIRONMENT
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If the environment is populated with potential adversaries who are adept at avoiding our
conventional advantages, then we must be prepared to respond with appropriate tools. The
traditional rules of conflict are changing – our ability to influence outcomes is not solely based
on our aggregate military capability. Our success will increasingly be determined by our ability
to respond with a range of capabilities while becoming more attuned to the intricacies involved
in an evolving landscape of relationships.
U.S. Special Operations Forces provide a portfolio of options to deal with complex
security challenges. We are uniquely able to operate in a variety of environments to support
strategic progress in achieving national security objectives. Our comparative advantage in this
environment is built upon three pillars: 1) persistent engagement, 2) enabling partners, and 3)
discreet action.
First, we conduct persistent engagement in a variety of strategically important locations
with a small-footprint approach that integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows us
to nurture relationships prior to conflict. Our language and cultural expertise in these regions
help us facilitate stability and counter malign influence with and through local security forces.
Although SOF excel at short-notice missions under politically-sensitive conditions, we are most
effective when we deliberately build inroads over time with partners who share our interests.
This engagement allows SOF to buy time to prevent conflict in the first place.
Second, we integrate and enable both conventional forces and interagency capabilities.
On a daily basis, SOF are assisting the GCCs across and between their areas of responsibility to
address issues that are not constrained by borders. When crises escalate, SOF develop critical
understanding, influence and relationships that aid conventional force entry into theater. The
close working relationships we have built with GCCs are essential in ensuring we are able to
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properly support and augment their operations. Today’s crises will not be resolved by a military-
only approach; instead, the nature of these challenges demands a whole-of-government response.
SOF play an important supporting, but not decisive, role. We continue to explore how we can
better augment the capabilities of the interagency to support the National Security Strategy.
Third, USSOCOM provides the ability to conduct discreet action against our most
immediate threats. Regardless of our efforts to build stability and favorably shape outcomes, the
need remains for an effective crisis response and a robust, proactive counterterrorism program.
For these cases, we must maintain the ability to conduct operations under politically-sensitive
conditions. This capability provides a tailored military response that reduces the associated
strategic risks and the likelihood of conflict escalation. We are continuing to disrupt the violent
actions of extremist organizations in conjunction with conventional forces, the interagency, and
our international SOF partners. These three pillars help us provide lower-risk, timely, and
tailored options to deal with the growing variety of security problems in today’s world.
USSOCOM and its PARTNERS
As an organization that deals with crises that occur in the “gray zone,” I believe
USSOCOM has an important role to play in facilitating interagency discussion. For example, we
hosted senior policymakers last year from across the interagency to discuss options to address
transnational organized criminal networks. Just this past February, we hosted a similar event in
Tampa on behalf of the National Counterterrorism Center to discuss the strategy to counter ISIL.
Challenges such as these will continue to evolve – and so must our approach to dealing with
them.
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Unconventional strategies are increasingly becoming a feature of the security
environment. I believe it is time for us to have an in-depth discussion on how we can best
support our national interests in these situations. Adversaries employing these strategies attempt
to maximize their coercive influence while limiting their risk of serious retribution. They are
becoming adept at avoiding crossing thresholds that would clearly justify the use of conventional
military force. Destabilizing a government is becoming easier through non-attributable methods
that are relatively cheap and easy to employ. Our success will therefore depend upon our ability
to act with and through regional partners, leveraging all instruments of national power, to counter
destabilizing influences.
Cyber threats are an increasingly common component of unconventional strategies for
which we must develop a more comprehensive approach. Our ever-growing reliance on
information infrastructure makes us vulnerable to attacks; the same is true for many governments
around the world, to include our potential adversaries. Simultaneously, there are a variety of
areas in which we must become more proficient to fully realize the potential of cyber
capabilities. I believe the interagency needs to maintain a continuing focus on this area.
Social media is another component of unconventional strategies, and the security
environment in general, that is playing a central role in recruiting individuals to causes. We must
therefore develop our ability to interact with key influencers through this medium, or else risk
blinding ourselves to this important conduit of information and influence in unfolding crises.
We all must view this space as a routine operational area; it is redefining how humans interact.
Our success in leveraging these tools will be determined by how well we cultivate the networks
in which we participate; it is important to note that these are not “our” networks – the very nature
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of these relationship tools is decentralized and participatory, rather than centrally controlled. We
require new thinking on this subject.
We stand ready to support interagency efforts to work through these challenges. Though
there are military components to countering and deterring unconventional challenges, whole-of-
government strategies are essential for building lasting stability and safeguarding U.S. interests.
DEVELOPING SOF for the SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Through close collaboration with Congress, I hope to optimize the allocation of our
resources to develop the capabilities, capacities, and authorities required by the GCCs. While
this emerging security environment will increase the demand for SOF, we are most effective
when we integrate our efforts with the GCCs, Services, and the interagency. In order to
strengthen SOF posture and capabilities, I have established five priorities for USSOCOM.
Focusing on these priorities will enhance our ability to address the range of conventional and
unconventional challenges that are increasingly characterizing the security environment.
First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills, and
capabilities to meet current requirements as well as those that will emerge in the future. As we
face both fiscal and security challenges, we must balance the readiness of the current force with
investment in future capabilities. Critical to this balance is ensuring that we maintain superior
selection, training, education, and talent management for our people. In turn, our people must be
supported by timely development, acquisition, and sustainment of both Service-provided and
special operations-peculiar equipment.
Recognizing that humans are more important than hardware – our first SOF Truth – we
must invest wisely in our people to develop the right talents our force requires. Over the past 14
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years we have evolved our approach to consistently produce operators who possess the attributes
and competencies we require. Developing language and cultural expertise is essential to our
ability to operate in complex situations to promote the security of the U.S. and its allies.
Operational success for SOF often depends on being able to establish relationships with key
partners. The strength of these relationships is founded on culturally attuned, regionally trained
operators interacting directly with foreign officials and security forces in their language.
USSOCOM and its Components continue to strengthen and rebalance regional capabilities to
provide appropriate expertise.
We have a shared responsibility with the Services for developing our special operations
forces and we are partnering with them on ways we can better assess and manage talent.
USSOCOM has the responsibility for ensuring the combat readiness of its forces while the
Services have broad authority for career development, so we are working on improving how we
collaboratively prepare SOF for the challenges they face. Yet reliance on the Services is not
limited to recruitment and development of our operators. The readiness of USSOCOM, the
Services, and Functional Combatant Commands are inextricably linked as SOF relies heavily on
Service training, logistics, facilities, and operational enablers such as cyber networks, global
distribution, and global patient movement. Service and Functional Combatant Commanders’
support will remain a critical requirement as USSOCOM continues to deploy SOF to meet
increasing GCC demand.
In terms of funding, our readiness has remained relatively stable over the past four years
through a combination of consistent base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding,
which has allowed USSOCOM to fulfill the most critical GCC demands. Although the majority
of our efforts have focused on the CENTCOM AOR, our current budget shifts efforts to improve
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support to all GCCs in accordance with strategic guidance. As we begin to focus more heavily
on emerging networked threats around the world, we are aligning resources to maintain current
readiness through joint training and exercises, operational unit readiness and training activities,
and flying hours. Our training exercises include a strong focus on building Service, interagency,
and international interoperability. We remain heavily reliant upon OCO funding, which has been
essential for responding to today’s threats, and appreciate the continued support of Congress in
this matter.
Second, we must help our nation win in today’s challenges and contribute to keeping the
nation safe. The challenges faced by the United States and our allies require unprecedented
agility and understanding. We must prioritize and synchronize SOF activities to protect our
nation’s interests as the challenges grow more numerous and complex. To accomplish this, we
must continue to invest in a diverse portfolio of SOF capabilities that meet both the immediate
and long-term needs of the GCCs and complements the capabilities of the Services, the
interagency, and our international partners.
DoD guidance identifies USSOCOM as the synchronizer for the planning and provision
of special operations capabilities in support of the GCC. To meet this guidance, we are in the
process of coordinating with the Services, the Department, and the GCCs to collaboratively
develop a campaign plan for global special operations. The plan is intended to help optimize and
prioritize our support globally, promote ongoing efforts to strengthen international partnerships
and will ultimately improve our ability to support the GCCs by providing coherent options and
recommendations for SOF employment.
Authorities such as Section1208 play a critical role in ensuring we can provide a more
comprehensive set of options for security challenges by leveraging the capabilities of local
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security partners. They also help ensure we retain access and influence in regions where we do
not maintain a large military presence. We appreciate your continued support for this authority.
Going forward, we will work with Congress to ensure we have the right authorities and programs
in place to properly support the GCCs.
Third, we are continuing to build relationships with international and domestic partners
through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures, and liaison
activities. These partnerships allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhance
regional capabilities that can respond to threats at their origin. Over the past few years,
USSOCOM has prioritized strengthening the network of military, interagency, and international
partners across the globe, through liaison exchange, and a multinational communications
infrastructure. These relationships build common understandings of shared threats and facilitate
cooperation.
Efforts such as our Special Operations Liaison Officers, or SOLOs, are helping us build
this network of international partners. Now present in embassies in 15 nations and operating in
every geographic combatant command area of responsibility, SOLOs help us facilitate
coordination across GCC boundaries to address challenges that span the globe. We also have
liaison officers from 13 partner nations that work with us at our Headquarters in Tampa.
Similarly, our Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) help us interface more effectively
with the interagency. By increasing transparency, communication, and collaboration with our
partners, we maximize the effectiveness of our collective action against shared problem sets.
USSOCOM will continue to invest in these relationships so that our network development
outpaces that of threat networks.
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The relationships USSOCOM has strengthened and the communications architecture we
have put in place allow us to coordinate with coalition partners on matters such as hostage
rescue, the movement of foreign fighters, international training, and developing the capabilities
for responding to shared threats. In January of this year, USSOCOM organized a dialogue that
brought together senior military representatives from 20 nations, as well as the Commanders of
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and NATO Special Operations Headquarters,
to discuss common security challenges and opportunities for collective action.
Our expanded support to the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) is another
key effort that is helping us further develop our regional capabilities and expertise. This support
includes extending the necessary communications infrastructure and providing key operations
support capabilities such as Civil-Military Engagement, and ISR processing, exploitation, and
dissemination. We are working closely with the GCCs to determine how we can best support
their operational needs. We have realigned approximately 800 USSOCOM billets to push more
capability forward to the TSOCs in areas such as planning, intelligence, analysis, and
communications. We will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we
maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely with our network of allies and partners,
and to encourage constructive defense cooperation.
As we operate with and through a growing network of global partners, we will
continually reassess relationships based on mission prioritization and ensure we maintain the
proper security protocols. As an enterprise, USSOCOM understands the reality that what
happens in Latin America affects Africa, which affects Europe, and so on. With a global
approach – working with international partners to coordinate activities and share critical
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information – we can more effectively deal with global challenges. In my opinion, this network
is an essential capability in adapting to the emerging challenges to our interests.
Fourth, we must prepare for the future by investing in SOF that are able to win in an
increasingly complex world. To do so, we must be innovators of strategic options. We will
focus on developing the total Special Operations Force through concepts, training, doctrine,
education, and research that are future-oriented and challenge our current operational constructs.
These concepts, in concert with robust experimentation and a rigorous capability analysis and
development process, will ensure we are prepared for an uncertain and dynamic future.
Ultimately, preparing for the future is about ensuring that we match the right people and
capabilities with the very best ideas to address our most pressing problems.
In today’s environment, our effectiveness is directly tied to our ability to operate with
domestic and international partners. We, as a joint force, must continue to institutionalize
interoperability, integration, and interdependence between conventional forces and special
operations forces through doctrine, training, and operational deployments. A key aspect of
building interoperability is through USSOCOM’s participation in Service Title 10 and Chairman
of the Joint Staff sponsored war games and experiments. These events provide a critical venue
for building partnerships with Service, interagency, and international partners to address some of
the most pressing challenges facing our nation as we look to the future. We will also continue to
use USSOCOM events to advance our efforts to institutionalize whole-of-government
approaches.
Programmatic keys to preparing SOF for the future are a continued emphasis on
enhancing the overall capabilities of the SOF operator; fielding new and recapitalized air,
ground, and maritime platforms; enhancing our SOF-specific ISR capabilities; and continuing to
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invest in new communications infrastructure and equipment technology that allow us to share
information more effectively and integrate our activities. We will work to ensure we are
developing the right technologies, equipment, and capabilities required for the future SOF
operator.
USSOCOM’s tailored and streamlined rapid acquisition processes, supported by
Congress and enabled through the oversight of ASD(SO/LIC) and USD(AT&L), have delivered
critical capabilities to the battlefield, in weeks and months, instead of years. For example, in
2014, conducting combat evaluations allowed us to develop and deliver advanced weapons and
cutting-edge Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors for our SOF MQ-9
unmanned aircraft that had immediate impact on the battlefield. USSOCOM also successfully
responded to an urgent operational requirement to increase ballistic protection on its fleet of CV-
22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. In less than six months, USSOCOM, working alongside the Army
and Navy, acquired lightweight armored panels and modified its fleet of Ospreys.
USSOCOM is also focusing on improving acquisition processes to support an adaptable
strategy by leveraging its network of partnerships with Services, the interagency, industry,
academia, and international partners. The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) is an
example of our emphasis on acquisition process innovation. The effort is designed to deliver a
test-ready combat suit prototype that protects our operators at their most vulnerable point.
Through the use of a small joint acquisition task force and rapid prototyping events, TALOS is
leveraging close relationships between operators, acquirers, and technologists to achieve greater
results than could be accomplished through traditional acquisition processes. This approach is
also helping us “spin off” technologies from the larger TALOS effort that are improving our
capabilities at an accelerated rate. Continued Congressional support of USSOCOM’s acquisition
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of SOF-peculiar capability and our commitment to innovative process improvement is
imperative to our continued ability to meet the needs of the warfighter.
As we prepare for the future, we remain very concerned about the detrimental effects of
sequestration; drastic cuts to the Services will have severe impacts on our own ability to support
the GCCs. A great deal of USSOCOM’s procurement is focused on SOF-specific enhancements
to Service-managed programs. Therefore, SOF buying power is directly connected to Service
investments. Even with a steady base budget for USSOCOM, our capabilities can still be
reduced through cuts to programs that we depend upon. A major reprioritization of these
programs will require us to reassess our own investments. Increased demand for SOF across the
GCCs combined with increased pressure on Service budgets may compromise our capabilities.
Internally, we are working hard to refine our programmatic decisions to build our buying power
and prepare for the future.
Another important area of future development for SOF is emerging from the Women in
Service Review. Women have served in SOF for years in Intelligence, Military Information
Support and Civil Affairs units, female engagement teams, cultural support teams, and Air Force
Special Operations aviation roles. Approximately two-thirds of our positions are currently
integrated. USSOCOM is sponsoring several research efforts to assess possible impacts on unit
performance to facilitate further successful integrations. We are also working in close
coordination with the Services to develop recommendations for further integration.
Fifth, we must preserve our force and families, providing for their short- and long-term
well-being. People – military, civilian, and families – are our most important asset. We always
take care of our people, but after 13 years of war, their resiliency and readiness is a primary
concern. We must leverage every resource available – SOF, Service, and community resources –
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to ensure our people are prepared for the demanding tasks we ask them to execute. At the same
time, we must pay particular attention to the often invisible challenges that our people and their
families face, and ensure that the SOF culture is one that fosters understanding and support.
In order to preserve our special operations force and families, we are focusing on four
areas: human, psychological, spiritual, and family/social performance. In each area, we are
taking steps to improve the long-term health of our force. These initiatives are not intended to
supplant the Services’ efforts in providing for the welfare of military members and their families;
but rather to provide SOF and their families with access to services that meet their unique needs
and complement Service-provided programs. Given the high frequency of combat deployments,
high-stake missions, and extraordinarily demanding environments in which the force operates,
SOF and their families have been under unprecedented levels of stress; it is imperative to address
the effects of more than 13 years of combat operations.
There are two specific areas that fall under preserving our force and families that I would
like to discuss in more detail: suicides and personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO. On the first
subject, our goal is to do everything possible to eliminate the incidence of suicide in the forces
and in our families. We have indications that our efforts in the four areas I mentioned are
making a difference by alleviating conditions that contribute to suicide. There are now higher
self-referral rates and our leadership is improving its ability to recognize important warning signs
and provide tools to intervene more effectively. We are moving in the right direction in
changing our culture when it comes to seeking psychological help, but still have work to do.
This effort will continue until seeking help is considered normal and expected by everyone. We
are grateful for the support Congress has provided to address this challenge.
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The second area I would like to mention is PERSTEMPO, which is the rate at which we
deploy our forces. Our policy is aimed at ensuring the physical, mental and operational
readiness and resiliency of assigned forces. In 2010 a study was commissioned to examine the
effects of a decade of continuous combat operations on the SOF community. The study
identified one primary source of ongoing stress: the lack of predictability resulting from a
demanding operational tempo exacerbated by significant time spent away from home for
training. Predictability is a key component of building resilience. USSOCOM’s PERSTEMPO
policy is designed to improve operational readiness and retention by allowing commanders to
evaluate and balance mission requirements with the needs of our service members. The intent is
to enable the Commanders at the lowest level to better monitor the use of assigned forces and
make informed risk decisions that help protect them from overuse, which will also improve
mission success. Ultimately, managing PERSTEMPO is about ensuring the long-term health of
the force and mission readiness while continuing to meet our global mission requirements.
The preservation of our force and families is vitally important in the preservation of
capabilities that the nation depends upon to respond to crises in an unpredictable environment.
Ensuring we properly care for those from whom we expect so much will allow us to meet
important requirements from the GCCs. As our people keep faith with our nation, we will keep
faith with them, now and in the future.
WORKING with CONGRESS
I look forward to working with Congress to explore how we can best enable our SOF
operators to prepare for the complex situations we ask them to deal with on a daily basis. Your
oversight, support, and partnership will ultimately help us provide better service to our nation.
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The fiscal situation requires the Department to make hard choices about the allocation of our
resources. It is imperative that this process occurs with a clear understanding of impacts. We
depend upon the Services and Functional Combatant Commands to provide us with key
capabilities; most SOF operations require non-SOF support. As we adjust to the changing
demands in the operating environment, we must work to ensure we are building the broadest
possible portfolio of options for our national security decision-makers through the innovation of
low-cost, small-footprint, and highly flexible SOF capabilities.
CLOSING
In closing, I thank you for providing me with this opportunity to discuss these issues that are
critical to the health of our Special Operations Forces and our ability to support the National
Security Strategy. I also thank you for your continued support of our SOF personnel and their
families; the tremendous demands we have placed upon them requires a continued commitment
to provide for their well-being and support their mission success.