Northern Triangle Security Analysis MAGG Capstone … · Dr. Jose Miguel Cruz Florida International University Christian Ostergaard and Shota Tchigladze . NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY

Running Head: NORTHERN TRIANLGE SECURITY

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Northern Triangle Security Analysis

MAGG Capstone

Dr. Jose Miguel Cruz

Florida International University

Christian Ostergaard and Shota Tchigladze

NORHTERN TRIANLGE SECURITY 2

Northern Triangle Security Overview

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of the Central American

Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in the northern triangle countries of Guatemala, El

Salvador, and Honduras. This paper will examine the strengths and limitations of CARSI

and how the United States Southern Command can further protect its national security, in

cooperation with CARSI, by understanding the weaknesses in the northern triangle

country’s security systems. Each country will be examined on the effectiveness of

CARSI, and how Southern Command can format its policy based on each country’s

situation. To assess threats posed by gangs and cartels, the final portion of this paper will

provide solutions and recommendations that could protect the United States and northern

triangle’s national security.

On March 12, General Kelly (2015) expressed concern that human smugglers are

managing to bring thousands of people into the United States, particularly via drug routes

that are vulnerable to national security. Due to weak security in the northern triangle

countries, “terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to

move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of

mass destruction into the United States” (Kelly, 2015).

Limited security in the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador,

and Honduras not only pose a threat to Central America, but to the United States’

national security. In the northern triangle countries, crime and violence affect 7.5 percent

of their combined GDP, and gangs control a vast amount of territory. Given the

geographical location, close proximity, weak governance, economic stagnation, and

emigration, the northern triangle country’s high levels of crime and violence, as well as


organized crime, all pose a direct threat to the national security of United States and its

neighboring countries.

This national security threat derives from gangs and cartels, such as MS-13,

Barrio 18, and Zetas that control territory in all three countries, all of which use many

forms of organized crime to advance their business. These gangs and cartels help support

the rise of corrupt government officials, and because of such high levels of illicit

trafficking, citizens are becoming less supportive of democracy in these countries (Meyer

& Seelke, 2014). Each county government within these countries has employed ways to

fight organized crime, but weak institutions, poverty, and limited funds have created a

safe haven for trafficking organizations.

Each government has been trying to combat the problem with support of CARSI

provided by the United States. Honduras has taken an approach that strongly involves its

military in police activities, where Guatemala has been trying to work with other Central

American governments to legalize narcotics to combat trafficking. In 2012 and 2013, El

Salvador successfully brokered a truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18, which lowered

homicides by almost 40 percent. Unfortunately, given the nature of these gangs, they took

advantage of the truce and expanded their territory where today homicide rates are back

to pre-truce levels (Meyer & Seelke, 2014). As the United States recognizes the threat,

they have implemented CARSI to help change the direction of the northern triangle.

CARSI has many successes and many limitations, and other federal U.S. law

enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense play a vital role in continuing to

support the countries in Central America.


CARSI Overview

In the 1980s, the United States supported military and economic assistance of

$1.4 billion annually to Central America, which was dedicated to overthrowing guerrilla

movements. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, support and funding to the region

declined sharply and the United States shifted its focus to combating drug trafficking in

Colombia and Mexico. As a result of the United States’ sponsored security initiatives

such as Plan Colombia and security programs in Mexico, drug cartels moved their

operations into Central America to avoid seizures from law enforcement (Meyer &

Seelke, 2014).

The United States’ Merida Initiative began in 2007 to assist Mexico in the war on

drugs because of the increasing flow of narcotics and organized crime.

The portion of the initiative that focused on Central America had split from the

Merida initiative in 2010 and became the Central American Regional Security Initiative

(CARSI). CARSI has a broad, rather than traditional, approach on security and narcotic-

trafficking efforts. Further, CARSI not only provides training and technical support

assistance to law enforcement, which helps to prevent vulnerable societies from criminal

threats, but also attempts to strengthen the governmental institutions in host countries to

overcome security challenges that are contributed by economic or social factors (Meyer

& Seelke, 2014). CARSI’s five main objectives are: to create safer streets, disrupt the

movement of criminals and contraband, support the development of strong, capable, and

accountable governments, initiate an effective state security presence to at risk

communities, and enhance the rule of law by fostering cooperation among nations in the

region (Department of State, n.d.).


Since FY2008, Congress has allocated an estimated $803.6 million for Central

American countries through the Merida and CARSI programs, and an additional $130

million already has been requested for CARSI in 2015. The International Narcotics

Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) received 64% of the appropriated funds, which is

managed by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) under the State

Department. The other 32% of funds were assigned under the Economic Support Fund

(ESF), which is managed by USAID. Other small portions of this funding are allocated

for anti-terrorism, de-mining and foreign military financing programs (Meyer & Seelke,

2014).

Guatemala

Since 2011, Guatemala has received more assistance from the United States than

any other country in Central America, with a total of 106.7 million in 2014 (Foreign

Assistance.gov, n.d.). This foreign aid is intended to helped combat the organized crime

and violence problems that originated in its civil war that ended in 1986. The end of the

civil war created a democratically-elected government, but has not created full optimism

between the United States and allied governments. The fallout from the civil war lasted

over ten years, once a new government took place, and this helped birth organized crime

and government corruption. Today, the country’s violence is not a result of internal civil

conflict, but from the vast amounts of organized crime activity that move illicit products.

It is estimated that 80% of the violence is a result of the drug trade, and it is projected that

over 60% of the territory in Guatemala is controlled by drug traffickers (Morales, 2014).

The Guatemalan police force is focused on combating drug traffickers and organized

crime, but unfortunately its military is taking on the role of police, which decreases


border security. It is estimated that less than ten percent of the Guatemalan military

perform traditional duties, and that the rest take on police roles to combat violence

(Meyer & Seelke, 2014).

Gangs have become a primary source for the increase in violence, especially with

their continued support to the Mexican drug cartels. The Mexican cartels that were

pushed into Guatemala after Mexico’s crackdown on drug operations have been able to

use gangs like MS-13 as assassins and protection for their drug operations. These MS-13

members received extensive military-type training so they can successfully help the drug

cartels move shipments, at first into Mexico, and eventually into the United States.

Gangs like MS-13 receive advanced weapons and equipment from the regional arms

trade, which filters through sources like the El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua

militaries (Lum & Farah, 2013). This poses a direct threat to the United States, especially

because the Department of State and Department of Defense policies are to help supply

and train these militaries to fight the crimes they are involved in. With Guatemala on the

border of Mexico, and transnational gangs coordinating with the Mexican cartels, it

allows MS-13 and their counterparts to involve themselves in many illicit trades that pose

a national security threat to the United States. MS-13 operates differently in Honduras

and El Salvador, but they work with the Mexican cartels in Guatemala to transport

humans, drugs, arms, and anything else that generates profit. Guatemala is located in a

region that will pose the greatest threat to the United States’ national security, mainly

because of the connection between the Mexican cartels in both countries (Lum & Farah,

2013).


Another result of Guatemala’s high rates of crime and violence originates from

the lack of criminal prosecutions and government corruption. Weak institutions and

security forces are still feeling the effects from the country’s civil war, and citizens are

afraid of the military because of the violations of human rights during the war. Drug

traffickers have taken over regions where the military has not been able to operate due to

lack of funding, especially in the Quiche and Izabal regions, where they are drug transit

regions with close proximity to Mexico. The lack of law enforcement in some of these

areas has not only allowed the Guatemalan drug cartels to traffic illicit products, but also

opened the door for Mexican cartels to operate. The following map shows the drug transit

routes from El Salvador, Honduras, and into Mexico:

Guatemala is a major transit country for cocaine and other illicit products moving in from

south of its borders, and has insecure northern borders that have allowed traffickers to


move drugs, arms, and humans into Mexico with ease (Morales, 2014). The United States

has rightfully supported the Mexican and Guatemalan government to secure Mexico’s

southern border, and additional funding and training of non-corrupt military personnel

must continue to ensure organized crime decreases (Kelly, 2015).

CARSI Policy in Guatemala

CARSI in the northern triangle allows the United States military and other

agencies to support local law enforcement and militaries with equipment, training, and

drug interdiction. CARSI has specifically helped Guatemala by providing specialized

helicopters that are able to fly into areas that are either too dangerous or too difficult.

These types of equipment have helped drug interdiction efforts and have assisted in the

effort to combat organized crime. El Salvador established the first anti-gang units, but

CARSI has allowed these units to be developed in Guatemala, with the goal of decreasing

gang-related violence and curbing illicit activity (Meyer & Seelke, 2014). It has been

estimated that over two-thirds of the cocaine from South America moves through

Guatemala before entering Mexico, and eventually, the United States, and Guatemala is

now a supplier of poppy seed, further proving that anti-gang units are essential for the

country’s security.

CARSI funds support the INL and USAID in Guatemala, and they have seen

success in a number of ways. Funding has helped decrease homicide rates, has created

Team Omega to patrol the borders, built 24-hour court systems, and has provided

helicopters and anti-gang units to the Guatemalan military (Phillips, 2015, p. 127 & 129).

In 2009, homicides were as high as 40.7 per 100,000 in Guatemala City, but at the end of

2013, they dropped to 32.1 per 100,000. This drop in homicides was not just because of


security alone, but was from factors like decreasing emergency response time, less

corrupt and more responsible local governance, and investments towards safer and

updated infrastructure (Phillips, 2015, p. 110). The following chart depicts Guatemala’s

homicide levels from 2003 to 2013:

The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has also had some

success, and is not affiliated with CARSI. Even though it has only dropped the impunity

rate from 95% in 2009 to 72% in 2012, it has helped stop corrupt people from acquiring

jobs in the Guatemalan government, has also reformed some of the country’s justice

institutions, and has assisted with prosecuting criminals (Meyer & Seelke, 2014).


CARSI supports a few different U.S. agencies in Guatemala, but the major two

are USAID and INL of the State Department. Both the INL and USAID need to set goals

that are specific for Guatemala in order for them to use funds from the CARSI account.

Both programs do not specifically deal with drugs, but attack the social implications of

illicit trafficking and violence. Some areas of INL like Team Omega target drug

trafficking, but can also arrest human traffickers. Both of these CARSI funded strategies

perform tactics that help build and strengthen Guatemala’s institutions and infrastructure

so the country is better equip to fight organized crime and protect its citizens (Phillips,

2015, p. 125 & 127).

USAID

In order for Guatemala to begin building its economy and provide security for its

citizens, it needs to focus on crime reduction. One of USAID’s primary focuses is

decreasing crime in order to build infrastructure and economic development. These goals

are to stabilize Guatemala by reforming police and the justice department, strengthening

government capacity in finance and administration, and strengthening the internal

government by creating institutionalized violence prevention strategies (Phillips, 2015, p.

130).

USAID has three development objectives, and the first involves greater security

and justice for citizens, which will be discussed in this paper. The second objective is to

improve levels of economic growth and social development in the western highlands, and

the third is dedicated to improving the management of natural resources to mitigate the

impacts of global climate change. Through USAID, Guatemala will develop a working

police force that has lower corruption and protects human rights. CARSI allocates funds


towards this portion of USAID’s projects because it helps build trust between citizens

and the police. Police trust has been lacking in the past at a 22 percent favorable rate by

the public, and USAID looks to establish community-based programs that change police

tactics and help facilitate relationships (Bliss, Forman, & Johnson, 2012). USAID

through CARSI will help create communication between the police and Guatemala’s

citizens so projects are implemented properly and crime will be reduced (USAID

Guatemala Development Strategy, 2012).

The USAID security strategy also involves the betterment of the country’s

judicial system so citizens can participate in policy matters that allow them to define their

security concerns. USAID is promoting stable local governments so they can better

combat crime, and this will also build trust among the population. USAID Guatemala

also focuses on youth joining gangs, and they are implementing programs that will

educate families so the country’s youth stays out of gang life, and focuses on education

(USAID Guatemala Development Strategy, 2012).

INL

INL’s job is not to disrupt the flow of narcotics, but to support the Guatemalan

security forces so they can thwart illicit drug trafficking. INL focuses on building strong

institutions because it believes that if the drug trade were to all of a sudden stop, violence

would still occur. INL wants Guatemalans to depend on themselves so they do not need

to be supported by the United States. INL focuses on training and equipping the local

police forces, and they want the police and the country’s residents to be able to

communicate with each other. The last poll taken in 2012 showed that Guatemalans did


not have confidence in their police forces, and INL is hoping to build that mutual trust

network (Phillips, 2015, p. 135 & 136).

INL helped establish Guatemala’s national anti-gang unit that is called PANDA,

and supplied them with electronic and surveillance equipment, and bulletproof vests.

Along with providing PANDA with equipment, INL trained and vetted them so they

would be an effective unit. PANDA has been doing a good job stopping gangs because

they do not take the traditional approach, but they investigate and build a case on an

entire gang for extended periods of time, and take down the entire criminal network. By

the end of 2013, PANDA split up over 15 gangs with 650 arrests, indicating that the INL

program has worked (Phillips, 2015, p. 138 & 139).

Along with PANDA, INL worked with the Guatemalan government to establish

Team Omega, a mobile interdiction team that primarily operates on land. Omega’s

purpose was to patrol the Guatemalan, Belize, and Mexican borders to thwart the flow of

illicit products. By using advanced technologies and fiber optics, Omega has created

checkpoints to search vehicles and stop any transnational drug movements. Team

Omega’s main success involves protecting U.S. national security: when searching for

smuggled drugs, they also have apprehended humans and animals being smuggled into

the U.S. (Phillips, 2015, p. 127 & 139).

Limitations

CARSI has been unable to provide appropriate resources to fully train and equip

the local police in Guatemala. Much of the funding goes directly to the anti-gang units,

and this does not fix the problem of police corruption. One of the reasons violence is high


in Guatemala is because the country has an illegal gun problem and healthy illicit arms

trade, and a majority of crimes are committed with these illegal guns.

Even though through CARSI the INL has developed Team Omega to patrol the

borders between Guatemala, Mexico, and Belize, there are still many blind crossings that

need to be addressed. Mexican officials estimate that there are over 350 blind crossings

on the border, and the local peasants take control of these crossings by charging a toll.

INL, through CARSI, should be focused on building Team Omega to secure these

crossings and take them over from the peasants to thwart the flow of humans and drugs.

Migrants will use river crossings along the Usumacinta River or even pay one dollar to

use zip lines to get into Mexico on the Suchiate River, which causes further security

issues (UNODC Smuggling of Migrants, n.d).

As CARSI is a regional initiative, there needs to be communication between the

northern triangle governments to secure their borders. It is easy to move between

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and this opens up numerous United States

national security threats, largely due to human smugglers, and their ability to use peasants

located on the border of Guatemala and Mexico to move potential threats into the United

States. Along the Guatemala and Mexico border, there are eight official crossings and

only four of them have adequate and armed security. Much of the military security left

after the civil war because Guatemala needed additional police support, which is still in

demand today.

The INL through CARSI focus most of their efforts on police security and bypass

the issue of militarized border security between the Northern Triangle countries. INL

lacks focus on ensuring measurable numbers of border security teams that focus on the


blind crossings. This is where CARSI should step in and use additional funds, through

help of the DOD, to ensure borders are protected from traffickers. Even though Team

Omega operates on the border, they are still too small to be effective in the remote

regions where there is no military or police presence. The Guatemalan government is

aware that supporting security forces on the border will help combat the illicit trade, but

when they send personnel to the border, they lack the appropriate funds and equipment to

be effective. Other than Team Omega, which has limited personnel, CARSI does not

have a specific border strategy to tackle the flow of organized crime. While building

infrastructure and institutions is important in Guatemala to secure its country, there needs

to be an emphasis on security personnel who are trained and funded on the border to

thwart human trafficking (Espach & Haering, 2012). The following map provided by the

Center for Naval Analysis shows the eight major crossing into Mexico, and shows the

amount of territory where there are blind crossings.


El Salvador

Ever since the country ended its thirteen-year civil war in 1992, it has seen

extremely high violence. With the lack of job opportunities and a high quantity of

weaponry left over from the civil war, guerrillas and militaries took up arms and began

work in organized crime. As gang deportees from the United States were sent back into

El Salvador, and these former combatants had extensive access to arms, they took

advantage of the new drug smuggling routes that came from the Andes and into Central

America. This was a dangerous combination and the problem still exists today. After a

decade, these ex-military members and gangs connected with the Mexican cartels to

coordinate drug and human trafficking operations. El Salvador is a different situation

than Guatemala and Honduras because there is a large area in the country that is

unprotected where traffickers operate freely. Instead of operating under the radar in

remote location as in the other two countries, traffickers are able to operate in urban areas

because they have extensive connections to the El Salvadoran political parties (Eguizabal,

2015, p. 58 & 61).

Per capita, El Salvador has the most gang members in all of Central America,

with estimates of 20,000, and they are responsible for a majority of the violence-taking

place (UNODC, 2012). MS-13 and Barrio 18 are the two gangs responsible for a

majority of the violence and crimes taking place in El Salvador, and they are working

with the Mexican cartels moving illicit products north. In 2012, the two gangs worked out

a truce that yielded a 40 percent drop in homicides the first year, and a decrease in 2013

as well. According to former President Mauricio Funes, the truce only “allowed the gangs

to grow and strengthen” (Gurney, 2015). The truce only lasted a few years, and


homicides and violence has spiked to numbers prior to 2012. In 2011, there were 72

homicides per 100,000, and in 2012, it dropped to 32 per 100,000 (Garzon, 2013). Since

the truce ended, homicides have increased 50 percent to 67 per 100,000 in 2014 (Gurney,

2015). Unfortunately, the truce was short-lived because society did not support it, and

there was a lack of transparency between the public and private sector (Gagne, 2014).

MS-13 and Barrio 18 are now transnational criminal organizations with their connection

to drug and human smuggling, and murder rates have steadily increased since the truce

expired. The following chart depicts El Salvador’s homicide levels from 2002 to 2012,

before the truce ended:


MS-13 and Barrio 18 are able to take advantage of the large illegal firearm

market, where El Salvador does not lack access to them. The firearms black market is

extensive in El Salvador, and the weapons come from a variety of sources. Fifty percent

of the firearms seized can be traced back to the United States, and the other fifty percent

come from a number of sources including the El Salvadoran and Nicaraguan militaries,

and local police forces. The ATF have moved on this illegal supply trying to seize the

firearms before the criminal gangs acquire them. The ATF has implemented e-Trace

systems similar to Mexico so they are able to track down arms movements and find the

Mexican drug trafficking organizations that are making them available to MS-13 and

Barrio 18 (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 79 & 80). One former El Salvadoran president was asked

what cartels and gangs operate in his country, and he responded by saying “Everybody.

There are Salvadoran cartels in connection with Colombian cartels. Guatemalan cartels

are there. And recently we have found evidence of the presence of Los Zetas” (Farah,

2011).

Similar to Guatemala and Honduras, El Salvador’s borders are not secure and

traffickers are able to move illicit products freely by paying off law enforcement

personnel. Similar to Guatemala, the El Salvadoran government has ignored border

security since the end of the country’s civil war, and budget cuts have limited the

country’s ability to employ a legitimate police force. El Salvador has been implementing

programs to try and improve its institutions and fight crime, including a focus on national

security reforms. They have also been trying to create budgets, develop services for crime

victims, and address faults in the penal system. Border security was not something the El

Salvadoran government focused on, and can be an area that Southern Command can work


with the government to continue organized crime interdiction efforts (Espach & Haering,

2012).

Geography is a key element in El Salvador’s role in the transnational criminal

network, and they do not produce any narcotics inside its borders. Transportation groups

like Los Perrones Orentales take control of the shipments of cocaine when it hits El

Salvadoran territory, and then move it north so the Mexican cartels take control of it. The

same routes are used for human trafficking, and cartels and gangs exchange services

through “pay in kind,” which is a major contribution to the high homicide rate (Farah,

2011). El Salvadoran violence becomes a national security interest to the United States

when MS-13 and the Los Zetas work together to traffic people. MS-13 is very good at

using regional networks to move illicit products and generate profits, and with unsecure

borders, cartels, gangs, and regional transportation networks will continue working

together and pose a direct threat to the United States (Farah & Lum, 2013). The

following map shows the routes that gangs and cartels take to move drugs into El

Salvador and Guatemala:


CARSI Policy in El Salvador

CARSI has changed throughout the years since its implementation.Under the

Merida framework, the primary focus was military-oriented, influenced by the “war on

drugs” approach. The main changes in CARSI shifted the focus to institution building

and crime prevention. Currently, El Salvador continues to receive a variety of U.S.

assistance from different funding sources, the largest being CARSI. In November 2011,

the United States and El Salvador signed a joint action plan to collectively evaluate and

reach the objectives funded by CARSI.

USAID

Since 1980s, the region’s largest democratic assistance was provided by USAID.

Despite the program’s goals, USAID did not address the fundamental issue causes of

violence in El Salvador, which was largely due to interests of the political elite and

power-hungry officials (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 67). The violence in El Salvador today is not

caused by police paramilitary activities, as it was in the 1980s, but a variety of factors

such as impunity and corruption, which helped facilitate organized crime and triggered

violence caused by street gangs.

USAID assistance in El Salvador is implementing five main initiatives funded by

CARSI: Violence Prevention, Adopt a School, Improving Justice System, Global

Development Alliance, and Rule of Law. These USAID programs seek to provide

education and other opportunities to help young people with dysfunctional families who

have minimal access to basic services, which makes them high risk of participating in

gangs (USAID El Salvador, 2013).


INL

INL opened its physical location at the United States embassy in El Salvador in

2012. Since 2008, the INL funded law enforcement programs have allocated $47.1

million, and not only through CARSI (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 93). CARSI assistance

provided through INL supports specialized vetted law enforcement units. INL has created

a vetted unit programs in El Salvador such the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Special Anti-

narcotics Group, and ICE’s Transnational Investigative Unit. These units are engaged in

complex investigations of drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms and human

trafficking. Funding provided by INL through CARSI covers operating costs, technology,

equipment, and training vetting units.

INL also oversees some task forces, the most notable among them is The Grupo

Cuscatlan. This unit’s main function is to intercept air, sea and land drug shipments in El

Salvador. U.S. personnel are not directly involved in the operations, but they act in a

supervisory capacity or as advisors in counter activities (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 95).

INL’s task forces and vetted units are designed to conduct successful operations and

investigations, and they act a role model that will positively impact law enforcement

institutions. Overall, these vetted units and task forces have conducted many successful

operations and investigation, although their success has been shadowed by El Salvadoran

police officer corruption and insufficiency (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 96).

Besides the traditional training approach, vetting units providing equipment and

expertise, INL also launched the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)

program. GREAT is education-based violence prevention program designed for

elementary and high school children, which provides children education and life skills to


avoid violence. 25,000 students have finished this program since its establishment in

2010. GREAT not only helps children in the community not to join gangs, but it saves

their lives (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 97).

INL directly focuses on training community police. For instance, it has created

“model precincts” which encourages local police to implement best practices in crime

prevention efforts. INL recently sponsored the training of 600 El Salvadoran police

officers that came from the United States. The model of precincts are established

throughout El Salvador, which will help increase the level of professionalism of local

police and be extremely useful in crime prevention efforts. Even though local level INL

programs start having successful results, violence data in El Salvador indicators are still

high (Eguizabal, 2015, p. 95).

Limitations

USAID has gotten criticism over its lack of collaboration and its dependence on

U.S. contractors, which disconnects program from local realities. USAID traditionally

contracted U.S.- based firms, but with new direction implemented by USAID, it allows

more local organizations and businesses to participate in these programs. With the agenda

to achieve long-term sustainability, USAID started supporting local private sectors and

organizations that are dedicated towards progress and growth for El Salvador. In 2012,

USAID launched SolutionsES that carries similar crime prevention strategies. It is too

early to evaluate effectiveness and overall efficiency of USAID initiatives. INL and

USAID both contribute to community policing, where USAID supports the National

Civilian Police in becoming more local community oriented law enforcement. This

assistance focuses on the police’s professional development and promotes productive


relationships with local citizens, and it also provides action plans to fight against crimes

(Eguizabal, 2015, p. 93).

Honduras

Honduras’ geographic location in the heart of Central America serves as a favored

transit route for drug traffickers. Poor border control, corruption and the lack of

governance in remote areas worsen the situation and also it helps to facilitate drug

trafficking networks activities in the region. Based on 2013, United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime report (UNODC), Honduras continues to remain the country with the

highest homicide rate in the world, which is a result from drug trafficking and local

organized crime. Major areas for this violence are concentrated in large cities in

Honduras across the Guatemalan border, where drug trade routes and criminal cartels are

very active. For instance, homicide rates reach up to 133 per 100,000 citizens in the

provinces of Cortes and Atlantida and are much higher than the national average. Gang

members and young males commit over 83.3 percent of these homicides using firearms

(Korthuis, 2015, p.169).

Honduran provinces of Copan and Ocotepeque also has a record high homicide

rate of 102 per 100,000, 20 percent higher than Honduras’ national average in 2012. The

Honduran-Guatemalan border area was nicknamed “Corridor of Violence,” which serves

as a very important transit zones for illicit products and narcotics. There are hundreds of

routes for illegal border crossing. Even though these regions have a long history of being

main transit points of illegal trafficking of narcotics and other illicit products, they have

not always been so violent. According to the reports by the International Crisis Group

(ICG), external factors such as the U.S. heavy measures to combat drug trafficking and a


declined in the demand of the U.S. cocaine market left local gangs with much smaller

profits to share, which created bloody competition among drug trafficking organizations

(Cawley, 2014). The following chart shows Honduras’s homicide levels from 2004 to

2013:

The local criminal group called the “transportistas,” contracted by Mexican

cartels, operates narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, mostly in the northern

region of Honduras via land, air and sea. As Honduras became the center of narcotics

trafficking in the last decade, rivalry between criminal cartels, lack of governance, and a

high impunity rate in these areas provided a perfect environment for violence and

organized crime activities such drug trafficking, arms trafficking and human trafficking.

According to estimates by the U.S. Department of State (DOS), 87 percent of narcotics

trafficking flights that came from Colombia and Venezuela first stop in Honduras as a

transit point (DOS Honduras, 2013). These flights first land in remote areas in Nicaragua

and then continue low altitude flights over Honduras to avoid radar detection. Lack of


cooperation with the Venezuelan government since the mid-2000s, Venezuela became a

main location for drug flights transits aimed for its final destination in the United States.

What is accelerating the illicit trafficking and gang violence are the extended

coastlines, long borders and many islands that are situated close to the shorelines, which

further aggravates the problem. These critical geographic areas limit the U.S. fight

against illicit trafficking. Without adequate resources including technology, equipment,

and manpower, there is no solution for effective border control. Consequently, loosely

controlled borders and different jurisdictions offer favorable accommodations for

transnational organized networks to conduct successful drug trafficking (Gavin, Corbin,

& Lecce, 2013, p.20). General John Kelly of Southern Command noted that drug

traffickers use fast boats and are able to move drugs quickly between Venezuela and the

Honduran coast (Kelly, 2015). The following map depicts the routes taken by drug

traffickers:


Drug traffickers, because of impunity, favor the northern coastline, where it gives them

the ability to operate in this region. Further, local authorities are suspected to be involved

with organized crime, and frequent allegations indicate that the politicians receive drug

money to operate their electoral campaigns. Even though there are many examples where

the Honduran government has taken actions to demonstrate their willingness to combat

drug trafficking and impunity, results from these actions are not quite successful. For

instance, Honduran authorities in 2013 took actions against individual and groups such as

Handal (former political candidate) and the Cachiros (drug lord) seizing $800 million

worth of assets. In Handel's case, many of his assets were already removed from the

house, and with Cachiros, some of his bank accounts were emptied (Parkinson, 2013).

There are estimated 12,000 gang members in Honduras conducting extortion,

human, drugs, and arms trafficking (UNODC, 2012). Consequently, growing violence

resulted in a significant rise of migration. Many citizens left the country because of gang

related violence. In 2012, there were over 35,500 Hondurans deported from the U.S. and

more than 40 percent had criminal histories. Emigrants join these criminal enterprises

because of weak states, a fledgling social economic system, and lack of unemployment

(Seelke, 2014).

Having the capacity to control large urban areas and criminal activities represents

a major factor of Honduras’ alarming violence. In addition to this condition, state security

forces and police often are involved in corruption. In 2014, Honduran major newspaper

published articles exposing corruption in the Honduran police and highlighted that 200

active duty police officers were involved in narcotics trafficking and other criminal

activities (Korthuis, 2015, p.175).


CARSI Policy in Honduras

The United States efforts to address organized crime, violence and corruption

through CARSI is primarily focused on dealing with security challenges to assure long

term sustainability in Honduras. U.S. through CARSI identifies three major problems

such as: drug trafficking, organized crime and low capacity of government justice

institutions to prosecute and investigate crimes. The U.S. considers drug trafficking as a

paramount issue, therefore CARSI aid received in Honduras primarily deals with this

problem. In order to fight crime and strengthen weak institutions, the U.S. CARSI

implementation program in Honduras engages a strategy based on the three main

components: Law enforcement, capacity building, and prevention. Similar to Guatemala

and El Salvador, these elements of CARSI are supervised by USAID and INL (U.S.

DOS, 2012).

USAID

USAID oversees a large range of different prevention programs in Honduras, and

these programs are focused on youth and families in high-risk crime neighborhoods.

USAID helps to service this community’s youth to keep them out of the streets and from

joining gangs. The prevention program Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET),

operated under USAID, is dedicated to help identifying and preventing potential

individuals who are likely to join gangs or conduct criminal activity. The USAID and

INL joint neighborhood community-policing program, which was launched in

Tegucipalpa, is very important for helping build a bridge between Honduran residence

and police.


All these programs have a geographical focus to serve in the most violent

neighborhoods, which also gives opportunity to coordinate programs such as teen

pregnancy and other educationally-oriented crime prevention efforts. The Gang

Resistance Education and Training program (GREAT), drug prevention program,

neighborhood community policy programs, and other crime prevention programs are

designed to provide long-term sustainability and security in the region (Korthuis, 2015,

p.198).

INL

Creating vetting units and anti-gang task forces are long-supported law

enforcement effort by the United States, and serve to improve capacity of local law

enforcement agencies. Building units to conduct sensitive operations and to improve

overall law enforcement efforts combating against criminals plays a major role in

Honduras. There are two main task force units created with CARSI, both of which are

supervised by INL: Violent Crime Task Force and the Financial Crime Task Force.

CARSI funds through INL provide computers, technology, cameras, and other items

necessary for task force operations (Meyer & Seelke, 2014, p. 29).

Limitations

Despite some coordinated efforts between USAID and INL, there are disconnects

between law enforcement and capacity building, and it is still unclear how the programs

can coordinate to make CARSI more effective. This indicates that coordination among

projects is limited. Other challenges that the CARSI strategy in Honduras is facing are

compatibilities to Honduran government priorities for citizen’s security. In some areas,

Honduran and U.S. strategies are different from each other, presenting problems for


CARSI programs. For instance, despite public and U.S. disagreement, Honduras’ new

law authorizes authorities to shoot-down flights suspected on transiting drugs.

Subsequently, U.S. suspended radar data support to the Honduran government (Cave,

2012).

In order for CARSI to be successfully implemented, there needs to be political

will of the Honduran government. Success of the program heavily depends on

willingness of authorities to respect and abide by the rule of law and reduce privileges to

political elites and also to come up with long term solution. The government’s lack of

commitment to vet police units explains that the political atmosphere does not exist to

provide sustainability by CARSI programs. For instance, efforts to fight against

corruption and to support crime prevention programs new reforms have not materialized.

Yet, the Honduran government’s failure to address these issues puts CARSI efforts in

isolation and unsustainable over time, due to the fact that limited funds are allocated

through CARSI. Based on the past five years, since CARSI implementation in Honduras,

the United States should direct more efforts to encourage the Honduran government to

demonstrate political will by implementing new reforms that will provide better

accountability and increase the importance for the rule of law in Honduras (Kleinfeld,

2012).

There have been successes with the violent crime and financial crime task units.

The operation against the CACHIROS Honduran drug trafficking organization was a

success because it resulted in a seizure of $800 million in assets and arrested the drug

lord “Negro Lobo.” This incident demonstrates that the U.S.-supported vetted units have

provided a successful campaign against narcotics trafficking. On the other hand, isolation


and lack of information sharing prevents for better outcomes and worsening impunity in

Honduras (DOS Honduras, 2014). In regards to the Financial Crime Task Force, one

particular case raises questions about their successes. In 2013, a major multiagency effort

was conducted against the notorious drug trafficking organization, Los Cachiros, led by

The Financial Crime Task Force. Despite multiagency efforts, the operation failed in key

areas. Even though Cachiros’ 71 bank accounts were frozen, it was later found that before

the operation was conducted money was removed from these accounts (Parkinson, 2013).

The Violent Crime Task Force’s improved performance is also limited. For instance, in

Tegucigapla City, where 86 homicides occur every month, most of the homicide

investigation gets assigned to local homicide units, while the Violent Crime Task Units

gets assigned fewer than 15 percent of the investigations (Korthuis, 2015, p.216). Vetted

Units and Task Forces produce important results, as a main aspect of CARSI, but it needs

to be transformed to support the performance of the Honduran police when they combat

crime and work to achieve institutional reforms.

CARSI has had its success in Honduras, but the programs are still facing

challenges. First, the lack of coordination between myriad programs funded by INL and

USAID should be more transparent and needs to be improved. Coordination and

information sharing between task forces and law enforcement will produce positive

results if they share the same prevention methods. Second, the USAID and INL strategy

should be reevaluated based on their performances and impacts. In order to do that the

U.S. should improve ways success can be measured to examine the impact of those

programs. The security assistance to Honduras provides undeniable success in prevention

efforts, but it is important to acknowledge the program’s impacts and limitations to


further improve criminological situations and to provide sustainability to Honduras

(Korthuis, 2015).

Even though it has been five years since the implementation of CARSI, drug

trafficking, urban violence, and corruption remain rampant. Despite CARSI’s limitations,

good things are happening. Recently, the Honduras government started taking strong

actions to fight drug trafficking and establish governance in rural areas. According to

General Kelly’s (2015) statement, the Honduran government, for the first time, extradited

seven Honduran drug traffickers to the United States to face charges. Also, based on

government data, the 2014 homicide rate dropped 25% lower than the previous two

years, to 66.4 per 100,000. Even though the Honduran military is being used for domestic

law enforcement, which has created controversy, the comprehensive strategy of the

Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) has brought charges against high profile

government officials involved in corruption.

Despite the U.S. CARSI successes to ensure security, which includes expertise,

training, equipment and technical assistance to help law enforcement interdiction

operation, the current humanitarian crisis along U.S. borders indicates that these

programs are insufficient. The problems are not just about the limitations in CARSI

programs, but also about Honduran government’s lack of political will. Therefore,

combating transnational organized crime and border issues requires cooperation among

nations and a multidimensional strategy.


Recommendations

Honduras

While the INL and Southern Command can continue vetting military and police

forces to ensure human rights abuses do not continue, the country of Honduras needs

funding support to rebuild their fleet of F-5 fighter jets. Repairing these fighter jets will

help detect and stop drug flights coming in from South America, and it will provide a

sense of national security protection. Honduras needs more assistance with its maritime

interdiction capabilities, and U.S. military budget cuts continue to weaken Southern

Command’s ability to offer support. Assistance to Honduras needs to continue because if

it is stopped, the country will not have the capabilities to secure itself and illicit networks

will continue expanding their territory and will keep moving products north that will

eventually reach the United States (Quintana, 2014).

Guatemala

The DOD and Southern Command need to continue training Guatemala’s military

and provide assistance to the vetted police forces. Washington’s proposal for FY2015 is a

good start, and it includes more than just funding and support to police forces. The

proposal would give the necessary funds to the Guatemalan military and allow them to

protect their own national security. Southern Command will be able to continue training

the Guatemalan military, while also teaching about human rights and what democratic

values mean to a nation.

CARSI fails to provide extensive vetting to the military, and it is good that the

DOD has implemented those vetting programs. It is important for the DOD to continue

vetting former civil war military officers so the Guatemalan military does not have


leadership that committed human rights violations. As the INL does this for police forces,

it needs to continue and expand under the DOD so there are not internal threats of

corruption or misconduct in the Guatemalan military ranks (Morales, 2014).

The DOD needs to address why the Guatemalan government continues to rely on

its military to conduct police roles, and work on addressing the issue of trust between the

public and the military. The country’s police force is underfunded and untrained, and

many times they are unable and unwilling to confront organized crime, which lowers

public trust and forces the government to use its military. Even though the police have

corruption issues, one report said that, “There is no clear or coherent agreement among

civilian government officials about what role the armed forces should play. Instead, there

is a tendency to resort to employing the armed forces on an ad hoc basis to assist with

critical tasks that civilian institutions are incapable of performing” (Police Reform

Guatemala, 2012). The Guatemalan government and the country’s civilians are

concerned about human rights issues if the military continues to take on the role of

police. It is continuously important for Southern Command to work with the Guatemalan

military to ensure these human rights violations are minimal. In General Kelly’s 2015

posture statement, he discussed human rights being “embedded in our doctrine, our

training, and our education, and above all, our moral code” (Kelly, 2015).

Although the DOD is currently working with the Guatemalan security forces to

secure the border between Mexico and Guatemala, more funds must be allocated to

expand border security. Team Omega is a good start and focuses on policing the borders,

but it is limited to only 38 or so men that need to secure a 600-mile border. As CARSI is

focused on building local law enforcement, Southern Command needs to work with the


Guatemalan military, as the Guatemalan government pulled resources away from the

border and refocused them on policing. This Guatemalan policy left their borders and

national security interests to be determined by the transnational traffickers, and the

United States’ security will benefit if Southern Command continues to support the

expansion of the Guatemalan security forces like Team Omega through their Joint

Interagency Task Force-South (Realuyo, 2013).

El Salvador

DOD operations in El Salvador need to take a different approach than Guatemala

because it is purely a transit country, but it has higher levels of crime, violence and gang

influence. A majority of drugs are driven on fast boats from Colombia and reach the

shores of El Salvador where transit organizations offload the cargo and move it north

towards Guatemala or Honduras. Similar to Guatemala, Southern Command needs to

continue supporting the El Salvadoran military so they can help combat organize crime

and illicit trafficking.

As CARSI does not necessarily focus on El Salvador’s national security, Southern

Command needs to continue protecting and intercepting shipments, similar to Operation

Martillo, so it does not impact the security situations in Guatemala and Honduras. This

will stop traffickers at the source and halt any national security threats to the United

States when human trafficking gets imbedded with drug trafficking. Undoubtedly, there

is a need to expand funding and multilevel coordination on the national and local levels

to improve security in El Salvador. A big share of funding has to come from the national

government of El Salvador so it demonstrates an increase of political will.


Conclusion

Unlike ten years ago, transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and local

organized crime have begun working together to generate profits and advance their

interests. Due to a lack of government institutions and mass corruption in the northern

triangle countries, the United States’ national security is threatened by human smuggling

through drug trafficking channels. Unfortunately, programs like CARSI, while good,

lacks important funding measures and does not address national security issues for the

northern triangle. Southern Command has been doing a better job of combating illicit

trafficking from supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies and local partners in the

region than CARSI, and all these efforts need to be in line with each other (Realuyo,

2013).

Through CARSI, there needs to be an effort to work with the governments of the

northern triangle countries so they expand their efforts to build up their militaries and

secure their borders. This has started on a smaller scale by creating task force units to

carry out operations, but it needs more funding and must cover more territory, especially

the regions where security is limited.

Southern Command needs to continue what it is doing in the region, and focus on

combating all forms of illicit trafficking simultaneously. Transparency is essential

between agencies so the U.S.-backed aid programs and law enforcement are used in the

right places. As corruption is high, Southern Command needs to promote transparency

and work with the northern triangle governments to ensure that they are not militarizing

the police forces, and that Southern Command will cut off aid if they do. The DOS and

DOD need to coordinate together through military diplomacy so Southern Command is


supporting the Guatemalan, El Salvadoran, and Honduran militaries, and not the

corruption vulnerable police force. In order for the civilians of these countries to feel

secure, the U.S. needs to continue supporting efforts that protect the northern triangle

residence’s human rights (Haugaard, Isacson, Kinosian, Poe, & Withers, 2013).

The United States’ initiatives should not just focus primarily on counter-narcotic

efforts. As experience in Central America has demonstrated that just drug interdiction

and eradication has experienced some limited success and it comes up short to address

long-term problems. For instance, Colombia has experienced significant progress in

counter-narcotics efforts, however, drug production and trafficking moved to the northern

triangle countries.

Evaluation is needed to measure the impact of security assistance programs in

order to determine whether these programs resulted in significant change. Just training

and vetting units is not sufficient. Large numbers of successful drug operations does not

mean that it will reduce crime, violence and diminish supply or demand. An aggressive

approach of anti-corruption efforts and improved prosecution is required in the region

immediately. Further, CARSI should address the issues that cause rapid migration so the

United States’ security is protected (Olson, E. 2014).


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