North Korean Defensive Tactics Reports 1951

7/29/2019 North Korean Defensive Tactics Reports 1951

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMANDMILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

1

COPY NO.

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1.6;.

ALLIED TRANSLATORAND INTERPRETER SECTION

RESEARCH SU T

INTERROGATINORTH KOREAN

I

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MANILA l MELBOURNE

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MORESBY . MAJ#L_jJ

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circumstances shall possession thereof;or the infor-mation therein, bg given to any per+nnel otherthan those whose duties specifically req&re know-ledge thereof. When not in user this do ment ischargeable to the custody of an officer. 3 e-e parsII, 27, 29, 33, AR 380-5~ 15 November 1949.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERSFAR EAST COMMAND

Military Intelligence Section, General StaffAllied Translator 8t Interpreter Section

28 Fcbrunry 1951

RESE;\RCH SCIl-LEMEh-1

I~TERROGATJON REPORT NO. 96

SOKTH KOREAN DEFEr\Sk\F TACTICS

XI< 3D INFANTRY DIVISION-NK 5TH INFANTRY DI\lSlOX

Thl\ report sun,nxw,~t-s significant intormatwn iomernmg North Korcnn &~CSI\Ctactics and the 31 and 5th Intantry Dl~~ston* oLt,uned from al-the-


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$L TAWKAR AMLYS;szS OF INMA~I& lhUNCLASSIFIED

AlfS FitE.3

Figures listed below are tabulation

ATIS Interrogations; i10.440 EiEhth Army

gence documents es of 28 February 1951.

of partial

Interrogations;

informstion

and

contained

17.723 allied

in 35,470

intelli-

TITLE OF SUl3JECTINDEX

TOTALEF NNCJ$SODATEIn File Interr Repts

1. AIR CIVIL ................................ 579 892. UMMUNICATICNS ...........................

a. Radar ................................ 1326 573b. Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*............... 6740 1209C. Sketches and Plans ..*a ,...,,......... 734 100d. Wire end Wireless Telephone ..*.* . . . . . 1460 1110

3. E(DNoMIC .*...*.. .,...,....,.... . ..,.,,,,.

8. Agriculture l ..,..s...*.....r...*..... 14 769 1262b. Factories in Operation .*..* . . . . ..I.. * 67032 15894C. Mines .,...-..........*...........t,.. 25984 2520d. Petroleum . . . . . l . . . . . . *..* .,..,. . .,... 13750 3012e. Power Plants .,......,...,...,.....,.. 20844 7893f. Ship Buildinp_and Repair . . . . .* . . . . *,, 4924 1409B. Sketches of Industrial Areas..... .... 9582 455h. Strategic Chemicals . . . . . . . . . ........ 5924 1097

4. MEDICAL ITIM .*................,.....r.., 9146 17645. PRRSONALITIES ..*a . . . . . . . . a... ,.,,,.., *,.. 38423 75646. POLITICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........I...... 1303 4537. POPULATION AND SCCIAL CDNDITICNS.*,.*..,, 11129 21068. PRESS AND PROPACANDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . q., 5964 9399. PRISCNERS OF WAR..........,.....,,....,.,

a. W Camps, Locetio . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I.... 40272 1732b. Use end Treatment of Personnel . . . . . , .

10,SDVIRT AIR RXCES . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.......r..4.543 2437

a, Aircraft ..,.......~....,..,,...,...., 0948 3068b, Defenses, incl, A-At.....,*.*,.,.,.** 2709 1752Cq Equipment and Armament . . . . ..I........ 85 71d. Loyalty and Condition .* . . . . . . . . * . . . . * 14 5e. Organization end Training . . ...*.* . . . . 2901 1052f. Posts. Camps and Stations , , . , . , . . . . . . 33947 461.5

g. Sketches of Airfields . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . 4314 664h. Unit Identificetions

11. SDVIET ARMY FORCES.,........ . . . . . ..*........

*.,.**.* . . . . . .

216 182

a, Defenses ..I.,.....,.................. 3835 ! 374b. Equipment end Armament ............... 9200 4766c- Loyalty and Condition ................ 992 194d. Organization nnd Training ............ 16597 1101e. P osts, Gwrpr and Stations ............ 3663 1397f. Sketches of Fortified Areas .......... 1391 93g. Unit Identifications ................. 22041 7681

12. SOVIET NAVAL K?RCFS......................

.. Ikfenses ............................. 58 4sh. Equipment and Armament ............... 229 57.. Loyalty and Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6d. Nevsl Vessels ........................ 5449 998e. Organirstion end Training ............ 133s 87f. Posts. Camps and Stations.,, ......... 1095 972g. Sketches of Navel Installations ...... 868 79h. Unit Identifications ................. 253 70

13. TRANSPORTATICN ...........................8. Railway T ransportation ............... 16741 2283b. Roads end Highways ................... 9731 1495c, Sketches of Ports .................... 978 346da Water Trnnsportetion ................. 7243 1687

14. -RY

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AND UIHATE .................. 5908. -_-I__ -___-

2300_

NOTEEr Not all technical subjects are listed in this tabulation.

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ALMIAIXTPC 4YX3SHEmiE%aS To:UNCtASSIFlED'Pl33IouS INWWXATION IU~ORIS I. . .

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SUBJECT BGOK.?UMRER. ,....e .. .

Agriculture . . . . . . . ..I... :.i ..,..; . . . . . . . . . . . 41Aircraft . . . . ..i....*..............*......... 2,4-13;16,18-&2934,

,. : :40-43?48,44?.62?92Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..(.............. l-13,16,18-34,36,40-43,4! ;;9?& ,92

i\irforce . . . . . . . . ..*......................... 3,7,11,16,33,32,a9-4$t1 44-47, so-55 969 9+x,76,

.. . 81,512

Andizhan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ..*............ .7? .An&en Coal Mine Area . .'.:. . . . . ::. . +.. . .,.: 7.1.. . . _Aniva .*.....*..........i...........,....., 77

.Anti-aircraft Defenses in USSR.. . . . . . . .. . ...81ArtenI..................................... 73Eirobidzhan . . . . . . . . . . . ..I................. . 65blagoveschensk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57. . . . ,

Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*... .. .. .. . 1Capture and Treatment . . . . . ..*....a......*... 8-15,17-27,60 .

Chsremkhovo. . . . . ..~....I..............~... 68China . . . . . . . . ..........!.......*.r.....r.. 216

.Chita . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.......~ 6r. .::::....Chuama. . . . . . . . ..*..*..................... 3.Civil and Hilitary Installations . . . . . ..*...a 34,37,39;41,44-46,51,,. .,.... ..

.,,. *..,.. .>,I. 53*55-58,61,65,67,63,. . ..+.. 71,73,74,77,79,80,83,

84.Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*.... 1-6,8-10,12,13,15,16,

,._. a. . . 18,22,23,27 29,30?42-44?.C .?.20

Conditions in Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . * .,*.,.. ,, . . 41?47,56,78.Dajren ..i...........................,,*...*.. 19?24?26?b2?87Defense . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .....*..3?4?11?81,96 .Defensive Tactics; North Korean _ 96..I.........Divisions, Xorth Korean. . . . . . . . ..i.......... 94,96

Do1insk ..1.,..........,.,..*~............., .. . . *.77, . .Eastern Si 5 eria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*............ 32?36,37,39,44,46,49Economic.. . . . . . . . ..*.....................s. 29?31?32?34-38140-48,

., . . 5o,si,s3-5sElectric Power .* . . . . . . . l . . . . . . . . . . . .,....., 38,83?89 aEquipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.................

,, ~..,I I..,,

,..,, .I .a... 2,4r7,106~1~13,14,16,

20 . . . .Factories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*............. 43149Jlergana . . * . . . . .Fortifications. . . . ..~.......................,..., 71 I..*..e. I -...... . . . . . . . . . . . ..*....*..*.....** I?30Ground Forces *...........,.......,....1..,. 3?31?32?35-47?5o-55,

69.75,87Grunch-Mazur.............................. 71... .. .Hospitals ................................... .39?42,52

Hydroelectric Power Facilities 1 ........in the ................................... 83 ...SSR .......

Identifications ............................. 7P8,11?18?27?29?48,........... 49?.75

Indoctrination ..................................... .$.,.30,60 .......Industrial .................................. 2%29?36?4o;42?43?49,

.52?53?63?64?66?72?78,X3,89 ?90?95

Inner Mongolia .............................. 16Irkutsk ....................................... 57

Iron and Steel Industry in the USSR............. 88Kamen Rybolov ................................ 79 .....Kazan ................. ...! ................. 89 ...........

UNdiAsslF,id [email protected] Town Plans

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K Khabnroask ..~ri..~..i.l..l.,~:;ij~i.l,~i.llir 61Khabarovsk Area.6 . . ..iJ.....rrl.r.r...J.~l.l 32

Kholmsk~.~t~J~*.*..~...........~.,.. 56Komsomolsk. . . . . . . . . . . . ..*................ 61Korea ...........*......r.iiriiiiJJ:i:iJ;. .211;16;2Oi23,31,42,$3,94,96. Korsakour...~....*....*,~,~irJl~tJ~~,JJi:J.~~6~~ .

Krasktno 1..,.~~.I......,.~.....,.,.,.~,..~ 6.5Xrasn&,iarsk,r*...t.r.r.*..~.*..~~,*..,,, ,S3 .

Krasnoyarsk Area . . . . . . . . . . . ..*.........*.... 29Kuri les . . . . . . . . . . ..~...*..~..r.rr...rr...r*~ 7~10,11~21,22j47,92

.Kurtl.Isbands ~Severo Kurtlsk)...,,.. .,.., 58Kuybyshwka-VostochnaUa .,*.......*.ry.r..r 68

Z? Mugradan .r...~....,,...r,..r..~.,,~~,~,,,~~~ . .Jfaknrov I.t.....*......~1.i.*~.~~~..,.**~ 77

Manchuria . . ..r..r.....rrr.,;rr.,...r.,r...L, 1-11,14,16,20>23,30,42,53

Manufacture and Repair of ,Soviet . .Railroad Equipment ..,..~.~rc.t,..rrr...,.. 90 (Nanzovka ..I,.,~,...*.*.*.,,..,,*,,~...,,, a3

&dical . . . . ..*...................*.....**.1. 2,3,6-8,11,15-17,19,21-.._./...,. -23,28,94Medical Organization, North.#orean....,,.... 94Military Units .,...*.*;.r.r,..r...........,.

4,68,69,75,87,4ra,93,94,96Mines . . ..t........*..~*..~.......*....l...., 44 .Mines, North Korean .*.*..I..*......I*.,~,,.. 94 . %Morale and, Propaganda .*.,***,.*, ,..,.....r,., 3,7,9,12-16,20,28,60

,MorshQnsR .,~,.1.,..~..~.,.....~,,,.~,....Motor Vthicle,I nbustry in USSR. , . . , , . .F . .*. 8Munition Manufacture, Repair and

Stgrage in Soviet and Soviet-. I (. . . _. .Dominated Areas,t,,...r...r,.*..~:..r.,,rrr. 3m3

H Nakhodka. . ..~..~..,..I.,......,.,.,.,..,.. 57Natural Resources.. ,......~......I..., . .28,31,3a,YC-37,64,66,

, . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78Naval .......~r....t.r~...*...,,*.,*.,,.*..,... 15,30,31,36,39,40,44-

4674f+-55p59,87Naval InttJligence in thk:Oi!&:& _ ,

Area . . ..~.1.....~.~.~..*.,,.......,,,,,,,, .50 $INew or Improv@ In stallation s .ia. *

Uzbek.Soviet socialist,8epublic.;::..;.,;:::y8::. ,. ,Ntkolaysvsk .t......r.rr.,.,..r...*,.....~. 37

North China .t,...I......................;..I. 2,3,9..,0 ,Okeanakayaa,,t,,rtt.~r,rr~~rr,........~,~... 67 . . . . . ...

Okha .c.r.,,.*.t,.r,.*.r,.r..r,rr..r., 41Order of Battle of the Ssvief.&rlay,,...,.;.~..48,69,7~,76,8~Personalities l 1,4,678,11-13,15-20,*.....*..I.*,,,,..~t..l,.......

,....... . .,. 2=%,27,28,39,44,46,.49150,53-55,65,76 -

Petroleum Product~onand Storage Facilities in Soviet Far.East,. , +. ., . , . ,.. .64. .

Pet ropavlovsk *.,~*.....,,..,...*.*tt.~,.*..,, 67....-Pet rovsk-Zabaykal 1Skivr............,.,.....,. 46Political ..1.........*..~~.,,,~~,*.,..,,,,,. 30734r 37?39,42-49,53,I.a2.,

* 19,24,&Ports 1,.,...1...1.**....~.~~,.,~...,*.,,~.... 21,26,30,3a,59 s- :Present ,Usage of .Manchurian .In@strial .

kuipment. Confjsc?ted by the USSR.. . . . : .-. : 1;; * . R Radar Installat ion and Aircraft

Production Facilities &qgryeQ (. , . . . .

Port Arthur . . . . . .....L..............~,...~, *

io the Soviet Far East t ? z ., . . ? z . 9, .. t .. l t +, ., ., 0, , . i;i .: ::....Railroads in Primorskiy Kray 33Raychikhinsk Mine* I . , - . .


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SUBJECTUNCLASSIFED

BOCK Gl!YOER

0 s Sakhalin .................................... ui43,15,17,18,21,22,

f Security Forces, North KoreanScientific ..................................1ewenoOkFr.................................

.. .I ...... .:, ..33,4%,47;83,92

1 .%w,45;47,6673

Shipbuilding, Ship Repair Pacili-ties, Submarine Bases in SovietFar East and Nava I. Craft Reported .......... sy

Ships .......................................Shipyards ...................................

4,.5,7-20,2G,30,32,5937s9

Siberian Railway Branch LinesSkovorodino ...............................

............... 3245

Sociological ................................ 2,3,29-35,37,38,4u,41,43-s 153-55

Sokol ..................................... 77Sovetskayn Gavan~. ........................ 34

Soviet Airborne Forces and MiliterpSchools in USSR........................... 69

Sovietity

and Chinesein Kwantung,

CommunistManchuria

r2ctiv-................ 82

Soviet Armed Forces Fie ld G radePersonalities ............................. 76Soviet Efforts in the Field of Atomic,

Eiological, and Chemical Warfare.. ........ 66Soviet Fishing Industrv ...................... 91Soviet Greund Forces and General

Officers Personalities .................... 75P Soviet Gu ided Xssiles and Rocket

Launcher UnitsSoviet Intentions

and Equioment .........................................

936

* Soviet Order of Rattle in KwantungLeased Territory .......................... 117SovietSoviet

PW Camps .............................Use and Indoctrination of

29,34,41,49,60

Japanese F%s.............................. 60Sppnssk-DalNip ............................ 65

Strategic and Industrial InformationSakhalin .................................. 78,83

Strategic Heavy Indust ry .................... 40,42,59,63,64,66,78,86,88,

T

Suchan....................................$ysoyeukn .................................Tn&anrog..................................

1 e3;8474

Telecommunica tion Facilities in So-viet and Soviet-Dominated Areas........... 70Tetyukiie ................................. 68

Thermcelectric Facilities inEastern Siberia ........................... 95

Thermoelectric Pacilities in the _Soviet Far East ...........................

Topographic .................................891,5,10,17,2~,29,31-52,

ka..

Toyohasa ..................................541.5556

Tractor Manufactu re and Repair intiuropean and Siberian [JSSR ............... 72

Troop Concentrations ........................U@lovuga and Vgol.h.aVa ....................

3,69,75,8784

Ulan Bntor ................................ 39Cla r. Ude .................................

Unit and Force ................ ..............519,10,12,14-16,1u,20-2s,30,34,36,48,69,75,

76,87USSR ~..~.......~..~...,,....,~.........,~., ~8r.s,52,54,55

Italics Include Tom Plans v UFKLASSFIED


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BOOK NllYBEff

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Vlntiiuostob . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..a...............Voroshi toi,. . . . . . . ..I.............#........Voz~hapwPa ..%O..................,,,.......

Western Siberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*..........MOS Who of Soviet intkJligence

Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*................Yelabu,ila *.**...*................,.......*.

., 79557934,3~,38,40,43,45,48,~o

54,75,7680

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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORTS: SUBJECT TITLES

i3OOK DATE110. PUtiLISiiEL) SUSJECT PahEiS sEPrb:s

1 21 Jan 47 MANCHUWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~~~...... 66 17Airfields, Bridges, Communication s, Forti-fications, Personalities, Topograph y.

2 14 Feb 47 MANCHURIA; XORL?A and North CHINA . . . . .54Afrcraft, Airfields, Comm unications,.Equipment, Medical, Sociological,

3 21 Feb47 MANCHURIA, KOREA and North CHINA . . . . .75Communication s;lDefense, Medical, MilitaryForces, Morale and Propaganda , Social,Airfields, Troop Concentratio ns.

4 28 Feb 47 MANCHURIA and KOREA ..,.. .,... ..... ... 63 26Aircraft, Airfields, Communication s, De-fense, Equipmen t, Military Unitsi Person-alities, Ships.

5 11 Mar 47 MANCHURIA an d KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 18Aircraft, Airfields, Communication s, E-wipnent , Ships, Topography.

6 17 Mar 47 MANCHURIA, KOREA and CHINA . . . . . . . . . . .64 5sAircraft, Airfields, Communicatio ns, E-quipmen t, Medical,. J1il.i tary Units, Person-alities, Soviet Intention s.

7 21 Mar 47 MANCHIJRIA, KOREA and KURILES . . . . . . . . .58 3Aircraft, Airfields, Equipme nt, Identifi-cations, Medical, Hili tary Units, Noraleand Propaganda, Personalities, Ships.

8 8 Apr 47 YANCIIURIA and l


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fUSLt~Si+ED SbBJECT, PAGES>

29Mw 47 North KOREA and hlANClfCfRIA . . . ...+..... 80Capture and- Treal ment, Eqnipmeut, Moraleand Propaganda, Ships, Unit or Force.

3 Jun 47 RUSS14 ~r.4 SlXBALIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Capture ,end r~1 ~~ent, Communications, _Korale 2nd 71 ~7:*c.2nt!8, Nava.1, Medical,Personal f t i es , Shy&, Jnit or Farce.

9 Jun 47 ,+n+l ~vxL:A, MANCHURIA . . . . . . . . . . . . 73ant; Ir2> LJA I.jX?h

Aircraft, PipiiiLdS, Communications, E- quipment , %?uical, Morale and Propaganda,Personalities , Skips, Unit or Force.

_,, .,_. . . .18 Jun 47 RUSSIA and SAKRALIN ..,...i..,....:.... 113

Capture and Treatment, Medical, Personali-ties, Ships, Topography.

30 Jan 47. RUSSIA; SAKHALIN an d the KuHILES . . . . . 102Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treat-ment, Communications,. Identifications,Personalities, Ships, Uni,t or Force.

..,..,.... I. I..7 JUl 47 BAIREN and I&i ARTHUR ..i.;....,:.'.'... 81

Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and T&at-ment, Medical, Personalities, Ships,

21 Jul 47..MhNFHWRlA and North.MRE4' . . , . . , . . . . . . 68Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Trcat-ment, Equipment, Morale and Propaga.nda,Personalities, Ships, Unit or .Force.

25 3~143 BUSSIA~ ?&WWkWN and the KURILES ..:.i 85Aircraft, AirfieLds, Capture and Treat-ment, Nedical, Ports, Unit or Force,

7 Aug 47 RuSSIA, SAKIIBLIN and the KURILES . . . . . 83Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treat-

ment , Communicat ionS, Medical, Personali-ties, Ships; Unit or Force. .

12 Aug 47 MNCHURIA and North KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treat-ment, ,Communications, Medical, Perso@- ities, Ships, Unit or Wrce. :

14 Aug 47 DAIREN and Port ARTHUR ,...l......:... ' 75Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treat

.ment, Personalities, Unit or, Pcrce. .. . . . ._. .., _;.. (,F,

22 Aug 47 RCiSSIh . . . . . . . . ..r.r...*....i.......... 98Aircraft, Airfields, Capture an6 Tre.a.t-ment, Persbnalities, Unit or Porte.

23 Aug 47,,?AIREN a@,Port.a,....ARTHqFJ .,.........i,....,. 89Aircraft, Airfields, Capture .and T&at-nxent, Ports, Ships, Unil.or Force. 1

1

10 Sep 47 RUkIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*......*...*88Aircraft, Airfields,, Capture and Treat-

ment, Conk&atidn~, Personalities, Iden- .tifications, Unit $r Force. .

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28 23 Ott I.& vi&t .I . . . . . . . . . I.,.. . . . . 95. . . . . . . . . . *.s, 51Airfields, Communist Propaganda, Indoc-trination, Industrial, Medical, NaturalResources, Personalities, Soviet ArmyUnits, Topographic.

47 Western . . . . . . . . . ..i..........9 7 NOV SIBERIA 99 55Aircraft, Airfields, Communications, Econ- .omit, Industrial Areas, Krnsnoyarsk Area,Sociol~~~ql,, Sopiet. PW. Camps, Topograph-ic, Identifications.

30 18Kov47 ~iAI\[CliCKIANorthKOREA 84 35nd . . . . . . . . . . . .dircraft, A irfields, Communications, For-tifications, Indoctrination, Xavy, Polit-ical, Ships, Ports, Sociological, &it orForce.

31 1 Dee 47 NorthKORl?A 131 64. . . . . . . . . ..I.............Aircraft, Airfielrls, Economic, GroundFor-ces, Natural Resources, Ysvy, Political,Sociological, Topographic.

32 16 i)ec $7 Easter,; $IBFBih :* . . .. . :. . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 67Aircraft , !iirf ields, Air Information, Fco-nomic, Ground lx>rces, ~~hdmw%%Area, Na-

I tural Resources, Polj tical, lnrts, Sjberi-an RailKay Eranch Lines,, ,Shi!:s , Sociologi-cal, Topographic.

SRKBALJ8 1133 2


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. '. Pk siE:ligEs39 18,Feb 48 Eastern SIBERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 32Air, Ground Forces, Hosp,i,t.al.s, Navy. Per-sonalities; Political, Topographic, TownPlan - Ulan Bator.

40 2s Feb 48 Western SIBERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~12 30Aircraft, Airfields, Economic, Ground For-ces, Navy, Sociological,. Strategic HeavyIndustry; Topograihic.

41 1 Apr48 SARI&IN (OKRA)~ . . . . . . . . . ..I..... . . . . . .106 37Agricultu re, Air, Aircraft, Airfields,Conditions in Sakhaltn, Economic, GroundForces, PW.Cqmps,. .Sociological, Topograph-ic, Toti Plan - Okha.

42 1 Apr ,48 KWXURIA &d North KOREA . . . . . . . i, . . . 113 aAircraft, Airfields, Communications, Econ-omic, Ground Forces, Hospital, Political,Present Usage; Manchurian Industria l E-quipment Confiscated by. the USSR, Scienti-fic, Topographic.

43 1 Apr 48 Western SIBERIA ..*...*.*............. 101 27Aircraft, Qrfields, C!ommunlcations, Econ-omic, Factories, Ground Forces, Political, ISociological, Topographic.

44 12 Apr 48 Eastern SIUEREA . . . ..*......*.......** 137 31Air, Communications, Economic, Ground For-ces, Mines, Naval, Personalities, Politi-;;.ln, Sociolp,gi,cal.,. Topogcapkic, ,ioxn

- Mc@adap

4s 22 Apr 48 W estern SIBERIA . . . ..*.....*..I*...... 113 31Air, Econo mic, Ground Forces, Naval, Po-litical, Scientific, .Sociolo,gical, Topo-graphic, TOI& Plan - Skovorodino.

46 w Apr 48 E astern SIBERXA .*........**.,......,I 102 3sAir, Economic , Grou nd Forces, Naval, Per-sonalities, Political, Sociological, Topo-graphic, Tqwq&an.: Pa.t.r.ousbzaba~kaZ I-skty.

47 6 Hay 48 SAmBIA LIN, KURXLIslands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 31Air, Economic, Ground Forces, Order ofBattle of the Spyiet. Armv.,. Political, Sci-entific, Sociblogical, Topographic.

48 18 May f+8 Western SlBEiiIA . . . . ..* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142 56. Aircraft, Airfields, Communications , Hcon-

omit, Identifications, New or Improved In-stallations . in, Uzbek S0vie.t Socialist P\e-public, Naval, Polwitical, Sociological,Topographic, Unit or Force.

49 24 May 48 Eastern SIREKIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..C~*.... 12% 39Aircraft, Airfields,, Factories, Naval,Personalities, Political, PW Camps, Socio-logical, Topographic, Unit or Forcer

i,,


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UNCLASSWEDExm

i@.

DATE

WILISHED SBBJECT

HO.PAGES

NIPS &

SKETChES '

50 s Jun 48 .We.stern SIEZRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air, Economic, Gro und Forces, Naval, NavalIntelligence i OZGa .!kz~Area, Personali-ties, Sociological, Topographic.

132

51 9 Jun 48 USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air, Economic, Ground Forces, Naval, Soci-ological, Special Report and Town Plan -Ulan We, Topographic.

129 39

52 19 Jun 48 USSR . . . . . ..*.....................*...Air, G round Forces, Hospital,Information, Naval, Topographic,

Industrial,122 34

53 2.q Jun 48 MAhiCHKJRIB and North KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . .Air, Economic, Ground Forces, Industrial,Navy, Personalities, Political, Sociologi-cal, Town Plan - Xrasnogarsk.

92

54 14 Jul 48 USSR . . . ..*..............*...*........Air, Econom ic, Ground Forces, Navy, Per-sonalities, Sociological, Topographic,who's Who of Soviet Intelligence Officers.

112

55 ag Jul 48 USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I..Air, Economic, Ground Forces, Navy, Fer-sonalities, Sociological, Topographic,Town Plan - YOFOSht~OV.

94

56 5 Aug 48 Civil and Hilitary Installationsin Sakhal in {liholmsk, liorsakov, Toyohnrnl .

. . . a7 12

~7 30 Aug 48 Civil and Military Installationsin Blalovctshchensk, IrkutsP, Nakhodka.

,. .

62 11

58 27Sep 48in Kuril

Civil and MilitaryIslands (Sever0

InstallationsRuri 7skl.

. . , 58

59 18 Ott 48 Shipbuilding, Ship Repair Facili-ties, Submarine Rases in Soviet Far East,

Soviet Merchant and Naval Craft Reported.

. . . 63

60 27 Cct 48Japanese

SovietPk.

be and Indoctrination of . . . 146

61 19 NOV 48 Civil and Military Installationsin Cht to, Khaharovsfi, Komsonol fsk.

. . . 65

62 30 NOV 48 Radar Installation and AircraftProduction Facilities Reported in the So-viet Far East.

.., 72 26

,

63 2.4 Dee 48StorageAreas.

Munitionsin Soviet

Manufacture, Repairand Soviet-dominated

and . . , 152 8

64 XI Jan 49Facilities

Petroleum Productionin Soviet Far East,

and Storage . . . 116 32

65 15 Feb 49 Civilin Lilrobidzbzn,

and MilitaryKrasktno,

InstallationsSpaeskdnl Nty.

. . , 67 16

::-, U~~~ASS~FiE~

k,I',,


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BOOK -DATE MO.NO. PUBLlSHED . . . . .,


15/99

. . - _._ __&...-.v _ .-.+-- --

U~~~~SSl~l~~

BCIOKP(o.

PATEPl~SLt SHED SLGJECT

Ii 0.PAGES

WPS &SK6TCRES

84 2y Febso Civil and h?ilitary Install ations . . . . .in l@lovayn, Pgol ivffy~, S~~scgmk2. 61 4

85 30Mar50 Civil and 1lilitaryin Suchan.

Installations m.... 59 3

86 9 May 50 bfotor Vehicle Industry in the USSR . . . iz+ 31

87 19 Jun so SovietLeased

Order ofTerritory.

Battle in knntwc; ., . 105 22

88 12JuL 50 Iron and Steel Industry in th3c USSR . . 120 21+89 20Aug 50 Thermoelectric Facilities

Soviet Far East.in the . . . . . 82 8

90 20 Sep 50 Manufacture and RepairRailroad Equipment.

of Soviet . ..a. 227 17

91 20 Ott 50 ,%viet Fishing Industry . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 114 11

92 20NW 50 Soviet Air Unitsin Sakhat in and and Installationsthe /miles. . . . 129 23

93 2EDee 50 Soviet GuidedLauncher Units

!?issiles and Rocketand Equipment.

. , . . 101 18

94 10 Jan 51 NKA Medical Organization; North .,....Korean Security Forces; North KoreanLand Mines; North Korean 2d InfantryDivision; North Korean 4th InfantryDivision.

62 15

95 10 Feb 51 ThermoelectricEastern Siberia.

Facilities in . . . . . . .., 92 11

96 28Feb 51 NorthNorthNorth

KoreanKoreanKorean

Defensive Tactics; ..,...3d Infantry Division;5th Infantry :ivision.

56 9

xiii


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2

UNCLASSIFIED

MhP NO MP G-2 GECGRAPHIC BMW, cARTcGP.APHIC SEcnON, 24 APR 50 UNCLASSFIE


17/99


18/99

II UNCLASSI&D ' " . I .* Y

. r


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,-

P t

),

k

UNCLASSIFIED

NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTiCS

NORTH KOREAN 3D INF DIV

NORTH KOREAN 5TH INF DIV


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$

c

6

't

Q

UNCLASSlFlED

ATIS M'lERIUGATICN REEORTNO. 96TABLE OF tJJIVTWlS

..I. I~.. *, .

Page. . . . .

TABULAR ANALYSIS. . . . . . . ..I...........................*......*..... I. . , .. II....ALPHABETIC CRXSS REFERENCE: INTERROGATION SFRIES . ..* . . . . . . . . a....? iii,*..a . . ,. ,ATIS INTERRBGATIONBEPORTS: SUBJECT TITLES .I,,.., . . . . . . . . ...a ..,. vii

- .a I.. . ..__

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~...........*...*..*.. q. xv.RIGBLIGHTS .r.r.,...............................,.,,...........~.~vii

.' . . . ..I.... . . ._., INORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS

1. GENERAL..,...~.,~.,...~........~,...L.~..,..~..L*....-....~.. 2..-....-..L. . . . . .. . , I.. ,\(...,2. DEFENSIVE TACTICS OFNI$ INFANTRY UMTS rt.l~..,....r.r.....~... k

, ~a. Frontages and Depth .~?(*r,...frt4i~~.,r.....~....~......*.. , 4

SKETCH 1: Defensiye Zones'of a Rifle I. ,Division ' "

be Distr ibution of Rifle Units in Depense 9....r~~rrrz..*.:'.;.:

' ""SKETCH '2: "D~~nsr~aPerimeter.of a . %' ,- _-Rifle Company

c. Organization of Ground *r..r*r....~.,..*r~.,~~...~,...*.*.. 5.*.*...., . . ..*a..*. 1...,, .,.*...1


21/99

23

Page,fi.. , .off\; .t ,. , .,I! ; j.,pq

c+ Combat From Envelopment _~.;~iY,,.,.,,,,..~.*.,...*~....~, 21 r4'

db Winter Defense . . . . . ..r........y............~.........e..... .._ , \ . ,I. . -.. ,* , ,,.. .:.

e. Defense in MouRtainous Terrain *...*......,..,..*......I.* 238 . ..I. *. *.

f'. Defense 02 a River Line ,....~...,~.~.),~.,,.~..,....,...,. 23_,* ._.,. ". o..... . : . \I :'

P;. Defense of&Towns and Villages .I...................~.,.... 24t ,.". ,,., , 1.1 . .I.,,.. , .~ "

NORTB KOmAN 3D INFAKTRY DIVISI(a. . . . . , . . . . I. 4~ ,, .* a,... . I/d' .* ",.f.. 1,' :

1. ORGANTZATION AND TRAINING . . . ..~......,..............I.,...~,.. 26.

CHART 1: fK 3d Infantry Div%sionmk. . ,. , / . .) 1 ; .I . . .. I

2: COM%T AISTGRL *.."~*r~~~,..r..~...,~........,...rr...~*.r..~,r. 2?3. ..I. .a,. . a '.

PLA&' r : Route and Major lkgagements.,. ,.. Period qct.4@ w ,Z%).~e$1.~5~- a , I J : .

PLATE Zr Route and Major Hngagements IPeriod 21 Sep SO - 29 Dee EiO

NORTH KOREANSTB INFAKTRl'.I)iVISION

1. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING. . . . ...*.......t..*............*..*. 37

CHART 3: NK 5th Infantry Divjsion. .I.. _,,.._ *,.- . ..%.'I... .

2. COMBAT B fSTI)IRY ,~.~,.....,."),.l....,...,.,~..,..,...........,. 39..~ .,I. ~ .(. .r ..b . . . .pLa&:&Route snd Major Engageknts

. . I/I .Per&od.Jul. 49 - 21 Sep.dB-.. ..Iss**..

PLATE.4: Rout0 .and.b;'isJor &agag&nQntS IP&&d 21 Sep 50 - Nov 50

,.., ..", ,., 11. .I.. %.I b L - *,IN&X -*. . . . . . ..**..~..~......~......,..,....,,...,,..,.~....,~..,.** 47

1. . . .t . . . ..I. -.* . . ..: .


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FUNCLASSIFED

RESEWRCY S-JFFLFl.YWT

IK':ERRCGA'XCZ' 3EFCFIEI

Issue vc. si-

!YGFiLLIGF'YS

V[RTF{ I(~lR-aA: ??~F:.-~~ry JCTICS :1. La -- -.- - :.rt- .-~ ,i - L.= iF- - c.,- A . - . .- . hccording to PVi in-A cng the .r-crth Korean. iwry, its pre-war train-crlrati iniqipi9 stressed offer:sive ryeratims to the virtual exclu-sicr. o_ Ciefensive techniques ~ rhus 9 it ~as an ill-pre-J?aY+ Fnd ~Plative?ji insffect?ve instrurrent of derer,sivesa rfa 1-e +, -,a ; W,~ yspared rorrpIeta Cisintepraticn only 115~the the!: . intervention, ir, greetlgi superior nucbers, of-!!he Chi nese Ccr runi.C:t Fcrces. Paye 2

Tke PePIr:er.t;cl sectors jr t?o Faln L5ne cf resist-aClCe i're rtr:wi-edly =-acie vp of 'r,aTra?.ion R nd c CF panystrcnp-pcints dep;oyed ciru~?arIy an8 In depth arwndthe re~+ente key p~sj.ticns e L tc ca ntL~-redAcco-dinPc-7c?xrcnt c 9 iCIt,h YDE?i3Il df3fWSiVc: fioctritie tcacFe*s thatthe rt?gii~eEt PlUSt be able to yjithst;a!ld strong host5lepress1 re without ,2bar,c ior,:m its positions ever. if corr-jIl(?telV surr0;:r-d ecjc The r+~girrent Is apparently- thesaaiiost stlf-sufficient tactical un:it ic cleftnsive COY-bat, pap0_ 5

Ir, s.?ic d!Jfensc IbCinL~ T'crr:;lr. aTtil.lerr a!l_E,7c31yPas the rrissicri of h&assir;g am? infli c tiw casJa2 tiF.sen hcs%i 1 c t-c serms 111 assoobl~: arFi3.s ar:d. of Pclaying,Bispc:rsing a23 ncntralizin~ infantry an& tank assa32ts.Purely intc:rdlctory ~issicns art not _fircd, PSI; cl.ain-.Cncr a hcsti:lc+ assal!?t GP Nc*rtb Ksrfxin dcfmsivc ~usi-tiGnS hEiS tecr, aVcYtc:r?, it. ri:pmtedl y bcccr~es the pri-Fe-ary E-2 ::sicn ef artillr r;- to 5Lpr


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RESEARCH SUPPLFJM3 T

INTERROGATION RF PORTS

Issue No. 96

This report summarizessignifieant information con-cerning. Uorth Korean Forces obtained by U.S. Army andFEAF intelligenceagencies operating in the Korean battlearea. Prfmary sources of information for this report in-c lude the following: .

,( 1) On-the-spot interrogation by highly-trainedinterrogatorsof North Korean and Chinese Commu nist PsWand deserters , Republic of KOREA (ROK) refugees and mili-tary personnel, and members of the UN Armed Forces.

1. (2) Translations by ATIS of captured enemydocuments, period3.cals, diaries, etc.

($1 I &her paraIle1 sources when appropriate.

(4) In addition, so as to provide a certainamount of background material and to present the some-times.fragmentary interrogation information in its propersetting, material culled from other sources than thosereferred to above has been utilized. Whenever this hasbeen done the source has been clearly identified in thetext. 1

~Using agencies, whenOevaluating information in this

report stemming from interrogation reports, should takethe following factors into consideration:

(1) As a source of detailed, authentic infor-mation about the enemy, lnterrogatfons are of inestlma,blevalue when properly analyzed and evaluated on a conti-.

nuing basis.. Xnformaticn contained in this report isnot considered final and will be modified or changed infuture publications as additional material becomes avail-able; f

(2) Individual interrogation reports uponwhich this study is based shave already been. reproducedand disseminated separately. Care must be exercisedtherefore, to ascertain that this callated summary iinot accepted as confirmatYon of these individual inter:rogations.

When, In the text of this report,a looaleis men-.tioned initially, the place name is given first followedby the geographic coordinates (coordinates used are thosecontained in Gazetteer, to Maps of KOREA, Elap Series AMSL551, dated September 1944). Thereafter the name alone,is used, Place names marked with en asterisk (*> couldnot be accurately located,

-:73(or-l2 .,2as.32s

;;.GdkVW

UNCLASSiFlED


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on political indoctrination. One regimental politicalofficer, a senior lieutenant states that since most ofthe men were, from the labor&g class the indoctrinationprocess was very successful. He add; that politicaleducation centersaround anti-American propaganda sup-

-plemented by lectures on the merits of commun ism filmsshowing the daily life of a Soviet worker cull&al andeducational movies and orientation sessior& on currentevents. While the recruits went through their basictraining cycle 9 some of the more experienced men alleg-edly eng aged in squad and platoon problems and advancedweapons training. Upon completion of basic trainingsome of the men assigned to technical and specializedunits of the division were purportedly sent to technicalschools of the North Korean Army for advanced technicalcourses. Several prisoners report that they attendedclasses on the self- ropelled gun at the armored trainingschool in SADONG (398021N-125048tE), Another PW relatesthat he was among a group of 3 0 men who were sent to theDefense Ministry Signal School at PYaNGYANG where theyattended a course which included instructionin basic.electricity, signal maintenance and code transmissionAfter seven months training he was able to transmit a;dreceive 1.8 words per minute in five-letter random codesAfter completing the course the source was commissioneda junior lieutenant and ass 4.gned as instructor to a newclass of 34 students who were given a shortened courseof radio communications training lasting only fourmonths. Upon graduation the lieutenant and his men wereallegedly transferred back to the 3d Division. (2)

Sometime during the early part of 1949 divisionalheadquarters is reported to have moved to ?AMHUNG, wherethe 9th Regiment was undergoing training. The divisionby that time was close to full strength and except forthe incoming recruits most of the men had completed theirbasic training. Tactical exercises on squad, platoon.and company level, along with strems physical exer-,cises, were reportedly conducted in the mountainous ter-rain around HAMHUNG. Meanwhile the division experienceda periodic depletion, in manpower by virtue of the factthat it was repeatedly called on to furnish cadres fornew units of the rapidly expanding Worth Korean Army andbecause of the need of sending men to various serviceschools and offfcers.training courses, This was largelyoffset by the flow of conscript s arriving in the divisionalmost daily; the largest group of these numbering about1,600 me n, is reported to have been received in the earlypart of March 1949. (3)

In June 1949 those elements of the 3d Division thatwere stationed at HAMHUNG were allegedly transferred tonew locations in a move that was designed to make roomfor newly-organized units of the North Korean Army, Di-vision Headquarters is said to have moved to WONSANwhere the artillery units and the 8th Infantry Regilhentwere already stationed, while the 9thRegiment movedfar-ther south to the Kumhwa*(38181N-12 7028E) Area, placing

(2) TIS 598, 1508, 1710, 1978.(3) TIS 779. ~f,$Q,jyJW

27


54/99

it close to the 7th Regiment located at CHORWON. Short-Zy after this move was accomplished the division is saidto have begun advanced training with units sp ending mostof their time in the field. During this period prisonersreport frequent maneuvers of battalion-size units andstate th at stress was chiefly laid on camouflage, patrol-ling and how to maintain contact between units in thefield by means of elaborate bugle calls, whistles, flaresand hand signals, Soviet officers who had been seen oc-casionally during earlier training phases were now pres-ent at every important field problem, enemy prisoners re-late, and seemingly held final authority in all decisions.(4)

By the latter part of 1949, the 3d Division, hardlya year old, was reportedly considered one of the besttrained units in the North Korean Army. The division,while not fully equipped, was apparently better armedthan most units,, notably with crew-served weapons whichat that early stage in the development of the North Ko-rean Army were aimost non-existent in some organizations.Consequently, 3d Division troops had the advantage oftraining with their table of equipmen t weapons. The 7thand 9th Regiments, stationed close to the 38th Parallel,were apparently required to perform border patrol du ty,for reports show that at various times during the earlypart of i950 separate battalions from these [email protected] were patrolling in the vicinity of HWACBO N(38 06N-127O42E) , CHICH t OR-NI (38OO2 tN-12704 0 E) and SACH ANG-NI(3804N-1270 32E), During this period extensive fieldmaneuvers were carried out and the influx of new per-sonnel was gradually bringing the division to fullstrength. One group of approximately 1,500 conscripts,who reported in March 1950, is believed to have been thelast contingent of fillers to be assigned to the divisionprior to the invasion. These m en were issued new riflesand were only allowed to fire four rounds of ammun itionin the course of their basic training. Supplies andequipmen t were pouring in and most reports indicate thatvery few shortages existed at this time. ( 5)

At the beginning of June 1950, division headquarters,the 8th Infantry Regiment and the divisional artilleryare said to have made preparations to depart WONSADTnorder to join the other two infantry regiments in thesouth . Division Headquarters, which is believed to havemoved first, reportedly set up a temporary comman d postat KUMHWA. On or about 19 June 1950 the 9th Regimentreportedly moved out of the Kumhwa Area and marched toSACHANG-NI (3804fN-1270 32rE), where-it took up fieldpositions. At roughly the same time the 7th Regiment issaid to have departed CHORWON and bivouacked in thevicinity of YONGP YONG (38OOO CN-127O1 3 E) ,3n about22 June 1950 the 8th Regiment with the remaining elementsof the 3d Division departed WGWS ANby rail and reachedCHORWON the next day. From there it proceeded towardthe border to join Ohe rest of the division, Althoughthe rank and file soldier of the North Korean Army wasunaware of the plans to attack the Republic of KOREA, a

(4) TIS 364, 844, 1624.( 5-j TIS 572, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

28
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


55/99

captured field.order from the Intelligence Department ofthe North Korean Army,General Staff9 dated 18 June 1950and addressed to Chief of Staff of the 3d bivision,definitely proves the familiarity of certain.higher-ranking officers with the invasion plans. This orderfurnished detailed information on ROK defensive positionsand prescribed a reconnaissance plan which included theexact n ames of towns that the 3d Division later actuallyoccupied on its way to SEOUL. After the entire divisionhad assembled along the 38th Parallel in the Kumhwa -Ch! Drwon -'Yongp'yong triangle, ammunition and hand gre-nades were allegedly issued to the troops and last-minute preparations'for the impending invasion were made.On 24 June 1950 the 3d Division moved into jump-off po-sitions along ii&s assigned route of attack the Kumhwa -Seoul Highway, in accordance with carefull; preparedcommunist designs to extend their hegemony over all ofKOREA. (6)

2. COMBAT HISTORY (For Route andMa or Engagements, seePlates 1 and 2, following page 3fi)

At 0100 hours on 25 June 1950, the 3d Division, underthe comm and of Major General LEE Yong Ho, was allegedlyde loyed along a line running generally from YONCR'ON(1~006~N-1270C4~E) to SACH'ANG-NI with the 2d Divisiontb'its left and the 4th on its risht flank. The 7thRegiment occupied positions on thg right of the Kumhwa -Seoul Highway, interrogation reports reveal., with the 9thRegiment abreast of it on the left. The 8th Regiment wasreportedly held in reserve positions along the same high-way, about one-half mile to the rear. A l$minute artil-lery barrage at 0500 hours reportedly signaled the begin-ning of the invasion. Spearheaded by attached tanks fromthe 105th Armored Division, leading elements .of the 7th*and 9th Infantry Regiments are reported to have crossedthe line of departure at approximately 0515. In the faceof only slight resistance from the surprised and hope-lessly outnumbered ROK defenders, the division was ableto make rapid 'progress at first, but began to meet moredetermined resistance after reaching the outskirts ofPOCHON (37541N-127013'E) at about 2300 hours. After a

brief withdrawal,' the leading units consequently en-trenched a short distance outside town. Early next morn-ing the division entered the townwithout incident it isreported, since the ROK defenders effected a withdiawalduring the night. Continuing the advance the North Ko-rean invaders approached UIJ3NGBU (3744'N-127002'E),where they were met,by heavy artillery and small armsfire. The 9th Regiment in a flanking movement throughthe mountains allegedly attempted to by-pass .the town,but was held u p by well-placed machine gun fire. I In themeantime the 7th.Regiment attacking UIJONGBU from thenortheast along the main highway was engaged 3n a small-arms battle that lasted about an hour, After flushingout some small poc'kets of resistance, the 7th Regimententered the town simultaneously with leading elements,ofthe 4th Division, which was driving south along theYonch'on - Seoul road. Third Division prisoners reportthat many of the men, tired by long marches over r%ugh

(6) TIS 480~; ENEMY DOC #200564 .

~~~~~~~~~~~~*

29


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~~ _ -_ -_ _

a

4 q!Pl ,qh;cr-Fr\I( :,, .>

terrain and through intermittent showers, were beginning cto fall out with swollen feet. During the advancethrough generally deserted villages the armored unitsattached to the division are reported to have been held ihup periodically by demolished and impassable bridges.Continuing the drive on SEOUL the 9th Regiment, whichwas heading the advance: was purportedly greeted withheavy machine gun fire at about 1 900 hours on 27 June.Enemy troops give the ROK defenders credit for a fiercefight; but after holding their position all night, theywere forced to withdraw the next morning . Fightingisolated rear guard actions, the ROK troops managed todelay the invaders entry into their cap itol until about1300 hours on 28 June. Upon entering SEOUL the soldiersof the 3d Division were greeted by an active fifthcolumn that assisted them in rounding up remaining ROKtroops, policemen and civil servants, The 3d Divisionreportedly occupied the eastern half of the tit and es-tablished its command post at Camp SOBINGGO(37 B 32N-127oOOE), a former American dependent housing area,Late in the afternoon the division received its first airattack when two planes strafed and damaged a self-propelled gun and wounded several of the crew. An evalua-tion of pertinen t reports reveals that the 3d Division inits drive on the ROK capitol suffered approximately 400casualties, most of them in the 7th and 9th Regiments.(7)

*The division allegedlyspent the next day in SEOULresting and preparing for its next objective. Early inthe morning of the 30th, the 8th Regiment crossed the HANRiver in the vicinity of the Sobinggo Ferry by means of *wooden boats capable ofcarrying a 2$-ton truck or from20 to 30 troops; the crossing was opposed by only scat-tered artillery and sm&ll arms fire. All attached tankswere left on the north bank of the river, it is reported,because all HAM River bridges had been destroyed, In themorning of 2 July.the last elements of thedivisionreached the other side of the river without serious mis-hap, thus bringing to a successful conclusion the firstphase of the invasion. (8)

On its way to SUWON (3716rN-127001tE) the division,with the 8th Regiment in the lead, was engaged severaltimes by isolated ROK units which succeeded in slowingits progress a nd inflicting minor casualties. Upon eh-tering SUWON on or about 5 July it wasdiscovered thatthe battered town had already been occupied by elementsof the 4th Dfvision which were pre aring to continue theadvance toward TAEJON (3620rN-127 826%). After a shortrest the 3d Division passed through the town and marchedsouthward , still in the wake of the 4th Division. Onthe way the troops reportedly encountered several de-stroyed tanks and trucks as well as many dead ROK and USsoldiers; this was the first indication for most of themen that the US had extended active military assistanceto the ROK Army. Reports reveal that the division Yreached OSAN (3710N-1270041E) late in the evening andremained there until early the next morning, when it

*. _

(7) TIS 1 7, 32.(8) TIS 48, 49. ~~~~~~~.~~,~~~~,~~~~

*

309


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4 resumed its advance. Approximately 4 miles south of OSANthe 9th Regiment allegedly swung southeast tov;ard ANSONG(37*00N-l27o16E), while the rest of the division fol-lowed the 4th Division toward PYONGTAEK (37oOOrN-12705E). Although the 9th Regiment met only minorresistance from isolated ROK units, 9t was reportediyslowed down considerably by the movement through diffi-cult, mountainous terrain. Late in the afternoon theregiment reached a wide cangon situated a proximately 18miles no rth of YANGSONG(37. 04N-12712E P and bivou-acked there for the night. Next morning the unit con-tinued its difficult route. through the mountains an dfinally entered ANSONG late in the evening of7 July.Since units of the 2d Division were already dccupylng thetown, the regiment marched on to the outskirts and duginfor the night. ddeanwhi1.e the rest of the division con-tinued south following behind the 4th Division. Prison-ers relate that the,marching column was subjected to sev-eral strafing and bombing attacks which forced the troops

off the main road and destroyed much of the heavy e quip-ment. After passing through PYONGTAEK and SONGHWAN(3654N-1s70081E ) without .eng aging UN Forces the mainbody reached ,the northern out skirts of CHONAN(36o48 N-12710E) on *or about 9 July and found the 4th DivQionheavsly engaged, At this point the 9th Regfment, ,whichhad continued its .diversionary route through IPCHANG(3654fN-127014rE), allegedly linked up again with the

A res: of t-he 3d Division. Later in the day the 8th and 9thRegiments were reportedly committed on the left of the4th Division. Casualttes susta&ed in, this engagementwere light, but the division was held up all day by in-

3,

* tense, artillery fire. Early in the evening a concertedattack coupled with infiltratibo tactics succeeded inpierCjng UN defenses and by 2400 hours the town was oc- ,cupPea. (9) .

The division was purportedly held up all the next day,Heavy artillery and. small-a rms fire allegedly broke uprepeated attacks so that by nightfall only slightgrogresshad been made. After dark the divlsidn is said to haverenewed the attack employing the same tactics that wereso-successful the night before. Again.the defenders wereforced towithdraw and the division occupied the abandonedUN positions forthe bight. On the morning of 11 July,the 3d Division pushed its advance to within a few m$lesof CHONUI (3640fN-1270,12E), where it was again me t. byheavy artillery and mortar fire. Whe n it finally enteredthe town after a four-hour battle, it was subjected tostrafing and bombing attacks by UN aircraft, Fires wereraging almost everywhere in the badly damaged town. The7th Regiment, which. c,onstituted the divisional reservewas ordered to by-pass CHONUI because of all the debriithat.made movement through 9t difficult. After spendingthe night in the out skfrts of town, the d.ivision, fight-ing only against small-scale. delaying actions, reachedCHOCHIWON (36O36 N-127181E) the next day, where it was

.* again held up. After a. fierce artillery bombardm.e nt ofUN positions by attached tanks and self-propelled guns,the troops forced their way ,into town and pursued-the re-.

* treating.UN forces to.th.e KUM River. Finding the,river

(9) TIS 490, 779, 1464.

B


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UNCLKMX iI

strongly defended, the 3d Division remained on.the north-ern bank and sent out reconnaissance patrols while makingpreparations for the crossing. On the morning of the14th, the division reportedlyattempted to cross theriver at two places but was forced to withdraw, Afterfighting an intense artillery duel during most of theday, a second attempt tn,crnss was repelled in the after-noon. Interrogation reports indicate that preparationswere made on the 15th for an all-out attack along theentrre river line; but repeated air strikes were hamper-ing the movement of heavy equipmen t and reportedly hadinstilled a deadly fear in the minds of most of thetroops. Political officers, aware of the decliningmorale, appear to have intensified their propaganda ef-fort by assuring the troops that the war would soon beover and promised the men a long-needed rest after theycaptured TAEJON. They also stressed that although TAEJONwould be strongly defended, the ltdefeated Americanswould all surrender once the city had been taken.in the morning of 1 6 July,

Earlythe division reportedly crossed

the KUM River in the *face of only scattered small-armsand mortar fire. Since the UN defenders had withdrawn to

Y

new positions before TAEJON during thevision made rapid progress and most nfacross the rjver before noon. Fightingdjvision reached the northern outskirtsafternoon of the 18th. In a coordinated

night, the 3dthe units were

all the way,of TAEJON by

action with

Di-

thethethe h

4th Division (attacking from the west), the 3d Divisionfinally entered the cZty on or about 21 July 1950 afteralmost three days of heavy fightjng, Reports reveal thatthe 3d Division, which had not received any replacementssince the outbreak of hostilities, had suffered approxi- ,mately 3,000 casualties up to this time. (10)

After entering the city the division purportedlyspent the rest nf the day reorganizing and restjng. Onthe afternoon of 22 July, the 7th Regiment was reportedlycommitted for the first time in an attadk along the high-

way leading from TAEJON to KUMCHON (3606N-128 0081E)with YONGDONG (36lO*N-127046E) as its objective. Itmet very little resistance, PsW state, and, after spend-in the night in the mountains en route, reached OKCHON(3%18N-1273 4tE) the following day After a shnrt restthe unit allegedly continued its advince to within a fewmiles of SIMCHON-WI (36o14N-l27044 E), where it took uppositions for the night. On the 24th, the 7th Reg-lment,still spearheading the 3d Division drive, reached theoutskirts of YONGDONG , where It was held up for the restof the day by heavy machine gun and artillery fire. Theregiment is reported to have infiltrated through the de-fenders positions under the cover of darkness, but be-came so widely dispersed that the next mornSng , after afierce fight, it found itself in a very precarious posi-tion. The 9th Regiment,~ which had jofned in the attackthat morning, made good progress but suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire in the early stages of thebattle. Toward noon the UN forces began to withdraw andthe divisidn occupied the city shortly thereafter, Afterclearing the city the divjsion took up positions alnng

p

LI

*

~~~~~~~~~~~~~(10) TIS 643, 759, 854.

32

4


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S.

s

The 3d Division Is said to have remained in the Xum-chon Area for two days resting and preparing for thenext ,move. Here they received their first replacements,a group of 300 North Koreans with from two weeks to onemonth of training. These men reportedly had little fight-ing spirit since they had been subjected to almost dailyair attacks on the way from SEOUL . After leaving TAEJONthe divisfon found it increasingly difficult to obtainsupplies. Ammunition is reported to have been at a dan-gerously low level during several crucial. engagements andfrequently no rations were issued for as l.ong as two daysat a time. Most reports indicate that searching partieswere selected to requisition rations locally in order toreplenish almost non-existent food stocks. After movinginto position in the vicinity of YONGMOK* on 5 Augustthe division made last-minute preparations for the atlackon TAEGU (350521N-128 036rE), However., during the .nightof 6 August, the 3d Division was ordered into new posi-tlons farther to the south in the Songju (35o55N-,128017~) Area , approximately 4 miles southwest of WAEG-WAN (36000fN-128024fE), in preparation for the assaultacross the NAKTONG River. At 0300 hours on 9 August the 7th Regiment began to cross the river at a point boasting

a firm, sandy bottom with a depth of approximately 5,ftand a slow current. The troops allegedly waded acrossholding their weapons above their shoulders. Participants In the operation relate that shortly after the leadingelements of the regiment reached the east bank the wholearea was illuminated by parachute flares. A murderousmachine gun and artillery barrage op4ned up inflictingheavy casualties on the troops still in the water _ Thosewho managed to reach the other side purportedly f*iughttheir way up a hill loca,ted approximately l+ miles fromthe river. After the crest of the hill was secured, theydug in and began to reorganize, for units had lost contactand become disorganized in the darkness atid heavy fighting,and some men did not rejoin their organization until sev-eral hours after daylight. About half an hour after the7th Regiment had established a bridgehead, the 8th and 9thRegiments, located a slight distance south* are reported

(11) TIS 500, 598, 661, 1508.

rJllf(J >,.-.I(:( WfrP;gj

33


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t

to have attempted a simultaneous crossing. When theywere in mid-stream the area was again illum inated and astream of machine gun and artillery fire opened up anddecimated their ranks. In order to escape the murderousbombardment, they allegedly were forced to withdraw totheir original positions; the few men who managed toreach the eastern bank state that they were promptlytaken prisoner,. In this action the two regiments aresaid to have hem reduced to about 500 men each and wereso disorganized that it took them two full days to re-assemble and reorganize. (I-2)

At daybreak the 7th Regiment, situated ona hilloverlooking the river, was reportedly busy preparing de-fensive positions when a terrific artillery barrageopened up. A light plane kept circling the area, ap-parently to direct the fire. Shortly afterwards,thetroops also began to receive mortar f ire. The fire pur-

portedly continued intermittent ly for two days. Duringthis time the regimen t,mas effectively pinned down, fortroops of this unit report that they did not dare tostir from their positions during the hours of daylight.At approximately 0200 hours on 11 August, the 7th Regi-ment, with its ammunition exhausted and its meager foodsupplies almost used up, was finally forced to withdrawacross the NAKTONG. When the unit reassembled on thewest bank of the river, it developed that only about 300men were left out of the entire regiment and some com-panies are reported to have been completely wiped out.On or about 12 August the 7th Regiment allegedly rejoinedthe rest of the division, which had withdrawn to the Yong-mok Area after the 8th and 9th Regiments disastrous at-tempt to cross the NAKTONG River.

As a consequence of its heavy losses the 3d Divisionwas placed in reserve and given approximately 1,500 re-placements who had allegedly received only a few daystraining. The division remained in this location reor-ganizing its badly depleted units until 28 August, whenit moved to the Poksong-Dong (3602N-128022fE) Area anddeployed along the west bank of the NAKTONG. Prisonerscontend that the division remained in this location until12 September and received an additional 3,000 replace-ments, which brought its strength up to approximately7,000 men. Due to the general shortage of weapons manyof the new men were armed only with grenades and in-structed to pick up any weapons they were able to findon the battlefield. On 12 September the division againforded the NAKTONG River, this time without opposition,and marched to WAEGWAN , where It arrived about noon on13 September. While passing through the city the troopswere reportedly subjected to a heavy strafing and bombingattack. After following the Waegwan - Tacgu Highway ina southeastern direction for a distance of about 4 miles,the division purportedly marched through the mountainsand took up defensive positions just north of the mainroad. Jumping off from these positions.on about 14 Sep- Ytember, the 3d Division reportedly joined in the generalall-out assault on TAEGU and was constantly engaged with

(12) TIS 444, 574, 1624.

.

~~~~~-~,~~~~~~~


61/99

UN forces until 20 September. During this period thecpn-tinual air and artillaryattacks are alleged to have causedheavy casualties. Since most of the soldiers in the di-vision.aere recent replacements with v-ry little taste forbattle, numerous reports indicate that after reading TJNsurrender leaflets many decided that thejr cause T:as hope-less and surrendered at the first opportunity. On orabout 20 September, after being exposed to renewed pres-sure all along the front, the division was reportedlyordered to withdraw to SANGJU (360241N -128010fE). .Frag-mentary information indicates that the divisional strnpthwas approximately 5,000 men at this time. During its with-drawal toward WAEGVvANhe 3d Division ostensibIy receiveda terrific pounding from strafing and bombing UN aircraftfor reports mention that entire units were seized by bliniPanic and retreated in confusion. Reports furthermorecontend that when the remaining units of the division with-drew across the NAKTON G River just north of VIAEGWAN , theysustained tremendous casualties and were practically an-nihilated. According to fragmentary reports, divisionheadquarters and other elements nf the 3d Division, total-ing approximately 1,800 men, succeeded in reaching SANGJU.where they were ordered to retreat north. After ssparat- -ing into small grou ps, they began to arrive in PYONGYANGon about 1 October, During its two-week stay in the NorthKorean capital, the division is reported to have swelledits ranks to a total strength of about 1,500 troops bythe integration of recent conscripts inducted during Scp-tember and October. In the face of the impending captureof PYONGYANG by the victorious UN forces the 3d Divi-sion was reportedly ordered on about 15 OGtober to resumeits withdrawal to a reassembly and reorganization area inthe north, leaving behind only a small covering force.From this point on the history of the 3d Division becomesobscured in contradictory reports and cannot be tracedwith any degree of certainty until the reconstituteddivision was again com mitted in the Seoul Area during therecent Chinese Com munist offensive. Two PsV indicatethat the badly mauled division retreated to the northernredoubt of the North Korean Army in the Kanggye (4005 8

N-12636tE) Area, where it was reorganized and engagedin some minor actions with advance UN spearheads. Ac-cording to another source, however, one rerimsnt of the3d Division the 7th, undervznt rcorganizatfon at ITON(400201N-12 8036fE) during November and proceeded to theHungnan (39054JN-12 7032fE) Area on about 18 December toparticipate in the enemys final assaults against the UN10th Corps perimeter. In direct conflict with these re-ports, a North Korean guerrilla and intelligence agent ofdoubtful reliability insists that the 3d Division to whichhis unit became attached crossed into MANCHURIA and re-assenbled at an unknown location approximately 25 milesnorth of the YALU River, where it was subjected to a brieftraining cycle together with 20,000 other North Koreantroops. The PW believes that the troops training and *being reorganized in this area comprised the 2d North Ko-rean Corps. According to this same account, the 3d Divi-sion recrossed the YALU River on 24 December at SINUIJU(4006N-124024rE) and, after p assing through FYONGYANG,reached KAESONG (3758fN-126026fE) on 29 December. Fromthis town the division presumably headed east and thenswung south, for subsequent reports indicate that it


62/99

-----

engaged ROK troops near UIJONGBU on about 2 January 3.951.The following day, when the didision arrlvod in 5EOULit was allegedly attached to an unidentified CCT Unit tospearhead the renewed Chjnese offensive. The iast avail-able iriformtion, dating from 5 January 1951, indicatesthat the division tr;as activery engaged in the Suwon Area.(13)

(13, TIS 1191, 1412, 2379, 2988, 3039, 30?4, 3193.

The fbllowing additional sources were utilized in thepreparation of this report f

TIS 17li 480, 481, 487, 494, 500 5051 506, 595, 596,756 1048 1252, 1264, 1272, 127k, 14671 1511, 1641,176s, 1818, 2300.

L

.


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PLATE 1

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEImNTS OF NORTH KOREAN3D INFANTRY DIVISION

PERIOD OCTOBER 1948 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1950

LOCALE PAGENO. NO,

1 26

2 26

3 26

4 26

5 27

6 29

7 29

8 30

9 30

10 31

11 31

12 32

13 32

LOCALE

P'YONGYANG(39001'N-12544'E)

HAMHUNG(3954'N-S27032'E)

WONSAN(39010'N-l27~26'E)

CM'ORWON(38O14'N-127O32'E)

KTJMHWA(38018~~-127~28'E)

YONCH'ON Area(3806'N-127004'~)

UIJONGBU(3744'N-127002'E)

SEOUL(3734'N-127000'E)

SUWON(3716'N-127001rE)

ANSONG(3700'N-127016'E~

CRONAN(3648'N-127010'E)

KU%! River

TAEJON(3620'N-127026'E)

RE@RKSSeat of 3 d Div Hq fromOtt 48 to the early partof 1949Training area of the 9thRegt from Ott 48 to Jun49 and location of 3d",FJE; zfom early 1949

Training area of the 8thRegt and division artil-lery from Ott 48 to Jun50 and location of 3dDiv Hq from Sun 49 toSun 50TrainingRegt fromoutbreak

Locationfrom Junof war and temporarylocationJun 50Location,;i;;nt;othe

Link-up

Entered

Entered

CapturedflankingRegt

area of the 7thOtt 1948 to

of war

of the 9th Regt49 to outbreak

of 3d Div Hq in

of the divisioninvasion of

with 4th Div

SEOUL 28 Jun

SUWON 5 Jul

on 7 Julmovement

First large-scalegagement on 9 Ju1

;go;;l;ng effected

E;t;KL; for TAEJON

pvJ ,\-JC-j -r1 ~IL

byof 9th

en-

on

18 to


64/99

LOCALE1NO.*

18

19

20

21

.*

PAGEhio.

32

33

33

33

34

34

34

35

LOCALE

YONGDONG(360101~-127~46fE)

MUJ-TJ(36OooN-127'40"E)KUMCH'ON(36006f~-128~08f~)

NAKTONG River(3558%-r28024'E)

YONGMOK*

$?%~-128~20 7E)

POKSONG-DONG(36002&128~22~E)IVAEGWA(36o00'N-l28~24'E)

SANGJU

Jhlct-dtSS!FIIED

REMARKS

Battle for YONGDONG24 to 26 Jul7th Regt's flanking move-ment aimed at KUMCH'ON

Entered KUMCH'ON 3 Aug

Crossing effected by7th Regt on 9 Aug

Division reserve posi-tions from 12 to 28 Aug

Position from 29 Aug to12 Sep

From positions near towndivision participatedin all-out assault onTAEGU from 14 to 20 Sep

Initial reassembly pointof defeated 3d Div


65/99

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

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1F NK jRD INFANTRY OIVISION

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UNCLASSIFIED

PLATE 2

ROUTE AND WAJOR ENGAGELBNTS OF NORTH KOREAN3D INFANTRY DIVISION

mm011 21 SEPTEMEBR1950 - 29 DECEP~~R 1950

LOCALE PAGE-L NO. LOCALE REMARKSO

" 1 35 SANSJTJ Initial reassembly point(36 24'N-128'10'E) of defeated 3d Div

2 35 P'YONGYANG Remnants of the division(39oOl'N-125o44'E) assembled here from

1 to 15 act

3 35 KANGGYE Possible reassembly and(4058'N-126036'~) reorganization area of

the 3d Div4 35 BUNGNAM Elements of the division

(39'54'N-l27O32'E) reportedly engaged inassault against UN X Corpsperimeter on about 18 Dee

,5 35 KAESONG Division passed through(3758'N-126026'E) this area on 29 Dee

UNCLASSIFlED

3


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72/99

1 a*. ORGANIZAP?fUNAND TRAINING

PW interrogation reports indicate that the 5th NorthKorean Division was activated at NANAM (4142N-129041tE),North KOREA, during the early part of August1949 fromKorean veterans of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Armys164th Division, which had been stationed in the old Man-churian aapitol city of CHANGCHUN f43521N-125021E) untilJuly 1949 . According to the majority of reports, all non-Korean troops of the 164th CCF Division were transferredto other Chfnese Communist organizations in July 1949 andin their place the division began to receive Korean sol-diers from various other units of the Chinese Comm unYstForces. Concurrently with this metamorphosis in the per-sonnel composition, a change is reported to have takenplace In the command echelon of the division; Major Gen-eral KIM CHAN DUK, the former assistant division com-mand er , allegedly replaced an unnamed Chinese general asthe new division commander. of the Koreans assignedto the 164th Division had allegedly seen action againstthe Japanese Army during World War II; but the majoritywere veterans of the Chinese civil war who had been in-

. ducted into the communist armies of CHINA at a later date,while a comparatively small percentage of these troopsstemmed from an even more recent conscription drive con-ducted in the various provinces in MANCHURIA.Since thepersonnel of this reconstituted 164th Division originatedfrom widely separated units of the Chinese Commun istForces, a wide scale of military experience appears tohave been represented among the troops, ranging from sea-sonal agricultural labor and security duties to activecommitment In combat. Almost all troops are said tohave received training with Japanese weapons, which theSoviet occupation forces in MANCHURIA had turned over tothe Chinese Communlsts, and American weapons capturedfrom the retreating Chinese Nationalist Army. (1)

Some

During the latter part of July I.949 the 164th Divi-sion, with a strength of approximately 7,500 men9 wasallegedly transferred by railroad from CHANGCHUN toNANAM, where it was integrated into the expanding NorthKorean Army and redesignated the 5th Division. Most ofthe American and Japanese weapons which had been broughtwith the division from MANCHURIA were purportedly turnedin and replaced by limited amounts of Soviet-manufacturedequipment. At the same time the division underwent areorganization to make it conform to the organizationalstructure of the standard North Korean rifle division,with the lOth, 11th and 12th Rifle Regiments (also knownas the lst, 2d and 3d Regiments) forming the combatnucleus of the new division. (See Chart No. 2) Most re-ports show that from the time of its activation untilDecember 1949%he division was engaged principally inroad repairs and construction work of a military nature.Beginning in January 1950 the entire division was alleg-edly subjected to a new basic training cycle in Order to

(1) TIS 36, ,gZ?, 870, 907, 2020.~~~~~SSf~fED


73/99

r

accustom these Chinese Communist-trained troops to themilitary terminolbgy andtactics peculiar to the NorthKorean Army. This training f.s said to have been con-ducted under the supervisionof six Soviet military ad-visors, two colonels and four lieutenant colonels, whoremained with the division.until it was committed in thedrive across the 38th Farallel. Ekrly in February 1950the division purportedly began a new phase of advancedfield training on a platoon and company level with em-phasis on mountain warfare and camouflage. Around themiddle of the same month the first group of fillersarrived, numbe.ring approximately 1,000 men between theages of 18 and 26 years. Prior to their assignment totne various units inthe division, these troops were al-legedly given one .mon th of basic training which includedinstruction in marksmanship and familiarization firingwith live ammunition. From then on the division report-edly continued to receive recruits until about the begin-ning of April, when reports indicate that it had been .brought up to full strength. Most of the new men had

allegedly completed basic training by the end of April.,PsW relate that during this same period infantry andartillery units conducted combined maneuvers. (2). ?I(,..

In. May the division ,was reportedly brought up to itsfull allowance of weapons and equlpment with huge quantl-ties of Soviet materiel and all tilts were required toturn in any remaining American or Japanese weapons whichhad been brought from MANCHURIA. One captured supplyofficer states that when he w&s sent to CHONGJIN (41 46N-129049E) to pick up supplies for the division engineers,he noticed that Chong jin Harbor was full of Soviet mer-chant ships unloading trucks, weapons and ammunition.

-According to Korean-speaking crew members of Soviet ves-sels; they had Come from VLADIVOSTOK (4308rrJt131054rE).During May and. in the first two weeks of June the troopswere a,llegedly busy firing individual weapons; but each.manwas only allowed to fire three rounds. Simultaneously,political inddctrinationz which hadbeenstressed through-out the.train ing period, was intensified.

About the middle of June all equipm ent was allegedlygiven a. final Check to insure fts combat readiness andprepared .for shipment south. In explanation the tr.oopswere told that they were going on maneuvers ; nevertheless,many of the men were skeptical when they were issued liveammunition and grenades. On 19 June leading elements ofthe division are said to hav.e departed NANAM by rail forYANGYANG (380041N-128038tE), where they arrived by23 June; by 25 June the movement of the divisions combatelements had been completed. The 10th Regiment, whichwas th.e ffrst to assemble at YANGYANG, allegedly departedsouth immediately after its arrival and bivouacked in thevicinity of the 38th Parallel. It was followed in shortorder by the other two infantry regfments and on thenight of 24 June the 5th Division, with the exception ofa few rear echelon units still en route, was reportedlydeployed ~along the 38th Parallel south of YANGYANG. (3)

1039,


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2. COMBAT HISTQRY (For route and major engagements'seec "PPa&.es~ 3 and 4, following Page 46) "I+_ ,

.,

,At approximately O$YO hours on 25 June 'according toenemy prisonersg the 5th Division lunged a:ross the 38thParallel in an offensive down the main road that paral-lels KOREA's rugged east coast. The division's drivewas allegedly supported by the 766th Independen t Unitan organization with a strength of 1,500 men which aplpears to. have been part of a larger amphibious forceunder the direct control of the North Korean Army's Gen -eral Eeahquarters in P'YONGYAXG. This unit-is revortedto have left YANGYANG on 24 June with the mission ofestablishing'beachheads along thi east coast in the rearof the R.OK Army in order to disrupt rear area comm unica-tions and'defenses. Wh.en its mission had been accom-plished &cl after contact had been established with themain body of the 5th Division, this am &ibious guerrillaunit was scheduled to infiltrate throu-h'the mountainsin the direction of PUSAN(3506'N-129 802'E) as'anordinary partisan force. Members of this unit are re-ported to have received extensive amphibious and guerril-7 a training. (4)

Following closely behind the 766th Unit, the 5th Di-vision, with the 10th Regiment .in the lead, enteredCHUMUNJIN (3754'N-12805 0'E> without incident shortlybefore noon, Late that evening, after continuing thedrive south, the 766th Unit was allegedly held up on theoutskirts of KANGHUNG (37o44'N-l28o54'E), The 10th Regi-ment is reported to have come to its assistance and bothunits after an all-night battle finally entered the townthe next morning. At KANGNUNG the 5th Division separat-ed, PsW contend, with the 11th Regiment heading south-west toward HAJINBU-RI (370381N -128034fE), while therest of the division continued south along the coastalhighway. Along its route of attack, in the vicinity ofHAJINBU-RI, the 11th Regiment purportedly met slightresistance and sustained minor casualties. Continuing inits drive along the Kangnung - P'yongch'ang (37o22'N-128o24'E) corridor, the regiment was generally engaged

in mopping up small pockets of resistance and finallyreached P'YONGCH'ANG on about 2 July. During this actionit is reported.that the 11th Regiment repeatedly ran intoelements'of the 7th North Korean Division, which wasfighting on the right flank of the 5th Division, Guer-rilla units, comprised largely of commun ists from the Re-public of KOREA who had gone into the mountains at theoutbreak of hostilities, were also encountered andproved very helpful to the North Korean regulars, sincedue to their'familiarity with the topography in thatarea they were able to give advice on road conditionsand possible hiding places of ROK troops. Soon, however,the gruelling marches over mountainous terrain were begin-ning to show their effect on the tired troqps, and anincreasing number of men fell jut with sore feet. Whentiqe troops were.fin_ally gi+eh a rest at PrYONGCHIANGthey had been marching almost con tinuously for sevendays. In its flanking movement over some of the mostrugged terrain south of the 38th Parallel, the 11th

(4) TIS 30, 239, 1192, 1425.

UQjC/J$$f~E[j "7c-l


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Regiment was allegedly separated several times when com-pany-size units were required to climb steep mountainslopes to ferret out small grnups of ROK soldiers hidingin the hills; This was time consum ing and exhaustingwbrk and the tired and weary s.oldiers welcomed the long-needed rest.

After spending two days at PYONGCHANG thellthRe iment moved out again and headed for CHUNYANG (36o56*N-12 8 0541E)by way of. YQNGWO L (3710fN-12802 8rE), which wasalready in communist hands, On the afternoon of 4 Julythen unit wasallegedly subjected to an attack by UN air-b-aft; while only few casualties resulted in this and si-milar air attacks, most reports show that the troopsgreatly. feared aircraft and were prone to panic wheneverUNplanes appeared in the skies. As the regiment drovean in a southeasterly direction over tortuous mountaintrails the progress continued to be slow. After marchingfive days through thehills and meeting only scatteredresistance, the outskirts of CHUNYANG were finally reachedon 9 July, prisoners relate. Here the 11th Regiment issaid to have engaged a large ROK force which was apparentlywithdrawing from the coast. After an all&day fight thecommunists managed to occupy the northwestern section oftown by nightfall. Early the following morning the unitpurportedly entered the town that had been abandoned bythe withdrawing UN defenders. Interrogation reports in-dieate that casualties up to that time approximated 400

,,menf most of these ere apparently sustained in the bat-tle for CHUNYANG, 5), , ?

After separating from thellth Regiment at KANGNUNG,the 10th and 12th.Regime ntg are reported to hav.e conti-nued south along the coastal highway; one battalion ofthe 12th Regiment , however, remained behind for fivedays guarding the townand assisting local communists inorganizing the civilian.populgtibn. The 766th Independ-ent Unit was still leadlhg the attack, PsW reveal, untilthe division keai?hed the appr5aChes t? SAMCHOK (S7326rN-129olOE). Here the former reportedly, joined other ele-

ments of its parent organization which a few days earlier!had made:an amphibious landing near that town. This com-bined unit, ostensibly priceeded intj the hills, fr?m wherethe troops, after changing into civilian clothes, infil-trated into SAMCHOK in ,order ta gather intelligence tobe

.-transmitted by radio to the advancing 5th Division. The10th Regiment, after some small skirmishes with ROKtroops, allegedly entered SAMCHOK 3n or about 5 July;most of these ROK troops appear to have been stragglerswho, according to enemy prisoner, were quite active inmaking smalllscale raids. during the night and inflicting

:yin3k casualties. During this time the 12th Regiment wasreportedly scattered along the coast mopping up Ps2latedUN troops w h5 were hiding in the hills. The division de-parted SAMCHOK on 7 July, according to available evidence,and reached UTCHIN (37oOON-l29o24E) on the morning ofthe 9th, The 10th Regiment was in the Iead followed byelements of the 12th Regiment. The766th Unit was stillspearheading the attack and fragmentary rep&ts indicate

. .

(5) TIS 36, 619, 903. + , *i ~:,f-rr,;;Q~: !f :I.:r. i..


77/99

%

W

0

that this unit fought a large-scale enpagement at UTCHINin which the 5th Division was not comm:tted The 11thRegiment, which was fighting in CHUNYANG at'that timeapparently became engaged with UN forces retreating fromUTCHIN, for numerous reports indicate that the ROK unitsencountered in that battle were withdrawing from thecoast, After taking CHUNYANG the 11th Regiment purport-edly proceeded toward the coast and re'oined the divisionat UTCHIN on or about 11 July. The 762 th Unit, afterundergoing a reorganization of undetermined scope atUTCHIN, is reported to have proceeded westward into themountains with the mission of infiltrating in small unitsto FUSAN, Leaving this unit behind, the 5th Divisioncontinued its drive south with the 10th Regiment leadingthe attack; the 11th followed closely behind, interroga-tion reports reveal,talion b rought up

and the 12th Regiment minus one bat-the rear.

delaying actions,Opposed only by small-scale

the division arrived at P'YONGHAE-RI(36044'N-12926'E) on or about 13 July. Here the divisionpurportedly split its forces again; this time the 10thRegiment separated from the main body and marched west-

ward through the mountains in the direction of CHINBO(36"3~~-129002~~). (6)

,

i

s

From the beginning of hostilities ux) to this timethe division was mainly engaged in mopping-up operationsand guarding areas along the coast.tle casualties were slight,

Although actual bat-considerable losses in man-

power are said to have been sustained due mainly to sorefeet and exhaustion caused by the long-forced marchesover extremely rough terrain.have also been reported,

Numerous cases of malariafor which the troops received a

camphor injection of Japanese manufacture, as well asthe usual atabrine and quinine tablets. The total divi-sion casualties up to that time have been estimated byPsW at approximately 1,800 me n7 most of which were sus-tained by the 11th Regiment. During the southward drive,two meals per.day were eaten whenever possible, 5th Di-vision prisoners contend. Rice was cooked in large ket-tles by each company mess section and mixed with wheatmillet and pickles; this monotonous diet was supplemenJedby a hot bowl of sou p whenever possible. In addition,each soldier was reportedly issued a one-day emergencyration consisting of rice, dried fish and seaweed. Al-though supplies were still coming through every day PsWassert that constant air attacks and naval bombardmlntwere beginning to cause shortages and restrict theirmovement to the hours of darkness. (7)

4

When on 13 July the 10th Regiment swung west atP'YONGHAE-RI, the rest 2f the division is reportedhave c?ntinued south fighting every inch of the way

to

against ROK rear guard action; as a consequence, the di-vision made slow(36"32'N-l29"24'E P;ogress'

At the outskirts of YONGHAEwhich was

of 14 July,reached on the afternoon

the division was allegedly held up by heavyartillery and mortar fire.Regiment tried to infiltrate

During the night the 11ththrough the ROK positions

d (6)(7)

TISTIS

101,620, 1172,39,

632.1548,

d

41


78/99

,.I ;;c,Qp!\fJ:,\y$J. ., &.l

but after a savage fight was repulsed and forced to with-draw. The following day, however, the 11th and 12thRegimen ts in a combined assault forced their way throughtheUN positions 9 reports indicate, and by 1400 ,hoursthe town wes in their hands; but their success was short-lived, for after a fierce counterattack lasting a.11 after-

. noon ROX troops re-occupied the sauthern section of town.On the morning of 16 July the 5th Division, after an-other all-out attack, finally secured the town and pursuedthe withdrawing UN defenders. Veterans of the operations

.oh the east, coast relate that the 5th Division in twoweeks of heavy battles forged its way ahead toward YONG-DOK (3624fN-1290221E) and finally captured the town onor about 3 August after sustaining prohibitive casual-ties. During the seige the 10th Regiment allegedly

-. pressed the attack from the west and fought its way intothe outskirts two or three times, but was forced to with-draw each time under withering artillery and small-armsfire. In its drive on YONGDOK the division is said tohave been subjected to almost constant bombardment fromUN aircraft and naval vessels; even at night the troopswere apparently not given any respite, for prisoners com-plain that our artillery opened up wfth heavy fire afterthe naval and air attacks ceased. To illustrate theterrific casualties that the division sustained in thesebattles, one P!W elates that in a single naval barrage 700men were killed and huge stores of supplies and equip-ment were destroyed. Altoge

Documents

North Korean Defensive Tactics Reports 1951