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KristynaChabova
Normsandvaluesconnectedtocorruption:Istheredifference
betweenpost-communistcountriesandtherestofEurope?
Abstract
This paper is looking at theoretical approaches linking norms and values to corruption and then tests these
approaches on the data from the ESS and the WB focusing specifically the differences between post-
communist countries and the rest of European countries. Author concludes that even 25 years after the fall
of the iron curtain the values connected to corruption are still different in post-communist countries.
However, there is no significant difference concerning the norms about corruption between post-
communist countries and the rest of Europe, which might signify positive future development in a fight
with corruption in post-communist countries.
Introduction
Corruptionisperceivedasoneofthemostseriousthreatstosociety,democracy,andtogood
governance.Assomeauthorssuggest(Rose,2001,p.105;Rose-Ackerman,1999),corruptionis
the greatest obstacle to progress and to democratization in post-communist societies.
Corruption decreases the quality of the public sector in many areas, can be an obstacle to
democratization and can even trigger civic unrest (Brown, Touchton, & Whitford, 2011;
Pellegata, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Corruption distorts the formal system of rules and
governance(Scott,1972,p.2).Moreover,asKarklinsadds(2005,p.4).,corruptioninvolvesthe
lossofequalaccesstopublicpowerandposition,whichdistortsthenormsofequalityandthat
leadstoalossofpublictrustandbeliefinthepoliticalsystem.Instates,wherethedemocratic
norms and institutions are still in process of building, the distrust to public officials can be
translatedintodisbeliefofdemocracyperse.Corruptionisalsodangerousfromtheeconomic
pointofview. It canbeabarrier toeconomicgrowth (WorldBank,1997b), italsonegatively
impacts the ratio of investment to GDP (Mauro, 1995;World Bank, 1997a) and the level of
foreigninvestment(Wei&Wu,2001).Corruptioncanalsocontributetoanuncertainbusiness
climate,canholdbackstatereformandcannourishorganizedcrime(Rose-Ackerman,1999,p.
17).
One would expect that European countries could have similar levels of corruption, being
culturallysimilarandgeographicallyveryclosetoeachother.However,politicalandeconomic
developmentofEuropeancountrieswas interruptedwhencommunistregimedividedEurope
intowestandeastforalmosthalfofcentury.Statesundercommunistregimedevelopedunder
verydifferent conditions. Today, 25 years after the fall of the iron curtainwhenEuropewas
reunited, thanks to the EuropeanUnion and to globalization the countries are influencedby
eachotherandunitedasneverbefore.
However, even after 25 years, European countrieswith a communist history have in general
higher levelsof corruption (Shleifer,1997) than the restofEuropeandpolitical corruption is
thereinfactaseriousproblem(Karklins,2005).Onepossibleexplanationtothisproblemmight
be that citizens of communist countries have different values, which are more prone to
corruption.Anotherexplanationmightbethatbeingcorruptisstillanorminpost-communist
countries.Thisarticleistryingtoanswerthequestionwhypost-communistcountriesstillsuffer
fromhighcorruptionlevelsandwhetheraredifferentvaluesornormsrootofthisproblem.
CorruptioninEurope
Eventhoughcorruption inEurope ingeneral isvery low,especially inScandinaviancountries,
post-communist European countries are an exception with levels of corruption consistently
highaswarnsforexampletheWorldBankthroughits indicatorControlofCorruption(graph
1).
Graph1:Controlofcorruption,pooleddata
Source:WorldBank.Averagecontrolofcorruption1996-2014.Controlofcorruptionshowshowthecountriesare
successfulincontrollingcorruption,theindicatorgoesfrom-3to3,while3indicatesthatcountryissuccessfulin
controllingthelevelofcorruption.
Similar results can be observed through direct experience with corruption (graph 2).
Communistregimeprovidesincentivestobribeeitherduetoscarcityofgoodsortothegeneral
belief that it is alright or even the encouraged to steal from the state. As the famousCzech
sayingillustrates:“Whodoesnotstealfromthestate,stealsfromhisownfamily”.
Graph2:Directexperiencewithcorruption
Source:ESSround2,2004.
Researchanddatashowthatinauthoritarianregimesthelevelofcorruptionishigherthanin
democraticregimes,however,surprisingly,therearemixedresultsoftheeffectofdemocracy
onthelevelofcorruptionconcerningtransitiontodemocracy(Blake&Martin,2006;Pellegata,
2012;Treisman,2000).Brown(2011)presentsthehypothesisthattheeffectofdemocracyon
corruption is nonlinear and thus the results describing the effect of democratization on
corruption aremixed.According to Pellegata’s analysis, countries that aremoving fromnon-
democracytodemocracy(hybridmode)havethelevelofcorruptionhigherinthebeginningof
the transformation than they had in non-democratic regime. Researchers suggest that the
transitioncomehandinhandwithdistortionorevenabsenceoftheformerrules,whichbrings
morepossibilitiestocorruptactivities.However,overtime,thelevelofcorruptionshouldstart
slowly declining thanks to enforcing new rules and laws (Pellegata, 2012). This theory is
supported by findings of Triesman, whose regressionmodel shows that the current level of
democracydoesnothaveanyeffectonthelevelofcorruption,butlongexposuretodemocracy
lowerscorruption(Treisman,2000).
Inregardtothesefindings,onewouldexpectthatthelevelofcorruptionwouldslowlydecline
in post communist European countries, which are now for more than 25 years exposed to
democracy.
Table1:Controlofcorruptioninpost-communistcountriesovertime
Country/year 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Difference
AL -1.09 -1.01 -0.86 -0.81 -0.49 -0.55 0.54BA -0.35 -0.28 -0.35 -0.29 -0.32 -0.28 0.07BG -0.78 -0.24 -0.2 -0.1 -0.21 -0.28 0.5BY -0.93 -0.63 -0.78 -0.63 -0.73 -0.32 0.61CZ 0.65 0.55 0.36 0.3 0.26 0.32 -0.33EE -0.06 0.57 0.64 0.96 0.86 1.27 1.33HR -0.82 -0.72 0.25 0.09 -0.03 0.19 1.01HU 0.58 0.65 0.52 0.61 0.25 0.13 -0.45LT -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.27 0.48 0.54LV -0.82 -0.03 -0.12 0.29 0.13 0.34 1.16MD -0.2 -0.29 -0.95 -0.58 -0.69 -0.85 -0.65
ME -0.38 -0.24 -0.01 MK -0.96 -0.67 -0.88 -0.37 -0.06 0.09 1.05PL 0.54 0.67 0.33 0.17 0.41 0.59 0.05RO -0.22 -0.68 -0.38 -0.15 -0.22 -0.14 0.08RS -1.03 -1.08 -0.91 -0.28 -0.29 -0.19 0.84RU -1.02 -0.94 -0.92 -0.85 -1.06 -0.87 0.15SI 1.32 1.3 0.72 1.02 0.85 0.69 -0.63SK 0.36 0.25 -0.1 0.4 0.24 0.12 -0.24UA -1.03 -1.15 -1.02 -0.68 -0.98 -1 0.03
Source:WBGovernance Indicators.Averagecontrolofcorruption indicator inpost-communiststates.Controlof
corruptionshowshowthecountriesaresuccessfulincontrollingcorruption,theindicatorgoesfrom-3to3,while
3indicatesthatcountryissuccessfulincontrollingallofthecorruption.
However,asshowninTable1,thecontrolofcorruptioninpost-communistcountriesdoesnot
increase in time in general. In fact, on average the control of corruption remains the same
between 1996 and 2014, increasing most significantly in Estonia, Latvia or Croatia, but
decreasing in Slovenia or the CzechRepublic. According to Johnson (Johnson, 2005, p. 31) it
seemsthatdemocratizationinCentralEuropehasnotreducedcorruption.
Sowhy it is that central andeasternpost-communist countries inEuropedidnotmanage to
lowertheircorruptionlevels,asresearchersexpected?
Theoriesexplaininglevelofcorruption
Thereexistmanytheoriestryingtoexplainthecausesofcorruptionandtoanswerthequestion
whyinsomesocietiescorruptionismorewidespreadthaninothers.Manyofthetextsdealing
withcorruptionareconnectedtotheoriesusingeithernormsorvalues.Firstgroupoftheories
connectedtonormsincludecriminologicaltheory,thetheoryofsocialdisorganization,theory
of ‘badapples’and ‘badbarrel’,andrationalchoicetheory.Theoriesconnectedtovaluesare
Weber’sprotestantethicsandInglehart’spostmaterialisttheory.Finally,thirdgroupoftextsis
not connected to any theories, as it is rather empirical statistical work of correlations. Even
thoughthisgroupdoesnotinmostcasesrefertoanytheory,inordertocoverthemostused
approachestostudyofcorruption, Iwillpresentthemost importantfindingsofthisgroupof
authorsaswell.
Norms
Norms are defined as shared understanding about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or
forbidden within society (Ostrom, 2000). Theories referencing to norms in the research of
corruptionareusuallycombiningmicroperspectiveandmacroperspective.Normsexistonthe
levelofsociety,however,thereareinternalizedbyanindividual,andindividual’sbehaviouris
reciprocally influenced by norms. Corruption is then behaviour of public officials, which
deviatesfromthenorms.Theliteraturestudyingtherelationsbetweennormsandcorruptionis
inconclusive, some authors argue that social norms influence corruption (Fisman & Miguel,
2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), however, there are also results showing that the relations
between corruption and norms are not that straightforward (Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, &
Gangadharan, 2005; Kapoor & Ravi, 2012). Below are presented authors, which analyse the
relationsbetweennormsandcorruption inpost-communistsocieties.Majorityofthemargue
that norms concerning corruption are different than norms in countries which have never
experiencedcommunistrule.
Rationalchoicetheory-gametheory
Rationalchoicetheoryarguesthatevery individual firstweightsthegainsandcostsandthen
actsinordertomaximizetheutilityandminimizethecosts.Apublicofficerthereforedecides
whetherthepossibilityofbeingcaughtisgreaterthantheenjoymentofmoneyhewasoffered,
andactsaccordingly.ThistheorywassupportedbyRose-Ackermanwhoarguesthatthereason
for corruption is precisely the fact that public officials believe that expected advantages
outweightheexpectedcosts(1978).
Gametheoryderivesfromthesamelineofthinkingastherationalchoicetheory.Gametheory
looksatthedecisionmakingofanindividualwhencollaboratingwithadifferentperson.Oneof
the most famous applications of the game theory is the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the classic
prisoner’s dilemma situation, there are two prisoners and each of them goes through
interrogation.Ifonebetraystheother,he/shegoesfree,however,ifbothofthembetraythe
otherone,theyserveverylongsentenceinprison.Butifnoneofthembetraytheother,they
both serve short sentence. The variation of a prisoner’s dilemma can be applied to the
evolution of norms as well. In their article Bendor and Swistak define social norms as
“behavioralrulesthatarebackedbysanctions”(2001,p.1494).Ifoneviolatessocialnorm,he
orshewouldbeavoidedorostracised.Therehavetobesanctionsfromthethirdpartysothe
normswouldbestable.Theypresentveryinterestingtheoryoftheevolutionofnorms,which
derives from the game theory. They argue that norms are developed through the repetitive
game.Whenonepersonbetraystheotherone,thethirdpartysanctionshimorher.Whenthis
game is repeated enough times, the behaviour of not betraying becomes the norm. Better
normssurviveinthesocietywhileworsewitheraway.Thisunderstandingofnormscanbeused
inthestudyofcorruption;forashortterm,orincountrieswherethesystemisnotbasedon
fairness,suchasinautocraciesorincommunismasinourcase,itisconvenienttobecorrupt.
However,forthelongerperiodoftimeorforcountries,whicharedemocraticandhavetherule
of law, it ismoreconvenient tobehonest. Incommunism,beingcorruptedcouldberational
andmaybeeven thebestdecisionnotonly for the individual,butalso for the society. Some
social scientists argue that corruption canbegood in somecases for the societyas awhole.
Whenthelawsandpublicofficeinthecountryisnotfairanddoesnotguaranteeequalaccess
toservices,corruptioncansubstituteforthis.Forexample indevelopingcountriescorruption
couldbebeneficialforallbecauseitcanhelptheeconomicsystemtofunctionmoreproperly
(Flatters&Macleod,1995).Beingcorruptitselfbecameanormduringcommunismandittakes
timetochangenorms.Afterthefalloftheironcurtain,thankstoemergenceofdemocracyand
the rule of law, new norms such as being fair, treat everybody equal, and integrity, slowly
startedtoemerge.First, itwasadeviancetonotofferoracceptabribe,butmoreandmore
peopleacceptthisdeviance,itbecomesanorm(Huntington,1968).
One can say that the norms in post-communist countries might have changed under the
communist rule. It became more rational to become corrupted and to bribe. New norms
emergedandbeing corruptwasnomore sanctioned,on the contrary, due to the scarcityof
goodspeoplebelievedthatitisimportanttostealfromthestate.AsthefamousCzechsaying
illustrates: “Who does not steal from the state, steals from his own family”. Almost half of
century under communism is a long time to change thenormsof thepeople, it is therefore
expected that norms in the post-communist states might be different; corruption might be
perceivedassomethingthateverybodydoes.
It is very difficult to find a proper question which can be understood as norms concerning
corruption. The closest one to the concept of norms is probably question asked in
Eurobarometer, which focuses on the business culture. Specifically, it asks respondents,
whethertheybelievethatcorruptionispartofthebusinesscultureinacountry.Theresultsfor
Europecanbeseeningraph5.
Graph5:Corruptionispartofbusinessculture
Source:Eurobarometer2011,2013.Corruptionispartofbusinessculture1-totallyagree,2-tendtoagree,3-tend
todisagree,4-totallydisagree
01
23
4m
ean
of b
uscu
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CY IT HR GR CZ SK SI LT BG ES IE HU PT PL GB FR AT BE EE DE LU NL FISE DK
Values
Themotivations for one’s incline to be corrupted can be studied from the point of view of
values. According to Weber, values are “the actions of persons who, regardless of cost to
themselves,acttoputintopracticetheirconvictionsofwhatseemstothemtoberequiredby
duty,honour,thepursuitofbeauty,areligiouscall,personalloyalty,ortheimportanceofsome
‘cause’ ... value-rational action always involves commands or demandswhich, in the actor’s
opinions,arebindingonhim.”(Weber,1920).Someauthorssuggestthatvalueschangedunder
communism(Karklins,2005)
Values–security
TheSchwartz(1992)ValueSurvey(SVS)iscurrentlythemostwidelyusedbysocialandcross-
culturalpsychologists forstudying individualdifferences invalues.Below isoutlinedthemain
conceptoftheSchwartzvaluesurvey.
Table 1. Definitions of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of their Goals and the Single
ValuesthatRepresentThem
POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. (social
power,authority,wealth,preservingmypublicimage)
ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social
standards.(successful,capable,ambitious,influential)
HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (pleasure, enjoying life, self-
indulgence)
STIMULATION:Excitement,novelty,andchallengeinlife.(daring,avariedlife,anexcitinglife)
SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. (creativity,
freedom,independent,curious,choosingowngoals)
UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all
peopleandfornature.(broadminded,wisdom,socialjustice,equality,aworldatpeace,aworld
ofbeauty,unitywithnature,protectingtheenvironment)
BENEVOLENCE:Preservationandenhancementof thewelfareofpeoplewithwhomone is in
frequentpersonalcontact.(helpful,honest,forgiving,loyal,responsible)
TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional
cultureor religionprovide theself. (humble,acceptingmyportion in life,devout, respect for
tradition,moderate)
CONFORMITY:Restraintofactions,inclinations,andimpulseslikelytoupsetorharmothersand
violatesocialexpectationsornorms.(politeness,obedient,self-discipline,honoringparentsand
elders)
SECURITY:Safety,harmonyandstabilityofsociety,ofrelationships,andofself.(familysecurity,
nationalsecurity,socialorder,clean,reciprocationoffavors)
Researchshowthatpost-communistcountrieshavedifferentvaluesthancountrieswhichhave
never experienced communist rule. This has been observed also by Inglehart (1997), who
analysesvaluechangein43societiesandcomeswithanobservationthatthereexistclustersof
countries falling into specific value categories (picture 1), with almost all post-communist
countriesbeinginthetopleftcornersignallingthattheyindeedsharedifferentvaluesthanthe
restoftheworld.TheclosestvaluefromtheSchwartzscaleisSecurity.
Picture1:Valuesintheworld
Dataandmethod
Formyanalysis Iuse25countries,all inEurope,9haveacommunistpastandtherest
(16)donot.IusetheEuropeanSocialSurvey(ESS),WorldValuesSurvey(WVS),Eurobarometer
andWorldBank(WB)dataasthesourcesformydataset.Thedataareaggregatedoveralltime
periods(1996-2014).
DependentVariable
Iwillbeusing theControlofcorruptionby theWorldBank.Thedata iscollectedevery
yearandtheWorldBankdataiscomparableovertime,thereforeitispossibletopoolthedata
across multiple years. Control of corruption shows how the countries are successful in
controlling corruption, the indicator goes from -3 to 3, while 3 indicates that country is
successfulincontrollingthelevelofcorruption.
IndependentVariables
ItestnormsasusedbytheEurobarometer,questionwhichisfocusedonthebusinessculture
andcorruption.ThenIusevaluesasunderstoodbySchwartz.
Unfortunately,duetoextremelysmallsamplesizeIcannotuseanyothervariables,especially
asIneedtoincludeinteractions.
Results
1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4.
Communisthistory
-0.725426**(.2722786)
-.8917325(1.338)
.9005(.750)
1.68(1.678)
Norms(businessculture)
0.9715248***(.1736062)
.9584911**(.297629)
1.171***(.750)
1.2379***(.299)
Values(Security)
0.3338753(.5605642)
.3529(.593)
-.225(.573)
-.342(.6251)
History*norms .0922(.7359) -.3673
(.702)
History*values 2.6142**(1.178)
2.806**(1.255)
Intercept -.4496253 -.41355 -1.10 -1.296AdjustedR2 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.84Numberof
cases 25 25 25 39
Results show that security valuesarenot connected to corruptionperceptions,onlywhen in
interactionwiththecommunisthistory.Thisshowsthatsecurityvaluesincreasecorruptionin
communist countries.Normsare verymuch connected to corruption, however, interestingly,
they are not significant when in interaction with communist past. It seems that norms are
importantinallcountries,thereisnotdifferencebasedonthecommunistpast.
Conclusion
Thisarticlediscusses themost important theoriesconnectedtocorruptionandoffersseveral
explanationsof the fact thatcorruption levelsarehigher inpost-communistcountries. Italso
discusseswhich theoriesmight be helpful andwhich are inconclusive in the study of higher
corruptionlevelsinpost-communistcountries.
This article serves as a basis for understanding corruption and its development in post-
communist Europe. It seems that the crucial effect that is connected to the legacy of
communismhavevalues,post-communistcountrieshavehighersecurityvalues.
First, there exist lots of authors arguing that due to a long communist rule, norms in post-
communistcountriesaretodaydifferentthanintherestofEurope.Duringcommunism,being
corruptbecamethenorm,andevenafter25yearsafterthefallofironcurtain,thisnormhas
not been changed yet. However, descriptive data and some research doubt this hypothesis,
normsofunderstandingcorruptionassomething,whichisnotseriouslywrong,arenotpresent
moreinpost-communistEuropeancountriesthanintherestofEurope.Itisthereforenotclear
whethernormsareimportantinunderstandingcorruptioninpost-communistcountries.
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