Nonviolent Resistance in Hybrid Regimes: Youth Movements in Post

Nonviolent Resistance in Hybrid Regimes: Youth Movements in Post-Communist States

Olena Nikolayenko Department of Political Science Fordham University Faber Hall, Rm. 677 441 East Fordham Road Bronx, NY 10458 E-mail: [email protected] Draft. July 15, 2011 Comments are welcome. Prepared for presentation at the pre-ASA workshop “Making Connections: Movements and Research in a Global Context,” Las Vegas, August 18-19, 2011.

mailto:[email protected]�

Nikolayenko Draft July 2011

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Brief Description of the Book Project Over the past decade, a myriad of youth movements emerged in the post-communist region and pressed for political change during the election period. In 2000 the Serbian social movement Otpor (Resistance) played a vital role in bringing down Slobodan Milosevic. Inspired by the example of Otpor, similar youth movements were formed in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. On the eve of the 2001 elections Belarusian youth set up the social movement Zubr (Bison) to challenge the power of the incumbent president. In 2003 Georgian civic activists formed the youth movement Kmara (Enough) to press for radical reforms. Ukrainian youth mobilized via the civic campaign Pora (It’s Time) during the 2004 presidential elections. Emulating these examples, Azerbaijani youth set up several youth groups ahead of the 2005 elections. Never before have post-communist youth protested on such a grand scale. Some youth movements, however, were more successful than others in mobilizing citizens for political change. This book argues that the analysis of tactical interactions between social movements and incumbent governments provides a partial explanation for divergent movement outcomes. Tactical interaction is “an ongoing process … in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset the moves of the other.”1

On the one hand, social movements seek to attain their goals and bring about political change through the deployment of novel tactics. On the other hand, movement opponents seek to counteract these threats through countermobilization tactics. This dynamic relationship between social movements and their opponents has a profound effect on the movement’s success. If the social movement deploys novel methods of resistance, such tactics might catch the authorities off guard and strengthen the movement’s position vis-à-vis its adversary. Otherwise, the use of conventional protest tactics puts the social movement at a disadvantage, since the ruling elite can anticipate a certain pattern of mass mobilization and take preemptive action.

This book seeks to extend social movement literature by examining state-movement interactions in hybrid regimes, falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. Most empirical research on tactical interactions has been done in advanced industrial democracies. Much less empirical work has focused on the interplay between social movements and their opponents in non-democracies. Yet, the rise of hybrid regimes provides a new political context for analyzing state-movement interactions. A salient attribute of these regimes is a combination of formal democratic institutions with systematic nondemocratic practices. The regime type has an effect on the timing of mass mobilization, the scope of movement claims, the repertoire of contentious collective action, and the repertoire of countermovement tactics. Compared to social movements in liberal democracies, challenger organizations in hybrid regimes tend to face higher barriers to political participation. At the same time, the repertoire of countermovement tactics in hybrid regimes is constrained by the government’s ambitions to maintain a façade of democracy.

1 McAdam, Doug. 1983. “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.” American Sociological Review 48(6): 735–54, p. 736.


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Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 2. Elections as an Opportunity for Political Change

Chapter 3. Otpor: Bringing Down Milosevic

Chapter 4. Zubr: Struggle against Lukashism

Chapter 5. Kmara: Enough of Corruption and Poverty

Chapter 6. Pora: It’s Time to Win

Chapter 7. Resistance of Azerbaijani Youth

Chapter 8. Conclusion


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Chapter 1. Introduction

Over the past decade, a large number of youth movements emerged in the post-communist

region. Youth deployed nonviolent methods to demand political change in repressive political

regimes that took root since the collapse of communism. In 2000 the Serbian social movement

Otpor (Resistance) formed by a group of students from the University of Belgrade played a

pivotal role in ousting Slobodan Milosevic from office. Thousands of young Serbs became

engaged in nonviolent resistance to the regime and voted the incumbent president out of office.

Inspired by the example of Otpor, Belarusian youth set up the social movement Zubr (Bison) on

the eve of the 2001 presidential elections and called for the removal of the incumbent president

from power. Similarly, youth in the Republic of Georgia formed Kmara (Enough) shortly before

the 2003 parliamentary elections to push for radical reforms. In 2004 the Ukrainian youth

movement Pora (It’s Time) mobilized thousands of citizens in anticipation of electoral fraud.

Likewise, Azerbaijani youth groups Magam (It’s Time), Yeni Fikir (New Thinking), and Yokh

(No) burst into the political scene to press for free and fair elections in 2005. Never before have

post-communist youth mobilized on such a grand scale.

Remarkably, the youth movements shared a lot of similar characteristics. With the

exception of Otpor and Yeni Fikir, the movements were formed during the election year in

anticipation of large-scale electoral fraud. Youth demanded free and fair elections and mobilized

citizens to exercise their voting rights. Furthermore, movement participants targeted the

incumbent president as a major obstacle to political liberalization. To accomplish movement

goals, young people applied nonviolent methods of resistance, including graffiti, stickers, and

street performances. These cross-movement similarities were not accidental. The cross-border


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diffusion of ideas explains, in no small degree, the use of similar movement tactics. Civic

activists across the region learned about Otpor via the mass media and established direct contacts

with Serbian youth. The attribution of similarity contributed to the adoption of Otpor’s ideas.

Young people shared similar political values and faced a similar set of constraints on political

participation. Furthermore, this generation of activists had a common experience of growing up

in the post-communist period (Nikolayenko 2007).

Some youth movements, however, were more successful than others in mobilizing

citizens for political change. In Serbia Otpor recruited thousands of young people to put up

nonviolent resistance to the regime. Similarly, thousands of young Ukrainians poured into the

street and stayed in the tent city to denounce electoral fraud. Albeit on a smaller scale, Kmara

enlisted a sufficiently large number of young people to campaign for radical reforms. In contrast,

Azerbaijani youth groups attracted no more than 100 members each. Furthermore, Zubr

mobilized a relatively small number of young people to tilt the power balance in its favor.

This book argues that the analysis of tactical interactions between social movements and

incumbent governments provides a partial explanation for divergent movement outcomes.

Tactical interaction is “an ongoing process … in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-

like fashion, to offset the moves of the other” (McAdam 1983: 736). On the one hand, social

movements seek to attain their goals through the deployment of novel tactics. On the other hand,

movement opponents seek to counteract these threats through countermobilization tactics. This

dynamic relationship between the social movement and its opponents has a profound effect on

the movement’s success. If the social movement deploys novel methods of resistance, such

tactics might catch the authorities off guard and strengthen the movement’s position vis-à-vis its

adversary. Otherwise, the use of conventional protest tactics puts the social movement at a


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disadvantage, since the ruling elite can anticipate a certain pattern of mass mobilization and take

preemptive action.

Learning is a critical dimension of tactical interactions. By definition, learning is

reflexive. In the course of the protest cycle both civic activists and the ruling elite can draw

lessons from earlier episodes of mass mobilization. This study suggests that learning is critical to

the development of effective strategies and tactics. Movement participants can devise more

effective tactics if they draw lessons from their firsthand experience in previous protest

campaigns and scrutinize anti-regime struggles around the globe. Similarly, the powerholders

can devise more effective countermobilization tactics if they draw lessons from previous protest

campaigns both inside and outside the country. In particular, autocratic incumbents can benefit

from a cross-national exchange of ideas about the maintenance of the non-democratic regime.

This study applies the concept of tactical interactions to the analysis of mass mobilization

in five hybrid regimes, falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. The analysis

suggests that the interplay between social movements and their opponents influenced movement

outcomes. In some instances, the pace of autocratic learning exceeded the magnitude of tactical

innovation exhibited by youth movements. Specifically, the adaption of Otpor’s tactics put late

risers in the protest cycle at a disadvantage because the model of nonviolent resistance became

well-known to the incumbent authorities and enabled them to take preemptive action.

Tactical interactions in hybrid regimes are distinct in several ways. The regime type

affects the timing of mass mobilization. The democratic political system offers citizens multiple

points of access. Presumably, social movements in democracies can stage an effective protest

campaign regardless of the election cycle. In full-blown dictatorships, civic activists are

systematically denied opportunities to express their grievances and demand concessions from the


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government. Oftentimes, dictators opt to stifle any sign of dissent. In contrast, hybrid regimes

offer limited opportunities for political participation of regime opponents. Social scientists and

practitioners have recently begun to consider elections as a critical moment for regime change in

hybrid regimes (Forbig and Demes 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Lindberg 2009). When the

incumbent government in the hybrid regime resorts to large-scale electoral fraud, it may trigger

mass mobilization of the disgruntled population and culminate in the breakdown of the political

regime.

In addition, the regime type has an impact on the scope of movement demands. While

claim-making in democracies tends to reflect diversity of political views in society, the range of

permissible political claims is quite limited in non-democracies. An overt anti-incumbent

campaign is usually met with repression in hybrid regimes. Incumbents, however, might tolerate

moderate criticism of public policies if civic activists refrain from placing the blame for

socioeconomic problems on the chief executive. Social movements in hybrid regimes need to be

well aware of these constraints to minimize the extent of repression.

The regime type further affects movement choices regarding the repertoire of contentious

collective action, “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, acted out through a relatively

deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1995: 26). In democracies, given the protection of political

rights and civil liberties, social movements can choose a wide range of tactics. In contrast, the

repertoire of contentious action is quite limited in full-blown autocracies, since the intensity and

frequency of repression assume large proportions. The political context in hybrid regimes,

located between these two extremes, compels social movements to tread carefully in the grey

zone of politics. In particular, social movements in hybrid regimes need to display a lot of


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resourcefulness to combine protest tactics deployed in liberal democracies and full-blown

autocracies.

Finally, the regime type influences the repertoire of countermobilization tactics. In

democracies, incumbent governments are under pressure to act within legal boundaries in their

interactions with challenger organizations. In full-blown autocracies, incumbents have the

capacity to apply indiscriminate violence against social movements and cover up their hideous

acts. In hybrid regimes, however, the powerholders maintain a facade of democracy that

precludes them from launching an overt large-scale attack against challenger organizations.

Instead, incumbent authorities in hybrid regimes need to exercise ingenuity in manipulating laws

and devising extra-legal means to strip social movements of power.

The Rise of Hybrid Regimes

Since the collapse of communism, there has been a proliferation of political regimes falling

somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. According to Diamond (2002: 27), the number

of pseudodemocracies increased from half a dozen in 1974 to more than 45 in 2001, amounting

to somewhere between one-quarter and one-third of all states at the turn of the twenty-first

century. Within the post-Soviet region, Freedom House classified at least eight states as “partly

free” in the 1990s, indicating that they fell short of both liberal democracies and full-blown

autocracies.2

2 Freedom House is an international non-governmental organization that monitors democratic change worldwide. It ranks countries on a scale from one to seven based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. Then each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “free” (1.0-2.5), “partly free” (3.0-5.5), or “not free” (5.5-7.0). Since 1994, the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – are coded as “free,” while four Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – are coded as “not free.” For more information, see Freedom House (2007).

Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that such regimes are quite durable

(Brownlee 2009). More than two-thirds of post-Soviet states remained non-democratic in 1999, a


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decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The persistence of these pseudodemocracies begs the

question of how to distinguish them from other forms of political order.

The classification of contemporary non-democracies presents a challenge for social

scientists. To some extent, this challenge arises from disagreements over the definition of

democracy. According to the minimalist perspective, democracy is associated with free and fair

elections (Schumpeter 1942). Others posit that the provision of civil liberties and political rights

is an indispensible attribute of democracy (Dahl 1971). More recently, some scholars argue that

the notion of “an uneven playing field” should be integrated into the conceptualization of liberal

democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 2010b). Depending upon the preferred definition of

democracy, analysts may come up with different estimates of non-democracies in the world

today. A fine-graded classification of repressive political regimes is further compounded by the

fact that social scientists need to apply subjective criteria to distinguish between full-blown

autocracies and the hybrids. It is debatable when the scope, intensity, and frequency of

repression reach a point that calls for the classification of the regime as authoritarian, rather than

hybrid. Belarus, for example, is a case of the hybrid regime that has grown increasingly

authoritarian and has become known as Europe’s last dictatorship.

In light of these theoretical and methodological ambiguities, numerous efforts have been

made to conceptualize the essence of contemporary non-democracies and put a label on them.

Scholars describe such regimes as hybrid (Diamond 2002), competitive authoritarian (Levitsky

and Way 2002), or semi-authoritarian (Ottaway 2003), to name a few. This study focuses on a

subset of hybrid regimes defined as competitive authoritarian. According to Levistky and Way

(2010: 5), “competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic

institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which


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incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.”

In competitive authoritarian regimes election processes are fundamentally flawed, civil liberties

and political rights are systematically violated, and state resources are regularly abused to skew

political competition in favor of incumbents. Levitsky and Way (2010b: 10-12) point out that “an

uneven playing field” is marked by unequal access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of

law. Press freedom, for example, is constitutionally guaranteed in competitive authoritarian

regimes. Yet, incumbents systematically exert political pressures on the media by manipulating

libel laws and endorsing the selective enforcement of tax code. The aforementioned disparities in

access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of law underpin the durability of competitive

authoritarian regimes.

Nonetheless, elections in competitive authoritarian regimes present a slim opportunity for

political change. The political regime provides room for the nominal presence of the political

opposition. Electoral laws do not bar multiple candidates from vying for power. Under these

conditions, the opposition political parties may use the election period as a trigger to mobilize

citizens against the autocratic incumbent (Kuntz and Thompson 2009).

This study treats Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine as competitive

authoritarian regimes.3

3 Levitsky and Way (2010: 34) consider the political regime in Azerbaijan as “insufficiently competitive.” Azerbaijan, however, possesses most of the attributes of a competitive authoritarian regime, including multicandidate elections and the presence of opposition political parties.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s these countries lacked viable

democratic institutions. Elections were regularly held, and opposition political parties competed

for power. Incumbents, however, skewed political competition in their favor through systematic

abuses of democratic procedures. Numerous reports by the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) indicate that electoral processes in these states were


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fundamentally flawed. In the past few years, however, some of these regimes experienced a

period of political liberalization as a result of the so-called electoral revolutions, while others

remained resilient to political change.4 Massive protests against vote rigging led to the

resignation of the incumbent presidents in Serbia (2000) and Georgia (2003) and the political

defeat of the incumbent’s handpicked successor in Ukraine (2004). In contrast, the incumbent

presidents in Azerbaijan and Belarus survived outbursts of mass mobilization and consolidated

their power. A brief description of each country is provided in the following paragraphs.5

Azerbaijan is a former Soviet republic that regained national independence in 1991, after

a 71-year period under communism. It is located in the South Caucasus and borders on Armenia,

Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is a resource-rich country. According to some

estimates, the country’s proven oil reserves amount to seven billion barrels. In addition,

Azerbaijan is the twenty-fifth largest exporter of natural gas. Yet, most people live in poverty.

GDP per capita, ppp was $10,900 in 2010. The country has the population of eight million

people, 93 percent of which profess nominal identification with Islam. From 1992 to 2003 the

country was ruled by Heidar Aliyev, former Communist Party official and KGB chief. Prior to

his death, the incumbent president manipulated electoral processes to pass on the reins of power

4 The phrase “electoral revolutions” is widely used to describe mass protests in the aftermath of fraudulent elections in the post-communist region. Another popular term for these events is “colored revolutions.” The 2003 protest events in Georgia became known as the Rose Revolution because a few protesters carried roses to symbolize commitment to nonviolence. The phrase “Orange Revolution” was coined to describe mass mobilization in Ukraine because the color of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidential campaign (orange) was ubiquitous during post-election protests. The term “revolution,” however, does not imply the introduction of substantive, long-term institutional changes in domestic politics. Since these protest events, only Serbia made tangible progress towards the consolidation of democracy. Georgia and Ukraine experienced a short period of political liberalization followed by the reversal of democratic practices. Azerbaijan and Belarus continue to stay on the path to authoritarianism. In describing political arrangements in these states, I use the past tense in reference to events during the election year and do not imply the end of nondemocractic practices. 5 Country information, including population statistics and GDP per capita, ppp (2010), is retrieved from The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.


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to his 42-year old son, Ilham Aliyev. It is the only case of hereditary succession in the post-

Soviet region.

Georgia is another former Soviet republic located in the South Caucasus. It shares

borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. The country’s location between Asia and

Europe makes it an important transit point for energy supplies. Georgia is known for its exports

of agricultural products and beverages. The country’s GDP per capita, ppp was $4,900 in 2010.

The post-Soviet state has the population of 4.6 million people, 89 percent of which are Christian.

Eduard Shevardnadze, former Communist Party leader and Soviet Foreign Minister, was the

President of Georgia from 1995 to 2003. He was forced to resign almost one year prior to the

expiration of his second presidential term in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution.

Belarus is a former Soviet republic situated in Eastern Europe. The country borders on

the European Union (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and such post-Soviet states as Russia and

Ukraine. The incumbent president propagates the idea of market socialism, imposing state

control on prices and currency exchange. The local economy depends, to a large extent, upon the

cheap supply of energy resources from Russia. The country’s GDP per capita, ppp stood at

$13,600 in 2010. The country’s population is approximately 9.6 million people. Since 1994,

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, former head of a collective farm, occupied the president’s office and

was officially re-elected three times. Lukashenka has recently begun to make public appearances

with his out-of-wedlock son Kolya and position the 6-year old boy as his successor.

Similarly, Ukraine is a post-Soviet state sandwiched between the European Union and

Russia. Steel production is a significant contributor to the country’s GDP, making Ukraine the

fifth largest exporter of steel in 2010. The local economy is crippled by the heavy dependence on

Russia’s supply of highly-priced energy resources and lack of structural reforms. In 2010 the


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country’s GDP per capita, ppp was $6,700, almost three times less than in the neighboring

Poland. The country’s population is approximately 45 million people. From 1994 to 2004 Leonid

Kuchma, former manager of the Soviet Union’s largest missile factory, held the post of the

country’s president. Upon the expiration of his second presidential term, Kuchma halfheartedly

handpicked as his successor Viktor Yanukovych, a politician with the murky criminal record and

mafia ties. The large-scale electoral fraud during the 2004 presidential elections triggered

massive protests and led to the political defeat of Yanukovych.

Serbia is a post-socialist state that emerged from the debris of Yugoslavia. For more than

a decade since the violent breakdown of the multiethnic federation, Serbia was a part of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006 these two

states formally declared national independence. Like Azerbaijan, Serbia had GDP per capita, ppp

of $10,900 in 2010. The local economy was heavily hit by inept public policies and international

isolation in the 1990s. The country’s population is estimated to be seven million people. As a

former Communist apparatchik, Milosevic played a domineering role in Serbian politics from the

late 1980s until his forced resignation in 2000.

The incumbents in these states set up “an uneven playing field” by inhibiting the

opposition’s access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of law to the extent turnover of

power was hardly possible. The ruling elite sought to limit the opposition’s capacities to

campaign by stifling economic freedoms in the country. The authorities stalled market reforms

and checked the growth of the private sector. Tax police, for example, has become notoriously

known as a tool in state dealings with regime opponents. Businessmen associated with the

political opposition faced the threat of unscheduled tax inspections and hefty fines, while tycoons

close to the presidential administration reportedly received unsanctioned tax breaks.


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According to the Index of Economic Freedoms annually compiled by Heritage

Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, the selected states scored less than 60 points on a scale

from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum amount of economic freedom.6

Furthermore, domestic politics was marred with systematic encroachment on press

freedom (see Committee to Protect Journalists 2000-2005). Incumbent governments sought to

exercise control over the mass media in several ways. First, state officials hampered the issuance

of licenses and the distribution of airwaves to independent media. In Serbia, for example, the

government closed down the private radio station Radio B92. Second, state officials undermined

the financial viability of private media. The Belarusian authorities, for example, seized

equipment and froze a bank account of a private printing house that published several

independent newspapers on the eve of the 2001 elections. Moreover, the ruling elite arbitrarily

used libel laws and tax inspections to impose hefty fines and trigger the closure of independent

media for allegedly economic reasons. Third, the powerholders induced self-censorship by

orchestrating physical attacks on journalists. Media professionals known for their investigative

The

distribution of scores was as follows for the election year: Azerbaijan (2005) – 54.4, Belarus

(2001) – 38, Georgia (2003) – 58.6, and Ukraine (2004) – 53.7. The data for Serbia in 2000 are

unavailable, but it is reasonable to assume that the level of economic freedom during the late

Milosevic period was even lower than in the former Soviet republics. Given systematic

violations of economic freedoms, the political opposition faced considerable obstacles in raising

funds and disbursing resources to challenge the incumbent government.

6 A country’s overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on ten individual freedoms, each measured on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten freedoms are business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Based upon these indicators, such advanced industrial democracies as the United States and the United Kingdom scored 77 and 74 points, respectively, in 2011. For more information, visit the web site of the Washington-based think tank Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Index/.


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reports were often harassed by thugs. Several journalists were killed for performing their

professional duties. Georgiy Gongadze, editor of the online publication Ukrainska Pravda

(Ukrainian Truth), was murdered in September 2000. Likewise, Elmar Huseynov, editor of the

Azerbaijani magazine Monitor, was gunned down in March 2005. These systematic attacks on

press freedom hampered genuine political competition.

In addition, the incumbents manipulated laws to accommodate their political aspirations.

Specifically, they devised various ways to circumvent the two-term constitutional limit on

presidential terms and prolong their political dominance. To stay in power, Milosevic changed

his position from the President of Serbia (1989-1997) to the President of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (1997-2000). In addition, the FRY Assembly amended the constitution, stipulating

election of the president by direct popular vote, rather than the federal parliament. The

constitutional amendments were introduced shortly before Milosevic called snap elections, with

the intent to boost his bid for re-election. Upon the start of his first term, President of Belarus

Lukashenka also initiated the revision of national laws. The constitutional amendments of 1996

granted the president vast powers and extended his first term until 2001. In Ukraine Kuchma also

considered multiple legal maneuvers to extend his presidency. The Constitutional Court ruled

that the incumbent president was eligible to run for a third term in office. In 2004, however,

Kuchma announced his intent to step down and backed the candidacy of Yanukovych. In

Azerbaijan the incumbent president groomed his son as his successor. Of all the incumbent

presidents, only 75-year old Shevardnadze repeatedly stated that he would resign at the end of

his second term. At the same time, the President of Georgia warned the political opposition that

“authorities will not let destabilization, confrontation, or violence burst into state institutions,

including in election commissions” (Peuch 2003).


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The orchestration of large-scale electoral fraud was a common incumbent tactic in these

regimes. Elections in the selected states failed to meet OSCE standards for democratic elections.

OSCE (2000a) described the federal elections held in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on

September 24, 2000 as “fundamentally flawed.” Similarly, OSCE (2001) identified fundamental

flaws in the electoral process in Belarus. The 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia were also

marred with “significant and systematic electoral fraud” (OSCE 2003). Likewise, OSCE (2004)

documented “a number of serious shortcomings” during the first and second rounds of the 2004

presidential elections in Ukraine. In Azerbaijan, the OSCE election observation mission reported

“a wide range of serious violations during the vote count at the polling stations and during the

tabulation of results at constituency election commissions” (OSCE 2006a: 2). The powerholders

viewed fraudulent elections as a vehicle for extending the length of their tenure and keeping the

pretence of legitimate authority.

Notwithstanding gross human rights violations, the incumbents tolerated the presence of

opposition political parties. For example, Musavat Party and the Popular Front Party of

Azerbaijan (PFPA) participated in parliamentary elections and nominated their candidates for

presidency. On the eve of the 2003 presidential elections, a total of thirty candidates, including

Isa Gambar, leader of Musavat Party, and Ali Karimli, leader of PFPA, submitted applications

for registration (Sodergren 2004). Similarly, the Central Election Commission of Georgia

registered eleven candidates in the 2000 presidential election (OSCE 2000b: 10). In 2003 the

National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats passed seven-percent threshold to enter the

Georgian parliament. Likewise, the bloc “Our Ukraine” headed by Viktor Yushchenko and the

Tymoshenko bloc, named after the former prime minister Julia Tymoshenko, gained seats in the

Ukrainian parliament as a result of the 2002 parliamentary elections (OSCE 2002: 24). In Serbia,


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several political parties, including Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia, competed

for power in the 1990s. Finally, several opposition political parties, including the Belarusian

Popular Front (BNF) and the United Civic Party of Belarus, were formally registered in Belarus.

To protest the adoption of a new election code, most opposition political parties boycotted the

2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus. Despite considerable political setbacks, the opposition

political parties and politicians associated with them posed a threat to political stability. If well-

organized, the political opposition could expose electoral fraud, enlist public support, and

mobilize citizens against the current regime.

Civic activists in several post-communist states have recently attempted to bring about

regime change via elections. The assumption was that autocratic incumbents could be voted out

of office by virtue of a well-organized get out the vote campaign, professional work of

independent election observers, and large-scale post-election protests. Given the timing of mass

protests and popular demands of regime change, such events were aptly described as electoral

revolutions. This wave of electoral revolutions was marked by high levels of youth participation

in protest events.7

In large numbers, young people turned to the street to protest against vote-

rigging. Furthermore, for months prior to elections, youth movements challenged the power of

incumbent presidents and galvanized mass support for political change.

Youth Movements in Post-Communist States

Youth movements are here broadly defined as “organized and conscious attempts on the part of

young people to initiate or resist change in the social order” (Braungart and Braungart 1990:

157). The modifier “youth” refers to the demographic composition of the movement. Illic (2001), 7 Though different segments of the population participated in post-election protests against electoral fraud, youth movements were often considered as the engine of anti-regime resistance (Chivers 2004; Cornwinr 2005).


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for example, estimates that 71 percent of Otpor members were under 25 years of age. Empirical

evidence further suggests that students formed the core of activists in the youth movements. This

is consistent with the argument that the tipping point for participation in protest activity tends to

be lower for students, compared to other social groups (Jarvikoski 1993; Karklins and Petersen

1993). Young people tend to have less access to positions of power and fewer commitments

associated with the fulfillment of adult roles. At the same time, students play an important

symbolic role in modern societies. As one former Otpor activist put it:

Youth are small in numbers in the former Soviet republics, these are “old nations.” But

students are perceived as the future of the nation. If they turn to the street, it signals to the

rest of people that something is wrong. They don’t stand only for themselves, but also for

their families.8

This study treats the level of youth mobilization during the election year as the dependent

variable. In estimating the level of youth mobilization, the analysis relies upon three indicators:

the size of the youth movement, the size of post-election protests, and the length of post-election

protests. This study compares levels of youth mobilization in relative terms. First, this study

assesses the level of youth mobilization in proportion to the population of the capital city

because capital cities were central sites of political contestation in the region. Mass support for

anti-regime protests in these urban areas could be interpreted as an indicator of the movement’s

success. Second, the analysis takes into account the number of regional branches, given the

country’s population. If the social movement functions only in the capital city, it considerably

limits the scale of mass mobilization. In addition, the level of youth mobilization needs to be 8 Interview with Srdja Popovic, Otpor, member of the human resources and marketing department, Belgrade, January 23 2008.


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evaluated in proportion to the regime’s strength. In more repressive political regimes the

movement of a larger size is necessary to upset the power balance.

Though reported statistics capture cross-country differences, they should be considered

only as crude estimates of youth mobilization. Accurate data on the movement size are missing

for several reasons. First, some individuals participated in protest events without establishing a

formal affiliation with the movement. Second, most former movement participants continue to

live in repressive political regimes and decline to divulge full information about the size of anti-

regime social networks due to security concerns. Moreover, this study reports the size of post-

election protests as a whole because it is nearly impossible to compile the headcount of young

protesters in each country. Still, the overall size of post-election protests can give us a good

proxy for the level of youth mobilization because multiple reports point to the numerical

prevalence of young people among protesters in the street (Chivers 2004; Corwinr 2005).

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Table 1 presents estimates of mobilization levels in the region. Clearly, Otpor developed

the most extensive network of activists. By September 2000 Otpor had more than 70,000

members in 130 branches across the country. According to the reported data, every hundredth

citizen of Serbia was a movement participant. A smaller fraction of the total population joined

social movements in Georgia and Ukraine. According to the most optimistic estimates, Kmara’s

membership reached 3,000 people at the peak of the movement’s activity (Kandelaki 2006: 8).

According to Kaskiv et al. (2005), Pora had more than 35,000 movement participants in the

country of 45 million people. In Belarus Zubr established its presence in 152 towns, with more


20

than 1,500 people pledging the oath of allegiance to the movement (Babak 2002; Kobets n.d.). In

contrast, Azerbaijani youth groups attracted no more than 100 people each and operated, mainly,

in the capital city of Baku (Huseynov 2007).

Notwithstanding data limitations, it is quite clear that post-election protests in Serbia and

Ukraine were larger than those in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia. The size of the largest

protest rally in Serbia was equivalent to more than half of Belgrade’s population. Similarly, the

largest gathering of protesters in Maidan, Kyiv’s main square, approximated one-third of the

city’s population. Between three and ten percent of Tbilisi’s population turned to the street on

November 22-23, 2003 (Nodia 2005: 99). In contrast, the size of post-election protests was

equivalent to less than one percent of the city’s population in Baku and Minsk. In general, the

data suggest that it is insufficient to bring 15,000 protesters to the city’s main square to deter

police violence. When hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians filled Maidan, the sheer size of the

crowd imposed constraints on elite response. In contrast, the relatively small size of anti-

Lukashenka protests unleashed political violence against civic activists.

Finally, the length of post-election protests varies across the countries. The longest

protest campaign was held in Ukraine, in part, due to the permanent occupation of the city’s

main square and the installment of the tent city. Thousands of Ukrainians stayed in the tent city

from November to December 2004. Most people left the square on December 3, after the

Supreme Court’s ruling invalidated the fraudulent election results, while a few activists stayed

downtown until December 26, the re-run of the second round of the presidential election. In the

remaining cases, protest rallies were staged for several days after the fraudulent elections. The

first post-election protest rally was held in Tbilisi on November 4, 2003, two days after the

parliamentary elections. Subsequently, a round-the-clock protest rally was organized in front of


21

the parliamentary building from November 8 to November 14. After a short break the Georgian

opposition forces resumed protest rallies and pressed for Shevardnadze’s resignation. Two years

after Georgia’s Rose Revolution protest rallied were held in Baku. The length of protest rallies,

however, was shorter in Azerbaijan. In the wake of the 2005 parliamentary elections, citizens

participated in protest rallies on four separate dates. Furthermore, post-election rallies lasted for

only two days in Belarus in 2001. The Belarusian opposition lost momentum when Hancharyk

showed lack of interest in continuous anti-regime protests.

Overall, this analysis registers cross-country variations in the extent of youth

mobilization. This book contends that the study of tactical interactions between youth

movements and incumbent authorities provides a partial explanation for divergent movement

outcomes. Obviously, these tactical interactions were conditioned by the political environment

and resource availability.

The Study of Strategy and Tactics

In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the study of movement strategies and tactics

(Doherty 1999; Jasper 2004, 2006; McCammon 2003; McCammon et al. 2008; Minkoff 1999;

Taylor and van Dyke 2004). Strategy is a long-term plan of action, while tactics denote specific

means to execute a strategy. A major finding in the literature is that social movements tend to

deploy a recurrent set of tactics to attain their goals. Tilly (1995: 26) develops the concept of the

repertoire of contention to describe “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, acted out

through a relatively deliberate process of choice.” Strike, for example, is a common form of

protest among workers. Yet, the toolkit of movement tactics may undergo change. Beckwith

(2000: 181) introduces the concept of a hinge in collective action to define “an opportunity to


22

adapt or replace the traditional repertoire.” There may be several opportunities for the

transformation of the repertoire. Based upon the analysis of women suffrage movement,

McCammon (2003), for example, demonstrates how significant political defeat may trigger a

change in movement tactics. Research further suggests that a period of heightened protest

activity can engender the deployment of novel tactics. Tarrow (1993), for example, finds that

Italian workers devised new forms of strike during the protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s.

Another strand of research focuses on countermovement tactics (for a review, see

Davenport 2007). In non-democracies, the incumbent government is the movement’s primary

adversary. A consistent finding in this literature is that dissent provokes some form of repressive

action. Repression can be defined as “any actions taken by authorities to impede mobilization,

harass and intimidate activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison,

and/or kill movement participants (Stockdill 1996: 146). The literature indicates that incumbent

authorities can choose a wide range of repressive measures to retain power. Earl (2003), for

example, develops a typology of repression and contrasts coercion with channeling. While

coercion involves the use of force, channeling refers to a subtler form of repressive action aimed

at affecting “the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to

movements” (Earl 2003: 48). Furthermore, the behavior of the coercive apparatus may change

over time. Della Porta (1995), for example, documents the evolution of policing styles in Italy

and Germany from the 1950s to the 1980s. These two lines of inquiry are somewhat

disconnected.

The concept of tactical interactions brings these two strands of research together by

integrating into analysis tactics of both social movements and their opponents. McAdam (1983)

singles out two components of tactical interactions: tactical innovation and tactical adaptation.


23

Tactical innovation refers to the use of novel tactics by challenger organizations. In turn, tactical

adaptation describes tactics of the movement’s opponents to counterbalance the use of

unorthodox movement tactics. The concept of tactical interactions implies that both social

movements and their opponents engage in strategic thinking.

This study assumes that a small group of individuals – movement leadership – plays a

crucial role in developing the movement’s strategy and tactics. While rank-and-file members can

engage in heated debates about movement’s activities, it is oftentimes the movement leadership

that shoulders the responsibility for charting the movement’s course of action. Consistent with

this view, prior research indicates that movement leadership affects movement dynamics in

numerous ways (Nepstad and Bob 2006). From this vantage point, strategy is “a result of

interactions among the individuals authorized to strategize on behalf of the organization” (Ganz

2009: 10).

Following Ganz (2009), this study singles out three critical elements of the movement’s

strategy: timing, targeting, and tactics. First, the social movement needs to identify an

opportunity for political change to act effectively upon its demands. Second, the social

movement needs to focus on a specific target to make the best use of its resources. Third,

movement participants need to choose tactics that are most likely to produce the desirable

outcome. This study further distinguishes tactics pertaining to recruitment, tactics vis-à-vis

opponents, and interactions with allies. The “logic of numbers” dictates that recruitment tactics

are important to upset the power balance between the challenger organization and the

powerholders. Moreover, tactics vis-à-vis opponents and allies are critical to the movement’s

effectiveness, since the social movement is usually at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent

government.


24

The movement’s opponent is another major player in tactical interactions. In non-

democracies, the incumbent government is the movement’s primary adversary and target. It is

reasonable to assume that incumbent governments can display resourcefulness in counteracting

the deployment of unorthodox movement tactics. Yet, the concept of tactical adaptation has

received little attention in social movement literature. As Ingram, Qingyuan Yue, and Rao (2007:

54) point out, “protest targets have largely been depicted as actors devoid of strategic ability and,

instead, either blind to protests or able to crudely repress activists using the levers of the state.”

In particular, incumbent authorities in non-democracies can devise a plethora of

countermobilization measures to complement or substitute repressive action. Davenport (2007:

9), however, notes that social movement scholars tend to understudy such alternative

mechanisms of social control as persuasion and selective incentives.

This book extends social movement literature by examining state-movement interactions

in hybrid regimes. Most empirical research on tactical interactions has been done in advanced

industrial democracies. Dixon (2008), for example, examines the interplay between labor

movements and employer organizations in the United States in the 1950s. Much less empirical

work has focused on interactions between social movements and their opponents in non-

democracies (Titarenko et al 2001; Zhao 2000). Shriver and Adams (2010), for example, trace

the evolution of environmental dissent and state response in communist Czechoslovakia. The rise

of competitive authoritarian regimes provides another political context for analyzing the

interplay between social movements and their opponents. The regime type has an effect on the

repertoire of contentious collective action and the repertoire of countermovement tactics.

Compared to social movements in liberal democracies, challenger organizations in hybrid

regimes are likely to face higher barriers to political participation. At the same time, the


25

repertoire of countermovement tactics in hybrid regimes is constrained by the government’s

ambitions to maintain a façade of democracy. Under these circumstances, the choice of tactics

has significant repercussions for social movement outcomes.

Learning through Experience and Example

This book further contends that learning is a critical dimension of tactical interactions. Before

deciding upon the deployment of certain tactics, social movements and their opponents may

draw lessons from their own experience or the experience of others. This study singles out

engagement in previous protest campaigns and the cross-national diffusion of ideas as key

learning mechanisms.

A long-term history of mass mobilization has far-reaching consequences for state-

movement interactions. Through participation in a series of protest campaigns civic activists can

build their organizational skills and gain a better understanding of which anti-incumbent tactics

work in a particular political context. Furthermore, episodes of mass mobilization in non-

democracies may create “organizational holdovers” that can be activated at a later point in time

(Almeida 2003). Similarly, autocratic incumbents may respond to an outburst of mass

mobilization more effectively if they reflect upon their action during previous protest campaigns.

In addition, frequent confrontations with protesters may strengthen the capacities of the coercive

apparatus to police and suppress protests. Though social movements and their opponents do not

necessarily draw valuable lessons from previous protest campaigns, a record of mass

mobilization in the country increases the chances that such learning might occur.

The cross-national diffusion of ideas supplies another opportunity for learning by social

movements and their opponents. Diffusion refers to “the flow of social practices among actors


26

within some larger system” (Strang and Meyer 1993: 488). Within social movement literature,

empirical research focuses on the diffusion of movement ideas. The diffusing item might be the

tactical repertoire or collective action frames. This study treats a model of nonviolent resistance

– a set of novel tactics and collective action frames – as the diffusing item. In the course of the

protest cycle, another diffusing item might be the repertoire of countermobilization tactics.

Autocrats can exchange information about methods of social control to pre-empt the rise of

similar challenger organizations. The empirical analysis of this type of diffusion, however, is

complicated by the dearth of reliable data about interpersonal contacts between incumbents. To

demonstrate the occurrence of diffusion, it is necessary to trace ties between the transmitter and

the adopter of the diffusing item.

Scholars distinguish between relational and nonrelational channels of diffusion (for a

review, see Strang and Soule 1998). Relational channels of diffusion involve direct contact

between the transmitter and the adopter of the diffusing item. Diffusion, however, can occur in

the absence of interpersonal ties. Individuals can gain exposure to novel ideas through such

nonrelational channels as the mass media and the Internet. Furthermore, McAdam and Rucht

(1993) point out that attribution of similarity is pivotal for the adoption of the diffusing item

from one social movement to another. Soule (1997: 857), for example, finds that the tactic of the

shantytown “diffused most rapidly between colleges and universities of the same institutional

type, with similar levels of prestige, and with similar endowment sizes.” Most empirical work on

this topic has been done in advanced industrial democracies (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Chabot

2000; Soule 1997).

The analysis of electoral revolutions in the post-communist region has recently

broadened the geographical scope of diffusion research (Arias-King 2007a, 2007b; Beissinger


27

2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 2006b; Fenger 2007; Forbig and Demes 2007). Beissinger

(2007) conceptualizes the occurrence of electoral revolutions, as well as the onset of nationalist

mobilization in the late Soviet period, as a modular political phenomenon. From this theoretical

perspective, emulation of prior success may engender the organization of similar protest

campaigns in other politically affinitive contexts. In an extensive study of elections in nine post-

communist states, Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 43) examine how civic activists adopted the

electoral model, “a toolkit of novel and sophisticated electoral strategies,” to propel the turnover

of power. Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) argue that the presence of cross-country “collaborative

networks” composed of international and local NGOs facilitated the diffusion of electoral

strategies. Yet, much less empirical work has focused on elite reactions to the cross-national

spread of anti-regime tactics (Ambrosio 2009; Carothers 2006; Marples 2006; Silitski 2005).

This book seeks to contribute to this literature by underscoring the significance of

learning in shaping tactical interactions between social movements and their opponents. Scholars

tend to focus on proximate causes of mass mobilization. In addition, the media attention quickly

shifts from one protest event to another, losing sight of long-term struggle against authorities.

Yet, the confrontation between challenger organizations and the ruling elite often lasts an

extended period of time. Taking a long-term look at mass mobilization in a country can deepen

our understanding of state-movement interactions.

The Salience of Nonviolent Action

Over the past four decades, dozens of challenger organizations across the globe deployed

nonviolent tactics to propel political change. Schock (2005: 5) refers to this phenomenon as “a

global wave of unarmed insurrections.” The rise of people’s power movement in the Philippines


28

is a telling example of triumphant nonviolent action in the 1980s. Peaceful protests caused the

resignation of the incumbent president and marked the country’s transition to democracy.

Likewise, the Polish social movement Solidarity won concessions from the communist

government by virtue of mass mobilization in the 1980s. More recently, citizens in post-

communist states deployed nonviolent action to press for political change. Nonviolent resistance

to the regime culminated in the resignation of Milosevic in Serbia in 2000. Similarly, peaceful

protests in Georgia led to Shevardnadze’s exit from power in 2003. The following year mass

mobilization of Ukrainians accelerated the downfall of the president’s handpicked successor. By

the same token, peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated the power of nonviolent

action in non-democracies. Thousands of Arabs filled main squares in Tunis and Cairo to topple

the repressive political regimes.

In light of these political developments, there is a growing recognition among

practitioners and social scientists that nonviolent action might be more effective that the use of

violence in bringing about political change (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Roberts and Ash

2009; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973, 2010; Zunes 1994; Zunes, Kurtz and Asher 1999). Stephan and

Chenoweth (2008) single out two interrelated reasons why nonviolent campaigns might be

preferable to violent insurgencies. First, challenger organizations committed to nonviolent action

are more likely to gain legitimacy at home and abroad. Second, the use of nonviolent action may

strengthen the movement’s bargaining position vis-à-vis its opponents due to broad-based

popular support. In addition, Sharp (2010: 29) points out that the deployment of violence puts

challenger organizations “at a distinct disadvantage” due to significant state-movement

disparities in military capabilities.


29

In general, nonviolent action is used as a method of social change for pragmatic and

principled reasons. The perceived effectiveness of nonviolent action provides a compelling

argument for the use of nonviolent tactics. In addition, social movements may prefer nonviolence

on moral grounds. Numerous religious teachings condemn violence. A large body of secular

writings also calls for the use of nonviolent action. Notably, Mahatma Gandhi developed a set of

nonviolent tactics that guided the national independence movement in India and influenced civil

rights activists in the United States (Chabot 2000).

In this study, the phrases “nonviolent action” and “nonviolent resistance” are used to

describe movement activities. As Schock (2005: 6) notes, “nonviolent action is nonviolent – it

does not involve physical violence or the threat of physical violence against human beings – and

it is active – it involves activity in the collective pursuit of social or political objectives.”

Nonviolent action is a critical element of nonviolent resistance. Broadly defined, nonviolent

resistance is “a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological,

economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence” (Stephan and Chenoweth

2008: 9). Nonviolent resistance can take multiple forms. Sharp (1973) compiles a list of 198

methods of nonviolent action, including boycotts, strikes, and symbolic public acts. The choice

of nonviolent methods is likely to vary from one country to another, contingent upon a

combination of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors.

This study seeks to contribute to the literature by tracing nonviolent resistance to

autocratic incumbents in several post-communist states. A common attribute of the selected

youth movements is commitment to nonviolent action. While most previous research has focused

on cases of successful mobilization, this book includes cases of both success and failure. The

present analysis seeks to shed light on factors conducive to the effective use of nonviolent action.


30

Additional Explanations for Social Movement Outcomes

The literature offers multiple explanations for divergent social movement outcomes. One

contention in the literature is that changes in the political environment affect the movement

outcome (for a review, see Meyer 2004). Another argument is that access to resources is central

to social movement outcomes (for a review, see Jenkins 1983). Yet, it requires resourcefulness to

take full advantage of changes in the political context and available resources. As Ganz (2009: 8)

put it, “strategy is how we turn what we have into what we need to get what we want.”

The concept of political opportunity structure occupies a prominent place in social

movement literature. Tarrow (1998: 19-20) defines it as “consistent—but not necessarily formal

or permanent—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in

contentious politics.” The emergence of elite divisions, the escalation of human rights violations,

or changes in the international context might signal cracks in the edifice of the political regime.

Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003), for example, find that media access and social networks are

crucial conditions for mass mobilization in autocracies. This analysis does not deny the

importance of political environment. In describing the political context in which the selected

youth movements emerged, this study focuses on four dimensions of the political opportunity

structure: elite divisions, alignments within the opposition, media access, and the international

context. The emergence of divisions within the elite may weaken the government’s response to

the rise of an anti-incumbent social movement. Furthermore, the unification of chronically

fragmented political opposition may open up an opportunity for the turnover of power via

elections. If the supply of alternative information increases in non-democracies, an anti-regime

social movement is more likely to mobilize citizens in favor of its cause. Finally, changes in the


31

international context may boost the strength of the social movement through the enlistment of

third party support.

Another line of inquiry investigates the significance of movement resources. According

to the resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), resource-poor movements are

less likely to achieve their goals. A wide range of resources might affect social movement

outcomes. Some scholars distinguish between tangible and non-tangible resources (Freeman

1979). Monetary resources fall into the category of tangible assets, while human resources

belong to non-tangible assets of the social movement. This study assumes that human resources

are vital to the movement’s success, since the development of movement tactics depends upon

the strength of organizational and analytical skills exhibited by movement leadership.

This study contends that the choice of strategy and accompanying tactics is crucial to the

movement’s success. While structural changes in the political environment may affect the odds

of the movement’s effectiveness, it is incumbent upon movement participants to recognize the

presence of these changes. Furthermore, social movements can initiate an opening in the closed

political system if they devise effective strategies. The social movement, for example, can

produce an opening in the political opportunity structure if it skillfully pushes for the unity of the

opposition political parties around one presidential candidate on the eve of elections. By the

same token, resource-poor movements can overcome their disadvantaged position by displaying

resourcefulness in their confrontations with their opponents.

Data

This research is based upon a combination of sources. I conducted semi-structured interviews

with 43 former movement participants, representing Pora (N=17), Otpor (N=14), Kmara (N=7),


32

Zubr (N=2), Yokh (N=2), and Magam (N=1).9

Using the snowball approach, I identified key informants, “a small number of

knowledgeable participants who observe and articulate social relationships for the researcher”

(Seidler 1974: 816). The criterion for choosing respondents was a leadership role in the

movement. For example, eight out of eleven founding members of Otpor were interviewed.

For ethical/security reasons, the number of

respondents is very low in Azerbaijan and Belarus. A number of former movement participants

in these two states either face the threat of arrest or are imprisoned. A handful of non-movement

members were also interviewed in each country (N=16). These civic activists supplied an

alternative perspective on youth movements.

10

To date, it is quite problematic to secure interviews with high-ranking officials

responsible for the implementation of countermobilization measures. Notwithstanding partial

turnover of power in Serbia and Ukraine, gross violations of democratic procedures committed

during the period under study remain unpunished. The Serbian government struggles to deal with

the history of ethnic violence during the Milosevic presidency and refuses to open security

archives to the public. Furthermore, Yanukovych made a political comeback in Ukraine and

I

conducted most interviews during the field trips to the region in 2008 and 2010. The interviews

consisted of open-ended questions about tactics of social movements and their opponents. A

principal advantage of semi-structured interviewing is that it allows the researcher to uncover the

logic behind the movement’s action and identify themes overlooked or misrepresented in the

mass media (see Blee and Taylor 2002).

9 A full list of interviewees is provided in the Appendix. Upon request, I conceal the identity of some former movement participants. 10 Otpor’s eleven founding members were Ivan Andric, Slobodan Djindovic, Slobodan Homen, Milja Jovanovic, Nenad Konstantinovic, Ivan Marovic, Vladimir Pavlov, Vukasin Petrovic, Srdja Popovic, Dejan Randic, and Andreja Stamenkovic.


33

hunted down prominent revolutionaries. In addition, the newly-elected President of Georgia

Mikheil Saakashvili came under criticism for his non-democratic leadership style. The

incumbent presidents in Azerbaijan and Belarus continue to suppress civic activism to keep a

grip on power. In this political climate, most public officials are unlikely to divulge information

that might compromise their privileged position.

Additional data on state-movement interactions were retrieved from various public

sources, including newspaper articles, online publications, and NGO reports. Specifically, data

about repression were gathered from reports by such international organizations as Human

Rights Watch and OSCE and such local NGOs as Serbia’s Humanitarian Law Center and the

Belarusian human rights center Viasna.

Roadmap

This book focuses on youth movements in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine.

Chapter 2 treats elections as an opportunity for political change in hybrid regimes and describes

political context in the aforementioned states. The subsequent chapters analyze state-movement

interactions during the election period. Chapter 3 examines how Otpor developed a model of

nonviolent resistance that brought down Milosevic. Chapter 4 analyzes the adaptation of Otpor’s

ideas and the deployment of countermobilization tactics during the 2001 presidential elections in

Belarus. Chapter 5 examines the formation of Kmara and elite response in Georgia. Chapter 6 is

concerned state-movement interactions during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Chapter 7

examines the rise and fall of several youth groups in Azerbaijan. The book concludes by

stressing the importance of analyzing state-movement interactions to gain a deeper

understanding of divergent social movement outcomes.


34

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Table 1. The Level of Youth Mobilization

Youth Movement (Country, Year)

YM Size

Size of the Largest Post-Election Rally

Population in the Capital City

Population in the Country

Length of Post-Election Protests

Otpor (Serbia, 2000)

70,000

700,000

1.1 mln

7.1 mln

Sept. 24 – Oct. 5

Zubr (Belarus, 2001)

1,500

5,000

1.8 mln

9.6 mln

Sept. 9–10

Kmara (Georgia, 2003)

3,000

50,000-150,000

1.1 mln

4.6 mln

Nov. 4–23

Pora (Ukraine, 2004)

35,000

1 mln 1,546 Pora tents (15,000 people)

2.8 mln

45 mln

Nov. 22 – Dec. 3/26

Magam Yeni Fikir Yokh (Azerbaijan, 2005)

50–100 each

15,000

1.9 mln

8 mln

Nov. 9, 13, 19, 26

Note: Population statistics are retrieved from The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. Sources: Interviews with former movement participants; Babak (2002), Cole (2001), Kandelaki (2006); Kaskiv et al. (2005); Nodia (2005); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2005).

Documents

Nonviolent Resistance in Hybrid Regimes: Youth Movements in Post