No Science Asks Questions

“None of theArts thatGivesProofsaboutSomeNature

is Interrogative”: QuestionsandAristotle’sConceptof

Science

RobinSmith

Departmentof Philosophy, TexasA&M University

February25,2002

Moderninterpretershave often regardedAristotle’s PosteriorAnalyticsasa mystery, or even

a bit of an embarrassment.In his treatiseson naturalscienceandethics,Aristotle is constantly

concernedto review theopinionsof his predecessorsandof peoplein general;whereappropriate,

he also takesnoteof experientialobservations,someof themhighly specialized.However, the

traditionalview of thePosteriorAnalyticsis thatit advancesanalmostCartesianpictureof sciences

asdeductivesystemsfoundedonintuitivelyevidentfirst premises.How aretheseto bereconciled?

One reconciliationis to hold that the Posterior Analytics is not aboutscientific methodbut

insteadtreatssciencein someotherway: for instance,asJonathanBarnesargues(Barnes1981),

aboutscientific pedagogy. Another possibility is to agreethat the Posterior Analyticsand the

methodologyof thetreatisesconflictbut to explain thisdevelopmentally, asIrwin 1988does.Oth-

ershavelookedin moresubtlewaysfor methodologicallinks betweentheAnalyticsandthetreatis-

1

“Noneof theArts thatGivesProofsaboutSomeNatureis Interrogative” Page2

es(Lennox1987,1994,Ferejohn1991)or aggresively defendedtheinnatistposition(Kahn1981).

However, for moderninterpreters,theseapproachesstill leave a critical questionunanswered:if

Aristotle did think that sciencesshouldhave deductive structures,and if he knew (asAn. Post.

I.3 shows he did) that deductive systemsmustreston first principlesnot themselvesjustified by

deduction,thenwhatalternativeaccountof thejustificationof first principlesdid hehave to offer?

Beginning with the work of G. E. L. Owen(Owen1960,1961),an answerto this question

hasbeenelaborated,principally by that is now nearlya matterof orthodoxy1. In outline,it is that

Aristotle thoughtthe principlescould be establishedby ‘dialectic’. which is (in Irwin’s words)

‘a methodof arguing from commonbeliefs’, andwherethesecommonbeliefsarea collectionof

views held by certainclassesof people. Irwin in particulararguesthatAristotle cameto believe

a kind of dialecticalargumentcouldaccomplishthetaskof establishingtheprinciplesof sciences

after having rejectedwhat Irwin regardsas the ‘pseudo-performance’of ‘cognition by �� ’ to

whichAristotleappealsin PosteriorAnalyticsII.19. Thispictureof Aristotle’smethodasdialecti-

calrestsonseveralprooftexts,mostcritically TopicsI.2 andNicomacheanEthicsVII.1, 1145b2-7,

andon theobservation thatAristotle oftenbegins the treatmentof a subjectwith a survey of the

viewsaboutit generallyheldor heldby earlierphilosophers.I havearguedelsewherethatthis type

of interpretationrestson a conceptionof dialecticthat is at bestmisleadingandon unsustainable

readingsof certaincritical texts.2. Ratherthanrepeatthosecriticismshere,I want to explore a

questionthatarisesif they aresound.For Plato,dialecticwasthephilosopher’smethodof inquiry.

Aristotle,by contrast,treatsdialecticalandphilosophicalargumentsasthey weredisjoint andex-

plicitly saysthat dialecticcannotbe a part of science.What hasbroughtaboutthis change,and

1Therearedissenters:seeD. W. Hamlyn1990andSmith1993,1994,1999.2SeeSmith1993andSmith1997,Introduction,52-55.


whatconception—orconceptions—ofdialecticunderlieeachphilosopher’sopinions?

In brief, I shall argue that Aristotle andPlatoagreeon the natureof dialecticup to a point

andthat it is a differencein epistemologythat leadsto their differentviews of its relationshipto

philosophyor science.Both philosophersthink of dialecticasa matterof questionandanswer.

Platoholdsthat we have innateknowledgeof the Forms,which are the true objectsof science,

andthatwe acquirewisdomby recoveringthis knowledgealreadywithin us. This leadsnot only

to the notion that questioningcan both teachand discover the truth but also to the methodof

Division, which both PlatoandAristotle treatascentralto the philosopher’s activity. Aristotle

deniesthatwe have any innateknowledgeandholdsthat we acquireall the knowledgewe have

throughexperience.He alsobelieves,on thebasisof somerathersophisticatedlogical theorizing,

that the indemonstrableprincipleson which a sciencerestscanbeextractedfrom a collectionof

truthsaboutits subjectmatter. Finally, he hasa dim view of the prospectsfor armchairscience

basedon a priori theorizing,evidently becausehe hasdisillusionedby seeingit practiced.As a

resultof all this,question-and-answerexchangehasnoparticularrole in thephilosopher’smethod

accordingto Aristotle.

For Plato,the askingandansweringof questionswasthe very lifeblood of philosophicalac-

tivity, which heconceivedof asessentiallya form of conversation(heevencharacterizesthought

asa dialogueof thesoulwith itself). For Aristotle’s philosopher, theaccumulationof factsfrom

experienceis muchmoreimportantthantheparticipationin dialecticalexchanges,andquestioning

thereforetakesonafarmorerestrictedutility. Collectingtheopinionsof othersis animportantfirst

stepin any inquiry, sinceananalysisof theinconsistenciesandproblemsin thereceivedviews (a

processAristotlecalls �� , ‘puzzlingthrough’)will bringto theforewheretheproblemslie.

However, theaskingof questionsplaysno role at all in establishingthefinishedstagesof philo-


sophicalinquiry: “None of the artsthat provesconcerningany natureasksquestions”( �� !��!�" � � � � � $#&% " � �('��) � � � �� +* '�" � � � : Soph.El. 172a15-16).

1 Innate Knowledge, Forms, and Philosophical Method in Pla-

to

For Plato,theexistenceof separated,suprasensibleFormswasbothattestedto by, andnecessary

to explain, our cognitive abilities. In (Phaedo74a-75d),he arguesas follows. We often judge

two sticksor stonesto beequalor unequal, yet we have never perceivedany two sticks,stones,

or anything elsethatweretruly equal: all the so-called‘equals’ we have encounteredwereonly

approximations,falling shortof equalityitself. Whence,then,cametheknowledgeof this equal-

ity itself with which we arecomparingthesemany approximately-equals?It cannothave come

throughperception,for wehaveneverperceivedsucha thing. Neithercanits objectbeapercepti-

bleobject,for all thatweperceiveis alwayssubjectto change,whereasourknowledgeof theequal

itself is knowledgeof somethingwhich is alwaysjust what it is andnothingelse. Instead,there

mustbeanequalitself apartfrom theperceptibleworld. Moreover, sincewecannothaveacquired

aknowledgeof it throughperceptionin this life, thatknowledgemusthavebeeninnatein us.

Thisargumenttakesourability to understandtheword‘equal’ asagivenandconcludesthatthis

understandingcanonly beexplainedonthesuppositionsboththattheequalitself existsseparately

from theentiresensiblerealmandthatwe have innateknowledgeof it. Generalizingthis to other

notionsbesidesequalitygivesus Plato’s theoryof forms. We shouldtake notehereof a critical

differencebetweenPlato’sconcernsandthebasicpositionof modernepistemology. Sincethetime

of Descartes,philosophicalepistemologyhasbeenmotivatedby thegoalof respondingto skeptical


claimsthatwe do not have knowledge.By contrast,Platotakesour knowledgeof suchthingsas

equalityfor grantedandaskshow it is thatwecouldhaveit. Answeringtheepistemologicalskeptic

is not a majorconcernfor him. I shall arguebelow that thesameis trueof Aristotle, andindeed

thatAristotle’sviewshavebeendistortedby a failureto realizethis.

If theFormsaretheobjectsof knowledge,andif theknowledgeof Formscannotbeacquired

from experience,thenteachingcannotbe a matterof impartingknowledgeto thosewho do not

have it: thatwould be, in the wordsof RepublicVII, “lik e putting sight into blind eyes” (518c).

Instead,teachingcanonly bea matterof reminding,of gettingusto recall theknowledgealready

in our souls.This reminding,for Plato,is broughtaboutby questioningin theright way.

2 Plato’s Answer to Meno’s Challenge

Platoarguesfor this pictureof knowledgeasrecallingin theMeno, whereSocratesis challenged

by Menowith thefollowing puzzle:

And how, Socrates,will you seeksomethingwhenyou don’t know at all what it is?

For which oneof the thingsthat you don’t know will you setup asthe thin you are

seeking?And even if you did comeacrossit asmuchaspossible,how would you

know thatthis is thatthingwhich youdidn’t know?(Meno80d2-5)

Meno’spuzzleis aboutinquiry, notpedagogy:Meno’sdilemmais thatinquiry is eitherpointlessor

impossible.In response,Socratessays,in effect,thatwealreadyknow everything,having acquired

thatknowledgein a prior existence,andthat it only needsto bebroughtout througha processof

reminding.As evidencefor this,heundertakesto leadoneof Meno’sslaves,aman3 whohasnever

3Despitethe almostubiquitiouscharacterizationof him asa ‘slave boy’ in the secondaryliterature,he is onlyidentifiedasa slave, not alsoasa child. The word ,�-�.0/ , ‘boy’, is quite commonlyusedto mean‘slave’ (asindeed


studiedgeometry, to recognitionof the answerto a geometricalproblem,usingonly questions.

Socratesclaimsthat he doesnothingbut askthe slave to answeraccordingto his own opinions.

Using this technique,he first shows the slave that his initial beliefsaboutthe problemarefalse;

then,whentheslavehasbecomeperplexedandno longerbelievesheknowstheanswer, heelicits

from him answersto aseriesof simplequestionsthatendin hisassent(with understanding)to the

proposition“the squareon thediagonalof asquareis doublethatsquare”.Socratesconcludesthat

theslave really possessedthis knowledgeall along,or otherwisehewould not have beenableto

answerSocrates’questions.Moreover, sincehedid not acquiretheseopinionsin his presentlife,

theslavemustalwayshavehadthem,andthusmustalwayshaveexisted.Socratesconcludes:

Socrates: So, if at that time whenhewasnot a man,thereweretrueopinionsin him

which,whenawakenedby questioning,becomeknowledge,thenhissoulwill already

have learnedthroughall of time.

Meno: Soit seems.

Socrates: Sothem,if thetruthof thingsis alwaysin oursoul,thenoursoulis immortal.

Sowhoeverdoesnotactuallyknow now—thatis, whodoesnot recall—mustbebrave

andtry to inquire—thatis, bereminded?

(Meno86a6-b5)

Socrates’glossof ‘inquire’ ( 1 � � ��32 ) with ‘be reminded’shows that thesubjecthereis really the

right way to pursuephilosophicalinquiry, not simply pedagogy. Sincethe entireexchangewas

‘boy’ wasin theAmericansouthunderslavery). Manuscriptsof thedialogueidentify this characteras‘Meno’s boy’( ,�-�.0/547698;:�8;<�/ ), andSocratesso addresseshim (85b5-6). This wasthe standardway of referringto a slave (maleor female).If we do take ,�-�.0/ in thatphraseto mean‘child’, thenthemeaningbecomes‘Meno’s child’, i.e. Meno’soffspring,which is obviously not what is meant:the senseis ‘Meno’s slave’. He entersthedialoguewhenSocratesasksMenoto call ‘one of thesemany attendantsof yours’ (82a8-b1:=;>�8?,@<BACA�>�8?D�E�<BA�<�F�G;:�8H=I<@JK=;:�8;L�=;>�8NM�-@JB=I<@OP 8;- ). All thatweareactuallytold abouthisstatusis thatheis Greek,speaksGreek,andwasbornin Meno’shousehold.


promptedby anargumentfrom Menoto theeffect thatwecannotlearnanythingwedonotalready

know, thatis to beexpected.

In thePhaedo, Platoalludesto this episodein termsthatmake it explicit that ‘reminding’ is a

matterof askingquestionsin acertainway:

Whenpeoplearebeingquestioned,if you do thequestioningwell, thenthey will on

theirownstateeverythingasit is; yetif knowledgeandcorrectreasonwerenotactually

presentin them,they wouldnotbeableto do that.(Phaedo73a1-6)

Unfortunately, Platodoesnot tell us,eitherin theMenoor thePhaedo, what this correctway of

questioningmustbe.Let meoffer anattemptat filling thatgap.

2.1 Dialectic and Refutation

Whatever the right way of questioningis, Throughouthis works, Platoassociatesthe term ‘di-

alectic’ with theactivity of thephilosopher. Justwhathemeansby it maychangefrom dialogue

to dialogue(Robinsonsuggestedthat we might almosttake it to mean“the methodof philoso-

phy, whatever that turnsout to be”). However, somegeneralizationsarereasonablysecure.To

begin with, dialectic is concernedwith questioning.This canbe groundedin the history of the

term beforePlato. Aristotle namedZenoof Eleaasthe founderof dialectic,andboth Aristotle

andPlatoregardedSocrates’characteristicstyleof interrogatingpeopleasdialectical.Two things

thesepracticessharearethat they aremattersof arguingby askingquestionsandthat they aim at

refutation(thoughin Zeno’scase,thequestionsmaybeansweredfor anotionalrespondentby the

arguerhimself).

Now, refutationmayclearthegroundfor furtherinvestigationsor inspirea desireto learn,but


it is not very promisingasthe whole of a methodof philosophicalinquiry: if all that you do is

refute,how canyou everbuild anythingup?Platoputsexactly this criticism into Meno’smouth:

Socrates,even beforeI met you, I heardthat you were just confusedyourself and

modeothersconfusedaswell. And now, asit seemsto me, you arebewitching me

andcharmingme andenchantingme into the middle of a confusion. If I may joke

a little, you seemto me, both in appearanceandotherways,very muchlike the flat

torpedo-fishin the sea: it too is full of numbnessandmakesanyonewho touchesit

numb. I think youhave just now donethatto me. I amtruly numbin soulandspeech,

andI can’t answeryou. However, I havegivenmany speechesaboutvirtue, thousands

of times,in front of many people—anddoneit quitewell, asfarasI’m concerned,yet

now I can’t evensaywhatit is at all.(Meno79e7-80b7)

Making allowancesfor Meno’s woundedpride andPlato’s ironic humor, thereis a seriouspoint

here. If all that Socratescando with his refutationsis leave peopleconfused,of what benefitis

it? Socrates’answerto this, throughhis conversationwith theslave, is twofold. First,hesaysthat

evenif all hedoesis refutepeopleandtherebyleave themconfused,hedoesnot injure thembut

ratherbenefitsthem,sinceit is alwaysbetterto know oneis ignorantthanto believe falselythat

oneknows(84a-c).

Socratesdoesnotstop,however, with thisdefenseof hispracticeof refutingpeopleandleaving

themconfused.He alsoclaimsthat theslave alreadyhasknowledgein him aboutthequestionat

hand,andheundertakesto show thisby askinghim questionsto helphim recover thatknowledge.

Thesequestions,however, do not involve any refutation.Thus,we have dialecticwithout refuta-

tion: it still relieson questionandanswerandrestson theopinionsof another, but thequestions


areintendedto awakendormantknowledgeratherthanto exposeunacknowledgedignorance.

In effect, theMenoexpandsthenotionof dialecticbeyondthepracticeof refutationubiquitous

in theearlydialoguesto obtaina positivemethod.This new kind of correctquestioningis dialec-

tical becauseit restson questioningandexpectsrespondentsto answerin accordancewith their

own opinions,but it haspositive, not merelynegative, effects. Its endresult is newly awakened

knowledge.But whatwouldamethodof inquiry by askingquestionslook like?

2.2 Questions and the Method of Division

The simplestdescriptionof Socrates’methodin his conversationwith Meno’s slave (Meno82b-

85b) is thathe asksvery simplequestionsandshows how a hardbut unanswerablequestioncan

be replacedby a seriesof simplequestions.At thebeginningof the exchange,he askstheslave

simplequestionsthatdeterminethat theslave knows whata squareis andcanunderstandhow to

computetheareaof a square.Then,heposesonemorequestionthattheslave takesto beequally

simple:“How longis thesideof thedoublesquare?”Theslaveanswersconfidentlybut incorrectly,

andSocratesrefuteshis answerby showing him that it leadsto resultsthatare(to him) obviously

incorrect.This is repeatedfor theslave’s otherattempts,andfinally hegivesup andsayshedoes

not know. It is at this point that Socratesturns from refuting to ‘correct questioning’. He asks

shortandeasyquestions,mostlyadmittingof simpleyes/noanswers:“If we addthreemorelike

squaresaroundthisone,is theresultasquare?”“If wedraw aline throughthissquarefrom corner

to corner, doesit divide the squareinto two equalhalves?” “Do thesefour lines, from cornerto

cornerin eachof thesefour squares,form a square?”Proceedingin this way, he leadsthe slave

to therecognitionof thecorrectanswerto theinitial question:thesideof thedoublesquareis the

diagonalof thesquare.


In this example,it is hardnot to supposethatPlatois relying on his audiencebeingawarethat

thequestion“How long is thesideof thedoublesquare?”is especiallydifficult to answerin the

waytheslavetriesto answerit. Sincethetwo areincommensurable,therelationshipbetweenthem

is, in Greekmathematicalterminology, Q �32;� ‘ � � �� —literally, ‘unsayable’.

Onelessonthatmightbetakenfromthisexampleis thatit is easierto chooseamongalternatives

thanto comeup with a substantive answer. If we areableto replacelarge questionsof the form

“What is X?” to questionsof theform “Is X Y, or is it Z?”, we mayfind themmoretractable.We

may alsofind it easierto dealwith questionsthat admit of yes/noanswersratherthanrequiring

moresubstantiveresponses.To oversimplify, Meno’sslavecangetnowherewith “What is theside

of thedoublesquare?”,but hedoesquitewell with “Is this squareon thefour-foot line thedouble

of thesquareon thetwo-foot line?”

Now, in the Sophistand Statesman, Plato introducesa methodof ‘Di vision’ as the way to

discover the essencesof things. Division is a methodfor finding the definition of a thing. We

begin by locatingoursubjectX in ageneralclassor R � �� . Wethendividethisgenusinto two—or

perhapsinto threeor four or more,but let usignorethathere—andaskourselves,“Into whichpart

of the Division doesX fall?” Having answeredthis, we thendivide that part again,chooseone

of the parts,andso on, until we have reachedX all by itself. For instance,a Divider trying to

determinethedefinitionof ‘human’ beginsby locatingit in thegenus‘animal’, thendividesthis

into mortalandimmortalanimals,andfinally asks:is a humanmortalor immortal? Thedivider

chooses‘mortal’, andthedivisionproceedsfrom there.

The methodof Division thustakesexactly the sameapproachto questioningasSocratesdid

in talking to Meno’s slave: it replacesa largesubstantive questionwith simplerchoicesbetween

alternatives.We maynot know just whatto do if asked“What is a sophist?”,but we cando better


with “Is a sophista kind of hunter?”To take a moreseriousexample,it will beeasierto respond

to “Is a humanterrestrialor aquatic?” than to respondto “What is a human?” The methodof

Division, I amproposing,is thesystematicreductionof large andsubstantive questionsto small

questionsthataskfor choicesamongalternatives.

Thoughit hasbeendisputed,I think it is clear that Plato thoughtDivision wasgenuinelya

methodfor thepursuitof philosophicalinquiry. For onething,aconcernwith answeringaquestion

of the form “What is X?” is at the centerof most of Plato’s dialogues,from the Euthyphro’s

question“What ispiety?” to theRepublic’s“What is justice?”to theSophist’s“What is asophist?”.

Suchquestionsare answeredby definitions,andDivision aims at finding definitions. External

testimony alsoconfirmsthepreoccupationof theearlyAcademywith findingdefinitions.

Supportcanalsobe drawn from Aristotle’s Topics. Especiallyin its eighthBook, Aristotle

clearlytakesfor grantedthathisaudienceis familiar with a stylizedform of debategovernedby a

numberof rules.Eachdebatetakesplacebetweenananswerer, whoseeksto maintainsomethesis,

andaquestioner, whoseeksto refuteit, i.e.,to leadtheanswererto concessionsfrom whichits con-

tradictorycanbeconcluded.Thequestioneris allowedonly to askquestionsthatcanbeanswered

by ‘yes’ or ‘no’; the answereris only to respondaffirmatively or negatively (thoughquestioners

areallowedto rejectquestionsasill-formed if, for instance,they implicitly askmany questions).

Evidently, theprincipalsubject-matterof thesedebatesis definitions.This is evident in theclas-

sificationof all predicationsinto four types:thosegiving thegenusof something,thosegiving its

definition, thosegiving its ‘peculiar property’ (proprium, ST�� ), andthosegiving an accidentor

incidentalproperty( "�!��VU �CU� XW � ). As Aristotle notes(I.5, 102b27-35),this entireclassification

systemrevolvesarounddefinitions.Moreover, this systemis theprincipleof organizationof Top-

ics II-VI, which discussargumentsabouteachof thepredicablesin turn. Whatever elsewe may


concludeabouttheTopics, its focusis clearlyargumentsaboutdefinitions.

I will simplytakeit for grantedthatmembersof Plato’sAcademyengagedin aformalizedkind

of disputationby questionandanswerconcernedprimarily with definitionsandthat theTopicsis

intendedprimarily for theseexchanges. To speculatea little further, thesedisputationsmight

plausiblyhave beenbasedon thepremisethatknowledgeof thenaturesof things,beingalready

presentin usfrom birth, couldbebroughtto light by anappropriateform of questioning.Debate,

for Plato,wasa form of scientificresearch.Thereareotherreasonsfor supposingthatPlatotook

philosophicalinquiry to beclosely, or evenindissolubly, linkedto debateanddialecticalexchange.

His expressionsof distrustof writing in thePhaedrus, theStatesman, andtheSeventhLetter are

motivatedin part by the view that only in an exchangebetweentwo personsis real philosophy

possible.

3 Aristotle’s Criticism of Division

Aristotle rarelymentionsDivision exceptto criticize it, andhis criticism is severe: hecomplains

thatasa methodof proof, it fails sinceit is little morethanbeggingthequestion.As heputsit in

An. Post. II.4:

Nor is theroutethroughdivisionsdeduced,aswassaidin theanalysisconcerningthe

figures.For nowheredoesit happenthat this factmustbegiventhat thesethingsare;

rather, it is like the personarguing inductively, who alsodoesnot demonstrate.For

theconclusionshouldnot beputasa questionor beasa resultof someoneconceding

it; instead,it shouldbenecessaryfor it to begiventhattheseare,evenif theanswerer

deniesit. “Is a humanananimalor inanimate?”If hepicks“animal”, it still hasnot


beendeduced.Next: “Everyanimalis terrestrialor aquatic.” He picksterrestrial,and

thatmanis thecombination,terrestrialanimal,doesnotnecessarilyfollow from what

wassaid,but he assumesthis aswell. It makesno differencewhetheronedoesthis

with many casesor with a few, for it is thesamething. (91b12-23)

Aristotle’s criticism, broadlyspeaking,is that eachstepin a Division dependson an answerer’s

choiceor concession.At no time is thenext stepsomethingwhich ‘must begiventhat these[i.e.

prior steps]are’, that is, a conclusionwhich follows from prior steps(the phraseAristotle uses

hereis taken from his definitionof a ‘deduction’or ‘syllogism’ ( "�!ZY�Y� R�� "�� W � ): seeAn. Pr. I.2,

Topics I.1, S.E.1. Now, it might be objectedagainstAristotle that this criticism supposesthat

Division wasintendedasa modeof proof in thefirst place,somethingwhich (it will beurged)it

neednot be. Division, accordingto this objection,is a methodof discovery for definitions,not

a techniquefor proving them. Indeed,the objectioncontinues,sinceAristotle himself doesnot

think thatdefinitionsin generalcanbeproved,andsinceheproposessomethingvery reminiscent

of Division in An. Post.II.13 asa meansfor finding definitions,his criticism of PlatonicDivision

is grosslyunfair. Division and deductionsimply aim at different results,and to complainthat

Division doesnot deduceis thereforeno moresensiblethanto complainthatdeductioncannotbe

usedto discoverdefinitions.

I believe that this objectiondoesnot recognizehow deepAristotle’s criticism goes.Whathe

is doing is rejectingnot just Plato’s view on how to find definitionsbut alsoPlato’s conception

of how to pursuephilosophicalwisdom,andultimatelyPlato’s conceptionof whatphilosophical

wisdomconsistsin. Fromthis perspective,hiscriticismsare,I shallargue,right on themark.

Wemustfirst seewhatAristotleadvancesasanalternativeto thePlatonicpicture.This is most

forcefully presentedin An. Pr. I.30 where,having finishedhis presentationof whatheregardsas


theuniversaltheoryof valid argument,heannouncesthatwhathehasgivenusis nothinglessthan

theonetruemethodof inquiry:

The way is the samefor everything: for philosophyaswell as for any art or study

whatever. That is: we mustcollect what belongsto eachthing andwhat it belongs

to, haveasmany of theseavailableaspossible,andinvestigatethemthroughthethree

terms,establishingin thisway, refutingin that(accordingto truth,from whathasbeen

demonstratedto belongaccordingto truth, in dialecticaldeductionsfrom premises

accordingto opinion. ... For this reason,the principlesof eachscienceare to be

providedby experience.... thus,if the factsthat obtainaboutanything aregrasped,

it is alreadyoursto bring demonstrationreadily to light. For if nothingthat truly is

thecasehasbeenleft out of thehistoria, we will beableto find thedemonstrationof

everythingthathasa demonstration;andfor thatof which thereis no demonstration,

wewill beableto make thatevident.(46a3-30)

Thereis no mistakingthesweepof this declaration.Furthermore,Aristotle quiteclearlyintendsit

to supplantPlato’s own method.He follows this passageimmediatelywith a criticism of Division

that repeatsthe main points found in An. Post. II.5. The “route of division throughgenera”,

he says,is only “a certainsmall part” of this onetrue method,andon its own it is only a kind

of extendedbegging the question(46b2-19),. Moreover, its partisansfailed to understandeven

the limited usefulnessthat it doeshave. Thus,Aristotle claims, the little that is valuableabout

Division is alreadysubsumedunderhis own grandermethod,andtheproponentsof Division did

notunderstandthepowerof their own method.


What,then,is this methodwith which Aristotle comparesDivision?We might supposethat it

is somebettermethodof findingdefinitions.However, definitionsarethegoalof Divisionbecause,

for Plato,definitionsexpressthecontentof thephilosopher’s knowledge:Division is Plato’s road

to wisdom. Aristotle rejectsthis view andmaintainsinsteadthat thephilosopher’s knowledge—

science,' �+� " � * � � —consistsin thepossessionof demonstrations( [ � � � ��]\�� ). Science,hetellsus

in An. Post. I.2, is knowing thereasonwhy somethingmustbeso,andwe have suchknowledge

whenwe possessa demonstrationof it, which is a deductionof it from premisesgiving its cause

or explanation.A deduction( "&!ZY�Y� R�� "&� W � ) is simply a valid argument,that is, anargumentwith

thepropertythatits conclusionis necessarilytrueif its premisesare.Now, Aristotle’sfundamental

complaintagainstDivision is thatnothingis ever necessitatedby what hasgonebefore. What a

Division cannotdo, then,is explain why anything mustbe thecase.Aristotle’s complaintis not

simplywith themethodof Divisionbut with theunderlyingsuppositionthatscienceor philosoph-

ical wisdomcanbeexpressedin definitions.

But Aristotle’s criticismsof Division have astheir backgrounda comparisonof Division with

his own alternativemethod.Whatpreciselyis thatmethod,andhow is it ableto accomplishwhat

Divisioncannot?

Onefurtherelementof Aristoteliantheorymakesthis methodpossible.Aristotle believesthat

a relatively simpletheorycanbegiventhataccountsfor absolutelyall valid arguments.Sincehis

methodis unintelligibleapartfrom thattheory, weneedto pausefor a look at it.


4 Deduction and Aristotle’s Philosophical Method

Aristotle thinks that every sentencewith a truth valueis oneof two types: eitheran affirmation

affirming somepredicateof somesubject,or a denialthatdeniessomepredicateof somesubject.

Affirmationsanddenialsmaybefurthersubdividedinto thosewith individual subjects(‘Socrates

is human’)andthosewith universalor generalsubjects(‘Greeksarehuman’);thosewith general

subjectsmaybefurtherdividedaccordingasthepredicateis affirmedor deniedof all of thesubject

(‘All Greeksarehumans’,‘No Greeksarehumans’)or of partof it (‘SomeGreeksarehumans’).

His logical theory(which we may convenientlycall the ‘syllogistic’) is thenthe theoryof infer-

encefor sentencesof thesetypes. Very roughly, Aristotle’s logic is the ‘traditional’ logic of the

syllogism.

It will be convenientto introducesomenotationhere. I representthe four typesof general

sentenceasfollows:^holdsof every _ (Every _ is

^)

â` _^holdsof no _ (No _ is

^)

âb _^holdsof some_ (Some_ is

^)

^dc _^doesnotholdof every _ (Not every _ is

^)

âe _In An. Pr. I.1-7, Aristotle studiesthevalid inferencesinvolving pairsof thesesentencesthat

shareone term. This theory is the principal basisof his well-deserved reputationasoneof the

greatestlogiciansof history; sinceit hasbeenthoroughlystudied(seeLukasiewicz 1957,Patzig

1968), I will only note a few points here. First, Aristotle proves that all the valid syllogistic

argumentscanbe‘reduced’to thesefour (I give themedieval mnemonicnamesfor each):

^d` _gfK_ `hjikâ`h(Barbara)^db _lfK_ `hjik^dbmh(Celarent)


^d` _gfK_ cnhjio^dcnh(Darii)^db _lfK_ cphjikâe�h(Ferio)

Second,Aristotle knowsthattheseresultsfollow from whathehasproved:

1. A universalaffirmativeconclusioncanonly bededucedfrom theform Barbara.

2. A universalnegativeconclusioncanonly bededucedthroughoneof thesethreeforms:^db _lfK_ `hjik^dbmh(Celarent)^d` _gf âbmhjik^dbmh(Camestres)^db _lf â`hjik^dbmh(Cesare)

Now, supposethat we are seekinga proof for a universalaffirmative propositionâ` _ . Since

Barbara is theonly syllogistic form with ana conclusion,our proof mustendwith an inference

like this: â`h hq`r^d` _s s s tttIf we continueour regressby looking for true premisesfrom which eachof

^d` h f hu` _ , canbe

deduced,wewill in eachcasehave to find anotherpair of truea propositions,e.g.:

â`r rv`h hq`w wx` _â`hy y y y y y tttttt hu` _s s s s s s tttttt^d` _z z z z z z z z z z z z {{{{{{{{{{{{

Aristotle exploresthe propertiesof suchregressesin detail in An. Post. I. 19-22. To explain

his results,it will be clearerto usediagramsrepresentingthe relationshipsof the termsin the

propositionsratherthanthepropositionsthemselves.I representana propositiona` _ asa graph


in which^

is above _ andanepropositionab _ by joining two termswith a line markedwith

b:

^d` _}| ^ âb _~| ^ � __Theterm-chaingraphfor theregressfor

^d` _ depictedpreviously thenlookslike this (with anno-

tationsto theright showing thecorrespondencewith thepreviousrepresentation):

^ ^d`r� � � �� r â`hs s st t trv`h� � � �

� � � �h ^d` _� � � � � � � ��

�hu`w� � � �� w hq` _s s s

t t twx` _� � � �� _

As this diagramshows,eachstageof theregressrequirestheintroductionof a new termbetween

the termsof oneof thepremisesreachedat theprecedingstage.For instance,termr

is betweenând

h, the termsof premise

a`h. This termthenservesasthemiddle term in a proof of that

premise. The regresscancontinueas long asanotherterm canbe found betweentwo adjacent

termsat the last stageof the regress.We may call this process‘packing’ the interval, following

Aristotle.4 Conversely, if thereis no suchterm, thentheregresscomesto a stopat thatpoint. A

premisefor which this happensis ‘unmiddled’ ( Q �X��"�� )5. Suchanunmiddledpropositioncannot

bededuced,in Aristotle’s logic, from anyothertruepropositions.

4TheGreekverbis E�-�=;-C,@JBE�8;<@OC8 , ‘pack full’ or ‘thicken’; heusesit only once,at An. Post. I.14,79a30.5I preferto avoid thepotentiallymisleadingbut traditionaltranslation‘immediate’


The lastpoint is crucial: in a systemgovernedby Aristotle’s logic, therecanbetrueproposi-

tionswhichcannotbededucedfrom any othertruepropositionswhatever. Thisis areflectionof the

very weakcharacterof Aristotelianentailment.Underclassicalpropositionallogic, for instance,

no propositioncanhave this property(any proposition� is logically equivalentto �� , �X�N� , and

infinitely many otherpropositions;so, if � is true, thensoareinfinitely many otherpropositions

from which it canbededuced).By contrast,considertheset

� â` _lf;_ `h f ^d`h f ^�cnh f h7cp^ f ^dc _gfK_ cp^ fK_ cph f h7cpû�

All thepropositionsin this setcanbededucedfrom thetwo propositionsd` _ and _ `�^ ; in fact,

thesetis simplythedeductiveclosureof� â` _lfK_ ` h�� . However, neitherof thesetwopropositions

canbededucedfrom any combinationof theremainingpropositions.Consequently, eachof these

two setsis deductively closed:

� ^d` _lf â`h f ^dcph f huc�^ f ^�c _lfK_ cp^ f;_ cnh f h7cp^q�� _ `h f â`h f ^dcph f huc�^ f ^�c _lfK_ cp^ f;_ cnh f h7cp^q�

For Aristotle, of course,theseare not factsmerely aboutsyllogistic systems,sincehe thought

(andindeedthoughtthathecouldprove6) that thesyllogisticwasthecorrecttheoryof inference

6I will not try to arguefor thisclaimhere,but therelevanttextsarethese:(1) at40b17-22,whenhehasfinishedhisaccountof thesyllogistic,hesaysthathehasshown thatall ‘argumentsin thefigures’(i.e. two-premisesyllogismsinthetraditionalsense)are‘completed’by thefirst-figureforms �H��B�T��K� and ��;��K�I�� . He thencontinues,‘But thateverydeductionabsolutelyspeakingis like this ( ��,�A�>+/�,��@/�M�JCACA�<��M��m�@/�<@ K=;:+/ P¢¡I£ � ) will beclearwhenit hasbeenprovedthatall comeaboutthroughoneof thefigures’.This is followedby anargumentbeginningwith theclaim thatany proof mustprovesomepredicateeitherto belongor not to belongto somesubjectandconcludingthat this mustemploy arguments‘in thefigures’. (2) At 46b38-47a9hesummarizeswhathehasachievedandwhat remainsto bedoneof hisproject.Thefinal phasewill beshowing ‘how wecananalyzeexistingdeductionsinto theaforementionedfigures’,andindeedwhatAristotlediscussesin therestof An. Pr. is how to turnvarioustypesof argumentinto figured


absolutelyspeaking.

Regressesfor e propositionsaresomewhatmorecomplicated.First, notethat if^db _ , thenno

chaindescendingfrom^

canintersectwith any chaindescendingfrom _ (otherwise,we would

have a proof of^�c _ via

rv`�¤¥` �V¦ c . Consequently, for any termsh

andr

below^

and _ respec-

tively, wemusthavehqbmr

: ^ � _h � rHowever, two chainsascendingabove thetermsof ane propositionmay intersect,asin this con-

figuration: ^§ § § § § ¨¨¨¨¨_ h...

...

Now considerhow regressesfor a universalnegative propositionâb _ can proceed. A deduc-

tion ofâb _ musthave oneof threeforms:

âbmh f hu` _ i©âb _ (Celarent),hu`�^ f hub _ iª^db _

(Camestres), orhqb@^ f hu` _ iªâb _ (Cesare). Eachof theseusesan

`premisewith oneof the

terms f;_ asits subjectandanb

premisecontainingtheotherterm.A continuedregressfor the`

premisewill consistof packingtheinterval^ _ . Continuationof theregressfor the

bpremisewill

againgive`

andb

premises.However, asthefollowing graphshows,any additionalmiddleterm

arguments.(3) In An. Pr. II.23, 68b8-14,Aristotle saysthat ‘not only do dialecticalanddemonstrative deductionscomeaboutthroughthesefigures,but also rhetoricalones,andabsolutelyany kind of proof whatsoever from anydisciplinewhatever’ ( D�A�A�«NE�-�LV<B¬VI®B=I<@¯C� E�<BL�E�-�L��,�A�>+/�°K=C�±M�<@O�8²,�³±Mm=C�´/�E�-�L+°?E�-�G�µX¶�,�<m�´-@8I<@O�8·��69G;<@¸;<C8 ). WhetherAristotle actuallysucceedsin proving theseclaimsis anotherissue;thepoint is thatheleavesno roomfor doubtthathethinksthetheoryof ‘argumentsin thefigures’ is theuniversaltheoryof valid arguments,without restriction.


will alwaysbeeitherin anascendingchainabove^

or in anascendingchainabove _ :

w¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ yyyyh»º ��¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼

¼¼¼r(½��¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾¾ ¾ ¾Middle terms

for CamestresMiddle terms

for Cesareh�¿ �ÀÀ ÀÀÀÀÀÀÀ rl¿�0Á ÁÁ Á Á Á Á Á Á^ � _Theregressthusproducesascendingchainsabove

ând _ .

Now, Aristotle argues(An. Post. I.22) thatevery ascendingor descendingchainis finite, that

is, containsonly finitely many terms. From this, it follows that every premiseregressfor an a

propositioneventuallycomesto a stop: an infinite regresswould packinfinitely many termsinto

the interval betweenits subjectand predicate,thus producingboth an infinite ascendingchain

above thesubjectandaninfinite descendingchainbelow thepredicate(seeAn. Post. I.20). Now

considerregressesfor e propositions.As shown above (andby Aristotle in An. Post. I.21), any

suchregressproducesascendingchainsabovebothsubjectandpredicate;if everyascendingchain

is finite, thenthesemusteventuallystop7.

Considerthetermsat thetopsof thechainsabove^

and _ in a fully packedregress(h»º

andr(½in thefigure).

h»º?bmr(½will betruebut unprovable(in orderto prove it we would needto find

a termover oneof its termsandb-relatedto theother, but sincethe regressis packed thereis no

suchterm). Therefore,we have foundanunmiddledb

proposition.Therearetwo waysthis might

happen:(1) theremay be no term overh»º

andno term overr(½

(in this case,we may callh»º

andr(½

highestterms).(2) theremaybesometermw

overbothh»º

andr(½

suchthattheintervalswx`h»º,wx`r(½

areunmiddled(I will call this an unmiddledbranch). Aristotle is awareof both

7Therearesomecomplicationsin Aristotle’sargumentin An. Post. I.21. In particular, thetext at 82b21-33seemsto beconfusedandmaybecorrupt:seeSmith1989for discussion.


typesof case8 (An. Post. I.15, I.23).

4.1 The Regress Argument of Posterior Analytics I

Aristotledoesnotarguefor theseresultssimplyoutof a theoreticalinterestin thepropertiesof his

logical system.Instead,heusesthemto addressacritical problemof thePosteriorAnalytics. The

subjectof thattreatiseis a certainkind of knowledgewhich, for lack of a bettertranslationI shall

call ‘science’( ' �+� " � * � � ). In An. Post. I.2, he first characterizesscienceasknowing the reason

why somethingmustbe asit is andthenexplicatesthis aspossessinga demonstrationor proof,

whereademonstrationis adeductionfrom premisesthatgivethecauseof theconclusion.Hethen

presentsa problem.Somepeople,hesays,claim thatdemonstrationis impossiblebecause:

1. Thepremisesof ademonstrationmustthemselvesbeknown scientifically.

2. Only whatis demonstratedis known scientifically.

Theseopponentsnext ask,“How arethepremisesof demonstrationsknown?” andthenpresenta

dilemma.Either thepremisesarescientificallyknown becausethey aredemonstrated,or they are

not. But if they aredemonstrated,thenthey mustbedemonstratedfrom otherswhich areknown

scientifically, andthus,by repeatingthis step,we getaninfinite regressof premises.On theother

hand,if they arenot demonstrated,thenby premise2 they arenot scientificallyknown. Thus,it

seemsthatscientificknowledgeis impossible.

This regressargumentis veryoftentakento bea familiar skepticalargumentabouttheregress

of justification. However, Aristotle’s way of seeingit is differentin an importantway. Insteadof

8Therearesomeproblemswith his argument,sincein I.15-I.17he seemsat timesto assumethat case(1) is theonly possiblecase,thoughheclearlyrecognizesit aspossiblein I.23.


askingwhetherthepremisesof agivendemonstrationarejustified,wecanask:are therepremises

fromwhich thesepremisescouldbedemonstrated?. Now, in Aristotle’s logical systemthis is a far

moreinterestingquestionthanit would bein any modernsystem,sinceAristotle’s systemallows

for thepossibilityof truepropositionswhicharenot logically derivablefrom any othertruepropo-

sitions,Thus,theanswerto this questionmayin somecasesturn out to be‘no’ becuasethereare

notruepremisesfrom whichthepremisescanevenbededuced.Shouldthisoccur, thentheregress

‘comesto a stop’ on groundsquite independentof anyone’s epistemicstate.Now, theadvocates

of the regressargumenthold that thereis no scientificknowledgeexceptby demonstration,and

thusthey hold that if a regresscomesto a stopin this way, thenits premises(andconsequently

everythingdeducedfrom them)will not be scientificallyknown. Aristotle respondsby in effect

embracingthe secondhorn of the dilemmabut deny the opponents’secondpremise:he argues

that all regressesultimately mustcometo a stopin just this way. If this is the case,thenevery

truepropositionis eitheritself unmiddled(andthusindemonstrable)or deduciblefrom unmiddled

propositions(sincereversinga regressgivesus a deduction). Sinceunmiddledpropositionsare

indemonstrable,scientificknowledgeof them,if possibleat all, mustcomethroughsomemeans

other thandemonstration.Thus,a necessarycondition for the possibility of scienceis the pos-

sibility of sucha form of knowledgefor thesepropositions. However, if every non-unmiddled

propositioncanbededucedfrom unmiddledpropositions,thenscientificknowledgeof theunmid-

dled propositionswould alsobe sufficient for the possibility of scienceoverall. We thushave a

preciseconditionfor thepossibilityof scientificknowledge:it is possibleif andonly if (scientific)

knowledgeof theindemonstrablepremisesis possible.

Nothing in this argumentappealsto any epistemologicalnotionsuchasself-evidenceor intu-

itiveevidence:theunmiddledpropositionsaredefinedsolelyon thebasisof their logical relation-


shipsto othertruths. In fact,Aristotle thinksthatwhenwe begin to acquirescientificknowledge,

we will not in generalfind theprinciplesparticularlyobviousandmayfind themlessevidentthan

theirconsequences,or evenlessevidentthanfalsehoods.Ourtaskin acquiringscientificwisdomis

to changeourepistemicsensibilitiesto bringtheminto line with thewaythingsareby makingour-

selvesseetheprinciplesasmoreevidentthananythingelse.As in thecaseof moraleducation,this

takestime andis accomplishedby a kind of habituation(this parallelis developedin Metaphysics

Z.3,1029b3-12).

SinceAristotle doesnot identify the startingpointsof demonstrationson the basisof episte-

mology, hecanseparatetwo questions:(1) how canwe find theprinciples?(2) how canwe come

to know theprinciples?

4.2 The Road to Wisdom

Thefirst questionis answeredby Aristotle’sonetruemethod.In brief, thatmethodis a procedure

for finding middle terms9. Aristotle spellsit out in detail in An. Pr. I.27-29. Let us say that

we want to prove someproposition. Sincethis is Aristotle’s system,usingAristotle’s logic, our

propositionmusthavea predicateterm^

anda subjectw

. Themethodbeginswith thecollection

of threelists of terms: thosewhich follow^

(call this list _ ), thosewhich it follows (list Â ),

andthoseinconsistentwith it (list Ã ). For instance,if^

is ‘animal’ andw

is ‘human’ then _will include‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘Greek’, ‘Americansenator’; Â will include‘mammal’, ‘chordate’,

‘primate’, ‘organism’;and Ã will include‘petunia’, ‘stone’, ‘integer’. Repeattheprocessfor termw, collectingtermsthat follow it (list Ä ), termsit follows ( Å ), andtermsit excludes( Æ ). When

wehavecompiledthesesix lists,wecanlook for amiddletermfor ouroriginalpropositionsimply

9Henceits usualmedieval nameof inventiomedii.


by looking for pointsof intersectionbetweenthe three^

-term lists and the threew

-term lists.

Whatintersectionswe look for, andwhatwedowith amiddletermwefind, dependon thekind of

propositionwestartedwith. Thedetailsaresummarizedin thefollowing figure:10

Çwhat

followsAÈÊÉ É É É ÉËÌ É É É É É É É É Í È º �nÎÐÏÒÑT�nÎÓÓÓÓÓÓ ÓÓÓÓÓÓ

ÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓ

ÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓ

Ô È º È¢Õ�Ö±×ØØØØØØØØØØØØ

ØØØØØØØØØØØØ



ØØØØØØ ØØØØØØ

Ù´Ú Î�� Õ �pÎpÎpÛ Üwhat

followsE ÈÝÝÝÝÝ Þß ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝàPredicateáâ � ãä

Èåååååååå

æç åååååå

èwhatA

excludes

Í �pÎ È ÑT�éééééé éééééééééééééééééééééééééééééé

ê � ÕëÈ�× Ï0ì ½ÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓ ÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓ ÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓÓ

íwhatE

excludes

îSubject

ãä�áâÈ�ï ï ï ï ï ï ïðñ ï ï ï ï ï ïò

whatAfollows

Ô È ÑTó È Ñ Èôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô

ôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô

ôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôôô

õ È Ñ Èö× Ï Ö ÷whatEfollows

For example,if we startedwith^d` w

, themethodtells us to look for a commonterm in the lists

Â and Ä . If they have someterm ø in common,then^d` ø (by thedefinitionof Â ) and ø `w

(by

thedefinitionofw

); from these,d`w

follows ( _ `�¤¥ùB`�¤¥` ). On theotherhand,it maybethatthere

is no term ø commonto Â and Ä . Sincethemethodassumesthatwe have collectedall possible

termsfor eachof thesix classes,thiswouldmeanthatthenthereis nomiddletermto befoundand

that,consequently,^d` w

is unmiddled.Aristotle’sonetruemethod,then,allowsusnotonly to find

middle termsfor propositionsthat canbe demonstratedbut alsoto find that there are no middle

termsfor otherpropositions,which will consequentlybeindemonstrable.This dependsof course,

on theassumptionthatoursix termlistsaretruly exhaustive. Aristotle recognizespreciselythis in

10A figure similar to this first appearsin Philoponus(In An. Pr. Comm., 274). In the Middle Ages,the diagramacquiredthenameponsasinorum(‘bridge of asses’).SeeBochenski1961,pp. 219-221andplatefacing.Thoughnofigureis foundin manuscriptsof Aristotle, it is quitepossiblethathehadonein mind.


summarizinghis results:

if nothing that truly belongsto the things,accordingto the collectedfacts(histori-

a), thenfor anything of which thereis a demonstration,we will be ableto find this

anddemonstrateit; andif thereis none,thenwe will beableto make that evident11.

(46a24-27,emphasisadded)

This collectionof factsis, for Aristotle, only possiblethroughexperience,asAristotle says

explicitly:

Theprinciplesconcerninganything areto beprovidedby experience.I mean,for in-

stance,thattheprinciplesof astronomicalscienceareto beprovidedby astronomical

experience(for when enoughphenomenahad beenobtained,astronomicaldemon-

strationswere found in this way), andso it is similarly for any otherart or science

whatsoever. So: if thefactsaboutanything ( ��úkû � ü � � �� $� ��ý²þ X " � �� ) have been

obtained,thenwearealreadypreparedto revealthedemonstrations.(46a17-24)

Oncethe factsarecollected,repeatedapplicationof it will organizethe truthsaboutany subject

matterinto demonstrations,sincethis will eventuallydiscovernot only theunmiddled(andhence

indemonstrable)propositionsaboutit but alsothedeductionsof all otherpropositions,ultimately

filling thesein to producedeductionsfrom indemonstrables.

Aristotle’s stresson the indispensabilityof experienceherereflectsa criticism he expresses

elsewhereof thosewho try to do philosophywithout theneededexperienceof the facts: that: as

hesaysin DeGen.et Corr. II,

11 <@ÿ»¸��·,@6��¥JBE £ 8²D�,��¸ £ � ¡ �ë/�@=I<@OK=;<N,�<m� £ . 8��-@8 £ ¯��C8 . I take thelastphraseto mean‘to make it evidentthatthereis no demonstration’.Othertranslatorsgenerallytake it to meansomethinglike ‘to make that propositionevident’:presumably, to make evident in someotherway a propositionthat cannotbe demonstrated.However, Aristotle hassaidnothingat all aboutmakingindemonstrablepropositionsthemselvesevident.


Lackof experienceis thecauseof adiminishedability to survey theagreedfacts.This

is why thosewho have madethemselvesmoreat homein naturalsciencearemore

ableto supposeprinciplesof thekind thatextendto many cases,while thosewho are,

asaresultof many arguments,inexperiencedwith thefacts,readilydeclaresomething

afterglimpsingat a few. cases.(DeGen.et Corr. II, 316a5-10)

This harshjudgmenton armchairtheorizingis directedat Plato. It is temptingto seeherean

allusionto Plato’s picturein Phaedo99e4-6of “seekingthetruth aboutthingsin arguments”.For

Aristotle, nothingcancomeof thatbut emptywords. This setsthestagefor thesecondquestion:

by whatmeansdoweacquireanappropriateform of knowledgeof exactly theseindemonstrables?

5 Posterior Analytics II.19: Universals through Perception

Aristotle claims to give us that answerin Posterior AnalyticsII.19, which he sayswill explain

“how theprinciplesbecomefamiliar ( R ��·� � �� )to us”. Beforewe try to interprethis answer, let

usreview thebackgroundsothatwecanbecertainweunderstandthequestion.

Platothoughtthatourpossessionof certainconceptsprovedthatwehadknowledgethatcould

not have beenacquiredthroughperception. In the Phaedo, he arguesthat our ability to judge

perceptibleobjectsto be equalor unequalpresupposesour acquaintancewith the equal itself,

somethingwhichwecouldnotpossiblyhaveexperiencedthroughperception.This recallsMeno’s

argumentaboutlearning: how canwe recognizewhat we don’t know if we don’t alreadyknow

it? Plato’s answerwasthat we do alreadyknow it. Evenperception,for Plato,relieson this in-

nateknowledgeof Forms. In orderto perceive two sticksas(approximately)equalor an object

as(roughly) circular, we mustcall on our innateknowledgeof the equalitself andthe circle it-


self. Aristotle agreesthatwe alreadyrecognizeuniversalsin perception.If he is to avoid Plato’s

conclusions,hemustexplainhow this is possiblewithout aninnateknowledgeof Forms.In brief,

his answeris that we acquireknowledgeof Formsthroughperceptionbecauseperceptionis the

impressingof theformsof externalobjectsonoursensibility. Formsarereal,thoughnotseparable,

andassuchthey have real causalpowers,including thepower to causethemselves,or copiesof

themselves,in our minds.

In all of this, neitherAristotle nor Platois trying to answerskepticalargumentsthat attempt

to undermineknowledgeby underminingjustification.Their concernis not whetherwe might be

mistakenaboutwhatwebelieve thatweknow. Instead,it is how to accountfor thefactthatwedo

have theknowledgewhich (asthey take for granted)we do. Aristotle is not looking for a way in

which theprinciplesmight bejustified. Instead,heis trying to explain how it is possiblefor usto

have thecognitionthatwedo.

Nearthebeginningof thePosteriorAnalytics, AristotleTheproblemII.19 needsto solveis the

‘puzzlein theMeno’, asAristotlecallsit nearthebeginningof thePosteriorAnalytics(): how can

weacquireknowledgethatwedo notalreadyhave, if not from previouslyexistingknowledge?

Platotakesit asgiventhatwedohaveknowledgeinvolving universalsandarguesfrom this that

wemusthavethatknowledgeinnately. Aristotle’smethodaspresentedin thePrior Analyticsrests

on a similar assumption.He takesit for grantedthatwe do acquireknowledgefrom experience.

Even knowledgeof particularfacts,however, requiresthat we possessknowledgeof universals,

sinceall factsfor Aristotlehavethestructureof predicationsandonly universalscanbepredicated

of anything. How canweacquiretheseuniversals,whichit appearsthatwemusthaveevento learn

individual factsfrom experiece?We arebackwith thePhaedo’s argumentthatwe mustinnately

know theForms.


Aristotle’s responseto this questionis breathtakinglysimple: we know the Forms through

perceptionbecausein reality perceptionis of universalsexisting in particulars.ThereareForms;

therejust arenoseparatedForms.TheFormsin thingshaverealcausalpowers,andthosepowers

includethepowerto affectoursenseorgansandthepowerto cause,in us—themselves.Perception,

for Aristotle, is theacquisitionof theform of whatis perceived,without its matter. Our intellectis

of suchanaturethatit canacquiretheformsof things12, andthusweareableto acquireknowledge

of formsthroughperception.

Let me try to show that the argumentof An. Post. II.19 conformsto the pictureI have just

sketched.Aristotle beginsby listing thequestionsthatremainto beanswered:

1. Is theknowledgeof the‘unmiddled’principlesthesameas,or differentfrom, theknowledge

of othertruths?[His answer:different.]

2. Is this knowledgescientificknowledge( ' �+� " � * � � ) or somethingelse?His answer:some-

thing else,namely �� .]3. Does the cognition of the principles “arise in us without alreadybeing present”or is it

“presentunnoticed”?[His answer:it ariseswithout alreadybeingpresent.]

Thethird questionis thecrucialone.Its secondalternative is justexactlyPlatonicinnatism,which

Aristotle dismissesquickly: how could it bethatwe have suchknowledgeandfail to noticeit, he

asks?However, the remainingalternative presentshim with a problem. He asks,“How canwe

recognizethem–thatis, learnthem–ifnot from previously existing knowledge?” The last phrase

clearly recallsthe assertionat the beginning of the Posterior Analyticsthat “all teachingandall

12In themoreelaboratetheoryof DeAnimaIII, the‘passiveintellect’, 8I<@O�/ ,�-@G;®K=C� E ��/ , is saidto havepreciselythecapacityto takeon all formsbecauseit hasno form of its own andis a kind of purepotentiality(429b21-430a2).


rationallearningarisesfrom pre-existingknowledge”.If hestill acceptsthatclaim,thenAristotle’s

only choiceis to arguethatwe canacquire somekindsof knowledgewithout learning it, that is,

withoutacquiringit astheresultof a rationalprocess.

Thatis justwhathedoes.Knowledgeof formsis causedin usby perception,andperceptionis

not a rationalprocessbut ratheronein which themind is a passive recipient.Perception,hesays,

is “an inborncapacityof judging” ( ��% � � � ��" % � # ! � �� +* ) which bringstheuniversalsinto

us from thevery beginning. “Thoughwhatwe perceive is indeedparticulars,perceptionis of the

universal,e.g.of man,notof themanKallias” (100a16-18).Repeatedperceptionthenleadsto the

recognitionof higherandhigheruniversalsthroughthefollowing process:

1. Whenweperceive,theforms(morepreciselytheinfimaespecies) of externalobjectsimpress

themselveson ourminds.

2. Repeatedperceptionstabilizesthis recognition(theuniversal‘comesto rest’ in thesoul)

3. Thisprocessis repeatedat thelevel of higheruniversals(genera)

It is intrinsic to this processthatwe acquirecognitionof universalsorganizedasahierarchy. This

processwould leadto therecognition,notsimplyof universals,but alsoof therelationshipsamong

them: what follows what,what is followedby what,whatexcludeswhat. Thus,thematerialsfor

theclassificationrequiredby Aristotle’sOneTrueMethodarealreadyavailablein thedeliverances

of perception.Sincethatmethodis capablenot only of finding thepremisesfrom which to prove

anything thatcanbeprovedbut alsoof discoveringwhich truthsarenot susceptibleof proof and

thusareprinciples,Aristotle canexplainhow all of sciencearisesfrom perception.

With this interpretationin mind,we canmake bettersenseof someotherwisebaffling partsof

II.19. To begin with, we canget a muchmorestraightforward accountof the threeprogressive


stagesof cognitionin 100a3-9(memoryarisesfrom perception,experiencefrom repeatedmemo-

riesof thesamething, andfinally principlesfrom experience).Hereis his accountof thecritical

third stage:

Fromperception,then,arisesmemory, aswesay;andfrom memoryof thesamething

occurringmany timesarisesexperience:memoriesmany in numberareasingleexpe-

rience.And from experienceor from every universalthathascometo restin thesoul

(from theonebesidesthemany that is sameonething presentin all of them)comes

thestartingpoint of art andscience:of art if it concernscomingto be,of scienceif it

concernsbeing13. (100a3-9)

Repeatedperceptiongivesrise to experience,then. Is it repeatedexperiencethatgivesrise to u-

niversals?Aristotle doesnot saythat,andwhenherepeatshis view a few lines laterhesaysthat

we getuniversalsfrom perceptionor repeatedperception:experienceis not a stageon theway to

perceptionof theuniversal.Thus,whatgivesriseto experiencealsogivesriseto universals.Aris-

totledoesnot limit this to repeatedperceptionof sensoryuniversals.Instead,repeatedrecognition

of universalsleadsto recognitionof thenext higheruniversals—that,at any rate,seemsto bethe

plainmeaningof 100a15-b3:first man,thensomespeciesof animal,thenanimal,andsoon.

Whatis this ‘coming to a stop’?Here,Aristotle offersusa simile thathasgenerallyperplexed

ratherthanhelpedinterpreters:

As in abattlewhena rout hasoccurred,if onemanstops,anotherstops,thenanother,

13 � E ¸ ’ � �m, £ �´¯C³ë-@/�� EN,�-@8 =I�@/��¯ £ ��CM�-@8 =I<@/ =;<@O²E�-@G��BA�<@J � 8�=��J��=I<@O�98;�@/ ,@-�¯;«H=I«H,�<CACA�� @8 � 8"!C,@-@M�� 8# 8 � 8�� E £ ³ 8;<@�´/ =I�?-�$K=��K=;6��8;®C/ D@¯��E�-@L � ,��±Mm=��C�m®�/%� � «@83��98 , £ ¯IL¥��698 £ M�� 8��C=I6��8I®�/%� � «@8�¸��&, £ ¯IL�=I��&@8�� ,��Mm=��m®C/'Translatorsusuallytake ,@-�8 =;��/(�C¯ £ ��CM�-@8¢=;<@/ =I<@O²E�-@G��BA�<@J to meansomethinglike ‘from thewholeuniversalhavingcometo restin thesoul’. But wegeta muchbettersenseif we readit as‘from everyuniversalthathascometo restinthesoul’


until it comesto thebeginning. Thesoul is from thebeginningof sucha natureasto

beableto undergo this.(100a12-14)

Philoponusratherliberally fleshesoutAristotle’s imageasfollows:

Suppose,asanexamplein words,a hundredmenengagedin war with enemies;turn-

ing, they disperse,andthenthe army breaksup. Next, oneof thosefleeing,getting

up his courage,turnsback from flight andstandsto facethe enemy. Thenanother

of thosefleeing,seeinghim standing,comesto him to help him. And wheneachof

thosefleeinghasdonethis, thenthehundredtoo standagainin thebattlethathadjust

recentlyperished(JohnPhiloponus,In An. Post.436.23-31)

Thoughthis is, to saythe least,a florid elaboration,thecommentarytradition follows it in spirit.

But what point could Aristotle possiblybe makingwith it? Philoponusthinks that it concernsa

sortof valianteffort by therationalpartof thesoulto makeastandagainstthecorruptinginfluence

of theemotions:

For whentheirrationalpartsof thesoul—I meanspirit andappetite—havedominated

the rationalsoul, the result is that the knowledgeof the universalthat is in it is cor-

rupted. Then,whenfrom perceiving oneperceptionis inscribedin the imagination,

andnext anothersuch,andthuswhenmany perceptionsarebroughtin together, many

memoriesarise...

But absolutelynothing in Aristotle’s text concernsthe emotions,and in any event Philoponus

seemsto be presupposingthat knowledgeof the universalis alreadypresentin the soul, which

is exactly whatAristotle denies.Apart from that, the imageof onebrave soldierturning the tide

in battlehasno evident relevanceto the point underdiscussion:arewe to supposethat it is the


braveryof individualperceptions,or individualexperiences,thatsomehow turnsthetide againsta

routof—what?

Mostrecentcommentatorshavedespairedof findingananswer. McKirahan,for instance,says,

‘this [simile] doesnothingto make the ideasclearer’(Mckirahan1992,p. 244). Barnes,finding

no reasonablesensein talk of a ‘beginning’, emendsthetext, reading[ Y +* � ratherthanthe [ � � * �foundin all thesources:“until apositionof strengthis reached”(Barnes1994,p. 265).14.

But thereis noneedto goto suchlengths.Aristotledoesnotsaythat,asaresultof thesoldiers

comingto a stop,the rout is turnedandthe battlesaved. He doesnot even saythat onesoldier

stopsandturnsto facetheenemy. All hesaysis thatonestops,thenanother, thenanother. There

is a familiar phenomenonthatfits this description.Supposethatpeoplearerunningin a line and

that thefirst personstops:in thatcase,thenext in line will stop,andthenext, andsoon ‘until it

comesto thebeginning’, i.e. theotherendof the line. Theleadrunner’s stoppingis sufficient to

14Interestingly, thephraseD�ACE��8·¸;JCM �� £ 8;<@/ occursin Philoponus’explicationof theimage.


bring thewholeline to astopbecauseeachperson’shaltingcausesthehaltingof thenext in line15.

Especiallywhenperceivedfrom a distance,this canproduceastrikingvisualeffect.

Aristotle describesjustsuchasequenceof eventsa few lineslater:

For when someundifferentiateduniversal16 hasfirst cometo a stop in the soul (it

is indeedthe particularthat is perceived, but perceptionis of the universal,e.g. of

man,not of themanKallias), it comesto a stopagainin these,solong as17 thethings

withoutparts—theuniversals—cometo astop(e.g.such-and-suchanimalsolongas18

15Barnesnotesthata similar figureof speechoccurstwice in thepseudo-AristotelianProblems. As it happens,thepoint it is usedto illustratetherefits B19 ratherwell. Herearethetexts:=I>�8?¸��E�-�=;«)�¥FCM�� 8 � ��C8 =I:�8�*�=;-�8»Mm=��N,�¯;�@/ # 8»° ¸C�+��8;<m�´- E�-@LV�� £ =I-�,��ACA�-·,@<BA�A�-��/.ÐMm=I-�=;-��E�-@L=I«10�ACA�-2*�M�-7, £ ¯IL =I�C8 =��,@<C8��43�85�C¯;69�m®CM¥�ë/N¶x K,@8I<@/ � M�=C³ 8�'6�98;��/N��«�¯�E�J�¯C³±<@J Mm=��8 =;<�/�87+Mm, £ ¯ � 8=I¯;<�,��mE�-�L =;«)0�ACA�- ��¯��ë-(.ÐMm=I-@M�GI-��Z,�6/��JCE £ 8�' 917a28-32

... whenthe thoughtstopsat onething andis not changedin all ways,whatever othersareabouttheplacealsostop,andthecalmingof themis sleep.For whenonegoverningpartstops,asin a rout, thentheotherpartsarealsonaturallydisposedto stop.

� 8 =I-@OCG;-·¸�� 6¢8 £ �m¸C�´«H=I�²,@-��FK=;-C=;<C8 £�9 8;-��=;�C8 , £ ¯IL�=��C8��:C83D@69¯;-²=I<@O;� £ �ë��>�8;<@/%'�=;-��<²¸�� M�JC8C³±M�=I-�=I-��E�-�L�¶)0�A�A�<@/�¸C�ë«5=I�>=�� £ � 8HD@¯��C8·E�-�L4=9¯ £ �±M��-�� ¸;6 ¡;£ =I-��¥E�-�L�D@G;¯;<@³�M £ �¥=I�5,�¯;<@M��±��8²E�-@G��C, £ ¯&@¯;G;¯I<@/?7+Mm, £ ¯H��«�¯ � 8H=I¯;<�,��@�¢8I�@/·D@8 =C�±Mm=��@8¢=;<@/²E�-�L+<B¬80�ACA�<m��698;<@JCM�� 8��¥<@ K=I:lE�-@L � ,�L =;<@O5D@69¯;<�/' ¸��±��=I-��<E�-�L � ¡ -�³A��8;®�/ � 8C³±<�= £ ��³ 8 £ =;-��ZE�-@L � ,�� 8;6�� £ A�-�' Prob. 941a8-14

But there,it remainsbecausethe air nearerthe earthis the thickestof the storm. And the otheralsocontractsquickly becauseit hasa startingpoint or fixedpoint,which receivesandcollectswhatcomesto it, asthedawn: for just as,in a rout, whenonehastakena stand,theothersalsostandfast,so is itwith theair.

The point in the first passageoccursin an explanationwhy somepeoplearemadesleepy by reading: the proposedansweris thatreadingmakesthoughtcometo a stop,andasa resulttheassociatedpartsalsocometo a stopbecausethoughtis thegoverningpart( =I��E�FC¯C�±<�8 ): theimageis thusthatof amilitary unit haltingwhenits commanderhalts.Inthesecondpassage,whatis beingexplainedis a phenomenonof condensationof air, which thewriter thinkshappensmorequickly oncea ‘startingpoint or fixedpoint’ hasbeenestablished.Herewe do find a referenceto a first soldier‘taking a stand’( �98;�@/5D@8 =B��Mm=��@8 =I<@/ : the verb literally means‘standagainst’or ‘standup to’), following which theothersdo soaswell. But if we considerthepoint beingexplained,it is thesimplefactof having cometo a stopthatseemsto beimportant.Evidently, air moving towards( ,�¯;<@M��C8 ) somealreadyestablishedcollectingpoint is supposedto bemorequickly collectedby it. This would beillustratedby a groupof soldierscomingquickly to a stopbecausethe onein front stopped.Neitherof thesepassagesis by Aristotle, of course.They do, however, give ussomeideahow Aristotle’s figureof speechmight beunderstood.Whatthey have in commonis thepictureof a groupof movingindividualscomingto astopbecauseoneof themhascometo astop.If weturnnow to II.19, weseethatthatis almostall thereis to whatAristotlesaysthere.

16Translatorsgenerallysupposethat the genitive absolutestopsat �98;�@/ andthat ,@¯;>�=I<C8 ...E�-@G��BA�<@J is a verblessclause;I take thewholephraseasthegenitiveabsolute.

17 P :+/B�@8 with subjunctivecanmeaneither‘so longas’ or ‘until’; othertranslatorsgenerallyopt for thelatter.18Thesenseof

P :+/ heremustbethesameasbeforeif this is to beanexample.


animal),andlikewisein this19. 100a15-3

‘Undif ferentiated’universalsareuniversalswithoutdifferentiae,thatis, imfimaespecies20. It would

make senseto saytheseare‘without parts’ becausethey arenot generawith furtherspecies.As

thesoldierscometo astoponeby one,sodotheuniversals,proceedingin orderfrom leastto most

universal.Whatcomesto bein thesoul,thenis notsimplyacollectionof universalsbut universals

orderedin achain.

If I canrecognizetheuniversals and _ andalsorecognizethat^

is immediatelyabove _ ,

then I have all that is neededfor knowing thatâ` _ is true and that it is unmiddled. If I can

recognizethat^

and _ areimmediatelybelowh

asspeciesbelow a genus,thenI have all that is

neededfor knowing that^db _ is trueandunmiddled.Thus,theability to recognizeuniversalsand

their positionsin a chainstructureof termsis all that is requiredfor knowledgeof theunmiddled

premisesin which all regressesterminate.

I believe this readinghasseveraladvantages.First,Aristotle is thenaddressingtheright prob-

lem: the‘puzzle in theMeno’. Platousedthis puzzleasanargumentfor our possessionof innate

knowledgeof Forms,andAristotle providesus herewith an alternative accountthat avoids pre-

cisely whathewantsto avoid: heexplainshow we canacquireknowledgeof universalswithout

beingborn with it andwithout the existenceof separableForms. Second,and following close

uponthis, we seethatonceagain,Aristotle’s principal target is Plato’s conceptionof philosophy

andphilosophicalmethod.Third, thesolutionfits closelywith Aristotle’sown accountof the‘one

road’ for all formsof inquiry.

19 Mm=��8 =;<�/5��«@¯ =I>�8dD�¸��ë-��¯;:�8>�¢8I�@/»,@¯I>�=;<C8 � 8 � �98 � 8 =��C�¥J��aE�-�G��CA�<@JED0E�-�L ��«@¯ -�F]M�G��@8 £ =I-��X��¢8 =I�uE�-@G�µP E�-@M�=I<C8��B°3¸�µ¥-/G M�GI®�M��´/X=;<@O E�-@G��BA�<�J � Mm=C³ 8��C<H�<�8 D@8;G;¯�I�,�<@J�D�ACA&µ�<�$(J²-�ACA@³±<@J D@8IG;¯�I�,�<�K�?K,��A�� 8 � 8 =I<@FK=;<@�´/ .ÐMm=I-�=;-��L�P :+/B�@8�=;« D@� £ ¯�:NMm=��»E�-�L =;«5E�-@G��BA�<�J��m<%H]<C8�=;<@��<C8;¸IL4M�N+<C8 P :+/BM�N+<C8��E�-@L � 8�=;<�FB=I<m�´/"O+M�-@FK=I:+/'20I amunpersuadedby Bolton’sattemptto give this another, andto my minda somewhatmysterious,sense.


6 Conclusions

What hasnow becomeof questioning,for Aristotle? It hasbeendisplaced,along with dialec-

tic, from the centralpositionit held in Plato’s methodandrelegatedto a purely ancillary status,

usefulperhapsin the preparatorystagesof assemblingthe datafor Aristotle’s theory-generating

method.“No sciencethatgivesproofsaboutany subjectmatterasksquestions,” saysAristotle in

On SophisticalRefutations11,

...but dialectic is interrogative; andif it did give proofs,thenat any rateit would not

makequestionsoutof thefirst premises,thoseproper[to thesciences]:for if someone

werenot to concedethese,it would have nothingelsefrom which to argueany more

againstobjections.21 (172a15-21)

Thesearethewordsof someonewhohasseentoomany dialecticalargumentsleadingnowhereand

who has,in consequence,becomedisenchantedwith thenotionthatargumentalonecanestablish

anything significant.ReversingPlato’s choicein thePhaedo(99d-e),Aristotle turnedaway from

Y W�R � � towardslooking directly at thethingsthemselves,takingexperienceastheultimatesource

of knowledge.

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