Nishida and Heidegger

Nishida on Heidegger

Curtis A. Rigsby

Published online: 29 January 2010

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Heidegger and East-Asian thought have traditionally been stronglycorrelated. However, although still largely unrecognized, significant differences

between the political and metaphysical stance of Heidegger and his perceived

counterparts in East-Asia most certainly exist. One of the most dramatic disconti-

nuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is revealed through an

investigation of Kitaro Nishidas own vigorous criticism of Heidegger. Ironically,

more than one study of Heidegger and East-Asian thought has submitted that

Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose philosophy most closely

resembles Heideggerian thought. In words that then and now resound discordantly

within the enshrined, established view of Heideggers relationship to East-Asian

* Note the superscript system I have devised to aid in translation. The precision of Japanese

philosophical vocabulary does not always translate easily into English. One English term with multiple

meanings, is often expressible by two or more Japanese terms with exactly one meaning each. I have

added superscripts to clarify the original Japanese term where appropriate, as follows: [EXPERIENCE]

experience (generic) []; experiencet (intensified with possible bodily manifestation) [].

[HISTORY] historyg (as in the theological history of faith, cf Bultmannian theology) (Geschichte);historyh (as in the factual history discernible by science) (Historie). [IDEALISM] idealismr (versusrealism) []; idealismb (versus materialism/realism) []; idealismm (versus materialism)

[]; idealismp or optimism (versus pessimism) []. [MATTER] materialismm [];

matterh (as opposed to form) []. [OBJECT] objecte (epistemological) []; objectx (existential)

[]; object (determinate, standing against) []. [REAL] real (generic) []; realj (especially,

philosophically, as a substance) []. [SPIRIT] spiritg (as in German Geist) []; spiritr (asanimating force) []. [SUBJECT] subjecte (epistemological) []; subjectx (existential, active) []; subjectg (grammatical-logical) []; subject matter []; all translations, unless otherwise

indicated, are the authors.

C. A. Rigsby (&)Philosophy Department of Saint Lawrence University, Canton, NY, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

C. A. Rigsby

Japan Committee of the Society of Christian Philosophers (International)

URL: http://www.societyofchristianphilosophers.com/

123

Cont Philos Rev (2010) 42:511553

DOI 10.1007/s11007-009-9119-8

thought, Nishida stated uninhibitedly his own view of Heidegger in the noteworthy

statement: Heidegger is not worth your time Hedoes not recognize that which

is indispensible and decisive, namely, God. This present study lays out for the first

time in English, the significant differences between the metaphysical and political

stances of Nishida and Heidegger, Nishidas own critique of Heidegger, and

Heideggers own rather dismal assessment of non-Western philosophy, all of which

demonstrate a remarkable, hitherto unrecognized discontinuity between Heidegger

and East-Asian thought.

Keywords Heidegger Nishida Kyoto School Nothingness God Karl Barth Ethnocentrism Nazism East-Asian philosophy

Comparative philosophy

1 Introduction

In the still emerging encounter between Heideggerian philosophy, Japanese

thinkers, and Western comparative thought, the general consensus has traditionally

been that a strong continuity exists between Heidegger and East-Asian thought.

Even in the wake of the critical shock waves generated by Victor Faras 1987 book

Heidegger and Nazism, and in the consequent scrutiny focused on the politicalthought of the Kyoto School of Modern Japanese philosophy in studies such as the

1994 anthology Rude Awakenings, the perceived continuity between Heidegger andEast-Asian thought continues to persist. However, although still largely unrecog-

nized, significant differences between the political and metaphysical stance of

Heidegger and his perceived counterparts in East-Asia, most certainly exist. One of

the most dramatic discontinuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is

revealed through an investigation of Kitaro Nishidas own vigorous criticism of

Heidegger. Ironically, more than one study of Heidegger and East-Asian thought

has submitted that Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose

philosophy most closely resembles Heideggerian thought. In words that then and

now resound discordantly within the enshrined, established view of Heideggers

relationship to East-Asian thought, Nishida stated uninhibitedly his own view of

Heidegger in the noteworthy statement: Heidegger is not worth your time.1 This

statement was a strong impetus for Nishidas student, Katsumi Takizawa, to first

reevaluate Heideggerian philosophy, and then the Nishida Philosophy itself, from

1 Takizawa recorded this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timline p. 164). Cfendnote in [3], just before [3.1], for full statement.

*TKC = The Collected Works of Katsumi Takizawa [] (abbreviated TKC). (19711975) Kyoto: Hozokan [] (all except the first printing of vol. 1, by Sogensha): vol. 1 (by Sogensha,1971), vol. 4, 5, 7 (1973), vol. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 (1974), vol. 1 (originally publ. 1971 by Sogensha but

republished by Hozo in 1975), 2 (1975).

*Inquiring of Religion [] (first ed, 1976). Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo [].*Sakaguchi, Hiroshi [], ed. (1989) Katsumi Takizawa: Timeline of Selected Works [:]. Fukuoka: Sogensha [].

512 C. A. Rigsby

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the standpoint that Nishida claimed Heidegger fatally lacked, namelythe

standpoint which recognizes the indispensable and decisive reality of God.2

2 Asian thought & enthusiasm for Heidegger

From the beginning of Heideggers career up until the present, the Japanese have

shown an enthusiasm for his thought, matched by a corresponding enthusiasm in

Western comparative studies of Heidegger and East-Asian thought, and modern

Japanese Philosophy in particular. Heidegger himself appears to have exhibited a

marked appreciation of East-Asian thought and culture.

2.1 Heideggers enthusiasm for Asia

In a letter to the organizers of the 1969 conference in Hawaii, Heidegger encouraged

hopes that his philosophy may stimulate a deeper understanding and fruitful

encounter between East and West, when he wrote:

Again and again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take place with the

thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world.3

Heidegger himself had already dialogued at length with various Japanese thinkers,

including Nishidas student, Takizawa, in 1965.4 In 1954, Heidegger issued the

essay A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer, which is a

fictional reconstruction of a real discussion he had in the same year with Tomio

Tezuka, a Japanese scholar of German literature from Tokyo University. In this

1954 essay, Heidegger references Nishida, Hajime Tanabe, and especially Shuzo

Kuki,5 and recalls fondly various stimulating encounters Heidegger had with

Japanese thinkers. In this essay, which is written in the form of a dialogue between

Heidegger and a Japanese interlocutor, Heidegger exhibits an interest in Japanese

culture, and ponderously considers the prospects for intercultural dialogue. He

undertakes philosophically motivated definitions of the Japanese words for chic

(iki []) and word/language (kotoba []).6 He claims that his essay What isMetaphysics? and its leitmotif of Nothing (das Nichts) was understoodimmediately by the Japanese because of their sensitivity to East-Asian Emptiness,7

2 ibid.3 Philosophy East and West, vol. 20, No. 3, July, 1970, p. 221; Parkes,Heidegger and Asian Thought, p. 7.*Heidegger, (1970) 1969 letter printed in Introduction to the Symposium and Reading of a Letter from

Martin Heidegger, by Winfield E. Nagley, in Philosophy East and West, vol. 20, no. 3, July*Parkes, Graham, ed. (1987) Heidegger and Asian Thought. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.4 Sakaguchi, Timeline, p. 148.5 Heidegger, in On the Way to Language, references Nishida (p. 1), Tanabe (p. 5, 37), and Kuki(throughout A Dialogue on Language).

*Heidegger (1971b). On the Way to Language. [Grn: Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959)] as translated byPeter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row.6 Heidegger, ibid, p. 43ff.7 Heidegger, ibid, p. 19. Cf also Parkes in May, p. 98.

Nishida on Heidegger 513

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and further claims that the Japanese have an innate understanding regarding the

reserve which respects the mystery of language, and which is necessary to

prevent unwarranted conceptualization.8 Heidegger praises his Japanese dialogue

companion, stating: you are nearer to the reality of language than all our

[European] concepts.9 Heidegger even said of D. T. Suzukis work:

If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all

my writings.10

Noting Heideggers considerable interest in Asian thought,11 Graham Parkes

claims that the extent of his knowledge of Asian philosophy is not yet widely

appreciated.12 Parkes goes so far as to suggest that Heideggers notions of

Nothing and death correspond closely to the philosophy of modern Japanese

thought, even warranting the possibility that Heidegger himself was influenced by

the so-called Kyoto School which formed around Nishidas thought.13 Indeed,

Heidegger did maintain a correspondence with Nishidas colleague D. T. Suzuki,

and Nishidas student Keiji Nishitani, a correspondence wherein Heidegger

pursued an inquiry into East Asian thought.14 Nishitani was convinced that

Heidegger pursued this inquiry for the purpose of uncovering what the history of

metaphysics has concealed, as Nishitani stated in 1976 on the occasion of

Heideggers death:

With respect to metaphysics Heidegger wanted to go a step further and inquire

into what lies beneath it. It became clear that this attempt made direct contact

Footnote 7 continued

*Parkes, Graham (1996) Rising Sun over Black Forest, in Reinhard May (ed.), Heideggers HiddenSources: Some East Asian Influences on His Work. London: Routledge (Mays work was first published in1989 in German. The 1996 publication was translated with a complementary essay, by Graham Parkes).

Routledge, USA: Canada.8 Heidegger, ibid, p. 50.9 Heidegger, ibid, p. 27.10 William Barrett, p. xi in Zen for the West, the Introduction to Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings, byDaisetz T. Suzuki. Barretts entire statement is as follows:

A German friend of Heidegger told me that one day when he visited Heidegger he found him reading

one of Suzukis books; If I understand this man correctly, Heidegger remarked, this is what I have

been trying to say in all my writings. This remark may be the slightly exaggerated enthusiasm of a man

under the impact of a book in which he recognizes some of his own thoughts; certainly Heideggers

philosophy in its tone and temper and sources is Western to its core, and there is much in him that is not in

Zen, but also very much more in Zen that is not in Heidegger; and yet the points of correspondence

between the two, despite their disparate sources, are startling enough. For what, after all, is Heideggers

final message but that Western philosophy is a great error, the result of the dichotomizing intellect that

has cut man off from unity with Being itself and from his own Being.

*Barrett, William (1956) Zen for the West in the Introduction (pp. iiixx) of Zen Buddhism: SelectedWritings, by Daisetz T. Suzuki. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.11 Parkes, p. 6.12 Parkes, p. 5.13 Parkes in May, Heideggers Hidden Sources, p. 81.14 Parkes in May, pp. 99102.

514 C. A. Rigsby

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with Eastern insights, such as those of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Zen Buddhism.

For this reason Heidegger used to question me about Zen Buddhism.15

In regards to Heideggers more general interests in East-Asian thought, it should be

noted that in 1946 he began a translation of Laozis Daodejing with the ChineseChristian thinker Paul Shih-yi Hsiao. Parkes claims that such encounters by

Heidegger with Laozi and Zhuangzi influenced both the style and content of

Heideggers post Being and Time thought, so as to move toward a greaterappreciation of the poetic.16

2.2 Japanese enthusiasm for Heidegger

Parkes has also noted that:

Heideggers interest in Asian thought has generated considerable reciprocal

interest in his work on the part of the Oriental philosophical world.17

Indeed, Japanese enthusiasm for Heideggers thought has roots as early as the

1920s. Kyoto School associates Hajime Tanabewho was personally tutored by

Heideggerand Kiyoshi Miki, had interacted with the young Heidegger in

Germany in 1923, and soon after began to comment about his thought in their own

writings. Because the last page or two of Heideggers summer lecture, Ontology:

Hermeneutics of Facticity, were lost, for 65 years, the sole source for Heideggers

first words on the topic of death were Tanabes lecture notes.18 Indeed, Tanabes

October 1924 A New Turn in Phenomenology19 is the first substantial

commentary on Heideggers thought in any language. Kitaro Nishida himself

immediately commented on Tanabes article, stating in an October 2, 1924

letter to Tanabe that Heidegger will contribute to cultural studies from the

phenomenological standpoint.20 The first translation of Heideggers work in

Japanese, What is Metpaphysics?, appeared in 1930, just one year after its

publication in Germany.21 Miki Kiyoshi published essays on Heidegger in 1930 and

15 Nishitani, Keiji. The Deep Sense of Crisis in Contemporary Culture [],Yomiuri Shinbun 27 May 1976; trnsl. By Elmar Weinbayr as Ein tiefes Gefuhl fur die Krise dermodernen Zivilisation, in Buchners Japan und Heidegger, pp. 1934. Translated into English andquoted by Parkes, in May, p. 101.

*Buchner, Hartmut, ed (1989) Japan und Heidegger. Messkirch: Jan Thorbecke Verlag Sigmaringen.16 Parkes in May, p. 98.17 Parkes, p. 6.18 Parkes in May, p. 82.19 [] in Shiso [] 36 Oct 1924; THZ 4:1724.20 NKZ 19:582, letter #2470, October 2, 1927. As quoted in Yusa, p. 198, footnote 38. Nishida received

from his student Risaku Mutai, a copy of Heideggers Being and Time in 1927, the same year as itspublication in Germany (NKZ 18:327, letter #447 to Risaku Mutai (in Freiburg), June 17, 1927; cf also

NKZ 19:600, letter #2516 to Hajime Tanabe, June 20, 1927).

*NKZ = Nishida, Kitaro (1965) The Complete Works of Kitaro Nishida [](abbreviated NKZ). Iwanami Shotenkan [].21 Seinosuke Yuasa, who studied with Heidegger in 1929, translated Heideggers What is Metaphys-

ics? for publication in Japan in 1930.


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1933.22 Shuzo Kuki, who had interacted with Heidegger in 1926 and 1927, and who

was the first to introduce Jean-Paul SartreKukis French tutor at the time23to

Heideggers thought, released the 1933 work, Heideggers Philosophy, which wasthe first book length work on Heideggers philosophy in any language. In the same

year, Tanabe summed up the thoughts of many in the Japanese intellectual

community when he stated:

Among contemporary German philosophers, no one has recently attracted

greater attention in Japan than Martin Heidegger. In what can only be

described as the German equivalent of the Japanese descent from heaven,

this comparatively young scholarHeidegger at 44 has just entered his prime

was given a post normally reserved for the most senior of academic

veterans. Obviously, in these exceptional times, the man is the object of

enormous expectations not only at Freiburg but also throughout the German

academic community.24

Tetsuro Watsujis Climate, which was soon to be published in 1935, althoughlargely a critique of Heideggers thought, still exhibited its indebtedness to

Heideggers brand of phenomenology and etymological speculation. Japanese

enthusiasm for Heidegger continued after WWII as well, as was illustrated by the

work Is Heidegger a Nihilist?,25 by Kyoto School associate Masaaki Kosaka. Moresecondary literature on Heidegger has appeared in Japanese than in any other

language, including German and French. Between 1939 and 1960, no less than six

different translations of Heideggers Being and Time appeared in Japanese.26

Heideggers association with the Kyoto School is especially worthy of note, as he

was not only studied carefully by several of its associates, but also developed close

relationships with Nishidas close friend D. T. Suzuki, and with Keiji Nishitani, who

was the successor to Nishida and Tanabe as the generally accepted head of the

Kyoto School.27

Given the deep interest that Heideggers philosophy was causing among Japanese

intellectuals, it is not surprising that Heideggers philosophy played a major role in

Takizawas own graduation thesis in 1931. Takizawa also wrote a critical essay

about Heidegger in 1933, shortly before meeting Nishida in person for the first time.

22 Heideggers Ontology (1930) & Heidegger and the Destiny of Philosophy (1933).23 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 158. Cf also Williams, p. 81.

* Williams, David (2004) Defending Japans Pacific War. New York: Routledge.24 Williams translation, p. 181, from THZ 8:39 A Philosophy of Crisis or a Crisis of Philosophy? [

]*THZ = Tanabe, Hajime (19631964) The Complete Works of Hajime Tanabe ()

(abbreviated THZ). 15 vols. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo ().

Tanabe, Hajime. 19631964. The Complete Works of Hajime Tanabe () (abbreviated THZ).15 vols. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo ().25 Piovesana, p. 201, footnote 2.

*Piovesana, Gino K., S. J. (1997). Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 18621996. Richmond:Japan Library (Curzon Press Ltd).26 Williams, p. 82.27 Cf Yuasa in Parkes, and Parkes in May, for a good historical overview.

516 C. A. Rigsby

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It is clear that during this meeting, Heidegger was an important part of the

conversation, and also evident that Takizawa himself expected to study with

Heidegger, as so many of Nishidas other colleagues and students had already done.

2.3 The Western expectation that Heidegger is a key to Japanese Philosophy

Interest in Heideggers thought has not been limited to Japan. Western students of

Heidegger and EastWest comparative studies have also looked to Heidegger with

great expectations as an auspicious case of a Westerner doing philosophy in a way

that is especially commensurate with East-Asian thought. This is attested to by

numerous publications,28 and particularly, by a symposium on Heidegger and

Eastern Thought that was held at the University of Hawaii in 1969 to celebrate his

eightieth birthday.29 The essays presented at this conference were anthologized in

1987, with an introduction which states that although the vocabulary of traditional

(Platonic/Christian) metaphysics and contemporary analytic philosophy threaten

to subject East-Asian texts to gross distortion, the language of Heideggerian

philosophy is especially suited to dealing with the Asian tradition, as Parkes states:

The realization has dawned recently, however, that the European Continental

traditionand existentialism and phenomenology in particularhas devel-

oped philosophical terminologies that are far more in harmony with many

strains of Asian thought than are those of Anglo-American philosophy.30

Regarding Heideggers significance for comparative philosophical studies and East

West dialogue, Elmar Weinmayr concurred in 1989, stating:

Heideggers thought isone of the few (philosophical) European advances to

the place in which East Asia and Europe can creatively encounter one

another.31

28 Examples of such publications setting up Heidegger as especially compatible with Eastern philosophy

include:

*Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen, by Steven Heine, 1985.*Thinking in transition: Nishida Kitaro and Martin Heidegger, Weinmayr, Elmar; Krummel,

John W. M.; Berger, Douglas, in Philosophy East and West April, 2005.*Heideggers Hidden Sources by Reinhard May.*Heidegger and Asian Thought, a (1987) anthology ed. by Graham Parkes et al.*Heidegger figures prominently in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism and Religion and Nothingness by

Keiji Nishitani, and also in Zen and Western Thought by Abe Masao.*Japan und Heidegger (in German), (1989) ed. by Buchner von Hartmut.*Japanese publications include: ( )

2002, (;:).29 Parkes, Heidegger and Asian Thought, p. 7.30 Parkes, p. 6.31 Weinmayr, p. 248.

*Weinmayr, Elmar (2005). Thinking in Transition: Nishida Kitaro and Martin Heidegger. (translated

from the original essay in the anthology, Japan und Heidegger. Sigmaringen: Jan thorbecke Verlag,1989). Philosophy East & West. Vol. 55, No. 2, April, pp. 232256.


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In investigating how Heideggers wartime thought and political life might clarify

the meaning and value of the wartime Kyoto School, David Williams even stated in

2004, that Martin Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time.32

2.4 The Heidegger studies crisis & Japanese Philosophy

The destinies of Heideggerian philosophy and modern Japanese Philosophy have

been closely intertwined, not only for the good, but also for the bad. When Victor

Faras 1987 book Heidegger and Nazism provoked a scandal throughout the worldof Heidegger scholarshipa scandal aggravated by a study of the same year which

exposed the anti-Semitic editorials of deconstructionist critic Paul de Man33the

resulting shock waves led to the 1994 anthology, Rude Awakenings, whichreevaluated the wartime political ideology and activity of the Kyoto School, of

which Nishida was a leading figure. Thus whereas since the 1960s, Western studies

of Kyoto School thought and Zen Buddhism had focused primarily on religious and

ontological themes, Faras work led to a new political vantage point in the 1990s,

whereby previously positive receptions transformed into highly critical assessments.

James Heisig and John Maraldo note:

If there is one factor we can point to as having brought the political aspect to

the fore, it is the case of Martin Heidegger. In the light of new revelations of

Heideggers associations with the German Nazi Party, affections for

Heideggerian thought underwent a sea of change, and in the process, the

consciousness of a generation was awakened as never before to the political

consequences of supposedly apolitical philosophers and scholars. It was only a

matter of time before this rude awakening was transmitted to those attracted to

the philosophy of the Kyoto School, not to mention Zen Buddhism.34

Williams concurs regarding this wave of Japan critique (Grn: Japanokritik),stating:

The global debate that had erupted in the 1980s over Heideggers politicsthe

so-called Faras Affairdealt a severe blow to the reputation of Kyoto

School philosophy in the West.35

Indeed, Williams notes that The ricochet of the Faras Affair damaged the Western

commitmentmoral, aesthetic, religious, and metaphysicalto Kyoto thought.36

Somberly keeping in view the central question of FarasIs there anything in

32 Williams, p. 29.33 Williams, p. 147.34 Heisig and Maraldo, Rude Awakenings, pp. viiviii. Cf Williams p. 144. Cf also Maraldo, TheProblem of World Culture, 1995, pp. 183, 189.

*Heisig, James and John Maraldo (1995) Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question ofNationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.*Maraldo, John C. (1995) The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishidas

Philosophy of Nation and Culture. The Eastern Buddhist. Volume 28, number 2, Autumn, pp. 183197.35 Williams, p. 129.36 Williams, p. 141.

518 C. A. Rigsby

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Heideggers philosophy that would have made his involvement with the Nazis

impossible?Jan Van Bragt, concluded in 1994 that, in a very general sense,

Kyoto School philosophy is intrinsically nationalistic, and that further reflection

upon the ramifications of this hitherto unconsidered aspect of modern Japanese

thought are in order.37 Williams went onto argue in 2004 that the corresponding

post-Faras Affair question which has generated the current critical stance against

modern Japanese philosophy is: Is there anything in Nishidas philosophy that

would have kept him from becoming an ultra-nationalist?38

Indeed, there is a sense in which Heidegger and the members of the Kyoto School

were nationalists who, in the face of opposition and competition, supported the

standpoint of their respective politispheres and cultures. Although this has been

perceived as a deficit by many Western scholars who take a critical stance toward

Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Williams has defended the Kyoto School

precisely in terms of its political objectives, calling it an adventure in post-White

thinking which defined the future of Asian resurgence.39 The very title of

Williams work of 2004Defending Japans Pacific Warresoundingly proclaimsthis provocative thesis. Williams not only thus portrays the Kyoto School as a

corrective to Western ethnocentrism, but also appeals to the commonly perceived

continuity between Heidegger and East-Asian thought in order to defend Heideg-

gerian philosophy from the aftershocks of the Faras Affair, as Williams states:

If a German problem (Heideggers politics) has provoked this Japanese

problem (the rediscovery of the true politics of the wartime Kyoto School), the

reverse may also be true: a Japanese solution may offer a cure for our German

problem.40

Thus, in summary, Williams argues on the assumption of a significant continuity

between Heidegger and the Kyoto School, that restoring the reputation of the Kyoto

School should correspondingly restore Heideggers reputation. The implication is that

if there is no such continuity betweenHeidegger and the Kyoto School, then themerits

of the Kyoto School cannot be appealed to in order to salvage Heideggers reputation.

3 The purported continuity between Heidegger & Nishida

Any claim that there is a general continuity of thought between Heidegger and the

East-Asian traditions quickly becomes suspect upon investigation of the vast

diversity representing East-Asian thought and culture. Even when purported

continuities with Heidegger are limited to the Kyoto School alone, the vast

differences between its members and associates militate against any purported

essential similarity. For example, Shinichi Hisamatsu was a Zen Buddhist, Seiichi

Hatano was a Christian, Hajime Tanabe and Masaaki Kosaka were nationalists,

37 Jan Van Bragt, in Heisig & Maraldo, Rude Awakenings, p. 243. Cf Williams, p. 141.38 Williams, p. 141.39 Williams, p. 91.40 Williams, p. 130.


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Kiyoshi Miki and Jun Tosaka were Marxists and Keiji Nishitani was an

existentialist of sorts. Given the vast range of options in modern Japanese

philosophy, more than one study of Heidegger has narrowed the field by proposing

Nishidas life and thought as exhibiting the strongest parallels with Heidegger.

However, some such studies, such as Arthur R. Luthers (1982) comparison between

the two thinkers, argue for a parallel between them based partly on an insufficiently

clear account of Nishidas thought.41 Given a clearer picture, in terms of both

political and metaphysical stance, strong discontinuities between the two thinkers

can be discerned if the comparison focuses on the early, pre-turn Heidegger.

3.1 Discontinuity between Heidegger & Nishidas political stance

In terms of the political stance of the two thinkers, Williams argues that for Nishida,

The analogy with Heidegger is close,42 in that both thinkers were objectivists,

prioritizing a standpoint transcending the historical creation and political activism

of humanism and subjectivism. Thus Williams distances Nishida and Heidegger

from subjectivists like Hajime Tanabe and the Kyoto School gang of four

Masaaki Kosaka, Shigetaka Suzuki, Iwao Koyama, and Keiji Nishitaniwho

stressed the rational self-mastery and effective agency, which is to say,

subjectivityt (shutaisei []),43 of human beings acting as subjectst.44 Notonly did Tanabe criticize Nishida for characterizing reality as determined by a trans-

historical principle that did not do justice to the actual movements of history,45 but

41 Arthur R. Luthers stimulating comparison of Heidegger and Nishida in terms of an original coming

into appearanceimmediately and directly experienced (p. 345, my italics) may characterize Nishidain more phenomenological terms than Nishida himself would have felt comfortable with. Luthers most

questionable characterizations of Nishida appear in terms of a conflation of Nishidas thought with

Buddhism. Luther concludes that for Nishida, all sentient existents are essentially empty or void of own-

being (p. 353), karma is integral to cosmic processes (p. 354), and as in Hua-yan (Kegon) Buddhism,

the dependent coorigination of all factors of existence is inclusive of infinite past as well as infinite

future (p. 354). To my knowledge, Nishida himself neither adopts the concepts nor utilizes the

corresponding Buddhist terms, void of own-being (nisvabhava) or karma as integral to his system.However, as Luther correctly notes, self-negation (jiko hitei []) is indeed integral to the NishidaPhilosophy, although not necessarily in a Buddhist manner; indeed, Nishidas notion of negation often

reminds me more of Hegelian negation and Christian self-denial than Buddhist voidness of own being.

Further, although Hajime Tanabes disciple Yoshinori Takeuchi (in 1963) portrayed Nishidas philosophy

of time as basically a Hua-yan Buddhist past to future/future to past mutual penetration and Western

scholars such as Steve Odin (in 1982) have likewise followed this interpretation, Nishida himself in both

1932 (NKZ 6:183) and 1945 (NKZ 11:375), emphasized the irreversible structure of time.

*Luther, Arthur R. 1982. Original Emergence in Heidegger and Nishida. Philosophy Today. VolumeXXVI, Number 4/4, Winter.42 Williams, p. 145.43 Williams, p. 68.44 Williams, p. 110. The French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre would define subjectivism as pointing to

the fact that man has a greater dignity than a stone, and as having two meanings, namely, that an

individual chooses andmakes himself; andthat it is impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity.

The Humanism of Existentialism (1945), in the context of Sartres explanation of Atheistic

existentialism.45 Maraldo, The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishidas Philosophy of

Nation and Culture, p. 185.

520 C. A. Rigsby

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in early Autumn of 1933, Tanabe also similarly criticized Heideggers Freiburg

Rectoral address of May 3 of the same year. Thus in 1933, Tanabe claimed

critically, that for Heidegger:

knowing is a creature born out of powerlessness. This is why the Greeks

called it theora Armed only with the awareness of the powerlessness ofknowledge, is it possible to establish, positively, with this principle alone, the

foundations for a metaphysics of the nation-state?46

That is, Tanabe felt that Heideggers Aristotelean commitment to a philosophical

methodology of mere theoradisengaged and disinterested contemplation

which during the Middle Ages degenerated into the handmaiden of theology, is

incapable of the Platonic invocation to historical awareness and political action.

Thus by way of Tanabes critique, both Heidegger and Nishida are united as

adherents to political objectivism, which is to say, a standpoint whereby individual

human beings are objects grounded in a reality greater than the effective agency of

historical production, and are thereby maximally distanced from the political

engagement demanded by subjectivism. Tanabes critiques of the objectivism he

detected in Heidegger and Nishida thus lend considerable support to the thesis of a

continuity between the two thinkers.47

However, despite the continuity between the two thinkers as perceived by Tanabe

and Williams, there are also significant differences between Heidegger and Nishida.

The differences between them were greatest in 1933, which is the year that Nishida

sent off his student Takizawa to Germany, and the differences remained strong until

the year of Nishidas death in 1945, which is one year before the culmination of

Heideggers turn (Kehre) represented by the 1946 essay Letter on Humanism,wherein he locates the error of Western philosophy in a metaphysics of presence

dominated by the will to power of active subjects seeking planetary domination

of technique. Although the later Heidegger clearly prioritized the letting go

(Gelassenheit) of self-assertion, the Heidegger of the 1927 work Being and Timeand the 1933 Rektoratsredewhich is to say, the Heidegger most familiar toNishidahad strong subjectivist tendencies. On the one hand, the later Heideggerwould warn of the inauthenticity of self-assertion aimed at future-oriented

progress and technology, and would correspondingly affirm the authenticity

of the subtle disclosure of truth (aletheia) as given in the past and cultivated byGreek thought. However, on the other hand, the early Heidegger conversely warnedof the inauthenticity of the past-oriented thrownness (Geworfenheit) of theThey (das Man), who in making no attempt to face the future and its implicationsof authenticity, constantly threaten to rob human beings (Dasein) of their self-autonomy, responsibility, and choice. Heideggers early subjectivism reverberates

46 Williams, pp. 182183. Tanabes article on Heidegger, Philosophy of Crisis, or a Crisis of

Philosophy?, appeared in a three-part series printed in the Asahi Newspaper in early Autumn of 1933.Tanabe had recently issued a similar critique of Nishidas philosophy in May, 1930, in the article,

Looking Up to Nishidas Teachings.47 Williams characterizes Tanabes critique of Nishida as a criticism against objectivism (cf Williams,

p. 116), and indeed characterizes both Heidegger and Nishida as objectivists (pp. 130, 135, 146).


123

clearly in a statement he made in 1933a statement which exhibits his choice-

oriented and future-oriented philosophical terminology of the period:

The German people must choose its future, and this future is bound to the

Fuhrer There is only one will to the full existence (Dasein) of the State. TheFuhrer has awakened this will in the entire people48

Evidently, from Nishidas 1931 essay History onward, culminating in his notion

of active-intuition, Nishida himself became increasingly interested in the

concrete, socio-political creation of history. However, in both theory and practice,

Nishida never exhibited the same degree of subjectivist activism as Heidegger. Even

more significantly, from the beginning to the end of his career, Nishida maintained a

rather detached stance toward political matters which later commentators would call

resistive cooperation (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []).49 Although thisstance worked indirectly to affirm the official policies of wartime Japan, it is not

comparable to Heideggers vigorous participation in political affairs and enthusi-

astic support for the Nazi party in 1933, the year of his Rectorship at Freiburg

University and the year of Takizawas study in Germany. Indeed, in private, Nishida

was highly critical of the political regime of wartime Japan.50

Although Williams argues for a strong continuity between Heidegger and

Nishida, he does not carefully note the difference between the early and the later

Heidegger. Further, Williams location of a continuity between the two thinkers

seems to assume the position of the later Heidegger. However, it is precisely thephilosophical subjectivism and political activity of the early Heidegger that led tocritical reassessment of his life and thought, and consequently, to a critical

reassessment of the Kyoto School. Indeed, it is precisely this subjectivist strain of

the early Heidegger that has led many to make a distinction between his political life

and his philosophy, thus affirming only the value of the latter in an attempt to

salvage it. Although Williams claims that distinguishing the man from the ideas,

the politics from the philosophy, does not work as philosophy,51 and that to make

this distinction is the hoariest cliche in the entire controversy over Heidegger,52

Williams himself nevertheless appears to resort to this cliche by claiming that the

ethicalpolitical critics of Heidegger often seem to have lost sight of the

metaphysical horizon and that This appears to be equally true of the political

48 Heidegger. German Men and Women!, Freiburger Studentenzeitung, 10 Nov (1933).49 Cooperative resistance (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []) is Ryosuke Ohashis term for thewartime political stance taken by several members of the Kyoto School, including Nishida, a stance

characterized by negotiating a reorientation by means of immanent critique or cooperative correction.

I would like to acknowledge Bret Davis for making this information available online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/. Cf also Ohashi, Ryosuke. The Kyoto School and theJapanese Navy [], Kyoto: PHP Shinsho, 2001, p. 20ff.50 Cf Michiko Yusas biography of Nishida.

*Yusa, Michiko (2002) Zen & Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitaro. Honolulu:

University of Hawaii Press.51 Williams, p. 150.52 Williams, p. 156.

522 C. A. Rigsby

123

critics of the wartime Kyoto School.53 Indeed, Williams himself praises the ability

to draw a firm distinction between the philosophic discourse proper and the realm

of political opinion,54 and thus even Williams takes the stance of distinguishing

the man from the ideas, the politics from the philosophy. Whether or not Williams

is correct in his claim that metaphysics is not about moral backbone,55 he has not

provided a satisfactory account of the continuity between the wartime political

philosophies of Heidegger and Nishida. If the wartime political thought of

Heidegger and Nishida does not exhibit significant continuity, then perhaps a

stronger continuity can be located in their ontological explorations on the

metaphysical horizon.

3.2 Discontinuity between Heidegger & Nishidas metaphysical stance

In terms of the metaphysical stance of the two thinkers, Elmar Weinmayr noted in

1989:

Nishida and Heidegger bothpoint to the derivativeness of the subjecthood of

man as well as the objecthood of things from a prior openness of reality as a

whole, that is to say, the subject-object relation is embedded in a deep.

structure embracing them and initially making their relation possible.56

Thus, Nishidas all-encompassing Place or Topos (basho []) exhibits significantsimilarities with Heideggers Being (Sein), which is manifest as an openness(Offenheit) and acts as a clearing (Lichtung) for the beings within it, thusproviding light (Licht) for human beings (Dasein) to encounter the emerging truth(aletheia) of Being. Nishidas account of the relationship between the infinite Toposand the finite individuals situated within it (oite aru mono []), alsoexhibits significant similarities with Heideggers account of the ontological

difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes), whereby on the one hand,Being enables a genuine encounter between beings and elicits a sense of care

(Sorge) among them, and on the other hand, beings themselves derive theirsignificance from Being. Indeed, Nishidas account of the relationship between the

Absolute Topos of Nothingness and the individuals situated within it, as a

contradictory self-identity (mujunteki jikodoitsu []), and hisaccount of the manifestation of Nothingness as a transcendence and-yet

immanence (naizai soku choetsu []), exhibits significant similaritieswith Heideggers characterization of the manifestation of Being as a simultaneous

absence and yet presence.

Heideggers preoccupation with the question of Being (das Seinsfrage), whichextended from the beginning to the end of his career, indicates that what the term

Being represents, was of paramount importance for him, and the same was true of

the notion of Topos or Nothingness for Nishida. Nishida often characterized his

53 Williams, p. 137.54 Williams, p. 161.55 Williams, p. 146.56 Weinmayr, p. 234.


123

understanding of the referent of terms such as Topos, Nothingness, and the

Absolute, as God. Heidegger was less inclined to characterize Being as

God, and indeed rarely touched upon the issue of God. Just as with Nishidas

view of God, there is a lack of consensus and clarity regarding Heideggers own

view of God. Of course, it has been noted that Heideggers ontological difference

between Being and beings shares affinities with the theistic difference between God

and creatures, and also that Heideggers aim to rid philosophy of all metaphysicaltheology does not necessitate the rejection of God, but may actually clear the way

for a genuine encounter with God.57 In the late 1950s, Heidegger implied this by

distinguishing the divine God (der gottlicher Gott) from the god of philosophy.58

However, although Heidegger himself references God and the holy in his own

work without rejecting such notions, his lack of clarity regarding the notion of God

has commonly led to the appellation of his position as agnostic. Indeed, in printed

translations of Heideggers notion of Sein or Being, some scholars do not use acapital B in order to avoid making Sein sound like some absolute ormetaphysical principle that rules over other beings.59 Emphasizing the difference

between Heideggers b-eing and the theistic God, Weinmayr emphasizes that

Heidegger is not interested in some:

law standing above all beings, for example a highest conjoining

(Verfugung) of a universally destined transience to which beings aresubjugated.60

Weinmayr explains that to seek such an all-encompassing trans-historical law is a

symptom of the modern problem of the oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit)whereby The modern subject desires that which fits (fugt) the highest and mostuniversal being, because it is unconjoined (unverfugten) and not conjoinable(unverfugbaren)61 Heideggers discontinuity with Nishida comes clearly intoview here, because Nishidas Topos is easily characterized as the highest and most

universal reality, fully absolute as the Topos of Absolute Nothingness or God.

Of course, Nishidas etymological appeal to relevant Sino-Japanese morphemes in

order to characterize the Absolute (zettai []) as that which has severed (zet-[]) all opposition (-tai []),62 implies a radical immanence and continuity of theAbsolute with all finite things and thus contrasts with the radical transcendence

implied by the corresponding Indo-European morphemes (Ltn: ab-solvere),

57 Kovacs, pp. 2021, 24.

*Kovacs, George (1990) The Question of God in Heideggers Phenomenology. (Part of theNorthwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. James M. Edie).

Illinois: Northwestern University Press.58 Heidegger, Identitat und Differenz (Identity and Difference) (1957), p. 71, my translation.

*Heidegger (1971a) Identity and Difference. [translation by Joan Stambaugh from Identitat undDifferenz (19551957)]. New York: Harper & Row.59 Krummel and Berger in Weinmayr, p. 251, footnote 6.60 Weinmayr, p. 237. For ease of comprehension, I replaced the singular generic a being with the plural

beings.61 Weinmayr, p. 238.62 NKZ 11:396.

524 C. A. Rigsby

123

which indicate a setting free (solvere) from (ab) or an unconjoinability(Unverfugbarkeit) with all finite things. However, both Sino-Japanese and Indo-European morphemes can generate the same end result in that maximal universality is

achieved in both cases, whether through the Sino-Japanese immanence in all finite

things or through the Indo-European transcendence from all finite things.

It is important to note that Heideggers account of Being, which is perhaps that

notion in his thought that most closely approximates the notion of God, changes

throughout the course of Heideggers career. Thus Heideggers later account of

Being more closely parallels the traditional notion of God than Heideggers early

account of Being, as Michael Inwood explains:

In [Heideggers 1927 work,] Being and Time, Being is only in theunderstanding [of individual beings]. If there were no Dasein [i.e. human

beings], there would be no Being, but there would be beings Later [in the

development of Heideggers thought]Beinghas becomemore like

God[in that] what human beings do depends on Being itself Being does

not depend on human beings, as in Being and Time, but creates human beingsas its abode.63

Tokiyuki Nobuhara correspondingly noted in 1992, that for the post-turn Heidegger,

Daseins authentic existence began to be coterminous with Daseins devotion or

correspondence (Entsprechung) to the ultimate reality as the verifying truth (dieWahrung der Wahrheit).64 Rolf von Eckartsberg and Ronald S. Valle, in 1981, inthe context of a comparison between Heideggerian philosophy and the major

Eastern spiritual traditions, have even identified Heideggers Being with a higher,

transpersonal God- or theo-dimension which is the source of legitimation and

validation of our activities.65 Thus whereas for the early Heidegger, human beings

are a precondition for Being, for the later Heidegger, the reverse is the case.

Therefore, it can be said that in the early Heideggerthe Heidegger of whom

Nishida was most familiarthe notion of God is maximally absent.

63 Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 7273. Man changed to human beings.*Inwood, Michael (1999) The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries: A Heidegger Dictionary.

Massachusetts: Blackwell.64 Nobuhara, Portraying Authentic Existence, part I, pp. 6162.

*Nobuhara, Tokiyuki (19921993) Portraying Authentic Existence by the Method of Analogy:

Toward the Creative Uses of the Analogy of Attribution Duorum Ad Tertium for Comparative Philosophy

of Religion. Bulletin of Keiwa College. Part I No. 1 Feb 28, 1992 (pp. 6182); Part II No. 2 February 28,1993 (pp. 2750); Part III No. 3 Feb 28, 1994 (pp. 119).65 Von Eckartsberg and Valle (1981) p. 289:

There has been emerging among consciousness-oriented psychologists an increasing recognition that

our personal and collective relationship to the world (man-world-relationships) has to be lived under the

inspiration and auspices of some higher, transpersonal power of divinity, of ultimate Being, as the source

of legitimation and validation of our activities. This higher, transpersonal God- or theo-dimension is

variously spoken of and conceptualized in different traditions. We want to select and compare

Heideggers work on the Western philosophical tradition of metaphysics and ontology with the major

Eastern spiritual traditions, because they bear some striking similarities in their emphasis on a

transcendent dimension, the theo-dimension, in human consciousness.

*Von Eckhartsberg, Rolf, & Ronald S. Valle. 1981. Heideggerian Thinking and the Eastern Mind.

(chapter 14, pp. 287311) Metaphors of Consciousness. New York & London: Plenum Press.


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4 Nishidas negative assessment of Heidegger

Whatever positive evaluations of Heidegger might have been suggested by

Nishidas favorable 1924 remark to TanabeHeidegger will contribute to cultural

studies from the phenomenological standpoint66and by the strong interest that

Nishidas associates such as Miki, Tanabe, and Kuki had shown in the great German

philosopher, Nishidas overall assessment of Heidegger was not as Weinmayr

suggests, just an ambivalent posture expressed in a few places wherein

Appreciation and critical distance are mixed.67 To the contrary, Nishidas overall

assessment of Heidegger was overwhelmingly negative.68 Indeed, given a broader

picture of Nishidas view of Heidegger, it can be said that Nishidas overall

assessment of Heidegger can be summarized bluntly in the uninhibited statement

made by the father of the Kyoto School to the young Takizawa in October 1933:

Heidegger is not worth your time.69 In the same year of 1933, Nishida repeated

his negative assessment of Heideggeralthough in a much more restrained manner

in a December 19 letter to Goichi Miyake, who had studied with Heidegger at

Freiburg from 1929 to 1931. Politely assuring Miyake of the value of his study in

Germany, Nishida stated:

I respect Heideggers work, but it cannot answer the deep problems of

substance (jittai []) and life (jinsei []).70

In his statement to Takizawa, Nishida explained clearly what does provide the

solution to the problems of substance and lifea solution lacking in Heidegger, at

least in early Heideggerian philosophy. Thus Nishida expressed his solution and

also his reason for rejecting Heideggers thought, in the following words:

Heideggerfocuses only on such themes as Angst and death, and

although he often relies upon Pascal and Kierkegaard, he does not recognize

that which is indispensable and decisive, namely, God.71

66 NKZ 19:582, letter #2470, October 2, 1927. As quoted in Yusa, p. 198, footnote 38.67 Weinmayr, p. 233. The full statement reads:

Nishida himself played hardly any role in the direct and immediate dissemination and reception of

Heideggerian philosophy in Japan. Indeed, only a few publications of Heideggers works are found in his

library, but nothing can be said of any reference to Heidegger. Appreciation and critical distance are

mixed in the few places where Nishida talks about Heidegger.68 Even the statements by Nishida about Heidegger, which Weinmayr himself examines, are all negative,

pp. 233234.69 Takizawa recorded this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timline p. 164).70 NKZ 18:489, letter #824, December 19, 1933. (trns. Rigsby) Referenced by Yusa, p. 257. Nishidas

term substance (jittai []) can be understood in a colloquial sense or in a philosophically nuancedsense. If Nishida has the philosophical sense in mindwhich is to say, substance as the unifier and

organizer of various propertiesthen this statement may be a criticism of Heideggers account of Being

and its insufficiencies in portraying the universal, all-encompassing Absolute which Nishida embraced.

Nishidas Absolutethe Topos of Absolute Nothingnessunifies and determines all concrete individuals

and the properties they exhibit.71 Takizawa makes this statement three times, in TKC 1:441, TKC 2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion(1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis Katsumi Takizawa Timeline p. 164).

526 C. A. Rigsby

123

Given that the later Heidegger would himself propose formulations of Being which

are closer to the traditional notion of God, and also given that the later Heidegger

would also adhere more solidly to socio-political objectivism in the manner of the

Nishida Philosophy, Nishidas 1933 assessment of Heidegger most likely applies

only to pre-turn Heideggerian thought. At the same time, just as the pre-turn

Heideggerian standpoint, which tended to be restricted to a political and

phenomenological subjectivism, worked toward breaking the continuity of his

thought with Nishida, Nishidas own negative assessment of Heidegger suggests a

significant discontinuity between the two thinkers. In Nishidas own words, the

decisive deficit in Heideggers thought is failure to recognize Godthe

ultimate Reality which Nishida interchangeably calls the Absolute, the absolute

Place or Topos, and Nothingness. Thus Nishidas criticism of Heidegger is

conversely constituted and motivated by Nishidas account of Gods essential

character, which can be summarized in the following six points: (1) first, Gods

transcendence which provides a ground for mathematics and a standpoint which is

not affected by the vicissitudes of contingent phenomena, (2) second, Gods

prevention of ethno-centrism, (3) third, Gods affirmation of individual and cultural

autonomy, (4) fourth, Gods immanence which affirms the significance of socio-

historical life, (5) fifth, Gods prevention of Nihilism, and (6) sixth, the clear

recognition of the reality of God provided by Christian thought.

4.1 Gods trans-historical, universal, & necessary character

From the beginning to the end of his career, Nishida attempted to attain a standpoint

locating that necessary ground upon which contingent, historical actuality is

dependent. According to Nishida, this ground is not only given in immediate

experience, but is the a priori basis for all the varied forms of experience.

Consequently, it was clear to him that certain formal and metaphysical truths do not

change, no matter the current historical time or cultural space. Nishida understood

these unchanging truths to be grounded in God and not in any one finite socio-

historical subject. For Nishida, phenomenology, whether Heideggerian or Husser-

lian, cannot provide an all-encompassing, stable standpoint, because it is restricted

to the contingent finitude of human subjects. Nishida stressed the trans-historical

character of his standpoint in a letter of September 22, 1940, to Takizawa, stating:

Footnote 71 continued

I propose the following harmony of Takizawas three accounts, avoiding repetition and yet providing all

of the information which he records of Nishidas statement:

Lately, Heidegger is famous in Japan. However, Heidegger is not worth your time (tsumaranu monoda). He focuses only on such themes as Angst and death, and although he often relies upon Pascaland Kierkegaard, he does not recognize that which is indispensable (kanjin no []) and decisive(ketteiteki na nanika []), namely, God (goddo/kami []). There is no philosopher inGermany now that I would recommend, as it appears that there is currently no philosopher of import

there. However, in Germany, recently, the theologians are vastly more interesting than the philosophers.

There are theologians such as Barth, Brunner, and Gogarten, but the most solid among them is Barth. It

would be good to study under him if you can. However, unfortunately, it appears as if he may have been

expelled by the Nazis and is no longer in Germany.


123

I argue from a more basic standpoint than so-called social science

(shakaikagaku []). I think there is a lot of truth in social science.However, rather than believe this standpoint so easily as is done nowadays,

shouldnt we reflect and examine even more deeply?72

Nishida stressed in a letter of July 2, 1934, to the young Heideggerian Goichi

Miyake, that a properly philosophical standpoint must account for the trans-

historical character of mathematical truths, and thus stated:

It is interesting to apply a current Heideggerian view to mathematics and so

on, thus taking a historical viewpoint. However, can this method really

provide a philosophical rationale (Begrundung) for mathematics?73

Indeed, it would appear that if there is any field of inquiry not affected by historical

contingencies, and which is even manifest of necessity within historical contin-

gencies, mathematics would present a prime candidate for such a field of inquiry.

This is certainly a conviction held by many philosophers from Plato to Spinoza to

Russell. Nishidas own view is that Mathematics is extremely universal as the self-

determination of pure thought.74 Nishidas own conviction that mathematics

cannot be reduced to historical contingency remained strong to the end of his career,

as is exhibited in his 1945 essay The Philosophical Foundation of Mathematics

wherein he states: I propose that numbers exist by themselves and act by

themselves.75 It seems that the young Miyake took Nishidas stern rejection of the

historicization of mathematics seriously, as the mature Miyake went onto follow the

mathematical thought of Bertrand Russell.76

Nishida had more in mind than just mathematics in his appeal to the young

Miyake to locate a standpoint grounded upon what is universal and necessary. In

contrast to a standpoint grounded in the contingencies of the philosophy of history

then popular in the Kyoto School itself, Nishida strongly urged Miyake to consider

the standpoint of the all-encompassing Absolute Place or Topos that is the core of

Nishida Philosophy, as Nishida wrote to Miyake on March 20, 1942:

The philosophy of history has engulfed many people, but so few have

endeavored to consider my topological logic (toposuteki ronri []) I truly hope you also will consider this endeavor. I think you also carry a

heavy responsibility.77

72 NKZ 19:128; letter#1488; September 22, 1940.73 NKZ 18:497; letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933, p. 385,

footnote 53.74 NKZ 7:400. Cf Dilworths translation on p. 218.

*Nishida, Kitaro. 1987. Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview (trnsl. By DavidA. Dilworth), Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.75 NKZ 11:237; Nishida also states herein that All logic exists by itself and acts by itself Nishidas

essay: [], first appeared in [345,1945] (NKZ 11:237ff).76 Piovesana, p. 221.77 NKZ 19: 189190, letter #1648, March 20, 1942.

528 C. A. Rigsby

123

In 1969, the mature Takizawa would himself write a critique of Miyakes

Heideggerian stance of historicist phenomenology. According to Takizawa, Miyake

claims that by pursuing a phenomenological reflection (genshogakuteki hansei []) of human beings, a viewpoint can be attained by which the self can

be rid of all inauthenticity (giman []).78 Claiming that Miyakes viewpointgrounds itself in the historical contingent and fallible conditions of human existence

which themselves prevent authenticity, Takizawa argues that in order to improve

real society and its way of life, including the nation and its politicians, a viewpoint

which recognizes the necessary Base (dodai []) grounding the contingentfeatures of human existence must be attained.79 Indeed, in this critique of Miyake,

Takizawa notes the failure of the early Heideggerand even Nishidato clearly

locate this Base which transcends human subjectivity and historical existence, and

which by its transcendence provides a viewpoint that makes the critique of human

existence possible.80

Takizawas mature philosophy agreed with Nishida in locating a universal and

necessary Base upon which all contingent phenomena are dependent. Just as the

mature Takizawa would do, Nishida identified this all-encompassing Base or

Nothingness as God. As early as 1927, in a letter to Risaku Mutai who was

studying under Heidegger in Freiburg, Nishida opposed Heideggerian philosophy by

characterizing this ultimate reality in personalistic terms, stating:

I do not particularly object if you opt to consider Heideggers Being (On) asbeing situated within the noetic dimension of my self-realization of

Nothingness. However, rather than characterizing [Nothingness] as what is

expressed (Ausdruck), it must be characterized as what expresses (ausdrucken)the self. In other words, Being (On) should completely have the character ofan I (Ich).81

For Nishida, ultimate Realitywhether called Nothingness or Beingis not

primarily what is expressed within human subjects in the manner of early

Heideggerian phenomenology, but is rather the creative Power that expresses and

forms human beings in the first place. This trans-historical and trans-subjective

Power is what Nishida calls God. Following in this trajectory of the Nishida

Philosophy, the mature Takizawa also stressed the same unmanipulatability (Grn:

Unverfugbarkeit, Jpn: hishudansei []) of Absolute reality by claiming thatno matter how human beings may try, they are unable to alter the nature of

Gods relationship with contingent phenomena. Further, following in the trajectory

of Nishida Philosophy to characterize God in terms of mathematical truths,

Takizawa refers to the Divine-human relationship as the Archimedean Point

78 Takizawa, from Phenomenology and Dialectics: Regarding Goichi Miyakes book, HumanExistence, a 1969 essay later printed in (1987) The Decoding Coordinates, p. 136.Takizawa, Katsumi (1987) The Decoding Coordinates: Philosophy, Literature, Education [:]. Japan: Sogensha [].79 Takizawa, ibid, p. 148.80 Takizawa, ibid, p. 135.81 NKZ 18:321, letter #432, January 30, 1927, to Risaku Mutai (in Freiburg).


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(arukimedesuteki itten []), the Fulcrum (shiten []), and thevanishing Point of all forms (issai no keizo no vanishingu pointo []).82 Evidently, in terms of Nishidas criticism of Heidegger, Godstrans-historical, universal, and necessary character suggests the negative ramificationthat all ethno-centrisms and ethno-exclusivismsmust be rejected, and correspondingly

the positive ramification that the autonomy of all finite individuals and groups isaffirmed.

4.2 God prevents Ethno-centrism and Ethno-exclusivism

Nishidas characterization of God as a trans-historical Nothingness works to prevent

the absolutization of any finite individuals or special interest groups, which are inevitably

finite and distinctively formed beings clearly distinguishable from the all-encompass-

ing formless Nothingness of ultimate Reality. Thus Nishidas philosophy consists of a

stancewhich rejects the ethno-centric and ethno-exclusive undercurrents that represented

Heideggers political activism of 1933. This year was not only the year in which Nishida

sharedhis negative assessment ofHeideggerian philosophywith theyoungTakizawa, but

was also the year in which Heideggger enthusiastically supported the Nazi Party in his

position as Rector of Freiburg University. Unfortunate highlights of this period of

Heideggers life include his refusal to protest the nation-wide burning of books with

un-German ideas, his silence in the face of the ill-treatment of his former mentor

Husserl due solely to Husserls Jewish ancestry, Heideggers furnishing of economic

support to ethnocentric military groups such as the SS and SA and corresponding

termination of all such support to Jewish students, and finally his premeditated success in

destroying the careers of the pacifist chemist Hermann Staundinger, the Catholic anti-

Nazi philosopher Max Muller, and the student of American philosophy, Eduard

Baumgarten. Although Heidegger did not hold to the official anti-Jewish Nazi policy

based on biological racism, he clearly held to an ethnocentrism and ethno-exclusivism

privileging German language, culture, and rootedness (Bodenstandigkeit) in the soil ofMiddle-Europe (Mitteleuropa), thus condemning the Jews for their rootless (bodenlos)self-identity based on diaspora andmigration.83 Evidently sensing sufficient kinshipwith

Nazi ideology to make its general ethno-centric and ethno-exclusive focus his own,

Heidegger nearly absolutized the place of German culture by closely associating it with

his own version of absolute reality, stating: the Fatherland is Being [Seyn] itself.84

82 These semi-mathematical expressions can be found, respectively, in #1 Thelle, p. 73; Ulrich & Yagi,

p. 157; #2 TKC 7:322; #3 TKC 7:324.

*Luz, Ulrich and Yagi, Seiichi, ed. (1973) Gott in Japan: Anstosse zum Gesprach mit japanischenPhilosophen, Theologen, Schriftstellern. Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag.* Thelle, Notto R (1975) A Barthian Thinker Between Buddhism And Christianity: Takizawa

Katsumi. Japanese Religions. Vol. 8, October, pp. 5486.83 Bambach, p. 53.

*Bambach, Charles (2003) Heideggers Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks. Ithacaand London: Cornell University Press.84 Heidegger. Holderlins Hymnen Germanien und Der Rhein. Winter Semester 1934/35; Ed. BySusanne Ziegler. 1989. Cf Bambach, p. 55.

530 C. A. Rigsby

123

This dimension ofHeideggers life and thought did not go unnoticed byNishida and

his Japanese associates.85 Indeed, Nishidas 1933 condemnation of Heidegger as

shared with the young Takizawa, makes it clear that Nishida was keenly aware of the

forceful measures taken by the Nazis in order to subdue all those who did not share

their vision. Nishidas knowledge about Karl Barths strong resistance to National

Socialism is apparent in Nishidas words: unfortunately, it appears as if Barth may

have been expelled by the Nazis and is no longer in Germany.86 Nishidas strong

affirmation of Barthian theology in the same train of thoughtBarth is vastly more

interesting that the current philosophers in Germanymay very well be intricately

related to Nishidas own opposition to the Nazis. Although Nishida was generally

aloof from political issues and controversya posture exemplified in what later

commentators called resistive cooperation (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku [])87he did speak out against German National Socialism. In an interview printedin the May 28 1933 issue of the Yomiuri Newspaper, Nishida spoke of the dangerousworldwide phenomenon of totalitarian rule which threatened to crush high culture.

Nishida pointed out in this interview the irony of Nazi anti-Semitism, noting that the

twomost influential ideological forces of the contemporary world had been developed

by Jews: capitalism by David Ricardo and communism by Karl Marx. In particular,

Nishida noted how impoverished the world would be without great Jewish scholars

such as Bergson and Einstein.88 Just four months after Heideggers inaugural address,

Nishidas successor Tanabe responded by writing an article dated September 5 and

published in the October 46, 1933 issues of the Asahi Newspaper. NotingHeideggers recent entrance into the Nazi party and the dismissal of Jewish scholars

from teaching posts, Tanabes article, Is it a Philosophy of Crisis or a Crisis of

Philosophy?,89 mirrored Nishidas displeasure by hinting at Heideggers champi-

oning [of] the racial significance of German academia.90 The Kyoto School associate

Kiyoshi Miki in particular became sharply critical of Heidegger after Heideggers

rectoral address.91 Miki also joined leading Japanese journalists and intellectuals in

writing letters to the press in order to condemn the May 10, 1933 Nazi celebration of

85 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 254.86 This quote is my own harmony of three statements made by Takizawa, found in TKC 1:441, TKC

2:5212, and Inquiring of Religion (1976), p. 87, (the last source being reprinted in Sakaguchis KatsumiTakizawa Timline p. 164).87 Cooperative resistance (hantaiseiteki kyoryoku []) is Ryosuke Ohashis term for thewartime political stance taken by several members of the Kyoto School, including Nishida, a stance

characterized by negotiating a reorientation by means of immanent critique or cooperative correction.

I would like to acknowledge Bret Davis for making this information available online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/. Cf also Ohashi, Ryosuke. The Kyoto School and theJapanese Navy [], Kyoto: PHP Shinsho, 2001, p. 20ff.88 Yomiuri Newspaper [] May 28, 1933, reprinted in Asami Hiroshi, Fukkoku sanpen

pp. 13940. Referenced in Yusa, Biography, p. 255, footnote 34.89 THZ 8:39 []. Cf Yusa p. 254. Cf Williams, p. 113.90 Parkes in May, p. 109, footnote 13; German translation in Buchnors Japan und Heidegger pp.139145 by Elmar Weinbayr. Cf also Williams translation pp. 181183.91 Parkes in May, p. 81.


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the burning of un-German books.92 Thus Miki also criticized the ethno-centric and

ethno-exclusive undercurrents in Heidegger by writing:

Heidegger seems to be seeking a principle for the nationalistic unity of

Germany in blood, earth and destinyin the realm of pathos, in which there is

no discernable objective principle.93

What Miki refers to in this statement as objective principle and elsewhere as

Logos,94 Nishida seems to equate with God. Nishidas own characterization of

God as the formless all-encompassing Place or Topos correspondingly works

against its conflation with any particular blood and soil. Of course, as wartime

pressures began to mount in Japan, Nishida himself closely associated the ultimate

reality of Nothingness with Japanese or Eastern cultureeven to the point of

conveying a chauvinististic outlook95but Nishidas broader socio-historical

metaphysics of global-world formationism (sekaiteki sekai keiseishugi []) also suggests that he was able to avoid the degree of ethno-centrism

and ethno-exclusivism conveyed by Heidegger.

4.3 Gods affirmation of philosophical and cultural autonomy

Nishida apparently held that if the all-encompassing God which grounds all life and

unifies all phenomena does notby way of its transcendence and formlessnessimpose any specific form upon those finite, personal individuals situated within it,

then they consequently should enjoy a freedom from regulation and a marked

autonomy. In the same letter of December 19, 1933 to the young Heideggerian

Goichi Miyake, in which Nishida had disparaged Heideggers philosophy with the

wordsHeideggers workcannot answer the deep problems of substance and

lifeNishida also stressed the need for the Japanese to think for themselves, as he

stated:

Japanese scholars devour books by German thinkers, borrow their methods,

and use them skillfully, without, however, being truly sustained by their

serious philosophical reflections. If this continues to be the practice, the

Japanese will forever remain emulators. How could we expect to see a

philosophical system that is born out of the depth of our own lives? Japanese

thinkers need to engage in the mutual exchange of their views, read what their

colleagues write, and establish a Publikum, a public forum. A philosophical

tradition is not something that is established by the work of one single

individual, but it takes a community of thinkers.96

92 Yusa, Biography, p. 254.93 Quoted by Yuasa in Parkes, pp. 161162.94 Yuasa in Parkes, p. 163.95 Cf Dilworths discussion, Nishidas Logic of the East in Last Writings, p. 129.96 NKZ 18:489, letter #824, December 19, 1933. As translated by Yusa, pp. 2578. Days later, on New

Years Day 1934, Nishida drove this same point home by composing a famous waka poem: People are

people; I am I; Unperturbed; I go on the path; which I take (NKZ 17:496: Hito wa hito, ware wa warenari, tonikaku ni, ware yuku michi wo, ware wa yuku nari).

532 C. A. Rigsby

123

The fact that Nishidas demand for the autonomy of Japanese thinkers and a

warning against a philosophy that is established by the work of one single

individual, occurred in the same context as his rejection of Heideggerian

philosophy, warrants careful consideration. Indeed, Heidegger, in his inaugural

address at Freiburg Universityalso in 1933enthusiastically proclaimed the end

of the much celebrated academic freedom amidst the flames of state-sanctioned

book burnings. Nishida once again wrote to Miyake on July 2, 1934 stressing the

importance that Japanese people think for themselves.97 Nishida also commiserated

with Takizawa in letters of 1940, regarding the importance of philosophical

autonomy and how rare its successful exercise seemed to be in Japan.98

Heideggers own account of the history of philosophy as a progressive oblivion

of Being (Seinsvergessenheit) suggests prima facie that because Western thinkershave lost touch with the rootedness (Bodenstandigkeit) of human existence (Dasein)in its home (Heimat) of Being (Sein), perhaps non-Western thinkers can aid inrevealing the truth (Grk: aletheia) that has been forgotten in the West. In 1955,Heidegger himself suggested as much, in what Elmar Weinmayr has called one of

the few passages wherein Heidegger expresses himself explicitly in the direction of

an intercultural conversation.99 Thus Heidegger notes that the greatness of the

challenge facing the modern age suggests that the West is not able on its own to

achieve the planetary thinking necessary for building according to a more

originary calling which overcomes nihilism, as Heidegger states:

[P]lanetary building will encounter issues to which those involved are today

nowhere equal. This is equally true for both the language of Europe and that of

East Asia, and it is true above all for the realm of possible dialogue between

them. Neither is able on its own to open or to found this realm.100

Indeed, in 1954, Heidegger branded the successes of [European] rationality[a]

delusion,101 and wondered whether it is necessary and rightful for Eastasians to

chase after the European conceptual systems.102 Heidegger was puzzled as to why

East Asian thinkers did not call back to mind the venerable beginnings of their

own thinking, instead of chasing ever more greedily after the latest novelties in

European philosophy.103 Statements such as these, together with Heideggers

statements that Japanese readers immediately understood his thought, would seem

to indicate that Heidegger considered Japanese thinkers to be fully qualified for the

purpose forming what Nishida had called a community of thinkers in full and

97 NKZ 18:, letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933, p. 385, footnote

53.98 NKZ 19:160; letter #1570; April 23, 1941. NKZ 19:161; letter #1572; May 3, 1941.99 Weinmayr, p. 248.100 Heidegger, On the Question of Being (1955), from the English language anthology, Pathmarks,p. 321. Heidegger wrote this essay in honor of, and addressed to, his friend Ernst Junger.

*Heidegger (1998) Pathmarks. [translation of Wegmarken. Frankfurt/M.: V. Klostermann, 1976].New York: Cambridge University Press.101 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 16.102 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 3. (Cf the original Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 87).103 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 37. (Cf the original Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 131).


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equal cooperation with the West, with the aim of jointly overcoming the oblivion of

Being in philosophy.

However, Heidegger made it clear in a September 23, 1966 interviewpublished

in 1976 in Der Spiegel, posthumously at his request104that the problem facing theWest and purportedly portrayed so vividly by Nietzsche105 would not beameliorated by the aid of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the

world. As Heidegger states:

Theconflict between the dionysian and the apollonian, the holy passion and

the sober account [as described by Nietzsche], is a concealed stylistic law of

the historical destiny of the Germans With this conflictNietzsche [has] set

a question mark before the Germans task to find their essence historically

I am convinced that a [solution] can only be prepared from the same place in the

worldwhere themodern technologicalworld originated. It cannot come about by

the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world.106

In fact, Heidegger not only thus claims negatively that East Asian thought is

incapable of addressing the problem of the modern technological world, butclaims positively that the only tradition fully capable of addressing this problem is

the German tradition. Noting that the modern technological world must betranscended (aufgehoben), Heidegger claims that the Germans have a specialqualification for this change by way of the special inner relationship between the

German language and the thinking of the Greeks. Heidegger goes onto state

confidently:

This has been confirmed to me again and again today by the French. When

they begin to think they speak German. They insist that they could not get

through with their own language [even with] all of their rationality when they

are attempting to understand it in the origin of its essence It would be good

if thiswould be taken seriously on a large scale and if it would finally be

104 Sheehan, Heidegger and the Nazis, p. 42.

*Sheehan, Thomas (1998) Heidegger and the Nazis. The New York Review of Books, vol. 35, no. 10,June 16, pp. 3847.105 It is ironic that Heidegger invokes Nietzsche here to support the threefold thesis that only the

Germans are specially qualified for philosophy, that this qualification is due to the special relationship

between the Germans and the Greeks, and that the special philosophical mission of the Graeco-German

trajectory was fatally violated by Latin influence. Nietzsche was adamant that the Greeks were not a

single race, nor the first originary culture, nor the only truly earth-bound humans. For him, this

interpretive approach is based on an utterly castrated and mendacious study of the classical world

(Arrowsmith, p. 329/Nietzsche 8:19; Cf Bambach, p. 218). Rather, according to Nietzsche, Greek culture

was the product of synthesis between various Asian, Near Eastern, and Hellenic influences, as Nietzsche

states:

Earliest inhabiting of Greek soil: people of Mongolian origin, worshippers of trees and snakes. A fringe

of Semites along the coast. Thracians here and there. The Greeks took all of these elements into their own

bloodstream, along with gods and myths (several of the Odysseus stories are Mongolian) What are

racially pure Greeks? Cant we simply suppose that Italic peoples, mixed with Thracian and Semitic

elements, became Greek? (Arrowsmith, p. 387/Nietzsche 8:96; Cf Bambach, p. 218).106 Neske & Kettering, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism (1990), pp. 6263.

*Neske, Gunther & Kettering, Emil (eds). 1990. Martin Heidegger and National Socialism.(Translated from the original German by Lisa Harries). New York: Paragon House.

534 C. A. Rigsby

123

considered what a momentous transformation Greek thinking suffered when it

was translated into Roman Latin, an event that still bars our way today to

sufficient reflection on the fundamental words of Greek thinking.107

If the problem of the modern technological world is indeed a global problem, and

if as Heidegger suggests, this problem can only be addressed by a Graeco-German

primal language (die Ursprache)108 and the philosophical tradition embodied by it,then what room is left for non-Western developments to contribute to a global

philosophical discussion? If those within philosophical traditions embodied in

Romance languagesthe French tradition given here by Heidegger being just one

exampleare unable with all of their rationality to address the problem of the

modern technological world, and if they must even speak German themselves as

Heidegger claims, in order to begin to think, then it comes as no surprise that

Heidegger excluded Eastern experiences of the world from the project of

transcending the problema project which for him is the specific destiny of the

Germans. Heidegger thus carried on the trajectory of his nationalistic predecessor,

Johann G. Fichte, who stated: other races [which is to say, non-German races,]

speak a language which has movement only on the surface but is dead at the

root.109

Premonitions of this ethnocentric conclusion of 1966 may even be seen in

Heideggers 1954 A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,

wherein Heidegger, conspicuously noting the affinity of the Greek and German

languages, states to his fictional Japanese interlocutor: Our thinking today is

charged with the task to think what the Greeks have thought in an even more Greek

manner.110 In this same context, Heideggers statement that the nature of

language remains something altogether different for the East Asian and for the

European peoples,111 appears prima facie to warn of the danger of too easily

107 Neske and Kettering, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism (1990), p. 63.108 As early as 1955, in a lecture on November 18, Heidegger proposed that the precondition of the

inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world can be nothing other than a dialogue with the Greek

thinkers and their language (Science and Reflection in The Question Concerning Technology andOther Essays, p. 158; cf p x for lecture date). Nishida was also intensely sensitive to the significance ofthe German and Greek cultures. He wrote large sections of his diary in German. In his 1934 Sequel to theBasic Problems of Philosophy, Nishida even stated: I believe that our Japanese culture has featureswhich especially resemble the Greek cultural form (NKZ 7:443). Nishida associates the Japanese and

Greek cultures because they both have an immanent worldview and both prioritize the aesthetic.

However, Nishida qualifies the correspondence between the Japanese and Greek cultures by noting that

Buddhism, which constitutes an important part of Japanese culture, adheres to a transcendent

worldview as does Christianity (NKZ 7:442; Dilworths translation p. 247).

*Heidegger (1977) The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper &Row.109 Johann G. Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation (Addresses to the German Nation) [1808] (Hamburg:Meiner, 1978), p. 72; Quoted and explained in Bambach p. 55.110 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 39. Heideggers identification of Greek and German languageoccurs on p. 46, where he suggests etymological affinities between Greek charis (grace) on the onehand, and Greek tiktousa and German dichten (versify, but meaning bring forward according toHeidegger) on the other hand.111 Heidegger, ibid, p. 23; cf also p. 5, where Heidegger claims that Europeans and Eastasians dwell in

different houses of Being.


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conflating Japanese and Western experiences and interpretations of the world.

However, Heideggers strict distinction between East Asian and European

reflections of reality, and especially his identification of German language with

the philosophical language of the Greeks, more likely threatens to prevent full

recognition of the capability of non-Western thinkers to autonomously participate in

a genuine project of philosophy. Thus, what on the surface may look like respect for

non-Western traditions may actually have the converse effect of ethnic exclusion, as

is suggested by Heideggers statement:

The name aesthetics and what it names grow out of European thinking, out

of philosophy. Consequently, aesthetic consideration must ultimately remainalien to East-Asian thinking.112

In 1973, just three years before his death, Heidegger claimed even more clearly that

the only philosophy is European philosophy, stating that there is no other, neither a

Chinese nor an Indian philosophy.113

Heideggers equation of European thinking and philosophy is often repeated

performatively even today in Japan, where on the one hand, it is common to apply

the term tetsugaku [], or philosophy, only to European philosophy andoccasionally to modern Japanese philosophy, and on the other hand, the term

shiso [], or thought, to pre-modern Japanese intellectual history, which isto say, Japanese thought before Western contact. In this context of contrastive use,

the term tetsugaku tends to suggest greater rigor and seriousness than shiso.Nishida always referred to his own project as tetsugaku, and stressed that

Japanese thinkers must develop tetsugaku autonomously. It is worthy of note thatNishida himself had written the article for the heading Philosophy (tetsugaku) inthe voluminous 1912 edition of the Iwanami Dictionary of Philosophy (iwanamitetsugaku jiten []). Although Nishida in this article explicitlyexamines by name the philosophical ideas of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus,

Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Locke, Wilhelm Windelband, Bergson, and other

Western thinkers, Nishida nevertheless proposes a definition of philosophy in terms

of the unification of the sciences and the unifying power of the True, the Good, and

the Beautiful, in the language of his own 1911 masterwork, An Inquiry Into theGood.114 Nishida challenged the Heideggerian Miyake in a letter of July 2, 1934,stating, if we do not attempt to alter conventional thinking at its base, then we

cannot develop a new philosophy (tetsugaku).115 Even while noting the differencesin rhetoric and trajectory between Western philosophy and Japanese philosophy,

Nishida still stressed a solid base uniting all philosophical projects, as he stated in

1940:

112 Heidegger, ibid, p. 2. My italics.113 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 224. (Cf the original Was heisst Denken?, p. 136).

*(1968) What is Called Thinking? [Grn: Was heisst Denken? (1973)]. New York: Harper and Row.114 Kitaro Nishida: article under the heading Philosophy in the 1912 Iwanami Dictionary of Philosophy[], pp. 667668.115 NKZ 18:497498, letter #846, July 2, 1934. Yusa suggests that this letter should be dated 1933,

p. 385, footnote 53,but I have followed the NKZ format.

536 C. A. Rigsby

123

I am not saying that there are two kinds (nishu []) of logic (ronri []),Western and Eastern. There must be only one logic.116

European leanings toward ethnocentrism and ethno-exclusivism as exemplified by

Heidegger, did not go unnoticed by Nishida and his ass

Documents

Nishida and Heidegger