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1 WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN JOS AND ITS ENVIRONS, SEPTEMBER 2002 ACKNOWLEDGMENT It is usual in assignment of this nature to thank those who worked and assisted in one way or the other for the successful completion of the assignment. Apart from the desire on my part to fulfil this tradition, I feel compelled to do so in this regard because of the very valuable contributions by persons particularly the members of the Commission and the supporting staff who spent all their time in ensuring that the Report was out on time. I want to first thank my colleagues on the Commission, living and dead, for the wonderful cooperation I received from them in the work of the Commission. I found each and everyone of them most able and enduring. I do not think I should have got better persons for the assignment anywhere in the State. My next thanks go to Mr. John G. Gobak, the pioneer Secretary of the Commission, now Commissioner for Special Duties for setting up a sound Secretariat for the Commission. Mr. Ibrahim M. Sale took over from Mr. Gobak when the latter was appointed Commissioner for Special Duties. Although relatively a young officer, Mr. Ibrahim Sale did an excellent job. He is one very honest youngman. He was ably assisted by Mr. P.P. Deshi and Mr. Dan B. Tenshak, who also deserve so much of my thanks. My thanks also go to the Registry staff led by Mr. Mark Mallan, including Mr. Harry Selbar and Mr. Jeffrey Manto Jatau. I must say a very big THANK YOU to the Secretaries and the Computer Anlaysts, Mr. James Gado Chinge, Mrs. Lydia Salba, Mrs. Lami Dumshaka, Mrs. Tani Sabo and Mr. Patrick Ajijelek the Photocopier operator. I am most grateful to Chinge, Salbe and Sabo for keeping the Commission’s secrets secret. That the Report did not leak is so much to their credit. My thanks also go to the drivers who served on the Commission. They are Mr. Philimon Dakyes, Mr. Cletus Baba, Mr. Alex Adi, Mr. Balat Gyang, Mr. Gershon Danladi, Mr. Zakaria Isa. I also extend my thanks to other support staff of the Commission, including Mr. David Dazang, Mrs. Magdalene Babale, Mr. Justin

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The Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the civil disturbance in Jos, Plateu State recommended the dismissal of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar (newly appointed acting IGP) from the Nigerian Police Force for grave negligence of duty.

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WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN JOS AND ITS ENVIRONS, SEPTEMBER 2002 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

It is usual in assignment of this nature to thank those who worked and assisted

in one way or the other for the successful completion of the assignment. Apart from the

desire on my part to fulfil this tradition, I feel compelled to do so in this regard because

of the very valuable contributions by persons particularly the members of the

Commission and the supporting staff who spent all their time in ensuring that the

Report was out on time.

I want to first thank my colleagues on the Commission, living and dead, for the

wonderful cooperation I received from them in the work of the Commission. I found

each and everyone of them most able and enduring. I do not think I should have got

better persons for the assignment anywhere in the State.

My next thanks go to Mr. John G. Gobak, the pioneer Secretary of the

Commission, now Commissioner for Special Duties for setting up a sound Secretariat

for the Commission. Mr. Ibrahim M. Sale took over from Mr. Gobak when the latter

was appointed Commissioner for Special Duties. Although relatively a young officer,

Mr. Ibrahim Sale did an excellent job. He is one very honest youngman. He was ably

assisted by Mr. P.P. Deshi and Mr. Dan B. Tenshak, who also deserve so much of my

thanks.

My thanks also go to the Registry staff led by Mr. Mark Mallan, including Mr.

Harry Selbar and Mr. Jeffrey Manto Jatau. I must say a very big THANK YOU to the

Secretaries and the Computer Anlaysts, Mr. James Gado Chinge, Mrs. Lydia Salba,

Mrs. Lami Dumshaka, Mrs. Tani Sabo and Mr. Patrick Ajijelek the Photocopier

operator. I am most grateful to Chinge, Salbe and Sabo for keeping the Commission’s

secrets secret. That the Report did not leak is so much to their credit.

My thanks also go to the drivers who served on the Commission. They are Mr.

Philimon Dakyes, Mr. Cletus Baba, Mr. Alex Adi, Mr. Balat Gyang, Mr. Gershon

Danladi, Mr. Zakaria Isa. I also extend my thanks to other support staff of the

Commission, including Mr. David Dazang, Mrs. Magdalene Babale, Mr. Justin

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Soghum, Hajiya Hadiza Adamu, Mr. Fabien Fottiem, Mr. Fabian Shapvel and Mr.

Yakubu Pam.

I must not forget to thank counsel who appeared before the Commission for the

assistance we received from them. Here mention should be made specifically of the

leading counsel to the Commission, Mr. Garba Pwul and his team, Pascal Mamoh and

Abdul Haruna. I am also very grateful to all other counsel who represented the

different interest groups. I enjoyed their loyalty not only to their clients but also the

Commission. I would like to place on record that no counsel saw the need to seek

redress in the High Court against the Commission. That is most commendable and I

commend Counsel accordingly.

It will be stupid on my part not to thank the witnesses who appeared before the

Commission for the evidence they gave. Although some did not tell the Commission

the truth, the assisted in the truth searching process of the Commission. My thanks also

go to the audience who spent time in the Commission to listen to the proceedings on a

daily basis.

It is worthy to put on record the marvelous contributions of the Press, the Police

most especially, the MOPOL Unit of the Nigeria Police Command, Plateau State, the

State Security Services (SSS), the C.I.B and many others that are too numerous to

mention for their invaluable contributions to the work of the Commission.

Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Government of Plateau

State for the support the Commission received for the performance of its work. The

people of Plateau State also deserve my thanks and I thank them.

Hon. Justice Niki Tobi, CON. Chairman

Government View Government notes.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION 1.0 The city of Jos and environs had witnessed relative peace for almost a decade

after the unfortunate communal clashes of 12th April, 1994. The peaceful posture of the city would have continued if not for yet another civil disturbance that occurred on the 7th September, 2001 which posed a great threat to the hitherto peaceful co-existence amongst diverse communities of the State. This unfortunate incident has once again put to test the ability of the Government in finding a lasting peace amongst the various components resident in the Jos Area and the State at large.

Government View Government notes. 1.1 Step Forward

In cognisance of the magnitude of the crisis and the complex dimension which came into play during the crisis, the Government of Plateau State thought it wise to set up a high powered Judicial Commission of Inquiry and in the process sought for an independent Judge of a competent Court to preside with a mandate to look into the elements of the re-occurring civil disturbances in the State. And that resulted in the choice made by the State of Hon. Justice Niki Tobi, who at the material time was the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Benin City, but now Justice of the Supreme Court, a choice which received the blessing of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Government View Government notes and appreciates his acceptance to preside over the Commission of Inquiry. Government further congratulates him as the Justice of the Supreme Court.

1.2 Membership The Commission was constituted as follows:

i. Hon. Justice Niki Tobi, CON - Chairman ii. Justice Ismaila Adamu - Member

iii. Barr. Ibrahim Hamman - “ iv. Barr. Nasiru Goshi - “ v. Chief (Dr.) Chigozie Njoku - “ vi. Chief Markus W. Ishaya - “ vii. Mr. Thomas Didel - “ viii. Hon. Mali Khandi Dung (Late) - “ ix. Hon. Mrs. V.K. Umaru - “ x. Mr. John G. Gobak - Secretary Government View Government notes. 1.3 Terms of Reference

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In the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2 of the Commission of Inquiry Law (Cap. 25) Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 applicable in Plateau State and all other powers enabling him in that behalf, His Excellency, Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye, the Executive Governor of Plateau State, constituted a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to look into the Jos Civil Disturbances (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) with the following terms of reference:

“i. To investigate the immediate and remote causes of the crisis; ii. To identify persons or group of persons responsible for the crisis; iii. To establish the extent of damage to properties and loss of lives; iv. To obtain any other relevant information or facts; and v. To suggest or recommend ways to forestall future re-occurrence.” Government View Government notes. 1.4 Counsel to the Commission

Government appointed the following persons to act as counsel to the Commission: i. Barr. Garba Pwul - Leading Counsel

ii Barr. Pascal Mammo - Counsel iii. Barr. Abdul Sale Haruna - “ 1.5 Quorum

The quorum of the Commission was formed with the Chairman and four (4) other members.

Government View Government notes. 1.6 Inauguration

The Commission was inaugurated on Tuesday 18th October, 2001 by the Executive Governor of Plateau State at the main Conference Hall, Governor’s Office, Rayfield, Jos. The Commission was given six (6) weeks within which to submit its report at the first instance.

Government View Government notes. 1.6 Methodology

After the inauguration, the Commission members convened to brainstorm on modalities of approach on how to handle this tasking assignment. In their maiden meeting, members were able to arrive at the following lines of action:

(i). Members resolved to have a spacious, adequate and well-equipped Secretariat and venue. Initially, the venue was situated at the Tudun Wada Government Lodge but later moved to the more spacious Azi Nyako Youth Centre, Dadin Kowa, Jos. The choice of the Azi Nyako Youth Centre was based on the following factors:

a. Easy accessibility by the members of the public that came to hear the public proceedings.

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b. The hall was spacious enough to accommodate a large audience at a any given time.

c. There was adequate office accommodation to house the chambers for Chairman and members of the Commission and also to accommodate the entire Secretariat.

(ii). Members requested for adequate security to cover the proceedings, and other sensitive places connected with the Commission’s work.

(iii). The Chairman of the Commission also addressed a Press Conference on Monday, 22nd October, 2001 at the Tudun Wada Government Lodge, Jos.

(iv). Members also agreed to place adverts in both electronic and print media calling for memoranda from the general public. The memoranda were to be typewritten and submitted in fifteen (15) copies within ten (10) days from the date of publication. It was also resolved that the memoranda must address all the terms of reference of the Commission.

(v). The Commission finally agreed to commence its public sittings on Tuesday, 30th October, 2001.

(vi). It was also resolved that in the course of the public sittings, authors of the memoranda would be required to appear before the Commission and present their memoranda. After the presentation, the authors were subjected to cross-examination and re-examination by counsel generally.

(vii). The Commission also allowed members of the press to cover the entire proceedings while the Commission on the other hand provided Audio and Video coverage of all the proceedings. Photographs of counsel and witnesses were taken in the course of presentation of memoranda.

Government View: Government notes. 1.8 Visit to Locus Inquo

The Chairman and members of the Commission also resolved to undertake a fact finding inspection tour of all the affected areas of the crisis. The itinerary of the visit took the Commission a complete week to cover the underlisted areas:

S/N AREA VISITED DATE OF VISIT

1. (a) Congo Russia (b) Angwan Rogo (c) University of Jos (d) Angwan Rimi (e) Nasarawa Gwong (f) Angwan Rukuba (g) Tina Junction (h) Rikkos (i) Gangare and (j) Dilimi, Jos

Monday 18/03/2001

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2. (a) Central Mosque (b) Sarkin Mangu (c) Ali Kazaure (d) Fatima Church (e) Maternity - Enugu Road (f) Corner Shagari (g) Busa Buji (h) Apata (i) Tafawa Balewa

Tuesday 19/03/2002

3. (a) Tudun Wada (b) Jenta Adamu (c) Rock Heaven - Zaria Road (d) Hwolshe (e) Rayfield - Mai Adiko (f) Bukuru Express Road (g) Gyel (h) Dilimi Village (i) Du Village

Wednesday 20/03/2002

4. (a) Heipang Village (b) B/Ladi Area, Nding Village (c) Pankshin

Thursday 21/03/2002

5. (a) Sabon Barki (b) Trade Centre (c) Vom/Vwang (d) Turu - Tahos (e) Jol (f) Kwall (g) Jebbu Miango (h) Bauchi Road where all burnt vehicles were

dumped (i) Back to commission

Friday 22/03/2002

S/N AREA VISITED DATE OF VISIT

1. (a) Congo Russia (b) Angwan Rogo (c) University of Jos (d) Angwan Rimi (e) Nasarawa Gwong (f) Angwan Rukuba (g) Tina Junction (h) Rikkos (i) Gangare and (j) Dilimi, Jos

Monday 18/03/2001

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2. (a) Central Mosque (b) Sarkin Mangu (c) Ali Kazaure (d) Fatima Church (e) Maternity - Enugu Road (f) Corner Shagari (g) Busa Buji (h) Apata (i) Tafawa Balewa

Tuesday 19/03/2002

3. (a) Tudun Wada (b) Jenta Adamu (c) Rock Heaven - Zaria Road (d) Hwolshe (e) Rayfield - Mai Adiko (f) Bukuru Express Road (g) Gyel (h) Dilimi Village (i) Du Village

Wednesday 20/03/2002

4. (a) Heipang Village (b) B/Ladi Area, Nding Village (c) Pankshin

Thursday 21/03/2002

5. (a) Sabon Barki (b) Trade Centre (c) Vom/Vwang (d) Turu - Tahos (e) Jol (f) Kwall (g) Jebbu Miango (h) Bauchi Road where all burnt vehicles were

dumped (i) Back to commission

Friday 22/03/2002

In some of the affected areas visited, the Commission witnessed the total sacking of an entire village area or community. Areas mostly affected were Angwan Rogo, Dilimi Village, Trade Centre, Heipang and Tahos Village areas.

Government View: Government notes. 1.9 Expansion of Mandate

At the resumed sitting of the Commission on the 7th January 2002, precisely after the Christmas and New Year, the Commission was informed that fresh crisis had broken out in Vom, Turu and Vwang Districts of Jos South Local Government Area, and Kwall and Miango Districts of Bassa Local Government Area on or about 30th and 31st December, 2001. The Commission considered the situation as most unfortunate as it was bound to affect the performance and

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functions of the Commission. The Commission, at the instance of Counsel, adjourned sittings for one week to enable the affected parties and their Counsel sort out issues. On resumption of sitting, the Plateau State Government again deemed it necessary to expand the mandate of the Commission to cover the renewed crisis areas of Vwang, Turu, Kwall and Miango in Jos South LGA and Bassa LGA.

Government View: Government notes. 1.10 Extension of Time

It will be recalled that from the beginning of the public sittings, the Commission was granted six weeks within which to complete its assignment. The possibility of realising this goal became extremely slim in view of the enormity of work-load and the slow pace in achieving justice.

For instance, the Commission had to entertain about 16 counsel representing different interest groups who were free to cross-examine witnesses on their evidence before the Commission. The Commission was therefore, constrained to request for an extension of time from the 28th November, 2001 - 28th February, 2002. Concerned again by the principle of fair hearing and for the course of justice to prevail, the Commission was again compelled to seek for the second time another extension of time. In granting this request, Government, in its wisdom, granted the Commission an open-ended approval to submit its report on completion of the assignment.

Government View: Government notes. 1.11 Mr. John G. Gobak: Secretary to the Commission

Mr. John G. Gobak was appointed Secretary to the Commission. He was at the material time Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Education. By divine providence, Mr. Gobak was elevated to the rank of Commissioner and a member of the State Executive Council. He left the Commission on 8th March, 2002 after being sworn as Commissioner and member of the State Executive Council. Mr. John G. Gobak is a most competent and assiduous officer who clearly knows his right from his left. He set up the administrative and managerial work of the Commission on a very sound footing. The Commission owes him so much gratitude for his excellent work.

Government View Government notes.

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1.12 Mr. Ibrahim Sale: Assistant Secretary Since Government did not deem it necessary and expedient to send a replacement immediately, (and that is unfortunate) Mr. Ibrahim Sale, the Assistant Secretary functioned as Secretary. The Commission would like to place on record that although Mr. Gobak left its services in March, Government sent a replacement in July, when the Commission was writing its Report. Obviously, the Commission no more needed the services of a substantive Secretary at that stage and therefore continued with the services of Mr. Ibrahim Sale. The young officer did well. He was finally appointed Acting Secretary.

Government View Government notes with regret the late appointment of a substantive Secretary and commend the services rendered by the Acting Secretary. 1.13 Hon. Mali Khandi Dung

Hon. Mali Khandi Dung was a member of the Commission. He died after a brief illness on Friday 31st May, 2002. He was buried on Friday, 7th June, 2002 at Gyel - Bukuru, leaving behind a widow and four children. He was a very hard working and fine member.

Government View Government notes and pray that may his soul rest in peace. 1.14 Barrister Nasiru Goshi

Barrister Nasiru Goshi was also a member of the Commission. He resigned on the 25th June, 2002 to contest election to the political office of Chairman, Jos North Local Government. He was another fine member of the Commission.

Government View Government notes. 1.15 Chairman’s closing remarks to end public hearing

On Thursday 30th May, 2002 the Commission concluded its public sittings and the Commission’s Chairman Justice Niki Tobi addressed a combined session of members of the Commission, Counsel, Press and indeed members of the audience. The Chairman called on all interest groups to stop the killings in Jos and environs. He urged them to wait for the outcome of the report of the Commission. He thanked God for sustaining the patience and health of everyone throughout the length of the proceedings. The Commission gave counsel one month to submit their final address on behalf of their clients for consideration by the Commission.

Government View: Government notes.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 2.0 The Commission has identified two events as constituting the immediate causes of

the crisis that occurred in Jos between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. These are:

(i) The attempt and effort by one Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam on Friday, 7th September, 2001, to pass through a road at Congo-Russia area of Jos where a Muslim congregation had gathered for their Juma’at prayers and the refusal of the congregation to allow her the right of passage.

(ii) The appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the Co-ordinator

of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) of the Federal Government for Jos North Local Government Area.

Government View: Government notes.

2.1 Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam’s attempt and effort to pass and the refusal of the

Muslim congregation to allow her pass during Juma’at prayers. It was agreed by the contending parties and indeed by all the witnesses who testified before the Commission that the fracas which sparked off or set in motion the gruesome events of 7tht to 12th September, 2001 occurred at the Congo-Russia area of Jos on a road just in front of a small mosque belonging to CW67, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi. It was a Friday and as was usually the case on all previous Friday afternoons since early 1996, the Muslims who normally held their Juma’at prayers there had gathered to pray when CW17, Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam, a Christian, attempted to return to her place of work after her lunch break, as usual, through the portion of the road blocked by the worshipers. She was denied passage. These facts are echoed in virtually all the memoranda which dealt with this aspect of the crisis.

Government View Government notes. 2.2 For purposes of clarity, the salient part of CW47's evidence on this issue when he

was examined in chief by his counsel, H. M. Liman, Esq. is as follows: H.M. Liman: “...why do you say the crisis was calculated and well planned?”

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A. Garba: “...my first reason for saying that it was well calculated and well planned is because of the mode of the attack, especially when you are praying and all of a sudden, you see people coming well prepared and ready to unleash terror. Before anything, you start receiving attack and blows and stones...”

H.M. Liman: “Attack where?” A. Garba: “Where we were praying at Congo-Russia Mosque” H.M. Liman: “Were you at Congo-Russia Mosque on the 7th of September?” A. Garba: “I was not there when they were on the verge of starting their Friday

prayers after the involvement of the young Lady, Rhoda and after a short quarrel, some people just came up fully prepared and well armed and started using bows and arrows and stones and the first victim was Alagogo.”

H.M. Liman: “...You were not at Congo-Russia Mosque?” A. Garba: “Yes”

To the question, “who killed Alagogo?” the witness answered : “Christians, because I can’t expect Muslims to attack the Muslims during prayers.”

Government View Government notes. 2.5 The Commission interpretes Garba’s “Yes” as “No”. That is the only way it can

make the meaning intended by the witness. In Exhibit 529, the memorandum submitted on behalf of the Muslim Community of Dilimi Village, the following statement appears at page 1 paragraph 4 to page 2, paragraph 1:

“... That the crisis emanated from Congo area when a christian lady wanted to forcefully cross a congregation of muslims about to start the Juma’at prayer. She was stopped by an Aid Group official and she came back immediately with a group of youths carrying dangerous weapons. They spontaneously launched attack on the Muslims with bows and arrows, sticks, machetes, stones, etc...the mayhem then spread to other parts of Jos and environs.” (Underling ours)

Government View Government notes.

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2.6 Exhibit 59 is the memorandum submitted by the Joint Committee of Islamic Uniform First Aid Group. At page 2 paragraph 4 to page 3 paragraph 1, it is stated that:

“On the faithful day, 7th September, 2001, after the usual roads were closed by some of our members, a lady who was later identified as Miss Rhoda Haruna who live at or near Tudun Fera/Congo Road which areas are very close to the Mosque came and insisted on passing through the area closed. She had earlier on passed through the same road as a result of concession given to her by members of the Aid group on duty. When she was prevented from passing on the third occasion because her act was perceived as unnecessary provocation and coupled with the fact that prayers was about to start, she went back. While the prayer was going on some people in T-shirts descended upon the Muslims worshipers with matchetes, bows and arrows, sticks and other dangerous weapons. Some were carrying petrol in gallons. The Muslims were dispersed and the attackers destroyed part of the mosque, part of the house of Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi and some vehicles belonging to the Muslims. Some muslims were killed while others escaped with injuries.” (Underlining ours).

Government View Government notes. 2.7 This, in summary, is the Muslim version of the events that took place on 7th

September, 2001 at the Congo-Russia Mosque. Against this version is the account given y CW17, Rhoda Haruna Nyam as contained in her memorandum. Exhibit 3 and her viva voce evidence given in the Commission’s venue and at the locus in quo. She maintained that on 7th September, 2001 at about 1.00pm, she passed to her house through the footpath normally left for pedestrians and cyclists when the road is blocked for Friday Juma’at prayers. She stated that although the uniformed Aid Group workers were present at the scene, she was neither stopped nor molested by them.

Government View Government notes.

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2.8 Trouble started when she was on her way back to her working place at 1.45pm, after her lunch break. She was mid-way between the two road blocks set up by the congregation when she was stopped by three men who were not in uniform and ordered to go back and wait until the prayers, which had not yet started, were concluded. They told her that even though she had been passing that way before, she would not be allowed to do so on that particular day. As she was going back, a fourth man by name Alankwasa told her to return to the road block where she pleaded that she be allowed to pass. The three men refused and one of them slapped and kicked her. She then ran to her house and the same man who had assaulted her pursued her, now holding a pistol. On seeing this, she ran out of her compound to a neighbour’s house while her brother, Dung, seized the pistol from the man. By this time, more muslims from the mosque had arrived where she was. Her father who was attracted by her shouts, also came out and was stoned. He sustained injuries for which he was treated at Kyoro Dispensary owned by CW12. The muslim crowd then went on the rampage first destroying Rhoda’s mother’s car parked outside their house and then setting fire to houses belonging to Christians within the vicinity. Realising the great danger they faced, Rhoda and several other people fled the area and took refuge at the COCIN Chwelnyap where they stayed for one week.

Government View Government notes. 2.9 Exhibit 42, the memorandum of Berom Youth Movement Chwelnyap Branch

corroborates Rhoda’s evidence in every material particular. In addition, in paragraphs 19 to 22 it is stated as follows:

“19. The Moslem faithful in their numbers went berserk smashing the family car and setting one of their family houses ablaze. 20. Youths from the community came out in their numbers alerted by the smoke from the burning house, shouts of people at the scene and sound of smashed car, engaged the Moslems in a first fight, which saw the Muslims retreating eventually. 21. The community youths then proceeded to quench off the fire in the burning house only for the Muslims to re-enforce back to the scene within minutes with guns, long cutlasses (Barandening), spears, bows and arrows. At this point three of our natives and colleagues were killed instantly with many others injured.

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22. With the death toll, men and women came out in their numbers to defend themselves.”

Government View Government notes. 2.10 The evidence of attack and self defence at Congo-Russia was given orally before the

Commission by CW36 while presenting Exhibit 42. Significantly, CW36 was an eye witness to these events for he said “we really defended ourselves.” And later when he was asked whether he personally witnessed the killings by the Muslims he said: “the first one was killed in front of me.”

Government View Government notes. 2.11 The Christian and Muslim versions of the happenings at Congo-Russia on Friday 7th

September, 2001 as summarized above are diametrically opposed to each other. They cannot therefore be both correct. One must be correct and the other wrong. After a careful appraisal of both versions, the Commission is of the view that Rhoda’s evidence and the evidence of those that support her testimony represents

the true and correct state of affairs at Congo-Russia on 7th September 2001. We respectfully reject the Muslim version for the following reasons:

1. None of the Muslim witnesses claimed to have been present during the happening of the events, except CW144, Sani Suleiman who said he worshiped at the Congo-Russia mosque on 7th September, 2001 but he never saw Rhoda. He also said:

“I discovered that people were standing up… I thought somebody fainted… I heard noise but could not see what was happening.”

2. The Muslim witnesses contradicted each other on material facts as shown by

the underlined portions of their memoranda quoted above, and renders their evidence, taken together, unreliable.

3. CW46 who presented Exhibit 59 testified in chief on 18th January 2002, and

was partly cross-examined. Thereafter, the memorandum was adjourned on

two occasions, to 21st February, 2002 and 20th May, 2002 to enable him

present himself for cross-examination by counsel to all the parties affected by his testimony but he failed to make himself available. In our humble view, while his evidence is admissible in law, it is of little probative value since the witness denied his opponents the opportunity to test it by cross-

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examination. The Nigerian Law of Evidence is clear on that. 4. The Muslim witnesses’ evidence is to the effect that when Rhoda was denied

passage on that day, the congregation was attacked and their properties burnt and destroyed without any reaction from them. They never said that they ran away for their dear lives either. Against the background of the palpable tension that existed at the time, the Commission finds this evidence hard to believe and we accordingly reject it as being less credible than the evidence on the other side.

Government View Government notes. 2.12 The Commission therefore accepts as true the evidence of Rhoda and CW36 that

Rhoda was assaulted when she attempted to pass during the Juma’at prayers on 7th

September 2001, and that she was pursued into her house, and part of it and other properties were set ablaze by the Muslim worshipers after her father was attacked, resulting in a highly charged atmosphere which degenerated into a free for all battle between the Christians and the Muslims at Congo-Russia. It is common ground and in fact a matter of common knowledge that thereafter, the violence quickly spread with the speed of lightening to other parts of Jos and beyond.

Government View Government notes. 2.13 We hasten to say at this point that for the purpose of determining whether the

incident that happened at the Congo-Russia mosque is an immediate cause of the crisis, it does not matter whether the Muslim or Christian version is correct. However, we have taken the pains to evaluate the evidence before us and to make our finding on that issue because we consider it important for the records, for history and for posterity. Government View: Government notes.

2.14 The Appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as NAPEP

Coordinator The National Poverty Eradication Programme (hereinafter referred to as “NAPEP”) is a programme established by the Federal Government with the specific objective of eradicating or eliminating poverty among the people throughout the length and breadth of Nigeria. At the Federal level, NAPEP is headed by the National Co-

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ordinator while the State and Local Government offices are placed under the leadership of State Co-ordinators and Local Government Co-ordinators respectively. This means that for each of the 774 Local Government Areas nation-wide, a Local Government Co-ordinator is appointed whose functions are quite separate from those of the “Local Government Council but whose team, known as the Local Government Monitoring Committee” must include, among others, the Vice Chairman and all Supervisory Councillors of the Local Government Council.

Government View Government notes. 2.15 By a letter dated 20th June 2001 signed by the National Co-ordinator of NAPEP,

Adamu Maina Waziri, Alhaji Mukhtar Mohammed was appointed Co-ordinator of NAPEP and Chairman of the Local Government Monitoring Committee (LGMC) for Jos North Local Government. This letter of appointment is annexed to Exhibit 534 as Appendix F. In the said letter the appointee was directed to facilitate the composition of Local Government Monitoring Committee and the following duties were assigned to him in addition to several others: “(i) Convening and presiding over the meetings of the Local Government

Management Committee. (ii) Presiding over the Management affairs of the LGMC Secretariat. (iii) Overseeing NAPEP projects implementation, co-ordination, monitoring and

evaluation at the Local Government level.”

He was also directed to convene and preside over the inaugural meeting of the LGMC to facilitate the proper and immediate take-off of the programme in the Local Government Council.

Government View Government notes. 2.16 The evidence before the Commission is to the effect that Mukhtar’s appointment as

Jos North NAPEP Co-ordinator was greeted by written complaints, petitions and protests from certain groups mainly, but not exclusively tribal, calling for his immediate removal. Among such protests against the appointment, which were as vehement as they were numerous, were the following:

1. Annexure H to Exhibit 534 letter dated 19th July, 2001 written by the Plateau Youth Council, Jos North Chapter, addressed to the Executive Governor of Plateau State, captioned “PROTEST LETTER IN RESPECT OF THE APPOINTMENT OF MALLAM MUKTAR MOHAMMED AS CO-ORDINATOR OF NAPEP JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT.”

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2. Annexure I to Exhibit 534 – Letter dated 27th July, 2001 written by the

indigenous Youth of Jos North Local Government Council addressed to the Executive Chairman, Jos North Local Government Area addressed to the Executive Chairman, Jos North Local Government Council captioned,

“RE: APPOINTMENT OF MUKHTAR MOHAMMED CO-ORDINATOR NAPEP JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT.”

3. Annexure J to Exhibit 534 – Letter written by the Afizere Cultural and

Community Development Association addressed to the national Co-ordinator of Programme, National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) Abuja captioned:

“RE: APPOINTMENT OF MALLAM MUKHTAR MOHAMMED AS CO-ORDINATOR NAPEP JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT.”

4. Exhibit 71 – Letter dated 28th July, 2001 written by the Anaguta Development Association addressed to the Executive Governor of Plateau State captioned:

“THE STAND OF ANAGUTA COMMUNITY ON THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF THE JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATOR MALLAM MUKTAR MOHAMMED.”

5. Exhibit 70 – Letter dated 30th July 2001 written by the BECO Elders

Solidarity Forum Jos North Local Government Council addressed to the Executive Governor, Plateau State captioned

“COMPLAINT AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF ALHAJI MUKTAR MOHAMMED AS POVERTY ERADICATION CO-ORDINATOR FOR JOS NORTH LGA.”

6. Exhibit 64 – Text of Press Conference held by the Plateau State Youth

Council on 31st August, 2001.

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7. Exhibit 65 – Letter dated 28th August, 2001 written by a group which calls itself “CONCERN YOUTHS” addressed to the Executive Governor of Plateau State captioned:

“ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” Government View Government notes. 2.17 All of these protests are unanimous not only in their condemnation of the

appointment on the basis that Mukhtar is not an indigene of Jos North Local Government Council, but also in their demand that he be removed and replaced with an indigene. While some of them are no more than passionate appeals for a review of the situation, others are more violent in their language and actually contain veiled, if not open threats to the peace of the area should the authorities ignore their demand. In particular, part of Annexure H to Exhibit 534 reads:

“We however call on the Government to urgently look into this matter for the interest of peace. Our peaceful posture should not be taken for granted.”

Government View Government notes. 2.18 Similarly, the authors of Exhibit 70 stated that the Berom of Jos North had resolved,

amongst other things as follows, and we quote: “3. That any attempt by the Chairman of Jos North to provide accommodation to Alhaji Mukhtar shall be resisted as we did to his brother Alhaji Mato in 1994. Note that the 2001 resistance will be more sophisticated than that of 1994. 4. That we will consider this as our last communication to Government on subjects of this nature as our capacity to calm our people has totally eroded to the point that we are regarded as collaborators. 5. That our desire to live in peace with settlers and neighbours should be seen as weakness because we also have the capacity to be violent and make Jos as uncomfortable as possible for settler elements. 6. We shall remain loyal citizens as long as our rights and traditional inheritance are protected. But any attempt to take what belongs to us shall be met with the stiffest resistance that is better imagined.

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7. We have been pushed to the wall.”

Also in Exhibit 65, the authors said Inter-alia “We are finally giving you sir and the Security operatives 48 hours to call these so called JASAWA to order OR we will SURELY call them to order. We kept custody of peace to the extent, that we can no longer accommodate it. “A word is enough for the wise”

Government View Government notes. 2.19 On the other side of the divide is the JASAWA Development Association, a

predominantly Hausa group, which wrote a letter dated 20th August, 2001 to the

Executive Governor of Plateau State, defending Mukhtar’s appointment and urging that it be allowed to stand. The letter was admitted in evidence as Exhibit B. The authors of Exhibit B drew the Governor’s attention to certain posters pasted in front of Mukhtar’s office by some unidentified persons who were clearly opposed to his appointment.

Government View Government notes. 2.20 Some of the posters were tendered and admitted as Exhibits as follows: 1. Exhibit L - “THE DEVIL HAS NO PARKING SPACE IN JOS NORTH” 2. Exhibit M1 - “I BELIEVE YOU WILL LIKE TO TAKE CARE OF YOUR

FAMILY BOY. RUN FOR YOUR LIFE” 3. Exhibit M3 - “PLEASE GO AND TELL THEM YOU ARE NOT

INTERESTED ANY MORE. 4. Exhibit M4- “IF YOU CAN’T READ AT LEAST YOU KNOW WHAT

THE SIGN ABOVE MEANS-DANGERRRR! 5. Exhibit M5 - “TRACE YOUR ROOTS BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE Government View Government notes. 2.21 In making their case for the retention of Mukhtar’s appointment, the authors of

Exhibit B condemned any reference to him as a non-indigene of Jos North and gave instances of acts of marginalisation of the Jasawa Community by previous Governments in terms of appointments and the refusal by the current Chairman of Jos North LGC Dr. Frank Tardy to give their members certificates of indigeneship.

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Government View Government notes. 2.22 On the face of it, Exhibit B looks like a harmless appeal for the protection of

Mukhtar’s life and his appointment as Jos North NAPEP Co-ordinator. However, a close study of the document will reveal that it is not as innocent as it looks or purports to be. The description of the opponents of the appointment as “...some disgruntled elements and tribal cohorts operating as enemies of democracy...cabal of extremists who would `run berserk and create instability, anarchy and chaos...Anarchists in tribal and religious garbs” “...and the statement that if such undesirable acts are not timely checked and the culprits brought to book, the peace, unity and tranquility of this area cannot be guaranteed” are as peace threatening as the statements contained in some of the protest letters we have referred to earlier.

Government View Government notes 2.23 Also annexed to Exhibit I, Exhibit 357 and several other memoranda are the

following posters which, according to several witnesses, were found pasted on the walls of many houses in Jos North Local Government Council.

“1. REJOINDER NO. 1 - YES! THE LOSE OF A FEW FAMILIES WOULDN’T BOTHER US. AFTER ALL FOR EVERY SINGLE ANAGUTA’S LIFE AND THEIR ALLIES; THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF HAUSA-FULANIS LET’S SEE WHO BLINKS FIRST.

Hausa Fulani Youth (Under 25). 2. REJOINDER NO. 2 - YES: THE DEVIL HAS NO PARKING SPACE IN

JOS NORTH. FRANK TARDY IS ALREADY DOING IT FOR HIM. (Hausa-Fulani Youths (UNDER 25). 3. REJOINDER NO. 3 - DEATH IS THE BEST FRIEND OF HAMAS. BE

REST ASSURED THAT WE WILL DO IT EVEN BETTER. (HAUSA-FULANI YOUTHS) - UNDER 25 4. REJOINDER NO. 4 - WE’VE TRACED OUR ROOTS TO JOS NORTH.

WE CAN RESIST THE REST, NOT ONLY YOU. (HAUSA-FULANI YOUTHS) UNDER 25.

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5. REJOINDER NO. 5 - THE SEAT IS DEARER TO US THAN OUR LIVES IN THAT CASE, DO YOU HAVE THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE? (Hausa Fulani Youths Under 25).

6. REJOINDER NO. 6 - BLOOD FOR BLOOD. WE ARE READY. LET’S

SEE WHO HAS MORE DEPOSIT OF READY STRIKERS WITH A CHANGE OF VENUE. (Hausa-Fulani Youths Under 25).

7. FOCUS A: ROSE TO CLAIM OUR RIGHTS.

...RESOLVED NEVER TO BE PASSIVE AGAIN IF WE ARE SUBJECTED TO TYRANNY AND INJUSTICE. (Hausa-Fulani Youth Under 25)

8. FOCUS B: Operation Eagle - JOS KASARMU CE WE ARE READY

“...KOWA YACE YANA IYAWA GA FILI NAN...” (Hausa - Fulani Youths Under 25).

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9. FOCUS C: MONKEY DE WORK BABOON DE CHOP Jos North Local Government is not only historically located in the middle of our community but was actually created absolutely at our own request, with violent resistance from those calling us names today. Ironically they are now claiming to be the only indigenes vested with absolute rights and privileges at our own expense. Is this justified? “...Baboon de work monkey de chop” A word is enough for the wise.

(HAUSA/FULANI YOUTHS-Under 25) 10. No. 9 - KURA DA SHAN BUGU GARGIDA KWASHE KUDI

HAUSAWA KUTUNA FA KUNE KUKA NEMO KARAMAR HUKUMA JOS TA AREWA, AMMA YANZU WADANSU CIMA ZAUNE NE SUKE MOREWA; SUN MA, CE” WAI, KU BA’YAN KASSA BANE SABO DA HAKKA BASU YARDA KUSAMI KOMAI ANAN BA. (HAUSA/FULANI-SAMARI (YAN KASA DA SHEKARU 25).”

Government View Government notes. 2.24 In addition to all these, CW320 testified that some unknown persons burnt car tyres

in front of the Jos North Local Government Council Secretariat and this fact is corroborated by Exhibit B. It is also in evidence that the indigenous youths prevented Mukhtar from occupying the office allocated to him - see Page 7 paragraph 4 of Exhibit 168 which reads as follows:

“It is a fact that the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar attracted the ire and consternation of the indigenes whose position was reflected in refusal of youths to permit the appointee to assume office.”

Government View Government notes. 2.25 In Exhibit I, the author said at page 2 paragraph 3 “Up till now when another appointment came from the

Federal Government; the Co-ordinator for Poverty Alleviation in Jos North Local Government the same again was given to Hausa Fulani of Jos. There we the indigenes reacted and refused that he will not enter that office because it is our right and our property that has been given to him.”

Government View

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Government notes. 2.26 Mukhtar himself, while testifying as CW320 said that his office was broken into and

some of his properties stolen. Human faeces was also smeared in several parts of the office, notably on his table and chair, all in an attempt to make it impossible for him to operate from there. A video tape showing all of this was tendered by him and admitted as Exhibit 537. The Commission had the opportunity of watching part of Exhibit 537.

Government View Government notes. 2.27 The evidence of Alhaji Sale Hassan, Mukhtar’s maternal uncle and several others

show that the “Hausa Fulani youths (Under 25)” who claimed responsibility for the posters, numbered 1-10 above are members of the JASAWA Community to which Mukhtar belongs. Between them and the three communities of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom, the tension that was generated by Mukhtar’s appointment was so high with either side spoiling for war, that physical combat between them appeared inevitable. It was in these circumstances that the Plateau State Government, according to CW330, the Secretary to the State Government, held meetings with tribal and religious groups with a view to calming frayed nerves and averting the crisis that was witnessed between that 7th and 12th of September, 2001. Several such meetings were held but before the joint meeting scheduled for 10th September, 2001 could hold, the crisis had broken out on 7th September 2001.

Government View Government notes. 2.28 The appointment of Mukhtar is one of the immediate causes of the crisis because

from the time it was made on 20th June, 2001 until the crisis engulfed the city of Jos on 7th September, 2001 (a period of less than three months) the tension created by the appointment never simmered down or subsided. If anything at all, it escalated with every passing day until it exploded with a big bang. No doubt, there was a great deal of ethnic and religious rivalry and intolerance, mutual suspicion and distrust, and even animosity between the groups that claim Jos North Local Government Council as their own, but all these by themselves did not ignite the fire that ravaged Jos and its environs between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. It needed something more to make it happen. That “something more” was the appointment of Mukhtar as Jos North Local Government NAPEP Coordinator. It was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.

Government View

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Government notes. 2.29 Indeed, it must be clear to any critical or discerning mind that the series of events

that followed Muktar’s appointment as described above were the veritable beginnings of the Jos crisis which on 7th September, 2001 was given a much more physical and violent expression, assumed an infinitely greater and wider scope and took on an unmistakable religious dimension. It was, so to say, “fire for fire,” and the gunfire, which had hitherto for the most part sounded only in ethnic and religious rhetoric, suddenly became visible, audible and wantonly destructive. Government View: Government notes.

2.30 It is therefore our conclusion that the immediate causes of the crisis are the

prevention of Rhoda from using the road at Congo-Russia during Juma’at prayers and the appointment of Mukhtar as the NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North Local Government Council. Put another way, it was the fierce opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar as Jos North NAPEP Co-ordinator and the equally fierce defence of it that translated or metamorphosed into the widespread violence and destruction of lives and properties that was witnessed in Jos and its environs between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001 using as a vehicle the attempt by Rhoda to pass and the resistance to that attempt and effort by the worshipers at the Congo-Russia Mosque. The rest of it is now history, a very pathetic history. Government View: Government accepts.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE REMOTE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 3.0 Ownership of Jos 3.1 One of the remote causes of the September, 2001 crisis is the claim of ownership of

Jos. While the Afizere, Anaguta and Birom claim the ownership of the town, the Hausas and to some extent the Fulanis also claim the ownership of it. These competing claims came to the fore in the Commission both in the memoranda submitted and in oral evidence. Apart from the above tribes, some other tribes also submitted memoranda and gave evidence as to which of the above tribes, in their view, own Jos. We will review some of the vital memoranda and evidence in respect of this very stubborn and vexed issue of ownership. We cannot deal with all the evidence presented at the hearing in the Commission. They are legion.

Government View Government notes. 3.2 In Exhibit 44 submitted by the Jos Divisional and Cultural Organisation (JODICO)

Solidarity Front, the authors of the memorandum referred to the Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, Volume IV (1934) page 53 and claimed that the book described those who formed former Jos Division, presently comprising of Bassa, Jos North, Jos East, Jos South, Riyom and Barakin Ladi Local Government Areas as, the Berom, Ganawuri, Irigwe, Jerawa, Rukuba, Pengana, Jarawa and Anaguta tribes. These people were described as sharing a common native treasury at Jos. They also made reference to an article in New Nigerian Publication of 13th March, 1986 entitled “Appointments and Employments in Plateau State credited to six persons and the rejoinder by eight Hausas. The eight Hausas rejected the claims made in the 13th March 1986 New Nigerian Publication. We will examine the rejoinder in some detail later.

Government View Government notes. 3.3 It is claimed in Exhibit 100 that in 1986 the Hausa-Fulani had sought for

registration as the recognised owners of Jos under the Land Perpetual Act, but could not succeed as the Late Dr. Alex Fom had already registered and received approval for Jos Development Association since 1975.

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3.4 Exhibit 508 dealt with the Hausa-Fulani Jihadists. It claimed that in 1873, the first invasion of the Jos area was attempted by the Hausa-Fulani Jihadists, led by the Sarkin Yaki (War Lord) Ahmadu under the command of Sarkin Bauchi Ibrahim and his Ciroma, but the invaders were badly defeated by the tripartite force of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere and they ceased risking any repeated attempt until the advent of colonialism, (See P. Lousdale (D.O) Naraguta 1915 Bauchi Provincial File 555 P/1915, personal Mem. No. 15 of 4th January - National Archives, Kaduna, Annexure 1; History of Plateau State Resistance to Jihadists Penetration, pp.140 - 141.

Government View Government notes. 3.5 In Exhibit 92, history is recorded that before the British came in the early years of

the 20th Century there had been a native settlement of Afizere, Anaguta and Birom at the site and part of the land presently occupied by the town was a communal hunting territory shared by not only the three tribes mentioned above, but by other neighbouring tribes like Buji, Rukuba and the Irigwe. With the British discovery of high quality tin which had been mined and smelted for centuries in the Dilimi Valley and carried by long distance traders all over West Africa, a special phase of colonial rule was opened on the Plateau. The Plateau indigenes at first resisted working in the mines, as they had staunchly resisted British incursion into their territory, so the British had to look elsewhere for a work force especially from the nearby emirates of Zaria and Bauchi (See page 2). For generally similar historical account see further Exhibits 148, 173, 338, 426, 470, 519, 521, 524.

Government View Government notes. 3.6 In Exhibit 162, the memorandum that was presented by the Elders of Jasawa

Development Association, the authors claimed as follows: (a) Out of fifteen persons who ruled Jos traditionally, thirteen were all of Jasawa origin, (b) Four persons from undisputable records served Jos in their capacity as Magaji Gari and Wakilin Garin Jos during the colonial and post colonial period respectively. (c) According to a book titled, This is Jos, by 1912 the town was referred to as the Hausa settlement of Jos.

Government View Government notes.

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3.7 In Exhibit 57, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande, dealing with what he called Imprints of Pioneering A Town, said at page 6:

“The Commission to particularly note that if a people found a place their imprints of initial settlement and pioneer status must be found in the place. There are certain obvious opportunities and privileges that history would confer on them which may include: (i) Their influence in names of important aspects of the settlement; (ii) The establishment of their culture; (iii) Initial leadership and administration of the place. Colonel Laws, who led the European expedition in Plateau Province (1903) disclosed that the word Jos, was a mispronouncement of the word “Guash” by Hausa traders which gave the town its name... Hausa-Fulani did not stop at naming Jos town, they utilized their vantage position and went further to name all the important early streets in the town thus, Sarki, Galadima, Balarabe, Turaki, Shehu, Ali Kazaure, Dan Karfalla Streets, etc which are still existing today. Colonial Administrators particularly recognised the role played by Hausa-Fulani in founding Jos, that was why in their writings they identified the town with Hausa people and referred to it as “Hausa Settlement”. According to colonial record on Plateau Province, 1926 Annual Report, page 262, reference CSO/26, mention was made in the report of Jos “Hausa” Settlement and on page 217 of the same report, Plateau Province was presented and Hausa and Fulani were included with a total population of 32, 856 and 7, 587 respectively”.

Government View Government notes. 3.8 In Exhibit 339 written by Concerned Muslims Youth in Jos North, the authors of the

memorandum wrote at pages 1 and 2: “It is evidence that no single tribe in Plateau State as a whole can claim that it did not migrate from another place to the present Jos. Eg, Birom tribe migrated from Sokoto... Our fore-fathers developed the areas; socially, economically and politically, that is, in addition to the founding of Jos and most of the villages in the mining areas in the division. Consequently these areas still bear their founders name thus,

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Barkin Ladi, Rafin Bala, Gindin Akwati, etc, all Hausa-Fulani Muslim names. It is also evidence that from 1904 to 1948 thirteen (13) rulers in Jos feature with the title of SARKIN JOS. Oral testimonies of Sarki BUNU and BARDE of first and second amongst the Hausa rulers”.

Government View Government notes. 3.9 C.W. 243, Alhaji Sale Hassan, gave evidence in favour of the Hausa ownership of

Jos. He tendered Exhibits 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 and 412. It should be noted that not all the Exhibits relate to the claim of the Hausas to ownership of Jos.

Government View Government notes. 3.10 In his evidence, the witness said in examination-in-chief, as follows:

“The Hausa-Fulani came to Jos long before the Biroms. The Hausa-Fulani came here 70 to 80 years before the Biroms... Jos was founded by the Hausas long before the advent of the colonial masters. The colonial masters came to Jos immediately after the Royal Niger Company was disbanded in 1900".

Government View Government notes. 3.11 The claim by the Hausas to the ownership of Jos is not authenticated beyond the

oral evidence of persons. Exhibit 57, which we will examine anon, made some attempts to authenticate the claim but to no avail. For instance, Exhibit 162 made reference to a book entitled This is Jos but the book was not tendered as an exhibit. In our view, tendering the book as an exhibit, would have gone a long way to authenticate their claim. The law does not allow the Commission to presume the existence of the book and so we cannot make such a presumption in favour of the Hausas.

Government View Government notes. 3.12 That is not all. The same situation applies in respect of the evidence of CW 243,

Alhaji Sale Hassan, a very intelligent witness by any standards. As seen above, he boldly claimed that Jos was founded by Hausa-Fulani. Although he claimed that the Hausa-Fulani came to Jos 70 to 80 years before the Beroms, he was not able to say

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when the Beroms came to Jos. How then does he know that the Hausa-Fulani came to Jos 70 to 80 years before the Beroms came to Jos?. Beyond contending that the Beroms migrated from Sokoto to Jos, he could not say when exactly they came to Jos. That makes his claim that the Hausa-Fulani came to Jos 70 to 80 years before the Biroms came to the town unbelievable.

Government View Government notes. 3.13 Another aspect of his evidence which worries the Commission is when he replied to

a question from a lawyer whether his family has ancestral land, and his answer was in the negative. He said:

“My grandfather roamed about all over the places when he first settled in Jos. My father was a miner. He was not a labourer. He was an Executive of a Mining Company. I do not have any ancestral land in Jos. I am a Tera man from Plateau State...We do not have a Tera Chief in Jos... My father did not inherit any farm land from my grandfather who was a farmer”.

Government View Government notes. 3.14 Ancestral land is a by-product of ownership of a place. How can a person claim

ownership of a place when he cannot boast of an ancestral land which simply means land acquired from an ancestor. This statement has put a very big dent in the claim of the witness that Hausas and Fulanis founded and own Jos. How can one own a place and not have an ancestral land or a land which is a subject of inheritance?. Such a situation will be new learning to this Commission and we are not prepared to learn such a bogus claim. Government View: Government accepts.

3.15 Let us now take Exhibit 57. We have carefully examined the document referred to

at page 6, paragraph 6.2(ii) of Exhibit 57. We do not, with the greatest respect, agree with the interpretation Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande gave to the document. It is an established canon of statutory interpretation that in order to know the intention of the maker of a document, the document must be read as a whole. In the document under reference, item 79 has the following caption as a sub-heading: Jos “Hausa” settlement. It is not our understanding of this caption that Jos was

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founded and owned by Hausas. It is necessary to quote for ease of reference the sentence which immediately follows the caption, and it is quoted as follows:

“This settlement of alien natives has, as have all the rest in a minor way, increased in area and population in a remarkable way. It was an astonishing sight to witness the daily building operations on hitherto un-tenanted land during the last quarter of the year. The “standing” population has increased by nearly one thousand”.

Government View Government notes. 3.16 The operative words above for purposes of argument are “alien natives” and “un-

tenanted land”. The expression “alien natives” in our humble view is the colonial master’s way of defining the Hausas. And if there were “alien natives”, then it is logical to think and come to the conclusion that there were “native natives”; or indigenous natives; and who were these “native natives” or “indigenous natives” can be any person’s guess. The argument advanced by Alhaji Nakande in respect of the table on the Tribal Population of the Jos Division is, with the greatest respect, neither here nor there. The table contains about 46 tribes. The table has no nexus with ownership of Jos. The table merely tabulates the number of tribes at the material time of 1926 in Jos Division. The claim of ownership of Jos on the basis of that table is an unusually tall ambition lacking historical basis. The Commission rejects the claim. Government View: Government accepts.

3.17 And that takes us to the second expression “un-tenanted land”. An un-tenanted land

simply means a land that is not tenanted, and that is to say, land that is not subject to alienation by way of sale, if we may so restrict our definition. The question is who owned the untenanted land? The document is silent and we cannot on our own extend the meaning beyond what we have stated above. But if the meaning was to be given, it would have been land owned by the natives and ownership of such land could not have included alien natives as provided for in the 1926 document. Looking at all the ramifications of the 1926 document, the argument of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande fails. Government View: Government accepts.

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3.18 We should now deal with the claim by the three tribes of their ownership of Jos. In the Book entitled Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, Volume IV, Chapter V, Jos Division was described at pages 53 and 54, thus:

“THE FIRST unit to be described is that formed by the Birom, Ganawuri, Irigwe, Jerawa, Rukuba, Pakaran and Anaguta tribes, who live in the northern and central parts of the Plateau and on some of the more broken ground to the north and north-west of it, and all of whom share a common Native territory at Jos... The Birom Tribe is the largest, with a population of some 44,000 and occupies the eight Southern Districts and half of Ganawuri”.

Government View Government notes. 3.19 What one gets from the above is that the Hausa and the Fulani tribes are not

mentioned. The conclusion the Commission draws from the above is that if the Hausas and the Fulanis were part of the Jos Division, the Book should have so indicated or mentioned.

Government View Government accepts. 3.20 In a letter, Confidential 5605/36 dated 28th February, 1945 from the Resident of the

Provincial Office, Jos to the Secretary of Northern Provinces, Kaduna, the Resident, while dealing with the nature of administration of the numerous smaller immigrant settlements and mining camps said at page 41, paragraph 14:

“As the Birom Authorities develop and are able effectively to look after the immigrant settlements and mining camps in their areas the District Officer’s authority would be taken away”.

At paragraph 16 of the same page, the Resident dealt with the Fulanis: “The tendency of named Fulani to settle on the Plateau is growing and must be controlled. In theory they settle with the consent of the land owners; in practice they often squat where they like. There is no need for any special administrative arrangements - they will be subject to the Local Native Authority; but what is essential is that they should seek formal authority from the appropriate Native Authority to settle. If given the Native Authority should issue

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a title giving the Fulani security of tenure, setting out the conditions of settlement eg (grazing and kraling) and preserving the ownership of the land in the native community”.

Government View Government notes. 3.21 Neither of the above statements mentioned Hausas and Fulanis. The first statement

mentioned the Birom tribe. The second statement mentioned the preservation of the ownership of the land in the native community. In the light of paragraphs 5(e), and 8, the native community is Birom and not the Hausas and Fulani.

Government View Government accepts. 3.22 In a letter No. 1174/72 dated 30th October, 1943 from the Resident, Provincial

Office to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, Kaduna, the Resident described Hausa as immigration settlement. He said in paragraph 3(vi) of the letter:

“Jos and Bukuru towns, with cosmopolitan populations and a number of immigration settlements, mainly Hausa, are administered directly by the District Officer through four Hausa District Heads who are not subject to the tribal native authorities nor appointed native authorities themselves”.

The above paragraph recognised Jos and Bukuru as cosmopolitan towns and Hausas as an immigration settlement. In other words, the paragraph drew a cleavage between the actual towns of Jos and Bukuru and the settlements.

Government View Government accepts. 3.23 Dealing with Jos Divisional Administration, Exhibit 359, B31, paragraphs 3 and 4

recorded: “3. In the following year therefore a reorganisation was taken in

hand, the indigeneous population being grouped into fifteen districts, each under the control of a District Head - usually one of the most prominent pagan Chiefs of the district but not in most cases the traditional authority. The District Heads were not sufficiently advanced or experienced to cope with the administration of the large number of stranger

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settlements which had spring up throughout the Division. These were therefore grouped to form four areas, called for convenience (though they were by no means wholly Hausa) Hausa villages...

104 As a result of these investigations the 73 traditional Chiefs of 11 preponderantly BI ROM Districts were formed into a single Native Authority Council, under the presidency of the Chief of Riyom. Subordinate to this Council were 15 village groups councils, each presided over by the traditionally senior chief of the group. Village courts were established in each group, the membership in each case being the same as that of the village council; and a tribal court, with appellate jurisdiction over the whole Birom area was established at Riyom”.

Government View Government notes. 3.24 The above in our view, clearly drew a dichotomy between the indigenous group

which were the Biroms, and the stranger settlements which were the Hausas who were the majority tribe of the stranger settlement. While the indigenous population was grouped into fifteen Districts, the stranger settlement was grouped into four districts.

Again, Exhibit 359, H1, paragraphs 4 and 6 recorded as follows: “4. In pre-British times Jos did not exist except as a small Birom

village in a Birom controlled area. The discovery of tin in the area brought to Jos a large stranger settlement; predominantly Hausa but including Ibo and Yoruba and other tribes, which settled round the terminus of the Railway...

5. The special position of Jos as a stranger settlement of Hausas in the middle of a Birom area has been recognised by the Native Authority by the establishment of Jos Native Town as a subordinate Native Authority with an elected Town Council. This Town Council is presided over by the Chief of Jos with an elected Vice-President. The situation is similar to Sabon Gari Kano, where the Waje Council is presided over by the Wakilin Waje, a Native Authority appointment, with an elected vice - president”.

Government View

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Government notes. 3.25 The above is a letter No. S.464/14 dated 29th March, 1957 from the Resident,

Plateau Province to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry for Local Government, Northern Region, Kaduna, captioned “Request for a Hausa Chief of Jos”.

Government View Government notes. 3.26 We should pause here to make a point and it is in respect of the claim by CW 243,

Alhaji Sale Hassan, that the Hausas and Fulanis founded Jos. In the light of the positive statement that in pre-British times Jos did not exist except as a small Birom village in a Birom controlled area, the claim by Alhaji Sale Hassan, not backed up by any documentary evidence beats us hollow. Where does he obtain his claim? As in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, Jos was recognised as a stranger settlement of Hausas, Ibo, Yorubas and other tribes. It is therefore flabbergasting that the Hausas whose presence in Jos as a result of commerce now claim ownership of the city while the other tribes, particularly the Ibos and the Yorubas, as mentioned in Exhibit 359, H1, paragraph 4 do not make similar claim.

Government View Government accepts. 3.27 C.W 8, Da G.G. Bot, a very intelligent witness, also fortified the evidence of Birom

ownership and Hausa non-ownership of Jos. He said: “According to history, the Birom migrated from Sokoto and settled here on bare or virgin land. Nobody was here and they settled. Jos is never a Hausa town”.

Government View Government notes. 3.28 This is a convenient point to deal with the evidence of one or two of the other tribes

who came before the Commission. In Exhibit 105, the memorandum submitted by the Igbo Community Association Jos, the authors of the memorandum said at page 4:

“Settler elements easily identified in earlier days were Ndigbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Urhobo, etc who lived among themselves without any rancor. It is worthy of note that Ndigbo in Jos had cordial relationship with indigenes and non-indigenes alike, a relationship which had continued to exist till date.”

In conclusion, Exhibit 105 said:

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“It is a known fact that the insistence of the Hausa Community to be at the head of every set up has put them at logger-heads with other communities... Let no one touch the tail of the lion whether it is dead or alive, is a wise saying of our Elders”.

Government View Government notes. 3.29 Exhibit 36, the memorandum of the Yoruba Community, Jos said at page 3:

“The relationship of Yoruba people with Jos dated back to 1840s. Records show that Yoruba were the first non-natives that first came to Jos. By 1850 sizeable number of Yoruba have stayed, forming a small community around Cole Street and Terminus Area of Jos. Since then, beside the fact that Yoruba increased in number other tribes came too. The Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and others came later”.

Government View Government notes. 3.30 In his oral testimony on Exhibit 36, C.W. 33, Engineer Adeniji Ogunnaike said:

“The Yorubas came to Jos first. Therefore the claim that Hausa-Fulani came first cannot be true”.

Government View Government notes. 3.31 The Yorubas, by the above, are specific as to when they came to Jos. It was in the

1840s. There is no such specific evidence in respect of the Hausas. C.W. 243, Alhaji Sale Hassan, simply said in evidence that his father, who was born in 1852 was one of the founders of Jos. If the claim of the Yorubas that they first came to Jos in the 1840s and by 1850 a sizeable number of Yorubas had formed a small community around Cole Street and Terminus area is correct, then the Commission can come to the conclusion that the Yorubas were first in time in Jos as it relates to the father of C.W 243. This is because at the time the Yorubas said they came to Jos, the father of C.Ws 243 was about two years old. Certainly at that age, he could not have been one of the founders of Jos.

Government View Government accepts. 3.32 The 1873 Jihad led by Sarkin Yaki had no impact on Jos. It is a historical fact that

the Muslims did not capture Jos during the Jihad. Perhaps that was one of the reasons why that very great Nigerian and one time leader of the North, Late Alhaji

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Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and Premier of Northern Nigeria, said in his book, MY LIFE:

“The countries which did not come under the Fulani rule were the areas known as the Borno Province , the Plateau Province (less Wase), the Jukun, the Tiv, and Idoma peoples of South of the Benue and small parts of Kabba and Ilorin Provinces”.

Government View Government notes. 3.33 It is not only that the Plateau did not come under Fulani rule, there is plethora of

evidence that the Fulanis were given land for the grazing of their cattle in the Plateau and were assimilated to the general administration of the Jos Division.

Government View Government notes. 3.34 Exhibit 173 reads at pages 1 and 2:

“In 1949, realising the white man’s love for milk, the Fulanis started coming to Jol to sell milk to them. When the Fulanis discovered that Jol Village has very rich grazing fields, they started requesting for portions of land from the native to settle. Because by nature the Berom people are hospitable and accommodating, they gave portions of land to the Fulanis on loan. When the Hausa/Fulani people settled in Jol village, they recognised the natives as their landlords and they paid tributes in the form of milk and grains to the land owners”.

Government View Government notes. 3.35 The Commission believes the above evidence. If the Fulanis paid tribute in the

form of milk and grains to the Biroms, they cannot be heard to say that they founded Jos and therefore the owners of the town. Payment of tribute is inconsistent with the right of ownership. Payment of tribute is consistent with a stranger element paying obeisance to the overlord. In this situation, the Hausa-Fulani being stranger element and the Biroms, being the overlord. This clearly brings out the meaning of tribute as a payment by one person to another as an act of submission or price for

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protection. In our view, the tribute paid by the Fulanis to the Biroms was clearly an act of submission or a price for political protection. Government View: Government accepts.

3.36 Another area worth considering in this vexed issue of ownership is in respect of the

appointment of traditional rulers at the embryonic or infant stage of development of Jos. There is very clear evidence that Da Rwang Pam was installed paramount Chief of Jos. Dealing on the issue, Exhibit 105, the memorandum of the Igbo Community, Jos said at page 5:

“In the early fifties, precisely 1953, the Hausa Community wanted to impose the Emirship stool on Jos. This was vehemently resisted by the indigenes with the backing of other settler elements - viz Ndigbo, Yoruba etc. The resistance paved the way for the installation of an indigene, namely Da Rwang Pam, as the paramount Chief of Jos. Since then, this stool has always been occupied by an indigene. Consequently, the current Gbong Gwom Jos is Da Fom Bot, an indigene”.

Government View Government notes. 3.37 It is the tradition in Hausa States to name or designate traditional title holders as

Emirs. This is a common feature in the North. If Jos was really founded by the Hausas and owned by them, why are the traditional rulers, like in other Hausa States, not named or designated as Emir. Most importantly, the present Turakin of Jos, Alhaji Inuwa Ali, was installed by Da Dr. Fom Bot. What is the implication of this? Is it a situation where a non-owner of Jos appoints or installs an owner of Jos? Can this be a regular procedure? Why did Alhaji Inuwa Ali accept such an appointment if he feels that the Hausas are the founders and owners of Jos? Is he not caught by the equitable principle of estoppel by conduct by accepting appointment from a “non-owner” of Jos? There are questions and questions galore. But the Commission can stop here, hoping that it has made the point.

Government View Government notes. 3.38 This is a convenient point to take the evidence of C.W 263, Alhaji Inuwa Ali. In

answer to cross-examination, the witness said:

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“My father came to Jos around 1912... My father is claiming Kano but I am claiming Jos. My father is Kanuri of Kano, like Liman who is Kanuri of Lafia but we call ourselves Hausas... My father is among the founders of Jos”.

Government View Government notes. 3.39 Liman was his counsel at the Commission. In view of the fact that Liman is from

Kanuri, the witness used him as an example. When asked by counsel when Jos was founded, he answered:

“Some people are saying 1914 but I am not quite clear because I did not read the history of the founding of Jos. I am not clear when Jos was founded but some people say Jos was founded in 1914 because in history, you can hear different things”.

Government View Government notes. 3.40 On the issue of ownership of Jos, witness said:

“Jasawa that was formed in 1987 are the owners of Jos. They will say so provided they were born here... The Hausas founded Jos”.

Government View Government notes. 3.41 By the above evidence, Alhaji Inuwa Ali said that his father, who came to Jos in

1912, was one of the founders of Jos around 1914. In other words, his father was one of the founders of Jos two years after he arrived Jos. Where was his father during the period of two years? This question is relevant because if his father was in Jos in 1912, then the presumption is that he founded Jos in 1912 and not in 1914. Since there is no evidence of where his father was between 1912 and 1914, this Commission is not in a position to know the real situation and that issue can hardly be resolved in his favour or in favour of the claim that his father was one of the founders of Jos. The Commission would like to draw an analogy here from the evidence of C.W. 243, Alhaji Sale Hassan who also claimed that his father who was born in 1852 was also one of the founders of Jos. What an interesting coincidence! Both fathers of these Muslim leaders of Jos founded Jos!!

Government View

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Government notes. 3.42 It is clear from the evidence of Alhaji Inuwa Ali that anybody or person born in Jos

can claim the ownership of Jos. With the greatest respect, this is a very lazy and awkward evidence which can be likened to asking a person to swim ashore in the Atlantic Ocean. He will never get to the shore. He will drown in the process. Is Alhaji Inuwa Ali seriously saying that all persons born in Jos are owners of Jos? Such type of statement will make the Hausa man retort in the language, Haba, Menene haka! (Meaning: “Why, what is this?”) Government View: Government notes.

3.43 Let us take how Jos got its name. There are quite a few versions. One version is

that the Birom named the town as “Jot” referring to a spring water, the name the Whiteman changed to Jos because he could not pronounce “Jot”. Another one closely related to the above is that the Birom called it “Jot-Shil” which is a spring water located at the back of the Jos main market. This spring water, the people said had ritual functions as it was believed to cure all sorts of illness. It would appear that the above two refer to the same thing. The other version is that Guash was the original name of Jos. The immigrants could not pronounce the word well and hence the change to Jos Naraguta.

Government View Government notes. 3.44 Apart from the above generally familiar versions which came out in evidence in the

Commission, C.W. 243, Alhaji Sale Hassan, gave two new versions. He said that Jos was earlier called Southern Sudan. He also said that Jos was named after Captain Jos, a German. He did not tell the Commission what circumstances led to the change of name from Southern Sudan to Jos. The witness did not cite any document to buttress his contention, a contention which stands alone. No witness gave evidence pertaining to Captain Jos, a German. It is a very curious version. What is surprising is that the witness said he did not know the name his people, the founders of Jos, called the town. That is primary and the Commission expected him to know the native name the Hausas called the town, if they really founded the town. The Biroms gave such evidence as to the name and that is where we got “Jot” and “Jot-Shil”. The Commission does not believe the evidence of C.W. 243, Alhaji Sale Hassan.

Government View

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Government notes. 3.45 The authors of Exhibit 339, the memorandum of Concerned Muslims Youth in Jos

North, with the greatest respect, had not been told the truth by their Elders on who founded Jos. It is clear from the plethora of evidence before the Commission that the Hausas were not the founders of Jos. There is one major fault in the case presented by the Youth and it is this. They relied on the so-called evidence from 1904. They did not tell the Commission what the position was before 1904. Like their elders they simply made the claim that the Hausas founded Jos without documentary evidence in support of their case. There is evidence that Jos was founded long before 1904 and to tie the foundation of the town with the traditional title of SARKIN JOS is to play down on a very important historical matter.

Government View Government accepts. 3.46 The argument in respect of Hausa names could be very attractive to the minds of the

youth but it does not really address the issue of ownership. Perhaps an analogy can help here. When the British colonised what is now known as Nigeria, they named streets and places after English names. Such examples abound in Ekoyi in Lagos, Calabar now headquarters of Cross River State and more relevantly Jos, the Capital of Plateau State ,particularly what was called Anglo Jos and Rayfield in Jos. Did the British claim ownership of these places merely because they named the places? That is a puerile argument. It does not hold water and the Commission dismisses it. It is the feeling of the Commission that as long as the Elders do not tell the Youth the \true story of ownership, half truths as contained in Exhibit 339 will continue to threaten peace in this great city and cause violence and crisis. The Elders owe posterity a duty to tell the youth that the Hausas were not the founders of Jos and therefore not the owners of the city. They should also tell the youth where they came from so that the youth may know their ancestral homes or routes. That will solve so much of the present predicament of the youth who are fed with false claims. Government View: Government accepts.

3.47 In Exhibit 44, Appendix 1, eight Muslims sent a rejoinder to a publication in the New Nigerian Newspaper of 13th March, 1986 a publication which dealt with discrimination in respect of appointments and employments in Plateau State. The authors who are Muslims took the liberty of the rejoinder in dealing with the ownership problem. We will quote the rejoinder in some detail:

“It is best known to Alhaji Husaini and his group who claim ownership of Jos Local Government Council to tell the world

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how many Districts they have in the Local Government Council. We peace - loving Hausas have learnt from history told to us by our parents that the Berom have been ruling Jos. It is therefore, not proper for Alhaji Husaini and company to claim any Chieftaincy right for themselves or their allies... We are of the opinion that a true Hausa leaves his home for another mainly in search of wealth and he therefore maintains peace in protection of his wealth. The people of Jos have been a peace-loving people; therefore they have not tempered with any Hausa’s wealth. In view of this, it is our cherished opinion that a true Hausa residing in Jos respects the actual indigenes... In answer to the articles calling on Youth Movements to challenge the Chieftaincy institution in Jos, we wish to caution that traditionally a tribe has the right to govern its area of jurisdiction no matter how small the tribe may be... The Chieftaincy of Jos, to the best of our knowledge is dominated by its rightful owners. The Berom are a leading tribe in Jos Local Government be it in terms of population or Districts as earlier mentioned. We even think the Berom are the most populated tribe in the whole state... It is known that the Hausas came here in search of wealth through tin mining which was Nigeria’s main wealth earner and so when the colonial masters were leaving they installed Chieftaincies to the traditional owners of the land... We shall not stand idly and allow some of us ruin the peace we have been enjoying here as we believe trouble is always sleeping until some fool wakes it up and God curses such fools who make it their duty to wake trouble up”.

Government View Government notes. 3.48 In Exhibit 425, a publication in the Punch Newspaper of November 2, 2001 twelve

Muslims said at page 23, paragraph 7: “We should not at any time consider our ethnic affiliation as paramount or the most superior to others. Since other ethnic communities have accepted us as their kith and kin, we should do everything possible to cherish and secure this spirit

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of brotherhood. We should not manipulate the religion of Allah to satisfy our whims and caprices. Allah in his infinite wisdom has created nations and tribes, Muslims and Christians and even idol worshipers, yet we are all in his sight”.

Government View Government notes. 3.49 The above passage portrays that not all Muslims in Plateau State are interested in

confrontation. That apart, not all Muslims in Plateau State believe that Hausas are the founders and owners of Jos. As it is, Appendix 1 of Exhibit 44 believes that the Hausas are not the owners of Jos but the Beroms.

Government View Government notes. 3.50 In Exhibit 25 is annexed the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of

12th April, 1994 in Jos Metropolis. The 1994 Commission said at page 25, paragraph 3.1.3 as follows:

“We observe that the contents of Exhibit 23C page 3, 23M page 2, 23P page 4 appear to lend support to the historical fact that Jos cannot be said to be an original place of Hausa people”.

(The Report is annexed to quite a number of memoranda). Government View: Government notes.

3.51 Exhibits 57, 339 and some others tendered before us contended that the Hausas

contributed to the economic development of Jos. Wealth or economic power is not the same thing as ownership. Wealth cannot influence ownership of a thing. Both are given by God and to the person or persons he chooses to give. A tribe may have economic power but not the ownership of a place. Let us keep the two differently. In our view, ownership of a town should be based on relevant evidence of first settlement and or conquest and such evidence must be convincing and true. Government View: Government accepts.

3.52 Exhibit 57 dealt with the predominance or preponderance of the hausa language in terms of usage in Jos. While language may determine ownership of a place, it is not invariably so. In the situation on our hands, although hausa language is predominantly spoken in Jos, that does not make the Hausas the owners of Jos. In our view, hausa is a unifying language of trade and commerce and not a language of

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culture conveying traditional ownership of Jos to the hausas. And what is more, the Afizere, Anaguta and Birom have their own separate and distinct languages which are not Hausa. The Hausa evidence of first settlement is puerile and full of holes and therefore palpably wrong. Government View: Government notes.

3.53 Foundation and subsequent ownership of a town is a matter of traditional history

and history according to Cicero is “the witness of the times, the touch of truth, the memory, the teacher of life, the messenger of antiquity”. History is not such a discipline one can rake up within his whims and caprices to suit his situation. The events of history must blend smoothly with the past. Mere rhetoric which have no relationship with the past cannot pass the test of valid and authentic history. It will be tantamount to selling or disgracing history if tin mine workers are said to be owners of the town, Jos when there is clear evidence that they came for tin mining labour and met the natives, the owners of the town. History hardly lies in its home of chronological record of events and if history lies, it is as a result of human manipulation. In such a situation we cannot blame history but mankind which is responsible for history’s lies.

Government View Government notes. 3.54 The claim of ownership of something is a very serious matter which requires solid,

precise, and unequivocal convincing evidence. It is not like the Englishman finding tea, coffee and toast on his breakfast table and he sips the tea or coffee with ease and effortlessly in comfort. It is much more than that. The claimant must adduce adequate or sufficient evidence to back up his claim. A rigmarole and sentimental evidence of a romantic nature will not suffice. No human being can romance or gamble with evidence of ownership of a place and succeed. Ownership is a hard matter of law and not one of sentiment. One either owns a thing or property or he does not. There is no half way to it. Ownership of a town is the most serious claim and the burden is so much on the claimant. We feel that the evidence of Hausa and Fulani ownership of Jos has not passed through Nigeria’s evidential rules of proof. In other words, the burden of proof has not been discharged by the evidence before us.

Government View Government accepts. 3.55 In this matter history, and very authentic history, has given us a consistent flowing

story of how the three tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Birom own Jos. We accept

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the evidence of the three tribes and other tribes that supported their evidence. We reject the evidence that the Hausas and the Fulanis or any other tribe for that matter founded Jos and therefore own Jos.

Government View Government accepts. 3.56 The story of ownership of Jos as told by the protagonists of Hausa-Fulani ownership

of the former tin city, is like the literature story of Alice in the Wonderland. Happily, this Commission will not wonder. It will arrive at the proper and correct destination with the assistance of a good “compass”. Let no human being attempt to re-write or muffle history because history will cry to the high heaven for justice and fairplay in anger and animosity. And that will be bad both for the beneficiaries of history and the persons attempting to re-write it. Let such a thing not happen in Plateau State. We have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the story that the Hausas and Fulanis founded Jos and therefore the owners, is most oppressive. Naked oppression is bad; oriental oppression more so. God hates both.

Government View Government accepts. 3.57 Based on the preponderance of evidence and the balance of probability, we come to

the inescapable conclusion that the three tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Birom own Jos and we are correct. For the avoidance of doubt, we have not mentioned the three tribes in any particular order of ownership but in the alphabetical order of their names. Government View: Government accepts.

3.58 Indigeneship: 3.58A The issue of indigeneship took a centre page in the memoranda presented before

the Commission. It caused so much controversy and bad blood. There were two clearly opposing camps. The three tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom said in evidence that they are the only indigenes of Jos. They went further to say that no other tribe, including the Hausas and the Fulanis, are indigenes of the town. They tendered quite a number of exhibits to buttress their claim.

3.59 On the other hand, the Hausas and the Fulanis also claimed to be indigenes of Jos.

They said so in so many words in both their memoranda and in oral evidence.

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They did not deny the indigeneship of the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. All that they said was that in addition to the three tribes, they are also indigenes.

3.60 Indigeneship is a thorny problem in the sociology and culture of Nigeria. It causes perennial problems in our polity. Crisis are experienced regularly in the country as a result of problems of indigeneship.

Government View Government notes. 3.61 The major problem is that there is no law known to the Commission which deals

directly with the issue of indigeneship, either at the Federal level or at the Plateau State level. The protagonists of the practice contend that it is in vogue in some other states. They name such States where the practice is in vogue. The fact that the practice is in vogue in some other States does not necessarily make it legal or lawful. There should be an existing law and there is no such law.

Government View Government notes. 3.62 The Commission knows as a fact that the Federal Government is addressing the

issue. It has set up a Committee to look into the vexed problem. It is the Committee on Provisions and Practice of Citizens rights in Nigeria. We think Plateau State should wait for the decision of the Federal Government and fall in line with the policy of the Federal Government. That will be good. Government View: Government notes.

3.63 Efforts at Islamization: 3.64 One of the remote causes of the September, 2001 crisis is the alleged desire to

Islamise Nigeria in general and Plateau State in particular. Most memoranda took the Commission through memory lane and documented alleged efforts in the past which have tried to Islamise Nigeria or plant Sharia. The major evidence received by the Commission are given herein.

Government View Government notes. 3.65 A statement was credited to Late Alhaji Ribadu that his dream is that the Qur’an

had to be dipped into the Atlantic Ocean before the Jihad would stop (See Exhibit 500).

Government View Government notes.

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3.66 In Exhibit 502 annexure `A’, written to President Ibrahim B. Babangida by the Islamic Liberation Movement headed: TO DIE IN THE PATH OF ALLAH, OUR TARGET, the movement said inter alia:

“This is the complete plan set up by the Islamic Liberation Movement on our last meeting on 14th November, 1989 at Katsina against the Kafuris (Christians). This plan to begin by December, 1989 to the end of our life, and we want you to co-operate and give the necessary assistance as a Muslim concerned. Mr. I.B.B you should know that death is the Faith of Allah is a Blessing to Maryeti just as wine is very important to drunkers. Mr. I.B.B you are warned of the danger ahead of you not to fail to co-operate. You will watch with your eyes that this nation will go in flames which will unite you from the leadership. You dare say no to our plan... Muslim should be calm and pretend, they should strive to equal themselves in the Force; through the help of other High Ranking Muslims which will enable them to make war by all means and islamise Nigeria and any time assistance will come from Arabs and Muslim Countries to do away with the Kafuris (Christians)... The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) are to be changed and replaced by Muslim brothers before the end of 1990. Important positions especially the Defence Minister, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff and the Naval, Inspector General of Police, etc are to be changed and replaced by Muslim brothers immediately... No Kafuri (Christian) should be allowed to hold any important position to rule this country again...”

Government View Government notes. 3.67 In Exhibit 257, Annexure B, headed Islam in Africa Conference Communique

(jointly issued by the Islamic Council, London), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (O.I.C), and the newly founded Islam in Africa Organisation (I.A.O) the following is recorded affecting Nigeria:

“The Conference unanimously expresses its gratitude and appreciation to the government and peoples of Nigeria for the interest shown in the Conference and in particular, extends its thanks to the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Badamasi

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Babangida for the stimulating inaugural address which he sent to the Conference and was delivered by General Sani Abacha, the Chief of Army Staff of Nigeria... The Joint Conference finally ratified the admission of Nigeria as a full member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and thanked the government and people of Nigeria for having generously donated US $21 billion to the Islamic Development Fund of the OIC and sincerely requested the Federal Government of Nigeria to implement all policies and programmes of the OIC to show the whole world that Nigeria is truly an Islamic nation.”

Government View Government notes. 3.68 In Exhibit 129, the Punch Newspaper publication of November 12, 2001, the

following news item is credited to the National President of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria, Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, at page 3 of the paper. He is reported to have made the following statement in his welcome address to the Council:

“We also expect in the near future, the establishment of Sharia in Kwara, Oyo, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Taraba, Adamawa, Plateau, Nasarawa and Kogi States. He urged that in the States mentioned, Muslims are in the majority”.

Government View Government notes. 3.69 Efforts made by the Commission to enable Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed give

evidence at the Commission proved abortive. The Commission notes that there was no denial of the statement credited to Dr. Ibrahim Dati Ahmed in the newspaper.

Government View Government notes. 3.70 We should pause here to deal briefly with the meaning and content of Jihad. C.W.

20, T.J. Davou, said under cross examination: “The meaning of Jihad is conquest or purify yourself from sins to become a good Muslim. After you purify yourself and you are

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clean yourself, go and preach to others to get more followers. This is the meaning of Jihad and Jihad never says go and kill”.

Government View Government notes. 3.71 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines Jihad at page 642 as “Holy War

fought by Muslims against those who reject Islam”. Similarly, Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture defines the word at page 708 as “Holy war fought by Muslims as a religious duty”.

Government View Government notes. 3.72 In his book entitled “Sharia: The Islamic Law”, Abdur Rahman I. Doi said in

Chapter 25, page 437: “Jihad is derived from the Arabic word al-Jahd meaning a struggle or striving and the word Jahada means “he has struggled or exerted himself”. Jihad does not necessarily mean resorting to the use of sword and the shedding of blood as is misunderstood by some people. The word Jihad, therefore, is so comprehensive that it also includes a striving and undergoing hardship and forebearing in great difficulties, while standing firm against one’s enemies. The actual words for war in Arabic are al-harb and al-Qital. In the Qur’an, therefore, the word Jihad as a Holy War, is used in respect of waging it for defence against any aggression or taking an offence in unavoidable circumstances when the onslaught of enemies is imminent. These circumstances alone can make a war morally justifiable.”

Government View Government notes. 3.73 It is clear from Abdur Rahman I. Doi’s definition that if a Muslim initiates a war

on his own it cannot be called Jihad because it is not carried out in defence against any aggression. Similarly if a Muslim initiates a war when the onslaught of the enemy is not imminent, it cannot be called a Jihad. In the above two circumstances, the Muslim will be taken to have done his own thing in his own way, clearly outsides the Holy Qur’an.

Government View Government notes.

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3.74 The major problem is the misconception or misunder-standing of the meaning of

the word, particularly by the Muslim youth. Doi said that “Jihad does not necessarily mean resorting to the use of sword and the shedding of blood as is misunderstood by some people”. Logically however, Jihad may result in resorting to the use of sword and the shedding of blood if it is carried out as a defence of Islam.

Government View Government notes. 3.75 The Commission strongly holds the view that so much civic education is required

in this very important area of Islam. The leadership of Islam should conduct workshops, seminars and lectures particularly for the youths so that they are better informed of the real meaning of Jihad. The societal meaning that once a Muslim kills for whatever reason in defence of Islam he goes to heaven could be responsible for the aggressiveness of most of the youths. After all every human being wants to go to heaven. Nobody wants to go to hell. The civic education must concentrate on circumstances when defence of Islam as a religion arises. In our view, the test should not be subjective but should be objective in the light of the teachings of Prophet Mohammed. The Commission must say in conclusion that Jihad cannot and should not be a defence against the penal laws of the country. Government View Government accepts.

3.76 In Exhibit 460, headed “Call to the Muslims of the World from a Group of Free-

thinkers and Humanists of Muslim Origin”, the following excerpts are recorded: “Does Islam really preach peace, tolerance and non-violence? The Muslims who perpetrate these crimes think differently. They believe that what they do is Jihad (holy war). They say that killing unbelievers is mandatory for every Muslim. They do not kill because they wish to break the laws of Islam but because they think this is what true Muslims should do.... The Quran tells us “not to make friendship with Jews and Christians” (5:51), “Kill the disbelievers whenever we find them” (2:191). “Murder them and treat them harshly” (9:123) “fight and slay the pagans, seize them, beleagear them, and lie in wait for them in every

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stratagem” (9.5)... The Quran takes away the freedom of belief from all humanity and relegates those who disbelieve in Islam to hell (5:10), calls them majis (fifth, untouchable impure) (9:28) and orders its followers to fight the unbelievers until no other religion except Islam is left (2:193).... Although we are asked to be compassionate amongst each other, we have to be “harsh with unbelievers”, our Christian Jewish and Atheist neighbours and colleagues (48:29). As for him who does not believe in Islam, the prophet announces with a “stern command”, “seize ye him and bind ye him, and burn ye him in the Blazing Fire. Further make him march in a chain, whereof the length is seventy cubits! This was he that would not believe in Allah most High... The Quran prohibits a Muslim from befriending a non-believer even if that non-believer is the father or the brother of that Muslim (9:23), (3:28). Our holy book asks us to be disobedient towards unbelievers and their governments and strive against the unbelievers with great endeavour (25:52) and be stern with them because they belong to Hell (66:9).... He made the Jihad mandatory and warns us that “unless we go forth (for Jihad) He will punish us with a grevious penalty and put others in our place” (9:39) Allah speaks to our Holy Prophet and says “O Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and the hypocrites and be stern against them. Their abode is Hell in an evil refuge indeed.

Government View Government notes. 3.77 While the Commission is not in a position to determine the authenticity or

otherwise of the Qur’an passages quoted in Exhibit 460, we would like to conclude here that followership in a religion or religious belief is a matter of evangelism flowing from the believer to the unbeliever and not a matter of force or intimidation. Nigeria is a multi-religious country and the Constitution of the country clearly recognises that. Accordingly, the major religions of Christianity and Islam must accept the constitutional position to enable the country move forward to gain higher grounds. We would like to mention for avoidance of doubt that Nigeria is not, we repeat, not a secular country. That is not what our Constitution says.

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Government View: Government accepts.

3.78 Delimitation of Electoral Wards 3.79 The complaint that there is an imbalance in the delimitation of Electoral Wards in

Jos North Local Government Council came out very strongly in several memoranda. The feeling of many non-Hausa Fulani residents of Jos North Local Government Council, particularly the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom who are undoubtedly the founders and owners of Jos, is that the Electoral Wards in the Jos North Local Council are delineated in such a way as to emasculate them politically and give the Hausa-Fulani group an unfair political advantage in the affairs of the Local Government.

Government View Government notes. 3.80 In Exhibit 369, the memorandum submitted by the Afizere Cultural and

Community Development Association (ACCDA), Jos North Chapter, the authors said at page 4 paragraphs 2 to page 5 paragraph 1:

“For instance, during General Babangida’s regime, Jos was not only divided in Jos North and Jos South to give the Hausa-Fulani settlers a clear advantage, but the electoral wards were delineated to the disadvantage of the indigenes (see table below). ...from there, it is very clear that the wards were created in such a manner to favour the Hausa-FUlani settlers as against the indigenes. For instance the total voter population of Abba-Na-Shehu, Ali Kazaure, Garba Daho, Gangare and Ibrahim Katsina wards where Hausa-Fulani are mostly found is 74,779, while the total population of three of the wards mostly occupied by the indigenes (Jos Jarawa, Naraguta B and Tudun Wada/Kabong) is 129,900. What a great disparity.”

Government View Government notes. 3.81 In Exhibit 22 submitted by the Anaboze (Buji) Youth Movement, it is stated at

page 6, pagraphs 2 and 3 as follows:

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“As a result, indigenous wards like Naraguta B and Tudun Wada-Kabong maintains 101 and 59 polling units respectively while those occupied by the settlers like Vandapuye, Ibrahim Katsina; and Garba Daho have only 30 polling units put together, with a maximum of 500 voters for each polling unit. It then become clear that Naraguta B and Tudun Wada-Kabong wards would produce 50,500 and 29,500 voters respectively as against about 15,000 voters produce by Vandapuye, Ibrahim Katsina and Garba Daho Wards put together. In terms of representation in the Council, while one (1) councillor represents about 50,000 and 29,500 voters each from Naraguta B and Tudun Wada Wards, three (3) councillors represent about 15,000 voters from the 3 settler wards. It is our humble opinion that early correction of this anomaly will go a long way in giving the indigenous tribes a sense of belonging in the affairs of the Local Government. To buttress our point,... out of the 14 number councillors in Jos North today, only 4 are from the indigenous tribes.”

Government View Government notes. 3.82 Still on the issue of the alleged unfair delineation of Electoral Wards in Jos North

Local Government Council, the same point is made in Exhibit 46 at page 3, paragraphs 3 to 6 as follows:

“The delineation of the electoral wards in Jos North could at best be described as gross injustice and unfairness against the indigenes. I dare say that what is on ground is not obtainable anywhere in the country. This has been done in supporting the faulty underlying plans right from the creation of Jos North Local Government Area so as to give the Hausa-Fulani higher advantage and chances of producing a good number of Councillors to the Local Government Council despite their minority status. A thorough look at the composition of these electoral wards, would reveal the most shocking and unthinkable injustice and manipulation. This should be looked at also in terms of geographical size, voting population and number of polling

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stations, etc. For example, a look at the analysis of the voting population in each of the electoral wards of Jos North would reveal an unfair situation where in a particular ward, upward of 50 thousand people would vote to produce a single councillor as against slightly over 5-10 thousand people in another ward, producing a single councillor too.”

Government View Government notes. 3.83 Finally, the grievance of the non-Hausa/Fulani group is summed up this way at

page 3, paragraph 3 of Exhibit W: “The delineation of electoral wards in Jos North has placed the indigenes of the disadvantage to the Hausa/Fulani.

Government View Government notes. 3.84 But the issue was not only raised in the memoranda submitted to the Commission,

oral evidence was also given and here we shall quote only one of such witnesses, namely, Yakubu Y. Sanda, CW27 who was led in evidence by Mr. G. S. Pwul, leading counsel to the Commission as follows:

Pwul: “Now, your page 5 gives factors that generate ill-feelings one of which is the Electoral Wards in Jos North, that you have one (1) person representing 50,500 people, 29,500 people?”

Sanda: “Yes, my lord” Pwul: “Why must it cause friction?”

Sanda: “I want to believe that, if we are talking of a balance representation, there is no justification one person representing 50,000 people while on the other hand, 30,000 people only are represented by one person.”

Government View Government notes. 3.85 Exhibit X is the Table showing the Ward structure in Jos North Local Government

Council in relation to the voter population as at 1998 which remained valid until 2002.

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3.86 Below is the table: S/No Ward Namme No. of Units Voters Population

1 Naraguta ‘A’ 28 21855

2 Naraguta ‘B’ 99 56415

3 Abba Na Shehu 27 18677

4 Ali Kazaure 36 19650

5 Garba Daho 26 10802

6 Gangare 18 11252

7 Ibrahim Katsina 25 14398

8 Jenta Adamu 24 13532

9 Jenta apata 34 19977

10 Jos Jarawa 34 30300

11 Sarkin Arab 17 11002

12 Tudun Wada/Kabong 64 43185

13 Tafawa Balewa 11 5600

14 Vanderpuye 11 5900

Total 354

3.87 From Exhibit X it can be seen that Jos North Local Government Area has 14 Electoral Wards. It is generally known that six of these Electoral Wards namely: Abba Na Shehu, Ali Kazaure, Garba Daho, Gangare, Ibrahim Katsina and Sarkin Arab wards with a combined voter population of 85,781 according to Exhibit X are inhabited mainly by the Hausa Fulani while the indigenes are the predominant group in the five wards of Naraguta A, Naraguta B, Jenta Adamu, Jos Jarawa and Tudun Wada/Kabong with a total voter population of 259,391. The other three wards of Jenta Apata, Tafawa Balewa and Vanderpuye are inhabited mainly by other tribes who are neither Hausa-Fulani nor indigenes. Exhibit 369 quoted above gives the figure for the Hausa-Fulani wards as 74,779 but this did not take account of the 11,002 voters in the sixth Hausa/Fulani ward, that is, Sarkin Arab ward.

Government View Government notes. 3.88 The delimitation of Electoral wards including the voter population and the polling

units given in Exhibit X tallies with those given in the various memoranda. In all of them, including Exhibit X, the source is said to be INEC i.e. the Independent National Electoral Commission. If the Table is correct (and we have no reason to think that it is not) then we think that the point made about the imbalance in the

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delimitation of Electoral wards in Jos North Local Government Council is well taken and we agree with it. The Hausa-Fulani group against whose interest the point was taken did not produce any other Table and did not in any way challenge the contents of Exhibit X even through cross-examination of the witnesses by their counsel.

Government View Government notes. 3.89 We also agree that such imbalance in the delimitation of Electoral Wards as is

apparent in Exhibit X will invariably give a political advantage to the Hausa/Fulani and consequently result in the political marginalisation of other groups in the Jos Metropolis area. This is unfair and, as has been said before us, it creates an ill-feeling in the other groups against the Hausa-Fulani. In our view, this is one of the factors that contributed to the tension that led to the crisis.

Government View Government accepts. 3.90 The Commission is therefore in favour of the restructuring of the Electoral Wards

in Jos North Local Government Council to correct the imbalance but we decline from making any specific recommendation to that effect because we realize that the State Independent Electoral Commission for Plateau State has already created additional Electoral Wards throughout the State. It is the Commission’s fervent hope that the problem highlighted before us has been fully resolved and laid to rest. Government View: Government notes.

3.91 The blockage of roads around Churches and Mosques by Christians and

Muslims respectively during worship 3.92 The fact that some Muslims and some Christians block the roads in the immediate

vicinity of their places of worship on Fridays and on Sundays as the case may be is one of the cardinal issues that featured before the Commission as a factor that contributed immensely to the crisis. A large number of the Memoranda submitted to the Commission brought this issue to the fore and several witnesses who testified before the Commission did their best to either justify or condemn the practice. See for example Exhibits 247 (Memo No.173/2001), 59 (Memo No.233/2001 and 463 (Memo No.316/2001) and the oral testimonies of CW’s 46, 69, 94, 144 and 270. This is not surprising because after all, violence broke out in Jos directly as a result of the blockage of the road at Congo Russia.

Government View Government notes.

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3.93 According to the evidence given before the Commission, the mosques which are

known to engage in the practice of blocking major roads every Friday during the Juma’at prayers are the Jos Central Mosque (popularly called Masallacin Juma’a), the Dilimi Juma’at Mosque and the Congo- Russia mosque of Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi, while the churches that block roads on Sundays are ECWA Good News Church along Ahmadu Bello Way, Cherubim and Seraphim Church along Dilimi Road, First Baptist Church along Pump Street and St. Theresa’s Catholic Church along Church street, all in Jos (See for example the evidence of CW’s 46, 69 and 144).

Government View Government notes. 3.94 There seems to be a general consensus by all the witnesses that the practice of

blocking roads by the Muslims during worship is an old one but no one seems to know exactly when it started. For instance, when CW46 was asked by his counsel, H.M. Liman Esq. for how long the Central Mosque and other mosques had been blocking the roads for prayers, he answered “I joined the Aid Group in 1978. I cannot tell when they started.” On the other hand, the blocking of roads by those churches that do it appears to be of fairly recent origin. CW69 testified that the practice was started by ECWA Good News Church in 1994.

Government View Government notes. 3.95 Both the Muslims (CW144) and the Christians (CW69) admit that there was no

permit or approval given to their respective communities to block roads for the purpose of worship. CW46 was very clear in his testimony that the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) did not give approval to the Congo-Russia mosque to block the road on Fridays and CW67, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi, the owner of the mosque admitted this much. However, each side i.e. the Muslims and the Christians, tried to justify their conduct of blocking roads on Fridays and Sundays respectively.

Government View Government notes. 3.96 The case for the Muslims is that the blockage of roads is borne out of necessity in

that the mosques in question are not large enough to accommodate all those who come to worship. They therefore maintain that the blockage of the roads is, for them, inevitable. On the issue of Rhoda’s attempt and effort to cross the road,

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they described it as “trespass” and rely on a tradition (Hadith) of prophet Mohammed which says:

“If the person passing in front of a Muslim praying knows the sin he has committed, it will be better for him to wait for forty days than to pass in front of him.”

Government View Government notes. 3.97 They claimed that the blockage of roads was for a short time only, lasting not

more than 30 minutes, and that opposition to it amounts to religious intolerance. In the opinion of the Muslim witnesses, the blockage of roads by the Christians is an unnecessary act of retaliation to the blockage of roads during Juma’at prayers by the Muslims.

Government View Government notes. 3.98 CW69, in defence of the blockage of roads by his Church, ECWA Good News

Church, said the practice was advised by the police because of the proximity of the church to the Jos Main Market and for the safety of the cars of the worshipers parked outside the Church. CW94 also gave the same reason i.e the safety of the worshipers and their cars, for the blockage of the road by St. Theresa’s Catholic Church. The Christian witnesses were emphatic that the blockage of roads by Muslims is provocative as it inconveniences adherents of other faiths. Indeed, soon after the Commissioning of Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi’s mosque at Congo-Russia on 26th January, 1996, the residents of the area launched a sustained official protest when it became clear to them that the mosque in question, though a private one had become public and a road block was mounted around it during Juma’at prayers every Friday afternoon. This protest began with the community’s petition to the Divisional Police Officer dated 20th February, 1996 annexed to Exhibit 3 as appendix C3. Next were two petitions to the Commissioner of Police Plateau State dated 11th March and 20th March, 1996 annexed to Exhibit 3 as appendices C4 and A2 respectively. Copies of these petitions were sent to the relevant authorities including the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (J.M.D.B.). Apparently because there was no positive or favourable response to these petitions, the community took its complaints directly to the JMDB by its petitions dated 21st June, 1996 and 28th January, 1997 annexed to Exhibit 3 as appendices C2 and A3 respectively. In summary, all of these petitions were bitter

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complaints against the blockage of the road at the mosque for the reason that the practice deprived other members of the public of their right of way during Friday Juma’at prayers. In addition, Exhibit 62 is a report in the Punch Newspaper of 13th August, 2001 of a communiqué by COCIN Church condemning the blockage of roads by Muslims in Plateau State.

Government View Government notes. 3.99 However, a Muslim organization known as Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah Wa’ikamatis

Sunnah (JIBWIS) to which, according to the evidence before the Commission, CW67, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi handed over the use and Management of the mosque, rose up in stout defence of the practice. In its letter to the Divisional Police Officer, Nasarawa Gwong Police Station, Jos, dated 18th March, 1996, annexed as appendix C6 to Exhibit 3, the body, in what appears to be a response to Appendix C3 to Exhibit 3, described the community’s petition as:

“…unwarranted and unfounded, in that it only seek to interfere with peaceful pursuit of Muslims worshipping in that mosque and as such infringes their constitutional rights already guaranteed..”

Government View Government notes. 3.100 And to cap it up, the Jos North Local Government Council Branch of Jama’atu

Nasril Islam, the umbrella organization of all persons of the Muslim faith, rejected and declared unconstitutional the order given by the Governor of Plateau State banning the blockage of roads by both Christians and Muslims during worship.

Government View Government notes. 3.101 This rejection is contained in Annexure 5J to Exhibit 148. It must however be

said at this point that not all Muslims agree that the blockage of roads is sanctioned by Islam. In the opinion of CW222 Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, a die-hard Muslim and the former Commissioner of Police, the practice is unislamic. He testified “In Islam, it is not even permitted to block roads because it will inconvenience others”. Also, in Exhibit 490, an advertorial in Punch Newspaper of 2nd November, 2001, titled “Muslims in Plateau State want peace to reign” it is stated that “we make bold to say without fear of contradiction that to block the

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highway and convert it to worship places is not sanctioned in Islam.” This article was published by muslims in an unfavourable reaction to the contents of Annexure 5J to Exhibit 148.

Government View Government notes. 3.102 As stated earlier, several memoranda which support the blockage of roads accused

Rhoda of “trespassing” when she attempted to pass through the road blocks at Congo-Russia. The question here is whether Rhoda’s attempt and effort to use the road at the material time was lawful i.e. whether she was exercising a right given to her by law or whether her act was unlawful. Conversely, it may be asked, was the blockage of the road by the Muslim congregation at Congo-Russia on 7th September, 2001 so as to prevent Rhoda and others from passing justifiable in law?

Government View Government notes. 3.103 The answer to this question is not far to seek. The Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides in section 41(1) as follows: “Every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria..”

Government View Government notes. 3.104 This freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to every

Nigerian under Chapter IV of the Constitution, a denial of which is a violation of the Constitution and is justiceable in a court of law. The proponents of the blockage of roads during Juma’at prayers, tried to justify the practice by reference to the Islamic injunction that it is a sin for a person to pass in front of a person who is praying. That may well be so as far as Muslims are concerned, but Nigeria is a multi religious Society and non-Muslims, of which there are many, are not bound by Islamic laws or injunctions. The Constitution of Nigeria is the grundnorm, the Supreme law of the land and any act or practice that seeks to take away the fundamental rights or freedoms given by it to the citizens of this country is, in our humble view, not only illegal but oppressive and must be discouraged and stopped. And it must be borne in mind that our Constitution is operated on the principles of democracy, not theocracy. It has been suggested before us that

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the practice of blocking roads during prayers is in conformity with section 38 of the same Constitution, which guarantees to every citizen the right to practice his religion. With respect, we disagree. It cannot be the intendment of the Constitution that in exercising his freedom of worship, a citizen is at liberty to deprive another citizen of his freedom of movement.

Government View Government notes. 3.105 In addition to the constitutional position on the matter, the unauthorised blockage

of roads by any person which denies any other person his legitimate right of passage whether for religious purposes or otherwise, is criminal. Section 194 of the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria Cap.89 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963 applicable in Plateau State provides as follows:

“Whoever, by doing any act… causes obstruction to any person in any public way… shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine or with both…”

Section 254 of the same Code also provides that:

“Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said to restrain that person wrongfully”

And the punishment for the offence of wrongful restraint is provided for in Section 256, namely, imprisonment for one month or a fine of sixty naira or both.

Government View Government notes. 3.106 To the question whether Rhoda was a trespasser at Congo-Russia on 7th

September 2001, our answer is an emphatic, No. Trespass in law implies that the person against whom it is committed has or is entitled to have exclusive possession of the property in question. But no one can deny that Rhoda and all Nigerians who wanted to use the road at Congo-Russia had an equal right with the congregation of worshipers, to use and occupy it. If that were not so, and the worshipers had a superior right, Rhoda would be a trespasser and even jus tertii would not avail her as a defence. But we are of the view that Rhoda was

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exercising her undoubted constitutional right and it was wrong to prevent her from doing so or to describe her act as illegal or a mark of religious intolerance. It is equally wrong and indeed unfortunate for anyone to say, as CW46 said before the Commission, that when Rhoda first passed the roadblock without any molestation, she was given a “concession” or “favour”. See also page 2 paragraph 4 of Exhibit 59 where a similar position was taken.

Government View Government notes. 3.107 By extension, it is the Commission’s firm but respectful view that the blockage of

roads by any religious group, whether Christian or Muslim, for the purpose of worship, is illegal and ought to be discontinued and must be discontinue. And this must be so notwithstanding the fact that the practice has been in existence for a long time. It must be said, however that this view does not detract or derogate from the power of the Government or the security agencies to restrict movement of persons when necessary in the performance of their duty of ensuring that there is peace and for the protection of lives and property.

Government View Government accepts. 3.108 We have taken the pains to examine the thorny issue of the blockage of roads in

some detail, particularly against the background of existing laws, because of its sensitive nature and the obvious danger it poses to peaceful co-existence between people of different religious persuasions. It is a notorious fact that in Nigeria, many laws, even penal laws, are honoured more in the breach than in the observance of them and this has in the past led to many unfortunate events such as the 7th September, 2001 Jos crisis. We think the time has come when, for the good of our society, our laws ought to be respected and enforced. It is our view that had the authorities acted swiftly and decisively when the residents of Congo-Russia cried out persistently against the blockage of roads for religious reasons, one of the major causes of religious antagonism between Christians and Muslims would have been eliminated at a very early stage. It was a distress call, which no one heeded.

Government View Government notes. 3.109 Indiscriminate use of loudspeakers in places of Worship

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3.110 Quite a number of witnesses when giving evidence confirmed that loudspeakers were used by both Moslems and Christians to alert or call on their followers to come out and fight during the crisis.

3.111 Exhibit 62 page 8 states thus:

“On the 7th September 2001 at various locations in Jos and Bukuru between 7.00pm to 1.30pm of 8th September 2001 there were repeated minaret calls from loudspeakers calling all Muslims to come out and fight the infidels as God has given them into their hands.”

Government View Government notes. 3.112 In Exhibit 166, mention is made that some of the calls on loudspeakers at Angwan

Rogo and Bauchi Road asked Muslims to fight and reclaim Jos and Bukuru. These calls were said to be made even during the curfew imposed on the 7th of September, 2001, which further worsened the crisis on Saturday the 8th of September, 2001.

Government View Government notes. 3.113 Majority of witnesses called for the ban on the use of loudspeakers in worship

houses as evident by CW175 in Exhibit 296 and Exhibit 168 page 26 para. 6, paragraph 9 page 9. Exhibit 559 stated that:

“At the meeting, the Deputy Governor briefed Committee on the on-going disagreement over the appointment of the NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North, the arbitrary use of loudspeakers by Religious organisations, the illegal construction of places of worship.”

Government View Government notes. 3.114 Moslems also mentioned that Christians used loudspeakers to invite their

followers to come out and fight non-Christians during the crisis. Paragraph of Exhibit 479 read thus:

“On Friday the 7th day of September, 2001 at about 3pm after Jumma’at prayer at a Mosque inside my Father’s Compound we suddenly saw an ash coloured 504 peugeot car

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been driven recklessly, and having the logo of COCIN church Angwa Rukuba marked on its body an information came through a loudspeaker in Hausa saying that “LOKACI YAYI KU FITO, KU FITO” which means, “it is time! You should come out! You should come out! Some few minutes later we then saw a group of Christian Youths with bows, arrows, matchets, cutlasses, bottles (which we later discovered to have contained petrol), sticks and other dangerous weapons.”

Government View Government notes. 3.115 The right to private life is violated when loudspeakers are indiscriminately

bombarded in odd hours; as it disturbs sleep. 3.116 The Commission realised from evidence that loudspeakers were used to further

escalate the riot during the crisis and that any time such loudspeakers were used, people were kept on the alert and this fomented more trouble. We also realised from evidence that external loudspeakers used in mosques or churches in residential areas created a lot of nuisance to the community and had the tendency of provocation. Government View: Government notes.

3.117 In the light of the foregoing, the Commission recommends the banning of external

loudspeakers in places of worship, in churches and mosques as well as in motor parks, residences and vehicles for the purposes of propagating any religion or religious beliefs. Government View: Government accepts.

3.118 Fulanis Trespassing on Farmlands in Plateau State. 3.119 One of the remote causes of the September and December 2001 Crises in Jos and

environs can be traced to a long standing animosity, mutual distrust and suspicion between the Fulanis and some Berom Communities in Jos South, Riyom, Barikin Ladi and Irigwe community in Bassa Local Government Areas over the issue of Fulanis grazing their cattle on farmlands of these communities. Evidence brought

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before the Commission showed that this situation has remained unresolved for a long period of time. Government View: Government notes.

3.120 Exhibit 173 submitted by Jol community traced the advent of this problem to

1945 when the Whiteman first came to Jol as a result of the discovery of a large deposit of tin in the area. According to C.W. 95 Mr. Bulus Audu Danke, who testified on behalf of the Jol Community, the Fulanis started coming to Jol in 1949 to sell milk to the Whiteman. He said:

“When the Fulanis discovered that Jol village has a very rich grazing field, they started requesting for portions of land from the natives to settle. Because by nature the Berom people are hospitable and accommodating, they gave portions of land to the Fulanis on loan.”

Government View: Government notes.

3.121 Testifying further, CW95 said that at first the Fulanis accepted the Beroms as their

landlords and paid tributes to them. However, trouble started brewing when the Fulanis “began to covet the land of the native and started stockpiling arms in order to forcibly take over the land. In the 1990s, the Fulanis stopped paying tributes to the land owners, who in reaction threatened the Fulanis with eviction.” Government View: Government notes.

3.122 This situation generated a lot of tension, which resulted in communal clashes

between the two groups. For example CW 95 said that on 15th February 1999, the Fulanis mobilized and set Jol Village on fire. Following the intervention of the Riyom Local Government Council in July 1999, a peace accord was brokered between the Fulanis and the Beroms. The Fulanis agreed to resume the payment of tributes and the Beroms withdrew their eviction threats. But the seed of discord had already been sown. It was just a matter of time. The time came when news of the September 7th crisis in Jos filtered into Jol on 10th September and the Fulanis saw it as an opportunity to realise their ambition of taking over the land of the natives and we quote CW95 once again:

“unknown to the Berom natives they mobilized themselves

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with assorted firearms and descended on the hapless natives and by the time they were through on 14th September they left only destruction, blood and death in their trail.”

CW95 brought to the Commission pictures and video tapes of the destruction of Jol Village by the Fulanis. They were marked Exhibit 174. Government View: Government notes.

3.123 In their own evidence contained in Exhibit 540, the Vwang Community of Jos

South Local Government Area, represented by CW322, Daniel Gyang Choji, expressed surprise and shock at the attack unleashed on their community by the Fulanis in September and December 2001 during which many of their people were killed, others wounded and properties destroyed. Rejecting the allegation by the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), that Vom people conspired to “wipe out” the Fulanis, the Vwang community stated:

“...before the crises, Berom land especially in Vwang, the Fulanis were welcome and given land free of charge to build and graze their cattle. Apart from frequent destruction of economic crops by their cattle, the relationship between the Fulanis and Berom has been cordial.”

3.124 They regretted that their receptive spirit was being repaid by “ingratitude, insult

and ridicule” and expressed the fear that the Fulanis may have a wider ambition to possibly displace the Berom and possess their land. Government View: Government notes.

3.125 Perhaps the animosity between the Fulanis and their host natives over grazing land

is more deeply seated among the Irigwe of Bassa LGA and their Fulani settlers. This is as contained in Exhibit 541. Testifying before the Commission on behalf of the Irigwe Elders, CW323 Mr. Josiah K. Rabo, said that long before the September 2001 crises there have been disagreements between the Irigwes and the Fulanis over farmlands. He traced these disagreements to the 1930s when the Fulanis were attracted to the richly endowed natural landscape of Irigwe land. The Fulanis came in their large numbers to settle and graze their livestock. As time went on, trouble crept in when the Fulanis failed to “comport themselves in accordance with the customs and traditions of their host communities” and started

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claiming that they had the right to graze their livestock unabated even on Irigwe farmlands. The Irigwes of course would not allow their crops to be destroyed by the Fulanis and “such disagreements became common place and in the course of time developed into physical assaults, rape and destructions with grave consequences.” Government View: Government notes.

3.126 Pages 3-6 of Exhibit 541 give vivid instances of alleged “willful” and “deliberate”

destructions to Irigwe farmlands by Fulani cattle between 1994 and 1999. Attempts to resolve this recurring conflict were made by the District Head of Miango and agreements were reached between the Irigwe Elders Forum and the leaders of the Fulani Community. Among such agreements was that:

“...routes through which cattle owners could pass with their livestock were carefully identified and Irigwe landowners, mostly farmers, donated portions of their land to serve as such routes. However, the Fulanis never honoured this arrangement but continued to drive their cattle right into farmlands with crops thereon thereby causing destruction of unimaginable magnitudes to the poor Irigwe farm owners.”

3.127 This situation persisted until there was a total breakdown of law and order with

devastating consequences to both Fulanis and Irigwes on 28th March 1999. A committee made up of representatives of both Irigwe and Fulanis was consequently set up by the District Head of Miango to critically examine the conflict. The report of this committee “held the Fulanis mostly responsible for a greater number of the problems in the area”. Government View: Government notes.

3.128 It would appear that the recommendations of this committee were never adhered

to and the conflict persisted up to September when crises broke out in Jos. The spirited efforts by the District Head of Miango succeeded in preventing the crisis from being “imported into Miango by the Fulanis.” But the tension was palpably there until the crises of Vwang in Jos South Local Government Area erupted on 30th December 2001 and “like wild fire spread into the Southern parts of Kwall District of Bassa Local Government Area the following day leaving in its trail a heart broken Irigwe inhabitants…”

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Government View: Government notes.

3.129 A detailed account of the alleged attacks inflicted on the Irigwes on 31st

December, 2001 by the Fulanis is given on pages 11-13 of Exhibit 541. This account indicted some unidentified “soldiers of Fulani origin” at the Rukuba Barracks who allegedly assisted the Fulanis in brutally beating some Irigwe leaders. Pictures of some victims as well as destruction to houses were tendered as annexures H-Z of Exhibit 541. Government View: Government notes.

3.130 The Rim Community of Riyom LGA also identified the long standing animosity

between the Beroms and Fulanis as one of the remote causes of the September crises. On page 2 paragraphs 1 and 3 of Exhibit 504 they stated thus:

“1. The Fulanis have settled in Rim for quite some time now. Some of them came and settled on our peoples farmlands without compensation or commission paid to the owners of the land. This has created animosity between the Beroms and the Fulanis. 2. The Fulanis who are predominantly herdsmen have on several occasions, left their herds to destroy crops belonging to the Beroms who are poor farmers.”

3.131 Like the Jol, Vwang, and Irigwe Communities, the people of Rim initiated several

attempts to address this problem without success. In 1996 the Community applied for the establishment of a Forest Reserve area and even though the Local Government approved this, “the Fulanis have not allowed the community to gain anything from this Reserve Area.” (See Exhibit 504). The situation thus remained unsolved and continued to create tension and mutual distrust between the Beroms and the Fulanis. Government View: Government notes.

3.132 It was against the backdrop of this that the crisis in Rim erupted giving an

opportunity for the tension to burst out as reported on page 4 of Exhibit 504:

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“Between 10th and 16th September 2001 about 20 people from Rim got several injuries from gunshots, daggers, knives, stones, sticks which the Fulanis inflicted on their bodies when they launched surprise attacks on them on their farmlands...”

3.133 The Fulanis gave omnibus evidence in Exhibit 81 under the umbrella of the

Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, Plateau State Branch with CW53 Alhaji Sale Bayeri, as their representative. Even though Exhibit 81 accepted that indeed there had been a long standing animosity, and mutual distrust between some Berom Communities in Jos South, B/Ladi, Riyom as well as Irigwes in Bassa Local government Areas, it did not pin down this hostility to the issue of Fulanis grazing their cattle on farm lands of these communities. The Exhibit stated that “the Berom have singled themselves more than any other Plateau tribe as the worst enemy of the Fulanis” but failed to give the reason or genesis of this enmity. Government View: Government notes.

3.134 Under cross examination C.W 53 did not react to an observation raised as follows:

“That during the September crises the Commonest area of friction between the Fulanis and the Beroms was the occasional destruction of economic crops by cattle.”

3.135 Witness accepted that because of the nature of the occupation of the Fulani man,

which requires him to move from one place to another pasturing his cattle, “he does not own a specific land. The Fulani man is everywhere and nowhere. He stated that:

“We are not disputing the ownership of these place…if we travel out, these people will displace us before we come back and we go to another place.…”

3.136 Because of the paucity of evidence from the Fulanis to counter the allegation that

they, the Fulanis, graze their cattle on farmlands of Beroms and Irigwes, thereby destroying their food crops, the Commission has no option but to accept that the allegation is indeed one of the remote causes of the September and December 2001 crises.

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3.137 We therefore recommend that Government in conjunction with communities should provide grazing area and permanent routes for cattle to enable the Fulanis feed their cattle without interference to farmlands thereby not causing damage to farm crops. This should not affect only the Beroms and Irigwes in Jos South, Riyom, B/Ladi and Bassa but other Local Government Areas in the State where there could be potential of similar animosity building up and bursting out into physical hostility in the future. Government View: Government accepts.

3.138 Alleged Discrimination against Moslem Hausa and Fulani. 3.139 This allegation was made mainly by the Moslems and Fulanis in their various

memoranda as well as their oral evidence before the Commission. According to their testimonies, they are discriminated against when it comes to appointments, admissions into Government institutions, awards of scholarships and programmes on PRTV. Government View: Government notes but reaffirms that it has never discriminated against anyone on the basis of religion or tribe.

3.140 On the remote causes of the September crises, the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI)

Plateau State in Exhibit 463 stated on page 4; “...the unfortunate bias activities of the PRTV against Muslims in the State. Prior to the crises, the PRTV had few Islamic programmes whereas the Christian programmes were too numerous to mention... thus gives the impression that the PRTVC is used to promote Christian interest only....” Equally of importance is the attitude of the State Government towards Muslims in matters of appointments into the State Public Service, Statutory Corporations, Parastatals. The Muslims are always relegated to the background, marginalised and treated as if they do not exist in the State....”

Government View: Government notes but refutes the allegation as false.

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3.141 In their own evidence given in Exhibit 247, the National Council of Muslim Youth Organisation of Nigeria agreed with the JNI and stated further at page 4 that:

“...the same is always on admission into schools such as Plateau State Polytechnic, School of Nursing, School of Health Technology, etc. Even the Federal Government owned institutions like the University of Jos....”

Government View: Government notes but refutes the allegation as false.

3.142 The Fityanul Islam, Jos Chapter categorically referred to the allegation against Muslim as “official backing of a particular religion against the other”. According to this organisation:

“...right from the beginning of the dispute, the attitude of people in Government have not helped matters. Government have openly taken side, conniving with dubious people to rob the Muslims...”

Government View Government notes but states that it does not discriminate against anyone on the basis of religion on tribe.

3.143 In the celebrated letter of the Jasawa Development Association addressed to the

Executive Governor dated 20th August, 2001 and tendered as “Exhibit H, the Association stated on page 6 that:

“The Jasawa Community is the most marginalised in Plateau State in particular... Our people have been contributing immensely to the social, economic and political development of Plateau State and Nigeria, yet when it comes to sharing the spoils of office we are brazenly and shamelessly discriminated upon...”

Government View: Government notes but is not aware of any such discrimination. Furthermore, Government is not aware of any community by the name Jasawa.

3.144 The Jasawa Development Association (JDA) maintained that the attempts to be

employed at the State and local levels have always been frustrated despite the fact that many of their members are qualified. Indeed the JDA considers the protest against the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtari as NAPEP Coordinator of Jos North Local Government as one of such denial and discrimination.

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3.145 The Jasawa Development Association declaration also echoed this alleged

discrimination on page 1 paragraph 6 said that they are: “...being marginalised, suppressed and “operaised” (sic) by successive administrations of Plateau State because we are Moslems.

And paragraph 17 stated: “...That within the Federal and Plateau State Civil Service, not a single senior office is held by Jasawa.”

3.146 Ibrahim Dasuki Salihu Nakande, CW 45, who tendered Exhibit 57 lamented that the alleged discrimination against Hausa and Fulani is one of the remote causes of the Jos crisis, citing two examples of Hausa and Fulani who were denied indigene certificates for admission to a Federal Government College and Federal Government job respectively. C.W. 45 stated:

“...Since the inception of Plateau State, none of us has ever been appointed a cabinet Commissioner; none of our university graduate has ever been employed in any Ministry or Parastatal of the State...”

3.147 On the other hand, the indigenous tribes of Jos North Local Government Area i.e

Afizere, Anaguta and Berom in particular disagreed that there is any discrimination against the Hausa and Fulani as alleged. To them, the Hausa Fulani are the ones depriving the indigenes of their own share of appointments and other rights and privileges. Government View: Government notes.

3.148 In their separate letters of complaint on the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtari as

NAPEP Coordinator by the three tribes they referred to previous appointments given to Hausa and Fulani on the quota of Jos North Local Government Area. In annexures `H’ and `J’ by the Jos North PYC and the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association respectively and tendered in Exhibit 534, the two groups expressed their dissatisfaction over what they referred to as:

“...the persistent appointment of non-indigenes into key positions at both state and federal levels under the Local Government quota. Some of the notable appointments include members transition implementation committees, Coordinator, Constitution Review Committee, Board members of Tertiary Institutions...”

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Government View: Government notes.

3.149 Both the Anaguta Development Association and the BECO Elders Solidarity

Forum in Exhibits E and F respectively referred to a meeting the indigenous tribes of Jos North held with the Governor of Plateau State during which they intimated the Government:

“...of the resentment caused by the continued appointments of the Hausa into positions representing the indigenous people of Jos North... We recounted almost seven of such appointments...”

Government View: Government notes.

3.150 In Exhibit 44 the JODICO Solidarity Front claimed that “political appointments

was another area of great concern”, because the Hausa Fulani have been using their Federal linkages to enjoy political appointments and employment to the detriment of the indigenes. Government View: Government notes.

3.151 Perhaps the views of the indigenous tribes of Jos North Local Government Area

were candidly expressed by a respected Berom Elder, Da Toma Jang Davou, CW 20 when asked during cross examination whether or not Hausa Fulani should not get any political appointments in Jos North Local Government. He said:

“...In fairness, the Hausa Fulani deserve appointments with the consent of the indigenous and not through the backdoor. If they want appointment they should first of all obey us. Group Captain Dan Suleiman proposed that they should relinquish indigenisation of their former States or LGA then come to Plateau State with a letter to show that they are not cheating any Local Government or any State or have for almost a century. So they deserve appointment, with the consent of the indigenes.”

Government View: Government notes.

3.152 During their oral evidence however this allegation of discrimination was

debunked by some of the Moslems themselves. For example, under cross

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examination Alhaji Sale Hassan C.W 243, said he contested and won election to Jos North Local Government Area in 1975 and was subsequently appointed Councillor for Health. C.W. 270 Alhaji Alhassan Shuaibu, who is the State Secretary of the JNI is a current member of the NNDC representing North Central Zone on Plateau State quota; the witness who testified on behalf of JIBWIS admitted that he has never been deprived of anything in Plateau State and that he attended Christian primary and secondary schools in Jos (see p.4 of the Commission sitting on 22nd January 2002;). Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande admitted that he retired from the Federal Civil Service as the Director General and Territorial General Manager of NITEL and was one time Secretary of Jos North Local Government Council. He said he was never discriminated against in his educational pursuit saying that he attended the Government owned Township School Jos and enjoyed Plateau State Scholarship for his tertiary education. Government View: Government notes and appreciates that it has been exonerated.

3.153 Debunking further this allegation of discrimination, the indigenous tribes tendered

Exhibit 14, which contains the list of Moslem Hausa Fulani appointed as members of various Plateau State Government owned Boards and Parastatals. They further referred to the traditional title of Turakin Jos given to an elder of the JDA, Alhaji Inuwa Ali. Government View: Government notes.

3.154 In response to the allegation of discrimination against the Muslims on the State

owned PRTV, the Corporation claimed in Exhibit 553 that “there is no iota of truth in this respect going by antecedents.

“They explained that the intra-conflict between the JIBWIS and the JNI affected the JIBWIS sponsored Muslim programme, stating further that the non-inclusion of the Muslim programme, thereafter was necessitated by the non-compliance for renewals which had to do with payment of money”.

3.155 In his oral evidence before the Commission, the PRTVC General Manager, Mr.

Joseph Ari, as CW 329 explained further that: “PRTVC has tried as much as possible to be very fair. We have not seen any station sanctioned as a result of

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dominance of one religion over the other but we have been very fair. If we get something from any religious body we try to be fair.”

Government View: Government notes.

3.156 Indeed, the allegation of discrimination is not a recent problem in Jos North.

Exhibit 183(a) tendered before the Commission was a letter written on 3rd April 1956 by the then Sarkin Jos, Rwang Pam. He was refuting the complaint made by the Hausas to the Senior District Officer that:

“…we the indigenes of this town are chasing away the Hausas from Native Authority jobs and replacing them with the native of Jos.”

Government View: Government notes.

3.157 After giving a long explanation on the circumstances that led to the complaint, the

Sarkin Jos ended thus: “...the Hausas are not being sidelined as they want to claim. Except for the lack of understanding some of them who want to lord it over the people of this land as it was when the people were not enlightened and there was no understanding among the various ethnic groups in the area. In the administration of Jos Native Authority, no tribe will be sidelined, we shall move together by God’s grace.”

Government View: Government notes.

3.158 History seems to be repeating itself here, for while the present generation of

Hausa and Fulani are complaining of discrimination, the indigenous tribes are refuting the claims. In fact this issue of claims and counter claims of marginalisation and discrimination is being made by almost every tribe or group in Nigeria. It has become a major cause of conflict among many ethnic groups in the country, and because it is intractably connected with the problem of indigenisation, the Federal Government has set up a committee on Peace and Conflict Resolution in some Central States to examine the issue as it affects Nigeria as a whole. The Commission advises that the Plateau State Government

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should await the decision of the Federal Government on the recommendation of the committee. Government View: Government notes.

3.159 Non-Implementation of the Fiberesima Commission’s Report of 1994 3.160 On 12th April, 1994 there were riots in Jos Metropolis resulting in the killing of

four people and the burning of part of the market at Gada Biyu and part of the Jos Main market. Also destroyed were school buildings, an office complex, a mosque, properties of Jos Metropolitan Development Board, NITEL Plc and properties belonging to private individuals such as houses and motor vehicles. Government View: Government notes.

3.161 The immediate cause of the 12th April, 1994 riot appears to be the appointment of one Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Hausaman and member of the Jasawa Development Association as the Chairman of the Care-taker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government Council. While the appointment was hailed and supported by his Kinsmen and the Jasawa Development Association, it was roundly rejected by the Afizere Anagutas and Berom and it was the demonstrations and counter demonstrations by the two opposing groups that degenerated into the riots.

3.162 The then Military Administrator of Plateau State, Lt. Col. Mohammed Mana set

up a seven-man Commission of Inquiry with the Hon. Justice J. Aribiton Fiberesima as Chairman to look into the riots with the following Terms of Reference:

1:1 To establish the remote and immediate causes of the riots in Jos metropolis on 12th April, 994.

1:2 To identify the individuals, groups of persons, and institutions directly or indirectly connected with the riots, and those behind the destruction.

1:3 To identify and assess the property destroyed, their owners, and those behind the destruction.

1:4 To apportion blames on persons or groups of persons and recommend appropriate action.

1:5 To recommend ways of avoiding future re-occurrence of such incident. 1:6 To make any other recommendations incidental to the foregoing terms of

reference.”

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Government View: Government notes.

3.163 The Commission which was inaugurated on 22nd April, 1994 invited memoranda

from members of the public and conducted public sittings after which it submitted a well considered Report to the Government incorporating its findings and recommendations. Although the said report was not tendered before us independently as an Exhibit, it was nevertheless placed before us in the form of an appendix or annexure to several memoranda. Exhibits 42, 148, 348 505 and 521 are some of such memoranda. Government View: Government notes.

3.164 For some reason which is not altogether clear to us or for no reason at all, the

Government neither issued a white paper on the report nor implemented any of the Commissions recommendations. The contention of the witnesses who gave evidence before us is that if the recommendations of the Fiberesima Commission had been implemented by Government, the crisis of September 2001 would have been averted. Government View: Government notes.

3.165 We have ourselves studied (the Report of the) Commission of Inquiry into the

riots of 12th April 1994 in Jos Metropolis and we are satisfied that the main issues that arose before that Commission are very similar to the issues that were canvassed before us. Just as the appointment of Aminu Mato, a Hausa Jasawa man to head Jos North Local Government Council led to the crisis of 1994 as a result of its rejection by the three tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom, so the appointment of Mukhtar Mohammed an Hausa/Jasawa man as Jos North NAPEP co-ordinator rejected by the same tribes, is one of the causes of the September, 2001 crisis. The negative role of the Jasawa Development Association and the conflicting claims of the ownership of Jos by the Hausa Fulani and the Afizere Anagutas and Berom which featured prominently before the 1994Commission as remote causes were again played out before us as remote causes of the September, 2001 crisis, not to mention the findings and recommendations regarding certain Jasawa elders of both Commissions based on similar evidence brought before them. The main points of distinction between the riots of 12thApril 1994 and the crisis of September, 2001 is in the glaring religious dimension in the September 2001 crisis which is less discernible in the April 1994 riots, and scale of killings and destruction which was by far greater in 2001 than in 1994. It is also fair to

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say that while the 1994 riots took place only in Jos Metropolis, the 2001 crisis spread beyond Jos to other part of Plateau State. There were, of course, other distinctions in less crucial areas. Government View: Government notes.

3.166 With the above in mind, we think there is merit in the argument that it is desirable

for the Reports of Commissions of Inquiry set up by Government to investigate major civil disturbances with similar terms of reference to the present ones to be faithfully implemented in order that potential mischief-makers may be deterred. No one can say with any degree of certainty that the implementation of the Report of a Commission of Inquiry will ipso facto end all civil disturbances, but it is a necessary measure that will demonstrate the resolve of Government to ensure justice for the innocent victims of such disturbances, deter mischief makers, rid the society of the existence and fear of “sacred cows” and thus engender a peaceful and stable polity. Government View: Government accepts and reaffirms the implementation of the reports.

3.167 While the present Government cannot be blamed for the non implementation of

the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 12th April, 1994 riots in Jos Metropolis submitted five years before it came into office, it is the Commission’s fervent hope that the recommendations of this 2001 Commission will be implemented.

Government View Government accepts and observes that the same fate of non implementation befell the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry of 2004. The present Government has however undertaken to implement both the 1994 and 2004 Reports.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4. PERSONS OR GROUP OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS 4.0 The Commission decided to examine under this chapter, three categories of

persons and or organizations: (i) These are persons alleged to have committed offences during the 7th

September, 2001 crisis. (ii) Persons and or organizations which committed some wrong. (iii) Persons and or organizations alleged to have committed some wrong but

were not found liable. Government View: Government notes.

4.1 Persons alleged to have committed offences:

The following persons were alleged to have committed different types of offences. Some of the persons appeared before the Commission and denied the allegations that they committed offences, some did not appear before the Commission. Since the Commission was not mandated to investigate the Commission of offences and the apportionment of criminality and possible sentence, it decided to give the names of the persons for possible police investigation and trial, if need be:

LIST OF SUSPECTS S/NO NAME OF SUSPECT ALLEGED

OFFENCE MEMO NO. & WITNESSES

1. 2. 3

Aliyu Mohammed, Biu Ibrahim Maikudi

Homicide 14/2001 (Ex.C”) Mrs. Resto Ogbonna (CW.2)

4. 5. 6. 7.

Alhaji Hassan, Alhaji Sani Mudi, Alhaji Usman Mohammed Muktar Alhaji Sale Hassan

Conspiracy, Illegally Stock Piling of Arms

38/2001 – (Ex.52) Emmanuel Jok Bettah (CW41)

8. 9. 10. 11 12. 13.

Salisu Jinjiri Yahaya Abdullahi, Abdullahi Salihu Abdullahi Amini Useini, Kabiru Ayuba

House Breaking, Theft and Arson

74/2001 (Ex.267) Stephen Gyang Dagwambwi

14. 15.

(A) Silas Dalyop (B) Yusufu Mashal

13/2001 – (Ex.340) Nasiru Usman Alhaji Bawa Abubakar (CW260)

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16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Martin Joshua Solomon Buji Emma Kupa William (Traffic Warder) Musa (Traffic Warder) Ajonah Ebenezer Okoro Jerry Dickson Markus

Homicide Arson Arson

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Mr. Elochukwu Mr. Emeka Mr. Femi Mr. Eugene Mr. Maduka Mr. Pius Mrs. Ada Mr. Lawal Mr. Godwin G. Mr. Jonah

Arson, Mischief Theft

112/2001 (Ex.89) Second-hand motor Dealers Association Jos Plateau State. Alh. Yahaya Kega. (CW58)

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

Bala Mai Kano Babangida Balan Goggo Saidu Zaki Murtala Dan Azumi

Homicide Arson Mischief

155/156/2001 (Ex.331) Jan Rin Gyang CW202.

43. 44.

Hajiya Galadima, Mr. Sani

Theft and House Breaking

161/2001 – (Ex.506 pastor Chidiadi Chidi (CW302)

45. 46. 47.

Mr. Da Bot Pwajok Mr. Bitrus leman Mr. Nyam Wang

Homicide Mischief

172/2001 (Ex ) Destroyed Dilimi village Alh. Mustapha M. Shettima (CW )

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

Saidu Maikerosine Alhaji Bala Samaila Ibrahim Abdullahi Maikerosine Sule Yusufu Abdullahi Ibrahim Maikano Alhaji Abubakar Tonga Kamalu Jamalu Waziri Bala Dangogo & his younger brother.

Arson Mischief

186/2001 (Ex.478) Da Samuel T. Dawap (CW280)

61 Abdullahi Rogo Homicide 208/2001 Ex.504 Rim Community Dev. Association Daniel Ajik (CW300_

62. Mr. Yohanna Dalyop 285/2001 (Ex.447) Hajiya maria

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63. 64.

Mr. Shaba Mr. Manji Dazel

Homicide

Zaidu (CW 262)

65. 66.

Dauda Ibrahim Salihu Ibrahim

House Breaking Theft

449/2001 Ex.474 Robert Kwap (CW 276).

67 Mallam Sale Bayari

Conspiracy Homicide

01/2002 Ex.540 Daniel Gyang Chayi (CW 322)

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

Kadarko Buba Kaduna isa Barji Sule Alhaji Ibrahim Alhaji Isa Bwoti Alhaji Wada Dutse Abdullahi Dutse DSP. Daniel Tarkumburu Hardo Jafaru Hardo Kadarko Buba Saidu Alhaji Abdullahi.

Conspiracy Homicde Mischief Rape

03/2002 Ex.541 Irigwe Elders Forum Josiah K.Rawo (CW323

78. 79. 80.

(i) Ali Alh. Samaila Dan Abu Abubakar Ladan

(ii) Mamuda Naituwa

Homicide Arson Mischief

29/2001 Ex.92 Central Youth Council Jenta Adamu Joseph Izang (CW44)

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

Alhaji Bala Adamu Yahaya Useni Likita Jibo Alhaji Dari Abubakar Saleh Alhasson Saleh Babiyo Tagiya Maikai Manga Ado manga Liti Dali Danshi Dali Sule Amidu Buba Saleh Adamu Amidu Buba Sule Ahmadu Damaba Bala Adamu Alhaji

Homicide Arson

85/2001 Ex.173 Jol Community Riyom L.G.A. Bulus Audu Danke (CW.95)

98. 99.

Dahiru Sule Turaki Inuwa Ali

Illegal Possession of Fire Arms

13/2001 Ex.Y. Daniel Gora CW16

100 Tijani Abdullahi Flauting Building & Planning Law & Regulations

Exhibits 37 & 39 from JMDB

101 Mr. Tempi Gwaram & Others Homicide 259/2001 Alh. Shehu Mamman (CW292) Ext.494.

Government View: Government notes and directs the Police to complete investigations.

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4.2 Persons and organizations that committed some wrongs 4.3 Alhaji M.D. Abubakar: The former Commissioner of Police 4.4 Of all the individuals, groups and organizations who were mentioned in the

various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less that fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the Commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others. The oral evidence of witnesses before the Commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent. The only dissenting voice is that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Dominic Yadubiya, the Area Commander who signed and presented Exhibit 79, the Memorandum of the office of the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command. While not condemning Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, Yadubiya did not praise him either. Government View: Government notes.

4.5 The criticism of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar’s role in the crisis stems from the fact that

apart from being a member of the State Security Council, he was at the helm of the Plateau State Police Command whose admitted primary and constitutional role is to provide security of life and property to the people of the State. He was accused variously of neglecting or even undermining this role with serious consequences for the government and the people. Government View: Government notes.

4.6 There is abundance of evidence that before the crisis erupted on 7th September,

2001 there was palpable tension in the air arising mainly from the controversial appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government Council. There were threats of violence expressed in the various correspondences written to the Government some of which were copied to him, the Commissioner of Police e. g Exhibit B, 70 and 71 among others. There were also the flyers containing threats to the life of Mukhtar pasted all around his office by unknown persons and the flyers being circulated in

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Jos allegedly written by the Hausa Fulani under 25 indicating that there would be violence if Mukhtar was not allowed to remain in office as NAPEP Co-ordinator. When Alhaji Abubakar testified before the Commission, he admitted knowledge of all these and agreed that he knew that some kind of violence was in the offing. He was examined by Mr. Okereafor and this is how it went:

M.U. Okereafor: “When you saw these leaftlets, you should have known there

was tension on ground” M.D. Abubakar: “Yes” Earlier on, it had gone like this: M.U. Okereafor: The summary of all these leaftlets is that there was going to

be a kind of violence involving lives” M.D. Abubakar: “Yes” M.U. Okereafor: “And you have told the Commission that the Police was

aware of these leaftlets” M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

He was cross-examined by Mr. G. S. Pwul, leading counsel to the Commission as follows:

G.S. Pwul: “With such leaflets, did you sense that an unusual

development was about to occur? Did the leaflets signal that an unusal development was about to happen?

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes” G.S. Pwul: “If you did identify them, the right thing to do was to arrest

them” M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

G.S. Pwul: “And that would have forestalled the problem of September” M.D. Abubakar: “Yes and it would give us an insight as to why such leaflets

were flying” Government View: Government notes.

4.7 While being led by his counsel, Mr. O. Uket in his evidence in chief, he said as

follows:

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M.D. Abubakar: “Before the crisis of 7th September, there were a lot of rumours and a lot of leaflets due to the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar as the Co-ordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government. As the Commissioner of Police and jointly with other Security agents, we conducted distress investigations about the happenings and we took certain security measures... We brought this to the notice of the government at the State Security Council meeting.”

O. Uket: “...what recommendations did you give the Government to stem the tension?”

M.D. Abubakar: “We became worried. I personally became very worried. I saw leaflets flying. There were leaflets reading “blood for blood” and others...”

Government View: Government notes.

4.8 Alhaji Abubakar also admitted that he was aware that tyres were burnt in front of

the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and also in front of the Gbong Gwom Palace which he agreed was unlawful. Government View: Government notes.

4.9 The major accusation against Alhaji Abubakar on this score is that with

knowledge of all these events, he never caused the matter to be investigated so that those found to be behind these obvious threats to peace could be apprehended. But in his defence he said that he could not have anyone arrested because he did not know whom they were as none of the leaflets was signed by anybody. He said that he instructed that a detachment of police be deployed to Jos North Local Government and detectives sent to look for information relating to the crisis that was brewing as a result of Mukhtar’s appointment. He also said that he brought the issue up at the State Security Council meeting where it was agreed that the Government should look into the matter by calling all the interested parties with a view to finding out what was on ground in order to solve the problem. Government View: Government notes.

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4.10 Very significantly too, CW 41, Emmanuel Jok Bettah testified in line with his memorandum. Exhibit 52, that meetings were held by Muslims at Laranto Motor Park, Angwan Rogo and Gangare where the opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar was discussed and it was decided to set Jos ablaze on Friday 31st August, 2001 and that no `arne’ (infidel) would escape. He said he personally attended the meeting at Laranto Motor Park in disguise on 25th August, 2001. Among the decisions taken according to CW41, was the arrangement to stockpile arms, guns and knives in the Central Mosque and the houses of certain individuals. According to CW41, the Chairman Jos North Local Government Council, Dr. Frank Tardy, the heads of Churches and Muslims who did not support the plan were to be the prime targets. He said he wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police which he personally delivered informing him of what he had seen and heard. A copy of his letter was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 53. He said he did not receive any reply to Exhibit 53 and added that the attack did not take place on 31st August, 2001 as planned because it rained on that day but that it happened on 7th September, 2001. Neither in his memorandum Exhibit 79, nor in his oral testimony did Alhaji Abubakar make any allusion to this vital evidence. It therefore stands uncontroverted and against him. Government View: Government notes.

4.11 The Plateau State Youth Council, for its part, held a press conference on 31st

August, 2001, the text of which was admitted as Exhibit S. Stating their opposition to Mukhtar’s appointment but at the same time blaming the Jasawa Development Association for any breach of the peace or breakdown of law and order that might occur in the State. Government View: Government notes.

4.12 The press conference ended with a call on the “security operatives” to arrest and

be made to face the law all the “agents of destabilization and their sponsors”. 4.13 The summary of the above scenario is that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar as

Commissioner of Police was fully aware of the volatile situation that existed at the time but did nothing about it until it exploded on 7th September, 2001. Far more serious, however, is the allegation that he not only failed to take action to avert the crisis, but took certain active steps to facilitate it, for which he was accused of bias and even complicity. It was suggested before us that being himself a Muslim,

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Alhaji Abubakar took sides with the Muslims and that using his position, he did certain things to aid the Muslims against the Christians in a crisis that had long been planned by the Muslims. Government View: Government notes.

4.14 Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75 is a letter dated 29th August, 2001 by which Alhaji

Abubakar, Commissioner of Police, Plateau State ordered the postings and transfers of thirty one Divisional Police Officers within Plateau State Command to different locations within the State “with immediate effect”. The letter was addressed to the Area Commander, Langtang, the Assistant Commissioner of Police `D’ Department (CID) Jos and All Divisional Police Officers of the Nigeria Police, Plateau State Command. The letter ended with the following instruction:

“2. Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September, 2001 unfailingly. Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”

4.15 When, during his oral testimony, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was asked why he made

those postings at the time he did bearing in mind that there was so much tension in the State, he said the postings were made because of the approaching retirement of three Divisional Police Officers, those of Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. In his words:

“It is true that there were postings at Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. This is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. We were not expecting crisis. These people were going on retirement and before you go on retirement, you take one month’s leave to get prepared for retirement. That is why the woman DPO in Barkin Ladi was changed. The man in Bukuru and the man in Nasarawa Gwong were changed. The situation brought changes and this was necessitated by their retirement period and I eased them out to put officers who are capable of taking care of these Divisions. That is why we made these transfers.”

Government View: Government notes.

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4.16 There is also Exhibit 472 which is a Radio Message dated 7th September 2001

from Alhaji Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police to the Divisional Police Officers of Angware, Bassa and Riyom withdrawing the ALGON vehicles allocated to them to the State Headquarters. No explanation was given as to why this was done. Government View: Government notes.

4.17 Several memoranda and several witnesses also accused Alhaji Abubakar of providing adequate security for mosques, especially the Central Mosque, Jos by posting policemen to be on guard while no Church was guarded or protected by the police, suggesting that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians. In answer to this charge, Alhaji Abubakar said that during the crisis, the Area Commander was instructed that all mosques and churches be guarded by policemen. Government View: Government notes.

4.18 Exhibit 79 is the memorandum submitted by the Office of the Commissioner of

Police. In the substance, it corroborates the evidence of Alhaji Abubakar, affirming that in the face of mounting tension in Jos North Local Government Council Area, he alerted the Plateau State Government about the situation and advised that a meeting of the State Security Council be held with all interest groups. When the meeting was held, he, Alhaji Abubakar, was not invited. Generally, in Exhibit 79 and in his oral testimony, Alhaji Abubakar denied the allegations made against him and explained the steps taken by him to contain the crisis between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. These included the deployment of conventional and Police Mobile Force men to the areas of conflict, the request for more men and arms from the Inspector General of Police and the request for the assistance of the Military for a joint operation with the Police. Government View: Government notes.

4.19 There can be no doubt that the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D.

Abubakar knew that something unusual involving violence was about to happen. That much was admitted by him and that was why he called for a meeting of the

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State Security Council. The hostile and war-like leaflets that were threatening bloodshed circulating all over the city of Jos, the forceful prevention of Mukhtar from occupying his office, the burning of tyres at the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and the Press Conference by the Plateau State Youth Council calling on the security agencies to arrest the agents of destabilization in our view, provided sufficient materials to make him take such measures as would nip the crisis in the bud or at least ensure that if it eventually erupted as it did, it could be effectively tackled and put down before much damage could be done. And if he was still unsure of what to do, C.W.41 had written to him, Exhibit 53, explaining how meetings were held by some Muslim groups where plans were made to attack some people and churches with arms that were to be distributed from certain locations. In the face of all these warning signals, we are, to say the least, very surprised that apart from calling for a meeting of the State Security Council to discuss the issue and his general statement that he deployed policemen to the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and detectives to look for information, he did nothing to avert the crisis. No serious investigation was carried out to fish out the belligerent groups and find out the extent of their plans, if any, and no arrests were made in spite of the fact that some of the dangerous leaflets were allegedly written by the “Hausa Fulani under 25”, a group which could, with some diligence be identified. His reason for not investigating or making any arrests was that no names were written on the leaflets and that the people behind them could not therefore be identified. Police have investigated such matters in the past. These events are so glaring and dramatic that we find it extremely difficult to excuse or justify Alhaji Abubakar’s handling of the situation. A diligent Commissioner of Police would not only have thoroughly investigated the matter before it happened, but would ensure that if the matter degenerated into the kind of bloodbath that eventually took place, his men were ready to contain it. He should have put them on red alert, but he never did. With his knowledge of the very volatile situation on ground, he ought to have made contingency arrangements with higher police authorities such that if widespread violence broke out he could receive immediate assistance by the deployment of more men and arms before the situation could get out of hand. Government View: Government notes.

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4.20 The evidence before the Commission is that because of the serious constraints under which the police operate throughout the country, when the crisis broke out on 7th September, 2001, the police were outnumbered and outgunned by the rioters and consequently, the police could not handle the situation, as confirmed by CW52, ACP Dominic Yadubiya. Alhaji Abubakar did request for reinforcements during the crisis and these came from Benue, Kaduna and Gombe Commands but it was too late. The damage had already been done. Had he placed his men on the alert and requested for rapid deployment from other commands in case of a breakdown of law and order, the police would have been more successful in managing the crisis and many lives and properties that were lost or destroyed could have been saved. The evidence before the Commission shows that it was the presence of the Military that brought the situation under control. The inability of the police to handle the situation resulted largely from the poor handling of the crisis by the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar at whose doorstep the blame must be laid. We are strengthened in this view by the evidence of CW330, the Secretary to the Plateau State Government. CW330 told the Commission that the Government was misled by the security reports given to it by the Police Command headed by its Commissioner, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The reports gave the Government the false impression that all was well and there was no cause for alarm. It was on the strength of these reports that the government assured the people that the situation was under control. The Secretary to the State Government in his testimony informed the Commission that it was known that an attack or demonstration was planned to take place on 31st August, 2001 and that there was an unusual movement of people contrary to the assurances given by the Commissioner of Police that the situation was under control. Even when the crisis broke out in Congo-Russia, the Commissioner of Police continued to assure government that the situation was under control until it became clear to everybody that it was not, and the President had to be contacted to allow the Military to intervene. CW330 described the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abubakar as “totally unreliable”. In fact even when Government informed him of the influx of visitors into Jos especially in Zangon Baki and Mista Ali areas and expressed its concern over it, Alhaji Abubakar did nothing. If Alhaji M.D. Abubakar had performed his duties well he would not have given the government that false sense of security that turned out to be fatal. In the light of this, the conclusion is inescapable that the former Commissioner of Police is

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guilty of, at best, gross negligence and at worst, sheer incompetence. This is on the passive side that is, on what he failed or omitted to do. Government View: Government notes.

4.21 On the active side, it was alleged that the crisis occurred as a result of a

premeditated and well planned attack on the Christian community by some Muslim groups with the active connivance of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, he being a Muslim. In support of this allegation, evidence was given of Alhaji Abubakar’s conduct in three areas, namely, the transfer of some Divisional Police Officers shortly before the crisis, his withdrawal of the ALGON vehicles on the day the crisis erupted i.e. 7th September, 2001 and the imbalance in the provision of police security to places of worship during the crisis. Government View: Government notes.

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4.22 Let us now examine each of these in turn. (i) The transfer of some Divisional Police Officers: Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75

is a letter dated 29th August, 2001, by which the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, ordered the immediate transfer of thirty one Divisional Police Officers mainly within Jos and its environs from one Division to another. While most of the transfers were within the Jos area, some of them involved officers in places as far away as Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Kanke, and Wase. The evidence was that Alhaji Abubakar had foreknowledge of the crisis and that the transfers were made at such a critical time with the aim of disabling the officers from being effective in handling the crisis when it came. He denied the evidence and said that the posting of police officers is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. He said, and as indicated above, the transfers were made in preparation for the retirement of the Divisional Police Officers of Barkin Ladi, Nassarawa Gwong and Bukuru. He had to make the transfers so that these Divisions could be manned by capable hands. He called the exercise “routine changes” but admitted that with the situation where crisis was brewing it was not a responsible act to make such changes. He however said that it was not done with any bad intention.

Government View: Government notes.

4.23 The Commission finds Alhaji Abubakar’s explanation for the transfer of thirty-

one Divisional Police officers because of the approaching retirement of three of them most unsatisfactory. In fact he could not really explain why he did it. The fact that it was done at a most inauspicious time lends credence to the fact that it was done with the ulterior motive of rendering the officers ineffective in their new places of posting. And if that is so, it must be because he knew of the planned attack by the Muslim groups and wanted to make it easy for them to succeed in their bid. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that the transfers were made on 29th August, 2001 with the firm instruction that “Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September 2001 unfailingly? And he added “Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.” Government View: Government notes.

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4.24 Assuming the officers got the notice of transfer the same day, i.e. 29th August 2001, they had less than five days within which to complete their movements and take over the new Divisions. The reason for this extreme urgency was not explained before us and we think the postings are far from being the innocent “route changes” he branded them to be, especially in the light of his admission under cross-examination that it takes time for a person to study the files he will take over in the new Station. Our view is that while Alhaji Abubakar’s postings of 29th August 2100, may not by themselves prove conclusively that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians, taken together with the other two factors, they provide strong circumstantial evidence of his partisanship. Government View: Government notes.

4.25 This is more so when one considers the evidence of CW330 that the State Security

Council was informed by intelligence reports that the Muslims were planning a march in Jos on 7th September, 2001. Alhaji Abubakar did not take us to the bottom of this issue of sudden transfer. Government View: Government notes.

4.26(ii) The withdrawal of ALGON Vehicles

It is a matter of common knowledge that all Local Government Council in the Country were provided with one vehicle each, (Toyota Jeep) to assist the police in its fight against crime. These vehicles are popularly referred to as ALGON vehicles. There is evidence that on 5th September, 2001, two days before the crisis erupted in Jos, the ALGON vehicles allocated to Angware, Bassa and Riyom Divisions were withdrawn through a wireless message, Exhibit 472, sent to these Divisions from the office of the Commissioner of Police for what is simply described as “special duty”. The vehicles were ordered to be released to the State Headquarters on Friday, 7th September, 2001, the day the civil disturbances erupted. Again there is no conclusive proof that it was done to facilitate the crisis. However, these areas are within the environs of Jos and no reason was given for their withdrawal. While we cannot speculate as to why they were withdrawn, we must say that the timing of the withdrawals was curious and they would definitely have the effect of crippling the operations of those Divisions in time of crisis. In the absence of any explanation coming from the Commissioner of Police, the Commission cannot say that the withdrawals for “special duty” which was

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unspecified were done in good faith or with a proper motive. We are more inclined to believe that the vehicles were withdrawn to satisfy the commissioner’s hidden agenda. Government View: Government notes.

4.27 The unbalanced protection given to places of Worship: One of the most serious

allegations against Alhaji M.D. Abubakar is that he took sides in the provision of protection to places of worship in a battle which he knew was fought along religious lines. It was very strongly alleged that during the crisis he gave police protection to the mosques in Jos, especially the Central Mosque, while he deliberately left the churches to the mercy of the rioters. This point is made in so many memoranda that it is impossible for the Commission to ignore it. While it will be tedious for us to reproduce all that was said before us on this very weighty matter, some examples taken from a few of the memoranda will suffice. Government View: Government notes.

4.28(i) Page 8, paragraph 2 of Exhibit 498 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“Curiously, the Police prior to the Friday prayers heavily guarded the Central Mosque in Jos, while no security was provided for the churches in Jos. Paradoxically, the mosques were not under any form of threat on Friday 7, September, given that attack was launched on unsuspecting Christians. Yet many churches within a range of 200 to 500 metres from the Central mosque in Jos were burnt either fully or partially on the afternoon of that Friday. The Police in Plateau State will be the only group to account for this unbalanced action, which speaks volumes about the nature of policing in Jos and the rest of Plateau State.”

4.29(ii) Page 12, paragraph 3 of Exhibit 334 (Memorandum No. 342/2001)

“While innocent lives were freely taken from armless people, the best the Commissioner of Police could do was to protect the Central Mosque and other mosques at different locations in the town. No police protection was sent to any church.”

4.30(ii) Page 17 paragraph 1 of Exhibit 44 (Memorandum No. 20/2001)

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“While all churches, Government establishments and other strategic premises were left helpless and at the mercy of the muslim hoodlums, the police were seen armed to the teeth strategically guarding the Jos Central Mosque.”

4.31(I) Page 8 paragraphs 2 and 3 of Exhibit 75 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“The Police Commissioner, M. D. Abubakar, who coincidentally hails from Zamfara had a field day, given the timely exit of the Chief Security Officer of the State, the Governor.... Most police were stationed to protect mosques, especially the Central and Dilimi Mosques.” Government View: Government notes.

4.32 Both Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 denied this allegation and it was strongly

denied in their memorandum, Exhibit 79. The evidence of Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 is that CW52 was instructed by Alhaji Abubakar and that he in turn instructed the various Divisional Police officers to provide police protection to all places of worship, both churches and mosques, within their respective areas. There is evidence before the Commission that Alhaji Abubakar’s normal places of worship on Fridays was the Mosque attached to the prisons near his office. Government View: Government notes.

4.33 However, on this particular day, 7th September 2001 he worshipped at the Central

Mosque. Alhaji Abubakar testified that he worshipped at the Central Mosque on 7th September, 2001 at the request of one of his friends who persuaded him that both of them should worship at the Central Mosque and not at the Prison Mosque. He said:

“On Friday, 7th September when I was about to go to the mosque, a colleague of mine from Interpol at the Police Staff College called me to go to the mosque. Usually, I have two places of worship, the Central Mosque and the Prison Mosque. If not for my friend, I would have gone to the Prison mosque. He called me to wait for him so that we could go to the mosque. He said he wanted to go to Kano after the Mosque. He convinced me to go to the Central Mosque. We prayed outside because we got there late. I never pray outside. Two minutes after the prayers, we left immediately.

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On the way back, my friend took off on Kano and I went back to my office.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.34 He said he took five policemen to the Central Mosque as his escorts but did not notice the presence of other policemen there during or after the prayers. From this story, certain pertinent questions come to mind. Government View: Government notes.

4.35(i) Since he never prays outside the mosque, what was so special about the Central

Mosque on that day that made him yield to his friend’s prompting to drive all the way to the Central Mosque at the risk of arriving late and praying outside when he could have conveniently prayed inside the prison mosque which is just across the road from his office? Could it be because he wanted to police the situation at the Central Mosque, knowing what was about to happen?

4.36(ii) Having instructed that Mosques be guarded on Fridays and churches on Sundays

as stated by him, why did he not take advantage of his presence at the Central Mosque to find out if his instruction was being implemented? Could this apparent lack of interest be because he knew what was about to happen, having made adequate arrangements for the protection of the Central Mosque? His behaviour in this regard is, to say the least, strange, if not abnormal. Government View: Government notes.

4.37 From the evidence before the Commission, there can be little doubt that the Jos

Central Mosque was well guarded on the day of the crisis. The only question is whether this protection was extended to the churches as well and if not, whether the omission was deliberate. Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 both admitted that churches which were in the vicinity of the Central Mosque, namely, COCIN Sarkin Mangu and Assemblies of God Church were burnt on 7th September 2001 while the Central Mosque was neither burnt nor damaged. Many houses and shops at Enugu Road very near or opposite the Central Mosque were also either set on fire or damaged. All these were viewed by the Commission during its visit to the locus in quo. C.W.52 and Alhaji Abubakar admitted that these churches were burnt down while the Central Mosque was left intact. They could not say why it was possible to burn all these structures while the Central Mosque

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remained untouched especially when it is known that some other mosques around the city were also burnt. It is obvious to the Commission that the Central Mosque was not burnt like the churches, shops and houses around it because it was heavily guarded by the police. Alhaji Abubakar said also that Fatima church was guarded by the police but he could not explain the burning of the church and its pastorium in spite of the protection allegedly provided by the police.

In considering this aspect of the matter, reference must be made to the case of Alhaji Dahiru Sule, CW319 who, when arrested with a double barrel gun on 8th September, 2001, said it was given to him by the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The investigating police officer, one CSP Momoh wrote an Interim Report, to the Commissioner of Police, Exhibit 80B, in which he recommended that the suspect be released on bail because he appeared not to have committed any offence. Alhaji Abubakar told the Commission that he refused to approve the Report and issued a query to the officer, Exhibit 354, for taking Alhaji Dahiru Sule to Court on a First Information Report alleging inciting disturbance only while others arrested in connection with the disturbances were charged with the more serious offences of conspiracy, rioting, mischief by fire and unlawful possession of firearms.

Similarly, Alhaji Abubakar also queried one ASP Patricia Osaje for visiting the Magistrate’s Court where Dahiru Sule’s case was mentioned when she had no part to play in the investigation of the case. Government View: Government notes.

4.38 When however, he was asked in cross examination whether he queried any of the

policemen who stood guarding the Central Mosque and watching while churches, shops and houses were being set ablaze he admitted that he did not. When further questioned on why he did not query the policemen for this more serious dereliction of duty he said at first that he could not do so because he left Plateau State immediately after the crisis. But when he was reminded that his transfer only came on 16th November, 2001, two months after the crisis, he said that he was too busy attending to other matters in his effort to restore peace and had no time to issue queries. How strange! Government View: Government notes.

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4.39 The Commission does not believe that he had any intention of querying the said

policemen who looked the other way when the churches were burning and this must be because they had firm instructions to guard only the Central Mosque. If that was not their instruction, they ought to have been queried because their conduct was more deserving of disciplinary measures than that of CSP Momoh and ASP Patricia Osaje.

4.40 On this score, it is clear to us that Alhaji Abubakar as Commissioner of Police ensured that the Central Mosque was adequately protected during the crisis but did not ensure that the churches, even those close to the Central Mosque, got the same or any protection at all. This is another evidence of his partisanship and the inference from this and the other facts considered in (i) and (ii) above is that Alhaji Abubakar did play an active role in the escalation of the crisis, pitching his tent, as it were, in the camp of the muslims. Government View: Government notes.

4.41 The Commission’s conclusion from proved facts therefore is that Alhaji M.D.

Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State is one of the persons who, by acts of commission and omission, contributed to the crisis and must be held responsible as such. For a man of his position into whose hands the safety of lives and properties of Nigerian citizens was entrusted to have displayed such unethical conduct in the performance of his duties is most unfortunate. Because much was given to him, much was also expected of him but in the Commission’s view, he did not justify the trust reposed in him. Government View: Government notes.

4.42 A Commissioner of Police of a State must bury his religious bias, leanings and

inclinations qua superior police officer when he is performing his official duties of policing the state. He must, on no account, show to the public that he is either a Christian or a Muslim. In a country like Nigeria where religious belief is played to the gallery with all sentiment, thus affecting the sociological orientation of the people, the police must be seen as non-partisan in the regime of religion at all times and for all times. Unfortunately for Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, this was not the situation. He clearly showed his bias for the religion of Islam and his hatred for the religion of Christianity and this bias blinded his eyes, thoughts and orientation in the crisis of September, 2001 which resulted in the numerous killings.

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Government View: Government notes.

4.43 In the light of the above, the Commission is of the view that Alhaji M. D.

Abubakar be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force. In the event of his refusal to take the advice, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar should be dismissed from the service. The matter should be referred to the Police Service Commission for the appropriate disciplinary action as recommended above. Government View: Government accepts.

4.44 Alhaji Inuwa Ali 4.44A Alhaji Inuwa Ali gave evidence as C.W.263. He is the Turakin Jos. By virtue of

being the Turakin Jos, he holds a leading position in the Muslim Community in Jos. He is a highly influential person and Muslims take his words seriously as words coming out from the mouth of a leader. He is also the Vice-President of JNI.

4.45 CW 16, Daniel Gora (JP) in his oral evidence against Alhaji Inuwa Ali said:

“Where I stay, precisely in Hwolshe: Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s house was a death trap during the crisis. His house is just behind NTA. There were gun shots coming from that house and almost everybody passing through that place was attacked. There were gun shots coming from Inuwa Ali’s house in Hwolshe... Since we could not go close, we were told that they evacuated the weapons and machines in that house and they also made sure that the said Ali went home”.

4.46 In his oral evidence, CW22, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar the former Commissioner of

Police, Plateau State said: “The guns and the licenses were not returned to Alhaji Inuwa Ali at the time I was occupying the office of Commissioner of Police, Plateau State. Alhaji Inuwa Ali denied sighning the letter written by Jasawa Development Association.”

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4.47 The Commissioner admitted in evidence that two guns were recovered from Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s house.

4.48 CW 150, Mr. Mayat A. Akim, said under examination-in-chief:

“Between 9th and 10th, I cannot tell specifically... so, I became inquisitive. I wanted to know where the house is. So, Alhaji Inuwa Ali was mentioned, a respected community leader resident in Jos along NTA, BEPCO. As a patriotic citizen, I first mentioned to the soldiers who were nearby that there was gun shots into the air from Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s house. Their response, I gathered was not too serious. Somebody said that it is not mandatory on the soldiers; that I should go straight to the Police and report. Straight I went to the Police Headquarters, reported the matter to some officers. I reported to the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abubakar.... The first question he asked me was, “what is your source of information?” I got so discouraged. I almost got angry. I said, Sir, I was even told about your bias. I did not want to come... They said I should lead them (Police) to the house which I did with my car on the understanding that they have no vehicle. I took them to the house, but I did not go in... after 15-20 minutes, they came out with a rifle... together with 50 rounds of ammunition. I saw it with my eyes.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.49 Alhaji Inuwa Ali said in examination-in-chief

“I saw a group of people around 50 of them coming to my residence through the reservoir and the hill and they were throwing petrol bombs from the top of the hill in the front of my house, even near to my gate. They threw about three times or so. My children told me what happened. I came out and saw them with bows and arrows and swords. I was afraid and shocked and I brought my rifle and shot on the air in order to scare them away. I shot about three or four times on the air.... At times when I am learning how to shoot, I go 30 miles in the bush

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along Bauchi Road and learn how to shoot in the air but still, I don’t know how to shoot.” Government View: Government notes.

4.50 It is clear from the evidence of Alhaji Inuwa Ali that he shot a gun. Whether he

shot the gun into the air to scare away his attackers, he agreed that he shot a gun. Here is a man who admitted that he does not know how to shoot a gun, shooting into the air, according to him to frighten people out of his sight and out of his vicinity. Government View: Government notes.

4.51 When cross-examined by leading counsel to the Commission, Mr. G.S Pwul, that

since he did not know how to shoot, it is possible for the gun shot into the air to miss its target and kill a human being; he answered: “The bullet will disappear in the air if it misses...” How does he know? Has he control over a gun he has shot into the air? What is his control mechanism? Although he denied the evidence that he killed somebody, he admitted that he shot the gun into the air. What of if the bullet strayed to a human being? Government View: Government notes.

4.52 Another evidence against him is that he used gun meant for sporting and hunting

in the bush in the town. This is a clear admission on his part. The question is why did he do that? In the Commission’s view, his conduct was clearly against the licence issued to him. Government View: Government notes.

4.53 Alhaji Inuwa Ali found himself in a big mess on the issue of renewal of licences.

Although he said under examination-in-chief that he renewed his licences regularly, this was not the position. In an effort to defend himself on the issue of renewal of licences, he found himself telling lies, a situation which is unbecoming of a holder of a traditional title of his standing and calibre. The Commission is satisfied that at the time he shot the gun, it was not covered by current renewal of the licence and that is an offence under Nigerian law. Government View:

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Government notes. 4.54 There is yet the issue of where and how Alhaji Inuwa Ali bought the gun. He said

in evidence that he bought the gun in Awka through his brother who was a Police officer there at the material time. He said that he bought the double barrel during the Biafran war for N100.00. For a man of his societal standing now to have bought a gun during the Biafran war for a give away price of N100.00 is worrisome. Whether he was not a holder of the traditional title of Turakin Jos at the material time is not relevant. The Commission looks at the totality of the conduct of Alhaji Inuwa Ali in terms of integrity and all that. Is it proper for Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s image to use the Police connections of his brother to buy a gun at the rate of N100.00, a gun recovered from the Biafran war? In his words:

“I bought it (the gun) in Awka, Anambra State. I bought it through my brother, Ali Jos who was a Police Officer in Awka.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.55 And so, he bought the “debris” of the Biafran war. The Commission sees Alhaji

Inuwa Ali as a parochial and eccentric leader for the protection of Muslims. His heart does not seem to have a place for any other religion or body. He champions the cause of Jasawa Development Association (JDA) to the detriment of the State Government. He signed Exhibit 377 a letter which said that the Association cannot guarantee peace. His interests start and stop on matters relating to Islam. Where then lies his role as Turakin Jos? Only to serve the interest of Muslims?. Government View: Government notes.

4.56 The Commission disbelieves his evidence of petrol bomb. Petrol is a mineral oil

which easily ignites fire. There was no evidence of fire in his residence. The Commission visited his residence and there was no sign of fire. The petrol bomb story was presented to the Commission to give credence to self defence. Government View: Government notes.

4.57 Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s loyalty to the State Government is minimal if not nil,

particularly in matters relating to religion. We doubt whether he is even loyal to the person who installed him, Turakin Jos.

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4.58 In view of the foregoing the Commission is of the opinion that Alhaji Inuwa Ali is

not a fit and proper person to hold the office of Turakin Jos. He should, accordingly be removed forthwith and replaced by another person who is Hausa by tribe and we repeat, for avoidance of doubt replaced by a person who is Hausa by tribe. Government View: Government accepts and refers the matter to the Jos Joint Traditional Council for consideration. He is also to face prosecution for illegal possession of fire arm.

4.59 Dr. Frank B. Tardy 4.60 Dr Frank B. Tardy, CW 226 the immediate past Executive Chairman of Jos North

Local Government Council Area stood at the centre of the crisis of the 7th September,2001 to 12thSeptember, 2001 that engulfed Jos and its environs. His actions and inactions in one way or the other contributed negatively or positively to the Jos crisis. The crisis started at Congo-Russia on the 7th Sept 2001, which is in Jos North L.G. C. within the jurisdiction of Dr. Frank Tardy’s government.

4.61 The Commission observed that one of the remote causes of the crisis was Dr.

Frank Tardy’s stoppage of the issuance of the indigene certificate to Hausa- Fulani elements and members of Jasawa organisation barely six days after he was sworn in as the Executive Chairman of Jos North L.G.C. In a letter dated 16th June, 1999, written by Darim B. Digus on behalf of the Chairman to the Gbong Gwom Jos, he said:

“I am directed to inform you that from now henceforth, applications for the Jos North Local Government indigene certificates must be duly endorsed by the Ward Head, Village Head and District Head before the Local Government processes such applications. In this respect, you are reminded that the Council recognises the following eleven (11) village areas only.”

The eleven village areas were named and strict compliance was demanded from the Village Heads. See Exhibit 184. With this letter, the foundation for animosity and confrontation between Hausa-Fulani cum Jasawa Development Association on one hand and Dr. Frank Tardy’s Government of Jos North LGC on the other hand was laid. Government View:

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Government notes. 4.62 Another issue that agitated the minds of Hausa-Fulani community against Dr.

Frank Tardy was the appointment of Muktar Usman as the Coordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government Area. The Hausa-Fulani community and Jasawa Development Association held it against Dr. Frank Tardy, that as Chairman of Jos North L.G.C he engineered his people against the appointment of Muktar Usman as NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North LGC, which Dr. Frank Tardy denied in cross-examination. He said:

“The said Muktar was not appointed by us. We have no reason to oppose his appointment. We only came to know of the appointment later and another letter directing us to give him an office. So, I personally took him round to see the offices, so that he will settle down. We took over an office that belonged to Deputy Director... we came to know about his appointment from the State Coordinator who informed us that Muktar had been appointed as the State Coordinator of Jos North. As I said I personally took him round to see the offices before he settled down. There is an office belonging to a Deputy Director which I told him to manage pending when the Council will have enough resources to furnish the office properly.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.63 The above statement notwithstanding, the Commission found as a matter of fact

that Dr. Tardy did not extend hand of fellowship to Muktar Usman. While it is agreed that the animosity of the Hausa-Fulani against Dr. Tardy was thoroughly misplaced and unfounded (as he was not in any way responsible for the appointment) the Commission expected him to give him an olive branch. Instead of doing just that, Dr. Tardy twisted or folded his arms against Muktar Usman. That was not expected from a person holding the position of Chairman of a Local Government in a situation such as the one before him. Government View: Government notes.

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4.64 One very serious thing the Commission found against Dr. Tardy was his refusal to obey the instruction of the State Government to revert to the status quo in respect of the problem of issuance of indigeneship certificate. Exhibit 66 conveyed the position of the State Government to Dr. Tardy, apparently to douse any possible ‘’fire’’ but he ignored the letter and did his own thing in his own way. That was most unfortunate. Government View: Government notes.

4.65 Dr. Tardy stated in evidence that before he became the Chairman of Jos North

Local Government, he was a community leader. The Commission came to the conclusion that Dr. Tardy saw his position of Chairman as an extension of his community leadership and continued to implement his pet ideas as if he was still a community leader. This is where he went wrong indeed. As Community leader, he was a sectional tribal and clandish leader. But as Chairman, he was the servant of all persons in the Local Government Council as he was bound to extend his stewardship to all persons, without discrimination. Government View: Government notes.

4.66 In the light of his parochial conduct, the Commission was inclined to suggesting that he be either impeached by the Local Government Council or recalled by his constituency in accordance with the provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Government View: Government notes.

4.67 Alhaji Sale Bayeri: 4.68 Alhaji Sale Bayeri gave evidence before the Commission as C.W.53. He is the

Chairman, National Ad-hoc Committee on the Jos crisis, set up by MACBAN. He is also the Plateau State Secretary of the Association. By this position, Alhaji Bayeri is no doubt a recognized leader of the Fulanis. It was in this capacity that he wrote and tendered in evidence Exhibit 81 on behalf of all the Fulanis in Plateau State. His leadership qualities and capabilities can only be inferred from the style of Exhibit 81 and his comportment during his oral testimony.

4.69 Alhaji Sale Bayeri likes writing. Not only that Exhibit 81 contains expressions

that are abusive, rude, threatening, inciting and very confrontational. He appears to give the impression that everybody else is wrong except himself and the

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Fulanis, he wrote: “...the whole issue is of religious, economic, ethnic and political suppression, hate, repression and vandialisation of a people for no cause other than the wicked whims and caprices of a people of shameful history and antecedents of moral bankruptcy in their entire history. We (Fulanis) as a civilised people cannot and will not allow ourselves to be ruled without rules. We want these rules now. Or else...”

4.70 In a letter he authored and addressed to the Executive Chairman of B/Ladi LGC

dated 20th April 2000 tendered as annexture 1A of Exhibit 81 on the issue of indigeneship certificates, Sale Bayari accused the Chairman of “crude display of ill feeling and animosity towards the Fulanis”, abusing him further that by issuing Residential Certificates to the Fulanis, the Chairman has:

“...betrayed your indiscriminatory, tribal agenda against the Fulanis. It also exposes your vague, very poor understanding of the laws...”

Government View: Government notes.

4.71 As far back as 1995, Sale Bayari wrote to the Chairman of MACBAN of B/Ladi LGA on 12th May, 1995 on the issue of indigene certificate and the increase of cattle tax by the LGC (refer to annexure 1B of Exhibit 81), he said:

“...please mobilize your Ardos other members of the association to ensure that nobody pays that amount now...”

Government View: Government notes.

4.72 When Alhaji Bayari was asked under cross-examination whether or not this

language is confrontational and inciting, he answered that “this letter is the mildest of all letters”!

4.73 He has given the Fulanis the erroneous impression that their Ardos are equivalent

to District Heads, admitting in his oral evidence that Government has a policy of pursuing anti-Fulani agenda in the State. He affirmed what he wrote on page 18 paragraph 23 of Exhibit 81:

“...there is no doubt that these clandestine, surreptitious, secret and diabolical ethnic cleansing agenda

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of the people of Plateau State against the Fulanis through Government machinery... the government was the conduit pipe for the delivery of these heinous agenda...”

4.74 Under cross examination, CW 53 rejected a suggestion that he is an ethnic and

tribal chauvinist describing himself rather as a tribal champion. It is however the view of the Commission that Alhaji Sale Bayari is very parochial in championing the cause of the Fulanis. He plays on their intelligence and deceives them about their relationship with others especially their host natives. Indeed the animosity, the mutual suspicion and distrust between the Fulanis and the Beroms and Irigwes can be said to be caused by his confrontational leadership style. He is misleading the Fulanis. Government View: Government notes.

4.75 The Commission is surprised that the Government of Plateau State has appointed

this same person as Special Assistant to the Executive Governor on Fulani Affairs. His antecedents as the State Secretary of MACBAN do not qualify him for such a position. We consider him incapable of being an impartial liaison between the Government and the Fulanis. He could be a security risk. The Commission saw in this man so much hostility and animosity, a person who is not prepared to listen to another person’s views. a person who thinks his views, are the best and final. Alhaji Bayeri is a self-centred and self seeking human being. He is a human being which decent society should avoid for good.

4.76 We strongly recommend that Alhaji Sale Bayeri be advised to withdraw his

services as a Special Assistant to the Governor, failing which he should be removed. Government View: Government accepts as Alh. Sale Bayeri is not fit and proper to hold public office.

4.77 Alhaji Dahiru Sule 4.78 Alhaji Dahiru Sule gave evidence as CW 319. He was picked up by some

Government officials along Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Jos, carrying a gun. He was taken to PRTV where he met the Deputy Governor. From there he was taken to the police headquarters where he was detained with all others who were arrested during the Jos September 2001 crisis.

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4.79 Alhaji Dahiru Sule was taken to the magistrate court and later granted bail. Two issues featured prominently in Alhaji Dahiru’s case, namely his licence and the nature of the gun he was caught with and the way and manner he was granted bail. Alhaji Sule admitted that he did not know how to handle firearms nor did he know the rules of handling firearms. The police who gave him licence should receive the blame. Government View: Government notes.

4.80 Another disturbing aspect is the way the witness procured bail. There were many

accused persons who were denied bail and therefore were put in police custody; but not this witness. He had the golden wings to fly away to freedom. It came to the notice of the Commission that the police was instrumental to the haste in which the witness was granted bail. He had a red carpet treatment. Government View: Government notes.

4.81 The Commission recommends that the licence given to the witness, an illiterate,

be revoked forthwith. The Commission also recommends that the police should, as a matter of utmost urgency, escalate the investigation of the offences alleged against Alhaji Dahiru Sule with a view to prosecuting him. Others are prosecuted and he should be prosecuted if he is found to have committed any offence. What is good for the goose is also good for the gander, adage says. Government View: Government accepts.

4.82 The Magistrate that granted Alhaji Dahiru Sule bail. 4.83 The Chief Magistrate that granted Alhaji Dahiru Sule bail came to the open when

ASP Patricia Osaji gave evidence at the Commission. 4.84 It is in evidence that Mrs Fibi Longhwom granted Alhaji Dahiru Sule bail when

the tension in the city of Jos was still very high. The evidence of ASP Patricia Osaji on the issue did not throw any light. The Commission did not invite the Chief Magistrate to give evidence, apparently because of her judicial immunity. But the Commission feels that she should be given an opportunity to explain before the appropriate body the circumstances that led her to grant Alhaji Dahiru Sule bail.

4.85 It is our recommendation that the matter be referred to the Plateau State Judicial

Service Commission for such explanation and appropriate action, if need be.

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Government View: Government accepts.

4.86 Jasawa Development Association (J.D.A) 4.87 Jasawa Development Association with the acronym (JDA) as the name implies is

an Association. It was formed in 1987. It is not a tribe or a community as is arrogantly referred to in certain quarters.

4.88 Exhibit 400, which is the Constitution of the Association, in section 3 provides for

the Aims and Objectives of the Association as follows: “a. To foster unity and harmony among the entire members of the Association

and other citizens of this country, Nigeria. b. To protect the legitimate interest of the members of the Association by

promoting their intellectual, moral, socio-economic and cultural being. c. To promote the comprehensive development of our home town Jos through

self-help and community development projects. d. To enhance the progress and advancement of education in our home town

Jos in particular and Nigeria in general. e. To serve as a link between our people on the one hand, the various

authorities and the government on the other hand over matters of mutual interest.

f. To encourage and sustain good sense of discipline, dedication and loyalty to our dear country, Nigeria”.

Government View: Government notes.

4.89 Exhibit 400 provides for two types of membership. Ordinary and Honourary life

membership. While section 5(1)(a) throws open the membership to an individual either of whose parents were born in Jos, section 5 (1)(b) restricts such individual membership to Hausa/Fulani descent i.e, Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Kanuri and their likes. Honourary life membership may be conferred on any deserving individual who has made useful contributions for the positive realisation of the ideals of the Association, as may be recommended from time to time by the EXCO, approved by the Parliament and ratified by the Congress. Government View: Government notes.

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4.90 Section 5 (1)(b) provides for Hausa/Fulani descent. The expression Hausa/Fulani is a double barrel coinage of relatively recent history, a nomenclature aimed essentially at achieving political, economic and religious ambition and relevance. Hausa is a tribe. Fulani is a tribe. The expression Hausa/Fulani in our view, does not have any historical, cultural and even ancestral meaning or relevance. There is no tribe in Nigeria called Hausa/Fulani and the expression has no background in the culture and sociology of the two distinct Nigerian tribes. Government View: Government notes.

4.91 Quite a large number of the memoranda submitted alleged that Jasawa is one of

the causes of instability in Jos. They contended that since Jasawa was established as an Association in 1987, peace in Jos has always been threatened. Some of the memoranda called for the proscription of the Association for peace to return to the city and the State as a whole. Government View: Government notes.

4.92 In Exhibit 377, a letter dated 23rd August, 2001 written to the Governor of the

State, the Association said: “Sir, as peace-loving citizens, we took a number of steps to prevent the possible breakdown of law and order. However, if such undesirable acts are not timely checked and the culprits brought to book, the peace, unity and tranquility of this area cannot be guaranteed. As Chief Security Officer of the State, you may be aware of these evil machinations which, if not checked, are capable of reversing the significant strides achieved under the guidance of your re-engineering philosophy”.

4.93 Exhibit 377 which was signed by eight persons, including CW 263, Alhaji Inuwa

Ali, in our humble view threatened peace in Jos. How else can we interpret the letter which clearly stated that the peace in Jos cannot be guaranteed if the undesirable acts were not checked by the Governor. The alternative of not guaranteeing peace is crisis and that befell the State, particularly in Jos on 7th September, 2001. Government View: Government notes.

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4.94 We do not have the slightest doubt in our minds that the Association was one of

the bodies responsible for the September 7th, 2001 crisis. They added materially to the crisis as a body and that is not acceptable. We also believe that since the formation or establishment of the Association in 1987, it has used most of its time for confrontation. It is one single body which is clearly designed to propagate and protect Islam as a religion. There is nothing wrong for a body to propagate and protect a particular religion but there is everything wrong for that body to disturb and destroy the peace and tranquility of a town or State. We clearly see negative ambitions of Jasawa Association in respect of the disturbance and destruction of peace in Jos in particular and the state in general. Government View: Government notes.

4.95 The activities of the Jasawa Development Association were examined by the Hon.

Justice J.A. Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry of 1994 Report. The Commission said at page 26 of the Report:

“It appears to us from evidence received that for many years Jos had been and is subject to pressures and forces of ethnicity which work against its development, governability and stability. A problem of policing Jos metropolis may be attributed to the rise of Jasawa Development Association, which seems to attract recognizance by force, harassment and intimidation, and conduct which has logically eroded the legitimacy of its operation, thereby creating problem of policing. Hear what witnesses say... We further recommend to government to put under the microscope, the activities of Jasawa Development Association, and all other potentially dangerous tribal, religious or social organizations”.

4.96 We entirely agree with the above finding of the Justice J.A. Fiberesima

Commission of Inquiry because the activities of the Association have continued to harass and intimidate law abiding citizens resident in Jos. The Association, in our view, has abandoned most of its laudable aims and objectives to fight against peace and tranquility of Jos in particular and Plateau State in general. This is bad, very bad indeed. It is unacceptable.

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Government View: Government notes.

4.97 In view of the fact that the Association has moved away from its laudable aims

and objectives in its Constitution and has embarked on activities which not only threaten peace but attack and destroy peace in Jos in particular and Plateau State in general, it is our view that the activities of the Association be suspended for a period of two years beginning from the date Government announces a White Paper on the Commission’s Report for the peace, order and good governance of the State. In the event of the Association involving itself in violence or threatened violence and precipitates crisis of any form or dimension during the period of suspension, the Association should be proscribed forthwith. The State House of Assembly should be contacted to pass the necessary legislative instrument or order to legalise the suspension. Government View: Government accepts and prescribes the Jasawa Development Association forthwith.

4.98 Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) Plateau State 4.99 The Jama’atu Nasril Islam is a religious organization which serves as an umbrella

for Muslims and Islamic organizations in Plateau State. It has branches in all the seventeen Local Government Council as well as affiliate Muslim organizations like the Jama’atil Izalatul Bidi’ah Waikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS). As a religious organization, the JNI takes care of and protects the interest of Muslims in the State.

4.100 With reference to appendix ‘O’ of Exhibit 553, it is evident that the JNI is

recognized by the Government and its views are respected on matters relating to Islam and Muslim generally. Because of this recognition, Government has always involved their leaders in various Government activities and programmes. For example, the General Secretary to the JNI in the State who testified before the Commission as C.W.270 informed the Commission under cross examination that he is a member of the Inter-Religious Committee. He was also a member of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee along with CW243, Alhaji Sale Hassan, and C.W 263 Alhaji Inuwa Ali, set up to assist the Government to pacify the aggrieved and warring groups and communities and spreading messages of peace, tolerance and reconciliation.

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Government View: Government notes.

4.101 Despite government recognition of JNI and the involvement of their respected

leaders in the concerted effort to bring peace in the State it was disturbing and demoralizing that the Jos North Local Government Area branch of JNI went to press and published a very incisive, confrontational and peace threatening article in the weekly Trust Newspaper of October 5-11th 2001 titled REPLY TO THE GOVERNOR DARIYE’S DIATRIBES AGAINST MUSLIMS. This article which was a reaction to the Governor’s public address to the entire people of Plateau State on the Jos Crisis, accused the Governor and the State Government of openly taking sides with the Christians against the Muslims. Government View: Government notes.

4.102 Using very foul language, the Jos North Local Government Area branch of the

JNI described each of the measures announced by the Governor to address some of the issues which contributed to the crisis as a ploy “in furtherance of Christian agenda” and therefore anti-Moslem. They went ahead to call on “all Muslims appointed to serve on the lopsided committees to discontinue their membership of such committees forthwith.” For ease of reference the entire article is hereby produced:-

“JAMA’ATUL NASRIL ISLAM, JOS NORTH L.G.A. BRANCH REPLY TO THE GOVERNOR DARIYE’S DIATRIBES AGAINST MUSLIM”

Introduction: 1:1 Since the September 7, 2001 violent and orchestrate attacks on Muslims not only

in Jos, the Plateau State capital but also throughout the State and the consequent steps being taken by the Plateau State Government to tackle the problem, it is becoming clearer that Muslims have been singled our for total annihilation. The most glaring step which further proves that both state machinery and the non-Muslim caucus have made up their minds to do away with Plateau Muslims in the most recent speech by Governor Joshua Chibi Dariye. The Governor’s address to the people of the State of Tuesday 25th September, 2001, leaves no one in doubt that the reign of terror unleashed on Muslims, their religion, personality, wealth and psyche throughout the State, in fact is officially sanctioned by the Plateau State Government. In other words, Plateau State

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Governor has taken sides, and declared war on Muslims. Even though Governor Dariye pretends in the speech, that the steps he ordered affected both Christians and Muslims and that they were taken in good faith, an objective examination of the order belie the Governor’s pretensions, and demonstrate clearly that a Christian agenda is being implemented to suppress Muslims.

1:2 Right from the beginning, the composition of the Committee arising from the

conflict had been made in such an unjust manner as to loose the confidence of the entire Muslims. In addition, the distribution of relief materials that have been given to the Plateau State Government from various Federal and State Governments and NGOs is being done so in favour of Christians. In spite of all the havoc and extent of damages unleashed on the Muslims, the state relief committee has done little to assuage our pains. This is a further confirmation of the State Government’s favouritisms for Christians. The World should know. In fact, we observed with keen interest how the governor’s pretentious peace Mission to the Local Government Areas where Muslims were massacred in Kanke, Pankshin, Mangu, Heipang and Barkin Ladi, completely avoided Kanam and Wase where the multitudes of the Muslims that were ransacked from these areas are currently taking refuge. No wonder therefore the latest steps only confirm the fears of the Muslims. Even before now, statements made by top Plateau State Government functionaries attest to the subjective position of the Government. The mouth peace of the State Government and Information Commissioner, Chief Amos Azi, never loses any opportunity to show where he belongs. Even before he was appointed to be the Chairman of the lopsided Information and Community Relations Committee, he has been making allusions to opposing those he said were abusing the hospitality of the indigenes. In his statements to Secretary to the State Government Mr. Ezekiel Gomos, showed clearly his inclinations in an N.T.A. Jos Special Edition of Guest of the Moment in which he dwelled on the causes of the crisis. He said actually it was the State Government that ordered the closure to Mukhtari’s office. Similarly the Deputy Governor, Chief Michael Botmang, would not even acknowledge the presence of Hausa-Fulani Muslims among the existing ethnic groups in Jos, in the same programme. A critical examination of each of the measures announced by Governor Dariye in the infamous address shows certain indisputable facts. Firstly, it links all the toppest level officials of the Government to the atrocities committed against the

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Muslims. Secondly, Muslims were clearly the targets and intended victims of the State Policy. Finally, there will be neither justice nor fairness to the Muslims in the hands of the Plateau State Government and its agents. Any dispassionate observer could easily tell the real intentions of both the violence against Muslims and the measures being taken against them.

MAJOR HIGHLIGHTS OF DARIYE’S BROADCAST AND IMPLICATIONS (1) Ban on blocking major streets leading to places of worship and restricting worship

to officially designated places of worship i.e. Churches and Mosques. This banning order is without any iota of doubt given to satisfy a long standing Christian grudge against Muslims. The grudge is actually based on petty jealousy and intolerance of the increase in Muslim population in the State. This is evident from the communique issued at the end of COCIN third session meeting for the year 2001 signed by Rev. Alexander Lar President carried in Punch of Monday August 13, 2001, Vol.17 No.18,180: “The Church also frowned at the blocking of major roads on Fridays in Jos which it said is a predominantly Christian area…”

(2) This erroneous impression that Jos is a predominantly Christian area is based on wishful thinking and the unfortunate official policy of marginalizing Muslim being executed by the State Governor. Anyone who claims majority for Christians in terms of population is only deceiving himself as there is no official census figure to establish that claim. Besides, everyone knows that all over the world not only in Jos or Nigeria for that matter, by nature no Mosque can contain the multitude of worshipers during the Friday Prayer. Therefore even if the access roads to the mosque are not restricted no one could cut through the worshipers. In addition; where such access roads are restricted there is always an alternative route and the minimal inconvenience is only for a few minutes. The hue and cry over the matter is nothing but tolerance and enviousness. The banning order just seeks to satisfy the Christian agenda, who have not been satisfied with their own needles and longer period of blocking major roads.

(3) Banning the use of loudspeakers for worship purposes in houses designated as residential areas. This is another intentional measure whose target is aimed at hurting and further frustrate Muslims in furtherance of the Christian agenda. The order seems to be senselessly issued a blind opposition to Muslims with no clear objective but restricting the Muslims right and freedom of worship.

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Banning until further notice, “using loudspeakers at motor parks, public areas markets and streets. This is another Christian agenda against Muslims that is also targeted at Muslims for if there is no ulterior motive, one cannot see any relationship between the targeted action and the conflict in question.

(4) The decision to restrict only one Mosques and one church at the Jos Main Market, under the pretext

“it is a center of commerce and shall remain so is another Christian machination that seeks not only to interfere in the fundamental human rights of Muslims as citizens but also an insult to their intelligence.

Even an enemy of Islam knows the irreducible minimum requirement on Muslims to perform the five obligatory prayers daily wherever they are. Therefore the need for Mosques wherever Muslims are present is not a matter of luxury. Neither can it ever be the subject of legislation by any Government no matter how it hates Islam. In comparison to the “nature of true Christian worship, there cannot be said to be any need whatsoever for any church in the market at any time since a good Christian observing Sabbath on Sunday could never be in the market doing any business. The churches that were invented in any marker or motor park were done as a result of blind imitation by Christian of Muslims. Even at the Jos Main Market and the Bauchi Road Motor Park, where emergency churches were established to blindly compete with mosques they have never been effectively operated because there is absolutely no need for them. So who is really being fooled?

(5) The order to relocate the ‘Yan Awaki’ market under the pretext of decongesting the city is another attempt to hurt Muslims in an economic activity they clearly dominate. There is absolutely no relationship between the presence of ‘Yan Awaki and any traffic congestion in Jos. Neither is there any health hazard. Since, however, it is one area that Muslims successfully defended themselves against the crusading marauders, the power of State instrument is being used to dislodge Muslim’s control of the area.

(6) We are watching with keen interest to see how the J.M.D.B. would map out the illegal worship centers being talked about.

(7) The talk about arraigning two hundred people before the courts, most of whom are Muslims even before the Commission of Inquiry takes off, further shows that the

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Plateau State Government has already prosecuted and sentenced the Muslims as guilty. If really there is no hidden agenda against Muslims, why should anyone be prosecuted before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry is even instituted? Why is it that only Muslims who were in the first place the subjects of attack and rose to defend themselves be the ones being prosecuted? How can anyone in his right sense execute all these atrocities and claim to want peace?

Our Position From the foregoing, the Muslims have no option but to declare their total loss of faith in the Plateau State Government. We therefore call on all the Muslims appointed into any of the State Government lopsided committees to discontinue their membership of such committees forthwith. We also reiterate our stand not to have anything to do with any measure that has been taken by the State Government so far, and in future. We rather call for an Independent Judicial Commission of Inquiry with a Supreme Court Judge as head, to investigate the matter fairly and justly. Conclusion: All the enumerated purported bans and so-called prohibitions by the State Governor in his executive attempt to protect the interest of his Christian colleagues by directing the Christians agenda, amounted to a direct constitutional violation of the Muslim’s fundamental human rights of freedom of religion, conscience, thought, movement, speech and association. Since the prohibitions are unconstitutional, they are to be declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever and shall consequently stand rejected. Another implicative dimension of these unconstitutional prohibitions is that the Governor is engaging in a kind of war with the Federal Government, having engaged in an act of constitutional violation erroneously believing that Plateau State deserves its own laws as if it exists out of the present existing Federal Structure. The act is also capable of giving room to the Federal Government to declare a State of emergency since the Governor has by his public broadcast given impressions to the Muslims and every listener that the crisis is still on course with clear state government’s support for the Christians.” (Sgd) (i) Alh. Abubakar Hamman,

JNI – Jos Branch Plateau State.

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(ii) Alh. Adamu Musa JIBWIS – founded by Sheikh Ismail Ibn Zakaria, Plateau State Branch.

(iii) Fityanul Islam,

Jos Plateau State, Alh. Ibrahim Mu’d Kakaye.

(iv) Munazzanoh – Fityanul islam,

Jos Plateau State Alh. Inuwa Tanko Waziri.

(v) Islamic Forum of Nigeria, Jos Branch Plateau State.

Alh. Babangida Saadu. (vi) JIBWIS – Plateau State Branch,

Alh. Iliyasu Umar Wushishi. (vii) Rahotil Islam – Wat Hajj, Plateau State Branch,

Alh. Lawal Na-Adamu. Government View: Government notes.

4.103 Written and published at a time when tension and fear were still very high in the

State, when the Government and well meaning people were making concerted efforts to calm frayed nerves and facilitate the early return of peace and normalcy, one cannot but say that the article was written in very bad faith. It was direct confrontation and the height of insult to constituted authority in the State and should therefore be condemned in the strongest terms by peace loving citizens. It is close to treason. Government View: Government notes.

4.104 Under cross examination, the Secretary General of the State JNI “disagreed with

the stand or position taken” by the Jos North Local Government Area JNI saying that “the tune in which it was written was very bad.” When pressed further to tell the Commission what the State JNI did to reprimand the Jos North Local Government Area JNI, the Secretary General was evasive in his answers. He said that the State JNI was not comfortable with the publication and drew the attention of the Jos North Local Government Area chapter to it. He further informed the Commission that even though the State chapter was equally “not comfortable with the measures announced by the Government”, their own approach would have

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been different, stating that: “JNI is law-abiding. We want to cooperate with Government. Our members are law-abiding citizens, JNI is ready to abide by any Government decision taken on blockage of roads during Friday worship”.

Government View: Government notes.

4.105 It would however appear that the JNI Secretary General tacitly agrees with the

“substance” of the Jos North Local Government Area article even if “the tune was very bad”. In justifying that, the Jos North Local Government Area JNI may have written the article “under provocation”, he opined that:

“...when Government makes a policy, people are bound to react, it is not everybody’s reaction that will be palatable to the Government”.

It is the view of the witness that the Plateau State Government should not feel insulted or castigated by the Jos North Local Government Area JNI article. Government View: Government notes.

4.106 Even though “... presumably JNI is an umbrella organisation” for Muslims and

Muslim organisations in the State, it does not appear to have control over the activities of its Local Government Area branches and affiliates. This is why, for example, the JNI was not aware that for many years there were persistent complaints and problems between the Congo-Russia Community and the JIBWIS over blockage of road at the Alhaji Tijani Mosque. This is also why JIBWIS and JNI engaged in claims and counter-claims over who should coordinate and vet Islamic programme on PRTVC. More relevantly, this is why the Jos North Local Government JNI could publish a rude and wicked article against the State Government without any consultation with the State JNI when the latter “had dialogue with government to tell them where the Muslims were not comfortable” with the measures announced by the government. The State JNI could not also convince the Jos North Local Government Area JNI to retract the article because according to the Secretary General, “in situations like this, a few people will still stand by their decision.” Government View: Government notes.

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4.107 The Commission considers the infamous Jos North Local Government Area JNI articles as the diatribes not just against the Government but also against peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Plateau State and therefore should not be allowed to “stand by their decision.” It is hereby recommended that the activities of the Jos North Local Government Area JNI should be suspended for two years after which the State Government should very closely, monitor its activities. If after these measures the Jos North Local Government Area JNI does not show signs of tolerance, accommodation and peaceful disposition, it should be proscribed. Government View: Government accepts and refers the matter to the State and National Chapters of the JNI as well as to the NIREC.

4.108 Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO) 4.109 One organisation whose involvement in the crisis cannot be overlooked is BECO.

This is an acronym for Berom Education and Cultural Organisation, representing the general interests of the Berom ethnic group. Several Berom groups such as the BECO Elders Solidarity Forum and the Berom Elders Council appear to be off shoots or branches of BECO.

4.110 The Berom as an ethnic group are one of the three tribes that claim the ownership

of Jos, the other two being the Anaguta and the Afizere. In the events leading up to the September 2001 crisis following the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North Local Government Council, the different bodies representing these ethnic groups were the pressure groups that took it upon themselves to fight the cause of the indigenous tribes in seeking his removal from office. As the mouth pieces of their respective communities, they were prolific in their condemnation of the appointment and even more so in demanding his removal and replacement with one of their kinsmen. Of particular note in this connection is the letter dated 30th July, 2001written by BECO Elders Solidarity Forum, Jos North Local Government Area, to the Executive Governor, Plateau State. The letter, which the authors claimed to have been written “on behalf of the entire Berom of Jos North Local Government, “is captioned: “COMPLAINT AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF ALHAJI MUKTAR MOHAMMED AS POVERTY ERADICATION CO-ORDINATOR FOR JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA”, and was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 70. Part of the letter reads:

“Recall that the indigenous tribes of Jos North,

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namely, Anaguta, Berom and Afizere had cause to intimate you of the resentment caused by the continued appointment of the Hausa into positions representing the indigenous people of Jos North. During one of our visits, we recounted almost seven of such appointments and cautioned against the continued marginalisation of our people. However, while we awaited Government to repair the damage by appointment indigenes of Jos North into future positions, we were shocked to hear yet another Hausa as the Co-ordinator of the poverty eradication programme for Jos North. Your Excellency, Sir, to us, this is an insult and an attempt to deliberately cause unrest among our people. Our people are now sure that your action is deliberately titlted towards making Jos a “no man’s land”, which will be resisted with the last drop of our blood. We did it to Usman Dan Fodio, Ahmadu Bello, etc., as such your own attempt like those before you will be resisted.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.111 The letter (Exhibit 70) ends with some equally violent resolutions, which we

quote verbatim hereunder: “1. That the Government should withdraw without

delay, the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar and replace him with an indigene as is the case with the other sixteen (16) Local Government Councils in the State.

2. That an unreserved apology be tendered to the indigenous people of Jos North for this deliberate sell out.

3. That any attempt by the Chairman of Jos North to provide accommodation to Alhaji Mukhtar shall be resisted as we did to his brother, Alhaji Mato in 1994. Note that the 2001 resistance will be more sophisticated than that of 1994.

4. That we will consider this our last communication to government on subjects of this nature as our capacity to calm our people has totally eroded to the point that we are regarded as

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collaborators. 5. That our desire to live in peace with settlers

and neighbours should not be seen as weakness because we also have the capacity to be violent and make Jos as uncomfortable as possible for settler elements.

6. We shall remain loyal citizens as long as our right and traditional inheritance are protected. But any attempt to take what belongs to us shall be met with the stiffest resistence that is better imagined.

7. We have been pushed to the wall.” Government View Government notes. 4.112 The Commission’s view is that Exhibit 70 addressed to the Governor is patently

rude and confrontational. Its language is unequivocally violent, bellicose and belligerent. If ever there was any letter that was inciting and peace threatening, it is Exhibit 70. We have no doubt in our minds that Exhibit 70 contributed immensely to the escalation of the tension that culminated in the September, 2001 crisis. As such, it must be condemned in the strongest possible terms and we so do. An organization that threatens the peace without any qualms must be told in clear terms that such conduct is unacceptable.

4.113 Accordingly, the Commission recommends to the Government that the activities

of BECO Elders Solidarity Forum, Jos North Local Government Area, be suspended for a period of two years and if during that period the body engages in any act that is inimical to the peace of the area, it should be proscribed. Government View:

Government accepts and the matter referred to the National BECO. 4.114 Plateau State Youth Council (PYC) 4.115 On 31st August 2001, the Plateau State Youth Council called a Press Conference

to “express our concern on the alarming threats to the security of our State in general and Jos North in particular.” The PYC made references to some publications which were in circulation in Jos at that time and which they termed as “incitive and provocative”, alleging that the publication were authored by JDA, an organization they called “illegal”. According to them, no security measures were taken against the writers of the publications. The Youth body threatened:

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“…We will no longer fold our arms to repeated threats to peace and security of our beloved state by hooligans who can hardly trace their root.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.116 Before the Press Conference, the Jos North branch of the PYC had written a letter

to the Executive Governor of Plateau State protesting the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as NAPEP Cordinator for Jos North Local Government Area. They called for the “immediate withdrawal” of the appointment and replacement with an indigene of Jos North Local Government Area, warning that “our peaceful nature should not be taken for granted.”

4.117 Some witnesses who testified before the Commission alleged that the PYC Press

Conference was provocative and contributed in heightening the tension which was already palpable in the air and which eventually burst into the September crises. In exhibit 36, the Yoruba community stated:

“…this press statement and some publications, we believe did not help matters. They should be prevented for future remedy.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.118 In Exhibit 466 written and tendered by the Community of Indigenous Muslims in

Plateau State, they advised that the activities of the leadership of the PYC should be critically looked into because:

“…instead of being a vanguard to catalysed (sic)the heightened tension by way of consultation and counseling it went into the media to release inflammatory statements to incite the people against each other.”

Government View: Government notes.

4.119 Exhibit 175 tendered on behalf of JIBWIS accused the PYC especially the Jos

North Local government Area Chapter of allegedly sponsoring or publishing and

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circulating “this maliciously forged document in many churches throughout the state with the sole aim of causing disaffection, disenchantment, tension....” Government View: Government notes.

4.120 However, the JODICO Solidarity Front did not consider the content of the PYC

Press Conference as contributory to the crisis but rather as a reaction to the: “incisive and provocative statements by the so called Jasawa groups… to alert the security of the impending threat to peace in Jos…”

JODICO regretted that this action by the PYC fell on “deaf ears” as nothing was done by the security operatives about the “peace threatening publications”. Government View: Government notes.

4.121 Testifying before the Commission, the PYC State Chairman, CW298, Mr. Yakubu

Itse, defended the action of the Council saying that since the formation of the PYC in 1964 it has never done anything to change the course of peace in the State. He described the members of the Council as “responsible citizens they were reacting to information from the public and wanted to inform the security agencies to take immediate action over the said dangerous publications going round town and not ignite breakdown of law and order.”

4.122 The PYC Press Conference may have been done in ‘good faith’, they may have

genuinely intended to alert the security operatives about alleged threats to peace. However, the language of the text of the Press Release may not have achieved this intention. In the first place, many people who were not aware of the “incisive and provocative publications” got to know about these from the Press Conference, thus heightening fear and anxiety in peoples minds. The use of certain words and expressions were less than peaceful e.g. referring to the JDA as an “illegal organization” and “agents of destablisation”. The sentence:

“We will no long fold our arms to repeated threats to peace and security of our beloved state by hooligans who can hardly trace their root”.

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is not only threatening but also abusive and inciting. Moreover, while the PYC alleged that the Hausa Youth were the authors of some of the “provocative bills, they were silent about the authorship of some abusive flyers to which the Hausa Youth were alleged to have published rejoinders. Government View: Government notes.

4.123 As a recognized youth organization the PYC no doubt exerts a lot of influence over the actions of youths in the State either positively or negatively. Evidence before the Commission showed that most of the physical violence, and destructions were exhibited, perpetrated and carried out by the youth. The activities of the PYC should be geared more towards creating good relationship that will cut across the boundary of religions and tribes. The Commission recommends that the PYC should be severely reprimanded to desist from the use of provocative and inciting language. Their activities should be very closely monitored by the Government. Government View: Government notes

4.124 Alh. Mukhar Usman Mohammed: 4.125 Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed is the young man whose appointment as

NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North Local Government Council heightened the latent ethnic tension that had been plaguing the socio-political life of the people of Jos North Local Government Area since the formation of the Jasawa Development Association (JDA) around 1987. By his own admission, he is a member of the JDA and has been in the limelight for a fairly long time. At one time he served as the Education Secretary for the Local Government and in 1996 he contested and won the chairmanship election but his election was nullified by the Election Tribunals on the ground that he was not qualified to contest the election by reason of his age.

Government View Government notes 4.126 There is no doubt that Mukhtar’s appointment as NAPEP Coordinator for Jos

North Local Government Council is one of the major causes of the 7th September, 2001 civil disturbances for reasons that have already been explained. According to his oral testimony as CW320 and his written Response to the allegations leveled against him (Exhibit 534), his appointment came about as a result of his

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membership of an Association known as Obasanjo/Atiku Success Movement formed for the general purpose of helping President Obasanjo and Vice President Abubakar Atiku to succeed in their task of governing Nigeria. It therefore came to him by way of political patronage direct from the Federal Authorities, as NAPEP itself is a Federal Government Programme. There is no dispute that Mukhtar’s appointment as NAPEP Coordinator is a Federal appointment. Government View: Government notes.

4.127 It is also clear from Mukhtar’s evidence that from the time he was appointed, he

did his best to perform the duties assigned to him but he was unable to do so because he did not get the required support from the Local Government Council. This, coupled with the hostile posture of the indigenes of the Local Government Area namely Afizere, Anaguta, Berom and others, made it impossible for him to perform. In compliance with his letter of appointment, he reported to the Chairman of Jos North Local Government Council on 27th July, 2001 and was allocated office accommodation about seven days later. But then protests and threats started coming in, culminating in the smearing of human faeces all over his office. In spite of this, there is evidence before the Commission that Mukhtar did his best to meticulously comply with the terms of his appointment but his efforts were frustrated at every point even by the Local Government Council Chairman Dr. Frank Tardy whose duty it was to ensure the success of the Programme by co-operating with the Co-ordinator. For instance, on the same 27th July, 2001, Mukhtar wrote to the Chairman informing him of the proposed inauguration of the Local Government Monitoring Committee which he had constituted in accordance with his letter of appointment. His letter is attached to his response as Annexure N. There was no response to Annexure ‘N’ until after he had again written to the Chairman on 22nd August, 2001 by Annexure ‘R’ to his response, reporting how his office was broken into, his properties tolen and his life threatened. The Chairman’s reply, Annexure ZF to the Relsponse, is dated 31st August, 2001 and is titled “IRREGULARITIES IN THE DISCHARGBE OF YOUR DUTIES”, the substance of which is that Mukhtar had no power to constitute the Local Government Monitoring Committee and that he should stop the distribution of NAPEP forms. Meanwhile, faced with threats of assassination, Mukhtar had written to the Commissioner of Police on 13th August, 2001 requesting for a thorough investigation into the matter (Annexure Q to the Response). On 22nd

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August, 2001, Mukhtar had again written to the Chairman to complain about the unwholesome developments that followed his appointment and in particular about the Chairman’s instruction on 20th August, 2001 that his office should be locked up in his own interest. He also appealed to the Chairman to “investigate and fish out the perpetrators of this ungodly act and bring them to book...” (See Annexure R. to the Response). There appears to have been no response to Annexure R but by Annexure R2, the Chairman wrote to the Governor of Plateau State on 24th August, 2001 narrating the trend of events since the appointment was made, stating amongst other things, that:

“In the meantime, the Coordinator of NAPEP was advised to keep off the office allocated to him pending further investigation...”

Government View: Government notes.

4.128 In the light of the evidence given on both sides regarding the appointment of

Mukhtar as NAPEP coordinator the Commission finds as established the following facts: (i) Mukhtar’s appointment was a Federal appointment given to him for his

loyalty to the cause of the Obasanjo – Atiku Success Movement without any input from Jos North Local Government or the Plateau State Government.

(ii) The protests against the appointment were based purely on ethnic considerations because according to the protesters, Mukhtar is not an indigene of Jos North Local Government Council.

(iii) Having accepted the appointment, Mukhtar did his best to perform his duties and to reach out to the Local Government Council but he failed because he was operating in a very hostile environment and without the support of the Chairman of the Council.

(iv) The efforts of the Plateau State Government to resolve the matter were still on when the crisis broke out and the problem still remains unresolved (see the evidence of CW330, the Secretary to the State Government).

Government View: Government notes.

4.129 The Commission has no hesitation whatsoever in coming to the conclusion that in

accepting the appointment Mukhtar has done nothing wrong. The evidence shows, prima facie, that he was ready and willing to serve diligently as NAPEP

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Coordinator. We cannot accept the suggestion made in several memoranda that he was one of the persons responsible for the crisis. He was a victim of circumstances for it was his appointment, and not him, that caused the crisis.

Government View: Government notes. 4.130 Reference must however be made at this point to the evidence of CW41 that on

24th or 25th August, 2001, he saw Mukhtar addressing some Muslims at Laranto Motor Park where it was decided that Jos would be set ablaze on 31st August, 2001. This allegation is very serious and if it is true then Mukhtar must be held as one of the perpetrators of the crisis. Mukhtar denied the allegation. The Commission is hesitant to accept this fact as established, firstly because, with the threats to his life raging as a result of his appointment it seems to us most likely that he will conduct himself in such a manner in a public place as open as a Motor Park. Secondly, we would have been more willing to accept the story if it was corroborated by some other oral or documentary evidence but it was not. For these reasons we find it safer to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline from acting on this piece of evidence. Having said this, we must now give our impression on him as an individual as shown by the evidence given before us. Government View: Government notes.

4.131 Mukhtar testified before the Commission as CW320 and presented his written

Response to the allegations made against him, which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 534. Apart from the issue of his appointment as Coordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government Area, Exhibit 534, and his oral testimony covered other areas such as his quest for education and his claim to being an indigene of Jos North Local Government Area.

4.132 When Mukhtar appeared before the Commission, he impressed us as a very

intelligent youngman and this bears eloquent testimony to the very impressive educational and public service credentials displayed in his Response, Exhibit 534. However, the Commission found it strange that when he was asked the name of his tribe he answered:

“We are regarded as Hausa.”

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It was only after he was questioned on the place of origin of his great grand father and his father that he finally admitted that he is Kanuri by tribe. It turned out that the reason for his evading the question in the first place was that he was anxious to impress it upon the Commission that he is an indigene of Jos North Local Government Area knowing that the Kanuris come from Borno State and not Jos. Government View: Government notes.

4.133 Mukhtar also testified that when in 1984 his father could no longer afford to pay

his fees for his undergraduate studies at the University of Maiduguri, he applied to the Plateau State Government for a Scholarship. According to him, the scholarship was not given to him because he was considered not to be an indigene of the State. Because of his failure to obtain a Plateau State Government Scholarship, he applied for and obtained a Borno State scholarship. He said it was his uncle, Saleh Hassan, who testified before the Commission as CW243, that introduced him to one Alhaji Lawal Bukar from Konduga Local Government Area, the Registrar of the University of Maiduguri to assist him to obtain the scholarship. It is pertinent and the Commission noted it, that when he was asked by his counsel why he applied for a Borno State Scholarship when he considered himself as an indigene of Plateau State, he replied:

“The issue of my education for me is necessary It was a choice for me to either remain perpetually illiterate or an education person.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.134 He then admitted that on his Registration Form for Degree Programme, Exhibit 2,

he had indicated that his Local Government of origin was Konduga Local Government in Borno State. He was confronted with the same question in cross-examination and his answer was not different. It went thus:

M. U. Mohammed: “Since I was denied in my own State of origin, it was logical for me to look for scholarship elsewhere. I was introduced to Lawal Bukar.”

B.G.L. Choji: “What is your philosophy in life? The end justifies the mans?”

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M.U. Mohammed: “When it comes to education, one should strive to be educated.”

B.G.L. Choji: “As far as education is concerned, the end justifies the means, so you lied. In 1984, you fought for scholarship in Plateau State and you were denied.”

M.U. Mohammed: “Yes” Government View: Government notes. 4.135 He was also referred to Exhibit I, the application form he filled in 1989 for

admission to post graduate studies at the University of Jos, and again he admitted that for that purpose, he had claimed Konduga Local Government in Borno State as his Local Government of origin.

Government View: Government notes. 4.136 Lastly, contrary to his evidence that he was 42 years old when he testified before

the Commission (meaning that he was born in 1960) his date of birth given by him in Exhibits 2 and 1 in 1987 and 1989 respectively was 10th June, 1964 making his age 38 years when he testified. When confronted with these discrepancies, he said the date of birth given in Exhibits 1 and 2 were mistakes made by him and for which he took full responsibility.

Government View: Government notes. 4.137 Having admitted that his great grand father, his grand father and his father were

all Kanuri by tribe from Borno State, it follows that Mukhtar is a Kanuri. His initial attempt to impress the Commission as a Hausa man was made in a bid to emphasise his consistent claim to the indigeneship of Jos North Local Government Area, a concept or practice which we have said, is not supported by any existing law. Our laws however recognise tribal or ethnic groupings, the claim to which is always patrilineal. His hesitation in the first instance to admit that he was Kanuri shows that he had something to hide regarding his tribal origin. That was why he was equivocal when he said, “We are regarded as Hausas.” Belonging to a tribe is a clear cultural matter depicting a social group made up of people of the same race, belief, custom and language and not one of choice. It is therefore flabergasting for Mukhtar to say that he is regarded as Hausa. A person cannot be regarded as belonging to a tribe. A person belongs to a tribe as a matter

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of birth right. When therefore he went to Borno State to obtain his scholarship he knew that that was where he belonged as a Kanuri man. His claim to being a Hausa man and therefore an indigene of Jos North Local Government, which is legally a non-issue, must therefore be regarded as insincere or, at best, half-hearted. On the other hand, if it is based on a genuine conviction, then his Machiavellian ways portray him as a person who cannot be trusted. His thirst for knowledge and education is commendable but to resort to falsehood to acquire them is bad, very bad indeed.

Government View: Government notes. 4.138 On the question of his age, there can be no doubt that he lied concerning his date

of birth. His evidence before the Commission that he was born in 1960 was given on oath. If that evidence was untrue, he would have committed the offence of perjury. But if it is the date of birth given by him in Exhibits 1 and 2 (10/7/64) that is untrue then again he has lost is credibility. The Commission may give him the benefit of the doubt and accept his corrected date of birth as 1960. This means that the date stated in Exhibits 1 and 2 is wrong. He said it was a mistake. The Commission does not believe this. He was an educated and enlightened youngman of about 27 years old when he made the first “mistake” in 1987 and then in 1989, at 29 years old and with the benefit of even higher education, he made the second identical “mistake.” The Commission does not accept this theory of mistakes.

We have no doubt that he did it on both occasions intentionally, for a purpose that is not clear to us. Whatever that purpose is, the act depicts him as a person who is not trust worthy and would readily conceal the truth when it is convenient for him to do so. In our view, such a person is not the best candidate for the job of NAPEP Coordinator for any Local Government. It is therefore the view of the Commission that Alhaji Mukhtar U. Mohammed be not appointed Chairman of NAPEP, Jos North Local Government.

Government View: Government notes. 4.139 ASP Patricia Osaji 4.140 ASP Patricia Osaji CW 254A got herself involved in the Jos 7th September, 2001

crisis when it was alleged that she went to the court to solicit bail for Alhaji

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Dahiru Sule. In her evidence before the Commission, she tried to exonerate herself from the allegation. She is supposed to be a very experienced Police officer, going by the number of years she has spent in the Police Force - an experience extending to over 30 years mostly spent in Plateau State Police Command, Jos, where she served last as the Administrative Officer, State CID Jos.

Government View: Government notes. 4.141 By the time CW 254A came to give evidence before the Commissions he was

already transferred out of Jos and was with the Nigeria Police Force, Benue State Command, Makurdi. One would have therefore expected a dispassionate account of what happened during the Jos crisis from her. This unfortunately was not to be.

4.142 The witness gave conflicting and contradictory evidence as to the circumstances

she found herself as the Magistrate’s court on that day when Alhaji Dahiru Sule was arraigned before the court. This resulted in query issued to her by the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar. She did not impress the Commission as a truthful witness. She had so much to hide and so the Commission was unable to get to the bottom of the circumstances and the reason why CW 254A went to see the Magistrate on that eventful day; eventful in the sense that Alhaji Dahiru Sule was arraigned before the Magistrate that the witness went to see. The visit could not have been a coincidence even from her own evidence. It is sad that she, CW 254A got herself involved in a matter that did not in anyway concern her officially.

4.143 The Commission found the conduct of this witness most unbecoming of that of a

superior police officer. Government View: Government notes. 4.144 Concerned Youths 4.145 In Exhibit 175 mention is made of the CONCERNED YOUTHS as persons or

groups involved during the crises of September 7, 2001. The concerned youths who were authors of Exhibit 65 were not traced as a recognised body.

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4.146 It appears the group was transient organisation that came to lime light only during the crises. The Commission observed the militancy and the aggressive language in their writeup, especially the writing captioned: ENOUGH IS ENOUGH in Exhibit 65. Such a group in the Commission’s opinion should not be recognised by Government if they apply for registration.

Government View: Government notes. 4.147 The Nigeria Police 4.148 The general consensus among all the witnesses and as highlighted in the numerous

memoranda which dealt with the role of the Nigeria Police before and during the crisis is that the performance of the police was far below expectation. Almost every memorandum castigated the police or its former Commissioner for failing to avert the crisis even though they were in a position to do so, in view of the warning signals that were so clear, and for failing to contain it when it happened.

4.149 In its memorandum signed by ACP Dominic Yadubiya which was admitted as

Exhibit 79, the Plateau State Police Command described its role before the crisis at pages 1-2 as follows:

“The unfortunate crisis that engulfed Jos on 7th - 15th September, 2001 had its genesis from the pent-up anger of some Jos indigenes over the appointment of one Muktar Mohammed as the Chairman of the Poverty Eradication Programme in Jos-North Local Government. The Government was subsequently alerted by the Police and other Security agencies like SSS of the mounting tension in the city and consequently advised the Governor that a security meeting of the State should be called with all the parties in attendance in order to stem the tide of the mounting tension. The Police advice was thus premised on the need for the security meeting to assess the security situation, as leaflets: “Blood for Blood” were pasted at strategic locations in the Jos-North Local Government headquarters. And to prevent breach of the peace, the Commissioner of Police re-enforced security at the Local Government Headquarters immediately with posting of additional policemen to take care of the Local Government Headquarter while operatives were tasked to

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collate intelligence relating to this and others. In direct response to the Commissioner of Police worry on the growing tension in the city, the Governor called a meeting of the Afizere, Anaguta and Jasawa ethnic extractions, but unfortunately, the Commissioner of Police was not invited to the meeting and neither was the representative of the GOC nor the Director of the SSS and was therefore not privy to the discussions at the meeting and as such, a golden opportunity to assess and gauge the apprehensions, fears and intentions of the leaders met by the Governor was thus lost; and consequently, the security threat arising therefrom could not be appropriately addressed.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.150 The evidence of Dominic Yadubiya (CW 52) and the former Commissioner of

Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar (CW 222) supports the memorandum in toto. 4.151 It seems to us from the above quoted passage and from the oral evidence of the

two officers that: i. The police was aware of the tension generated by the appointment of

Mukhtar Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government Council.

ii. Apart from posting additional policemen to the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and informing the State Government of the prevailing tense situation, the police did nothing on its own to ensure that there was no break down of law and order.

4.152 It seems to us, with respect, most incomprehensible that, with the high level of

tension that existed at the time as admitted by CW 52 and CW 222 he police failed to investigate the matter and no arrests were made. The Commission is not impressed by the attempt to pass the buck to the government as the police seems to have done, by its statement that “the Commissioner of Police was not invited to the meeting and neither was the representative of the GOC nor the Director of the SSS and was therefore not privy to the discussions at the meeting and as such a golden opportunity to assess and gauge the apprehensions, fears and intentions of

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the leaders met by the Governor was thus lost...” It was the duty of the police to investigate the matter, make any necessary arrests and make its findings available to the government in the form of intelligence reports. The failure of the police to perform that duty is, in our view, inexcusable. The police cannot be heard to say that they depended on the outcome of the Governor’s meeting with the Community leaders and that because they were not invited, there was nothing else that they could do. The truth is that the police failed to put in place proper measures designed to forestall a breach of the peace and as we have said elsewhere in this Report, the blame lies squarely on its leadership in Plateau State at the material time. Above all, who knows whether the failure or refusal on the part of Government to invite the Commissioner of Police to the meeting was because of lack of confidence on the performance of his duty of policing the periphery of the crisis? After all, the Secretary to the State Government described the Police Commissioner as “totally unreliable”. And that speaks volumes, coming from the mouth of a person of the status of Secretary to State Government. Because of what the police failed to do, the crisis erupted on 7th September, 2001. The evidence shows that the police fared no better in managing the crisis when it occurred. It was clearly established before us and admitted by CW 52 and CW 222 themselves that the police were unable to contain the crisis and that was why the Military and the Airforce had to be called in to save the situation. Here we may refer to the evidence of CW 330, the Secretary to the Plateau State Government, Mr. Ezekiel Gomos. He said, inter alia;

“We noticed that the problem in Congo-Russia area was much. The then Commissioner of Police said he had his men on ground. He assured us. It was obvious to us that the men on ground could not contend the situation. Immediately, myself, the Deputy Governor and the Permanent Secretary, State Security Services decided to phone the GOC and told him that in addition to what the police were doing, we needed Soldiers on ground.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.153 The former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar himself admitted the

inability of his men to hand the crisis. Led in evidence by his counsel, O. Uket Esq., he was asked:

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“You said when the crisis started, it was far beyond what the police contemplated. With the initial intervention by the police and with their enforcement, were the police able to overcome the situation at the time?”

Alhaji M. D. Abubakar answered:

“They were not able to, because the crisis spread like wild fire, from Congo-Russia to other places like Dilimi and Angwan Rogo. I did brief the Inspector General of Police, the Deputy Governor and Zone 4, Makurdi. I asked them to mobilise policemen to be reinforced in the state. We were not able to contend the situation because of difficulty in terms of personnel, equipment and logistics to move men to those areas of crisis.”

“I contacted the Deputy Governor and asked for an emergency Security Council meeting be called. It was called. I requested for the Military to be called to reinforce according to the rules of this country and the Deputy Governor did so. Before then, I had alerted the GOC that there might be need for us to seek reinforcement.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.154 The question here is, why was the police unable to quell the crisis? The answer in

our opinion, and according to the evidence before us, is that apart from the partisan conduct of the Police Commissioner, Alhaji Abubakar, the police were ill-equipped to handle a crisis of that magnitude. At page 8 paragraph 2 of Exhibit 79, it is stated:

“By 8th and 9th of September, 2001, the Command had exhausted most of its smoke, Tear-gas and Ammunition. It had to seek for assistance from Inspector General of Police who ordered the Commandant, Police Staff College, Jos, to assist the Command with smoke teargas... Arms/ammunition earlier requested was expected from Lagos and the Commissioner of Police was directed to send a lorry to bring same to Jos. This, the Commissioner of Police considered very difficult during the crisis, more so, that the Command had no single lorry since he took over on 12/7/2000.”

Government View: Government notes.

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4.155 At pages 20-21 of Exhibit 79, the following details are given of the equipment

available to the police at the time of crisis: “There are nine (9) Divisions in Jos metropolis. It is saddening that there is no Division that has up to five (5) Walkie-Talkies out of which a sizeable number are out-modeled and unserviceable, and considering that there is an average of 150 policemen in each Division... the generator in the Headquarters cannot work for four (4) hours consecutively. .. Presently, there is no single lorry in the Command... the deployment of men from Division of the scenes of riot was very cumbersome, problematic and hazardous. Therefore, officers and men traveled to the various trouble areas on foot.... However, the statistics on the attached Appendix ‘C’ shows clearly that out of 381 arms available to the Command, 84 are unserviceable. There are nine (9) Divisions in Jos Metropolis, and the manpower strength of policemen in Jos Township Division stands at 1,811. It is thus clear that there was one (1) arm (serviceable) to seven (7) policemen before the crisis in the Command.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.156 In this state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that the police was unable to manage

the crisis. Some policemen, it was said, actually ran away when they ran out of teargas. The Commission cannot but sympathise with them. In view of the poor conditions under which policemen work and the dearth of equipment with which they are faced in times of major crisis such as the September, 2001 crisis, the Commission will recommend to government that proper care should be given to the police in terms of the provision of adequate and up-to-date equipment to enable it fight crime and effectively manage crisis. This, in the Commission’s view is the antidote to low morale which leads to ineffectiveness in crisis management and control by the police. A situation where criminals have very sophisticated equipment to fight the police who have most of the time obsolete equipment is not good for the detection and apprehension of crime and criminals respectively.

Government View:

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Government notes. 4.157 Persons mentioned but not found guilty or liable

Allegations of wrong doing were made against the following persons and organisations. The Commission did not find them guilty or liable.

4.158 Governor of Plateau State 4.159 Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye is the Governor of Plateau State

He was away in the United States on annual vacation when the crisis broke out. A few memoranda alleged that he knew that there was to be a crisis as the security of the State was unstable, when he left the country.

4.160 Exhibit 559, the memorandum submitted by Mr. Ezekiel Gomos, the Secretary to

the State Government, replied to the allegations. He said at page 11, paragraph 13 as follows:

“Also with regards to insinuations that the Governor knew that there was going to be crisis, yet he proceeded on his annual vacation, such allegations are only mischievous. In the first place, the annual vacation had long been planned even before the issue of any NAPEP appointment was made. No one can say that the Governor knew in advance that such a thing would occur. It is a common fact that not even the Devil knows the mind of a man. We can compare this with the American situation despite the sophistication of the world’s most advanced early warning and security intelligence system, and despite a previous attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, if only George Bush knew that Osama Bin Ladin would attack on September 11, America would have probably prevented it... or could they?. The Governor had no means of knowing that the crisis will erupt soon after he left for his earned vacation which was long over due. In any case, there was no leadership vacuum during his absence, because the whole state had been informed in a press statement that the Deputy Governor was going to act in the absence of the Governor. And as Acting Governor, Chief Michael Bot-Mang handled the situation creditably.”

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4.161 The Secretary to the State Government confirmed the above in his oral evidence before the Commission on 28th May, 2002. The Commission would like to place on record that of the large number of memoranda, only a few, an infinitesimal few, made the allegation. Most of the memoranda which dealt with the role played by the State Government in crisis, before, during and immediately after the crisis, praised the Governor for the role he played.

Government View: Government notes. 4.162 There is a plethora of evidence before the Commission that the Governor held

meetings with different sectors in respect of the security situation of the State. He did this in his capacity and office as the Chief Security Officer of the State. From the evidence before us, such meetings were enough to douse any possible crisis and any human being in the position of the Governor would have come to the conclusion that the State was on course for stability after the meetings.

4.163 We do not believe the allegation that the Governor knew that there would be the

7th September, 2001 crisis at the time he left the State on his annual vacation. If he knew or his God told him, Governor Joshua Chibi Dariye would be the last person to abandon the State and fly to safety. He does not look like a person who can run away from problems. He looks to us like one man who takes challenges and face them to the best of the ability. The Almighty God has given to him, come rain, come sun-shine. He is a sturdy young man whose interest for the State is total, complete and unfathomable.

Government View: Government notes. 4.164 What else will this Commission say about the Governor’s sincerity of purpose,

goodwill and magnanimity for the State, in the light of the very brave way he has faced the very difficult problems of this State. Men of lesser courage and belief in the Almighty God could have fallen by the wayside and succumbed to the Devil. Not Chief Dariye.

4.165 Chief Joshua C. Dariye looks to us as a man who can surrender his life for the

peace, tranquility and stability of Plateau State. We see such a commendable conduct in every inch of his style of administration and he leaves nobody in doubt, who cares to follow his style of governance that he loves Plateau State and would

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like the State to go places, even if that will mean decrease in his status, reputation and well being.

4.166 The Commission is totally satisfied with the evidence given by the Secretary to

the State Government concerning the Governor and coupled with Exhibits 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588 and 589, we totally and fully exonerate him from all allegations of wrong doing in the September, 2001 crisis.

Government View: Government notes. 4.167 The Deputy Governor of Plateau State 4.168 Chief Michael Bot-Mang is the Deputy Governor of Plateau State. Two

allegations were made against him before the Commission. One relates to his office as Deputy Governor and the other related to his life as a community leader of the Birom. Chief Michael Bot Mang is a Birom by tribe.

4.169 Let us take the first allegation which was made by CW 50 Hassan Zakari Biu, a

retired Assistant Commissioner of Police. He alleged that the Deputy Governor used his office to release a vehicle which was a subject of crime. The second allegation was to the effect that Chief Michael Bot Mang as a Community leader of the Birom used his position to commit evil. This allegation was not made by CW 50.

4.170 The first allegation was not proved to the satisfaction of the Commission. The

witness did not make out a case of abuse of office against the Deputy Governor, and that is the only interest of the Commission.

Government View: Government notes. 4.171 The second allegation does not fall within the terms of reference of the

Commission. The Commission lacks the competence to investigate the conduct of the Deputy Governor when he was a Community leader of the Birom, his tribe. The Commission notes that persons are free to lead their people when called upon to do so and they have a duty to fulfill or satisfy the dictates of their followership, and as long as they do so within the precincts of law, they cannot be faulted.

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4.172 The Commission totally and fully exonerates the Deputy Governor of any wrong

doing during the September, 2001 crisis. Government View: Government notes. 4.173 Alhaji Sale Hassan 4.174 Alhaji Sale Hassan who testified before the Commission as CW243 is a political

consultant and a member of the Jasawa Development Association. He is a well respected Community leader and one of the elders of the JDA. He is also a member of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee set up by the Plateau State Government after the September, 2001 crisis.

4.175 When he testified before us, he impressed us as a man of very high intelligence by

any standards. His evidence centred mainly around the claim of the Hausa-FUlani to the ownership of Jos. Though a Tera by tribe, Alhaji Sale Hassan insisted that the Hausa are the founders and owners of Jos. In fact, he claimed that his own father was one of the founders, an issue which the Commission has resolved against him.

Government View: Government accepts. 4.176 Alhaji Sale Hassan’s affinity with the Jasawa Development Association has never

been hidden or in doubt. He can safely be described as one of its mentors or sponsor. He is certainly one of its leaders. As long ago as 1987, soon after the formation of the Association, Alhaji Sale Hassan left no one in any doubt about his determination to champion the cause of the Association. In an article titled “Jasawa Youths asked to recover Jos rulership” carried in the 13th October, 1987 edition of the Reporter Newspaper, Alhaji Sale Hassan is reported to have urged the Jasawa Youth Association to recover the rulership of Jos which slipped off the hands of their parents in 1945 because according to him, Jos belonged to the Hausas. That report was admitted in evidence by the Commission as Exhibit 11. Apart from that, Alhaji Hassan was a signatory to the Jasawa Declaration presented to the Government and people of Nigeria, Exhibit 377, and the letter dated 20th August, 2001 written to the Governor of Plateau State by the Jasawa Development Association in support of the appointment of Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government

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Council. It was also he who presented and defended the Jasawa Development Association’s memorandum before the Commission.

4.177 The Commission has been urged in several memoranda and by several witnesses

who testified before it to find that Alhaji Sale Hassan is one of those who should be held responsible for the September, 2001 crisis. This position is taken on the basis of his call on the Jasawa Youths to recover rulership of Jos which is regarded as inciting. With respect to the authors of the said memoranda and the witnesses, we find ourselves unable to make such a finding. The call by Alhaji Sale Hassan, made about fourteen years before the crisis is, in our view, too remote to place responsibility for the crisis on him. Looking at the gamut of the evidence before us, we cannot say that beyond his association with the Jasawa Development Association, Alhaji Sale Hassan as a person did anything to aid or escalate the crisis. He alone cannot be made to bear personal responsibility for the acts of the Association. However, the evidence discloses that he is always ready and willing to champion the cause of the Jasawa Development Association, which we have already said, should be suspended for a period of two years. For this reason, we will recommend that the activities of Sale Hassan be closely monitored by Government.

Government View: Government accepts. 4.178 Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi 4.179 Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi gave evidence as CW67. He would not have occupied

any important position in the affairs of things during the September 7th, 2001 Jos crisis had his Mosque built first and foremost as a private Mosque, not stood at the heart of the controversy that engulfed Jos and environs from 7th - 12th September, 2001.

4.180 The idea of building a private Mosque and for that matter a private Mosque is in

itself a very laudable gesture. Such an undertaking brings families and friends together in times of worship and cements relationships and promotes love and peace besides the spiritual benefits of the venture.

Government View: Government notes. 4.181 The area in which the Mosque was built is a residential area and mostly populated

by non-Moslems. Alhaji T. Abdullahi moved into the neighbourhood in 1988,

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and met the non-Muslim population. During the visit to the locus inquo, the Commission observed that the Mosque could at most contain fifty (50) worshippers, hence the necessity for worshippers to pray outside the Mosque and occupy the street. With the worswhippers milling out on the street during the Juma’at worship, the blocking of the road was introduced to the annoyance of non-Muslims living around the areas and other road users who found the practice very annoying, uncomfortable and encumbersome. What made Alhaji T. Abdullahi’s private Mosque special was that after it was built he decided to hand it over to JIBWIS (Jama’atul Izalatil Bid’iah Wa’ikamatus Sunnah) which converted it to a Juma’at Mosque. It became a Mosque for everybody, so to say a public property. From the time this Mosque was taken over by JIBWIS and launched in 1996, the Community living around the vicinity, namely Congo-Russia, has known no peace. Series of complaints and protests have been the order of the day.

4.182 Furthermore, the Commission observed that the Juma’at Mosque at Congo-Russia

was sandwiched between the many houses of CW 67. It was more of a garage turned into a Mosque than a real Mosque that was meant to cater not only for Muslim faithfuls in Congo-Russia but also for other Muslims living around Bauchi Road and Angwan Rogo. While tension was mounting, CW67, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi and JIBWIS whom he handed over the Mosque did not help out matters either. All the complaints and petitions written by the community fell on deaf ears and were not objectively attended to. There was no love lost between CW67 and JIBWIS on one side and the Community and public road users on the other side. From Exhibits 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 112, 113, and 144, it could be seen that CW67 and JIBWIS treated the complaints with contempt and disdain. From Exhibit 38, a Memorandum by “the Congo-Russia (CHWELNYAP) community of Jos North LGA” submitted to this Commission, it is evident that many attempts were made by the Congo-Russia community to reach an accord with CW67 and JIBWIS without any success.

Government View: Government notes. 4.183 Many letters were written to CW67 and copied to Government, the Police, JMDB,

JNI among others without any avail. One of such letters was the one written to the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, Jos, written on 20/03/1996 captioned: “Re: Petition Against Mounting of Road Blocks During Friday

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Moslem Worship in Congo-Russia Area.” This letter was signed by eighteen (18) persons and copied to twelve (12) persons. See Exhibit 38 Appendix E. In a letter written by JIBWIS addressed to the General Manager JMDB on the 05/04/1996 with: “Our Ref: JIBWIS/NHQ/AO/107/Vol.11/96" signed by Adam Musa Adam, Ag. National Administration Secretary, JIBWIS, it was thus stated that: (JIBWIS) “...has no any Mosque approved to any organisation or group of people to conduct Friday Prayers in the area referred to in your letter.” See Exhibit 112.

4.184 It was very wrong for Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi to have given that small Mosque to

JIBWIS which in turn made it a Juma’at Mosque. The Mosque ought not to have been converted to a Juma’at Mosque.

Government View: Government notes. 4.185 The Commission recommends that since the Mosque was built without any town

planning documents and approval from the relevant authority, the Mosque should not be rebuilt.

Government View: Government accepts. 4.186 From the evidence available, Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi had no pre-knowledge of the

crisis in Jos as he was away in Abuja while the members of his family were trapped in the crisis in his house at Congo-Russia. The Commission therefore exonerates him from the allegations made against him in respect of the crisis.

Government View: Government notes. 4.187 The Government of Plateau State 4.188 The Government of Plateau State was accused in quite a number of memoranda

for its failure to act appropriately in preventing the crises. The Secretary to the Government of Plateau State, Mr. Ezekiel Gomos (CW330) in his evidence defended government action substantially.

4.189 Dealing with the issue of appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman, Exhibit 559 said

at page 3, paragraph 6 which read: “When Plateau State Government realised that the appointment was not acceptable to a cross section of the people of Jos North Local Government Area; it took a

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number of steps to prevent a breakdown of law and order which includes: a. immediate contact was made with the Office of

the State Co-ordinator and the National Coordinator of the NAPEP conveying to them the implications of the appointment and the mood of the State and discussions entered into with a view to resolving the problem.

b. A number of meetings were held with the various contending parties to appeal to them to maintain the peace and also to assure them that Government was pursing the matter with a view to seeing that the issue was resolved.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.190 On 27th August, 2001, government further invited the Executive Chairman of Jos

North for a discussion especially regarding the security implications of the problem. On the same 27th of August, 2001 Government summoned a meeting of some prominent sons of Jos where it was agreed that another meeting will be convened on the issue in two weeks time.

4.191 On the 30th August, 2001, Government called a meeting of the Security Council to

review the security situation especially when tension generated in Jos by the appointment of the NAPEP Coordinator of Jos North had not been resolved.

4.192 The State Government also went further to summon a meeting of Inter-Religious

Committee of the State on the 3rd of September, 2001. 4.193 After the Security Council’s meeting on the 8th of September government

extended the curfew placed on Jos to commence from 4.00pm to 7.00pm. It also invited religious and Community leaders to join the security meeting after which representatives of Christian and Muslim faiths made intermittent broadcasts calling on their followers to eschew violence. The Gbong Gwom Jos, Dr. Fom Bot, also made a special broadcast to the people appealing for calm.

Government View: Government notes.

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4.194 On Monday, September 10, the State Government called a World Press

Conference after the Executive Governor’s return from overseas trip on Sunday night. The Government also set up a number of Committees to tackle the challenges and to ease up tension and the suffering of those affected. The committees were:

a. The Refugee, Rehabilitation and Management Committee. b. The Search, Rescue and Environmental Management Committee. c. The Information and Community Relations Committee. d. The Peace and Reconciliation Committee. e. The Medical Committee. f. The Documentation Committee. Government View: Government notes. 4.195 From the evidence available at the Commission, (See Exhibit 559 page 13, page

16-17) the Deputy Governor Chief Bot Mang, who was acting as the governor and the Chief Security Officer at that time, undertook a tour of the affected areas during the crises despite the risk. The Commission commends his gallantry and meritorious service to the State and its people.

4.196 The Deputy Governor’s role during the crises was noted to be most commendable

as he immediately contacted the President when the situation became impossible for the Nigeria Police to handle. The President then contacted the GOC Jos to handle the situation when soldiers moved into the city.

Government View: Government notes. 4.197 In the light of the foregoing concrete and concerted steps taken by Government as

a corporate body, the Commission cannot find Government liable, either for any wrong doing or any lapses immediately before, during or immediately after the crisis. No Government in the circumstances could have done better.

Government View: Government notes. 4.198 The Nigeria Army 4.199 The Nigeria Army through CW40 Ltd. Col. AY Ahmed did send a letter to the

Commission and was admitted as Exhibit 51.

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The letter was a response to CW16 (Daniel Gora’s) evidence that fake soldiers were identified during the crises.

4.200 A number of witnesses also gave evidence that fake soldiers were identified

during the crises e.g CW6 (Bitrus Ajik Arin), CW39 (Dung Awol), CW 22 (Paul O. Kaze), CW30 (Ezekiel D. Izam) and CCW222 (M. D. Abubakar), the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State.

Government View: Government notes. 4.201 CW40, (Lt. Col. A. Y. Ahmed, in his evidence denied that the Military arrested or

detained fake Soldiers as alleged by Daniel Gora and other witnesses. The Commission saw in Exhibit 51 ready “text book answers” to the convincing evidence on the involvement of fake soldiers in the crisis. No less a person than the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar (CW222) said in oral evidence:

“There were Soldiers in that house and there was tension that they did not know where those soldiers came from.”

Government View: Government notes. 4.202 The denial by the Military authority on this issue is best known to them. In the

Commission’s view, it was a convenient denial and it is difficult for such denial to fly on the face of the clear evidence of Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, who was the Chief Police Officer of the State at the material time. The Army did not take the Commission to the bottom of this matter and this is not likely for reasons of protecting their security ego. We stop here and allow sleeping dogs lie, hoping that they will not bark one of these days.

Government View: Government notes. 4.203 The above notwithstanding, the Commission commends the good work of the

Army for the prompt and decisive action in quelling the crisis. They did a marvelous and fantastic job for which posterity will remain grateful.

Government View: Government notes. 4.204 Plateau Radio Televison Corporation (PRTVC)

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4.205 The Memorandum written by Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria marked Exhibit 81, accused the Management of PRTVC thus in paragraph 28 of page 22:

“We have observed the denial of the muslims of Plateau State the services of the Plateau State Radio Television (PRTV) which is run and maintained by the tax payers money (out of which the muslims feel they contribute more) while exclusively giving one quarter of its air time to the Christians in their religious programmes on daily basis on both TV, Radio AM and FM. In fact on every Monday through Friday from 9.00p.m to 9.30pm the tax-payers-run AM station is donated to ECWA, Evangelical Radio Service called RADIO ELWA which takes over the total air waves for 30 minutes every day for over one year now, even before the government could announce Plateau State as a Christian State.”

In Exhibit 59, the management of PRTVC was also accused of discriminating on Islamic programmes.

Government View: Government notes. 4.206 The General Manager of the PRTVC Mr Joseph Ari (CW329) as a person was

accused in some memoranda for being religiously biased. An example of such accusation as indicated above, is found in Exhibit 81 by the Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria. Its para.30 of page 23 reads, thus:

“For example in Plateau State within the last two years, we have noticed the religiously biased position of the PRTV. Since the appointment of Knight of Saint Murumba (Ksm) in the person of Joseph Ari to its management as General Manager against Islam which we have earlier observed is equated within Hausa-FUlani for diabolical and satanic, wicked reasons. Despite being a public property, funded by money that accrue from both muslims and Christians, the PRTV has been operating like the station established and funded by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN).”

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4.207 The General Manager, Mr. Joseph Ari (CW329) however defended these

allegations with enough documentary evidence. See Exhibit 553. From the evidence available, the Commission saw in-house problems within the Islamic groups, vize: JNI and JIBWIS as contained in Exhibit 553, appendix J,K,M,N and Q. There are acrimonies and struggles in the groups as to religious hegemony and superiority in the handling of Islamic programmes, acrimonies and struggles which did not make the choice of programmes on the part of PRTV easy.

Government View: Government notes. 4.208 An example of such in-house acrimonies and struggles in Exhibit 553, written by

JIBWIS is stated below ipsissima verba: “that we are afraid to state categorically that JNI which runs its sponsored programmes with NTA is jealous, malicious and vexatious of JIBWIS and PRTV because of the fellowership we command and such using your organization as a vehicle for causing disunity and hence disruption of the peace vide your reaction in it tends to precipitate “danger: for our people.”

4.209 The Commission did not find any case of discrimination against the Islamic

programmes, as alleged. As a matter of fact, the Commission commends the Corporation for the dispassionate coverage of events during the crisis. This is as a result of the dedicated and solid leadership of the General Manager of the person in the person of Mr. Joseph Ari. We saw him as a dynamic and painstaking journalist in the witness box.

4.210 It came out in evidence that apart from very few religious programmes on PRTV

which are released on gratis of the body, (that is without payment of money) all other programmes are commercialized. It was clear in evidence that while most Christian bodies willingly paid the commercial rates for their programmes, most Islamic groups could not do so and bargained for lesser fees. This the PRTV could not agree, thus giving rise to unfounded allegations and accusations of bias and discrimination.

Government View: Government notes.

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4.211 Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association 4.212 The Association has its headquarters in Kaduna with a branch in Jos. One

common feature of this body is the use of very bad and unprintable language in their memorandum which portrayed it as a trouble seeking organisation. The Commission noted that most members of the association who are Fulanis are not literate. The rude language have the potential of causing crisis. We quote a bit from the “iceberg”.

“Plateau State does not have an anthropological evidence of indigeneship that exclude the Fulani from the Goemai, Taroh, Jere, Birom, Anaguta, Mushere, Ngas among others. Is there? The whole issue is of religious, economic ethnic and political suppression, hate, repression and vandalisation of a people for no cause other than the wicked whims and caprises of a people of shameful history and antecedents of moral bankruptcy in their entire history.” “From the foregoing, it only escaped the most undiscerning that there was an animihilistic agenda against the Fulani in the State. For those who have observed and seen the barely hidden agenda knew that sooner or later there was going to be a well planned, Orchestrated genocidal war against the Fulani.”

4.213 More of this type of language was used in the Exhibit e.g page 18 paragraph 23,

page 23, paragraph 30 and also page 24 paragraph 31 to mention just a few. The Commission found as a fact that the leadership of Alhaji Sale Bayeri is ruining the development efforts of this apparently innocent and innocuous body largely made up of illiterates. The leadership of Alhaji Sale Bayeri is directly responsible for confrontations with Government and other peace loving people in the State.

Government View: Government accepts and refers him to National body of Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) for appropriate sanction.

4.214 Apart from evidence that individual Fulanis were involved in the crisis, there was

no evidence that the Association as a body qua organisation was involved in the crisis. Although the dividing line between the Association and the members could at times be thin, it is not fair to hold the Association liable for the acts of the individual Fulanis.

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Government View: Government notes and accepts.

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CHAPTER FIVE

EXTENT OF DAMAGES TO LIVES AND PROPERTIES 5.0 There is need to mention and emphasise that the Commission’s terms of reference

did not extend to or include the recommendation of payment of damages or compensation for loss of lives and property. The third term of reference, as indicated above, is to assess the extent of damages to lives and property. This did not in anyway vest in the Commission the power to award damages or compensation. Accordingly, the Commission helplessly took evidence from persons who lost their dear ones and property. This third term of reference, as indicated above, is to assess the extent of damages to lives and property. This did not in anyway vest in the Commission the power to award damages or compensation. Accordingly, the Commission helplessly took evidence from persons who lost their dear ones and property.

5.1 From the evidence, the following lives were lost in the crisis:

1. Adamu Audu Adeoye Ojo Aina Ogunmola Aziz Bamidele Agnes Akinjobi Adamu Gyang Audu Makut Abba Manya Gado Audu Kyari Abbas Audu Alexander John Azi Agwom Ayuba Azi Alpheus Okorie Anthony Obanaka Azubuike Udeagha Alhaji Bahago Abubakar Ahmadu Ciroma Alh. Ahmadu Kadarko Azumu Kadarko Adam Abdullahi Alhaji Abubakar Ahmadu Ibrahim Abdullahi Adamu Ahmad Baje

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Ardo Ja’o Adamu Barka Alh. Idris Bala Alhaji Mohammed Bula Alhaji Mohammed Alhaji Idris Idi Abubakar Idris Ardo Ibrahim Isau Alhaji Tahiru Aliyu Abubakar Abdullahi Abubakar Abubakar Adamu Abdullahi Ahmad Muhammed Ahmed Musa Chachaba Alhaji Dodo Namina Alhaji Duni Yunus Alhaji Pate Ibrahim Alhaji Adamu Abdullahi Abdullahi Adamu Abdulkarim Mohammed Alhaji Ja’o Abdulkarim Ruwa Auydu Chigwang Asabe Boyi Musa Arch. David D. Dalyop Audu Gumaidu Auwal Garu Abubakar Mohd Sani Abdullahi Gani Adamu Adah Lawrence Onuh Akula Emmanuel Akinjopo R. Maxwel Bolawa Alhaji Maijaki Pankshin Alhaji Abdulhamid Gudus Abuga Anthony Allahama Alhaji Sani Ogah Adeshi Alhaji Yakubu Jacob Abdulkarim Zaidu Abubakar Tanko Abdullahi Adamu Alhaji Haruna Mohammed Abdulrahman Dalyop Audu Jahafaru Adamu Idi Don Gyang Ali Musa Abdullahi Haruna

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Abdullahi Isa Adamu Muhammad Abubakar Yunus Ali Garba Wase Adamu Odili Alh. Abdullahi Babayo Shehu Ali Ibrahim Adamu Mikaila Ali Ibrahim Alh. Abdulrahman Hassan Abdullahi Yaro Aminu Ishaku Abdullahi Maigida Alh. Ibrahim Ojotta Alh. Adamu Auwal Garu Adamu Abubakar Alh. Sani Adamu Bazamfare Alh. Ishaku bababibile Ali Ibrahim Abubakar Abubakar Abdullahi Garba Alh. Ahmed Na-Waram Alhaji Alhassan Bazza Abubakar Mohd. Sani Abdulhamid Gani Adamu Auwalu Hussaini Alhaji Habibu Alh. Garba Danfulani Abdullahi Habibu Alhaji Muktar Tela Alhaji Ali Alhaji Datti Samaila Alhaji Alkasim Auwal Hussaini Abdullahi Aminu Yahaya Alh. Uba Yusuf Adamu Abdul Abdullahi Babayo Alh. Dahiru Mohammed Adamu Abubakar Amina Yusuf Aminu Yakubu Adamu Abdu Abubakar Ahmad Suleiman

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Abdullahi Driver Abubakar Mohammed Abdullahi Wakili Afamu Mikhail Alh. Abdulrahman Hassan Abubakar Miazu Abubakar Usman Abubakar Mohammad Alhaji Hassan Garba Abubakar Ahmad Abdullahi Waziri Ali Dauda Adamu Maishayi Abubakar Danjuma Adamu Ibrahim Abdullahi Salisu Adamu T/Wada Alhaji shittu T/Wada Abdullahi Azare Aki Ibrahim Mai Doki Abdullahi Shoe Shaina Abubakar Hussaini Alh. Abba Dan Borno Alh. Jibrin T/Wada Alh. Yahaya T/Wada Adamu Usman Abubakar Mohd A’ishatu Abubakar Abdullahi Ibrahim Alh. Pate Fobur Alh. Galadima Don Audu Gumaidu Alh. Shuaibu Biribiri Adamu Sule Abdullahi Harka Bello Aminu Hassan Amali Alh. Isa Kibawu Maiturare Abubakar Lere Alh. Hassan Adamu Alh. Adamu Jibga Adamu Tella Ado A. Abdulmumini Ado Maisonka Alh. Hassan Amali Abdu Musa Abdul Maiyale Ahmadu Muhammad

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Abubakar Isa Abdulahi Penta Alh. Tsoho Jodi 2. Adamu Kamas Soja 3. Abdullahi Aliko Dan’are 4. Alh. Garba Nagoje 5. Auwalu Abubakar 6. Abdullahi Ali Zango 7. Ado Fata

8. Abdullahi mallam Sale 9. Ado Haiyo 10. Abdul Azeez Abdulkarim 11. Abdullahi Abubakar 12. Alh. Adamu Jubja Alh. Dodo Ardo Alhaji Zakari Haruna Alh. Yunusa Shatima Abdulrahman Abubakar Audu Tsakuwa Alhaji Adamu Isa Alhaji Adamu Muhammad Ahmad Chiroma Alh. Ahmadu Kadarko Azumi Kadarko Hajara Kadarko Ahmadu Ibrahim Abdullahi Adamu A day old baby Adamu Abdullahi Alh. Abubakar Diyal Ahmad Baje Ardo Dalhatu Adamu Barlai Alh. Goma Jol Alh. Muhammad Batten Amani Muhammad Alh. Ardo Dalhatu Alh. Goma Wareng Alh. Sani Hassan Ali Adamu Haruna Alh. Alhassan Adamu Haruna Abdulhamid Inusa

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Audu Ado Naladi Alh. Ado Naladi Adamu Idris Adamu Hassan (ROZ) Ahmad Idris Ado Tela Gombe Alh. Chindo Muhd Ismail Abdulkarim Muhammad Abubakar Adamu Alh. Adamu Abdullahi Abdullahi Adamu Abdulkarim Muhammad Alh. Dumi Alh. Fate Abubakar Shehu Mai Inji Alh. Alh. Garba Abdulkarim Adisa Alh. Adamu Abdullahi Audu Audu Sharmakwai Abdulkarim Ruwa Bitrus Damiyal Bisi Ogunpola Bulus Usman Baba Bitrus Daniel Baba Tiga Brother of Udeike Baleyel Sule Boyi Musa Baba Choji Chollom Baba Musa Manjei Baba Sabo Ardi Birgi Bot Lo Birgi Binta Garu Bala Mohammed Sani Bitrus Dachollom Boyi Gobe Baturu Shetu Bahago Bamo Bilal Muhammad Bashiru Al-Amin Baba Wase Baba Akinda Dauda Bala Usman Liba Bello Kabiru Miawalda Balkisu Yusuf Bashir Abdullahi Bisinyo Olaloye Onipede

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Bala Kato Baba Idris Baba Janga Suleiman Baba Musa Muhammad Baba Abba Babangida Tun Turu Baballe Salisu Baban Yar Umma Balayel Sule Bala Datti Buba Dan Samari Bako Yaron Makeri Chief kayode Akinyemi Christy Idi Christopher Dachollom Chukwumma Emeiwo Charles Akuchukwu Christopher Nwobi Chief Ocheka Joseph Clement Nwankwo Christopher Mulele Christopher G. Zatchuk Chollom H. Job Christopher Fom B. Chigari Dabo Chifara Dan Dabo Dachoru Iliya Dutse Tela David Elijah Damina Albarka Damina Kurni Dauda Dandi Dikko Idris Dikko Buyla David Silas Picolo Danboyi Choji David Chuwang Chollom David Gwong Davou Gwong Da Joseph Birgi Da Chuwang C. Nyam Dan Titi David Sherdung Danjuma Kongkor Daniel D. Fom Davou Bulus Dr. Zaidu Aliyu

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Danjuma Abdullahi Danjuma Ibrahim Dagujie Danbaba Danladi Dong Gyang Danjuma Dalyop Davou Yakubu Danbo Danjum Yakubu Dachung Bagai David Danjuma Dada Kwanta Dabwarang Dajuma Davou Pam Dabwarang Dachung Da Dachung Bagai Davou Dalyop Danlami Gemu Dauba Mohammed Dantiti Ang. Rukuba Danlami Mohammed Dahiru Umar O.K. Dahiru Zakari Dahiru Muhammed Dauda Abdulhamid Dan Alh. Usman Dan Funtua Driver Dahiru NURTW Danladi Hodi Danjuma Alh. Tangale Dauda Fulani Danladi Garba Dahiru Mohammed Danfulani Maigadi Dahiru Dan Union Dan Adoji Danjuma Ibrahim Dahiru Mohd. Dussa Dahiru Babur Damina Albarka Damina Kurmi. Dauda Bauchi Dikko Bula Dauda Sale Danlami Umaru (MEKA) Dahiru Ammu Emmanuel Adeyinka Emmanuel Ajayi Esther Musa

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Elizabeth B. Alijah Joshua Enyinnaya Egbuja Eke Frank Ebuga Anthony Alhnana Emmanuel Ozokafor Fatima Muhammed Abubakar Fatima Sani Farren N.D. Tyoden Femi Awobusuyi Gbenga Awobusuyi Gadu Yakubu Godwin Markus Godwin Emmanuel Godwin Ekwelonu Gagarau Maiyaki Gaga Isa Gamba Ja’e Gambo Adam Gyang Davou Dawang Gyang Chuwang Choji Gorip M.K Gyang M. Dapwa Godwin Mulkes Gyang Chuwang Gyang Da Gyang Musa Gambo Jeieh Gali Muhammad Gambo Saidu Gidado Maigunga Gayaram Maikai Gaya Isa Gaga Mafayo Gambo Adamu Hazara Kadarko Halidu Yahaya Hazara Muhammadu Hamza Mohd. Abubakar Haruna Mohammad Haruna Alh. Ado Hussaini Labi Habane Mogerode Helen Kangyang Haruna Bulus Haruna Bala Hadiza Bala

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Hafsatu Ahmad Hajiya Ahmad Hajiya Maitakalma Habu Danlami Haladu Sa’adu Haliru Mai Albassa Hassan Jibrin Haruna Abdullahi Hauwa Abubakar Hafizu Yusuf Haruna Hassaini Hajiya Limoji Abbas Hassan Adamu Hassan Mohd Babur Hamisu Jalla Hassan Dan Borno Halidu Yahaya Hajara Muhammad Hamza Mohd Abubakar Hajara Sani Hamza Sani Harina Muhammad Haruna Ismail Hardo Ja’o Habubakar Bulo Haruna Alh Ja’o Habvane Muanjirodi Habibu Lawan Ningi Hassan Taibu Hassan Na Mailaro Hassan Idi Hauwa’u Muhammadu Innocent Nduku Ogbonna Innocent Nwanugwu Ibrahim Nana Abdullahi Ishiaku Adam Ishaku Mohammed Jobbo Ibrahim Idris Idris Bula Idris Adris Bala Ismaila Salihu Isa Sale Ismaila gudo Mamda Ibrahim Rayi Ibrahim Muhammed Ibrahim Abubakar Ibrahim Musa Bazza

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Ikuma Garu Ibrahim Musa Abba Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim Mohammed Idris Mohd Yaya Gombe Ibrahim kabiru Isiaku Yaro Ibrahim Dan Jummai Ismaila Bala Yakubu Idris Suleiman Iklima Garu Ibrahim Black Ismaila Muhamman Isyaku Sale Ibrahim Idris Ibrahim Bill Idris Nuhu Ishaq Usman Idris Usman Abdullahi Ibrahim Usman Abdullahi Ibrahim Umar Isyaka Usman Ibrahim Ladan Imam Maiwada Inusa Saiye Ismaila Salihu Ibrahim Alh. Musa Ibrahim Dallali Ibrahim Nana Abdullahi Ishaq Adamu Isyaku Muhd Jabbo Idris Bula Ibrahim Idris Ibrahim Sale Idi Alarama Isyaku Mafayo Imam Yahaya Usman Ibrahim Zumudi Isa Umaru Isa Sale Ismaila Gidado Mamuda Ibrahim Raji Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim Abubakar Idi mai Kwakwa Isiya Danlambu Ibrahim Muhammad

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Isa Hussaini Joel Durhezie Joseph Adamu Joshua Awobusuyi James Yakubu Joshua Sirgeant Jonathan Ambayat James Ajik Joseph Nwoke Joseph Achonye Joel Duru Jeji Idris Jardo Dalhatu Jauga Makama Jummai Hajara Sani Jai’e Mohammed Jibril Musa Jidda John Denkang J.A. Nwoke Joshua F. Awobusuyi Joshua Bwede John Tengwong Jafar Tsoho Jai’e Ahmadu Jibrin Musa Jibrin Abubakar Jibrin Uba Jamilu Muhd Mitilla Jamilu Adamu Jeji Idris Janga Makana Jauga Muhammad Jibril Abdullahi Jibril Bala Jenuga Makal Jibrin Muhammed Kefas Dariyem Khadijat Muhammad Kasuwa bello Kabiru Mallam Mumuni Kitshiwe Madangyi Kabiru Maiwalda Kurma Deaf Khadijat Yusuf Kabiru Inuwa Dolo Khadija Muhammad

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Kasuwa Bello Lami Luka Ladidi Sule Lamo Aliyu Isau Laraba Abu Lurwan Yakubu Labaran Yahaya Moses Y. Kanta Mark Yusufu Debok Musa Wakili Musa Garba Misak Egbe Master Agwunedu Mallam Yakubu Bahago Mato Albarka Madaki Kokiye Salihu Mohammadu Galadima Maigori Ahmadu Mallam Abubakar Idris Mohammed Idris Manga Isau Makawu Manu Mohammadu Abubakar Mohd Abubakar Abdullahi Mu’azu Salihu Muhammed Sani Abubakar Mohammad Janga Musa Isa Chachaba Mallam Idris Isa Mallam Abdu Ibrahim Mallam Garba Alh. Pate Musa Manmuda Mudi Sale Mallu Woje Musa Abdullahi Muhammad Abdullahi Mohd Abdullahi Sodari Mallam Isa Alh. Useini Mallam Isa Pitidau Mathew Gyang Master Gyang Davou Birgi Mallam Yakubu Garba Muhammad Hardwa Mohd. Lkimoji Abbas Musa B. Goshi Mallam Hassan Adamu Muhammed Gidado.

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Mohammed Musa Bazza Mallam Garu Mallam Umar Meshach Bagudu Mallam Ibrahim Anawo Atukpa Mallam Iliya Mallan Tenle Madu Gel Mallam Usman Anagogo Muhammad bello Dan Sokoto Muhammadu Gashim Bak Musa Dan Almajiri Musa Bokkos Muhammadu nasiru Muhammad Shehu Mallam Ladan Khalid Muhammad Bashir Amin Mallam Rabiu Isa Muhammad Ibrahim Magaji Armaya’u Musbahu A. Audu Mallam Isa Na Tunba Mallam Haliru Sa’adu Muhammad Suleiman Adamu Muhamadu Sani Mallam Garba Laden Mallam Ibrahim Teacher Muhammad Saidu Ali Mallam Adamu Mallam Dogo ahmad Mallam Abubakar Liman Mallam Idris Mallam Mohd Sani Muktar Sani Mallam Umaru Sani Muhd Yakubu Angwe Muhd Abdullahi Muhammad Isa Abdul Maryam Yusuf Mallam Hussaini Abdul Mallam Usman Mohd Mallam Salisu Adamu Muhammad Abdullahi Muhammad Muhammed Muhammad Mustapha Muhammad Abubakar Mallam Jibrin Albagen

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Mallam Idris Bamba Mallak Muktar Sani Muhammad Garba Tsohon Soja Mallam Abubakar Muhammad Dan Borno Muhammad Garba Tsoho Mallam Musa Buba Muhammad Ibrahim Muktar Burman Muhammad Alanama Mazo Mai Gyemu Mallam Muhd Garba Mallam Musa Mallam Yakubu Garba Muhammad Haruna Muhammad Head Driver Mallam Ahmad Ladan Musa Ali Mallam Usman Mallam Abdullahi Mallam Danlami Muhammad Bello Munkaila Datti Muhammad Nasiru Muhammad Yaro Mallam Garba Baba Dutse Muhammad Dan Kutukulle Mhammadu M. Sale Moh’d Sani Abubakar Musa Sambo Mallam Ibrahim Buzu Mallam Rabiu Isa Meya Idau Muikawu Maru Muhammad Abubakar Mu’azu Salihu Muhammad Idris Muhd Sani Abubakar Muhammadu Janju Muhd Isa Chuchabe Musa Isa Chuchabe Mallam Hassan Taga Musa Shatima Fama Mallam Hassan Yarima Musa Ningi Muhammad Barau Mallam Abubakar Abubakar

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Mallam Yau Ibrahim Mallam Hassan Adam Mallam Aminu Ibrahim Mallam Muhd Sani Mallam Abdullahi Abdullahi Mallam Usman Mu’azu Mallam Ibrahim Sale Muhammed Ladan Bauchi Mallam Mato Albarka Madaki Koiye Salihu Muhammadu Galadima Majeri Ahmadu Mallam Abubakar Idris Mallam Audu Mai Glass Musa Muhd Dankamba Mallam yakubu Salihu Muhammad Hassan Toro Musa Baje Mudi Salke Musa Mamuda Musa Abdullahi Muhammad Abdullahi Muhd Abdullahi Solere Mallam Garba Fate Mallam Isa Mallam Musa Muhd Hassan Kwabba Muhammad Ali Buzu Murtala Dan Samari 13. Mallam Umaru 14. Muhammadu Sani 15. Musa Fitidau 16. Nanle G. Yamtu 17. Nasiru Adeleke 18. Nanchi Inspector 19. Nduka Ogbenna 20. Naksi Onyegbule 21. Ngo Katok Rwang Gyang 22. Nde Mutashak 23. Nde Mban 24. Njwosu M.S. 25. Nakalami Baba Lanzan 26. Nuhu Dan Fulani

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27. Nuhu Isa 28. Mura kabiru Maiwalda 29. Nura Yusuf 30. Nasiru Abdullrahim 31. Nasiru Ahmadu 32. Nuhu Maisaka 33. Nuru Aliyu Adew 34. Olemide David 35. Owolabi Ajakaiye, 2 wives and 7 children 742. Okechi’s twin daughters 743. Ogbonnaya Bernard 744. Odoh Ozohi 745. One day old baby 746. Peter Kumkak 747. Peter Azi 748. Paul Nwroah 749. Peter odoh 750. Paul Ugorji 751. Peto Daniel 752. Pam Davou 753. Raji Audu 754. Ronku 755. Rukeinya Sani 756. Rilwanu Musa 757. Ridwen Yakubu 758. Rabiatu Nuhu 759. Rufai Yusuf Rabiu Alh. Danjuma Rabo Abdu Ruguiya Sani Suleiman Audu Son of Sabar Tulu Sam Adjeola’s children Samson Azi Stephen Adeniyi Simon Joshua Samuel Sanusi S.G. Bitrus Bala

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Sunday Ijebuonwu Sunday Ezere Sylda Eletronics Son of Charles Akuchukwu Samuel Obika Son of Ezinifite Salihu Habane Majiri Sa’adatu Labi Saidu Kutu Salihu Muhammad Saleh Shehu Salihu Abubakar Saidu Abubakar Safiya Umar Abubakar Segari Dandabo Sani Adamu Shuaibu Adamu Suleiman Ruwa Saje Gimba Choji Suraju Ibrahim Haruna Sgt. Godfrey G. Begun (Rtd) Stephen G. Gofwen Stephen Dashe Stephen C. Gomerep Shuaibu Hamidu Gudus Shalok Gugwan Son of Ramatu Musa Son of Alh. Makama Dunama Sylvester Onyeabor Samson Musa Stephen Dauda Shuaibu Abdullahi Shehu B. Na-Allah Sani Ibrahim Salisu Mudi Sa’adu Abdulsalam Safiya Umar Shuaibu Abubakar Shuaibu Dan Mani Shittu Alhaji Suleiman Burma Suleiman Dilali Suraju Ibrahim haruna Sani Bawa Abubakar Salihu Abubakar Salihu Abubakar Chugin Sae’ed Abubakjar

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Safiya Umaru Abubkar Sale Toro Salihu Bahebni Mijri Sa’a Labi Salihu Muhammed Sae’ed Kutu Shuabu Inuwa Safiyyanu Yahaya Sale Idris Sani Adamu Shuaibu Adamu Shehu mai - inji Suleiman Ipalam Suleiman Rauwa Tanko Daru Timothy Galadima Tope Awobusuyi Tobosun Bolaji Turare Timothy Akinbola Tajudeen C. Elelubo Titi Akubu Tanko Ardo Tahiru Rap Tamba Jumbo T.Y. Daru Toma Yakubu Tomba Jumba Tahir Muhammad Tahir Ibrahim Tanko Mallam Sale Tanko Hardo Murdimi Umar Jibrin Umar Abubakar Ummi Mohammadu Umar Hussaini Abubakar Umaru A.N. Bassa Umar Ibrahim Useini Lawal Umaru Zakari Usaini Dilali Usman Abubakar Umar Musa Umaru Ang. Rukuba Usman Mai Nama Umar Jibrin Nakuru Umar Shagari Abubakar Umar Ismail

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Umar Abubakar Usman Buba Mohd Umar Hussaini Abubakar Uba Tela Umaru Mairake Umar Usman Mohd Useini Labi Vitalis Oduh Wakili Sambo Ibrahim W.O II John Dudapo Wakili Sambo Fobur Yaro Sani Yakubu Arigi Yakubu Musa Wakili Yunusa Abubakar Yuguda Baraya Yeguda Pitidau Yohanna Musa manjei Yusuf Muhammad Yakubu Dagwom Yamai Daniel Yakubu Vwang Yohanna Yakubu Yakubu Isa Yusuf Danjummai Yusuf Mohd Sani Yusuf Abubakar Yunusa Auwal Mai sugar Yahuza Suleiman Yahuza Suleiman Yahuza Suleiman Rikkos Yakubu Alh. Lawandi Yau Ahmadu Yusuf Maiwada Yusuf Yahaya Yunusa Abubakar Yakubu Bahago Yujula Baraya Yakubu Ismaila 760. Ya’u Idris 761. Zakar S. Zakka 762. Zakariyya Markus 763. Zakari Jutu 764. Zakari Usman 765. Zakari Umar

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766. Zakari Usaini 767. Zakari Aliyu 768. Zainab Ismaila 769. Zainab Usman 770. Zakari Ya’u Mai inji.

Government View: Government notes. 5.2 Individuals and organisations made a total claim of N3,369,716,404.95 arising

from damage to property as listed below:

S/N MEMO NO./AUTHORS PROPERTY DESTROYED

VALUE

1 19/2001 - (Exh. N) G.N. Ugbaja (CW.10)

Car N136,000.00

2 24/2001 - (Exh.16) Rtd CSP Audu Bokkos (CW. 24)

3 Bedroom Bungalow, kitchen, boys quarters and their entire household property burnt

N3,428,600.00

3 25/2001 - Exh. Q) Joseph Keyden Gwankat (CW 13).

Houses, furniture, electronics, cash, wears, ware etc of 78 members completely burnt and destroyed

N17,563,850.00

4 30/2001 - Exh.5) Catholic Archdiocese of Jos - Very Rev. Fr. Stephen Achuf Atawal (CW 18).

Partly burnt Churches, Parish home and their contents and vehicles

N25,000,000.00

5 34/2001 - (Exh.102) James D. Dung (CW. 63)

Hotel Complex burnt down N6,926,400.00

6 39/2001 - (Exh. 54) Chief Barr. J.A. Ogudogu

Residential houses, law office, books, cars and other properties burnt

N78,600,000.00

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7 49/2001 - (Exh. 33) Polycarp C. Nwadike (CW.32)

Cars, good and cash destroyed and looted

N375,000.00

8 52/2001 - (Exh. 96) Anglican Diocese of Jos, Emmanuel bayode (CW 59)

Houses, cars and properties of 109 members destroyed

N76,003,754.00

9 53/2001 - (Exh. 35) Yoruba Community Jos

Houses, vehicles, business premises and personal materials of some members

N105,114,531.00

10 54/2001 - (Exh. 45) Abdulkareem Adesokan - (CW 37)

Houses and household materials destroyed

N2,368,750.00

11 62/2001 - (Exh. 160) Bishop Benjamin Kwashi (CW.95)

Churches, properties of Churches and members destroyed

N407,523,779.70

12 65/2001 - (Exh. 19) Associate Prof. P.H. Mailumo (CW.25)

Car destroyed N400,000.00

13 67/2001 - (Exh. 470) Berom Elders Council - Yusufu Dawang (CW 274)

Houses, Vehicles, Foodstuff, Livestock, Household valuable etc

N800,000.00

14 71/2001 - (Exh. 78) - Alh. Hassan Zakari Biu (CW.50)

Vehicles, House and Household valuable destroyed

N16,000.000.00

15 72/2001 - (Exh. 20) - Gyel District, John Nyam - (CW 51)

Houses, Vehicles, livestock, household valuables etc

N211,767,880.00

16 73/2001 - (Exh. 86) Mr. Dominic U. Okorie (CW 56)

Business premises and content burnt

N759,580.00

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17 74/2001 - (Exh. 267) Stephen Gyang Dagwom Bun (C.W 160)

House, household, valuables, vehicle, motorcycle, sewing machine etc, looted and destroyed

N303,500.00

18 79/2001 - (Exh. 87) Dumjos (Nig.) Ltd - Chukwudum Josiah Maduneme - (CW 57)

Business Premises vandalized and looted

N8,302,000.00

19 95/2001 - (Exh. 81) Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association - Sale Bayeri (CW. 53)

Herds of cattle, sheep, goats, fowls, houses, vehicles, bicycles, water pumps, motor cycles, Mosques, educational institutions and household goods destroyed.

N366,913,982.00

20 96/2001 - Exh. 104) - Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

21 98/2001 - Exh. 134) Jimex De Omega (Nig.) Ltd - Chief Joseph Nnamdi Ejimbe - CW 75)

Business premises, vehicles and goods looted vandalized and destroyed.

N14,470,000.00

22 101/2001 - (Exh. 126) Clement Olajide

House and property destroyed

N1,863,100.00

23 110/2001 - Exh. 505) Kuru District - Monday Dalyop - (CW 301)

House, Livestock, vehicles, good and property destroyed

N19, 176,000.00

24 112/2001 - (Exh. 89) Second Hand Motor Dealers Assoc. Jos, Plateau State - Alh. Yahaya Kega - CW.58

Vehicles, Tyres, business premises and goods destroyed

N99,770,000.00

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25 113/2001 - (Exh. 340) - Alh. Bawa Abubakar - CW. 212

House vehicles and goods destroyed

N127,827,350.00

26 134/2001 - Exh. 379) Talatu Alh. Yakubu - (CW. 223)

House and property destroyed

N286,000.00

27 135/2001 - (Exh. ) Hajiya Maryam Abubakar - (CW 264)

Business premises and property destroyed

N2,156,000.00

28 136/2001 - (Exh. 227) Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria - Mohammed Umaru Yola - (CW.129)

Business premises, goods and vehicles destroyed

N79,266,336.25

29 137/2001 - (Exh. 352) Umar Adamu Gongola

House and property destroyed

N1,400,000.00

30 141/2001 - (Exh. 222) Hassan Umaru (CW 124)

House and property destroyed

N1,500,000.00

31 142/2001 - (Exh. 223) Ajibade Efuntoye - (CW 125)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N5,000,000.00

32 143/2001 - (Exh. 539) Da Micheal Pwajok Gyang -( CW. 321)

House and property destroyed

N16,267,685.00

33 145/2001 - Exh. 130) Romanus O. Uzoma - (CW 737)

Car destroyed N420,000.00

34 147/2001 - (Exh. 395) Dilimi Central Pharmacy Ltd - Chief B.O. Onwuchuruba - (CW 240)

Business premises and goods destroyed and vandalized.

N6,234,970.00

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35 148/2001 - (Exh. 140) Mr. Simon Duru - (CW.78)

House and goods destroyed N1,600,000.00

36 (i) 151/2001 (Exh. 142) Umaru Usaini (ii) 152/2001 (Exh. 143) Hamisu Musa (iii) 153/2001 (Exh. 144) Hassan Haladu (iv) 154/2001 (Exh. 145) Mallam Zakari Musa B.

Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt

N700,000.00 N400,000.00 N450,000.00 N500,000.00

37 161/2001 (Exh. 506) Pastor Chidiadi Chidi - (CW 302)

House looted N867,200.00

38 165/2001 (Exh. 163) Christopher Onyenankie (CW 91)

Property looted and destroyed

N266,500.00

39 168/2001 (Exh. 164) Chief Francis Nwanego - (CW.93)

Houses vandalized N300,000.00

40 171/2001 (Exh. 165) Isa Musa (CW 94)

Property destroyed N239,000.00

41 172/2001 (Exh. 529) Destroyed Dilimi Village - Alh. Mustapha M. Shittima

Houses and property destroyed

N146,887,793.00

42 174/2001 (Exh. 479) - Alh. Musa Bazza (CW 281)

House, Mosque and property destroyed

N294,900,000.00

43 181/2001 (Exh.312) Da Haruna Dakum

House and property destroyed

N5,348,442.00

44 184/2001 (Exh. 313) Hassan Suleiman Gaji - (CW 187)

Property destroyed N231,150.00

45 185/2001 (Exh. 314) Isa Mohammed (CW 188)

House and property vandalized

N300,000.00

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46 186/2001 (Exh.478) Da Samuel T. Dawap - (CW 380)

House and property destroyed

N12,043,467.00

47 190/2001 (Exh. 316) Usman Ibrahim (CW 190)

House destroyed N1,000,000.00

48 192/2001 (Exh. 345) Abdulkadir Muhammed (CW 214)

House and property destroyed

N1,299,000.00

49 199/2001 (Exh. 350) Chibuzo Nwaugo (CW 218)

Property destroyed N250,000.00

50 200/2001 (Exh. 351) Edwin Nwalozie (CW 219)

Property destroyed N1,785,000.00

51 201/2001 (Exh. 189) Augustine Ogburia - (CW 98)

Property destroyed N23,823,000.00

52 203/2001 (Exh. 192) Auwalu Bala (CW. 99)

House and goods burnt N500,000.00

53 204/2001 (Exh. 193) Magnus Okeke (CW 100)

House hold valuables destroyed

N450,100.00

54 205/2001 (Exh. 194) Geoffrey Osondu (CW.101)

Household valuables destroyed

N498,100.00

55 (i) 211/2001 (Exh. 320) Anthony Nwanede (CW 195) (ii) 215/2001 (Exh. 321) John N. Okeke (iii) 216/2001 (Exh. 322) Paulinus O. Ukwuoma

Property destroyed Business premises destroyed Property destroyed

N6,.705,200.00 N318,322.00 N1,084,200.00

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56 218/2001 (Exh. 275) Mrs. Cecilia E. Ekwuoma (CW 277)

House hold valuables destroyed

N4654,370.00

57 280/2001 (Exh. 503) Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Rev. Nanpon Longs Babaji (CW 299)

Properties destroyed N152,128,062.00

58 239/2001 (Exh. 550) Cherubim & Seraphim Church, Jos - Solomon Adeniran (CW 43)

Properties destroyed N14,681,623.00

59 248/2001 (Exh. 469) Abubakar Danladi Usman (CW.273)

Properties destroyed N41,414,900.00

60 259/2001 (Exh. 494) Alh. Shehu Mamman (CW 292)

Properties destroyed N94,900.00

61 268/2001 (Exh. 188) Sir Benard Awasoh (CW 97)

Properties destroyed N36,000.00

62 287/2001 (Exh. 122) ECWA Goodnews Church, Rev. David Laje (CW 69)

Properties destroyed N17,000.000.00

63 297/2001 (Exh. 399) Eze Okereke Eze (CW 242)

Properties destroyed N2,000,000.00

64 306/2001 (Exh. 420) Pankshin LGC - Emmanuel Yilluk (CW. 245)

Properties destroyed N26,467,000.00

65 316/2001 (Exh. 463) Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Plateau State - Alh. Alhassan Shuaibu (CW 270)

Properties destroyed State wide

N2,172,676,283.

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66 348/2001 (Exh. 228) Alh. Tanko Mohamed (CW 130)

Properties destroyed N2,300,000.00

67 350/2001 (Exh. 427) Alh. Shaibu Ahmodu

Properties destroyed N11,654,000.00

68 355/2001 (Exh. 229) Mavtex Aluminium Co Ltd - Moses M. Audu (CW. 131)

Properties destroyed N606,413.00

69 370/2001 (Exh. 342) Mrs. C. Udobi (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N869,400,00

70 371/2001 (Exh. 341) Mr. Jonathan Okpando (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N7,060,000.00

71 (i) 372/2001 (Exh. 343) Mr. Valentine Nwoye (CW 213) (ii) 375/2001 (Exh. 344) Mr. Chukwujekwu Onwuama

Business Premises and goods destroyed Vehicle destroyed

N1,090,100.00 N470,000.00

72 (i) 377/2001 (Exh. 324) Mr. C. Nwafor (CW 197) (ii) 378/2001 (Exh. 325) Mr. Sylvanus Udobi (iii) 380/2001 (Exh. 326) Francis Ndigwe

Properties destroyed Household properties burnt Business premises and goods destroyed

N135,000.00 N1,486,400.00 N2,000,000.00

73 389/2001 (Exh. 330) Stephen Ugwunna (CW 201)

House and property vandalized and destroyed

N1,519,200.00

74 390A/2001 (Exh. 327) Peter O. Amado (CW.198)

Household goods destroyed N487,500.00

75 408/2001 (Exh. 431) Emeka Azia (CW 253)

Business premises, machines and goods destroyed

N287,700.00

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76 409/2001 (Exh. 398) Alh. Sale Ibrahim Ganandaji

Household goods destroyed N2,276,410.00

77 417/2001 (Exh. 381) Alh. Shaibu Maidoya (CW 234)

House burnt N1,632,800.00

78 418/2001 (Exh. 473) Bala Alawa

Property destroyed N83,400.00

79 422/2001 (Exh. 353) Edwin Anolue (CW 221)

Business premises and goods burnt

N4,300,000.00

80 425/2001 (Exh. 432) Elder Manasseh Ngozi Amaliri (CW 254)

Household goods destroyed N4,045,000.00

81 427/2001 (Exh. 384) Mr. Michael Ozue (CW 238)

Goods vandalized (Tyres and tubes)

N1,151,000.00

82 428/2001 (Exh. 382) Mike Eziagba (CW 236)

Goods burnt or looted N550,000.00

83 429/2001 (Exh. 385) Innocent Okoye (CW 239)

Household goods destroyed N2,572,000.00

84 431/2001 (Exh. 443) Singer Tonyeleke (CW 257)

Household goods burnt and looted

N1,227,500.00

85 432/2001 (Exh. 430) Pharm. Shehu Ibrahim Sheni (CW 252)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N9,565,900.00

86 435/2001 (Exh. 477) Mr. Brendan Ihijirika (CW 279)

Business premises goods and household property destroyed

N403,800.00

87 437/2001 (Exh. 421) Mrs. Chukwu Perpetual (CW 246)

Business premises vandalized

N844,750.00

88 438/2001 (Exh. 383) Malama Sa’eed Sale (CW 237)

House, vehicle and valuables burnt.

N1,500,000.00

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89 449/2001 (Exh. 474) Robert Kwap (CW 276)

Household valuables and textbooks looted and burnt

N408,400.00

90 453/2001 (Exh. 445) Daniel Ikelionwu (CW 259)

House destroyed and business premises looted

N10,000,000.00

91 454/2001 (Exh. 446) Danaan Hygenius (CW 261)

Household goods and valuables, business equipments and building materials destroyed

N2,515,600.00

92 456/2001 (Exh. 496) Alh. Muhammed Dan Kawu (CW 294)

House burnt N861,000.00

93 03/2002 (Exh. 541) Irigwe Elders Forum Josiah K. Rabwo (CW 323)

Houses burnt, food stuff destroyed and properties destroyed

N19,000,000.00

94 77/2001 (Exh. 302) Dickson U.E. Uwagbama (CW 178)

House, business premises and goods burnt

N6,912,995.00

95 85/2001 (Exh. 173) Jol Community Riyom LGA - Bulus Audu Danke (CW 95)

Houses, and properties destroyed

N150,000.00

96 91/2001 (Exh. 104) Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

97 123/2001 (Exh. 276) Promises Ozadibe (CW 167)

House and household valuables destroyed

N1,049,000.00

98 128/2001 (Exh. 278) Alhaji Nalado Maiwada (CW 169)

Property destroyed N85,000.00

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99 129/2001 (Exh. 279) Edwin E. Anydika (CW 1170)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N1,327,500.00

100 158/2001 (Exh. 149) Ezeh Enyimulu Nwageokwu (CW 85)

House, vehilces and valuables burnt

N3,710,000.00

101 164/2001 (Exh. 153) Lawal Bellow (CW 89)

House destroyed N76,600.00

102 165/2001 (Exh.163) Christopher Onyemake (CW 91)

House and property destroyed

N266,500.00

103 209/2001 (Exh. 211) Mr. Anthony Omaghali (CW 115)

Business premises destroyed

N949,000.00

104 222/2001 (Exh. 225) Akilu Muhammed (CW 127)

Business premises destroyed

N450,000.00

105 246/2001 (Exh. 358) William Nimbut (CW 224)

Vehicle burnt N600,000.00

106 358/2001 (Exh. 204) Emmanuel Amoo (CW 111)

Business premises destroyed

N1,619,400.00

107 263/2001 (Exh. 205) Gyang Pam Chollom (CW 112)

House and goods burnt N15,000,000.00

108 264/2001 (Exh. 207) The Church of the Lord (Aladura) Deacon Olushola Ogun Tumehin (CW 113)

Church and Church valuables burnt

N1,118,558.70

109 116/2001 (Exh. 213) Mrs. Elizabeth Chima (CW 116)

Property destroyed N2,323,932.00

110 290/2001 (Exh. 201) Leonard Onwujobi

House destroyed N3,600,000.00

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111 299/2001 (Exh. 220) Alh. Usman Al (CW 122)

House and items burnt N800,000.00

112 317/2001 (Exh. 236) Maureen Iloka (CW 137)

Business premises, residence and properties destroyed

N37,400,000.00

113 343/2001 (Exh. 335) Labaran Musa (CW 207)

Trucks and Caterpillars burnt

N10,300,000.00

114 352/2001 (Exh. 305) John Okoro

Business premises and goods destroyed

N302,600.00

115 376/2001 (Exh. 298) Jeric Eye Hospital - Dr. Charles Madubuko (CW 176)

Business premises vandalized

N436,500.00

116 400/2001 (Exh. 301) Regina Uduagbomen (CW 177)

House and property destroyed

N304,300.00

117 430/2001 (Exh. 311) Mrs. Edere Obika (CW 185)

Motor cycles, electronics and household items destroyed

N700,000.00

118 444/2001 (Exh. 462) Mrs. Ruth Olaniyi (CW 269)

Properties destroyed N1,339,000.00

119 11/2001 (Exh. 23) Bolarinwa Alabi (CW 28)

Vehicle burnt and cash looted

N423,00.00

120 41/2001 (Exh. 31 & 546) Assemblies of God Church - Abel Daniel Ochigbo (CW 31)

Church properties and properties of members destroyed

N13,763,470.00

T O T A L N3,369,716,404.95

S/N MEMO NO./AUTHORS PROPERTY DESTROYED

VALUE

1 19/2001 - (Exh. N) G.N. Ugbaja (CW.10)

Car N136,000.00

2 24/2001 - (Exh.16) Rtd CSP Audu Bokkos (CW. 24)

3 Bedroom Bungalow, kitchen, boys quarters and their entire household property burnt

N3,428,600.00

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3 25/2001 - Exh. Q) Joseph Keyden Gwankat (CW 13).

Houses, furniture, electronics, cash, wears, ware etc of 78 members completely burnt and destroyed

N17,563,850.00

4 30/2001 - Exh.5) Catholic Archdiocese of Jos - Very Rev. Fr. Stephen Achuf Atawal (CW 18).

Partly burnt Churches, Parish home and their contents and vehicles

N25,000,000.00

5 34/2001 - (Exh.102) James D. Dung (CW. 63)

Hotel Complex burnt down N6,926,400.00

6 39/2001 - (Exh. 54) Chief Barr. J.A. Ogudogu

Residential houses, law office, books, cars and other properties burnt

N78,600,000.00

7 49/2001 - (Exh. 33) Polycarp C. Nwadike (CW.32)

Cars, good and cash destroyed and looted

N375,000.00

8 52/2001 - (Exh. 96) Anglican Diocese of Jos, Emmanuel bayode (CW 59)

Houses, cars and properties of 109 members destroyed

N76,003,754.00

9 53/2001 - (Exh. 35) Yoruba Community Jos

Houses, vehicles, business premises and personal materials of some members

N105,114,531.00

10 54/2001 - (Exh. 45) Abdulkareem Adesokan - (CW 37)

Houses and household materials destroyed

N2,368,750.00

11 62/2001 - (Exh. 160) Bishop Benjamin Kwashi (CW.95)

Churches, properties of Churches and members destroyed

N407,523,779.70

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12 65/2001 - (Exh. 19) Associate Prof. P.H. Mailumo (CW.25)

Car destroyed N400,000.00

13 67/2001 - (Exh. 470) Berom Elders Council - Yusufu Dawang (CW 274)

Houses, Vehicles, Foodstuff, Livestock, Household valuable etc

N800,000.00

14 71/2001 - (Exh. 78) - Alh. Hassan Zakari Biu (CW.50)

Vehicles, House and Household valuable destroyed

N16,000.000.00

15 72/2001 - (Exh. 20) - Gyel District, John Nyam - (CW 51)

Houses, Vehicles, livestock, household valuables etc

N211,767,880.00

16 73/2001 - (Exh. 86) Mr. Dominic U. Okorie (CW 56)

Business premises and content burnt

N759,580.00

17 74/2001 - (Exh. 267) Stephen Gyang Dagwom Bun (C.W 160)

House, household, valuables, vehicle, motorcycle, sewing machine etc, looted and destroyed

N303,500.00

18 79/2001 - (Exh. 87) Dumjos (Nig.) Ltd - Chukwudum Josiah Maduneme - (CW 57)

Business Premises vandalized and looted

N8,302,000.00

19 95/2001 - (Exh. 81) Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association - Sale Bayeri (CW. 53)

Herds of cattle, sheep, goats, fowls, houses, vehicles, bicycles, water pumps, motor cycles, Mosques, educational institutions and household goods destroyed.

N366,913,982.00

20 96/2001 - Exh. 104) - Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

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21 98/2001 - Exh. 134) Jimex De Omega (Nig.) Ltd - Chief Joseph Nnamdi Ejimbe - CW 75)

Business premises, vehicles and goods looted vandalized and destroyed.

N14,470,000.00

22 101/2001 - (Exh. 126) Clement Olajide

House and property destroyed

N1,863,100.00

23 110/2001 - Exh. 505) Kuru District - Monday Dalyop - (CW 301)

House, Livestock, vehicles, good and property destroyed

N19, 176,000.00

24 112/2001 - (Exh. 89) Second Hand Motor Dealers Assoc. Jos, Plateau State - Alh. Yahaya Kega - CW.58

Vehicles, Tyres, business premises and goods destroyed

N99,770,000.00

25 113/2001 - (Exh. 340) - Alh. Bawa Abubakar - CW. 212

House vehicles and goods destroyed

N127,827,350.00

26 134/2001 - Exh. 379) Talatu Alh. Yakubu - (CW. 223)

House and property destroyed

N286,000.00

27 135/2001 - (Exh. ) Hajiya Maryam Abubakar - (CW 264)

Business premises and property destroyed

N2,156,000.00

28 136/2001 - (Exh. 227) Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria - Mohammed Umaru Yola - (CW.129)

Business premises, goods and vehicles destroyed

N79,266,336.25

29 137/2001 - (Exh. 352) Umar Adamu Gongola

House and property destroyed

N1,400,000.00

30 141/2001 - (Exh. 222) Hassan Umaru (CW 124)

House and property destroyed

N1,500,000.00

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31 142/2001 - (Exh. 223) Ajibade Efuntoye - (CW 125)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N5,000,000.00

32 143/2001 - (Exh. 539) Da Micheal Pwajok Gyang -( CW. 321)

House and property destroyed

N16,267,685.00

33 145/2001 - Exh. 130) Romanus O. Uzoma - (CW 737)

Car destroyed N420,000.00

34 147/2001 - (Exh. 395) Dilimi Central Pharmacy Ltd - Chief B.O. Onwuchuruba - (CW 240)

Business premises and goods destroyed and vandalized.

N6,234,970.00

35 148/2001 - (Exh. 140) Mr. Simon Duru - (CW.78)

House and goods destroyed N1,600,000.00

36 (i) 151/2001 (Exh. 142) Umaru Usaini (ii) 152/2001 (Exh. 143) Hamisu Musa (iii) 153/2001 (Exh. 144) Hassan Haladu (iv) 154/2001 (Exh. 145) Mallam Zakari Musa B.

Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt

N700,000.00 N400,000.00 N450,000.00 N500,000.00

37 161/2001 (Exh. 506) Pastor Chidiadi Chidi - (CW 302)

House looted N867,200.00

38 165/2001 (Exh. 163) Christopher Onyenankie (CW 91)

Property looted and destroyed

N266,500.00

39 168/2001 (Exh. 164) Chief Francis Nwanego - (CW.93)

Houses vandalized N300,000.00

40 171/2001 (Exh. 165) Isa Musa (CW 94)

Property destroyed N239,000.00

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41 172/2001 (Exh. 529) Destroyed Dilimi Village - Alh. Mustapha M. Shittima

Houses and property destroyed

N146,887,793.00

42 174/2001 (Exh. 479) - Alh. Musa Bazza (CW 281)

House, Mosque and property destroyed

N294,900,000.00

43 181/2001 (Exh.312) Da Haruna Dakum

House and property destroyed

N5,348,442.00

44 184/2001 (Exh. 313) Hassan Suleiman Gaji - (CW 187)

Property destroyed N231,150.00

45 185/2001 (Exh. 314) Isa Mohammed (CW 188)

House and property vandalized

N300,000.00

46 186/2001 (Exh.478) Da Samuel T. Dawap - (CW 380)

House and property destroyed

N12,043,467.00

47 190/2001 (Exh. 316) Usman Ibrahim (CW 190)

House destroyed N1,000,000.00

48 192/2001 (Exh. 345) Abdulkadir Muhammed (CW 214)

House and property destroyed

N1,299,000.00

49 199/2001 (Exh. 350) Chibuzo Nwaugo (CW 218)

Property destroyed N250,000.00

50 200/2001 (Exh. 351) Edwin Nwalozie (CW 219)

Property destroyed N1,785,000.00

51 201/2001 (Exh. 189) Augustine Ogburia - (CW 98)

Property destroyed N23,823,000.00

52 203/2001 (Exh. 192) Auwalu Bala (CW. 99)

House and goods burnt N500,000.00

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53 204/2001 (Exh. 193) Magnus Okeke (CW 100)

House hold valuables destroyed

N450,100.00

54 205/2001 (Exh. 194) Geoffrey Osondu (CW.101)

Household valuables destroyed

N498,100.00

55 (i) 211/2001 (Exh. 320) Anthony Nwanede (CW 195) (ii) 215/2001 (Exh. 321) John N. Okeke (iii) 216/2001 (Exh. 322) Paulinus O. Ukwuoma

Property destroyed Business premises destroyed Property destroyed

N6,.705,200.00 N318,322.00 N1,084,200.00

56 218/2001 (Exh. 275) Mrs. Cecilia E. Ekwuoma (CW 277)

House hold valuables destroyed

N4654,370.00

57 280/2001 (Exh. 503) Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Rev. Nanpon Longs Babaji (CW 299)

Properties destroyed N152,128,062.00

58 239/2001 (Exh. 550) Cherubim & Seraphim Church, Jos - Solomon Adeniran (CW 43)

Properties destroyed N14,681,623.00

59 248/2001 (Exh. 469) Abubakar Danladi Usman (CW.273)

Properties destroyed N41,414,900.00

60 259/2001 (Exh. 494) Alh. Shehu Mamman (CW 292)

Properties destroyed N94,900.00

61 268/2001 (Exh. 188) Sir Benard Awasoh (CW 97)

Properties destroyed N36,000.00

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62 287/2001 (Exh. 122) ECWA Goodnews Church, Rev. David Laje (CW 69)

Properties destroyed N17,000.000.00

63 297/2001 (Exh. 399) Eze Okereke Eze (CW 242)

Properties destroyed N2,000,000.00

64 306/2001 (Exh. 420) Pankshin LGC - Emmanuel Yilluk (CW. 245)

Properties destroyed N26,467,000.00

65 316/2001 (Exh. 463) Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Plateau State - Alh. Alhassan Shuaibu (CW 270)

Properties destroyed State wide

N2,172,676,283.

66 348/2001 (Exh. 228) Alh. Tanko Mohamed (CW 130)

Properties destroyed N2,300,000.00

67 350/2001 (Exh. 427) Alh. Shaibu Ahmodu

Properties destroyed N11,654,000.00

68 355/2001 (Exh. 229) Mavtex Aluminium Co Ltd - Moses M. Audu (CW. 131)

Properties destroyed N606,413.00

69 370/2001 (Exh. 342) Mrs. C. Udobi (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N869,400,00

70 371/2001 (Exh. 341) Mr. Jonathan Okpando (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N7,060,000.00

71 (i) 372/2001 (Exh. 343) Mr. Valentine Nwoye (CW 213) (ii) 375/2001 (Exh. 344) Mr. Chukwujekwu Onwuama

Business Premises and goods destroyed Vehicle destroyed

N1,090,100.00 N470,000.00

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72 (i) 377/2001 (Exh. 324) Mr. C. Nwafor (CW 197) (ii) 378/2001 (Exh. 325) Mr. Sylvanus Udobi (iii) 380/2001 (Exh. 326) Francis Ndigwe

Properties destroyed Household properties burnt Business premises and goods destroyed

N135,000.00 N1,486,400.00 N2,000,000.00

73 389/2001 (Exh. 330) Stephen Ugwunna (CW 201)

House and property vandalized and destroyed

N1,519,200.00

74 390A/2001 (Exh. 327) Peter O. Amado (CW.198)

Household goods destroyed N487,500.00

75 408/2001 (Exh. 431) Emeka Azia (CW 253)

Business premises, machines and goods destroyed

N287,700.00

76 409/2001 (Exh. 398) Alh. Sale Ibrahim Ganandaji

Household goods destroyed N2,276,410.00

77 417/2001 (Exh. 381) Alh. Shaibu Maidoya (CW 234)

House burnt N1,632,800.00

78 418/2001 (Exh. 473) Bala Alawa

Property destroyed N83,400.00

79 422/2001 (Exh. 353) Edwin Anolue (CW 221)

Business premises and goods burnt

N4,300,000.00

80 425/2001 (Exh. 432) Elder Manasseh Ngozi Amaliri (CW 254)

Household goods destroyed N4,045,000.00

81 427/2001 (Exh. 384) Mr. Michael Ozue (CW 238)

Goods vandalized (Tyres and tubes)

N1,151,000.00

82 428/2001 (Exh. 382) Mike Eziagba (CW 236)

Goods burnt or looted N550,000.00

83 429/2001 (Exh. 385) Innocent Okoye (CW 239)

Household goods destroyed N2,572,000.00

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84 431/2001 (Exh. 443) Singer Tonyeleke (CW 257)

Household goods burnt and looted

N1,227,500.00

85 432/2001 (Exh. 430) Pharm. Shehu Ibrahim Sheni (CW 252)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N9,565,900.00

86 435/2001 (Exh. 477) Mr. Brendan Ihijirika (CW 279)

Business premises goods and household property destroyed

N403,800.00

87 437/2001 (Exh. 421) Mrs. Chukwu Perpetual (CW 246)

Business premises vandalized

N844,750.00

88 438/2001 (Exh. 383) Malama Sa’eed Sale (CW 237)

House, vehicle and valuables burnt.

N1,500,000.00

89 449/2001 (Exh. 474) Robert Kwap (CW 276)

Household valuables and textbooks looted and burnt

N408,400.00

90 453/2001 (Exh. 445) Daniel Ikelionwu (CW 259)

House destroyed and business premises looted

N10,000,000.00

91 454/2001 (Exh. 446) Danaan Hygenius (CW 261)

Household goods and valuables, business equipments and building materials destroyed

N2,515,600.00

92 456/2001 (Exh. 496) Alh. Muhammed Dan Kawu (CW 294)

House burnt N861,000.00

93 03/2002 (Exh. 541) Irigwe Elders Forum Josiah K. Rabwo (CW 323)

Houses burnt, food stuff destroyed and properties destroyed

N19,000,000.00

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94 77/2001 (Exh. 302) Dickson U.E. Uwagbama (CW 178)

House, business premises and goods burnt

N6,912,995.00

95 85/2001 (Exh. 173) Jol Community Riyom LGA - Bulus Audu Danke (CW 95)

Houses, and properties destroyed

N150,000.00

96 91/2001 (Exh. 104) Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

97 123/2001 (Exh. 276) Promises Ozadibe (CW 167)

House and household valuables destroyed

N1,049,000.00

98 128/2001 (Exh. 278) Alhaji Nalado Maiwada (CW 169)

Property destroyed N85,000.00

99 129/2001 (Exh. 279) Edwin E. Anydika (CW 1170)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N1,327,500.00

100 158/2001 (Exh. 149) Ezeh Enyimulu Nwageokwu (CW 85)

House, vehilces and valuables burnt

N3,710,000.00

101 164/2001 (Exh. 153) Lawal Bellow (CW 89)

House destroyed N76,600.00

102 165/2001 (Exh.163) Christopher Onyemake (CW 91)

House and property destroyed

N266,500.00

103 209/2001 (Exh. 211) Mr. Anthony Omaghali (CW 115)

Business premises destroyed

N949,000.00

104 222/2001 (Exh. 225) Akilu Muhammed (CW 127)

Business premises destroyed

N450,000.00

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105 246/2001 (Exh. 358) William Nimbut (CW 224)

Vehicle burnt N600,000.00

106 358/2001 (Exh. 204) Emmanuel Amoo (CW 111)

Business premises destroyed

N1,619,400.00

107 263/2001 (Exh. 205) Gyang Pam Chollom (CW 112)

House and goods burnt N15,000,000.00

108 264/2001 (Exh. 207) The Church of the Lord (Aladura) Deacon Olushola Ogun Tumehin (CW 113)

Church and Church valuables burnt

N1,118,558.70

109 116/2001 (Exh. 213) Mrs. Elizabeth Chima (CW 116)

Property destroyed N2,323,932.00

110 290/2001 (Exh. 201) Leonard Onwujobi

House destroyed N3,600,000.00

111 299/2001 (Exh. 220) Alh. Usman Al (CW 122)

House and items burnt N800,000.00

112 317/2001 (Exh. 236) Maureen Iloka (CW 137)

Business premises, residence and properties destroyed

N37,400,000.00

113 343/2001 (Exh. 335) Labaran Musa (CW 207)

Trucks and Caterpillars burnt

N10,300,000.00

114 352/2001 (Exh. 305) John Okoro

Business premises and goods destroyed

N302,600.00

115 376/2001 (Exh. 298) Jeric Eye Hospital - Dr. Charles Madubuko (CW 176)

Business premises vandalized

N436,500.00

116 400/2001 (Exh. 301) Regina Uduagbomen (CW 177)

House and property destroyed

N304,300.00

117 430/2001 (Exh. 311) Mrs. Edere Obika (CW 185)

Motor cycles, electronics and household items destroyed

N700,000.00

118 444/2001 (Exh. 462) Mrs. Ruth Olaniyi (CW 269)

Properties destroyed N1,339,000.00

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119 11/2001 (Exh. 23) Bolarinwa Alabi (CW 28)

Vehicle burnt and cash looted

N423,00.00

120 41/2001 (Exh. 31 & 546) Assemblies of God Church - Abel Daniel Ochigbo (CW 31)

Church properties and properties of members destroyed

N13,763,470.00

T O T A L N3,369,716,404.95

S/N MEMO NO./AUTHORS PROPERTY DESTROYED

VALUE

1 19/2001 - (Exh. N) G.N. Ugbaja (CW.10)

Car N136,000.00

2 24/2001 - (Exh.16) Rtd CSP Audu Bokkos (CW. 24)

3 Bedroom Bungalow, kitchen, boys quarters and their entire household property burnt

N3,428,600.00

3 25/2001 - Exh. Q) Joseph Keyden Gwankat (CW 13).

Houses, furniture, electronics, cash, wears, ware etc of 78 members completely burnt and destroyed

N17,563,850.00

4 30/2001 - Exh.5) Catholic Archdiocese of Jos - Very Rev. Fr. Stephen Achuf Atawal (CW 18).

Partly burnt Churches, Parish home and their contents and vehicles

N25,000,000.00

5 34/2001 - (Exh.102) James D. Dung (CW. 63)

Hotel Complex burnt down N6,926,400.00

6 39/2001 - (Exh. 54) Chief Barr. J.A. Ogudogu

Residential houses, law office, books, cars and other properties burnt

N78,600,000.00

7 49/2001 - (Exh. 33) Polycarp C. Nwadike (CW.32)

Cars, good and cash destroyed and looted

N375,000.00

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8 52/2001 - (Exh. 96) Anglican Diocese of Jos, Emmanuel bayode (CW 59)

Houses, cars and properties of 109 members destroyed

N76,003,754.00

9 53/2001 - (Exh. 35) Yoruba Community Jos

Houses, vehicles, business premises and personal materials of some members

N105,114,531.00

10 54/2001 - (Exh. 45) Abdulkareem Adesokan - (CW 37)

Houses and household materials destroyed

N2,368,750.00

11 62/2001 - (Exh. 160) Bishop Benjamin Kwashi (CW.95)

Churches, properties of Churches and members destroyed

N407,523,779.70

12 65/2001 - (Exh. 19) Associate Prof. P.H. Mailumo (CW.25)

Car destroyed N400,000.00

13 67/2001 - (Exh. 470) Berom Elders Council - Yusufu Dawang (CW 274)

Houses, Vehicles, Foodstuff, Livestock, Household valuable etc

N800,000.00

14 71/2001 - (Exh. 78) - Alh. Hassan Zakari Biu (CW.50)

Vehicles, House and Household valuable destroyed

N16,000.000.00

15 72/2001 - (Exh. 20) - Gyel District, John Nyam - (CW 51)

Houses, Vehicles, livestock, household valuables etc

N211,767,880.00

16 73/2001 - (Exh. 86) Mr. Dominic U. Okorie (CW 56)

Business premises and content burnt

N759,580.00

17 74/2001 - (Exh. 267) Stephen Gyang Dagwom Bun (C.W 160)

House, household, valuables, vehicle, motorcycle, sewing machine etc, looted and destroyed

N303,500.00

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18 79/2001 - (Exh. 87) Dumjos (Nig.) Ltd - Chukwudum Josiah Maduneme - (CW 57)

Business Premises vandalized and looted

N8,302,000.00

19 95/2001 - (Exh. 81) Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association - Sale Bayeri (CW. 53)

Herds of cattle, sheep, goats, fowls, houses, vehicles, bicycles, water pumps, motor cycles, Mosques, educational institutions and household goods destroyed.

N366,913,982.00

20 96/2001 - Exh. 104) - Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

21 98/2001 - Exh. 134) Jimex De Omega (Nig.) Ltd - Chief Joseph Nnamdi Ejimbe - CW 75)

Business premises, vehicles and goods looted vandalized and destroyed.

N14,470,000.00

22 101/2001 - (Exh. 126) Clement Olajide

House and property destroyed

N1,863,100.00

23 110/2001 - Exh. 505) Kuru District - Monday Dalyop - (CW 301)

House, Livestock, vehicles, good and property destroyed

N19, 176,000.00

24 112/2001 - (Exh. 89) Second Hand Motor Dealers Assoc. Jos, Plateau State - Alh. Yahaya Kega - CW.58

Vehicles, Tyres, business premises and goods destroyed

N99,770,000.00

25 113/2001 - (Exh. 340) - Alh. Bawa Abubakar - CW. 212

House vehicles and goods destroyed

N127,827,350.00

26 134/2001 - Exh. 379) Talatu Alh. Yakubu - (CW. 223)

House and property destroyed

N286,000.00

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27 135/2001 - (Exh. ) Hajiya Maryam Abubakar - (CW 264)

Business premises and property destroyed

N2,156,000.00

28 136/2001 - (Exh. 227) Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria - Mohammed Umaru Yola - (CW.129)

Business premises, goods and vehicles destroyed

N79,266,336.25

29 137/2001 - (Exh. 352) Umar Adamu Gongola

House and property destroyed

N1,400,000.00

30 141/2001 - (Exh. 222) Hassan Umaru (CW 124)

House and property destroyed

N1,500,000.00

31 142/2001 - (Exh. 223) Ajibade Efuntoye - (CW 125)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N5,000,000.00

32 143/2001 - (Exh. 539) Da Micheal Pwajok Gyang -( CW. 321)

House and property destroyed

N16,267,685.00

33 145/2001 - Exh. 130) Romanus O. Uzoma - (CW 737)

Car destroyed N420,000.00

34 147/2001 - (Exh. 395) Dilimi Central Pharmacy Ltd - Chief B.O. Onwuchuruba - (CW 240)

Business premises and goods destroyed and vandalized.

N6,234,970.00

35 148/2001 - (Exh. 140) Mr. Simon Duru - (CW.78)

House and goods destroyed N1,600,000.00

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36 (i) 151/2001 (Exh. 142) Umaru Usaini (ii) 152/2001 (Exh. 143) Hamisu Musa (iii) 153/2001 (Exh. 144) Hassan Haladu (iv) 154/2001 (Exh. 145) Mallam Zakari Musa B.

Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt

N700,000.00 N400,000.00 N450,000.00 N500,000.00

37 161/2001 (Exh. 506) Pastor Chidiadi Chidi - (CW 302)

House looted N867,200.00

38 165/2001 (Exh. 163) Christopher Onyenankie (CW 91)

Property looted and destroyed

N266,500.00

39 168/2001 (Exh. 164) Chief Francis Nwanego - (CW.93)

Houses vandalized N300,000.00

40 171/2001 (Exh. 165) Isa Musa (CW 94)

Property destroyed N239,000.00

41 172/2001 (Exh. 529) Destroyed Dilimi Village - Alh. Mustapha M. Shittima

Houses and property destroyed

N146,887,793.00

42 174/2001 (Exh. 479) - Alh. Musa Bazza (CW 281)

House, Mosque and property destroyed

N294,900,000.00

43 181/2001 (Exh.312) Da Haruna Dakum

House and property destroyed

N5,348,442.00

44 184/2001 (Exh. 313) Hassan Suleiman Gaji - (CW 187)

Property destroyed N231,150.00

45 185/2001 (Exh. 314) Isa Mohammed (CW 188)

House and property vandalized

N300,000.00

46 186/2001 (Exh.478) Da Samuel T. Dawap - (CW 380)

House and property destroyed

N12,043,467.00

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47 190/2001 (Exh. 316) Usman Ibrahim (CW 190)

House destroyed N1,000,000.00

48 192/2001 (Exh. 345) Abdulkadir Muhammed (CW 214)

House and property destroyed

N1,299,000.00

49 199/2001 (Exh. 350) Chibuzo Nwaugo (CW 218)

Property destroyed N250,000.00

50 200/2001 (Exh. 351) Edwin Nwalozie (CW 219)

Property destroyed N1,785,000.00

51 201/2001 (Exh. 189) Augustine Ogburia - (CW 98)

Property destroyed N23,823,000.00

52 203/2001 (Exh. 192) Auwalu Bala (CW. 99)

House and goods burnt N500,000.00

53 204/2001 (Exh. 193) Magnus Okeke (CW 100)

House hold valuables destroyed

N450,100.00

54 205/2001 (Exh. 194) Geoffrey Osondu (CW.101)

Household valuables destroyed

N498,100.00

55 (i) 211/2001 (Exh. 320) Anthony Nwanede (CW 195) (ii) 215/2001 (Exh. 321) John N. Okeke (iii) 216/2001 (Exh. 322) Paulinus O. Ukwuoma

Property destroyed Business premises destroyed Property destroyed

N6,.705,200.00 N318,322.00 N1,084,200.00

56 218/2001 (Exh. 275) Mrs. Cecilia E. Ekwuoma (CW 277)

House hold valuables destroyed

N4654,370.00

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57 280/2001 (Exh. 503) Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Rev. Nanpon Longs Babaji (CW 299)

Properties destroyed N152,128,062.00

58 239/2001 (Exh. 550) Cherubim & Seraphim Church, Jos - Solomon Adeniran (CW 43)

Properties destroyed N14,681,623.00

59 248/2001 (Exh. 469) Abubakar Danladi Usman (CW.273)

Properties destroyed N41,414,900.00

60 259/2001 (Exh. 494) Alh. Shehu Mamman (CW 292)

Properties destroyed N94,900.00

61 268/2001 (Exh. 188) Sir Benard Awasoh (CW 97)

Properties destroyed N36,000.00

62 287/2001 (Exh. 122) ECWA Goodnews Church, Rev. David Laje (CW 69)

Properties destroyed N17,000.000.00

63 297/2001 (Exh. 399) Eze Okereke Eze (CW 242)

Properties destroyed N2,000,000.00

64 306/2001 (Exh. 420) Pankshin LGC - Emmanuel Yilluk (CW. 245)

Properties destroyed N26,467,000.00

65 316/2001 (Exh. 463) Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Plateau State - Alh. Alhassan Shuaibu (CW 270)

Properties destroyed State wide

N2,172,676,283.

66 348/2001 (Exh. 228) Alh. Tanko Mohamed (CW 130)

Properties destroyed N2,300,000.00

67 350/2001 (Exh. 427) Alh. Shaibu Ahmodu

Properties destroyed N11,654,000.00

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68 355/2001 (Exh. 229) Mavtex Aluminium Co Ltd - Moses M. Audu (CW. 131)

Properties destroyed N606,413.00

69 370/2001 (Exh. 342) Mrs. C. Udobi (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N869,400,00

70 371/2001 (Exh. 341) Mr. Jonathan Okpando (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N7,060,000.00

71 (i) 372/2001 (Exh. 343) Mr. Valentine Nwoye (CW 213) (ii) 375/2001 (Exh. 344) Mr. Chukwujekwu Onwuama

Business Premises and goods destroyed Vehicle destroyed

N1,090,100.00 N470,000.00

72 (i) 377/2001 (Exh. 324) Mr. C. Nwafor (CW 197) (ii) 378/2001 (Exh. 325) Mr. Sylvanus Udobi (iii) 380/2001 (Exh. 326) Francis Ndigwe

Properties destroyed Household properties burnt Business premises and goods destroyed

N135,000.00 N1,486,400.00 N2,000,000.00

73 389/2001 (Exh. 330) Stephen Ugwunna (CW 201)

House and property vandalized and destroyed

N1,519,200.00

74 390A/2001 (Exh. 327) Peter O. Amado (CW.198)

Household goods destroyed N487,500.00

75 408/2001 (Exh. 431) Emeka Azia (CW 253)

Business premises, machines and goods destroyed

N287,700.00

76 409/2001 (Exh. 398) Alh. Sale Ibrahim Ganandaji

Household goods destroyed N2,276,410.00

77 417/2001 (Exh. 381) Alh. Shaibu Maidoya (CW 234)

House burnt N1,632,800.00

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78 418/2001 (Exh. 473) Bala Alawa

Property destroyed N83,400.00

79 422/2001 (Exh. 353) Edwin Anolue (CW 221)

Business premises and goods burnt

N4,300,000.00

80 425/2001 (Exh. 432) Elder Manasseh Ngozi Amaliri (CW 254)

Household goods destroyed N4,045,000.00

81 427/2001 (Exh. 384) Mr. Michael Ozue (CW 238)

Goods vandalized (Tyres and tubes)

N1,151,000.00

82 428/2001 (Exh. 382) Mike Eziagba (CW 236)

Goods burnt or looted N550,000.00

83 429/2001 (Exh. 385) Innocent Okoye (CW 239)

Household goods destroyed N2,572,000.00

84 431/2001 (Exh. 443) Singer Tonyeleke (CW 257)

Household goods burnt and looted

N1,227,500.00

85 432/2001 (Exh. 430) Pharm. Shehu Ibrahim Sheni (CW 252)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N9,565,900.00

86 435/2001 (Exh. 477) Mr. Brendan Ihijirika (CW 279)

Business premises goods and household property destroyed

N403,800.00

87 437/2001 (Exh. 421) Mrs. Chukwu Perpetual (CW 246)

Business premises vandalized

N844,750.00

88 438/2001 (Exh. 383) Malama Sa’eed Sale (CW 237)

House, vehicle and valuables burnt.

N1,500,000.00

89 449/2001 (Exh. 474) Robert Kwap (CW 276)

Household valuables and textbooks looted and burnt

N408,400.00

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90 453/2001 (Exh. 445) Daniel Ikelionwu (CW 259)

House destroyed and business premises looted

N10,000,000.00

91 454/2001 (Exh. 446) Danaan Hygenius (CW 261)

Household goods and valuables, business equipments and building materials destroyed

N2,515,600.00

92 456/2001 (Exh. 496) Alh. Muhammed Dan Kawu (CW 294)

House burnt N861,000.00

93 03/2002 (Exh. 541) Irigwe Elders Forum Josiah K. Rabwo (CW 323)

Houses burnt, food stuff destroyed and properties destroyed

N19,000,000.00

94 77/2001 (Exh. 302) Dickson U.E. Uwagbama (CW 178)

House, business premises and goods burnt

N6,912,995.00

95 85/2001 (Exh. 173) Jol Community Riyom LGA - Bulus Audu Danke (CW 95)

Houses, and properties destroyed

N150,000.00

96 91/2001 (Exh. 104) Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

97 123/2001 (Exh. 276) Promises Ozadibe (CW 167)

House and household valuables destroyed

N1,049,000.00

98 128/2001 (Exh. 278) Alhaji Nalado Maiwada (CW 169)

Property destroyed N85,000.00

99 129/2001 (Exh. 279) Edwin E. Anydika (CW 1170)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N1,327,500.00

100 158/2001 (Exh. 149) Ezeh Enyimulu Nwageokwu (CW 85)

House, vehilces and valuables burnt

N3,710,000.00

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101 164/2001 (Exh. 153) Lawal Bellow (CW 89)

House destroyed N76,600.00

102 165/2001 (Exh.163) Christopher Onyemake (CW 91)

House and property destroyed

N266,500.00

103 209/2001 (Exh. 211) Mr. Anthony Omaghali (CW 115)

Business premises destroyed

N949,000.00

104 222/2001 (Exh. 225) Akilu Muhammed (CW 127)

Business premises destroyed

N450,000.00

105 246/2001 (Exh. 358) William Nimbut (CW 224)

Vehicle burnt N600,000.00

106 358/2001 (Exh. 204) Emmanuel Amoo (CW 111)

Business premises destroyed

N1,619,400.00

107 263/2001 (Exh. 205) Gyang Pam Chollom (CW 112)

House and goods burnt N15,000,000.00

108 264/2001 (Exh. 207) The Church of the Lord (Aladura) Deacon Olushola Ogun Tumehin (CW 113)

Church and Church valuables burnt

N1,118,558.70

109 116/2001 (Exh. 213) Mrs. Elizabeth Chima (CW 116)

Property destroyed N2,323,932.00

110 290/2001 (Exh. 201) Leonard Onwujobi

House destroyed N3,600,000.00

111 299/2001 (Exh. 220) Alh. Usman Al (CW 122)

House and items burnt N800,000.00

112 317/2001 (Exh. 236) Maureen Iloka (CW 137)

Business premises, residence and properties destroyed

N37,400,000.00

113 343/2001 (Exh. 335) Labaran Musa (CW 207)

Trucks and Caterpillars burnt

N10,300,000.00

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114 352/2001 (Exh. 305) John Okoro

Business premises and goods destroyed

N302,600.00

115 376/2001 (Exh. 298) Jeric Eye Hospital - Dr. Charles Madubuko (CW 176)

Business premises vandalized

N436,500.00

116 400/2001 (Exh. 301) Regina Uduagbomen (CW 177)

House and property destroyed

N304,300.00

117 430/2001 (Exh. 311) Mrs. Edere Obika (CW 185)

Motor cycles, electronics and household items destroyed

N700,000.00

118 444/2001 (Exh. 462) Mrs. Ruth Olaniyi (CW 269)

Properties destroyed N1,339,000.00

119 11/2001 (Exh. 23) Bolarinwa Alabi (CW 28)

Vehicle burnt and cash looted

N423,00.00

120 41/2001 (Exh. 31 & 546) Assemblies of God Church - Abel Daniel Ochigbo (CW 31)

Church properties and properties of members destroyed

N13,763,470.00

T O T A L N3,369,716,404.95

S/N MEMO NO./AUTHORS PROPERTY DESTROYED

VALUE

1 19/2001 - (Exh. N) G.N. Ugbaja (CW.10)

Car N136,000.00

2 24/2001 - (Exh.16) Rtd CSP Audu Bokkos (CW. 24)

3 Bedroom Bungalow, kitchen, boys quarters and their entire household property burnt

N3,428,600.00

3 25/2001 - Exh. Q) Joseph Keyden Gwankat (CW 13).

Houses, furniture, electronics, cash, wears, ware etc of 78 members completely burnt and destroyed

N17,563,850.00

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4 30/2001 - Exh.5) Catholic Archdiocese of Jos - Very Rev. Fr. Stephen Achuf Atawal (CW 18).

Partly burnt Churches, Parish home and their contents and vehicles

N25,000,000.00

5 34/2001 - (Exh.102) James D. Dung (CW. 63)

Hotel Complex burnt down N6,926,400.00

6 39/2001 - (Exh. 54) Chief Barr. J.A. Ogudogu

Residential houses, law office, books, cars and other properties burnt

N78,600,000.00

7 49/2001 - (Exh. 33) Polycarp C. Nwadike (CW.32)

Cars, good and cash destroyed and looted

N375,000.00

8 52/2001 - (Exh. 96) Anglican Diocese of Jos, Emmanuel bayode (CW 59)

Houses, cars and properties of 109 members destroyed

N76,003,754.00

9 53/2001 - (Exh. 35) Yoruba Community Jos

Houses, vehicles, business premises and personal materials of some members

N105,114,531.00

10 54/2001 - (Exh. 45) Abdulkareem Adesokan - (CW 37)

Houses and household materials destroyed

N2,368,750.00

11 62/2001 - (Exh. 160) Bishop Benjamin Kwashi (CW.95)

Churches, properties of Churches and members destroyed

N407,523,779.70

12 65/2001 - (Exh. 19) Associate Prof. P.H. Mailumo (CW.25)

Car destroyed N400,000.00

13 67/2001 - (Exh. 470) Berom Elders Council - Yusufu Dawang (CW 274)

Houses, Vehicles, Foodstuff, Livestock, Household valuable etc

N800,000.00

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14 71/2001 - (Exh. 78) - Alh. Hassan Zakari Biu (CW.50)

Vehicles, House and Household valuable destroyed

N16,000.000.00

15 72/2001 - (Exh. 20) - Gyel District, John Nyam - (CW 51)

Houses, Vehicles, livestock, household valuables etc

N211,767,880.00

16 73/2001 - (Exh. 86) Mr. Dominic U. Okorie (CW 56)

Business premises and content burnt

N759,580.00

17 74/2001 - (Exh. 267) Stephen Gyang Dagwom Bun (C.W 160)

House, household, valuables, vehicle, motorcycle, sewing machine etc, looted and destroyed

N303,500.00

18 79/2001 - (Exh. 87) Dumjos (Nig.) Ltd - Chukwudum Josiah Maduneme - (CW 57)

Business Premises vandalized and looted

N8,302,000.00

19 95/2001 - (Exh. 81) Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association - Sale Bayeri (CW. 53)

Herds of cattle, sheep, goats, fowls, houses, vehicles, bicycles, water pumps, motor cycles, Mosques, educational institutions and household goods destroyed.

N366,913,982.00

20 96/2001 - Exh. 104) - Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

21 98/2001 - Exh. 134) Jimex De Omega (Nig.) Ltd - Chief Joseph Nnamdi Ejimbe - CW 75)

Business premises, vehicles and goods looted vandalized and destroyed.

N14,470,000.00

22 101/2001 - (Exh. 126) Clement Olajide

House and property destroyed

N1,863,100.00

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23 110/2001 - Exh. 505) Kuru District - Monday Dalyop - (CW 301)

House, Livestock, vehicles, good and property destroyed

N19, 176,000.00

24 112/2001 - (Exh. 89) Second Hand Motor Dealers Assoc. Jos, Plateau State - Alh. Yahaya Kega - CW.58

Vehicles, Tyres, business premises and goods destroyed

N99,770,000.00

25 113/2001 - (Exh. 340) - Alh. Bawa Abubakar - CW. 212

House vehicles and goods destroyed

N127,827,350.00

26 134/2001 - Exh. 379) Talatu Alh. Yakubu - (CW. 223)

House and property destroyed

N286,000.00

27 135/2001 - (Exh. ) Hajiya Maryam Abubakar - (CW 264)

Business premises and property destroyed

N2,156,000.00

28 136/2001 - (Exh. 227) Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria - Mohammed Umaru Yola - (CW.129)

Business premises, goods and vehicles destroyed

N79,266,336.25

29 137/2001 - (Exh. 352) Umar Adamu Gongola

House and property destroyed

N1,400,000.00

30 141/2001 - (Exh. 222) Hassan Umaru (CW 124)

House and property destroyed

N1,500,000.00

31 142/2001 - (Exh. 223) Ajibade Efuntoye - (CW 125)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N5,000,000.00

32 143/2001 - (Exh. 539) Da Micheal Pwajok Gyang -( CW. 321)

House and property destroyed

N16,267,685.00

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33 145/2001 - Exh. 130) Romanus O. Uzoma - (CW 737)

Car destroyed N420,000.00

34 147/2001 - (Exh. 395) Dilimi Central Pharmacy Ltd - Chief B.O. Onwuchuruba - (CW 240)

Business premises and goods destroyed and vandalized.

N6,234,970.00

35 148/2001 - (Exh. 140) Mr. Simon Duru - (CW.78)

House and goods destroyed N1,600,000.00

36 (i) 151/2001 (Exh. 142) Umaru Usaini (ii) 152/2001 (Exh. 143) Hamisu Musa (iii) 153/2001 (Exh. 144) Hassan Haladu (iv) 154/2001 (Exh. 145) Mallam Zakari Musa B.

Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt Vehicle burnt

N700,000.00 N400,000.00 N450,000.00 N500,000.00

37 161/2001 (Exh. 506) Pastor Chidiadi Chidi - (CW 302)

House looted N867,200.00

38 165/2001 (Exh. 163) Christopher Onyenankie (CW 91)

Property looted and destroyed

N266,500.00

39 168/2001 (Exh. 164) Chief Francis Nwanego - (CW.93)

Houses vandalized N300,000.00

40 171/2001 (Exh. 165) Isa Musa (CW 94)

Property destroyed N239,000.00

41 172/2001 (Exh. 529) Destroyed Dilimi Village - Alh. Mustapha M. Shittima

Houses and property destroyed

N146,887,793.00

42 174/2001 (Exh. 479) - Alh. Musa Bazza (CW 281)

House, Mosque and property destroyed

N294,900,000.00

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43 181/2001 (Exh.312) Da Haruna Dakum

House and property destroyed

N5,348,442.00

44 184/2001 (Exh. 313) Hassan Suleiman Gaji - (CW 187)

Property destroyed N231,150.00

45 185/2001 (Exh. 314) Isa Mohammed (CW 188)

House and property vandalized

N300,000.00

46 186/2001 (Exh.478) Da Samuel T. Dawap - (CW 380)

House and property destroyed

N12,043,467.00

47 190/2001 (Exh. 316) Usman Ibrahim (CW 190)

House destroyed N1,000,000.00

48 192/2001 (Exh. 345) Abdulkadir Muhammed (CW 214)

House and property destroyed

N1,299,000.00

49 199/2001 (Exh. 350) Chibuzo Nwaugo (CW 218)

Property destroyed N250,000.00

50 200/2001 (Exh. 351) Edwin Nwalozie (CW 219)

Property destroyed N1,785,000.00

51 201/2001 (Exh. 189) Augustine Ogburia - (CW 98)

Property destroyed N23,823,000.00

52 203/2001 (Exh. 192) Auwalu Bala (CW. 99)

House and goods burnt N500,000.00

53 204/2001 (Exh. 193) Magnus Okeke (CW 100)

House hold valuables destroyed

N450,100.00

54 205/2001 (Exh. 194) Geoffrey Osondu (CW.101)

Household valuables destroyed

N498,100.00

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55 (i) 211/2001 (Exh. 320) Anthony Nwanede (CW 195) (ii) 215/2001 (Exh. 321) John N. Okeke (iii) 216/2001 (Exh. 322) Paulinus O. Ukwuoma

Property destroyed Business premises destroyed Property destroyed

N6,.705,200.00 N318,322.00 N1,084,200.00

56 218/2001 (Exh. 275) Mrs. Cecilia E. Ekwuoma (CW 277)

House hold valuables destroyed

N4654,370.00

57 280/2001 (Exh. 503) Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Rev. Nanpon Longs Babaji (CW 299)

Properties destroyed N152,128,062.00

58 239/2001 (Exh. 550) Cherubim & Seraphim Church, Jos - Solomon Adeniran (CW 43)

Properties destroyed N14,681,623.00

59 248/2001 (Exh. 469) Abubakar Danladi Usman (CW.273)

Properties destroyed N41,414,900.00

60 259/2001 (Exh. 494) Alh. Shehu Mamman (CW 292)

Properties destroyed N94,900.00

61 268/2001 (Exh. 188) Sir Benard Awasoh (CW 97)

Properties destroyed N36,000.00

62 287/2001 (Exh. 122) ECWA Goodnews Church, Rev. David Laje (CW 69)

Properties destroyed N17,000.000.00

63 297/2001 (Exh. 399) Eze Okereke Eze (CW 242)

Properties destroyed N2,000,000.00

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64 306/2001 (Exh. 420) Pankshin LGC - Emmanuel Yilluk (CW. 245)

Properties destroyed N26,467,000.00

65 316/2001 (Exh. 463) Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Plateau State - Alh. Alhassan Shuaibu (CW 270)

Properties destroyed State wide

N2,172,676,283.

66 348/2001 (Exh. 228) Alh. Tanko Mohamed (CW 130)

Properties destroyed N2,300,000.00

67 350/2001 (Exh. 427) Alh. Shaibu Ahmodu

Properties destroyed N11,654,000.00

68 355/2001 (Exh. 229) Mavtex Aluminium Co Ltd - Moses M. Audu (CW. 131)

Properties destroyed N606,413.00

69 370/2001 (Exh. 342) Mrs. C. Udobi (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N869,400,00

70 371/2001 (Exh. 341) Mr. Jonathan Okpando (CW 213)

Properties destroyed N7,060,000.00

71 (i) 372/2001 (Exh. 343) Mr. Valentine Nwoye (CW 213) (ii) 375/2001 (Exh. 344) Mr. Chukwujekwu Onwuama

Business Premises and goods destroyed Vehicle destroyed

N1,090,100.00 N470,000.00

72 (i) 377/2001 (Exh. 324) Mr. C. Nwafor (CW 197) (ii) 378/2001 (Exh. 325) Mr. Sylvanus Udobi (iii) 380/2001 (Exh. 326) Francis Ndigwe

Properties destroyed Household properties burnt Business premises and goods destroyed

N135,000.00 N1,486,400.00 N2,000,000.00

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73 389/2001 (Exh. 330) Stephen Ugwunna (CW 201)

House and property vandalized and destroyed

N1,519,200.00

74 390A/2001 (Exh. 327) Peter O. Amado (CW.198)

Household goods destroyed N487,500.00

75 408/2001 (Exh. 431) Emeka Azia (CW 253)

Business premises, machines and goods destroyed

N287,700.00

76 409/2001 (Exh. 398) Alh. Sale Ibrahim Ganandaji

Household goods destroyed N2,276,410.00

77 417/2001 (Exh. 381) Alh. Shaibu Maidoya (CW 234)

House burnt N1,632,800.00

78 418/2001 (Exh. 473) Bala Alawa

Property destroyed N83,400.00

79 422/2001 (Exh. 353) Edwin Anolue (CW 221)

Business premises and goods burnt

N4,300,000.00

80 425/2001 (Exh. 432) Elder Manasseh Ngozi Amaliri (CW 254)

Household goods destroyed N4,045,000.00

81 427/2001 (Exh. 384) Mr. Michael Ozue (CW 238)

Goods vandalized (Tyres and tubes)

N1,151,000.00

82 428/2001 (Exh. 382) Mike Eziagba (CW 236)

Goods burnt or looted N550,000.00

83 429/2001 (Exh. 385) Innocent Okoye (CW 239)

Household goods destroyed N2,572,000.00

84 431/2001 (Exh. 443) Singer Tonyeleke (CW 257)

Household goods burnt and looted

N1,227,500.00

85 432/2001 (Exh. 430) Pharm. Shehu Ibrahim Sheni (CW 252)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N9,565,900.00

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86 435/2001 (Exh. 477) Mr. Brendan Ihijirika (CW 279)

Business premises goods and household property destroyed

N403,800.00

87 437/2001 (Exh. 421) Mrs. Chukwu Perpetual (CW 246)

Business premises vandalized

N844,750.00

88 438/2001 (Exh. 383) Malama Sa’eed Sale (CW 237)

House, vehicle and valuables burnt.

N1,500,000.00

89 449/2001 (Exh. 474) Robert Kwap (CW 276)

Household valuables and textbooks looted and burnt

N408,400.00

90 453/2001 (Exh. 445) Daniel Ikelionwu (CW 259)

House destroyed and business premises looted

N10,000,000.00

91 454/2001 (Exh. 446) Danaan Hygenius (CW 261)

Household goods and valuables, business equipments and building materials destroyed

N2,515,600.00

92 456/2001 (Exh. 496) Alh. Muhammed Dan Kawu (CW 294)

House burnt N861,000.00

93 03/2002 (Exh. 541) Irigwe Elders Forum Josiah K. Rabwo (CW 323)

Houses burnt, food stuff destroyed and properties destroyed

N19,000,000.00

94 77/2001 (Exh. 302) Dickson U.E. Uwagbama (CW 178)

House, business premises and goods burnt

N6,912,995.00

95 85/2001 (Exh. 173) Jol Community Riyom LGA - Bulus Audu Danke (CW 95)

Houses, and properties destroyed

N150,000.00

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96 91/2001 (Exh. 104) Alh. Mohammed Umar Gombe (CW 65)

House and property destroyed

N10,000,000.00

97 123/2001 (Exh. 276) Promises Ozadibe (CW 167)

House and household valuables destroyed

N1,049,000.00

98 128/2001 (Exh. 278) Alhaji Nalado Maiwada (CW 169)

Property destroyed N85,000.00

99 129/2001 (Exh. 279) Edwin E. Anydika (CW 1170)

Business premises and goods destroyed

N1,327,500.00

100 158/2001 (Exh. 149) Ezeh Enyimulu Nwageokwu (CW 85)

House, vehilces and valuables burnt

N3,710,000.00

101 164/2001 (Exh. 153) Lawal Bellow (CW 89)

House destroyed N76,600.00

102 165/2001 (Exh.163) Christopher Onyemake (CW 91)

House and property destroyed

N266,500.00

103 209/2001 (Exh. 211) Mr. Anthony Omaghali (CW 115)

Business premises destroyed

N949,000.00

104 222/2001 (Exh. 225) Akilu Muhammed (CW 127)

Business premises destroyed

N450,000.00

105 246/2001 (Exh. 358) William Nimbut (CW 224)

Vehicle burnt N600,000.00

106 358/2001 (Exh. 204) Emmanuel Amoo (CW 111)

Business premises destroyed

N1,619,400.00

107 263/2001 (Exh. 205) Gyang Pam Chollom (CW 112)

House and goods burnt N15,000,000.00

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108 264/2001 (Exh. 207) The Church of the Lord (Aladura) Deacon Olushola Ogun Tumehin (CW 113)

Church and Church valuables burnt

N1,118,558.70

109 116/2001 (Exh. 213) Mrs. Elizabeth Chima (CW 116)

Property destroyed N2,323,932.00

110 290/2001 (Exh. 201) Leonard Onwujobi

House destroyed N3,600,000.00

111 299/2001 (Exh. 220) Alh. Usman Al (CW 122)

House and items burnt N800,000.00

112 317/2001 (Exh. 236) Maureen Iloka (CW 137)

Business premises, residence and properties destroyed

N37,400,000.00

113 343/2001 (Exh. 335) Labaran Musa (CW 207)

Trucks and Caterpillars burnt

N10,300,000.00

114 352/2001 (Exh. 305) John Okoro

Business premises and goods destroyed

N302,600.00

115 376/2001 (Exh. 298) Jeric Eye Hospital - Dr. Charles Madubuko (CW 176)

Business premises vandalized

N436,500.00

116 400/2001 (Exh. 301) Regina Uduagbomen (CW 177)

House and property destroyed

N304,300.00

117 430/2001 (Exh. 311) Mrs. Edere Obika (CW 185)

Motor cycles, electronics and household items destroyed

N700,000.00

118 444/2001 (Exh. 462) Mrs. Ruth Olaniyi (CW 269)

Properties destroyed N1,339,000.00

119 11/2001 (Exh. 23) Bolarinwa Alabi (CW 28)

Vehicle burnt and cash looted

N423,00.00

120 41/2001 (Exh. 31 & 546) Assemblies of God Church - Abel Daniel Ochigbo (CW 31)

Church properties and properties of members destroyed

N13,763,470.00

T O T A L N3,369,716,404.95 Government View: Government and sympathises with the victims.

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5.3 The Commission had no time at its disposal to assess each claim. Accordingly, the Commission submits the above amount as alleged total of damages. The Commission cannot rule out the possibility of inflating the claims which is a Nigerian practice in matters such as this. The Commission saw that some of the claims are excessive.

Government View: Government notes. 5.4 Although the terms of reference did not extend to and include the award of

compensation, it is the Commission’s strong view that the sum of N1,500,000.00 be paid to ECWA Evangel Hospital, being medical services given to some of the victims of the crisis. This is a unique situation which therefore needs a unique solution. We do not think the Hospital, which did a samaritan job should be denied the medical expenses it incurred. That will be grave injustice and the Commission cannot be part of such injustice.

Government View: Government accepts.

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CHAPTER SIX

ANGWAN ROGO AND ANGWAN RIMI COMMUNITIES 6.0 Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi are two villages situated in Jos North Local

Government Area near the temporary site of the University of Jos. While Angwan Rogo shares a common boundary with the University of Jos, the line of demarcation being the University’s fence, Angwan Rimi is not contiguous with the University even though it adjoins Angwan Rogo. The boundaries of the two villages vis-a-vis the University were made clear to the Commission during its visit to the locus in quo.

6.1 There is a plethora of memoranda and oral evidence urging the Commission to

recommend that the two communities of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi be relocated to some other places because of the danger which they allegedly post to the University community. See for example Exhibits W. 262, 296 331 and 496. Evidence was given before the Commission that during the crisis, members of the Angwan Rogo Community launched an attack against the University and made very serious attempts to invade the University but these attempts were repelled by the students. In spite of this however, it was alleged that several students and staff of the University were either killed or injured during the crisis. See the evidence of CW’s 15, 154, 175, 202 and 295. CW’s 202 and 295 in particular testified that during the attack, the residents of Angwan Rogo who are predominantly muslims created a large hole in the University’s fence through which they tried to gain entrance into the University. This hole was shown to the Commission during the visit to the locus in quo. Government View: Government notes.

6.2 According to the evidence of these witnesses, many of the students and staff of the

University who were killed or injured were living in Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi because of shortage of accommodation on the University campus. A list of casualties attached to the Vice-Chancellor’s memorandum, Exhibit 262, shows that 14 staff members and 8 students were killed by people from the Angwan Rogo Community. Exhibit 496 put the number of murdered staff at 12 and murdered students at 8, substantially corroborating the figures in Exhibit 262. Government View:

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Government notes 6.3 CW 154 is the Vice Chancellor of the University of Jos. In his evidence before the

Commission, he said the University of Jos started as a campus of the University of Ibadan in 1971 and became a full-fledged University in 1975, and that before then the Angwan Rogo Community had been in existence comprising a few scattered houses. He also testified that before September, 2001 there was no quarrel between the University community and Angwan Rogo. However, during the crisis, the University became a target of attack from members of the Angwan Rogo Community but it was ably defended by the students at the risk of their lives. He confirmed that because of insufficiency of hostel accommodation, many students of the University lived in rented houses at Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi until the September 2001 crisis. It is his view that the relocation of either the University or the two communities is necessary if the University’s safety is to be assured. Government View: Government notes

6.4 The Surveyor-General of Plateau State, Samuel Pam Pwat testified as CW 327. He

tendered a map, BPG447 which was admitted as Exhibit 551. This map shows that the area where the two communities of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi are presently located is University land. He described most of the residents of the two communities as squatters who do not have any statutory title to occupy the place. He explained that the Government’s intention was to develop the place as a residential area but that had not been done before the crisis broke out. He suggested that the communities should be relocated or the areas should be replanned as, according to him, there are very few motorable streets in Angwan Rogo. The Commission saw this when it visited Angwan Rogo. Government View: Government notes

6.5 The Angwan Rogo community submitted a Response to the allegations against it,

which was presented by CW328, Alhaji Abdulrahaman Suleiman. The witness denied that there was any attempt by residents of Angwan Rogo to attack or invade the University Community with whom they had always lived in peace. He said that many staff and students of the University were living at Angwan Rogo but that during the crisis, they fled. According to him, the community was appealing to them to return to their houses so that their peaceful co-existence with the

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community would continue. He told the Commission that only one person was killed at Angwan Rogo and that rather than attack the University, it was Angwan Rogo community that defended the University against attack. He could not say who the attackers were. CW328 also said he and several other people have Certificates of Occupancy over their properties in Angwan Rogo. In his opinion, it is not the Angwan Rogo Community but the University, which should be relocated to its permanent site. Government View: Government notes.

6.6 The Commission has no difficult in disbelieving CW328's evidence that only one

person was killed at Angwan Rogo. Exhibits 262 and 496 gave not only the full names and addresses of its staff and students killed during the crisis, but also their departments and registration numbers. This evidence has supplied too many particulars and is too positive and specific to be effectively controverted by a generalised statement that only one person was killed. Furthermore, CW154 and 295 have no reason to insist that the persons they have listed are dead if they are indeed alive. Secondly, we reject the evidence of CW328 on his denial that the Angwan Rogo Community attacked the University because it is self-contradictory. In one breath, he said the community lived in peace with the staff and students of the University, and that the community defended the University from attack during the crisis, but in another breath, he said the same students and staff ran away and took refuge in the police station during the crisis. When he was asked against whom his community was defending the University, he gave no answer. The Commission regards CW328 as a false witness who set out to deliberately mislead the Commission. Government View: Government notes

6.7 The Commission therefore finds as a fact: (i) That Angwan Rogo shares a common boundary with the University of Jos

but Angwan Rimi does not.

(ii) There was an unsuccessful attempt by residents of both Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi to attack and destroy the University of Jos during the September, 2001 crisis.

(iii) Several staff and students who lived at Angwan Rogo were killed while others had their properties destroyed by members of the two communities.

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(iv) The two communities of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi are sitting on land which was initially allocated to the University of Jos but which they have taken over many years ago without resistance from any quarters.

(v) The two communities are very large and densely populated without adequate facilities in the form of motorable roads.

Government View: Government notes

6.8 In the light of the above therefore, it is the Commission’s view that relocation of the

two communities of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi, as advocated before us, is neither necessary nor feasible because of the magnitude of the financial involvement of such a venture. The Commission will however recommend to the Government:

(i) To establish a mobile police barrack within Angwan Rogo to serve as a buffer zone between the two communities and the University for the protection of the University in the event of crisis.

(ii) To replan Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi by the provision of more access roads for ease of movement and easy evacuation of people and property during emergencies.

Government View: Government accepts and directs the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) and Ministry of Land, Survey and Town Planning to explore ways of replanning these areas and call on the Inspector General of Police to build a Police Mobile barracks at Angwan Rogo.

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CHAPTER SIX

RECOMMENDATIONS The Commission’s Fifth Term of Reference is “To suggest or recommend ways to forestall future re-occurrence” of such crisis. In the course of its assignment, the Commission read and digested 456 memoranda and the numerous documents attached to them, admitted 614 exhibits, heard oral evidence from 331 witnesses and visited most of the areas affected by the crisis. The oral evidence given before the Commission was in most cases tested by rigorous cross-examination by very competent counsel. After a careful analysis and consideration of all the relevant issues raised by or on behalf of all interested parties, the Commission, in accordance with its fifth Term of Reference, makes the following Recommendations: 1. The Commission firmly believes that non-implementation by Government of the

Reports of previous Commissions of Inquiry, and in particular the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the riots of 12th April, 1994 in Jos Metropolis (the main features of which are very similar to the September, 2001 Civil disturbances), is a sure recipe for a repeat performance of such disturbances. The Commission therefore recommends that the Government should take seriously and implement diligently the recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry. Non-implementation will embolden the perpetrators of the crisis and their sponsors to tread on the same path again and again. Government View: Government accepts.

2. All persons who were alleged before the commission to have participated in the

crisis by engaging in the commission of offences as detailed in chapter 4 of this Report should be handed over to the police for thorough investigation and possible prosecution on the advice of the Ministry of Justice. Conspiracy, murder, arson, inciting public disturbance and the like are very serious offences and unless those found to have committed them are appropriately punished, those who have the propensity of making themselves available for use in perpetrating these crimes will not be deterred and there will be no peace in the State. Government View:

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Government accepts and directs the Commissioner of Police to thoroughly investigate and forward the case diaries to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution.

3. The Government should ban and enforce the banning of the blockage of public roads by both Christians and Muslims for prayers and other religious purposes. The practice is illegal, oppressive to members of the public and creates unnecessary tension and acrimony among different religious groupings. Government View: Government accepts and directs the JMDB and the Police to enforce the Laws in consultation with the Plateau State Inter-Religious Council for Peace and Harmony (IRCPH).

4. The use of loudspeakers mounted on the external walls of churches and mosques

should be made illegal by a law of the Plateau State House of Assembly. The practice by any religious group causes annoyance and inconvenience to the adherents of other religions. The evidence before the Commission shows that during the September, 2001 crisis, some religious bodies made use of such loudspeakers to mobilize their members to join in killing people of other faiths and destroying their properties, thus escalating the crisis. Government View: Government accepts.

5. The Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) should, acting on the Jos

Metropolitan Development Board Edict No.5 of 1974, ensure that the indiscriminate construction of places of worship in residential areas of Jos and other towns is stopped. The practice creates inconvenience to residents and in times of crisis innocent residents become easy targets of religious bigots and fanatics. Government View: Government accepts and directs the JMDB to comply.

6. The Government should ensure that Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi’s mosque at Congo-

Russia, Jos where the crisis started on 7th September, 2001 and which was destroyed during the crisis, is not rebuilt. Government View: Government accepts.

7. The inter-religious Committee has been shown to be very ineffective in its duties. It

should therefore be disbanded and in its place a new Committee should be formed whose membership should include both Muslims and Christians and which should

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meet more regularly. The persons to be appointed into the Committee must be persons who are not fanatics but persons of liberal minds, even if they do not hold leadership positions in their respective religions. Similar Committees should also be formed at the Local Government level. Government View: Government notes.

8. Both Christian and Muslim leaders should be admonished through the inter-

religious Committees to educate their members on the consequences of killing human beings or destroying their properties and on the need for religious tolerance generally. In particular, members of the Islamic faith should be educated on the true meaning of “Jihad” and the need to abstain from the use of derogatory language in describing the adherents of other religions for example, the use of the term “arne” or “arna” to describe non-muslims. This is provocative. Government View: Government notes.

9. The Government should encourage the establishment of inter-religious clubs in secondary and post secondary institutions through the Ministry of Education for the purpose of inculcating in the students mutual respect for each other’s religious beliefs. Government View: Government accepts and directs the Ministry of Education to implement.

10. The Government should monitor the establishment of private schools and their

syllabi with the aim of detecting and eliminating religious fundamentalism. Government View: Government accepts and directs the Ministry of Education to comply.

11. Government and the security agents should put in place measures that will check the

illegal possession of firearms in the State. There was evidence before the Commission that arms were illegally stock-piled in the State and these were freely used during the crisis. This should not be allowed to happen again. Government View: Government accepts and directs all the Law Enforcement Agencies to recover all fire arms and checkmate the importation of same into the State.

12. Urgent steps should be taken by Government to fish out illegal aliens who are

reported to be present in great numbers in the State. The evidence before the Commission shows that illegal aliens who have no stake in the well being of the State fueled the September, 2001 crisis. The case of these aliens should be reported

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to the Immigration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for deportation to their respective Countries.

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GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and directs the Secretary to the State Government to liaise with the State Comptroller of Immigration to stop the influx of illegal aliens into the State.

13. Government appointments should only be made after consultations with the

stakeholders as failure to do this has often led to misapprehension and disaffection among the people. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

14. The sale of petrol outside the petrol filling stations should be banned and the

Government should ensure that the ban is enforced. There was clear evidence before the Commission that because street hawking of petrol was commonplace, it was very easy for the youths who participated in the crisis to set innumerable properties ablaze. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

15. The Hausa-Fulani Community should be encouraged to dialogue with other

communities and accept the ownership of Jos by the Afizeres, Anagutas and Beroms. Anything short of that will not make for peace. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

16. The Government should do everything in its power to see that the security agents

i.e. the police and the military, are always at alert and are able to respond promptly to distress calls by individuals. In this way crisis situations can be effectively controlled before they get out of hand. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

17. Religious fanatics should not be posted to head State Police Commands. In other

words, Senior Police Officers who are fanatics either in the religion of Christianity or Islam should not be posted to head State Police Commands; and here the criterion for fanaticism is that a senior Police Officer by being a Christian or Muslim, has extreme beliefs or behaviour in that religion, or shows total bias for the religion to the extent that he exhibits very great and often unreasoning keenness for his religious belief, and he gives priority to that belief and not to his constitutional and

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statutory function of policing the State. We do not expect this as a written law oozing out a command but in the dossier of the Inspector-General of Police. The Commission recommends that the Government sends this recommendation to the Inspector-General of Police for consideration. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

18. The Commission recommends that for his ignoble role during the September, 2001

crisis which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, among other losses, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force, and in the event of his refusal to do so, he should be dismissed from the service. The Government should forward this recommendation to the Police Service Commission for consideration and necessary action. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

19. Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed should not remain the NAPEP Co-ordinator for

Jos North Local Government Area. The State Government should liaise with the Federal Government to have him replaced. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

20. While there is no evidence on which the Commission can find that Alhaji Sale

Hassan did anything to aid the crisis, he is a leader of the Jasawa Development Association whose activities have always been inimical to peace in the State. The Commission recommends that his activities be closely monitored. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and directs that a letter be written to Alh. Sale Hassan cautioning him to be of good conduct and being an elder, he should be seen to be promoting peace rather than resorting to acts that threaten peace.

21. Alhaji Inuwa Ali should be removed as Turakin Jos and replaced with another

person from the Hausa Community. Alhaji Inuwa Ali being, a traditional ruler, has shown himself to be a parochial leader, siding unmistakably with the Muslims. He signed the Jasawa Development Association’s peace-threatening letter and even signed the Jasawa memorandum submitted to the Commission. His partisanship is not hidden.

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GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and refers the issue to the Jos Joint Traditional Council for consideration.

22. The Commission recommends that the activities of the Jasawa Development

Association be suspended for a period of two years from the date the Government accepts these recommendations, for its persistent heightening of ethnic tension in Jos North Local Government Council. If during the period of suspension the Association does anything that could cause a breach of the peace, the Government should have the option of proscribing it. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government rejects and hereby proscribes the Jasawa Development Association.

23. The BECO Elders Solidarity Forum of Jos North Local Government Area should

be suspended for two years as the violent language in their protest against Mukhtar’s appointment has shown them to be a militant group which contributed to the ethnic tension that resulted in the crisis. If during the period of suspension the Forum does any act that could lead to a breach of the peace, the Forum should be proscribed. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and directs the Secretary to the State Government to liaise with the National Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO) and act accordingly.

24. The advertorial of the Jos North Local Government Branch of the Jama’atu Nasril

Islam in the Punch Newspaper of 1st October 2001 is a clear indication that the Branch is not willing to accept any measures put in place by Government to bring about lasting peace in the State. The Commission recommends that the Branch be suspended for two years while its activities are monitored by the Government. If the Branch shows any militancy or refusal to accept Government’s peace efforts, the Branch should be proscribed. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and refers the matter to the National Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI).

25. Plateau State Youth Council should be severely reprimanded by Government for its

provocative and inflammatory utterances such as “we will no longer fold our arms to repeated threats to peace and security of our beloved state by hooligans who can hardly trace their root.” The activities of the Council should be closely monitored

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and any further incitement or threat to peace coming from it should lead to its proscription. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government notes.

26. Alhaji Sale Bayeri, the State Secretary of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders

Association of Nigeria who is also a Special Adviser to the Governor on Fulani Affairs, should be advised to withdraw his services as such Special Adviser and if he does not do so he should be removed and replaced by a Fulani man who is more temperate, level headed and less confrontational. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

27. Because of the fear of insecurity expressed by members of the University

community following alleged attacks launched against them by the Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi Communities, the Commission recommends that a police barrack be set up between the University of Jos Main Campus and the Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi Communities. It is also recommended that both communities be replanned in such a way as to make movement and evacuation of people and property easier in times of emergency or crisis. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts and directs the JMDB and Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning to explore ways of replanning the area and the Police to build a Police Barracks in the area.

28. To improve the effectiveness of the Police in crisis management and control, the

Commission recommends that urgent steps be taken to equip the police force with adequate facilities such as modern communication equipment, teargas, arms and ammunition, transportation and other logistics. The police should also be properly trained to handle crisis situations. The Plateau State Government should convey this recommendation to the Inspector-General of police for consideration and necessary action. GOVERNMENT VIEW: Government accepts.

29. In all bodies and or organisation in which the Commission has recommended

suspension of activities, Government should seek the assistance of the State House of Assembly for the necessary legislative, instrument or order. Government View:

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Government notes.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION This Report contains eight chapters. In Chapter 1, we have dealt with general matters of introductory nature. In Chapter 2, we have examined what we regard as the two immediate causes of the September 2001 crisis in Jos and environs. Chapter 3 examined ten remote causes of the crisis and in Chapter 4, we have dealt with persons or group of persons and organisations responsible for the crisis. We have examined also in this Chapter a group of persons and organisations that allegations were made against and which we did not find liable. In Chapter 5, we have dealt with the extent of damages to lives and properties. Here the Commission was only able to collate the extent of damages as presented by the victims and that gave a total figure of N3,369,716,404.95. The Commission did not have the time to authenticate the claims of the victims. It does not appear that such authentication was really necessary in the light of the fact that the terms of reference of the Commission did not extend to and include the recommendation of the payment of compensation or damages to the victims of the crisis. We are not surprised that the terms of reference did not so extend because the State Government does not, in our view, have the financial means to pay compensation or damages to victims in the crisis. We have dealt in Chapter 6 with one unique area and it is the Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi communities near the University of Jos. What we did here was to convert the fourth term of reference to deal with the two communities. We realised that the fourth term of reference was generic and omnibus in the sense that it covers all the terms of reference. We therefore decided to take the specific areas of the two communities. This we did because there was no other term of reference that could assimilate the contents of Chapter 5. In Chapter 7, we have made twenty-nine recommendations which, in our view, will forestall future re-occurrence. Our Report is based exclusively on what we saw and hear. In other words, it was based on evidence before the Commission. It could not have been otherwise. We noticed during the proceedings acrimony and bitterness along religious lines and coloration and such also naturally affected the evidence. Some witnesses were blind to the truth in religious matters and it should not be so. If our recommendations are implemented, they will go a long way to ameliorate the big religious divide in the State.

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Once again, we thank the Government of Plateau State for finding us suitable to undertake this fairly difficult but interesting assignment. We have done our best.

Government View: Government notes and express deep appreciation to the members of the Commission for their commitment and resilience towards this assignment and a job well done. Government directs the Secretary to the State Government to write letters of appreciation to the Chairman and Members of the Commission.