SPECIESISM: A FORM OF BIGOTRY OR A JUSTIFIED VIEW?

EVELYN PLUHAR Pennsylvania State University

Fayette campus

Editor's Note: An abridged version of this paper and the commentary on it by Prof. Sapontzis were delivered at the December, 1987, meeting of the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals held in New York City.

g~;~~~:Fr:iiil~~JmoDs.

He ..... York: Dover, 1979

We humans tend to view ourselves as the paradigms of morally considerable beings. Humans, it is often claimed, are the most PHILOSOPHYmorally valuable (perhaps the ~ morally valuable) beings on this planet. It is commonly assumed that "lesser" beings

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES83

-------~------------ -

SPECIESISM:A FORM OF BIGOTRYOR A JUSTIFIED VIEW?

EVELYN PLUHARPennsylvania State University

Fayette Campus

Editor's Note: An abridgedversion of this paper and thecommentary on it by Prof.Sapontzis were delivered atthe December, 1987, meetingof the Society for the Studyof Ethics and Animals held inNew York City.

We humans tend to view ourselves as theparadigms of morally considerable beings.Humans, it is often claimed, are the mostmorally valuable (perhaps the ~ morallyvaluable) beings on this planet. It iscommonly assumed that "lesser" beings

83

PHILOSOPHY

BRIWEEN THE SPECIES

should be sacrificed for our benefit. When pressed to provide a rational defense for the belief in human pre-eminence, philosophers have argued that our autonomous, richly complex lives warrant our special status. Few, however, have argued that humans who are incapable of autonomy may properly be sacrificed to further the interests of normal humans.

It was inevitable that this prima facie inconsistency would be challenged. Writers

like Peter Singer and Tom Regan advanced the argument from marginal cases to show that our differential treatment of impaired

humans and many other animals is morally

suspect. 1 If it is wrong to use a severely

retarded human to test the effects of toxic gas, let alone as a main course, isn't it also

wrong to use a nonhuman with equivalent or

higher mental capacities? On the other hand, if autonomy or personhood is necessary for

a right to life (perhaps even for moral considerability), then it would be permissible to kill humans who lack those

attributes. If such humans do after all have a right to life, then, it has been urged, we must look beyond personhood for the source

of that right.2 In any case, according to the challenge, our attitudes toward very mentally impaired humans and many nonhumans require readjustment.

Many have responded to this challenge by retorting that severely retarded humans are due full moral respect because they are humans, members of our own species. When asked w.b.Y. this fact should count morally, they often found their inability to answer no cause for concern. E. g., the Chairman of Harvard University's Department of Philosophy has acknowledged that "it is not easy to explain why membership in the human species does and should have moral weight with us," addil1g that "nothing much.. .should be inferred from our not presently havihg a theory of the moral importance of sp~cies membership that no one has spent much time trying to formulate because the

issue hasn't seemed pressing."3

For those who continue to think that it is not wrong to eat and vivisect nonhumans, but indefensible to do so to even less well mentally endowed humans, the issue should be very pressing indeed. They stand accused of moral inconsistency by two very different groups. Those who have become convinced that moral considerability is not restricted to humanity are urging that we cease even the painless exploitation of non humans. According to quite another, very disturbing view, we should consider exploiting mentally defective humans in addition to nonhumans. E. g., R. G. Frey has recently argued that consistency requires us to choose between antivivisection and vivisection of some humans. He reluctantly chooses the latter alternative:

I am where I am, not because I begin a monster and end up choosing the monstrous, but because I cannot think of anything at all

compelling that cedes human life of any quality greater value than animal life of any

quality.4

Peter Singer has also argued that, given the appropriate circumstances, it may well be moral to use and kill nonhumans sm..d. humans

who lack self-consciousness.5

Those who reject both the exploitation of humans and the cessation of nonhuman exploitation must explain why mere "membership in the human species does and should have moral weight with us." In short, they must defend speciesjsm. The need for such a defense has become increasingly evident, as several recent attempts in this direction attest. I will argue that each of them fails.

Speciesism pefined

We must begin by distinguishing two versions of Speciesism:

(1) Weak Speciesjsm: The according of preferential treatment to a being, A, because A is a member of species X.

(2) Strong Specjesjsm: The ascription of

BE'IWEEN THE SPOCIES 84

;;:::;::,\4 q.

should be sacrificed for our benefit. Whenpressed to provide a rational defense for thebelief in human pre-eminence, philosophershave argued that our autonomous, richlycomplex lives warrant our special status.Few, however, have argued that humans whoare incapable of autonomy may properly besacrificed to further the interests of normalhumans.

It was inevitable that this prima facieinconsistency would be challenged. Writers

like Peter Singer and Tom Regan advancedthe argument from marginal cases to showthat our differential treatment of impaired

humans and many other animals is morally

suspect. 1 If it is wrong to use a severely

retarded human to test the effects of toxicgas, let alone as a main course, isn't it also

wrong to use a nonhuman with equivalent or

higher mental capacities? On the other hand,if autonomy or personhood is necessary for

a right to life (perhaps even for moralconsiderability), then it would bepermissible to kill humans who lack those

attributes. If such humans do after all havea right to life, then, it has been urged, wemust look beyond personhood for the source

of that right.2 In any case, according to thechallenge, our attitudes toward verymentally impaired humans and manynonhumans require readjustment.

Many have responded to this challenge byretorting that severely retarded humans aredue full moral respect because they arehumans, members of our own species. Whenasked w.b.Y. this fact should count morally,they often found their inability to answer nocause for concern. E. g., the Chairman ofHarvard University's Department ofPhilosophy has acknowledged that "it is noteasy to explain why membership in thehuman species does and should have moralweight with us," addil1g that "nothing much...should be inferred from our not presentlyhavihg a theory of the moral importance ofsp~cies membership that no one has spentmuch time trying to formulate because the

issue hasn't seemed pressing."3

BE'IWEEN THE SPOCIES 84

For those who continue to think that it is notwrong to eat and vivisect nonhumans, butindefensible to do so to even less wellmentally endowed humans, the issue shouldbe very pressing indeed. They stand accusedof moral inconsistency by two verydifferent groups. Those who have becomeconvinced that moral considerability is notrestricted to humanity are urging that wecease even the painless exploitation ofnonhumans. According to quite another,very disturbing view, we should considerexploiting mentally defective humans inaddition to nonhumans. E. g., R. G. Frey hasrecently argued that consistency requires usto choose between antivivisection andvivisection of some humans. He reluctantlychooses the latter alternative:

I am where I am, not because I begin amonster and end up choosing the monstrous,but because I cannot think of anything at all

compelling that cedes human life of anyquality greater value than animal life of any

quality.4

Peter Singer has also argued that, given theappropriate circumstances, it may well bemoral to use and kill nonhumans sm..d. humans

who lack self-consciousness.5

Those who reject both the exploitation ofhumans and the cessation of nonhumanexploitation must explain why mere"membership in the human species does andshould have moral weight with us." In short,they must defend speciesjsm. The need forsuch a defense has become increasinglyevident, as several recent attempts in thisdirection attest. I will argue that each ofthem fails.

Speciesism pefined

We must begin by distinguishing twoversions of Speciesism:

(1) Weak Speciesjsm: The according ofpreferential treatment to a being, A,because A is a member of species X.

(2) Strong Specjesjsm: The ascription of

;;:::;::,\4 q.

basic moral rights, including the right to life, to a being, A, because A is member of species X.

Clearly, (2) implies (1), but not conversely. A being may be due preferential treatment on account of species membership without necessarily having a right to life. For examp.le, it might be argued that a human nonperson should not be killed to "harvest" its tissue if a nonhuman could be used instead, but that no right to life would be violated if we do kill the human when no nonhuman would serve our purposes. Those who instead believe that vivisecting or eating humans is a violation of those humans' rights, but who see nothing wrong with continuing to thus use nonhumans, need to

defend what I call strong speciesism.

The most straightforward way to justify either version of speciesism would be to show that species membership can be a morally relevant characteristic, perhaps sufficiently weighty to warrant the ascription of a right to life. On the other hand, it might be possible to show that preferential treatment or the ascription of a right to life on the basis of species membership is justifiable even if species membership is .nQ1 a morally relevant characteristic.

speciesjsm and Bigotry

However, it might be thought that the attempt to justify either version of speciesism is doomed from the start. It has been charged that preferential treatment on grounds of species is just as wrong as letting moral considerations hinge on race or sex. It would be very difficult indeed to justify bigotry!

Speciesists find the analogy to racism and sexism poorly based and offensive. E. g., Michael A. Fox argues that racial minorities and women, as autonomous beings, have their rights violated by racists and sexists. By contrast, Fox believes that nonhuman animals lack the autonomy required for basic rights. Thus, he finds the analogy between

human and animal exploitation ridiculous. 6

"For reasons of this sort," Fox claims, "some critics of animal liberation have denied that speciesism constitutes a form of immorality comparable to racism and

sexism---indeed, that is immoral at all."?

I agree with the critics that it would be a mistake automatically to dismiss speciesism as yet another form of bigotry. But their reasons for rejecting the analogy with racism and sexism quite miss the point. With the possible exception of whales and dolphins, there certainly is a large gap between the mental capacities of normal adult humans and other animals. But thjs same gap is present between the abilitjes of normal adult humans and very mentally jmpaired humans. Those who attack species ism focus on our differential treatment of impaired humans and nonhumans with comparable or superior capacities. According to racism, sexism, gmLspeciesism, two individuals who do not otherwise differ in morally relevant respects may be treated differentially because of their race, sex, or species. In this respect, the views are exactly

analogous.S

Now, it is undeniably true that racism and sexism have not been shown to be justified. No one has succeeded in showing race or sex to be a morally relevant characteristic, or in showing how preference on these grounds could be justified even if race and sex are not morally relevant characteristics. It does not follow, however, that speciesism cannot be justified. Speciesists who want to escape the charge of bigotry must show that their view is different.

Attempts to Show that Speciesism Can Be a Morally Releyant Characteristic

It is generally agreed that personhood is sufficient for moral consideration and basic moral rights, inclUding a right to life (utilitarians who are uncomfortable with rights talk prefer to speak in terms of "presumptions against killing"). Philosophers differ on the criteria for personhood: some require full autonomy and

85 BElWEEN THE SPECIES

basic moral rights, including the right tolife, to a being, A, because A is member ofspecies X.

Clearly, (2) implies (1), but not conversely.A being may be due preferential treatmenton account of species membership withoutnecessarily having a right to life. Forexamp.le, it might be argued that a humannonperson should not be killed to "harvest"its tissue if a nonhuman could be usedinstead, but that no right to life would beviolated if we do kill the human when nononhuman would serve our purposes. Thosewho instead believe that vivisecting oreating humans is a violation of those humans'rights, but who see nothing wrong withcontinuing to thus use nonhumans, need to

defend what I call strong specjesism.

The most straightforward way to justifyeither version of speciesism would be toshow that species membership can be amorally relevant characteristic, perhapssufficiently weighty to warrant theascription of a right to life. On the otherhand, it might be possible to show thatpreferential treatment or the ascription of aright to life on the basis of speciesmembership is justifiable even if speciesmembership is .QQ.1. a morally relevantcharacteristic.

speciesjsm and Bigotry

However, it might be thought that theattempt to justify either version ofspeciesism is doomed from the start. It hasbeen charged that preferential treatment ongrounds of species is just as wrong asletting moral considerations hinge on race orsex. It would be very difficult indeed tojustify bigotry!

Speciesists find the analogy to racism andsexism poorly based and offensive. E. g.,Michael A. Fox argues that racial minoritiesand women, as autonomous beings, havetheir rights violated by racists and sexists.By contrast, Fox believes that nonhumananimals lack the autonomy required for basicrights. Thus, he finds the analogy between

85

human and animal exploitation ridiculous. 6

"For reasons of this sort," Fox claims,"some critics of animal liberation havedenied that speciesism constitutes a form ofimmorality comparable to racism and

sexism---indeed, that is immoral at all."?

I agree with the critics that it would be amistake automatically to dismiss speciesismas yet another form of bigotry. But theirreasons for rejecting the analogy withracism and sexism quite miss the point.With the possible exception of whales anddolphins, there certainly is a large gapbetween the mental capacities of normaladult humans and other animals. But thjssame gap is present between the abilitjes ofnormal adult humans and very mentallyjmpaired humans. Those who attackspeciesism focus on our differentialtreatment of impaired humans andnonhumans with comparable or superiorcapacities. According to racism, sexism,gmLspeciesism, two individuals who do nototherwise differ in morally relevantrespects may be treated differentiallybecause of their race, sex, or species. Inthis respect, the views are exactly

analogous.8

Now, it is undeniably true that racism andsexism have not been shown to be justified.No one has succeeded in showing race or sexto be a morally relevant characteristic, orin showing how preference on these groundscould be justified even if race and sex arenot morally relevant characteristics. Itdoes not follow, however, that speciesismcannot be justified. Speciesists who want toescape the charge of bigotry must show thattheir view is different.

Attempts to Show that Speciesism Can Be aMorally Releyant Characteristic

It is generally agreed that personhood issufficient for moral consideration and basicmoral rights, including a right to life(utilitarians who are uncomfortable withrights talk prefer to speak in terms of"presumptions against killing").Philosophers differ on the criteria forpersonhood: some require full autonomy and

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

moral agency (e. g., Michael A. Fox), 9 some stipulate little more than self-consciousness and rudimentary agency (e. g., Joel

Feinberg 10 and Peter Singer 11). Regardless of how liberally the criteria are specified, there are conscious humans (and some nonhumans) who fail to satisfy them. For the purposes of this paper, the strict

interpretation of personhood, which requires moral agency, will be adopted. On this interpretation, most (perhaps all) nonhuman animals and a good number of humans do not qualify as persons.

Recent defenders of speciesism have agreed that it is persons, primarily, who are rights-bearers. They have argued that nonpersons who are members of species that are characterized by personhood have basic moral rights as well. Belonging to a species of this kind, they believe, is a morally relevant characteristic. Let us now look at the arguments they have advanced to show this.

a. The Appeal to Fairness

Michael Wreen has written extensively on this subject of late. In his initial article, he set himself the task of establishing the following "strong speciesist" view:

A live creature's belonging to a species, not necessarily our own, which is generally characterized by personhood, is of some moral weight, and enough, in fact, to ascribe

a right to life to that creature. 12

Briefly. Wreen argues that (1) there is a

"quasi-metaphysical link" between

personhood and humanity; (2) the laws of

nature and chance have a bearing on whether

a human will become or remain a person; (3)

for the most part, human nonpersons are

nonpersons through no fault of their own;

and (4):

Human nonpersons, then, should be ascribed

basic rights; for although in the primary

case it is persons who are ascribed basic

rights, equality of opportunity, or, better,

fairness, requires us to ascribe basic rights

to human nonpersons as wel1. 13

Wreen goes on to argue that the same would hold for a nonhuman belonging to a species characterized by personhood.

I have recently criticized this defense of

speciesism. 14 Wreen has replied;15 I have

replied in turn;16 and he has just fired the

last salvo. 17 My purpose here is not to rehash our lengthy debate. I simply want to spotlight the key claim in Wreen's argument for strong speciesism: the appeal to fairness. It is instructive to see why this seemingly plausible appeal must fail.

Wreen believes that we owe human nonpersons whose condition is no fault of their own basic moral rights because it would be !.!!1fillr. to do otherwise. Those less fortunate than ourselves deserve compensation in the form of basic rights for their loss. I have pointed out that the fairness premise simply begs the question because it implies that human nonpersons already have a basic moral right: the right

to be treated fairly.1 8

Wreen has responded that he did not invoke fairness as a r.l.gb! in his argument for the basic rights of human nonpersons, but as a principle. That principle (unstated in his original article) is:

[The Fairness Principle] All creatures in the relevant (person-related) class are to be treated fairly and equally in respect of personhood-generated-rights.

Thus, he claims that his argument is not

circular. 19

I replied that his fairness principle would have no bearing on his argument unless "the relevant (person-related) class" included human nonpersons (those whose conditions are no fault of their own). Since the only relation between human persons and

nonpersons is their common humanity, and

since the human species is characterized by

BEIWEEN THE SPOCIES 86

raW . tid i .

moral agency (e. g., Michael A. Fox), 9 somestipulate little more than self-consciousnessand rudimentary agency (e. g., Joel

Feinberg 10 and Peter Singer 11).Regardless of how liberally the criteria arespecified, there are conscious humans (andsome nonhumans) who fail to satisfy them.For the purposes of this paper, the strict

interpretation of personhood, which requiresmoral agency, will be adopted. On thisinterpretation, most (perhaps all) nonhumananimals and a good number of humans do notqualify as persons.

Recent defenders of speciesism have agreedthat it is persons, primarily, who arerights-bearers. They have argued thatnonpersons who are members of species thatare characterized by personhood have basicmoral rights as well. Belonging to a speciesof this kind, they believe, is a morallyrelevant characteristic. Let us now look atthe arguments they have advanced to showthis.

a. The Appeal to Fairness

Michael Wreen has written extensively onthis subject of late. In his initial article, heset himself the task of establishing thefollowing "strong speciesist" view:

A live creature's belonging to a species, notnecessarily our own, which is generallycharacterized by personhood, is of somemoral weight, and enough, in fact, to ascribe

a right to life to that creature. 12

Briefly. Wreen argues that (1) there is a

"quasi-metaphysical link" between

personhood and humanity; (2) the laws of

nature and chance have a bearing on whether

a human will become or remain a person; (3)

for the most part, human nonpersons are

nonpersons through no fault of their own;

and (4):

Human nonpersons, then, should be ascribed

basic rights; for although in the primary

case it is persons who are ascribed basic

rights, equality of opportunity, or, better,

BEIWEEN THE SPOCIES 86

fairness, requires us to ascribe basic rights

to human nonpersons as wel1. 13

Wreen goes on to argue that the same wouldhold for a nonhuman belonging to a speciescharacterized by personhood.

I have recently criticized this defense of

speciesism. 14 Wreen has replied;15 I have

replied in turn;16 and he has just fired the

last salvo. 17 My purpose here is not torehash our lengthy debate. I simply want tospotlight the key claim in Wreen's argumentfor strong speciesism: the appeal tofairness. It is instructive to see why thisseemingly plausible appeal must fail.

Wreen believes that we owe humannonpersons whose condition is no fault oftheir own basic moral rights because itwould be !.!!1fillr. to do otherwise. Those lessfortunate than ourselves deservecompensation in the form of basic rights fortheir loss. I have pointed out that thefairness premise simply begs the questionbecause it implies that human nonpersonsalready have a basic moral right: the right

to be treated fairly.1 8

Wreen has responded that he did not invokefairness as a r.l.gb! in his argument for thebasic rights of human nonpersons, but as aprinciple. That principle (unstated in hisoriginal article) is:

[The Fairness Principle] All creatures in therelevant (person-related) class are to betreated fairly and equally in respect ofpersonhood-generated-rights.

Thus, he claims that his argument is not

circular. 19

I replied that his fairness principle wouldhave no bearing on his argument unless "therelevant (person-related) class" includedhuman nonpersons (those whose conditionsare no fault of their own). Since the onlyrelation between human persons and

nonpersons is their common humanity, and

since the human species is characterized by

raW L @# . tid i .

personhood, the assumption that this warrants their inclusion in the class of beings due rights is question-begging. Wreen must establish that membership in a species characterized by personhood is morally relevant and sufficient for the ascription of basic moral rights: he cannot simply assume

this as a premise in his argument,20

Wreen has now responded that he does not assume that human nonpersons should be included in the class to whom fairness principle applies: he believes he has

established this by argument.21 The appeal to fairness, then, is not an assumed premise: we are to construe it as an intermediate conclusion. The argument now looks like this:

1. All creatures in the relevant (person­related) class are to be treated fairly and equally in respect of personhood-generated rights.

2. Personhood "is metaphysically caught up with humanity."

3. Whether we become or remain persons depends on empirical considerations.

4. For the most part, human nonpersons are that way through no fault of their own.

Therefore: Human nonpersons whose condition is no fault of their own should be included in the relevant (person-related) class, all members of which are to be treated fairly and equally in respect of personhood generated rights.

Therefore: (It now follows trivially that) human nonpersons whose condition is no fault of their own have basic moral rights.

This move on Wreen's part fails to salvage the argument. The premises as stated do not yield the intermediate conclusion at all. The "Fairness Principle" (premise 1) implies nothing about the sorts of beings to be included in the 'relevant (person-related) class.' The highly dubious "metaphysical" claim (premise 2) also doesn't shoW that a.ll humans are---like persons---the sorts of

beings who are due basic moral rights, as

Wreen admits.22 The empirical claim (premises 3 and 4) can have no normative implications. The conjuction of (1 )-(4) is simply insufficient to establish the intermediate conclusion. In order to be valid, the argument must be an enthymeme. Another normative premise must be added, saying· somthing like this: "It would be unfair to deny personhood-generated rights to those humans who would have been persons had conditions not obtained which were beyond their control." But this would be to assume that these human nonpersons are already included in the class to which the fairness principle applies: the very (intermediate) conclusion of the argument. If we leave any such premises out, the conclusion will not follow; if we leave it in, and do not support it by further argument,' it simply begs the question. We must go beyond an appeal to fairness if speciesism is to be justified.

b. The Ar(~ument from Thwarted potential

I want to suggest an argument here which does try to go beyond an appeal to fairness. It is in the spirit, if not the letter, of Wreen's defense of strong speciesism.

Suppose one holds the view that personhood,

while sufficien!, is not necessary for moral considerability. One might hold that

potential personhood is a morally relevant

characteristic which makes a being morally considerable. Very small children, for

example, are not yet persons but may be held to be morally considerable because they are potential persons. Now, it can be

argued, very mentally deficient humans (assuming that their condition is no fault of

their own) are innocent beings who have been deprived not merely of actual personhood (which holds in some cases only), .but of any potential personhood. Their potential in this regard has been thwarted. If potential personhood has moral weight, it can be argued, why shouldn't the l.2n of potential personhood count as well? The child will be a person; the severely retarded human wo u Id have been a person if

87 BEmiEEN THE SPOCIES~ "'_"'"_'._ 'j""ni:""v~;,2:;;"F~;:"~:'--,.~"'-,;i;'f:r"~d::'C,,T ",\,i'f,&;j;:iiY;1BH;',,;;?ii ~·'·-·:;«:iii':¥i!:;"';;::'c>:,,:·:C;j:::;,,<,:~ .",,-,-, .~",:c-';'_'"~>f,\M~>1-~)')\","'i.,,\·i.:r0?";,;"-';C~,.·; "",._;,n' """.,q-.,

personhood, the assumption that thiswarrants their inclusion in the class ofbeings due rights is question-begging. Wreenmust establish that membership in a speciescharacterized by personhood is morallyrelevant and sufficient for the ascription ofbasic moral rights: he cannot simply assume

this as a premise in his argument.20

Wreen has now responded that he does notassume that human nonpersons should beincluded in the. class to whom fairnessprinciple applies: he believes he has

established this by argument.21 The appealto fairness, then, is not an assumedpremise: we are to construe it as anintermediate conclusion. The argument nowlooks like this:

1. All creatures in the relevant (person­related) class are to be treated fairly andequally in respect of personhood-generatedrights.

2. Personhood "is metaphysically caught upwith humanity."

3. Whether we become or remain personsdepends on empirical considerations.

4. For the most part, human nonpersons arethat way through no fault of their own.

Therefore: Human nonpersons whosecondition is no fault of their own should beincluded in the relevant (person-related)class, all members of which are to betreated fairly and equally in respect ofpersonhood generated rights.

Therefore: (It now follows trivially that)human nonpersons whose condition is no faultof their own have basic moral rights.

This move on Wreen's part fails to salvagethe argument. The premises as stated do notyield the intermediate conclusion at all. The"Fairness Principle" (premise 1) impliesnothing about the sorts of beings to beincluded in the 'relevant (person-related)class.' The highly dubious "metaphysical"claim (premise 2) also doesn't show that IDlhumans are---Iike persons---the sorts of

87

beings who are due basic moral rights, as

Wreen admits.22 The empirical claim(premises 3 and 4) can have no normativeimplications. The conjuction of (1 )-(4) issimply insufficient to establish theintermediate conclusion. In order to bevalid, the argument must be an enthymeme.Another normative premise must be added,saying· somthing like this: "It would beunfair to deny personhood-generated rightsto those humans who would have beenpersons had conditions not obtained whichwere beyond their control." But this wouldbe to assume that these human nonpersonsare already included in the class to which thefairness principle applies: the very(intermediate) conclusion of the argument.If we leave any such premises out, theconclusion will not follow; if we leave it in,and do not support it by further argument,' itsimply begs the question. We must gobeyond an appeal to fairness if speciesism isto be justified.

b. The Ar(~ument from Thwarted potential

I want to suggest an argument here whichdoes try to go beyond an appeal to fairness.It is in the spirit, if not the letter, ofWreen's defense of strong speciesism.

Suppose one holds the view that personhood,

while sufficien!, is not necessary for moralconsiderability. One might hold that

pote atial personhood is a morally relevantcharacteristic which makes a being morally

considerable. Very small children, for

example, are not yet persons but may beheld to be morally considerable because theyare potential persons. Now, it can be

argued, very mentally deficient humans(assuming that their condition is no fault of

their own) are innocent beings who havebeen deprived not merely of actualpersonhood (which holds in some casesonly), .but of any potential personhood. Theirpotential in this regard has been thwarted.If potential personhood has moral weight, itcan be argued, why shouldn't the l.2ll ofpotential personhood count as well? Thechild will be a person; the severely retardedhuman would have been a person if

~ THE SPOCIES

misfortune had not struck. This, one might hold, is the morally relevant difference between a mentally handicapped human and, e.g., a dog. If so, differential treatment of the two would be justified.

Many would reject this argument because it assigns moral weight to potentiality. Suppose the objections to this could be overcome, however (as I am inclined to believe they could be). Would we now have a good argument for speciesism?

It is certainly reasonable to say that potential personhood depends upon the characteristics of one's species. But how much moral weight should be assigned to potential personhood? We must answer this question before we can try to determine how much the loss of that potential should count. We can hold one of two views: the strict potentiality view or the gradualist

potentiality view. 23 The first view assigns full moral status to potential persons. Since it implies that a fertilized ovum has all the basic moral rights possessed by a person, the strict view is often rejected as extremely implausible. However, those who retreat to the gradualist view will find that it cannot be used to support strong speciesism.

According to gradualism, potential persons are all morally considerable, but their moral significance increases as that potential is actualized. The nearer one is to being a person, the greater is one's moral significance. One does not achieve maximum significance---i. e., one does not gain basic

moral rights---until actual personhood is achieved. Until then, one has· at most a strong claim to life, a claim whose strength increases as one comes closer to being a person. What moral weight could thwarted potential have on such a view? Does one's degree of moral significance increase depending on how close to personhood one was when misfortune struck? Does a human damaged as a three-month-old fetus count for less than a child who became brain­damaged after birth? At what point, if any, does a victim of thwarted potential gain a right to life? Perhaps only if he or she had

achieved personhood, then tragically lost it? We could not very well hold that those who had not yet achieved personhood when their potential was thwarted have a right to life when ~ persons with the same characteristics who soon will ~ persons lack that right.

Gradualism simply does not provide the theoretical underpinning needed for the view that unfortunate human nonpersons all have a right to life. Thus, it does not support strong speciesism. It could be used to support weak speciesism because it would warrant differential treatment of human nonpersons deprived of their personhood and nonhumans who never could have been persons. But all this would mean is that we should sacrifice the nonhuman to benefit a person before sacrificing the human. It would also imply that the human nonperson

who was afflicted as a three-month-old

fetus should be used before one afflicted at

sixteen weeks of gestation.

Considerations of this sort drive us back to the strict potentiality view. At least it

accords a full right to life to any potential

person. By extension, one could accord this

right to any victim of thwarted potential,

regardless of the point at which the

deprivation occurred. Wouldn't such a view give good support to strong speciesism?

It would not. Even supposing the implausability of the strict view could be overcome, it can at most allow the ascription of a right to life to a nonperson who once was a potential person. Those who were conceived without that potential have no such potential to thwart. One cannot be robbed of what one has never possessed. (The same implication holds for the gradualist position: those who never had potential for personhood would not even have a weak claim to life.)

Imagine three individuals. All have comparable mental abilities and all are nonpersons. One is a nonperson because his mother was injured when he was a six­month-old fetus. Another was conceived

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 88

misfortune had not struck. This, one mighthold, is the morally relevant differencebetween a mentally handicapped human and,e.g., a dog. If so, differential treatment ofthe two would be justified.

Many would reject this argument because itassigns moral weight to potentiality.Suppose the objections to this could beovercome, however (as I am inclined tobelieve they could be). Would we now have agood argument for speciesism?

It is certainly reasonable to say thatpotential personhood depends upon thecharacteristics of one's species. But howmuch moral weight should be assigned topotential personhood? We must answer thisquestion before we can try to determine howmuch the loss of that potential should count.We can hold one of two views: the strictpotentiality view or the gradualist

potentiality view.23 The first view assignsfull moral status to potential persons. Sinceit implies that a fertilized ovum has all thebasic moral rights possessed by a person,the strict view is often rejected asextremely implausible. However, those whoretreat to the gradualist view will find thatit cannot be used to support strongspeciesism.

According to gradualism, potential personsare all morally considerable, but their moralsignificance increases as that potential isactualized. The nearer one is to being aperson, the greater is one's moralsignificance. One does not achieve maximumsignificance---i. e., one does not gain basic

moral rights---until actual personhood isachieved. Until then, one has· at most astrong claim to life, a claim whose strengthincreases as one comes closer to being aperson. What moral weight could thwartedpotential have on such a view? Does one'sdegree of moral significance increasedepending on how close to personhood onewas when misfortune struck? Does a humandamaged as a three-month-old fetus countfor less than a child who became brain­damaged after birth? At what point, if any,does a victim of thwarted potential gain aright to life? Perhaps only if he or she had

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 88

achieved personhood, then tragically lost it?We could not very well hold that those whohad not yet achieved personhood when theirpotential was thwarted have a right to lifewhen ~ persons with the samecharacteristics who soon will ~ personslack that right.

Gradualism simply does not provide thetheoretical underpinning needed for the viewthat unfortunate human nonpersons all have aright to life. Thus, it does not supportstrong speciesism. It could be used tosupport weak speciesism because it wouldwarrant differential treatment of humannonpersons deprived of their personhood andnonhumans who never could have beenpersons. But all this would mean is that weshould sacrifice the nonhuman to benefit aperson before sacrificing the human. Itwould also imply that the human nonperson

who was afflicted as a three-month-old

fetus should be used before one afflicted at

sixteen weeks of gestation.

Considerations of this sort drive us back tothe strict potentiality view. At least it

accords a full right to life to any potential

person. By extension, one could accord this

right to any victim of thwarted potential,

regardless of the point at which the

deprivation occurred. Wouldn't such a viewgive good support to strong speciesism?

It would not. Even supposing theimplausability of the strict view could beovercome, it can at most allow theascription of a right to life to a nonpersonwho once was a potential person. Those whowere conceived without that potential haveno such potential to thwart. One cannot berobbed of what one has never possessed.(The same implication holds for thegradualist position: those who never hadpotential for personhood would not even havea weak claim to life.)

Imagine three individuals. All havecomparable mental abilities and all arenonpersons. One is a nonperson because hismother was injured when he was a six­month-old fetus. Another was conceived

with a genetic makeup which makes it impossible for her to become a person. The third is a nonhuman animal who is a typical member of her species. Of course, none of them has chosen to be a nonperson. Now suppose that we could save the life of a person by killing anyone of these three. The strict inte rpreta tio n of the thwarted potential view would require us to spare the accident victim and to sacrifice either the remaining human or the animal. Neither of the latter two has a right to life on this view, because, unlike the first human, they never were potential persons.

Why do we find this consequence so morally unacceptable? t think that reflection on this matter will lead us even further from speciesism. It seems wrong to spare the human who was victimized when a six­month-old fetus while we condemn the human who was conceived without the potential for personhood, because both are essentially innocent. Neither had any control over the circumstances resulting in their conditions.. Whether the die was cast at conception or after hardly seems morally relevant. B.!!1 this also holds for the animal. Her permanent nonpersonhood is just as genetically determined as the second human's. If the two humans seem to be on a

moral par, shouldn't the animal share their status?

It is tempting to reply as follows: "We have been interpreting 'potential' too narrowly. The human who was conceived without the potential for personhood suffers from a genetic abnormality. There is a "species potential" in which she cannot share, through no fault of her own. By contrast, although the animal also did not choose nonpersonhood, she was dealt a full hand at conception. This is the morally relevant difference between the two. Thus, speciesism is justified. The animal should die; not the human."

Tempting though this line of argument may be, we cannot use it to support speciesism, for it assumes the very point at issue. According to speciesism, membership in a species where personhood is the norm is

morally relevant. We cannot establish this conclusion by asserting that nonpersons belonging to species where personhood is the norm are thereby more morally significant than nonpersons who are in the normal range for their species. This argument is plainly circular.

Thus, however it is interpreted, the thwarted potential argument fails to support any speciesist conclusions.

c. The A~~eal to Beneyolence

It will now be fairly easy to show why appeals such as M. A. Fox makes to "charity,

benevolence, [and] humaneness"24 also do not support speciesism. Suppose one holds

that (1) ~rima facie, only persons are

morally considerable,· but that (2)

nonpersons who belong to species characterized by persons also can be shown

to be morally considerable. One could not argue that benevolence, etc., requires one to include these nonpersons in the class of

morally considerable beings. Such an

argument would be circular in the same was the appeal to fairness is: we can only be benevolent or charitable to those who already are morally considerable (as opposed to things like video cassette recorders). They must be suitable objects of moral concern in order for us to kind to them.

On the other hand, if one holds the view that (1) ~rima facie, only persons have a right to .l.i.W., (2) sentient nonpersons are morally considerable, and (3) those sentient nonpersons who belong to species characterized by personhood should also have a right to life, one will still run into difficulties. For why should benevolence favor one group of morally considerable nonpersons (e. g., impaired humans) over another? Thi's must be shown, not merely asserted. It cannot be shown by pointing out that human nonpersons are "less fortunate

than ourselves": 25 this either collapses into an illicit appeal to fairness ("they don't deserve such treatment") or thwarted potential ("unlike us, they were robbed of

89 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

with a genetic makeup which makes itimpossible for her to become a person. Thethird is a nonhuman animal who is a typicalmember of her species. Of course, none ofthem has chosen to be a nonperson. Nowsuppose that we could save the life of aperson by killing anyone of these three. Thestrict inte rpreta tio n of the thwartedpotential view would require us to spare theaccident victim and to sacrifice either theremaining human or the animal. Neither ofthe latter two has a right to life on thisview, because, unlike the first human, theynever were potential persons.

Why do we find this consequence so morallyunacceptable? I think that reflection on thismatter will lead us even further fromspeciesism. It seems wrong to spare thehuman who was victimized when a six­month-old fetus while we condemn the humanwho was conceived without the potential forpersonhood, because both are essentiallyinnocent. Neither had any control over thecircumstances resulting in their conditions.Whether the die was cast at conception orafter hardly seems morally relevant. B.!!1this also holds for the animal. Herpermanent nonpersonhood is just asgenetically determined as the secondhuman's. If the two humans seem to be on a

moral par, shouldn't the animal share theirstatus?

It is tempting to reply as follows: "We havebeen interpreting 'potential' too narrowly.The human who was conceived without thepotential for personhood suffers from agenetic abnormality. There is a "speciespotential" in which she cannot share, throughno fault of her own. By contrast, althoughthe animal also did not choosenonpersonhood, she was dealt a full hand atconception. This is the morally relevantdifference between the two. Thus,speciesism is justified. The animal shoulddie; not the human."

Tempting though this line of argument maybe, we cannot use it to support speciesism,for it assumes the very point at issue.According to speciesism, membership in aspecies where personhood is the norm is

89

morally relevant. We cannot establish thisconclusion by asserting that nonpersonsbelonging to species where personhood is thenorm are thereby more morally significantthan nonpersons who are in the normal rangefor their species. This argument is plainlycircular.

Thus, however it is interpreted, thethwarted potential argument fails to supportany speciesist conclusions.

c. The A~~eal to Benevolence

It will now be fairly easy to show whyappeals such as M. A. Fox makes to "charity,

benevolence, [and] humaneness"24 also donot support speciesism. Suppose one holds

that (1) ~rima facie, only persons are

morally considerable,· but that (2)

nonpersons who belong to speciescharacterized by persons also can be shown

to be morally considerable. One could notargue that benevolence, etc., requires one toinclude these nonpersons in the class of

morally considerable beings. Such an

argument would be circular in the same wasthe appeal to fairness is: we can only bebenevolent or charitable to those whoalready are morally considerable (asopposed to things like video cassetterecorders). They must be suitable objectsof moral concern in order for us to kind tothem.

On the other hand, if one holds the view that(1) ~rima facie, only persons have a right toJ..i.Ul., (2) sentient nonpersons are morallyconsiderable, and (3) those sentientnonpersons who belong to speciescharacterized by personhood should alsohave a right to life, one will still run intodifficulties. For why should benevolencefavor one group of morally considerablenonpersons (e. g., impaired humans) overanother? Thi's must be shown, not merelyasserted. It cannot be shown by pointing outthat human nonpersons are "less fortunate

than ourselves": 25 this either collapsesinto an illicit appeal to fairness ("they don'tdeserve such treatment") or thwartedpotential ("unlike us, they were robbed of

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

their potential personhood"). We must move beyond benevolence if we are to show that species membership can make a moral difference.

d. Appeals to Kinship and Closeness

Fox puts the next move this way:

Just as our untutored moral sense tells us that we have very strong obligations to members of our immediate families, so it seems that preferential treatment should, under certain circumstances, accordingly be

granted to members of the human family.26

Mary Midgely makes the same suggestion, claiming that no case has been made for the moral irrelevance of kinship, "nor denying

that closeness imposes special duties."27 If our kinship to one of two otherwise relevantly similar beings does indeed

constitute a morally relevant difference between the two, the argument goes, we are justified rather than bigoted when we prefer one over the other.

A kernel of truth is buried in this argument, but careful examination will show that this attempt to justify speciesism collapses. At the core of the argument is an analogy between our obligations to our "kin" and our obligations to mentally impaired humans. But how are we to interpret kinship here?

The kind of kinship most relevant to speciesism is genetic relatedness. But is it true to say that we have obligations to certain beings because they are genetically related to us? That such beings should be preferred to others? If we believed this, we would think it right to prefer the "natural" parent or child to the adoptive parent or child, or to prefer the sibling to the spouse. Surely this is nonsense. (Of course, there are people who believe this, just as there are people who think that members of their own race should come first, but it is difficult in the extreme to imagine how such beliefs could be morally justified.) There is no room in this model for the strong obligations we believe we have to our closest friends

and, especially, to our mates. We may feel "akin" to them, but they are usually not particularly close to us in genetic terms.

Thus, kinship must be interpreted less narrowly if there is any plausibility to the claim that it imposes special obligations. Abandoning the genetic interpretation already weakens the analogy to speciesism. The analogy is even more seriously undermined by a closer look at the special

obligations we believe we have to those

close to us.

Although it has been charged that

preferential treatment of spouses, children ("natural" or adopted), and friends is pure

prejudice, a good case can be made for

special obligations in these matters. Rawls' distinction between aCQuired and unacQuired

or "natural" duties will serve us here.28

Our duties to respect the basic rights of others are .l!O.acquired, but other duties are acquired as a result of our voluntary actions or the voluntary actions of others. Tom Regan has plausibly argued that our close

relationships impose acquired obligations.29

This does not imply, however, that we should prefer our loved ones in all circumstances to others or that we are entitled to violate the basic rights of others for our loved ones' sakes. E. g., you would not be obligated to use your limited funds to shelter and educate your child rather than the neighbor's, but you would be entitled to steal from your neighbor to give your child a better education. Now suppose that the neighbor's child and your own are both drowning, that you are the only one in a position to help, and that you know you will only be able to save one of them. Since you owe your child special protection, you should save her rather than the unfortunate other child. You would D..Q1 be entitled to .Is.ill the other child (e. g., by dumping him out of lifeboat) to save yours, however. Now let us see what these considerations do to the kinship argument.

First of all, those who believe that Jlll,rn..a, facie only persons are morally considerable,.! but that nonpersons belonging to personhood-I

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 9"'J

their potential personhood"). We must movebeyond benevolence if we are to show thatspecies membership can make a moraldifference.

d. Appeals to Kinship and Closeness

Fox puts the next move this way:

Just as our untutored moral sense tells usthat we have very strong obligations tomembers of our immediate families, so itseems that preferential treatment should,under certain circumstances, accordingly be

granted to members of the human family.26

Mary Midgely makes the same suggestion,claiming that no case has been made for themoral irrelevance of kinship, "nor denying

that closeness imposes special duties."27 Ifour kinship to one of two otherwiserelevantly similar beings does indeed

constitute a morally relevant differencebetween the two, the argument goes, we arejustified rather than bigoted when we preferone over the other.

A kernel of truth is buried in this argument,but careful examination will show that thisattempt to justify speciesism collapses. Atthe core of the argument is an analogybetween our obligations to our "kin" and ourobligations to mentally impaired humans.But how are we to interpret kinship here?

The kind of kinship most relevant tospeciesism is genetic relatedness. But is ittrue to say that we have obligations tocertain beings because they are geneticallyrelated to us? That such beings should bepreferred to others? If we believed this, wewould think it right to prefer the "natural"parent or child to the adoptive parent orchild, or to prefer the sibling to the spouse.Surely this is nonsense. (Of course, thereare people who believe this, just as thereare people who think that members of theirown race should come first, but it is difficultin the extreme to imagine how such beliefscould be morally justified.) There is noroom in this model for the strong obligationswe believe we have to our closest friends

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 9"'J

and, especially, to our mates. We may feel"akin" to them, but they are usually notparticularly close to us in genetic terms.

Thus, kinship must be interpreted lessnarrowly if there is any plausibility to theclaim that it imposes special obligations.Abandoning the genetic interpretationalready weakens the analogy to speciesism.The analogy is even more seriouslyundermined by a closer look at the special

obligations we believe we have to those

close to us.

Although it has been charged that

preferential treatment of spouses, children("natural" or adopted), and friends is pure

prejudice, a good case can be made for

special obligations in these matters. Rawls'distinction between aCQuired and unacQuired

or "natural" duties will serve us here.28

Our duties to respect the basic rights ofothers are .l!O.acquired, but other duties areacquired as a result of our voluntary actionsor the voluntary actions of others. TomRegan has plausibly argued that our close

relationships impose acquired obligations.29

This does not imply, however, that weshould prefer our loved ones in allcircumstances to others or that we areentitled to violate the basic rights of othersfor our loved ones' sakes. E. g., you wouldnot be obligated to use your limited funds toshelter and educate your child rather thanthe neighbor's, but you would be entitled tosteal from your neighbor to give your child abetter education. Now suppose that theneighbor's child and your own are bothdrowning, that you are the only one in aposition to help, and that you know you willonly be able to save one of them. Since youowe your child special protection, you shouldsave her rather than the unfortunate otherchild. You would D..Q1 be entitled to .Is.ill theother child (e. g., by dumping him out oflifeboat) to save yours, however. Now letus see what these considerations do to thekinship argument.

First of all, those who believe that Jlll,rn..a,facie only persons are morally considerable,.!but that nonpersons belonging to personhood-I

characterized species can be shown to be morally considerable as well, cannot use the kinship analogy to make their case. Closeness warrants preferential treatment of one being with respect to another because we have acqujred duties to one and not the other. This implies that the being to whom we are close is a Ire a d y morally considerable; otherwise, we could have ll.Q

duties to that being. Closeness can be used to justify the favoring of one morally considerable being over another, without violating the other's basic rights, but it cannot be used to ace 0 r d moral

considerability to any being.

Speciesists who believe that moral considerability is not restricted to persons would seem to be in a better position to make use of the kinship analogy, but this is not the case. Typically, these speciesists hold that prima facie only persons have a right to life, but that sentient nonpersons are morally considerable, and can be shown to have a right to life if they belong to species in which personhood is the norm. But unless we have entered into close relationships with humans who are or have become nonpersons, our duties to them are lillacquired. Any such duties (e. g., the duty not to torture them) would have to be commensurate with their degree of moral significance and could not already include a right to life ( by hypothesis). By the same token, we would have these unacquired duties to morally considerable nonhuman nonpersons. On the other hand, if one did have acquired duties to human nonpersons, it is extremely doubtful that these could include a right to life. We construe our obligation to respect others' rights to life as a "natural" or Jm.acquired duty. Thus, the acquired obligations stemming from close relationships cannot be used to show why nonpersons who belong to personhood­characterized species such as humanity must have a right to life.

Speciesists who remain intrigued by the kinship analogy cannot now fall back on our greater biological kinship to human nonpersons to try to justify preferential treatment of them. That move has already

been discredited. On the other hand, the following reply ~ open to them: "We may have no close relationship to any human nonpersons, but we are still emotionally bound to them. While we do not object to using certain animals for food and research purposes, we cannot stomach the notion of doing the same to defective humans. Even if they have no right to Iife---even if, technically, they are not even morally

considerable---our feelings will not permit us to treat them in these ways. This is what makes, and should make, the difference." Fox suggests this reply himself when he claims that "natural emotional responses" should have weight in our moral judgments

about humans who are nonpersons.3D

Those who would argue this way are no longer arguing that species membership can warrant moral considerability or a right to life. That is just as well: all such attempts have so far failed. The emphasis is now placed on the emotional attachment one feels to certain beings rather than on the morally relevant characteristics these beings might have. Instead of arguing "we prefer individual x to individual y because it is right to do so," one is claiming "our preferring x to y makes it right to do so." Let us now consider this very different kind of attempt to justify speciesism.

Attempts to Show speciesjsm is Justified Eyen if Species is not a MorallY Releyant

Characteristic

a. The Appeal to Emotions

This is the argument just stated above. As it stands, it will not do at all. The lives and well-being of nonpersons, human and nonhuman, are said to be contingent on the emotional ties one may not have to these beings. The most obvious kinds of prejudice are sanctioned' by such a view. E. g., many people who happily consume pork chops would rather starve than eat a beagle; some

who are horrified by the agony of rabbits used for cosmetics testing would be

unconcerned if the rodents involved were

rats; and many who would never wear a coat

91 BE:lWEEN THE SPEX::IES

characterized species can be shown to bemorally considerable as well, cannot use thekinship analogy to make their case.Closeness warrants preferential treatmentof one being with respect to another becausewe have acqujred duties to one and not theother. This implies that the being to whomwe are close is already morallyconsiderable; otherwise, we could have UQ

duties to that being. Closeness can be usedto justify the favoring of one morallyconsiderable being over another, withoutviolating the other's basic rights, but itcannot be used to a c cor d moral

considerability to any being.

Speciesists who believe that moralconsiderability is not restricted to personswould seem to be in a better position to makeuse of the kinship analogy, but this is not thecase. Typically, these speciesists hold thatprima facie only persons have a right to life,but that sentient nonpersons are morallyconsiderable, and can be shown to have aright to life if they belong to species inwhich personhood is the norm. But unlesswe have entered into close relationshipswith humans who are or have becomenonpersons, our duties to them arelillacquired. Any such duties (e. g., the dutynot to torture them) would have to becommensurate with their degree of moralsignificance and could not already include aright to life ( by hypothesis). By the sametoken, we would have these unacquiredduties to morally considerable nonhumannonpersons. On the other hand, if one didhave acquired duties to human nonpersons, itis extremely doubtful that these couldinclude a right to life. We construe ourobligation to respect others' rights to life asa "natural" or 1ill.acquired duty. ThUS, theacquired obligations stemming from closerelationships cannot be used to show whynonpersons who belong to personhood­characterized species such as humanity musthave a right to life.

Speciesists who remain intrigued by thekinship analogy cannot now fall back on ourgreater biological kinship to humannonpersons to try to justify preferentialtreatment of them. That move has already

91

been discredited. On the other hand, thefollowing reply i.§. open to them: "We mayhave no close relationship to any humannonpersons, but we are still emotionallybound to them. While we do not object tousing certain animals for food and researchpurposes, we cannot stomach the notion ofdoing the same to defective humans. Even ifthey have no right to Iife---even if,technically, they are not even morally

considerable---our feelings will not permitus to treat them in these ways. This is whatmakes, and should make, the difference."Fox suggests this reply himself when heclaims that "natural emotional responses"should have weight in our moral judgments

about humans who are nonpersons.3D

Those who would argue this way are nolonger arguing that species membership canwarrant moral considerability or a right tolife. That is just as well: all such attemptshave so far failed. The emphasis is nowplaced on the emotional attachment one feelsto certain beings rather than on the morallyrelevant characteristics these beings mighthave. Instead of arguing "we preferindividual x to individual y because it is rightto do so," one is claiming "our preferring xto y makes it right to do so." Let us nowconsider this very different kind of attemptto justify speciesism.

Attempts to Show speciesism is JustifiedEyen if Species is not a MorallY Releyant

Characteristic

a. The Appeal to Emotjons

This is the argument just stated above. Asit stands, it will not do at all. The lives andwell-being of nonpersons, human andnonhuman, are said to be contingent on theemotional ties one may not have to thesebeings. The most obvious kinds of prejudiceare sanctioned 'by such a view. E. g., manypeople who happily consume pork chopswould rather starve than eat a beagle; somewho are horrified by the agony of rabbits

used for cosmetics testing would be

unconcerned if the rodents involved were

rats; and many who would never wear a coat

BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

fashioned from skinned Persian cats wear

snakeskin shoes or belts (the snakes are skinned alive and generally take several days to die). Far more disturbing to the

speciesist is the fact that many people have much stronger emotional ties to their pets

than to mentally impaired humans. Fox indignantly reports the true story of a man in a small lifeboat who refused to throw his dog overboard to make room for two

31drowning men. If those two men had been nonpersons (and thus lacking in basic rights according to Fox's "autonomy" view), the argument from emotional attachment would tell us that the man in the lifeboat acted correctly.

Similar problems arise when the appeal to emotion is generalized. Most persons, it is often argued, would be so upset by the practice of treating human nonpersons as harvestable "natural resources" that the resultant "side-effects" of the practice would constitute a net loss in utility. This appeal to aggregate emotions also fails, as I

have argued elsewhere.32 Emotions, including those based on prudence, simply cannot be relied upon to provide the results speciesists desire.

b. Appeals to Rational Preferences

One way for a speciesist to try to avoid such problems is to appeal to rat ion a I preferences. One could argue that well­informed, clearly thinking persons would not sanction the "harvesting" of nonpersons belonging to their own species, but would have no aversion to the "humane" use of others allegedly lacking in basic moral rights. This is exactly what Thomas Young

has recently argued.33 He thinks that we have a tendency (probably innate) to prefer members of our species, even if they lack

moral considerability.34 He argues that such preference is rational, according to a very plausible theory of rational preference

advanced by Richard B. Brandt.35

According to Brandt, irrational preferences are preferences, had by an individual, which

would be extinguished by that individual's repeated, vivid reflection on relevant

information, including logic. Any preference which would not be extinguished by such a procedure is rational, according to

Brandt.36 Young believes that no amount of logic and informed, vivid reflection will alter one's preference for members of one's own species. Thus, on the Young-Brandt view, "rational" persons are speciesists.

Young uses this line of argument to support an "ideal" version of the side-effects argument for speciesism: if only rational preferences are counted, the side-effects of harvesting human nonpersons would create massive disutility compared to the humane

37disposal of animal nonpersons. However, others who prefer not to argue along utilitarian lines can also appeal to rational preferences. Even Mary Midgely, who claims that rationality has been emphasized at the expense of emotions in moral theorizing, could adopt the Brandt view. She claims that preferences for one's own species is due "considerable respect" because it is a "natural, emotional

preference. "38 Although she characterizes this preference as emotional "rather than"

rational,39 it ~ be rational in Brandt's sense if reflection would not extinguish it. What better justification could speciesism have than a demonstration of its rationality?

Despite its potentially broad appeal, however, this attempt to justify speciesism fails. That is because, on Brandt's view, it is impossible to distinguish rationality from extreme bigotry. Brandi himself points out that his view has a "surprising" implication: preference and aversions which are so firmly engrained that they would be extinguished by no amount of vivid, informed, logical reflection on the part of the individual who has them are classified as

"rational."40 Unfortunately, as we know, die-hard bigots are notoriously undisturbed by facts and logic. They are unmoved by considerations that change other minds. We

have always considered views which are immune to rational persuasion lrrational, but

BElWEEN THE SPEX::IES 92

,iJi. 4

fashioned from skinned Persian cats wear

snakeskin shoes or belts (the snakes areskinned alive and generally take severaldays to die). Far more disturbing to the

speciesist is the fact that many people havemuch stronger emotional ties to their pets

than to mentally impaired humans. Foxindignantly reports the true story of a manin a small lifeboat who refused to throw hisdog overboard to make room for two

drowning men.31 If those two men had beennonpersons (and thus lacking in basic rightsaccording to Fox's "autonomy" view), theargument from emotional attachment wouldtell us that the man in the lifeboat actedcorrectly.

Similar problems arise when the appeal toemotion is generalized. Most persons, it isoften argued, would be so upset by thepractice of treating human nonpersons asharvestable "natural resources" that theresultant "side-effects" of the practicewould constitute a net loss in utility. Thisappeal to aggregate emotions also fails, as I

have argued elsewhere.32 Emotions,including those based on prudence, simplycannot be relied upon to provide the resultsspeciesists desire.

b. Appeals to Rational Preferences

One way for a speciesist to try to avoid suchproblems is to appeal to rat ion a Ipreferences. One could argue that well­informed, clearly thinking persons would notsanction the "harvesting" of nonpersonsbelonging to their own species, but wouldhave no aversion to the "humane" use ofothers allegedly lacking in basic moralrights. This is exactly what Thomas Young

has recently argued.33 He thinks that wehave a tendency (probably innate) to prefermembers of our species, even if they lack

moral considerability.34 He argues thatsuch preference is rational, according to avery plausible theory of rational preference

advanced by Richard B. Brandt.35

According to Brandt, irrational preferencesare preferences, had by an individual, which

BElWEEN THE SPEX::IES 92

would be extinguished by that individual'srepeated, vivid reflection on relevant

information, including logic. Any preferencewhich would not be extinguished by such aprocedure is rational, according to

Brandt.36 Young believes that no amount oflogic and informed, vivid reflection willalter one's preference for members of one'sown species. Thus, on the Young-Brandtview, "rational" persons are speciesists.

Young uses this line of argument to supportan "ideal" version of the side-effectsargument for speciesism: if only rationalpreferences are counted, the side-effects ofharvesting human nonpersons would createmassive disutility compared to the humane

disposal of animal nonpersons.37 However,others who prefer not to argue alongutilitarian lines can also appeal to rationalpreferences. Even Mary Midgely, whoclaims that rationality has been emphasizedat the expense of emotions in moraltheorizing, could adopt the Brandt view. Sheclaims that preferences for one's ownspecies is due "considerable respect"because it is a "natural, emotional

preference. "38 Although she characterizesthis preference as emotional "rather than"

rational,39 it~ be rational in Brandt'ssense if reflection would not extinguish it.What better justification could speciesismhave than a demonstration of its rationality?

Despite its potentially broad appeal,however, this attempt to justify speciesismfails. That is because, on Brandt's view, itis impossible to distinguish rationality fromextreme bigotry. Brandi himself points outthat his view has a "surprising" implication:preference and aversions which are sofirmly engrained that they would beextinguished by no amount of vivid,informed, logical reflection on the part ofthe individual who has them are classified as

"rational."40 Unfortunately, as we know,die-hard bigots are notoriously undisturbedby facts and logic. They are unmoved byconsiderations that change other minds. We

have always considered views which areimmune to rational persuasion lrrational, but

. 4 ,iJi

on Brandt's view the opposite is the case.

Thus, the Wrational preferencew line of argument would Wjustifyw deep-seat~d

racial, sexual, or cultural prejudice. The human tendency to prefer those most similar to oneself often takes such forms. Midgely notes that this is the case, but dismisses it as mere wpseudo-speciation;w Le., as the confusion of race, culture, etc., with

species.41 This reply could not be used to distinguish speciesism from the above forms of bigotry, however, since it would clearly beg the question. The very term 'pseudo­speciation' in this context implies that preferences along species lines are legitimate while the others are not.

Yet another sort of deep-seated prejudice would be sanctioned by the Wrational preferencew defense. It may be true that humans, like other animals, tend to favor members of their own species. Unfortunately, there is evidence that normal members of species are often favored while the abnormal are shunned, despised, and attacked. The very fact of species resemblence seems to fuel the aversion some who are normal feel for the abnormal. Unfortunately, many humans have such attitudes. Recently, a newspaper advice columnist printed several letters from readers who protested that handicapped people should not be seen in public. One found the sight so offensive that she claimed it violated her rights: WI believe my rights should be respected as much as the rights of the person in the wheelchair...maybe even more so, because I am normal and she is

not.w42 Die-hard "normalists" want no part of those who live "worlhless lives," even when their own family members are involved. E. g., some abandon their handicapped children or refuse them life­saving surgery even when the children could have contented lives. When asked if this is

how they would wish to be treated if they became mentally impaired, wnormalistsW say they hope someone will have the sense to lock them away or shoot them. Vivid reflection about the abnormal seems to increase, rather than extinguish, their

horror and disgust. As the advice columnist wrote, wplease forgive me if I do not answer these folks. They are too far gone for me to reach.W It is ironic indeed that their very unreachability should be interpreted as rationality on the Brandt view.

To say the least, the existence of such attitudes casts grave doubt on Young's assertion that rational persons (in Brandt's sense) would always be horrified by the exploitation of human nonpersons for the benefit of others. Not only have experiments on the retarded and senile taken

place in the past;43 they are occurring now in eminently "civilizedw nations. A 1986 study conducted by the University of Maryland School of Medicine revealed that one-third of the family members who believed that their hospitalized mentally incompetent elderly relatives would not have wanted to participate in an experimeht on the adverse effects of urinary catheters nevertheless gave their permission. They reasoned that others would "possibly benefit" from the experiment.

In short, it appears that the "rational preferencew defense of speciesism has backfired in an exceptionally horrible way.

I can conceive of only one response to my charge that this last defense "justifies" deep-seated bigotry. Some people (quite a few, one hopes) are able to overcome racist, sexist, ethnocentric and "normalist" attitudes. Perhaps preferences and aversions that some, if not all, persons can

overcome by vivid, informed, logical reflection should be deemed "irrational." The speciesist could claim that this modification of Brandt's windividualistic" theory of rational preference defeats the bigotry charge.

Indeed it would---but at the cost of defeating speciesism itself. Some of us, if not all of us, have altered our belief that any member of our species should be favored over any sentient member of another species. Thunderstruck by the argument from marginal cases, we have racked our brains to find a morally relevant difference

93 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

-------~--------------_._-------_._--

on Brandt's view the opposite is the case.

Thus, the Wrational preferencew line ofargument would Wjustifyw deep-seat~d

racial, sexual, or cultural prejudice. Thehuman tendency to prefer those most similarto oneself often takes such forms. Midgelynotes that this is the case, but dismisses itas mere wpseudo-speciation;w Le., as theconfusion of race, culture, etc., with

species.41 This reply could not be used todistinguish speciesism from the above formsof bigotry, however, since it would clearlybeg the question. The very term 'pseudo­speciation' in this context implies thatpreferences along species lines arelegitimate while the others are not.

Yet another sort of deep-seated prejudicewould be sanctioned by the Wrationalpreferencew defense. It may be true thathumans, like other animals, tend to favormembers of their own species.Unfortunately, there is evidence that normalmembers of species are often favored whilethe abnormal are shunned, despised, andattacked. The very fact of speciesresemblence seems to fuel the aversionsome who are normal feel for the abnormal.Unfortunately, many humans have suchattitudes. Recently, a newspaper advicecolumnist printed several letters fromreaders who protested that handicappedpeople should not be seen in public. Onefound the sight so offensive that she claimedit violated her rights: WI believe my rightsshould be respected as much as the rights ofthe person in the wheelchair...maybe evenmore so, because I am normal and she is

not.w42 Die-hard "normalists" want no partof those who live "worlhless lives," evenwhen their own family members areinvolved. E. g., some abandon theirhandicapped children or refuse them life­saving surgery even when the children couldhave contented lives. When asked if this is

how they would wish to be treated if theybecame mentally impaired, wnormalistsW saythey hope someone will have the sense tolock them away or shoot them. Vividreflection about the abnormal seems toincrease, rather than extinguish, their

93

horror and disgust. As the advice columnistwrote, wplease forgive me if I do not answerthese folks. They are too far gone for me toreach.W It is ironic indeed that their veryunreachability should be interpreted asrationality on the Brandt view.

To say the least, the existence of suchattitudes casts grave doubt on Young'sassertion that rational persons (in Brandt'ssense) would always be horrified by theexploitation of human nonpersons for thebenefit of others. Not only haveexperiments on the retarded and senile taken

place in the past;43 they are occurring nowin eminently "civilizedw nations. A 1986study conducted by the University ofMaryland School of Medicine revealed thatone-third of the family members whobelieved that their hospitalized mentallyincompetent elderly relatives would not havewanted to participate in an experimeht onthe adverse effects of urinary cathetersnevertheless gave their permission. Theyreasoned that others would "possiblybenefit" from the experiment.

In short, it appears that the "rationalpreferencew defense of speciesism hasbackfired in an exceptionally horrible way.

I can conceive of only one response to mycharge that this last defense "justifies"deep-seated bigotry. Some people (quite afew, one hopes) are able to overcome racist,sexist, ethnocentric and "normalist"attitudes. Perhaps preferences andaversions that some, if not all, persons can

overcome by vivid, informed, logicalreflection should be deemed "irrational."The speciesist could claim that thismodification of Brandt's windividualistic"theory of rational preference defeats thebigotry charge.

Indeed it would---but at the cost of defeatingspeciesism itself. Some of us, if not all ofus, have altered our belief that any memberof our species should be favored over anysentient member of another species.Thunderstruck by the argument frommarginal cases, we have racked our brainsto find a morally relevant difference

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

between nonpersons of our own and of other species. Finding none---as the earlier part of this paper indicates---we have rejected speciesism. The burden is on speciesists to show this rejection to be confused, illogical, or misinformed. So far they have failed. It is speciesism---not its denial---which appears to be irrational.

Those who believe that human nonpersons are morally considerable and have a right to life should look for support to other positive arguments about the sorts of beings who can

have moral status.45 I predict that they will find these far more promising than the attempt to defend speciesism.

1See Peter Singer's classic, "All Animals are Equal," reprinted in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan and P. Singer, eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 148-162. Cf. Tom Regan's "An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights," InQuiry 22 (1­2), Summer, 1979, pp. 189-219.

2For an extensive look at the challenge the argument from marginal cases poses to the personhood view, see my "The Personhood View and the Argument from Marginal

Cases," forthcoming in Philosophica.

3 Robert Nozick, "About Mammals and

People," [a review of Tom Regan's The Case

for Anima! Rights (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1983)], The New York Times Book Reyiew, November 27, 1983, pp. 11, 29-30.

4 B. G. Frey, Rights Killing, and Suffering (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 116

5 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and Killing Animals," InQuiry 22 (1-2), Summer, 1979, p. 153. Also see his "Animals and the Value of Life," pp. 366-371, in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, Second Edition (New York: Random House, 1986).

6 Michael A. Fox. The Case for Animal Experimentation (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1986), pp. 58-59

7 lQl.Q.., p. 219, note 13.

8 Two individuals could be quite different without differing in morally relevant respects, of course. Mary Midgely, in Animals and Why They Matter (Athens: U. of Georgia Press, 1983), pp.98-9, has attacked the analogy between speciesism and racism because species, but not .@il,

results in important differences among individuals. This is true, but not to the point. The fact that some individuals like to have their ears scratched, or prefer to spend time in trees, or react to smiles with aggression, while others do not, indicates that their needs must be satisfied in different ways. It is difficult to see how such differences could be morally relevant. Midgley gives a second criticism of the analogy between racism and species ism in her very interesting book. She suggests that racism is an inherently confused concept; therefore, to the extent to which speciesism .i.§. related to racism, it is said to be confused as well. Midgley's main reason for asserting this is her belief that justified reverse discrimination often comes out as racist, although we assume that racism must be

unjustified (p. 100). This doesn't seem quite correct. Such reverse discrimination, when justified, is not an instance of racism at all. Individuals, who may belong to a racial minority, are given preferential treatment because they are victims of past and present injustices, whereas their competitors are the (perhaps innocent) beneficiaries of those same injustices. I..bl.s.. is the morally relevant difference between the individuals involved, not their race. E. g., it would be absurd for a U. S. firm to give Idi Amin job preference over a poor white from a New York slum on grounds of reverse discrimination. Reverse discrimination properly applies to any victim of oppression, and is not restricted to @Qt!l. groups at all. Midgley argues that racists too claim they are motivated by historical considerations (p. 100). Regardless of what racists may

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 94

"' l MEAa $4

between nonpersons of our own and of otherspecies. Finding none---as the earlier partof this paper indicates---we have rejectedspeciesism. The burden is on speciesists toshow this rejection to be confused, illogical,or misinformed. So far they have failed. Itis speciesism---not its denial---whichappears to be irrational.

Those who believe that human nonpersonsare morally considerable and have a right tolife should look for support to other positivearguments about the sorts of beings who can

have moral status.45 I predict that theywill find these far more promising than theattempt to defend speciesism.

1See Peter Singer's classic, "All Animalsare Equal," reprinted in Animal Rights andHuman Obligations, T. Regan and P. Singer,eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1976), pp. 148-162. Cf. Tom Regan's "AnExamination and Defense of One ArgumentConcerning Animal Rights," InQuiry 22 (1­2), Summer, 1979, pp. 189-219.

2For an extensive look at the challenge theargument from marginal cases poses to thepersonhood view, see my "The PersonhoodView and the Argument from Marginal

Cases," forthcoming in Philosophica.

3 Robert Nozick, "About Mammals and

People," [a review of Tom Regan's The Case

for Anima! Rights (Berkeley: U. ofCalifornia Press, 1983)], The New YorkTimes Book Reyiew, November 27, 1983,pp. 11, 29-30.

4 B. G. Frey, Rights Killing, and Suffering(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 116

5 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and KillingAnimals," InQuiry 22 (1-2), Summer, 1979,p. 153. Also see his "Animals and the Valueof Life," pp. 366-371, in Tom Regan, ed.,Matters of Life and peath, Second Edition(New York: Random House, 1986).

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 94

6 Michael A. Fox. The Case for AnimalExperimentation (Berkeley: U. of CaliforniaPress, 1986), pp. 58-59

7 lQl.Q.., p. 219, note 13.

8 Two individuals could be quite differentwithout differing in morally relevantrespects, of course. Mary Midgely, inAnimals and Why They Matter (Athens: U.of Georgia Press, 1983), pp.98-9, hasattacked the analogy between speciesism andracism because species, but not .@il,

results in important differences amongindividuals. This is true, but not to thepoint. The fact that some individuals like tohave their ears scratched, or prefer tospend time in trees, or react to smiles withaggression, while others do not, indicatesthat their needs must be satisfied indifferent ways. It is difficult to see howsuch differences could be morally relevant.Midgley gives a second criticism of theanalogy between racism and species ism inher very interesting book. She suggests thatracism is an inherently confused concept;therefore, to the extent to which speciesism.i.§. related to racism, it is said to be confusedas well. Midgley's main reason for assertingthis is her belief that justified reversediscrimination often comes out as racist,although we assume that racism must be

unjustified (p. 100). This doesn't seem quitecorrect. Such reverse discrimination, whenjustified, is not an instance of racism at all.Individuals, who may belong to a racialminority, are given preferential treatmentbecause they are victims of past and presentinjustices, whereas their competitors arethe (perhaps innocent) beneficiaries of thosesame injustices. I..bl.s.. is the morallyrelevant difference between the individualsinvolved, not their race. E. g., it would beabsurd for a U. S. firm to give Idi Amin jobpreference over a poor white from a NewYork slum on grounds of reversediscrimination. Reverse discriminationproperly applies to any victim of oppression,and is not restricted to @Qt!l. groups at all.Midgley argues that racists too claim theyare motivated by historical considerations(p. 100). Regardless of what racists may

"' l MEAa $4

say, however, it is quite plain that in fact they regard race as the determining characteristic. (For more reflections on reverse discrimination, see my "Preferential Hiring and Unjust Sacrifice," The Philosophical Forum, XII, 3 (1981), p. 279-89.)

9 Fox, op. cit. , pp. 45-46, 51-56.

10 Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Matters of Life and peath, op. cit" p. 262.

11 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and Killing Animals," op. cit., p. 151.

1 2 Michael Wreen, "In Defense of Speciesism," Ethics and Animals V(3), 1984, pp. 47-60.

13.1.!2.i.d.. p. 52

14 "Speciesism Not Justified," Ethics and Animals V (4), 1984, pp. 122-29.

15 M. Wreen, "My Kind of Person," Between the Species 2 (1), 1986, pp. 23-28.

16 "Species ism Revisited," Between the Species 2 (4), 1986, pp. 184-9.

17 M. Wreen, "If At All Humanly Possible,"

ib.i.d.., pp. 189-94.

18 "Speciesism Not Justified," p. 126.

19 "My Kind of Person," p. 27.

20 "Speciesism Revisited," p. 187.

21 "If At All Humanly Possible," p. 193.

22 "In Defense," p. 50. Even if this were not so, premise (2) is unwarranted. Wreen supports premise (2) by arguing that it is related to the following allegedly plausible criteriological claim: "It is necessarily true that the statement 'X is a live human being' is good evidence for the statement 'X is a

human person.' " ("In Defense," p. 50.) However, as I have pointed out (and Wreen has agreed), all that is needed to defeat such a criteriological claim is to conceive of circumstances in which it would be false to say that 'X is a live human being' is g.,Q..Q..Q evidence for 'X is a human person.' It is exceedingly easy to conceive of such circumstances: e. g., a new brain disease could render all or most humans nonpersons. Oddly. Wreen claims that the fact that we

can conceive of worlds in which all or most

humans are nonpersons "doesn't show that

being a live human being is not good evidence

for being a human person in these worlds"

("If At All Humanly Possible," p. 191). He

claims that there would still be good

evidence, although the evidence would be

insufficient or inconclusive (p. 191). On the

contrary, the brain-disease example shows

that 'X is a live human being' would fi.Q1 be

good evidence (no one said anything about

sufficient evidence) for 'X is a human

person' in such a world. Thus, premise (2)

is unsupported.

23 See Feinberg's characterizations of these views in "Abortion," op. cit., pp. 266-7. He believes that both views are infected by "a fatal logical error." I disagree. See my " Moral Agents and Moral Patients," read at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco in March, 1987, and forthcoming in Between the Species, note 13.

24 M. A. Fox, op. cit., p. 63. Ironically, Fox is in no position to argue in this way. First, it contradicts his repeated claim that .Q...O...!y persons (moral agents) can have basic moral rights (e. g., p. 51, 52, and 54). According to strong speciesism, nonpersons can be said to have such, rights if they belong to the appropriate species. Second, one must be morally-considerable---"an end in oneself"­--to have basic rights, but Fox believes that those who cannot qualitatively assess their lives can be instrumentally valuable only (p. 48, p. 88). He makes these claims about animals, but they apply to human nonpersons as well. Thus, his theoretical views are

95 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

say, however, it is quite plain that in factthey regard race as the determiningcharacteristic. (For more reflections onreverse discrimination, see my"Preferential Hiring and Unjust Sacrifice,"The Philosophical Forum, XII, 3 (1981), p.279-89.)

9 Fox, op. cit. , pp. 45-46, 51-56.

10 Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Matters ofLife and peath, op. cit" p. 262.

11 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and KillingAnimals," op. cit., p. 151.

1 2 Michael Wreen, "In Defense ofSpeciesism," Ethics and Animals V(3),1984, pp. 47-60.

13.1.!2.i.d.. p. 52

14 "Speciesism Not Justified," Ethics andAnimals V (4), 1984, pp. 122-29.

15 M. Wreen, "My Kind of Person," Betweenthe Species 2 (1), 1986, pp. 23-28.

16 "Species ism Revisited," Between theSpecies 2 (4), 1986, pp. 184-9.

17 M. Wreen, "If At All Humanly Possible,"

ib.i.d.., pp. 189-94.

18 "Speciesism Not Justified," p. 126.

19 "My Kind of Person," p. 27.

20 "Speciesism Revisited," p. 187.

21 "If At All Humanly Possible," p. 193.

22 "In Defense," p. 50. Even if this were notso, premise (2) is unwarranted. Wreensupports premise (2) by arguing that it isrelated to the following allegedly plausiblecriteriological claim: "It is necessarily truethat the statement 'X is a live human being'is good evidence for the statement 'X is a

95

human person.' " ("In Defense," p. 50.)However, as I have pointed out (and Wreenhas agreed), all that is needed to defeat sucha criteriological claim is to conceive ofcircumstances in which it would be false tosay that 'X is a live human being' is g.,Q..Q..Qevidence for 'X is a human person.' It isexceedingly easy to conceive of suchcircumstances: e. g., a new brain diseasecould render all or most humans nonpersons.Oddly. Wreen claims that the fact that we

can conceive of worlds in which all or most

humans are nonpersons "doesn't show that

being a live human being is not good evidence

for being a human person in these worlds"

("If At All Humanly Possible," p. 191). He

claims that there would still be good

evidence, although the evidence would be

insufficient or inconclusive (p. 191). On the

contrary, the brain-disease example shows

that 'X is a live human being' would fi.Q1 be

good evidence (no one said anything about

sufficient evidence) for 'X is a human

person' in such a world. Thus, premise (2)

is unsupported.

23 See Feinberg's characterizations of theseviews in "Abortion," op. cit., pp. 266-7. Hebelieves that both views are infected by "afatal logical error." I disagree. See my "Moral Agents and Moral Patients," read atthe Pacific Division Meeting of the AmericanPhilosophical Association in San Francisco inMarch, 1987, and forthcoming in Betweenthe Species, note 13.

24 M. A. Fox, op. cit., p. 63. Ironically, Foxis in no position to argue in this way. First,it contradicts his repeated claim that .Q...O...!ypersons (moral agents) can have basic moralrights (e. g., p. 51, 52, and 54). Accordingto strong speciesism, nonpersons can be saidto have such, rights if they belong to theappropriate species. Second, one must bemorally-considerable---"an end in oneself"­--to have basic rights, but Fox believes thatthose who cannot qualitatively assess theirlives can be instrumentally valuable only (p.48, p. 88). He makes these claims aboutanimals, but they apply to human nonpersonsas well. Thus, his theoretical views are

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

incompatible with the strong speciesist view he tries to support.

25 Ih ;,.! 6.L!oLI.lo!.., p. O.

26 llllii.. p. 60-1.

27 Midgley, op. cit., p. 22. Unlike Fox, however, she denies that this would require us to adopt a "human first" position.

28 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 114-15.

29 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights,

op. cit., p. 316.

30 Fox, op. cit., p. 60. He certainly does not

rest his case for speciesism on this one argument, but it is now the only argument he offers which has not yet been refuted.

31.l.!:lli!..,p.15

32 See my "Must An Opponent of Animal Rights Also be An Opponent of Human Rights?," InQuiry XXIV (2), 1981, pp. 229­41, especially, pp. 233-36; and my "The Personhood View and the Argument from Marginal Cases," forthcoming in Philosophica.

33 Thomas Young, "The Morality of Killing Animals: Four Arguments," Ethics and Animals V (4), 1984, pp. 88-101. Young denies that he is supporting speciesism. This is because he thinks 'speciesism' is unjustified by definition (he defines it as 'ignoring the interests of members of other species for no reason other than that they are members of other species' [po 89]). In fact, his position ( if correct) would support both strong and weak speciesism as I have earlier defined them.

34.l.Ql.Q.., p. 98. Although Young writes that human nonpersons have "moral standing," he does not mean by this that they possess qualities which impose direct duties on the

rest of us. He believes that anyone or any thing that persons care about sufficiently has "moral standing" and an "other-based" right to life (l.QlQ., p. 95). On this view, as Young would agree, a video cassette recorder would have "moral standing" and an "other-based" right to continued smooth functioning. Clearly, this is not 'moral standing' as we normally interpret it.

35 R. B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 1979).

36 lllli!., p. 113.

37 Young, op cit., p. 98.

38 M'd I .I g ey, op. CIt., p. 124.

39 .Lb..i.d.., p. 104.

40 Brandt, op. cit., p. 41.

41 Midgley, op cit., p. 109.

42 Column by Ann Landers, September 22, 1986, The Uniontown (Pa.) Herald-Standard, p.8.

43 See Bradford Gray, Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation (Robert E. Krieger PUblishing, 1981).

44 "Consent to Research on the Aged Questioned," The New York Times, October 30, 1986, p. A-20.

45 See, e. g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, op. cit. Cf. Bernard Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Moraljty (Buffalo: Prometheus Press, 1981). I have suggested another positive argument in my "Moral Agents and Moral Patients," op. cit.

Jim Harter, Animals: ~

Cooyright-Free ITIUstre.hons. N~w York: Dover. 1979

BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES 96

incompatible with the strong speciesist viewhe tries to support.

25 Ih ;,.! 6.L!oLI.lo!.., p. O.

26 llllii.. p. 60-1.

27 Midgley, op. cit., p. 22. Unlike Fox,however, she denies that this would requireus to adopt a "human first" position.

28 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1971), pp. 114-15.

29 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights,

op. cit., p. 316.

30 Fox, op. cit., p. 60. He certainly does not

rest his case for speciesism on this oneargument, but it is now the only argument heoffers which has not yet been refuted.

31.l.!:lli!..,p.15

32 See my "Must An Opponent of AnimalRights Also be An Opponent of HumanRights?," InQuiry XXIV (2), 1981, pp. 229­41, especially, pp. 233-36; and my "ThePersonhood View and the Argument fromMarginal Cases," forthcoming inPhilosophica.

33 Thomas Young, "The Morality of KillingAnimals: Four Arguments," Ethics andAnimals V (4), 1984, pp. 88-101. Youngdenies that he is supporting speciesism. Thisis because he thinks 'speciesism' isunjustified by definition (he defines it as'ignoring the interests of members of otherspecies for no reason other than that theyare members of other species' [po 89]). Infact, his position ( if correct) would supportboth strong and weak speciesism as I haveearlier defined them.

34.l.Ql.Q.., p. 98. Although Young writes thathuman nonpersons have "moral standing," hedoes not mean by this that they possessqualities which impose direct duties on the

BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES 96

rest of us. He believes that anyone or anything that persons care about sufficientlyhas "moral standing" and an "other-based"right to life (l.QlQ., p. 95). On this view, asYoung would agree, a video cassetterecorder would have "moral standing" and an"other-based" right to continued smoothfunctioning. Clearly, this is not 'moralstanding' as we normally interpret it.

35 R. B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good andthe Right (Oxford: Clarendeon Press,1979).

36 lllli!., p. 113.

37 Young, op cit., p. 98.

38 M'd I .I g ey, op. CIt., p. 124.

39 .Lb..i.d.., p. 104.

40 Brandt, op. cit., p. 41.

41 Midgley, op cit., p. 109.

42 Column by Ann Landers, September 22,1986, The Uniontown (Pa.) Herald-Standard,p.8.

43 See Bradford Gray, Human Subjects inMedical Experimentation (Robert E. KriegerPUblishing, 1981).

44 "Consent to Research on the AgedQuestioned," The New York Times, October30, 1986, p. A-20.

45 See, e. g., Tom Regan, The Case forAnimal Rights, op. cit. Cf. Bernard Rollin,Animal Rights and Human Moraljty (Buffalo:Prometheus Press, 1981). I have suggestedanother positive argument in my "MoralAgents and Moral Patients," op. cit.

Jim Harter, Animals: ~Cooyright-Free ITIUstre.hons.N~w York: Dover. 1979