This article was downloaded by: [Moskow State Univ Bibliote]On: 03 February 2014, At: 03:53Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Defense AnalysisPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan19

Neutrality and defense: Legal theory and militarypractice in the European neutrals’ defense policiesHeinz Vetschera aa National Defence Academy , Vienna, AustriaPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Heinz Vetschera (1985) Neutrality and defense: Legal theory and military practice in the Europeanneutrals’ defense policies, Defense Analysis, 1:1, 51-64

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178508405182

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Defense Analysis, Vol. I. No. [ .pp. 51-64. I9K5. (1743-0175/85 £MX1 + O.IXIPrinted in Great Britain. Brnssey's Defence Publishers UO.

Neutrality and Defense: Legal Theory and MilitaryPractice in the European Neutrals' Defense Policies

H E I N Z VETSCHERA

National Defence Academy, Vienna, Austria

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the military policies of Europe's neutrals — Switzerland, Sweden,Finland, and Austria — have not attracted much attention within the securitypolicy community. They were regarded, at best, as marginal, if not negligible.

This perception has changed. First of all, the neutrals have been sometimesviewed by those searching for "alternative" security policies as an example to befollowed. In this context, emphasis was mainly given to their denuclearized statusand the non-existence of foreign bases on their soil. But then even sometraditionally orientated analysts have discovered the neutrals, not for reasons ofimplicit neutralism, but because they appear to have solved some of the manpowerproblems with which the Western alliance is confronted.1

Nevertheless — and perhaps even because of the use of the neutrals as a bait forattempts to propagate neutralism — misperceptions about the security and defenseissues of Europe's neutrals still continue. Therefore, the following outline willundertake to present specific elements of the European neutrals' defense policies.First, we will analyse how the status of permanent neutrality influences defenseissues in general. Then, we will show how the European neutrals have individuallydeveloped their security and defense policies. Finally, we will compare them forfurther conclusions.

THE STATUS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS ANDIMPLICATIONS

The increased co-operation of the European neutrals with other states in thegroup of the Neutrals and Non-Aligned in the framework of the Conference onSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has further contributed to obscurethe characteristics of permanent neutrality, allowing the concept of neutrality tooeasily to be paralleled with the concepts of neutralism and non-alignment. Such aperception is, however, misplaced. Both neutralism and non-alignment derive fromthe present division of the world between East and West.2 Permanent neutrality,however, predates this current division by centuries. After longstanding practice,

51

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

52 Heinz Vetschera

Switzerland's neutrality was finally formally acknowledged after the NapoleonicWars, in 1815. Then, 100 years later, the conflict between communist and othercountries was born in the Russian revolution of 1917. Thus, equating neutralitywith neutralism or non-alignment has neither historical nor conceptual justifica-tion, despite the fact that on some occasions there may be similarities in practicalpolitics.3

There is, however, one issue which sharply divides Europe's neutrals from themajority of the non-aligned countries. All neutrals advocate and practice Westernparliamentary democracy and political pluralism. Less visible, but no lessimportant, is the fact that the status of permanent neutrality is not exhausted by thenon-participation in existing alliances, but entails far-reaching legal implications.They produce the impact of the status of permanent neutrality on defense matterswhich would not be understandable without them.

PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AS A FUNCTION OF ORDINARY NEUTRALITY

Permanent neutrality obliges the neutral to abstain from all future conflicts andto take the role of a non-belligerent, or "neutral", in them. "Permanent" thus doesnot indicate the obligation for a continuous "neutral" conduct between conflictingpowers, aimed at equidistance in all relevant matters. It indicates, on the contrary,the permanent obligation to act in future as, a neutral only when the case arises todo so, namely, when war has broken out between others.

Although legal doctrines differ sharply between East and West on several issues,statements on the concept of permanent neutrality as deriving from the concept of"ordinary neutrality", or "neutrality ad hoc", coincide in both doctrines.4 Evenwithin the legal doctrines of some non-aligned states, the same view prevails.5

It is therefore the contents of "ordinary" neutrality which determines thecontents of permanent neutrality. The present framework of East-West relations inEurope, although not to be ignored in the day-to-day practice of the Europeanneutrals, has no doctrinal impact on their neutrality.

ORDINARY NEUTRALITY AS A FUNCTION OF A WAR BETWEEN OTHERSOrdinary neutrality rests on the fact of non-participation in a war between other

states. Therefore it implies a trilateral relationship between the two (or even more)belligerents and the neutral. Mutual rights and obligations between the belligerentsand the neutral are thus determined by this trilateral structure. Their mainobjective is to stabilize the structure.

The main obligation for neutrals is abstention from war. They have to refrainfrom everything which could involve them in the armed conflict, thus precludingany direct or indirect support for the war efforts of one or the other side. In theremaining relations between the neutrals and the belligerents, neutrals are boundto strict impartiality, as, for example, in the conduct of economic relations.

The basic obligations for the neutrals correspond to their basic rights. They areentitled to: the right to undiminished territorial integrity; and the right to continuepeaceful relations with both the belligerents and the other non-belligerents, i.e. theneutrals. More concretely, rules prohibit the use of neutral territory for the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense 53

purposes of warfare by the belligerents.6 Whenever a belligerent violates theserules, it acts not only to the disadvantage of the neutral, but also of the otherbelligerent. Controlling neutral territory may favour the violator and may offer itstrategic advantages over its adversary. These advantages should be mutuallyexcluded by denying access to neutral territory to all belligerents.

Therefore, it derives from the trilateral structure of neutrality that the neutral isnot free in making dispositions over its territory, but has to maintain its integrity.The pertinent provision of International Law expressis verbis obliges the neutralnot to allow any violation of its territory by the belligerents.7 It implies activecountermeasures to defend neutrality, otherwise, the efforts would remainineffective if restricted to verbal protests, etc. Thus, defense is an option for aneutral to protect its neutrality, and an obligation in International Law. Thisobligation also is acknowledged not only by the traditional Western view ofInternational Law, but also in communist doctrine.8

Whenever a neutral wilfully allows the misuse of its territory by one of thebelligerents, or fails to protect its neutrality against such a misuse, the otherbelligerent would be no longer obliged to respect the neutral's integrity. It isentitled to take all steps necessary for its security, including military action againstits adversary on neutral soil.9 Such actions may have the character of reprisalsagainst the neutral. More frequently, they are acts of self-help against an illegal actby the other belligerent. In any case, they are of no assistance to the neutral butmake it the theatre of war for the belligerents, ending both its peace andneutrality.10

CONSEQUENCES FOR PERMANENTLY NEUTRAL STATESFrom the obligations of ordinary neutrality, consequences emanate for per-

manently neutral states. According to a generalized formula, they have to doeverything not to be drawn into future wars, and have to abstain from anythingwhich could draw them into future wars. It implies, first of all, that they are notentitled to join any military alliances. The obligation to assist their allies in case ofwar would contradict the obligation to refrain from participation in a war betweenothers. Therefore, even the idea of a military alliance between neutrals, althoughsometimes mentioned, would contradict the concept of permanent neutrality.

In the same vein, membership of an organization of collective security wouldcontradict the status of permanent neutrality if it automatically obliged its membersto joint military sanctions, as was provided for in the League of Nations. TheUnited Nations Charter, on the other hand, leaves some legal11 loopholes allowingneutrals to participate in this peculiar organization. Furthermore, the practice ofthe United Nations has made the problem even more remote, having shifted to apolicy of "collective neutrality" in offering good services to reconcile parties in aconflict and to secure armistices, instead of taking punitive actions. Most ofEurope's neutrals12 have consequently seen no major obstacles in joining theUnited Nations, and in participating in peacekeeping operations.

Permanent neutrality also precludes the stationing of foreign military bases onneutral soil. In case of war, these bases would favour their owner and would entitle

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

54 Heinz Vetschera

the adversary to attack them, again drawing the neutral into the armed conflict.The same rule does not, however, preclude the temporary use of neutral territory— or neutral airspace — for the transit of military vehicles or aircraft in peace byother powers, as long as no consequences derive for a time of war.

Besides these "passive" commitments, there are also "active" obligations forpermanently neutral states. Because they will have to defend their neutrality andtheir territory, they are obliged by International Law to maintain adequate defensecapabilities for their future needs. Sometimes, ideas of "disarmed neutrality" havebeen proposed, protected only by non-violent defense. The theory of non-violentdefense, however, argues that only the social order of the attacked country may bedefended, not its territory. In contrast, neutrals first of all have to defend theirterritory in order to maintain their neutrality. Thus, ideas of "disarmed neutrality"are based upon a misperception of the neutrals' defense objectives and must berejected as irrelevant.13

It is therefore axiomatic that permanently neutral states are obliged, underInternational Law, to prepare a military defense. In doing so, they have to meetinternational standards, set by the defense efforts of other states comparable insize, economic, and manpower potential. Whereas international standards markthe lowest level for their efforts, not to be exceeded without potentially violatinglegal obligations, the other line is drawn by the legal principle "ultra posse nemotenetur" (nobody should be obliged beyond his powers). A neutral state cannot beexpected to overburden its economy by military preparations and, simultaneously,neglect other fields completely, such as education, welfare, or a sound economicinfrastructure. .

Another "active" obligation is the conduct of states pursuing a policy ofneutrality. This does not imply a policy of "equidistance", as prescribed by theconcept of neutralism; rather, it should contribute to make future neutral conductin war credible. The contents of a policy of neutrality cannot be regulated in detail.They derive rather from the individual situation of the neutral than fromgeneralized formulae.

In the same way, the detailed preparations of a neutral's defense cannot begeneralized. They, also, are to be decided on an individual basis, according to thespecific circumstances of the respective state, and for as long as they correspond tothe general task set by the legal framework.

THE DEFENSE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS

The European neutrals have individually and separately developed their defensepolicies. Differences derive not only from their separate locations within Europe,and from the different political contexts within which their neutrality took shape,but also from their respective economic strength and related factors. For purposesof this discussion their defense policies will be analysed in respect of the followingquestions: first, what is the function of defense in the framework of their overallsecurity policy?; second, how far has the factor "permanent neutrality" influencedtheir military preparations, apart from the non-participation in an alliance?; and,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense ' 55

third, is there a congruent pattern of "neutral" defense policy, or are the policiesshaped primarily by individual factors?

Switzerland14

Switzerland has the longest tradition of permanent neutrality. It has alsocontributed in shaping customary law both for ordinary, and for permanent,neutrality. Switzerland's neutrality dates back to the 14th century, was firstformalized in the Thirty Years' War, and finally recognized by the EuropeanPowers in 1815.

Switzerland's current security policy has its foundation in Art. 2 of the SwissConstitution, which defines the purposes of the Swiss Federation as "thepreservation of the country's independence, the maintenance of internal peace andorder, the protection of the freedoms and rights of the citizens, and the furtheranceof their general welfare". In accordance with these purposes, the tasks ofSwitzerland's strategy have been defined as: self-determination in a state of relativepeace; preservation of peace and crisis-management; keeping out of war throughdefense readiness (dissuasion); preparation for the conduct of war; damage-limitation and security of survival; and, ultimately, armed and passive resistance ifoccupied.

On the one hand the emphasis of Switzerland's security policy and strategy restson the concept of "dissuasion"; foreign policy, on the other hand, is perceived as acomplementary instrument. It should make credible, as its first task, thedetermination with which the country would defend its independence andneutrality.

Switzerland's foreign policy is guided by the principles of neutrality andinternational presence. Neutrality should allow a calculable international conduct,thus safeguarding stability and peace. Restrictions deriving from the status ofneutrality are perceived as necessary costs for the benefits deriving from neutrality.Conversely, a clear determination to maintain neutrality allows certain functions ofinternational presence, in which neutrals would have optimal policy options, as, forexample, in the humanitarian field, in mediating disputes, participation inarbitration, etc.

Because "dissuasion" forms the cornerstone of Switzerland's security policy, amajor function rests with the Swiss Armed Forces, which are its main instruments.They consist almost exclusively of militia forces, aimed at a strength of 680,000troops on mobilization, which gives a high concentration of men under arms,fighting only within their own borders. Due to their militia structure, these forcesare fully integrated in the population and have no problems finding qualifiedpersonnel. With a high level of civilian education, the militia forces are able to usehigh-technology equipment, and this allows for a conventional defense based uponmechanized forces and a strong air force. Guerrilla-type operations in occupiedregions play only a subsidiary role.

Because the main objective of a potential aggressor is perceived to be the controlof Swiss territory for further military operations, defense efforts are complementedby preparations for extensive demolition of the country's infrastructure in order to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

56 Heinz Vetschera

cause the maximum delay to the enemy's advance. More than 2000 demolitioncharges are permanently built into the country's road and railway networks for thispurpose.

In the event of an attack, Switzerland's strategy is to inflict major damage on theaggressor, costing him casualties, losses of material, and time. Thus, everypotential aggressor should be deterred from perceiving Switzerland as an easyinvestment in his military calculation. Should dissuasion fail, the aggressor shouldbe denied the chance to reach his principal objectives. Much emphasis is also givento maintaining those parts of the territory still under Swiss control to safeguard itsindependent existence under International Law. Preparations in the civilian fieldadd to the military efforts, including safeguarding the basic necessities of life for thecivilian population, providing medical facilities, taking appropriate economicmeasures, and providing protection against illegal activities. Civilian protection isaimed at ensuring shelter for every citizen in case of attack.

To maintain its independence in military matters, Switzerland has tried to rely aslittle as possible on military imports. Swiss defense industries produce tanks, lightaircraft, and small arms. Only heavy equipment — as, for example, supersonicfighters — has to be imported or is produced under licence.

Because of Switzerland's neutrality and non-participation in the United Nations,it has had no military presence abroad, apart from participation in the NeutralNation's Supervisory Commission after the Korean conflict.

Sweden15

Sweden's security policy is based upon non-participation in alliances inpeacetime, in order to remain neutral in the event of war. Although there is noformal legal foundation of its neutrality, Sweden has always acted as a neutral andhas effectively been able to keep out of armed conflicts since the early nineteenthcentury.

To preserve its neutrality and freedom, Sweden's security policy is aimed at thefollowing objectives, according to a decision taken by the Swedish Parliament in1968: first, to safeguard the nation's freedom of action in all situations.and inself-determined ways in order to enable the further development of its people in thepolitical, the economic, the social and the cultural fields and to protect and to takecare of them in every other respect; and, second, to work for international detenteand peace in a manner compatible with the achievement of these nationalobjectives.

Foreign policy and defense are equivalent instruments of Sweden's securitypolicy. The foreign policy is non-aligned16 to make future neutrality more credible.Sweden does not abstain from adopting a position on international problems, yetrefrains from everything which could disturb the balance between powers oralliances. Its foreign policy, furthermore, is designed to convince other powers thatthe nation is willing and able to repel every attempt to use its territory forbelligerent military purposes.

The Swedish Armed Forces are shaped in accordance with these strategicobjectives. They are, therefore, determined by the following parameters: first,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense 57

defense preparations have to reach a level which leaves no doubt about Sweden'sability to maintain a position of armed neutrality. Alliances, especially, should notbe encouraged to doubt Sweden's declared foreign policy of neutrality in war;second, defense has to be structured in such a way that it cannot be misperceived asconstituting a threat to any other country; third, Sweden has to have a militarystrength which cannot be overcome by limited forces and both the major alliancesshould be convinced to refrain from an attack; and finally, defense has to bestructured so that it offers effective and enduring resistance to an aggressor.

When all potential aggressors are convinced that an attack on Swedish territorywould not pay off, the return for not attacking would be that the same situation alsoapplies in turn to their adversaries. Sweden thus should be an effective obstacle; onthe one hand, any attack against it should involve uncalculable and unacceptablerisks, whilst on the other to refrain from attacking should offer a secure flank. Theargument is that no side should be induced to infringe Sweden's neutrality in case ofwar, or should benefit from so doing.

Sweden's defense efforts, therefore, exceed those of many alliance memberswhich are comparable in size. The strength of the Swedish forces on mobilizationtotals 800,000 men, and because of the high probability of being attacked from thesea, Sweden emphasizes a strong coastal defense capability involving an effectiveAir Force and Navy. Because these forces are kept at a high state of readiness, theyrequire a higher percentage of active personnel. The Army, however, is structuredmainly as a militia force, based upon reservists.

Emphasis is also given to complementary civilian, economic, and psychologicaldefense. There is place for more than 5,000,000 people in shelters, and training incivilian defense is obligatory for all citizens between the ages of 16 and 65. Strategicmaterials are stockpiled amounting to more than one billion US $ in order tomaintain essential supplies in time of crisis, or war. To do this, Sweden maintains adomestic defense industry, producing aircraft, ships, armoured fighting vehicles,missiles, and small arms, even though it would be significantly arguably lessexpensive to purchase them abroad.

Finally, Sweden has actively and frequently participated in UN-peacekeepingoperations as, for example, in the Congo, in Cyprus, and in the Middle East.

Finland11

Finland perceives its security policy and its policy of neutrality as congruent.According to a definition of the Finnish Parliament in 1976, the aim of Finland'ssecurity policy is to "protect the safety and the welfare of (its) the citizens bymaintaining the country's independence in all circumstances. The primary target isto prevent the country from becoming involved in war and other external crises andin this way safeguard the security of the people and give (its) the citizens thechances of developing their society and conditions of life in the way they wish."

There is no formal international Act establishing Finland's neutrality, yet thereare two international agreements determining Finland's conduct in foreign anddefense affairs: One is the Peace Treaty of 1947, which was signed by Finland as the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

58 Heinz Vetschera

defeated party. It includes inter alia restrictions on Finland's defense capabilities18

to:(i) a total strength of the Army not to exceed 34,400 troops;(ii) a total strength of the Navy not to exceed 4500 personnel, with the total

tonnage of the Fleet restricted to 10,000 tons; and(iii) a total strength of Air Force not to exceed 3000 personnel and 60 combat

aircraft.The Peace Treaty also included a prohibition inter alia on the possession or

acquisition of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, self-propelledor guided missiles, and submarines.

The other agreement is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and MutualAssistance signed in 1948 between Finland and the Soviet Union. It was first agreedfor a period of 10 years and then extended in 1955, 1970, and 1983 for furtherperiods of 20 years.

Such an agreement appears to contradict the basic rule of neutrality, obliging aneutral country to abstain from military alliances. For Finland, however, it iscompatible due to its specific provisions. It obliges Finland only to repel a foreignattack when "Finland or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory become theobject of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter". Finlandis thus committed to self-defense, an obligation which does not differ from thegeneral obligation of permanent neutrality. Soviet military support is onlyenvisaged after a breach of Finland's territorial integrity by an adversary. This,also, is compatible with the law of ordinary neutrality. Conversely, the agreementdoes not require Finnish military action outside its territory and thus, the basicdilemma between conflicting demands of neutrality and alliance membership, viz.the abstention and participation in wars between others, is avoided.

Both Finland's desire to remain neutral and the obligations of the Treaty requirea sufficient defense capability, but this is, however, clearly limited and circum-scribed. To reduce the effects of these limits defined in the Treaty, Finland hasadopted a militia-type structure for the Armed Forces whilst maintaining only theallowed quantity of troops in active service at any one time. These include trainingunits and some quick-reaction forces. However, more than 1.1 million Finns havereceived military training, and, on mobilization, the Finnish Armed Forces total700,000 troops. Quantitative limits on material could not, on the one hand, becompensated in the same manner, which has left Finland with a comparativelyweak Air Force and Navy.

With regard to qualitative limitations, the restrictions on self-propelled or guidedmissiles appeared to contradict Finland's requirements for an adequate air defense.As a consequence, Finland sought, and received, the agreement of the othercontracting parties — the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union — to acquiredefensive missiles. It was stated that such missiles did not contradict the provisionsof the Treaty, which were intended primarily to prevent German rearmament withoffensive weaponry such as, for example, long-range missiles.19 Finland thus wasable to acquire naval surface-to-surface missiles as well as anti-tank andanti-aircraft weapons and equipment.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense 59

Despite these efforts to improve its defense capabilities, the emphasis ofFinland's security policy rests on its foreign policy. National defense is seen assupporting foreign policy and should guarantee its continuity in the event of a crisisaffecting Finland.

Finland's specific geographic situation also has influenced its strategic planning.One aim is the protection of Finland's territorial integrity and neutrality whenthreatened by an armed conflict extending to Northern Europe. In this event, theAir and Naval Forces would be the main line of defense. A second is defenseagainst an attack made on, or through, Finnish territory, which would mainly bethe responsibility of the Army. Because of the environmental conditions in vastareas of Finland's territory, the Army has given a preference to guerrilla tactics todisrupt and delay a potential enemy's advance. Large scale conventional operationswould be difficult or even impossible, both for the attacker and the defender inthese areas.

In addition to purely military preparations, Finland's defense has also incorpo-rated economic and civilian defense, and other provisions such as defenseinformation, communications, and medical services, the maintenance of publicorder and security, and a variety of legislative and administrative measures.

Domestic defense industries supply Finland's Armed Forces with light aircraft,artillery, mortars, ships, vehicles, and light armaments. When Finland has had toprocure heavy military equipment from abroad, it has preferred to mix Eastern,Western, and neutral weapons systems in a balanced way, as in the case of theSoviet MiG-21 and Swedish Draken interceptors, and French "Fouga Magisters",which are to be replaced by British "Hawks" in the near future.

Finland also has been an active participant in UN-peacekeeping operations; ithas major forces stationed in the Middle East, but also some serving in Cyprus, andin Kashmir.

Austria20

Austria's neutrality was formally founded in a Constitutional Act dated 26October 1955. Security policy, neutrality and defense are closely linked together, inorder to "permanently safeguard Austria's independence and for the purpose ofthe inviolability of its territory". Austria also promises in this Act to "maintain anddefend this neutrality with all means at its disposal".

The declaration of permanent neutrality is closely connected with the StateTreaty on the Re-Establishment of Austria's Independence dated 15 May 1955,which ended 10 years of combined occupation by France, the Soviet Union, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. It belongs to the same series of post-WorldWar II Treaties as the Finnish Peace Treaty and includes similar military clauses,albeit without quantitative restrictions. Like the Finnish Treaty, it does notmention neutrality, yet a declaration of permanent neutrality was offered byAustria in a "package deal" to get the Soviet Union's agreement on the StateTreaty, and the withdrawal of its occupation forces.

During the following period, Austria emphasised military defense as the maininstrument to maintain its neutrality and independence. In the .early seventies,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

60 Heinz Vetschera

however, the balance appeared to shift away from military defense in favour offoreign policy as the primary instrument of safeguarding Austria's neutrality andsecurity. In 1975, however, the balance between defense and foreign policy wasre-established after the introduction of a Constitutional Amendment on Compre-hensive National Defense. Austria now views internal stability, active foreignpolicy, and Comprehensive National Defense as equally important instruments ofsecurity policy.21

Because of the allies occupation, Austria could establish armed forces only after1955. They were initially shaped as smaller-scale versions of the Austrian militaryforces of today, and numbered around 40,000 men. The forces, however, weresoon seen as insufficient for the specific task of protecting Austria's neutrality.After several reforms, a militia structure was finally adopted, leaving only a smallportion as standing, active forces, including one mechanized division and the AirForce. Today the total strength on mobilization would reach about 186,000 men,but it is envisaged that a force of 300,000 should be possible by the nineteennineties.

Located in an area of high strategic significance for a future armed conflict inEurope, Austria sees an early objective of a potential aggressor that of crossingAustrian territory in order to conduct further military operations against its mainadversary. A subsidiary strategic aim would be to cross Austrian territory withminimal losses of time and forces. To cause the maximum delay and inflict the mostlosses to the aggressor, Austria has developed a concept of area-defense,combining a static defense approach encompassing choke-points along the mainlines of communication, with guerrilla-type operations against the rear and flanksof the aggressor's forces. The overall design is to ensure that as much territory aspossible should be kept under Austria's own control in order that its survival as aNation under International Law is safeguarded. The concept of area defense isintended to deter any potential aggressor from attacking Austria, yet promising it asecure flank by simultaneously offering the same obstacles to a respectiveadversary.

A concept of area defense does not require a strong air capability because of itsdispersion of forces. Nevertheless, a capability to intercept violations of Austria'sairspace by belligerents appears necessary, and consequently it has been decided toreplace its ageing fighter-bombers by an adequate, but limited, number ofinterceptors.

The concept of Comprehensive National Defense integrates military civilian,economic, and psychological defense. Even so, preparations in these non-militaryfields are sometimes perceived as insufficient, especially in the area of civilianprotection. Nonetheless, Austria has been able to develop a domestic defenseindustry producing armoured fighting vehicles, artillery, mortars, vehicles, andsmall arms. Battle tanks and aircrafts however, have had to be imported.

Austria participates in UN-peacekeeping operations and currently has forcesstationed in Cyprus and in the Middle East.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense 6t

CONCLUSIONS: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

When comparing the profiles of Europe's neutrals' defense policies, thedifferences appear to prevail over the similarities (Table 1).

Table 1. The neutrals in profile

POLITICAL FACTORSFoundation of Neutrality

Before East-West ConflictDuring East-West Conflict

Legal StatusFormally BindingNo Formal Foundation

Internal StructurePluralistic Democracy

Foreign PolicyPro-WesternOccasionally "Equidistance"Accommodation with USSR

STRATEGIC FACTORSLocation in Europe

Central EuropeNorthern Europe

Confrontation NATO/WTOOn Confrontation LineMarginalIn Distance

Strategic Importance inOpening Phase of Conflict

HighMediumLow

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICYMain Instrument

Foreign PolicyDefenseEqually Important

Protection of NeutralitySpecific Task for Defense

Armed ForcesRestricted by TreatiesNot Restricted

Emphasis onConventional OperationsGuerrilla-Type Operations

Force StructureExclusively MilitiaMilitia + Alert Forces

StrengthWithout MobilizationOn MobilizationCombat AircraftBattle Tanks (+Lt.Tanks/ATK)

ConscriptionBasic Training

Switzerland

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

20,000680,000321815

X118 d.

Sweden

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X(a)

68,000800,000420870

X7.5-15 m.

Austria

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X(b)

15,000(b)186,00032

370X

6-12 m.(e)

Finland

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X(c)

40,400700,00042

1 amd bdX

8-11 m.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

62

Refresher Training (Res.)NCO Training (Militia)Officers' Training (Militia)Civilian CO-Service

Complementary MeasuresCiv./Econ./Psych DefenseDomestic Defense Industry

Heinz Vetschera

Table 1. Continued

Switzerland

(d)(d)

118 d.—

XX

Sweden

90-160 d.(0

320 d.420 d.

XX

Austria

60 d. (e)60 d.90 d.8 m.

XX

Finland

40 d.75 d.100 d.

11-12 m.

XX

(a) Air Force, Navy and Recruits in Army available without mobilization.(b) Air Force and one mechanized division plus three battalions in quick alert force ("Bereitschafts-

truppe").(c) Air Force and Navy; garrison forces of Army serve as "Ready Trunk Forces" for quick reaction.(d) Several turns of refresher training, each 20 days, depending on rank.(e) An 8-month basic service may be chosen instead of 6 months basic training plus 60 days refresher

training, depending on military necessities.(f) NCO's in the militia serve 12 months basic training plus 160 days refresher training (like

"specialists").

These differences, however, are only superficial. They may be more the result ofnecessary adaptations to a basic pattern of neutral defense policy more in responseto individual circumstances, such as geographical location, strategic situation, andhistorical developments, than by essentially dividing factors. The task common toall neutrals is to make permanent neutrality survive and to give it endurance againstfuture armed conflict. Thus, both their historical origins and the formal legalaspects of their adoption, will have only little relevance when the most likelyconfrontation in Europe will be an East-West conflict. Strategic considerations,conversely, may directly influence the individual shape of these policies.

Thus, Finland has to accommodate itself to the most influential power in hervicinity, whilst Switzerland may comfortably refrain from such a necessity. Finlandwill have to refrain from emphasising defense as an instrument of security policy inpublic statements in order not to provoke risks to her security, whilst Switzerlandmay still emphasise defense over foreign policy. Even so, Switzerland's foreignpolicy is by no means less active than Finland's.

Geography also dictates differences in military strategy. For states located in themost likely areas of high or medium strategic importance in the initial stages of anEast-West conflict, the main task is to prevent belligerents from crossing neutrals'territory in order to avoid their becoming involved in the war at an early stage.Thus a combination of delaying actions and guerrilla-type attrition is emphasisedfor this scenario, as envisaged by the Austrian Armed Forces in general, and alsoby the Swedish and the Finnish military with regard to their Northern regions.Switzerland is less exposed to direct threats in the early stages of an armedEast-West conflict since its defense has to cope with attacks aimed at lastingoccupation, Switzerland has emphasised conventional defense over attrition.Sweden requires strong airpower because of the specific task of repelling attacksfrom the seas. The other neutrals do not have the same problem and expect only tohave to fight on land.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

Neutrality and Defense 63

Even these differences should not be overestimated. Switzerland has anticipatedguerrilla-type operations in occupied parts of her territory, and both Austria andFinland have left no doubt that they will not wait until the country has beenoccupied, and will offer resistance from within their borders.

Altogether, the neutrals appear to be more closely related to each other than toany of the other European states. Each gives specific emphasis to the protection ofits neutrality as the principal condition with which its security policy has to cope.Each has also tried to compensate for the lack of allies by a high turn-out of militaryforces on mobilization. This, in turn, has required a militia-type structure toachieve the manpower necessary for such a task, though most have retained at leasta minimum permanent force. This idea is no longer taboo even in Switzerland,where it has taken the form of militia units doing refresher tours of duty.

AH the neutrals feature provisions for civilian protection, economic precautions,and psychological measures, inter alia in their overall defense planning. They all tryto reduce the necessity for relying on foreign military hardware by maintainingdomestic defense industries. Apart from heavy equipment, Europe's neutrals havedemonstrated that they are mostly self-supporting in military weapons andhardware.

Another characteristic features the significant participation in UN-peacekeepingoperations by the European neutrals. Here, a last exception may also disappearwhen Switzerland, finally, joins the United Nations, as soon as internalconstitutional obstacles are overcome. The chance for Switzerland to participate inpeacekeeping operations is now generally viewed within the country to be apositive one.

Putting to one side some of the specific factors which individually shape theneutral's defense policies, a basically congruent pattern emerges. Both theindividual factors and the basic pattern have to be taken into account whenever thedefense policies of the neutrals are the object of discussion. This should berecognized whenever their defense policies are compared with those of other states.The solution to defense and national security found by the neutrals may neither beof significance or use for others, compared with that found in membership ofalliances, nor may they be of much help to the non-aligned countries for onesimple, but most fundamental, reason: to be a neutral requires that the governmenthas always to consider one specific and immutable objective which is to remain inpeace, even when the others would be at war.

NOTES1. J. L. Clarke, NATO, neutrals, and national defence. Survival 14 (6), 260-265 (1982).2. L. Mates, Non-Alignment: Theory and Movement. Oceana Publications, New York (1972); R.

Vukadinovic', The original concept of non-alignment. Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussenpolilik22 (1), 20-22 (1982).

3. H. P. Neuhold, Permanent neutrality and non-alignment. Osterrekhische Zeitschrift fur Aussenpoli-tik 19 (2), 79-99 (1979).

4. As representative for the Eastern doctrine, H. Kr6ger (ed.), Volkerrecht, Vol. 2, pp. 385-386.Staatsverlag der DDR, E. Berlin (1973).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014

64 Heinz Vetschera

5. See for example J. Andrassy, Medjunarodno Pravo, 7th edn, p. 123. Skolska knjiga, Zagreb(1978).

6. According to the Convention on Neutrality in Land Warfare of 1907, the use of neutral territory isprohibited for transporting troops, ammunition, or supplies. In the same way, the Conventionprohibits indirect use of neutral territory, as for example for installing communication facilities, orto recruit combatants.

7. Article 5 of the Convention.8. Kr6ger (ed.), Volkerrecht, p. 388.9. This principle has been confirmed in the Coenca-case (1927) and in the Nuremberg Tribunal.

10. H. Neuhold and H. Vetschera, Austria's Security Policy, Report for the United Nations' Institutefor Disarmament Information and Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, pp. 8-10 (1983).

11. The United Nations' Charter requires specific agreements between the Security Council andindividual states to oblige them to participate in coercive measures (articles 43, 45). Neutrals mayabstain from concluding such agreements.

12. With the exception of Switzerland who — after negative experiences with a system of collectivesecurity in the League of Nations — has until now abstained from joining the UN.

13. See in detail H. Vetschera, Soziale Verteidigung - Ziviler Widerstand-Immerwdhrende Neutralitat,pp. 83-165. Braumuller, Vienna (1978).

14. Data and information have been compiled from: Unsere Sicherheitspolitik, edited by Zentralstellefur Gesamtverteidigung, Bern (1975), based upon the official "Concept of Total Defence (1973)";Divisionnaire E. Miiller, "Swiss Defence Strategy and Means", lecture at the American Club,Zurich (2 Oct, 1981); Divisionnaire R. Mabillard, "Die Armee und unsere Sicherheitspolitik",Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarische Zeiischrift 145 (2), 53-58 (1979).

15. Data and information have been compiled from: The Swedish Total Defence, edited byTotalforsvarets Upplysningsnamnd (The Total Defense Information Committee) (no year or placeindicated); Landerportrat Schweden, Wehnechnik 16 (3), 60-64 (1984); H. J. Schutz, Sicherheits-politik in Skandinavien. Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift 14 (4), 296-298 (1976); N. Andren,The Nordic Balance and Swedish Security (1980).

16. Andren uses the term "not-aligned" apparently to mark the difference between Sweden's factualnon-participation in alliances and the more politicized term "non-alignment".

17. Data and information have been compiled from: M. Jakobson, Substance and appearance: Finland.Foreign Affairs (1982); Finnish National Defence, General Headquarters Information SectionHelsinki, (1978); T. Ries, Finnland: Selbstbehauptung im AUeingang. Internationale Wehrrevue 17(4), 263-270 (1984).

18. On the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Rumania in detail: R. Hecht,Militarische Bestimmungen in den Friedensvertragen von 1947. Osterreichische MilitarischeZeitschrift 17 (5), 377-384 (1979).

19. See Hecht, Militarische. Bestimmungen in den Friedensvertragen von 1947, p. 380.20. Data and information have been compiled from: Alfred Verdross, The Permanent Neutrality of

Austria. Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, Vienna (1978); Area Defense, Background Information,Federal Ministry of Defense, Bureau of Defense Policy, Vienna (1979); Brief on Austria —Austria's Security Policy, Comprehensive National Defence, and related Defence Matters. Pressand Information Directorate of the Federal Ministry of Defence (1984); Wolfgang Danspeckgruber,The defense of Austria. International Defense Review 17 (6), 721-731 (1984); Neubold, Vetschera,Austria's Security Policy, pp. 10-28; Brigadier F. Freistetter, Die strategische Lage Osterreichs.Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarische Zeitschrift 149 (5), 237-242 (1983).

21. Data for the "profiles" have been compiled from the publications mentioned above, plus theMilitary Balance, pp. 44-48. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1983); Onthe militia systems: J. Culik, Milizsysteme, Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift 17(6), 461-470(1979).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Mos

kow

Sta

te U

niv

Bib

liote

] at

03:

53 0

3 Fe

brua

ry 2

014