COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS Organización no gubernamental con status consultivo ante la ONU

Filial de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas (Ginebra) y de la Comisión Andina de Juristas (Lima) PERSONERÍA JURÍDICA: RESOLUCIÓN 1060, AGOSTO DE 1988 DE LA ALCALDÍA MAYOR DE BOGOTÁ

Calle 72 Nº 12-65 piso 7 PBX: (571) 3768200 – (571) 3434710 Fax : (571) 3768230 Email : ccj@coljuristas.org Website: www.coljuristas.org

Bogotá, Colombia

Bulletin No 29: Series on the rights of the victims and the application of Law 975

Neoparamilitarism and new massacres The atrocities that should have stopped after the supposed “demobilization” of the paramilitary groups not only never ended but have reappeared with even greater force. In the year 2008 massacres of civilians, affecting mostly peasants, have been registered in growing numbers, perpetrated by illegal armed groups labeled as “emerging gangs” by the State security forces or the Government, which refuse to recognize them as paramilitaries. Repetition of the atrocities The massacre committed this past July 20 in the municipality of Puerto Libertador (Córdoba), in which seven people died, among them a community leader and two children, at the hands of illegal armed groups traveling in a pick-up truck and dressed in civilian clothing, hooded and armed, is a painful reminder of this. However, it is not the only case. At least four other massacres presumably attributable to paramilitary groups have been registered this year. One, which occurred on January 11 in the city of Santa Marta (Magdalena), in which five community leaders were killed and three other persons wounded after armed men broke up a family gathering and shot the people taking part in it. Another, on February 23 in the municipality of San Juan del Cesar (La Guajira), in which four members of the same family died after armed and hooded men wearing clothing exclusively for use by State security forces broke into a farm where the peasant family was staying. Another massacre took place between April 27 and 28 in the municipality of Pizarro (Chocó), in which nine fishermen were assassinated and six other persons were disappeared. Still another took place in June in the rural area of the municipality of Istmina (Chocó), in which four sawyers died, causing the forced displacement of 69 people toward the seat of the municipality. These massacres have two common elements: on the one hand, they have been attributed to the so-called “emerging gangs;” but, on the other, they are acts that follow the usual patterns and modus operandi of the paramilitaries. It has been established that these massacres have been directed against the civilian population, which has traditionally been the target of these groups. It is the case of the five massacres described, in which fishermen, peasants, and community leaders died who had been demanding respect for their rights. Likewise, the massacres were committed by men dressed in civilian clothing, armed and hooded, as was the case in the massacres of Puerto Libertador and San Juan del Cesar. Also, some of the massacres were announced beforehand, as was the case of the massacre of Puerto Libertador, in which local peasants had previously alerted the authorities about the threats the population had been subjected to; this led the Ombudsman’s Office to send three reports to Bogotá in which it warned of the risk situation affecting the municipalities of Montelíbano, Tierralta, Valencia and Puerto Libertador. 1 The Colombian Commission of Jurists has been able to ascertain that between December 1, 2002 and December 31, 2007, at least 4,019 persons were registered as victims of violations of the right

1 El Tiempo newspaper, “Guerra de bandas ex ‘paras’ desangra a 7 departamentos” (War of gangs of former paramilitaries bleeds 7 departments), July 28, 2008, p.1-2.

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to life attributed presumably to paramilitary groups in 27 of the country’s 32 departments. The figures in themselves contradict the so-called “cease of hostilities;” but in addition to these figures, and to the massacres mentioned before, other deeds have occurred each year that show a dramatic increase in the violations of the right to life that were registered. Indeed, various civil authorities have expressed concern about the increase in assassinations, particularly in two places in the country. According to information from the National Police, in the department of Córdoba alone 283 homicides have been committed in 20082; and in the city of Medellín, the authorities speak of 530 persons having been assassinated between January and June 2008.3 Dangerous euphemisms regarding paramilitarism For all the above reasons, it is a source of concern that the Government should insist on stating the paramilitarism no longer exists in Colombia; or that it should claim, as did the president of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR in Spanish), that the cycle of violence in Colombia is in its final phase:

“… the cycle of violence is in its final phase and we Colombians are teaching a lesson that has universal value: it is one of the only countries in Latin America where the crimes of the past are being faced with courage and impunity is being avoided as a means of moving from war to peace, or from dictatorship to democracy.” 4

Declarations such as these and, in general, those that seek to show that the crimes of paramilitarism are a thing of the past do nothing more than to blatantly disregard reality while, at the same time, making invisible the victims of the present, laying the groundwork for a renewed and greater impunity. One of the main objectives of any peace process that aspires to be real must be to make available all necessary mechanisms and actions to guarantee that the atrocities will not be repeated. However, almost three years since the beginning of negotiations between paramilitaries and the Government, and three years since the application of the law of “justice and peace,” it cannot be said the civilian population can count on guarantees that the crimes will not occur again, simply because they have never stopped happening and because, additionally, the control strategy most widely used by the paramilitary groups to spread fear among the civilian population – massacres – are being repeated. Indeed, the records on the commission of massacres demonstrate that the claims made by the Government and the president of the CNRR are not true. Although a decrease took place in the collective assassinations registered in the period between 2006 and 2007,5 it must not be forgotten that this drop was not the result of the paramilitaries’ stopping their actions. On the contrary, they continued acting – only differently. For example, some paramilitaries have admitted that the

2 Iván Cepeda, “La ficción del Posconflicto” (The Post-Conflict Fiction) , in newspaper El Espectador on line August 2 2008. 3 El Espectador newspaper on line, “Desmovilizados, en tinieblas” (Demobilized, in Darkness), July 29 2008. 4 Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, “La violencia no es maldición bíblica” (Violence is not a biblical curse), El Tiempo newspaper, July 28, 2005, p. 1-15. 5 Indeed, a decrease was registered between 2006 and 2007 in violations of the right to life in massacres; during that period, five massacres were registered, whereas between 2002 and 2003 456 massacres were registered. At the same time, however, the high number of selective assassinations and forced disappearances attributed to paramilitary groups remained constant. In that regard, see: Colombian Commission of Jurists, Colombia: El espejismo de la justicia y la paz. Balance sobre la aplicación de la ley 975 de 2005 (Colombia: the Mirage of Justice and Peace. Overview of the Application of Law 975 of 2005), Bogotá, March 2008, p. 74.

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paramilitary groups stopped committing massacres because it is no longer politically profitable for them, so they turned to committing selective assassinations instead.6 Nevertheless, this decrease in massacres has been accompanied by an increase in the commission of extrajudicial executions directly attributable to the State security forces,7 and by the use of threats by the paramilitaries against the civilian population in order to maintain the power they hold over the communities, which they were able to achieve through the terror spread by the thousands of massacres throughout the country committed by these groups since they were set up.8 The reality on the “emerging gangs” On the other hand, as was mentioned before, the increase in the number of homicides as well as massacres has been attributed to the “emerging gangs,” even though it is known that the patterns of these types of acts are the same as those used by paramilitary groups. Why insist, then, on claiming that the so-called “emerging gangs” are not paramilitary groups? According to a report by the Institute for Studies on Development and Peace (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz - Indepaz), as of November 2007 there were 67 paramilitary groups with 6,377 active members.9 Other organizations, such as Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, have stated more recently that even after the ‘demobilization” there are at least 10,000 active paramilitaries.10 This assertion is credible since, according to intelligence sources, the group under the command of alias “Don Mario,” in the north of the country, is made up of three thousand combatants; and the one under the command of alias “Cuchillo,” in the Eastern plains, is also made of up three thousand men. It does not seem strange, then, that in the more than 65 groups that remain there should be more than four thousand additional combatants. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her report on the human rights situation in Colombia for 2007, pointed out the following on the so-called emerging gangs:

“These groups are strongly armed, have military organization and responsible command, and they have the capacity to exercise territorial control and carry out military action against other armed actors. They are an active factor in the intensity of the armed conflict, with direct and grievous consequences for the civilian population. Information has been received suggesting links, acquiescence, or tolerance of some members of the State security forces in actions attributed to some of these groups.”11

6 Free-version hearing of Éver Veloza García, alias “HH,” November 7 2007. In that regard, see: Colombian Commission of Jurists, Colombia: El espejismo de la justicia y la paz. Balance sobre la aplicación de la ley 975 de 2005 (Colombia: the Mirage of Justice and Peace. Overview of the Application of Law 975 of 2005), Bogotá, March 2008, p. 74. 7 Between July 2002 and December 2007, at least 1,122 cases were registered of extrajudicial executions directly attributable to the State security forces, against 669 cases registered between January 1997 and June 2002. 8 The Colombian Commission of Jurists has been able to ascertain that between December 1 2002 and December 31 2007, at least 4,213 persons were victims of threats from paramilitary groups. 9 Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), “Nuevos grupos paramilitares” (New Paramilitary Groups), November 26 2007 (modified on December 3 2007). See: www.indepaz.org.co 10 Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, “¿Desapareció el paramilitarismo?” (Did Paramilitarism Disappear?), June 2008. See: www.nuevoarcoiris.org.co 11 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia , Doc. A/HRC/7/39, February 28 2008, paragraph 39.

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The report’s description of this type of groups resembles, rather, a description of paramilitary groups. It thus becomes evident that we are not facing “new” or “small” groups, as the government has stated. This is why the High Commissioner, further along in the same report, emphasized that “labeling all these new structures as mere criminal gangs does not reflect the complexity, variety, plurality and risks of the phenomenon.” 12 Indeed, to reduce the objectives of these “criminal gangs” to their struggle for control of coca cultivation, coca-processing laboratories, and drug-trafficking routes is naïve, to say the least. Some of the names of these groups, such as “Rondas Campesinas Populares” (Peoples’ Peasant Patrols), “Ejército Revolucionario Popular Anticomunista” (Peoples’ Anti-Communist Revolutionary Army), and “Héroes de Castaño” (Castaño’s Heroes) suggest that their aims go beyond that. Other groups, such as “Los paisas” or “Águilas Negras” (Black Eagles), although their names might not be so telling, do reveal much through their actions aimed against social activists and the civilian population. Although it is true that, apparently, some of these groups are fighting among themselves, this is not the reason or the explanation for all the deaths of peasants and community leaders in massacres. Much has been said about the confrontation between the paramilitary group led by Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias “Don Mario,” and the group “Los Paisas”, formerly “Oficina de Envigado” (Envigado Office). However, the deaths that are being attributed to these groups are not totally the product of the clashes among them, since the truth is that many of those deaths are the result of the actions that these groups pursue directly against the civilian population. Also, it must not be forgotten that, although the State security forces have tried to present Daniel Rendón Herrera as simply a powerful drug trafficker with a criminal gang at his service, alias “Don Mario” is also a landowner who holds properties in Córdoba and Urabá illegally seized from peasants who were assassinated, threatened, or displaced, and who is interested in maintaining his grip over them due to his participation in fruit concerns. 13 It is not beside the point to mention also that the war among paramilitary groups is not new in the Colombian conflict. It suffices to remember that the “Cacique Nutibara” front, under the command of alias “Don Berna” waged war against the “Bloque Metro,” under the command of alias “Doble Cero,” resulting in the extermination of this second group and the death of its paramilitary boss. Or the war between two paramilitary groups operating in the Eastern plains: the group led by Martín Llanos and that which used to be led by Miguel Arroyave. However, these wars were no obstacle to all these groups’ carrying out activities against the civilian population. New impunity in sight In order to confront this “new” wave of violence, the State security forces have constituted an “élite group” made up of members of the Prosecutor’s Office, the State security agency - DAS, the technical investigation corps - CTI, the Army and the Police, for combating the so-called “emerging gangs.” 14 Nonetheless, all these organs have been involved with the paramilitary groups since their 12 Ibíd., paragraph 40. 13 Iván Cepeda, “La ficción del Posconflicto” (The Post-Conflict Fiction) , in newspaper El Espectador on line August 2 2008. 14 Some communications media announced that members of the State security forces will present before the Ministry of Defense a plan to set up five élite groups with the aim of combating the “emerging gangs.” See in this regard El Tiempo newspaper, “Guerra de bandas ex ‘paras’ desangra a 7 departamentos”, (War of gangs of former paramilitaries bleeds 7 departments), July 28, 2008, p.1-2.

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inception, which makes this solution not only inadequate but maybe even harmful. The President has even mentioned bringing to justice the persons who make up these groups in terms that are hardly adequate for someone who represents a State with rule of law, and which suggest rather the violation of the fundamental principles of that same rule of law:

“There is nothing that attracts more investment, Dear Generals, than the task that you are carrying out against these bandits that remain here. One is told that alias ‘El Yiyo,’ that alias ‘El Memín,’ are still active with the Oficina de Envigado, that some of those bandits are still there. Finish them off, I take responsibility for it, and don’t worry, General.” 15

The truth is that the paramilitaries have never ceased to exist. They simply have changed names and modus operandi; but the guarantees of non repetition they gave the Government and Law 975 of 2005 have yet to materialize. And they will be even further from materializing if the existence of paramilitarism continues to be denied and the victims continue to be made invisible. Inappropriate responses will continue to be given to crimes that unfortunately do not belong only to the past but remain very much in the present. For more information, please contact Gustavo Gallón-Giraldo, Director of the CCJ, at Tel. (571) 376 8200, Ext. 115. Bogotá, September 3, 2008

Occidente newspaper,on line “Grupos élite contra bandas emergentes” (Élite groups vs. emerging gangs), August 20 2008. 15 El Espectador on line, “Uribe ordena eliminar la oficina de Envigado” (Uribe orders the elimination of the Envigado Office), July 29, 2008.