Neoliberalism as liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement

8/12/2019 Neoliberalism as liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement

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The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation

Author(s): Rex BrynenSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring, 1995), pp. 31-43Published by: University of California Presson behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537878.

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THE DYNAMICS OFPALESTINIAN ELITEFORMATIONREXBRYNEN

The signing f theOslo Accord etween srael nd thePalestine ib-erationOrganizationPLO) in September 993 generated mportantquestions egardingolitical nclusion nd thedynamics felite orma-tion.With he Cairo AgreementfMay 1994,Israeliwithdrawal romGaza andJericho,nd theestablishmentf the Palestinian uthority(PA), thesequestionshave become even sharper.Who occupies whatpositions fauthorityntheemergingA?To whatextent illpoliticalelitesbe held accountable,whetherhroughhedemocratic rocess(theCairoAgreement'srovisions or n elected alestinianegislature)orthroughhemediation fother ctors nd institutionsa free ress,theoffice f a Palestinianmbudsman,nd a watchfulndvibrant al-estinian ivil ociety)? ow are elite leavagesikelyo affecthe nstitu-tionalization,dministrativeevelopment,ndpolicy hoicesofthePA?Particularttention as been focussedon thepersonal eadershipstyle fYasirArafat,hairman f the PLO and now President fthePA.Arafatasbeencriticized or entralizingecisionmaking, ampantRexBrynens associateprofessorfpolitical cience tMcGillUniver-sity,Montreal.he authorwishes o thank heSocial Sciences ndHu-manities ResearchCouncil of Canada, the Fonds FCAR, McGillUniversity,nd the nter-UniversityonsortiumorArabStudiesMon-treal)for upportntheresearchndwritingfthis rticle, ortions fwhichwill appear n Louis Cantori, d., ThePolitics f nclusion ndExclusionBoulder:Westview ress,forthcoming).Journal fPalestine tudiesXXIV,no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 31-43.

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32 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIEScronyismn the taffingfthePalestiniandministration,ndallowingthe nstitutionsf thePLO and thePAto languishwithoutffectivea-pacity.The centerpiecefthePA-thetwenty-four-membercabinet -remainsncomplete, ith everal ortfoliostillunfilled. ncertainsto howmuchpowertheymight njoy and doubtful boutthe Osloprocess tself),everal rominentalestinianersonalitiesaverefusedto oin.' Others, rustratedy theirackof nfluenceverpolicy,havethreatenedo resign.2 ocal offices roliferatend competewithoneanother o claim official tatusand to establish inkswithexternaldonors.The PalestinianconomicCouncilfor evelopmentndRecon-structionPECDAR)-initiallystablished s theprimary onduitforthe$2.4 billion n developmentid pledgedby the nternationalom-munity-was irstfflictedytensions etween echnocratsnd polit-ical appointees, nd now appears increasinglymarginalized y theemergence fregular Aministries. alestiniandministrativeonfu-sionandparalysis as furtherlowed nternationalssistance. alestin-ian nongovernmentalrganizationsNGOs) fear or heir utonomynthe faceofpotential dministrativeentralizationnd politicalcoop-tion;a growing umber fNGO activists aveessentially ivenup infrustration.ritics fbothArafat'seadership tyle nd his negotiatingtacticshave oined togethern a loose democracymovement allingfor undamentalolitical eform. eanwhile,hedateofpromised lec-tions n the WestBankand Gaza Stripremains nclear mid stalledPalestinian-Israeliegotiations.Thisarticlewillnot eekto address llthe ssuespresentedbovebutwill explorehow analysts fcontemporaryalestinian oliticsmightthinkbout hem.nparticular,twillcriticallyeviewhe xistingiter-atureon Palestinianliteformation,nd assess its utilityor hestudyof theemerging ynamics f Palestinianelf-government.Conceptualizingalestinian lites

Differentcholarshaveunderstood alestinianlite ypesnvery if-ferent ays. orthepurposes fthis nalysis, owever,hoseviewscanbegrouped nto hreemajor ategories:rimordialisterspectivesem-phasizingtraditionalocial formations),ocial changeperspectives(emphasizingheemergencefnew socialgroups), ndorganizationalperspectivesemphasizinghedynamics f Palestinian ationalistmo-bilization).A fourthategorys provided ya statist erspectivem-phasizing he mpact fstate nstitutions.Primordialisterspectives

The primordialisterspectiverguesforcontinuityn Palestinianpolitics, uggestinghat heunderlyinglite tructureemains, espitethechange n outwardform,hehamula clan) and leadingnotable



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 33families.3 his s true, t hasbeen suggested,otonly ntheWestBankand Gaza, butalso among he xiled eadership fthePLO.4The analy-sis furtheruggests hat egional, eligious,nd familyivalries emaintheprimaryxes of cleavagewithin alestinian olitics.It is difficulto sustain uch a perspectiven light f thedramaticchanges n theeconomic nd political ituation fPalestinians uringthepastcentury.5 s elsewheren thedeveloping orld, rowingnte-gration ntoglobalmarkets isruptedstablished atternsf trade ndproductionnd generated ew ones. n so doing, ld social bonds andgroupswereweakened, hile thers rewmore nfluential.n Palestine,thiseffect as compoundedby politicaldevelopmentshat prior to1948 led to a decline nthepower frural haykhstheconsequence fthereformsfthetanzimateriod, s well s ofgrowingrbanization);theentrenchmentfa classof and-owningrbannotables reinforcedbytheir capture flocal governmentouncilsunder theOttomans,and their ubsequent nteraction ith heBritish); nd the growth nthecoastalareasofa professional/entrepreneurialroup sustained yurbanization,rade, nd theexpansion fsmall-scalemanufacturing).By the atter art fthemandate, rbannotables-notablyl-HajjAminal-Husayni-dominatedhenationalistmovement.This elitestructure as severely isrupted y theestablishmentfIsrael: Urbannotablesfoundtheirpowerweakenedbothby loss oflands and bytheir oliticalfailures, ndmuch of theentrepreneurialelitewas exiled. n Gaza, administrativeontrol estedn thehandsofEgyptianmilitaryuthorities,eaving nly narrowupportingoleforlocal elites.ntheWestBank, ordanianulefocussed ncooptingndi-vidualnotableswhile t the ame time ragmentinghenotable lassasa wholebyemphasizingand manipulating)ocal interestsnd rival-ries.Althoughhe xpansion feducation edtothegrowthfpotentialmiddle-classhallengersoften upportingan-Arabist olitical gen-das), this hallengewassuppressed ytheHashemite egimewhenevernecessary.n therefugeeampsofJordan,ebanon, ndSyria, omeofthe pre-1948elite structurewas repro-duced, nd-to theextent hat tprovidedan immediate ocial supportnetwork- Newstructuresreated yevenreinforced.6t the same time,how- thePLO after 969ever,hesewereunderminedynewstruc- competedwith ndtures feconomic urvivalUNRWA,ocal overlapped reviouslabor force participation,migration), hierarchiesof class andwhichgave ancien elites littlematerial social control.control ver heir ormerubordinates.nLebanon nparticular,heestablishmentfquasi-administrativeunc-tions ythePLOafter 969created ewstructures,ontrolledya newelite, orregulatingocial behavior nd distributingesources.These



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34 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESsimultaneouslyompetedwith nd overlapped revioushierarchies fclass and social control.7

Withtheoccupation f theWestBank and Gaza in June1967, fur-ther ragmentaryorceswereunleashed. sraelsought o make contin-ued use of Jordan's stablished tructures nd strategies f socialcontrol, ftenwith acit and sometimesubstantial) ordanian ooper-ation. But Israel was less able thanJordanhad been to control hechanges ustained y shiftingatterns f economicproduction. heseincludedthe proletarianizationf marginalized easants and refugeepopulations, ften n the form f casual laborwithin srael;continuedexpansion feducation nd an educatedmiddle lass,and longer-termlabormigrationutside alestinewhich n turn enerated ew sourcesoffamilyncome n the form f remittances). ll of thisfurther eak-enedthepower f ocal notables nd conservative unicipal eaders. naddition othese ocioeconomic orces,herise ofPalestinian ational-ism and itsbloody onfrontationith heJordanianegime n 1970-71furthereakened ro-Hashemiteeaders.As the 1976 WestBankmu-nicipal electionsdemonstrated,alestinian ationalism tself ecameoneof hemost mportantvailable olitical esources, llowingtspro-ponents omobilizemassconstituenciesnd access externalPLO andArab) support. his creatednewavenues feliterecruitment-namely,nationalistctivism-not holly ependentn traditionaltatus r con-trol ver conomic roduction.8 ommitmento thenationalisttrug-gle provided counterweighto thefragmentedocalism mongelitespromoted nderJordanianand, less successfully,nder sraeli)rule.Atthe ame time, deological actionalismmongnationalistlites re-atedothermportantines ofcleavage.Inthe1980sother,argely olitical, hanges urtherltered his itu-ation.One was theweakeningf the nationalistmunicipal eadership(marked ythefadingftheNationalGuidanceCommitteeNGC]andbythedeportationfPalestinianmayors). artly ecause of this andpartly ecauseofthe oss ofmuch of its territorialase in Lebanonafter 982,Fatehdirectedncreased ttentionograss-rootsrganiza-tion nthe erritories.9sa consequence fthis nflow fresources ndspurredby factional ompetition,he levelof popular organizationgrewdramaticallyn the form fstudent,radeunion,and women'sorganizations.uchorganizationandthediffuseocal eaderships heyspawned)proved armore esistanto sraeli ountermeasureshan heearlierrelianceon a relativelymall numberof public nationalistfigures.n terms felite ypes, hisformforganizationlso providednew mechanisms or articipationndupward oliticalmobility,othinurban entersnd nrural reas and the amps,'0 nd wouldprovidemuch oftheorganizational nderpinningor he ntifada.11



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 35Social ChangePerspectives

A farmoresatisfyingerspectivehataccommodatesmanyoftheprevious bjections o a primordialistnterpretationtressesnotcon-tinuityutchange. articularmphasis s placedbothon the mpact fsocioeconomicransformationnPalestinianociety ndon thepartic-ulareffectsssociatedwith he xperiencefoccupation nddiaspora:ThemobilizationfPalestinianocietyy new litewasmade ossi-bleby tructuralhangeshat ad ed tothe eripheralizationf hetraditionallite. he hree ostmportanttructuralhanges ere hedramaticise fwage abor fter967,whichransfiguredbasicallypeasant ociety,xtensiveandconfiscations,ndthewidespreadavailabilityfuniversityducationfter972.Eachof hese evelop-ments elped obreak raditionalatron-clientelationshathadbeen he ocial aseof he ldelitendpaved heway or he ise fmore xtensive,etterducated,more ural,ndnonlanded litewhich adgainedohesionnthe alestinianniversities.naddition,these evelopments,nd nparticularhe iminutionf hePalestin-ianpeasantry, eant hatarge egmentsfthepopulationad, neffect,een leaved romheirocialmooringsndwere,hus,moreopen forrecruitmentnto new forms f social relationsndorganizations.2

Politically,hese ocial changesundercut ashemitenfluencetied tothe onservativeotables) ndsustained he mergencefa new Pales-tiniannationalisteadership.'3Theoretically,omedifferencesxistbetween cholarswho concep-tualize hisprocess n terms fmodernizationwith mphasison ur-banization, ducation,and political-culturalhange),'4 those whounderscorehangesneconomic roduction,ocioeconomic lass andclass conflict,'5 nd thosewho emphasize hechanging olitical on-text. tillothershavepointed o the mportancefgenerationalndelitechange, nd theemergencenderoccupation f a newcohort fPalestinianeadershipn theterritories.16While he xaminationfPalestinianlite ormationnthecontextfsocialchange s fundamentallymportant,t still isksmissing arts fthepicture. ome scholars neoprimordialists,orwantofa better i-tle)have attacked hedichotomyetween traditional nd modernoften resumed ythe ocialchangeperspectiven thegrounds hat tmayunderestimateheextentowhich ld socialgroups familiesndclans) reassert heir aliencedespitesocioeconomic hangethroughtheir articipationn newpatternsfproductionnd organization. sone scholar fPalestinianociety nder he ntifadauggests,The clanhas become a pressuregroup,proving freshts ability o influencepolitical ndsocial life nthevillage, hus ncreasinghe alience ndpolarization fvillageclans to new levels. 7 imilarly,egional ndother traditionalinesofcleavagemaybe accentuated,s elites n dif-ferentreascompete or carceresources.18



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36 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESGender s another roblematicrea.Theconsiderablettentionaidtothe tatus fwomenhasusuallybeenconfinedoexplicitlyeminist

analysis. hosewhoemphasize lassstruggleend oglossovergenderdifferences,hile hosewhoemphasizemodernizationend otreatwo-men's emancipation s intrinsico themodernization rocess.Cer-tainly, ocioeconomic hangeand nationalist truggleeem to havebrought ewlevelsofactivism ywomen, specially n thecontext fthe intifada, ut fewwomen have been admitted o seniorpolicy-making ircles, ndthedurabilityfthegainsmade s uncertain.19n-deed,counter othe ssumptionsfmodernizationpproaches, heex-perience fmany iberationmovementss thatnational mancipationoften ringsn itswake a redomesticationfwomen.20Finally, hile he mergence f newmiddle lass 21 r pragmatic,pro-PLOurbanelite 22may be explicable n modernizationr classterms, hecleavageswithin hat lite annotbe fully educed osocio-economicdifferences:urvey atasuggesthat ocioeconomic tatus sa weakpredictor f ideologicalorientationmongPalestinians.23snoted arlier, hegrowth fPalestinianationalistrganizationreatednewpaths topositions f social leadership,nd upwardmobility asbeenshapednotonlybyeducation, lass origins,nd familyonnec-tions,but also by ndividual olitical trategiesnd organizationaly-namics. n short, litestructure ithinPalestinian olitics s also aproduct fvariables ntrinsiconationalistrganization.Organizationalerspectives

Historically,rganizational ariableshavebeenparticularlympor-tant n shapingPalestinianliteformation,ohesion, nd cleavage nthediaspora. n the 1970s and 1980s, thePLO and its constituentgroups ustained massive nstitutionaltructure,nvolvingt itspeakover20,000 militarynd civilianpersonnel, iplomatic fficesn al-mostone hundred ountries,nd an annualbudgetwellover 200 mil-lion.24While the externalstructure f the PLO was weakenedsubstantially ythe 1982 Israeli nvasion fLebanon, nd evenmorebythesuspension fpetrodollarundingfter he1990-91GulfWar,this structure emained ubstantial: riorto thesigning ftheGaza-Jerichogreement,he PLO employedome2,300personneln Tunisalone, naddition omilitaryadres nYemen, lgeria, ibya,ndLeba-non,and Palestine iberation rmyPLA) forcesn Egypt,raq,andJordan. fthe ome9,000Palestinianoliceandsecurityorces alledfor ythe greeinent,p to7,000willberecruitedrommong xisting(external) ateh nd PLApersonnel.25 iven he arge nflux fonce-exiledPLO leaders, adres, nd militaryersonnelntoGaza and theWestBank, fullunderstandingfPalestinianliteformationnd in-terim elf-governmentlearly equires ttentiono thehistoricalndcontemporaryynamics f Palestinian ationalistrganization.



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 37Theorganizationalariablemost ommonlyointed oby cholars fthe Palestiniannationalistmovements ideologicalcompetition e-tweenPalestinian roups.Several analystshave suggested hat thePLO's policyprocess s fundamentallyhaped bythe nteractionf or-ganizationalmperativesndcentrifugalolitical ressures.26npartic-ular,fears forganizationalragmentationavecreatedncentives orpolitical nclusion nd consensual, owest-common-denominatorol-icy-making.27tthesame time, ffortsoavoid theconstraintsf con-sensus-buildingave purred ateh oconstructtsownmechanisms fcontrol, ncludingpatronageand hegemony verthe bureaucraticstructurefthePLO.28The rise of theIslamistmovementn the 1980s has involved ewlines oforganizationalecruitment,lite election,nd ideological ivi-sion.29nthecaseofHamas,for xample,many fthefoundingeaderswere fmiddle-classrigin;omewerefromhe ulama'. mportantve-nues ofrecruitmentncludemosques and Gaza's IslamicUniversity,and, fororganizationalresources, thewaqf administrations.30Within he eadership fparticularrganizations,nalysts avehigh-lighted he mportance otonlyofpolicydifferences,ut ofgenera-tionaldifferencesnd clique formation.31tillothershavepointed otensions etweenhe xile eadership fthePLO andthe ocalnational-ist eadership n theterritories,articularlyn thecontext frelationsbetween he PalestineNationalFront, heNGC, and theFateh/PLOleadership in the 1970s.32Withthe intifada, ifferencesetween inside and outside re-ceivednewscrutiny,33s did thedifferencesetween rass-rootsctiv-ists, the organizationaleadership f the variousgroups, nd theintellectualpersonalities n the territories.34uchofthis iteratureemphasized heextent o which he enior rganizationaleadershipn

theWestBankand Gaza had risenthrough rass-rootsctivismandlongperiodsof mprisonment)ather han ocialposition.35Finally, he debateon democracy,ccountability,orruption,ndbureaucratizationhatbegan, oth nside nd outside he erritories,nthe arly 990sintensifiedith he ransitionoself-government.36ac-tionalism-bothetween rganizationsnd within ateh nparticular-has been aggravatedydebates overthepeace processand by turfbattles, whichhave further ividedthe variousnascentministrieswithin he PA.37n particular,herehas been considerable ivalry e-tween hevarious economicportfolios eldbyAhmadQurai' (Econ-omy,and director-generalf PECDAR), Nabil Shaath (Planning),MuhammadZuhdi al-NashashibiFinance),and Faruq al-Qaddumi(deputy ead ofPECDAR).Therehave lsobeensigns f power trug-gleamong ome Palestinianecurityrgans.38



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38 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESStatistPerspectives

A final etofpotentialnsightss offeredy a statist erspectivem-phasizing he mpact f sraelipolicy in theterritories)r Arabhostgovernmentolicies in thediaspora) on Palestinianrganizationndhence theemergence fPalestinianlites.This areaofscholarship asnot beenfully eveloped, ut t s implicitn a number fstudies.39With hetransitionoself-government,tatist nalysismayprove fincreasingmportance,s the rules fthegame -constitutionaltruc-tures, egalrights nd prohibitions,lectoral ystems,lectionproce-dures, nd so forth-couldll have an impacton who can effectivelycompete orpositions fauthority.imilarly,he formal llocation fdiscretionaryowerswithin he PAstructuresas importantmplica-tionsfor liteformation. tpresent, owever,esearch n thisarea islimited ythe mbiguous, ersonalized,ndoften entralizedharacterofpolitical nstitutionsnd authority ithin he PA.Elite ormationnder nterimelf-Government

Palestinianlite ormationasbeen understoodndifferentays ndindeedmustbe understoodn differentays. n otherwords, he m-pact of traditionalatterns fsocial organization,ccupation nd so-cioeconomic change, and the organizationaldynamics of thePalestinian ationalistmovementperate imultaneously,eneratingdifferentialathsofeliterecruitmentndmultipleinesof elitecleav-age. Moreover,hefuturemergence f formal tatestructuresmaycomplicatehispicture tillfurther.Examinationf theunfoldingtructurefPalestinianolitical litesprovides mpirical onfirmationf thispoint see table 1).40 AttheapexofPalestinianelf-governments YasirArafat. lthough memberof a juniorbranch ftheal-Husayniamily, rafat'sosition f eader-shipis largely functionfhis position s co-foundernd leaderofFateh.Themembers fthePAappointedorapparentlyppointed) rehardly eflectivefthebroad copeofPalestinianocietyn a statisticalsense: there s onlyone woman,fewmembers rom uralor refugeebackgrounds, isproportionateepresentationf middle-class rofes-sionals and traditional lites, nd no mem-

The membership f the PA bers of the opposition. Most of theseTharl reflectshitheoAd characteristicsre,of course, rue fcabi-hardly reflects he broad nets round heworld.)At the ametime,scope ofPalestiniansociety, thecabinet's omposition learlyreflectsbut it demonstrates variety someeffortt balancedrepresentationfofpaths to inclusionwithin differentonstituencies, nd certainlythepolitical elite. demonstrates variety fpaths to inclu-sion within hepolitical lite.



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 39Table 1Members f PA Cabinet

January 995Name Position Background AffiliationYasirArafat President:nterior diaspora FatehMinisterNabil Shaath Planning diaspora FatehMuhammad uhdi Finance diaspora independental-NashashibiZakariya l-Agha Housing Gaza FatehSaeb Erakat MunicipalAffairs Jerusalem/ FatehJericho'Abdal-'Aziz l- Transportation Ramallah FatehHaj AhmadRiyad l-Za'nun Health Gaza Fateh'Azmi l-Shu'aybi Youth nd Sports deportee FIDAIntissar l-Wazir Social Affairs diaspora FatehSamirGhawshah Labor diaspora PLFIlyasFrayj Tourism ndAntiquities Bethlehem independentFrayhAbu-Midyan Justice Gaza FatehYasir Amr Education diaspora independentAhmadQurai' Economy diaspora Fateh'Abd al-Hafiz l- Communications Hebron independentAshabYasir AbidRabbu InformationndCulture diaspora FIDAFaysal l-Husayni Jerusalem FatehHasan Tahbub ReligiousAffairs Jerusalem independentTayyibAbd l- PASecretary diaspora FatehRahmanMunib l-Masri diaspora independentItalicsrepresentncertain, nofficial,r uniorcabinet tatus.

Organizationally, he bulk of the members are either formalFatehcadres or pro-Fateh ndependents (it should be rememberedthat re-peated polls havegivenFateh a majority r large pluralityn the territo-ries). There are two representativesfrom the Palestine DemocraticUnion (FIDA) and one fromthe Popular StruggleFront (PSF).41 Fivemembersof thePA are on thePLO ExecutiveCommittee, nd manyofthe remainder are members of the PLO Central Council or PalestineNational Council.42 Several others head or have headed importantpro-fessionalorganizations n theWest Bank or Gaza.43 Geographically,hecabinet s fairly venly splitbetweenlong-termxiles and local leaders(or recentdeportees) from the territories. aza and the southernandcentralparts of the West Bank (includingJerusalem)are represented.Socioeconomically,he cabinet consists of a mix of individuals fromwell-established otable families e.g., al-Nashashibi,Frayj, l-Masri, l-Husayni,Erakat) and those from he new middle class. Manyof thosefromnotable families,however, lso have long historiesof nationalistactivism.44



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40 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESSimilar ariations evidentmong he enior oliceandsecurityffi-cials appointed yArafat, hocomprise mix ofpreviously-deported

Fatehorganizersnd seniorofficersromFateh's external)militarywing,Fateh/PLO overt ecuritynd intelligencergans, nd regularPLA careerofficers.45ECDAR-supposedly heprimary onduitforaid for heterritories-istaffedy a combination f nternalndexter-nal political ppointees nd technocrats.Counterelites-representedygroups xcludedfrom hecurrentA(thePFLP,DFLP, Communists, amas,and theremnantsfJordan'straditionalupporters)-arelsodrawn rom iverseocialandpoliticalbackgrounds.ftheproposed lections or Palestinianegislaturero-ceedas planned, hese ndividualsmaybe drawn ntomoreformalizedpolitical oles n theemergingalestinianolitical ystem.Conclusion:heChallengesfPoliticalManagement

Thecompositionfthe mergingalestinianolitical lite s still n astateofflux.However,xaminationfthis lite uggests multiplicityof recruitmentaths and social backgrounds.While not all socialgroups rerepresented,heelite s far roader han heusual categori-zationsoftraditional/modernrsocialclass, ndorganizationalactorsareshown oplay keyrole nshaping he mergencefpolitical ead-ership. hisunderscoreshe xtent o which liteformationncontem-poraryPalestinecannot be understoodmonocausallybut must beapproachedn a holistic nd nuancedmanner.Takentogether,he various factorsustaina fairly eterogeneouselitestructure,haracterizedya multiplicityfsources, verlappingelite-types,ndmultiple otentialines ofelite leavage.Thisin turnraisesthe questionofhow, n the context f so muchpotential litefragmentation,sufficientevel fcohesion anbemaintained o alloweffectivealestinianovernance.One obviousanswerhas been Palestinian ationalism, hichpro-videsunifyingoalsand a common ode of discourse ormuchoftheelite.But nationalist iscoursehas been under ncreasing hallengefromslamist orces,whichprivilege rather ifferentrame f refer-ence.Moreover, ationalist iscourse tself ontainswidevariations,ranging rommilitant ejectionismo pragmatic ccommodationism,whichhaveonlybeenaggravatedythe urrenteace process.Finally,Palestinian ationalistunity as often een definedn opposition oan occupyingsraeli other. he historyfnational iberationmove-ments round heworld uggestshat nticolonialnity ades ndfrag-mentation ncreasesas movementsass from asksof resistance othose ofgovernance. he same holds true ofPalestinianelf-govern-ment s it confronts ot sraelbutquestions f ccountability,evelop-ment riorities,ndpractical erformance.



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 41Strong, harismaticeadership epresents secondpossiblemecha-nism formanaging he dangersof politicalfragmentation.rafat's

charismaticutocracy asplayed keyrole nmaintaininghecohe-sion of themainstreamalestinian ationalistmovementn thepast,buttoday t s clear hatwhatevereserves emay tillhave n thePales-tinianpolity rerapidly eingdepleted.Yet nother ossibleresponse othesedilemmass politicaldemoc-racy nsofars ithelps egitimizeoth he tructuresfgovernancendthosewhooccupy hem. emocratic oliticalnstitutionslready xistat the evel fcivil ociety, nddemocraticmechanisms avebeenbuiltinto heOslo andCairoagreementsn theform f egislativelections.Given he tate fPalestinian-Israeliegotiationst thetime fwriting,however,hese resentlyeem rather istant romise,nd the xperi-ence of otherdecolonized ocieties lso suggests he difficultieshatnewdemocracies an face.Inthis ontextfhighdegrees felitedifferentiation,olitical ncer-tainty, nd the imits f deology nd charisma, ontrol vermaterialresources-thebility o cooptthrough atronage, inancial ewards,and contingentoliticalnclusion-may rove n attractivelternative.Analytically,he ontours nddynamicsf ucha neopatrimonialtrat-egy fpoliticalmanagementillbe exploredna forthcomingrticlenthesepages.Practically, any fthe ccoutrementsfneopatrimonialpolitics-personalism,ronyism, ent-seeking,orruption,nd weakpolitical nstitutionalization-arelready videntn aspectsof thecur-rent ransitiono interim alestinianelf-government.

NOTES1. Perhapsthe most notable person to decline aministerial ppointment s Hanan Ashrawi,whoinstead has devoted her attentionsto the In-dependent ommittee orCitizens reated s a Pal-estinian ombudsman to oversee self-government.Others urning own offers fappointmenteport-edly ncludeHaydar Abd al-Shafi former ead ofthe Palestinian eam to the bilateral negotiations,and a critic fthecurrent eace process),MahmudDarwish poet and formerndependentmember fthe PLO ExecutiveCommittee), nd senior FatehleadersFaruq al-Qaddumi thePLO's foreignmin-ister ) nd Mahmud Abbas (a member f the PLOExecutive ommittee nd an architect f the OsloAccord). AssociatedPress, 11 May 1994; UnitedPress nternational,1 May 1994.2. Noteworthymongthese s Ahmad Qurai' (AbuAla'),who tendered nd thenwithdrew rather m-biguousresignationn protest vera lack of polit-ical backing romArafatnd turf attleswithotherPA ministers.wo ministersssociatedwith hePal-estinianDemocraticUnion (FIDA) have also beenunderpressure rom heir arty o resign heir osi-tions, n thegrounds hat heyhavebeen unable toinfluence A policy n desiredways,

3. See,for xample,Aryeh odfat nd YuvalArnon-Ohanna,PLO Strategynd TacticsLondon: CroomHelm,1981), pp. 68-72.4. Donna RobinsonDivine, The DialecticsofPal-estinianPolitics, n JoelMigdal et al., PalestinianSocietyndPoliticsPrinceton: rincetonUniversityPress,1980), pp. 227-28. Divinedoes notattributethis to some unchanging haracteristicfPalestin-ian political ulture, owever, ut rather o thepar-ticularconditionsof dependencyengenderedbyexile and occupation.5. Foran overview,ee Migdaletal., Palestiniano-ciety nd Politics, art ; and BaruchKimmerlingandJoelMigdal,Palestinians:heMaking f People(New York:The Free Press,1993).6. Shafeeq Ghabra, Palestinians n Kuwait:TheFamily nd the Politicsof Survival, PS 17, no. 2(Winter1988), pp. 62-83.7. On this process, ee Rosemary ayigh, alestini-ans: FromPeasants o RevolutionariesLondon: ZedBooks, 1979), pp. 118-24, 164-71, 177-81; JuliePeteet,Socio-Politicalntegrationnd Conflict es-olution n PalestinianCamps in Lebanon, JPS 16,no. 2 (Winter1987), pp. 29-44; RexBrynen,The



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42 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESPoliticsfExile: hePalestiniansn Lebanon, our-nal of Refugeetudies3, no. 3 (Fall1990).8. Having aid this,higher ocioeconomiclassclearly nabledhigher egrees f educationndprovidedeadierccessto influentialocial net-works-bothontributingactorso effectiveolit-ical leadership. onsequently,upper-)middle-class ctivistsatherhan easants rcasualwork-erswere ftenhebeneficiaries.9. Previously,heCommunistsad been hemostactive rganizerst this evel, ateroinedby thePopularrontor he iberationfPalestinePFLP)and Democraticront or heLiberationf Pales-tine DFLP).10. This is evident rom tudiesof the back-groundsf both dministrativeetaineesnd de-portees uring he ntifada.ad saac found hat,among isfellowetaineest theAnsarII camp,71 percentame romefugeeamps rruralreas;48 percentad averagemonthlyncomes f 100JDs r ess; nd29 percentere nskilledaborers.Jad saac, ASocio-economictudy fAdministra-tive etaineest Ansar , JPS18, no.4 (Summer1989),pp. 102-109.Anotherurveyf leadingc-tivists f theUnified ational eadershipftheUprisingound hat ver third ere rom uralrrefugeeamp rigins,ndthat nly percentr owere rom otable amilies. eir itvak,Palestin-ian Leadershipn the Territoriesuring he n-tifada, 987-1992, rient34,no.2 (June993), .206.11. JoostHiltermann,ehindthe Ititifada:Laborand Women'sMovementsn theOccupiedTerritores(Princeton:rincetonniversityress, 991).12. Glenn obinson,TheRole f heProfessionalMiddle lass ntheMobilizationfPalestiniano-ciety: he Medical ndAgriculturalommittees,Internationalournal fMiddleEast Studies 5,no.2(May1993),p. 301. I would iketothankGlennRobinsonor is nsightfulommentsnan earlierversionf his aper.13. MosheMa'oz,Palestinian Leadershipon theWestBank:TheChangingRoleoftheMayorsunderJordan nd Israel (London:FrankCass, 1984);Emile ahliyeh,n SearchofLeadership:WestBankPolitics ince1967 (Washington:heBrookingsn-stitution.988).14. Ma'oz, alestinian eadershipn theWestBank,pp. 127-30;Robinson,TheRole ofthe Profes-sionalMiddle lass n theMobilizationfPalestin-ianSociety, p. 301-302, 21-22.15. Jamil ilal, l-Diffa l-gharbiyya:l-tarkibl-ij-tinla'iwa al-iqtisadi[TheWestBank:Socialandeconomictructure]Beirut:LO Researchentre,1975);SalimTamari,West ankPoliticsndSo-cialForces, ERIPReports100/101October/De-cember981);Pamela nn mith,alestinend thePalestiniansNewYork.t.Martin's,984).16. This s the ssumptionfJohnWallach ndJa-netWallach, he New Palestinians:The EmergingGenerationfLeaders Rocklin,CA:Prima ublish-ing,1992).For critiqueftheview hat he n-tifada adicallyltered alestinianlite tructures,seeAliJarbawi,PalestinianlitesntheOccupiedTerritories:tabilitynd Change hroughhe n-tifada,nJamal assar nd Roger eacock, ds.,Intifada:Palestine at the Crossroads New York:Praeger,990).

17. Majdi al-Malki, Clans et partispolitiquesdanstrois villages palestiniens, Revue d'etudes Pales-tiniennes 2 (Summer1994), p. 126.18. See, for xample, he discussionon Gaza-WestBank tensions n Sara Roy, Gaza: New Dynamicsof Civic Disintegration, PS 17, no. 4 (Summer1993), pp. 27-28. For an interestingecent ttemptto think hrough ow Gaza/WestBankdifferencesmight be accommodated n the structures f anemerging alestinian olitical ystem,ee Khalil al-Shiqaqi, al-Diffa l-gharbiyya a qita' ghazza: al-alaqat al-siyasiyya a al-idariyya l-niustaqbaliyya[TheWestBank andGaza Strip:The future oliticaland administrativeelations] Jerusalem: ASSIA,1994).19. On the current ituation, ee Rita Giacamanand PennyJohnson, Searching orStrategies: hePalestinianWomen'sMovementn the New Era,Middle East Report 186 (January-February994);Sahar Khalifeh, The Women's Movement, nWhitheralestine?Washington, C: Center or ol-icy Analysison Palestine,1994); UnitedNationsDevelopment rogram, t theCrossroads: hallengesand Choices orPalestinianWomenn theWestBankand Gaza Strip New York:UNDP, 1994).20. See Maxine Molyneux, MobilizationwithoutEmancipation? Women's Interests, State, andRevolution, n Richard Fagen, Carmen DianaDeere, and JuanLuis Coraggio,Transition and De-velopment:roblems fThirdWorld ocialism NewYork MonthlyReviewPress, 1986); Gay Seidman,No Freedom withoutthe Women: Mobilizationand Gender n SouthAfrica, 970-1992, Signs18,no. 2 (1993).21. Robinson, The RoleoftheProfessionalMiddleClass, p. 322.22. Sahliyeh,n SearchofLeadership, . 163.23. See, for xample,Michael Inbar and EphraimYuchtman-Yaar,The People's Image of ConflictResolution, ournal fConflict esolution3, no. 1(March 1989); Marianne Heibergand Geir 0ven-sen,PalestinianocietynGaza, West ank ndArabJerusalem:A Surveyof LivingConditions. Oslo:FAFO, 1993), pp. 273-75.

24. CherylRubenberg, he Palestine iberation r-ganization: ts nstitutionalnfrastructureBelmont,MA: Institutefor Arab Studies, 1983); AdamZagorin, AuditinghePLO,' in AugustusRichardNorton nd MartinH. Greenberg,ds.. The nterna-tionalRelations fthePalestine iberation rganiza-tion Carbondale, IL: Southern llinois UniversityPress,1989).25. Agreemiientn theGaza Str-ipnd theJerichoArea,Annex : Pr-otocoloncerningWithdrawal Is-raeliMilitary or-cesnd Security rrangenments,r-ticle II.4.a. In fact, henumber fPalestinian olicemaynowbe as highas 15,000;Associated ress, 7January1995. Several hundred additional Fatehmilitaryadresmaybe transferredrom ebanontoGaza in early1995.26. See,for xanmple,heemphasison political/ide-ologicalfactionalismn Helena Cobban, The Pales-tinian LiberationOrganization:People,PowerandPolitics Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1984). On the mpactoffactional ompetition ithPalestinianmass organizations n the West Bankand Gaza, see Hiltermann, ehind he ntifada.



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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 4327. Aaron avidMiller,he PLO and thePoliticsfSurvival (New York: raeger, 983); and ShaulMishal,he PLO underArafat etween un and Ol-ive Branch (New Haven:Yale Universityress,1986).28. RexBrynen,anctuary nd Survival: hePLO inLebanon (Boulder:Westview ress, 1990), pp.174-75.29. Ziad Abu-Amr,slamicFundamentalisnmn theWestBankand Gaza: Muslini Brotherhoodnd Is-lanuicJihadBloomington:ndiana niversityress,1994).30. Litvak,Palestinianeadershipn theTerrito-ries, p. 209-11.As Litvak otes, he socioeco-nomic nd educational rofile f slamist ctivistleadersnPalestinechoes hat f slamicmilitantselsewherenthe egion;ee,for xample,aad Ed-din brahim,AnatomyfEgypt's ilitantslamicGroups:Methodologicalotesand PreliminaryFindings,nternationalournalfMiddleEast Stud-ies 12,no.4 (November980).31. OnFateh,eeCobban, hePalestinian ibera-tion Organization; on the PFLP, see As'adAbuKhalil,Internalontradictionsn thePFLP:DecisionMaking nd Policy rientation, iddleEastJournal 1, no. 3 (Summer 987).32. Ibrahimakkak,BackoSquare ne:AStudyintheRe-emergencef thePalestiniandentityntheWest ank, 967-1980, nAlexandercholch,ed.,Palestinians ver theGreenLine:Studies n theRelations etween alestinians n Both ides of the1949 Armistice ines Since 1967 (London: thacaPress, 1983). Becauseof the disproportionateweightf eftistrganizationsn the NF ndNGC,andbecause fa concern ver he oss of centralcontrol ver ctionsn theterritories,rafat assuspiciousfboth roups. ater,onservativeota-bles (like Ilyas Fray) and external esources(through he PLO-JordanianointCommittee)would eused nan attempto reassertontrol.33. Thedifferencesre mphasizedyZe'ev chiffandEhud a'ari,ntifada: hePalestinian prising-Israel'sThird rontNewYork: imon ndSchuster,1990).For more uanced iew, ee HelenaCob-ban, The LOandthe ntifada,MiddleEastJour-nal 44, no. 2 (Spring 990). On inside-outsiderelationsndthePLO's nstitutionalevelopment,seeJamil ilal, PLO nstitutions:heChallengeAhead, JPS3, no.1 (Autumn993),pp.46-60.34. AliJarbawi,l-Intifada aal-qiyadat l-siyasiyyafi al-diffa l-gharbiyya a-qita' ghazza: bahthal-nukhba l-siyasiyyaThe ntifadand thepoliticalleadershipn the WestBankand Gaza Strip:Astudyf oliticallites]Beirut:ar l-Tali'a,989);ZiadAbuAmr,Notes nPalestinianoliticalead-ership, Middle East Report 154 (Septem-ber-October988).35. See, orxample,illel risch,The alestinianMovementntheTerritories,iddleEasternStud-ies 9,no.2 April 993), p.257-62; nd l-Malki,Clans tpartis ans rois illages alestiniens,.120.Some 0,000persons ere eld n sraeli e-tentionetween988 nd 1994.36. For recentiscussiony he ecretaryf hePalestinianndependentommission orCiti-zens, eeAs'ad Abd l-Rahman,al-Nidall-filas-tiniwaal-dimuqratiyya,ThePalestiniantruggle

anddemocracy],aperpresentedo theWorld f-fairsCouncil onferencen Democracyn theArabWorld, mman,uly 994.37. See Sara Roy, The Seeds of Chaos, and ofNight: heGazaStrip fterheAgreement,PS 8,no. 3 (Spring 994),pp. 85-89.38. In particular,etween preventativeecurityand presidentialecurity fficers.alestine eport7, no. 36 (4 September994),p. 16.39. See in particularaurieBrand,alestiniansntheArab World: nstitution uilding nd theSearchfor State (New York: olumbiaUniversityress,1988).Alsorelevantre several f the nalysesfthenterplayetweensraeli olicy nd Palestinianorganizationnder occupation resentedbovein the previous section on organizationalperspectives.40. It s indicativefthe urrentonfusionfPal-estinianelf-governmenthat ifferentources ro-duce differentists of thePAcabinetmembers.Jerusalem-basedaysal l-Husayni as named othe abinet utnot wornntoprotecthe tatus fOrientHouse. Munib l-Masri as not swornnand s inactives a cabinetminister,evotingiseffortsnsteadoprivateectorobbyingnda ma-jor Palestiniannvestmentonglomerate.ayyib'Abd l-Rahims secretaryf hePAbutdoesnotformallyccupya cabinet eat. RabbiMosheHirsch f the nti-Zionistaturei arta ecthasbeen ited y ome ourcesincludingimself)sPA Ministerf ewish ffairs.inally.everalffi-cials haveusedtheunofficialitle f MinisterfState jamil Tarifi, coordination ith srael ;HakamBalawi, security,Abd l-Rahimhmad,presidentialffairs ).41. TheFIDAmembersreAzmil-Shu'aybia de-portee nd formerenior rganizern the WestBank) nd FIDA eader) asirAbidRabbu; amirGhawshahsfromhe SF.Arafat asunsuccessfulinenticing embersf he FLP, FLP, alestinianPeople's artyPPP, he ormerommunistarty),or Hamasnto iscabinet,ut s probablyoldingseats pen o that emay e abletodo so inthefuture.42. Arafat,l-Nashashibi,Amr,AbidRabbu, ndGhawshah re all PLO Executive ommitteemembers.43. These nclude l-Shu'aybiDentists' ssocia-tion,Ramallah), ray]Abu-MiydanBar Associa-tion, Gaza), Zakariya l-Agha Arab MedicalAssociation, aza), and Riyad l-Za'nunHigherHealth ouncil, aza).Tahbub eaded heHigherIslamic ouncil.44. For xample, aysal l-Husayni-a emberftheHusayni lan,and son of Abdal-Qadir l-Husaynia nationalisterokilled n 1948)-hasspent earsnprisonnd under ouse rrest. ewas anactivist ith heGeneral nion fPalestin-ian Studentsn the ate 1950sand early1960s;workedttheJerusalemfficefthePLO when topenedn 1964; ndwas a Fateh rganizerntheWest ank fter 967.Seehis nterviewnJPS 18,no.4 (Summer 989),pp.4,8.45. The PAhas separatetructuresor ublic e-curity,ivil olice,ivil efense,residentialecur-ity, preventativeecurity,nd ntelligence.

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