Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions

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Nelson's Blood: Attitudes and Actions of the Royal Navy 1939-45Author(s): E. F. GueritzSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, The Second World War: Part 2(Jul., 1981), pp. 487-499Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260316.

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2/14

Rear-Admiral

E.F. Gueritz

Nelson's

Blood:

Attitudes

and

Actions

of the

Royal

Navy

1939-45

On 1

August

1970

the issue

of

a

free

ration of

rum,

commonly

call-

ed Nelson's

Blood,

to

ratings

in

the

Royal Navy

was

discontinued,

and a

custom which had

originated

soon after the

capture

of

Jamaica in 1655 came to an end. Lord Nelson was no more

associated with rum than

any

of his

contemporaries,

and the

grisly

association

with

the

preservation

of his

body

is based

on

a

misunderstanding.'

The

significance

of the nickname

lies

in

the

ac-

ceptance

of

Nelson as

the embodiment of all

the

Royal

Navy's

traditions

whether

they originated

with him or

not. It is

ironical,

therefore,

that

some

of

Nelson's most

important

contributions to

naval

warfare

became

overlaid

in

the

Royal

Navy

by

a

heavy

layer

of Victorian orthodoxy and social prejudice, to the detriment of

British naval

operations

in

the

first

world war.

Some old

sailors

used to

say:

'If 'e knew

what was

done

in

'is name

'e'd be down

off

'is

pedestal

to

sort 'em out.' The

purpose

of

this

article is to

review

how

attitudes had

developed by

the

outbreak

of

the second

world

war,

and to

examine

very

briefly

some

examples

of how

actions

may

have

been affected.

It

seems

remarkable that a

nation

with

a

strong

maritime tradi-

tion should

produce

generations

of

naval officers

addicted to an

orthodoxy

quite

at variance with the character and

practice

of the

great

hero whose

memory they

venerated. It

was

for

change

in

this

attitude that

Vice-Admiral

Sir

George Tryon

strove,

and

literally

died

in

vain,

towards

the end of

the

nineteenth

century.

He had

/JoIrnal

of

('ontemporarv

listorv

(SAG(E,

I

ondon and

Beverly

Hills),

Vol. 16

(1981),

487-99


3/14

Journal

of Contemporary History

recognized

the baleful influence

of

orthodoxy

and blind

obedience,

and

sought

to

make his

subordinates

think for

themselves.2

The

performance

of the British fleets

in

the

North Sea

in

the

first

world

war bore

distressing testimony

to the wisdom of his

appreciation.

The

courage

and

seamanship

of the officers of those fleets are

not

in

question,

nor is

the

respect

which

they

had

for

their

Commander-in-Chief.

It was

this

virtue

which

became

the vice

when it

seemed

to be

accepted

that the Admiral was

omniscient,

and

that it would

be

presumptuous

to

give

him

information.

Failures at Jutland

were not confined

to

unwarrantable

silence.

There were also cases in which the Nelsonian injunction was ig-

nored that

'. . .

no

Captain

can do

very

wrong

if he

lays

his

ship

alongside

that

of an

enemy'.

There was no lack

of

courage

but

there was a

great

lack

of

initiative,

and

consequently

orthodoxy

triumphed

over

opportunity.

The

contrast

in the second

world war was most marked.

By

a

for-

tunate

chance,

certain men

of

genius

had

wrought

a

great

change.

One

can,

perhaps,

date this

phenomenon

from

the

departure

of

Admiral Sir Roger Keyes from the Mediterranean, and attribute its

development

to

the influence

of

Admiral

Sir

Ernle

Chatfield

(later

Admiral

of

the

Fleet Lord

Chatfield)

and

Admiral

Sir William

Fisher3

who

became

his successors

as

Commander-in-Chief.

Cer-

tainly

the restrictive

effects

of

voluminous

Fleet Orders

and tactical

instructions

were

quickly

dispelled,

training

was made

more

realistic,

and

a

proper

emphasis

was

laid on

training

for

night

fighting.4

Among

the subordinate

Flag

Officers

was Rear-Admiral

A.B.

Cunningham,

who held

the

appointment

of Rear-Admiral

Destroyers,

and himself

made

his name

as a

great

wartime

commander-in-chief

in

the

Mediterranean.

With his enormous

ex-

perience

of

destroyers

(he

commanded

HMS

Scorpion

for

seven

years,

1910-18)

and

the

high

standards

which he

expected,

the

destroyer

flotillas

of the

Mediterranean

must have

been a

fine

school

for

initiative,

quick-thinking

and

team

work. There

is

no

doubt

that

by

1939 there

were

a number

of

very

experienced

com-

manding

officers

and first

lieutenants

in

destroyers.

This

was

just

as well, as it was upon them that fell the tremendous burdens of the

first

years

of

the

war. There

was a

heavy

toll

among

the

less

ex-

perienced

and

robust,

as was

evident

in the

RN

hospitals

of

the

time.

Destroyer

officers

tended

to be an

exclusive

professional

group,

contemptuous

of

their

brothers

in

big

ships

and

condescen-

ding,

to

put

it

politely,

to

newcomers

to

the 'boats'.5

Commander

488


4/14

Gueritz:

Nelson's Blood

Lord Louis Mountbatten

was

not

fully

accepted,

and

his

invention,

the Mountbatten

Station

Keeping Gear,

was scorned

by many

'old'

destroyer captains.

Coincidentally,

or so

it

seems,

the resurrected

spirit

of the Nelso-

nian 'band of

brothers'

not

only

brought

initiative

and

enterprise

back into naval

operations,

but also

a

new

sensibility

in the handl-

ing

of

men,

as

was

exemplified

in

the doctrine and

practice

pioneered

by

Commander Rorie O'Conor.

By

the outbreak

of

war,

for

example,

the attitude

adopted

towards

midshipmen

had

chang-

ed

considerably. They

were treated as

young

officers

rather than as

fugitives

from a

preparatory

school, and the

gunrooms

in which

they

lived ceased

to be run as

though

Doctor

Arnold had never

lived 6

There

may

have been

exceptions,

but

these

tended to

be in

battleships

where older ideas died hard. The

change

in attitude

may

have

been

due

in

some measure to

the

influence of the

Special

Entry

scheme.

Midshipmen

trained under

this

scheme were older when

they

went

to sea

and

had a

wider

educational

background.7

One

lesson of the

age

of

enlightenment

in

the 1930s was

the

emphasis

placed on enemy reporting: the overriding duty of reporting the

enemy,

his

strength

and his movements.

There

were,

however,

aspects

of

the

Royal

Navy's

character

which

had

escaped

reform. The

attitude

to

non-executive

officers,

Engineers

and

Paymasters,

was

considerably improved.

The dif-

ference

in

their uniforms was now

only

that

of

the distinctive

pur-

ple

and

white cloth between the

gold

rank

stripes

on the arms

or

shoulder

straps.

Nevertheless,

the

Seaman Branch retained its

privileged position

and certain

prerogatives

which

caused

ill-feeling

until

major

reforms were enacted

in

1955.

Regrettably,

this social

prejudice

extended to the

Reserves.

Officers and

ratings

who

joined

the

Royal

Naval Reserve

(RNR)

while

serving

in

the

Merchant

Navy

served for

short

periods

of

training

in HM

ships.

On

at least

two

occasions,

groups

of

officers were

accepted

for

transfer

from

the RNR to the RN.

It would be

gratifying

to

say

that the

public

spirit

of

the Reserves

and the welcome

accession

of

strength

represented

by

the transfers were

recognized

by

officers

in the fleet.

The politest term which can be used about the usual attitude is

'patronizing'.

Yet Merchant

Navy

officers

had

more

practical

sea

experience

by

the

nature

of

their

profession

than

RN

officers whose

sea-time was

restricted

by

fuel

economies.

(Shades

of

1980-81.)

Moreover,

the

attitude betokened

a

failure

to

appreciate

that

one of

the

main raisons

d'etre

of

a

navy

is the

care

of its

merchant fleet.

489


5/14

Journal

of

Contemporary History

Lack

of

understanding

of the

virtues and the

difficulties

of the

men

who manned the British

merchant

fleet was inexcusable after the

hard-won

lessons

of the first

Atlantic

war.

Some

progress

was

made

by

way

of official

training

in

Naval

Control of

Shipping just

before

the

war: the

Admiralty organization

for

such control

was

in-

comparably

better

than it had

been

in

1914 or

even 1916. The

underlying

cause

of inattention

to

the

Merchant

Navy

was the

failure

to

appreciate

that fleet

action was a means to

an

end,

and

not

an

end

in itself. Anti-submarine

warfare

training

was far more

a matter of fleet

protection

than of

convoy

escort work.

The work of

Chatfield,

Fisher,

Cunningham

and others bore

fruit

in

the first

hard

years

of

the second world

war.

Single

ships

or

squadrons flung

themselves at the

enemy

with

little

regard

for the

prospect

of success but with

complete

certainty

about the

path

of

duty.

There are

examples

in

plenty:

the

Battle of the

River Plate

in

December

1939,

the forlorn

hopes

of

destroyers

such as Gloworm

and Acasta

in

the

Norwegian

campaign,

the

sacrificial action of the

armed merchant-cruiser Jervis

Bay

which saved

Convoy

HX

84.

Or, one can add the actions against the battleship Bismarck in June

1941

(not

least

the

excellent

reporting by

HM

ships

Norfolk

and

Suffolk)

and

the classic

defence

of

Convoy

JW 51 B

by

a handful

of

destroyers

and smaller

escorts,

pitted

against

a

battle-cruiser

and a

heavy

cruiser

in December 1942.

Any

appearance

of

reluctance

to

engage

brought

censure,

just

or

unjust.

A

shadow

fell

across the

good

name

of HMS

Newcastle,

a Town Class

cruiser,

next

on

the

patrol

line

in

Northern

Waters,

when

the

armed merchant-cruiser

Rawalpindi

was sunk

by

the battle-cruisers Scharnhorst

and

Gneisnau

in

the autumn

of

1939.

A

high-powered

Board of

Inquiry

sat

in

Gibraltar

in

December

1940,

under the

presidency

of

Admiral

of the Fleet the

Earl

of Cork and

Orrery,

to examine

the

conduct of

Vice-Admiral

Sir

James

Somerville

in

his action

with

Italian forces

off

Cape Spartivento,

Sardinia.

The treatment of Admiral

Sir

Dudley

North,

as

Flag

Officer

Gibraltar,

when a

French

squadron

passed

unmolested

through

the

straits,

remains a blot

on the Ad-

miralty's

record.s

The

execution

of an Admiral

'pour

encourager

les autres' may be desirable, sometimes essential, even if the execu-

tion

has,

in modern

times,

been

metaphorical

rather

than literal.

Nothing

but harm

is

likely

to result

from

an evident

injustice

to a

subordinate

in order to cloak

the

shortcomings

of a

superior.9

It

has

been

suggested

that the First

Sea Lord should have done

more

to

restrain

the Prime

Minister

from

interfering

in the

operational

490


6/14

Gueritz:

Nelson's Blood

conduct of the fleet.

Men

such as Admirals

Cunningham

and

Somerville needed no

urging

to use

their

ships effectively.

It

is

recorded that

Admiral

Cunningham

'could

hardly forgive

him

[Churchill]

for some of the

insulting

telegrams

he received

from

time to

time'.10

Captain

Stephen

Roskill,

with his close

personal

knowledge

of

Admiral

Pound,

has examined this

question

in

the

book

already quoted,"

and it has

been

an area of

dispute

between

him

and that other eminent

scholar,

the late

Professor

Arthur

Marder.

Great attention has been

paid by well-qualified

observers

and authoritative writers to the

question

of

Admiral

Pound's

health12and opinions differ about its significance. Discussion often

centres

upon

the

Admiralty's

actions

during

the

passage

of

the

Convoy PQ

17

to Russia. It is not

intended

to

rehearse the

sequence

of

events

or

argue

once

again

the

rights

and

wrongs

of

the First

Sea

Lord's

decision to scatter the

convoy

except

in

one

respect.

Con-

voys

in

the

Mediterranean were

escorted

by heavy

ships

and were

subjected

to

attack

by

surface

forces,

as well as

by

aircraft and

sub-

marines.

They

were

fought through

at

great

cost,

and the same

can

be said of the Arctic convoys with the added comment that the

weather

frequently

was

appalling.

In

the Arctic

deployments, heavy

surface escorts

were

stationed

in

close

or

distant

covering positions.

In

the

case

of

Convoy PQ

17,

a

particular

threat

was

posed

by

the

German

battleship

Tirpitz.

It

seems

strange

that,

instead of

seeking

to

bring

that

enemy

to

action with our own

heavy

forces,

the Ad-

miralty's

actions

were

diametrically

the

opposite.

If

it

were decided

to avoid

risks of air

attack on

surface forces

by

limiting

their

move-

ment to

the

east,

this would

be

understandable,

if

contrary

to

the

best

traditions of

eliminating

the

surface

threat

in

battle.

In

any

case,

the

order to scatter

seems

wholly

inappropriate.

Such an

order was

surely

intended for

use

in

the broad

oceans

against

an

im-

mediate surface

threat,

and

not

in

an area

where

air

and

submarine

threats

were

equally

real and

dangerous

to

unescorted

merchant

ships.

To

withdraw

all

protection

seems

incomprehensible,

par-

ticularly

as this

was

the action of

a

distant

command

headquarters

bypassing

three

levels of

command: the

Commander-in-Chief,

Home Fleet, the Cruiser Force Commander, and the Escort Force

Commander.

What

these men

needed was

the

best

possible

infor-

mation

and

the

freedom

to

respond

to

the

circumstances with

which

they

were

confronted,

not

in

an

office,

but

on

the

bridge.

The

Board

Room in

the

Admiralty

building

has a

weather

gauge,

a

relic of

the

eighteenth

century.

Its

sole

purpose

was

to

remind

those

491


7/14

Journal


sitting

at the

table

that

it was

on

'storm-tossed

ships'

that

success

or failure

would

depend.

The disastrous

material

consequences

of

the

order to scatter

are recorded.

The losses which

might

have been

inflicted

by

the

Tirpitz

could

have been as

bad,

although

other

ex-

perience

does

not

support

such

a

proposition.

What is

unquestion-

ed

is the moral

impact

of the withdrawal

of the escort

forces.

Perhaps

the wounds

have healed

by

now,

but

the

damage

done to

relations

between

the

Royal

Navy

and the men

of its merchant

fleet,

and between

the

Royal Navy

and the United

States

Navy,

was

deep

and

lasting.

The

accepted

standard

was voiced

by

Admiral

Cunningham in his famous affirmation: 'It takes three years to

build

a

ship

but

three hundred

to build

a tradition'.

This

was

his

view

during

the

days

of

the evacuation

from

Greece,

the

defence

of

Crete,

and

finally

the evacuation

of

Imperial

forces from

the island

in the

spring

of

1941.

He declared:

'Whatever

the

risks,

whatever

our

losses,

the

remaining

ships

of the

fleet would

make an

all-out

effort

to

bring

away

the

army',

and

'We

cannot let

the

army

down'.'3

Stories

of

that

period

can

be a source

of

pride

for officers

and men of the Royal Navy following, as they do, upon the

catalogue

of

similar

experience

in

the

Norwegian

campaign,

at

Dunkirk

and

elsewhere

in France.

The

attitude

which

they

fostered

was

again

patronizing,

that

of a

competent

and

self-righteous

elder

brother

towards

his

junior

who

was

frequently

in some

sort

of

scrape,

and

had

to be

picked

up,

dusted

down

with

generous

affec-

tion and

sent

on

his

way.

They

held

a

sneaking

regard

for

the

soldiers'

courage

and

endurance

coupled

with

tolerance

for

his

un-

familiarity

with

shipboard

life,

and

readiness

to share such

com-

forts

as

there

were.

As

one

period

ended,

so

another

was

well

under

way.

Only

the

British

would

set

up

an

Expeditionary

Force

Head-

quarters

immediately

after

the

precipitate

withdrawal

from

a

disastrous

continental

venture.

This

headquarters

was

established

at

Largs

on

the

west

coast

of Scotland.

Commando

units

were

rais-

ed,

and

amphibious

training

started

not

only

for

commandos,

but

also

for

selected

formations

of

the

army proper.

It has been

said

that it was possible to identify units which had been trained in am-

phibious

operations

by

the fact

that

their

officers

and

men had

lost

their

child-like

faith

in the

Royal

Navy

The cause

of this loss

of

faith

was

the

natural

consequence

of

familiarity

with

ships,

boats

and

their

watery

environment,

and

also

the effect

of the

realization

that even

sailors

sometimes

make

mistakes

The

most

ordinary

492


8/14

Gueritz: Nelson's Blood

mistakes were

those of

navigation.

The aids to

navigation

in

small

craft were

primitive

and were

not

helped by

the close

proximity

to

compasses

of

steel

helmets

and other metal

objects.

The crews with

whom the

soldiers

trained were

themselves under

training.

The

system by

which

the officers

and men were channelled

into

Com-

bined

Operations

reflected

another unreformed attitude of the

pre-

war

navy.

This

was,

once

more,

a failure to

appreciate

the

true role

of

a

navy.

Viscount

Grey

of Fallodon

remarked that the

army

is

a

projectile

to be fired

by

the

navy.'4

It

seems, however,

that the

Royal Navy,

at

least,

neglected

to

carry

out battle

practice

with that

particular weapon stystem

Naval vessels

frequently

acted as

troop transports

in

emergency:

the

County

Class cruisers

were built with room

for

a battalion to be

carried for short

periods.'5

However,

little

money

was laid out for

the

development,

let alone the

production,

of the

specialized

vessels

needed for

modern

landing

operations.

It has been said that the

capture

of

Diego

Suarez

in

Madagascar

in

May

1942 was the first

successful British Combined

Operation

since

Quebec

in

1759. This

is probably unfair, but in most respects the provisions for landing

operations

in

1940 were little better than those

available

at

Aboukir

Bay

in

1801. Power boats

had

replaced

some

ship's

oared

boats,

but

many

of

the boats were less suitable

for

the

purpose

than

those

available to

Abercromby's

men. Even the

Royal

Marines

gave

visi-

ble

evidence

of

the low

priority

which was

accorded

to their

per

ter-

ram task. The

smartness

with

which the

Royal

Marines could adorn

a

ceremonial

occasion,

with blue

uniform,

white

helmets and

pipe-

clayed belts,

was

in

strange

contrast to their

appearance

when

land-

ing

for

field exercises. For

these their khaki

uniform,

obviously

dragged

from the bottom of

kitbags,

would

hardly

have done credit

to their

forebears

in

the trenches on the

Somme some

twenty years

before.

Nor were the

Royal

Marines

given

their

natural

place

as

the

first

units of the new

Special

Service

group. Army

Commandos

were

formed,

while

Royal

Marine

battalions

remained

brigaded

as

infantry

until 1942.

Thereafter,

Royal

Marines Commandos

were

formed,

and the

balance

of

the men

available

manned

landing

craft

flotillas and special support landing units. Thus the Royal Marines

joined, very

properly,

the

Royal Navy's

effort

to

project power

ashore.

The

manning

of the naval

components

of

Combined

Operations

can

be

summarized as

follows.

Some

enthusiastic and

experienced

yachtsmen,

pre-war

members of

the

Royal

Naval Volunteer

493


9/14

Journal


Reserve

(RNVR),

formed the

cadre

which

provided

leadership

and

skill. The bulk of the officers were appointed (selected would be

too

strong

a

word)

from the

mass

production

line of the

training

establishment,

HMS

King

Alfred.

Ratings

were

drafted from New

Entry

establishments

and

from the Patrol

Service,

which was based

on the

peacetime

fishing

fleet.

The

senior

element

was

generally

found

from retired

officers who were recalled to

service

and were

found

employment

in

the mushroom

growth

of

landing

craft bases.

The

organization

quickly

passed

from the

hands of a senior

Royal

Marines

officer,

General

Sir Alan

Bourne,

into

those of

Admiral of

the Fleet Sir

Roger

Keyes.

It was not a

happy

arrangement.

The

navy

was not

disposed

to

look

with

great

favour

upon

the

eccentric

activities

of what

promised

to be

a

most

irregular,

if

not

piratical,

crew.

Admiral

Keyes

was

not the

person

to oil wheels or

to

smooth

ruffled

feathers,

and some

of his

appointees

were worlds

apart

from the

modern

navy,

let alone

from its

brand-new

striking

force.

Some

officers

from the General

Service

of

the

Royal

Navy

volunteered

for

Special

Service,

and

were

appointed

to Combined

Operations. Many of these appointments were of comparatively

short duration.

The

Royal Navy's

appointing system

rolled

on

its

accustomed

way, presuming

with

complete

confidence

that

the war

was

only

a

break

in

the

ordered

pattern

of the

Royal Navy's

life.

Career

planning

must continue

without

thought

of the

possibility

that it

might

be as well

to hatch

defeat

of

the

Axis before

counting

the chickens

of

post-war

appointments

and

promotions.

It is

hardly

credible

that

an

experienced

senior

beachmaster,

recovering

from

wounds received

ashore

in

Normandy,

was

told:

'to

stop fooling

around

with

this Combined

Operations

business

and

get

down

to

some

regular

sailoring'.'6

At that

time,

the Walcheren

operation

had

not

yet

taken

place,

and

peace

in

Europe

was

eight

months

away.

The

war

against

Japan

was

at its

height

with

amphibious

operations

pending

in

South

East

Asia

and

continuing

in

the

Pacific.

In

spite

of

this,

career

planning

took

precedence

over

the

use

of

knowledge

and

experience.

This

same

spirit

motivated

the

Royal

Navy's

approach

to

temporary

promotions

and

the award

of

acting rank. Such benefits were dealt out lavishly among the ranks

of

RNVR

officers,

whose

temporarily

inflated

status

would

not

complicate

the

reversion

to

peacetime

promotion

patterns.

This

unruffled

confidence

in ultimate

victory

was not an

affectation,

but

sprang

from an

inborn

sense

of

invincibility.

Disasters

there

might

be,

setbacks,

reverses,

critical

struggles

for existence

but,

in the

494


10/14

Gueritz:

Nelson's Blood

end,

the

Empire

and

its navies

would

emerge

triumphant.

The

same

spirit was perceptible in operation orders which sent ships into

night

action

against

superior

forces

concluding

with the

injunction

that

'ships

are

to return

to

harbour at

0900'.

However such

confidence

may

be

described,

whether

as

op-

timism,

arrogance

or steadfast

faith,

it had

its

price-tag.

There is

the

difficulty

of

encompassing

the

possibility

of

innovation.

As

Field

Marshal

Kesselring

remarked in his memoirs:

'Since then

I

have

often observed

this

instinctive

rejection

of an innovation

that

has not

broken

down

prejudice.

It is remarkable

how

strongly

the

vis inertiae

is able

to exert

influence on

the best

intelligence."7

Be-

tween the wars

the

impact

of air

power

on

naval

strategy

and tactics

had

yet

to be

appreciated

fully

in

the

Royal

Navy.

It

is

true

that the

pusillanimous

attitude

adopted

towards

Italy

in 1935 stemmed

partly

from assessments

of the

vulnerability

to air attack

of the

British Mediterranean

Fleet.

However,

it seems that more

energy

and verbal ammunition

was

expended

in

Whitehall warfare

be-

tween

the

navy

and the

Royal

Air

Force than ever went

into the

provision of effective air defence of the fleet, although Admiral

Fisher declared

in

1936 that

great

strides had been

made.

Chatfield,

by

then

First Sea

Lord,

stated that:

'My personal

view trends

strongly

in

the direction that attack

of

ships

at sea

by

aircraft

will

be unremunerative

in a few

years."'

Although

the

battle

for the

control of the Fleet

Air Arm

involved so much bloodshed

in

Whitehall,

that

arm of the service

with

its carriers had not achieved

its

rightful

eminence

in

the

Royal Navy's thinking.

The

big gun

and

the battleship still held sway, but the distinguished naval writer,

Commander Russell

Grenfell,

ventured

to

suggest

in

1937: 'When

certain

warships

had become

so

large

and

expensive

that there is an

inevitable

tendency

to

keep

them

in

cotton

wool,

and when increas-

ing

numbers of other

warships

have to be devoted to their

protec-

tion

there

are,

perhaps, grounds

for

thinking

that these

particular

vessels have

outgrown

their usefulness.'"

At

about the same

time,

Admiral Yamamoto

in

Japan

was

recorded

as

saying:

These

ships

are like elaborate

religious

scrolls which old

people

hang

up

in

their

homes..

..

Military

people

always carry

history around with

them

in the

shape

of old

campaigns. They carry

obsolete

weapons

like swords and it is

a

long

time

before

they

have

become

purely

ornamental. These

battleships

will

be as useful

in

modern warfare as a Samurai ssword.2"

Both in

Japan

and

in

the United

States,

the

power

of the aircraft

495


11/14

Journal

of

Contemporary

History

carrier was

appreciated

to

greater

effect

than in

Britain,

notably

in

the

provision

of

up-to-date

aircraft for

the

embarked

squadrons.

The lack of direct naval

responsibility

for

procurement

is blamed

for the

poor

equipment

of

the Fleet

Air

Arm,

but what sacrifices

did

the

Royal

Navy

offer

to make in

those

days

of

penurious

budgets

for defence?

Later,

there was

a lack

of

industrial resources

to meet all rearmament

needs,

and time was

running

out

by

the

time the

navy regained

full control of the

Fleet

Air Arm in

1937.

Nor was the

personnel

problem straightforward.

By

transfers from

the

Royal

Air

Force,

promotions

from

the lower deck

and the use

of rating pilots, some progress was made in building up resources.

A

bigger

step

was the

introduction of

the Air Branch

Entry

by

which officers

were recruited

expressly

for

flying

duties.

They

were

distinguished

by

the

addition

of

the

letter

A in

the surl

of

their

rank

stripes,

and were

restricted

in the duties

expected

of

them.

Resources

were

increased

by

the creation of an

Air Branch

in the

RNVR.

Two threads

are

distinguishable

in

the

Royal

Navy's

attitudes

towards the new influence

on naval warfare.

The first is the

reluc-

tance to

recognize

that the

battleship

was

being supplanted

as

the

core of

a modern

fleet

by

the aircraft

carrier. This led

to some

mishandling

of

the

available

carriers

and

the

consequent

un-

necessary

and

tragic

losses.

For

example,

the

sinking

of

HMS

Courageous

was the

result of her

misemployment

in

anti-submarine

operations.

HMS

Glorious

was detached

from

the forces

operating

off

Norway

in

1940

to return

to

Scapa

Flow

in

readiness

for a

court-martial.

This

was

a

deplorable

reason

for

depriving

the Allied

forces of her

services,

and for

imperilling

a most valuable fleet unit.

She

was sunk

by

the battle-cruisers

Scharnhorst

and

Gneisnau

while on

passage.2'

The

employment

of

a

balanced

force

with a full

range

of

air and

surface elements

came

to be

accepted

in

1940,

almost

unconscious-

ly,

with

the

operations

of Force

H

based

on Gibraltar.

This

force,

presumably

inheriting

its

designation

from

one

of

the

lettered

hun-

ting

groups

of

the 1939

period,

was

an

exemplar

of the

well-

practised co-operative action which became commonplace in

carrier

task

groups

in the

Pacific

war and

thereafter.

It

is

in-

teresting

to

reflect

on the

fact

that the

commander

of

this successful

pioneering

venture,

Vice-Admiral

Sir James

Somerville,

had,

in

fact,

been

invalided

from the

service before

the

war. He

might

well

have adhered

to conservative

opinions,

but

he

was,

on the

contrary,

496


12/14

Gueritz:

Nelson's Blood

a most

lively personality

with

a

great

gift

of

leadership.

This

stood

him in

good

stead when he

personally dragged

the

men of

the

Eastern Fleet out

of

a

slough

of

low morale

in

the summer

of

1942.

The

gift

of

appeal

to

all

ranks and

specializations

was a

key

factor

in a

navy

whose

main

striking power

was

increasingly

dependent

upon

the skill and

courage

of

young

men,

many

of whom

had

no

real naval

background.

The carrier aircrews were

irked

by

tradi-

tional

routines and

ceremonial,

disciplined

in

their own

profession,

but

unimpressed

by

the

rigid

attitudes

and conventions of the 'Fish-

heads'

(seamen

officers)

who ran their

floating

airfields. Needless

to say, the Fish-heads were scandalized by the demoralizing

behaviour of

some

of the aircrew

in

the

squadrons

which

embark-

ed. To an

extent,

specializations

and

sub-specializations

within a

service

need their

special

ethos,

some

feeling

of

elitist

separation.

This

must

apply particularly

to airmen

and

submariners,

who need

an extra

element

of

self-discipline

and

professional

responsibility.

The

dilution

in

the aircrew ranks

increased

inevitably

with

heavy

casualties and

great

expansion

of

the

air

arm. With the

dilution,

the

separation between the 'establishment' of the regular navy and its

wartime reinforcements increased.

Long-service

officers and

ratings

were

called 'the caretakers'

by

their

'hostilities-only' ship-

mates,

and this term was not confined to

any particular

branch

of

the service. The

second

thread in

the

Royal Navy's

attitudes

related, therefore,

to the

difficulty

of

moulding

the

strength

of

tradition and

customary

discipline

with

the vital force of en-

thusiasm

and new

skills,

the delicate

balance

between

stifling

orthodoxy

and

ineffective amateurism. Problems

could,

and

did,

occur

in

any

ship

or

force,

but

in

carriers,

living

conditions

brought

everyone

into close

propinquity

and,

at the

same

time,

the

flying

task set the

aircrew

apart

from

their

messmates. With

good

leader-

ship

at

many

levels a fine

rapport

could

be achieved. The

results

of

carrier

co-operation

were a

source of

pride

and

self-perpetuating

ef-

ficiency

of

operations.

In

landing

craft

bases and

assault

forces,

great

care

had

to be

exercised.

Living

and

working

conditions

were

often

rough

and

ready,

basic

training

had been

sketchy,

and the

leavening of RN officers and ratings was lightly sprinkled. For the

Normandy

invasion a

larger

framework of

organization

was

ap-

plied

to

direct the

training,

to

oversee and

execute

administration,

and to

fit

squadrons

and

flotillas

into

the

great pattern

of the

assault

and

build-up.

These

squadrons

and

flotillas were

a vital

weapon

in

the

armoury

of

Allied

sea

power.

Their

crews

and the

497


13/14

Journal


associated beach

parties

were

very largely

RNVR

and

hostilities-

only

officers

and

ratings.

It

would have been

easy

for

them to have

degenerated

into an

ill-kempt

and

incompetent

rabble

without

sym-

pathetic support

and

guidance

from those with more

experience

and

training.

Lord Nelson would have

delighted

in

the

offensive action which

landing

craft crews achieved. He would

have

revelled

in

the dash

and

courage

of Fleet

Air Arm

crews and would

certainly

have en-

joyed

their

respect.

His

humanity

would have

recognized

and en-

couraged

the enthusiasm

of reservists

of

all kinds. He would have

commended the fighting spirit of Cunningham and the sacrifice

made

by

his band

of brothers

off Greece and Crete. He

would have

turned a deaf ear

to the

interference

of the

Admiralty.

He

might

not have seen

plainly

that the defence

of

shipping

and the

projec-

tion of

power

ashore

are

truly

naval

roles,

not distractions from the

pursuit

of the fleet action.

As to how he himself

might

have

per-

formed as a

Whitehall

warrior,

Lord Nelson's encounter

with the

Duke of

Wellington

in

Whitehall one month before

the Battle

of

Trafalgar was hardly promising

Notes

1. Nelson's

body

was

transported

to

England

after

Trafalgar

in

a cask

of

brandy

(not

rum).

2. Richard

Hough,

Admirals

in Collision

(l1ondon

1959).

3.

Admiral

Fisher

died

suddenly

in

1937

while

serving

as

Commander-in-(hief

Portsmouth.

4. Rear-Admiral

Royer

Dick,

who

was

Chief

of Staff to

Sir

Andrew

Cun-

ningham,

has

told the

writer that at

the Battle

of

Matapan

he remarked

that Chat-

field's

emphasis

on

night fighting

was

being

rewarded.

5. The

word 'boat'

was

formerly

used

colloquially

to describe

passenger

ships,

thus: 'P&O

boat'.

It was a solecism

to

apply

the

term to

warships

but,

confusingly,

jargon

in the

Royal Navy

used

'boats'

for submarines

and

collectively

for

destroyers,

thus 'I served in the Boats

up

the Straits (of Gibraltar)'.

6.

Captain

O'Conor was

killed

while

commanding

HMS

Neptune

in

1941.

His

main

published

work was

Running

a

Ship

on

Ten

Coniiiiandmnents.

7.

Special

Entry

cadets

joined

from their

secondary

schools

by

competitive

ex-

amination

from

171/2-18

years

of

age.

8.

Those

two

regrettable

affairs are

magisterially

examined

by

Captain

Roskill

in Churchill

and

the Admirals

(London

1977), chapter

II.

498


14/14

Gueritz:

Nelson's Blood

9. The

quotation originated

from Voltaire's Candide and relates to the

execu-

tion of Admiral The Hon. Sir John

Byng

in

1757.

10. Captain S.W.C. Pack, RN, Cunningham (Iondon 1974), 126.

11.

Roskill,

op.

cit.,

Appendix.

12.

For

example,

Dr

Hugh

L'Etang,

The

Pathology

of

Leadership

and

Fit

to

Lead?

13.

Pack,

op.

cit.,

177.

14.

Viscount

Grey

of

Fallodon,

Fisher

Memoirs.

15.

The writer travelled in

a

County

Class

cruiser

carrying

500 survivors and 200

prisoners

in

addition to

her

complement.

16.

Words

spoken

to

the writer

in

September

1944.

17.

Kesse ring,

Memoirs

(Iondon 1953),

17.

18. (. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy (London 1979), 152.

19.

Russell

Grenfell,

The

Art

of

the

Admiral,

244.

20. John

Deane

Potter,

Admiral

of

the

Pacific

-

The

Life

of

Yalmamoto

Ion-

don

1965),

30.

21.

Till,

op.

cit.,

176.

Rear-Admiral Gueritz

is Director

and

Editor-in-Chief of the

Royal

United

Services Institute for

Defence Studies.

He is

also President of

the

Society

for

Nautical

Research and

sets naval

questions

for

the tele-

vision

series,

Mastermind.

499

Documents

Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions