NCO ‘app’ for iPhone a possibility

8/8/2019 NCO app for iPhone a possibility

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NCO app for iPhone a possibility

PaulMitchell, author of the book Network Centric Warfare and coalition

operations: The new military operating system, speaks to Defence IQ

Editor Bryan Camoens on the importance of Network Centric Operations tomilitaries.

Paul also discusses the evolution in technology along with Network Centric Operations as

well as the future of Network Centric Operations.

Bryan Camoens:

Ever since the inception of Network Centric Warfare in 1996 how has the sector

evolved and what should militaries be doing to enhance their NCW operations?

Paul Mitchell:

With this in mind, the most interesting development I am seeing at the present time is theslow death of efforts to crack the multi-level security problem in coalition networks.While there are clear technological solutions to create MLS on shared networks, the

principal issues creating problems are found in terms of organisational and international

politics.

The key issue is the problem of trust, which is a social problem, rather than a technical

one. If you dont trust an individual or organisation, the presence of secure network

architecture will not prompt you to begin sharing critical information (think of thewillingness of the US to share its Blue Force Tracker data with, say Pakistan for

example).

Trust is a condition of dependency between two or more entities. Dependencies create

vulnerabilities, and in those relationships, the level of vulnerability or dependency is

rarely shared equally. In other words, when I trust another, I open myself up to havingthat second party damage me if they so choose to. MLS can never remove this essential

condition. As nations, save in rare occasions, (the ABCA relationship seems virtually

unique in this respect) manage these trust relationships in bilateral contexts, rather than

multilateral ones, it seems inevitable that MLS will slowly disappear.

This may seem like a minor observation, many of your questions are framed within a

information age context. IT was supposed to open up the flow of information and freeinquiry. However, in terms of military operations, nations have been jealous of freeing

up the pipelines for the flow of information. In this regard, military networks have been

highly territorial, going against much of the speculation concerning the social andpolitical meaning behind these technical developments. NCW, in an international sense,

will never replicate the experience of the World Wide Web because of the distorting

impact of politics and its fundamental relationship with the problem of trust.


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Bryan Camoens:

Technology is an ever evolving sector with new technologies making some obsolete

in an instant, what are some of the newer forms of technologies that you are seeing

being adopted in current NCW operations?

Paul Mitchell:

The technology to watch are the application of 4G cell phones (and data pad technology)in the operational environment. In the recent humanitarian operations in Haiti, the only

interoperable communication system on which JIMP partners could collaborate was

RIMs Blackberry cell phone. The US military is beginning to experiment with both theiPhone and Android enabled devices, and military apps for both are beginning to

appear. These systems bring significant security issues with them. Blackberry was so

successful precisely because it was a humanitarian and disaster relief environment and

the decision to go unclassified was easily made as the repercussions were negligible.While 4G phone systems can be used in a warfighting/stabilisation environment, the risks

of doing so are higher, and the ease with which this technology can be used to facilitatecombined operations will be less.

What is particularly interesting of this shift is the increasing shift to COTS technologies.

Throughout the twentieth century, militaries largely developed their own communicationsystems, and the US military in particular was the source for much of the technological

development in ICTs.

Both the networks we use and many of the enterprise applications we use on thememerged from military research and development (the Internet evolving from the

ARPAnet and the SABRE travel reservation system evolving from the SAGE air defence

system being prime examples). However, militaries everywhere today are increasinglyreliant (and for many, totally reliant) on commercial systems. Whether these systems can

be trusted to the same degree as military systems is debateable. Whether the bandwidth

in austere locations will support these types of systems is also questionable.

Bryan Camoens:

In this information age, why is network centric warfare a non-negotiable option for

militaries?

Paul Mitchell:

First, it assumes that what is taking place is the development of a new age in the senseof the industrial age or whatever. Second, it also assumes that all militaries will need

to implement networked technologies.

We need to understand that ages are social constructs that we apply to specific

historical periods. For most of these, they were applied ex post facto by those studying

those times. In recent times, we have attempted to anticipate these ages and jump thehistorical gun somewhat. Remember, in the 1950s we thought we were going through a

nuclear age, a concept that did not survive the operational and tactical irrelevance of


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nuclear weapons, or the risks of employing that technology for the generation of power.

Few today discuss the relevance of nuclear power to the future evolution of humansociety today. Clearly information is a more ubiquitous phenomenon than nuclear

technology, but my point in raising this example is the need to be cautious about how

particular things will affect the future. Information technologies could be rejected in the

future for any number of reasons.

Still, it is reasonable to assume that in the near term and potentially the long term,information technologies will continue their disruptive effects on society and thus they

will have consequences for military operations. Do all states require networks akin to

those being developed by the US? This is, in my opinion, an unsustainable position.Recall that US networks were developed first in response to the conventional challenges

posed by the Soviet Union on the European Central Front, second in response to the

growing operational costs of modern operations, and last in response to the global nature

of American military operations. For militaries engaged in combined expeditionaryoperations, networking technology will be increasingly non-negotiable, simply in order to

interoperate with their partners (and the US in particular).

For others, however, it is not clear that such investments will deliver the same advantages

as are being experienced by large militaries. In small militaries, keeping pace with

rapidly evolving technology will be organizationally difficult. The number of personneltechnically literate enough to keep pace with technology will be small, and often poorly

placed in the command structure. Networking may lack an organizational champion to

properly shepherd its development over the long term. Some cultures will have difficulty

adapting to the openness of digital technology.

The technology permits both highly decentralized mission order environments as well as

highly centralized command directive ones. The operational freedom envisaged by NCWmay not be realized in many militaries, lacking the requisite social permissions for how

this technology should be employed. Recall that even the US is having real difficulties in

employing blogs and utilizing social media. Finally, all of these technologies areincredibly expensive and many militaries are having difficulty in affording the

replacement simply of legacy equipment.

If an information age is taking place, then its results are likely unforeseeable. Asmilitary institutions are situated in a very specific historical context, anything that

disrupts that context will change the look and employment of military forces. 19th

century militaries, the culmination of industrial developments of the previous 300 years,look nothing like the armies of the medieval period (agricultural age forces). So too it

will be our militaries of the present compared with what may result with any putative

information age.

Bryan Camoens:

How do you see network centric operations evolving over the next decade, by the

year 2020?


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Paul Mitchell:

It is difficult for me to determine what the future looks like in terms of networkingtechnology. In terms of our ability to interoperate between different militaries, some

more consolidation is likely amongst ABCA nations, and possibly even amongst some

NATO forces. However, it is very likely that we have reached the high tide of this effort,

barring some cataclysmic strategic event which unifies the interests of states in a moreconcrete fashion than at present.

It also seems likely that additional levels of transparency is unlikely to be achieved, in

contrast to the predictions of NCW from the 1990s. In certain environments (the air

environment in particular), high levels of transparency will be possible because of theaustere nature of that domain. The complexity of land environments ensures, however,

that the general situational awareness that we already have achieved will be unlikely to

dramatically improve from here.

While spectacular successes have been achieved in some endeavours (such as the

network based investigation and attacks that reduced the impact of IEDs in Iraq), thelarge scale social problems which are creating the contemporary security problems ourmilitaries are largely dealing with in failed and failing states will resist easy

characterization that will enable them to be translated into a usable digital tool. Fog and

friction will remain important parts of the battlespace.

Last, while non-state actors are able to utilize networks far more effectively than

militaries in general, it is difficult to imagine formed militaries either disappearing or

evolving into Al Qaeda like entities. Much as states have evolved to meet changingstrategic and social issues, it is likely we will see continued adaptation and innovation

within military formations. I do not anticipate that our militaries will work with flattened

or absent hierarchies. Mass and concentration will continue to play important roles inmilitary operations, and attrition will always be the yin to manouevres yang.

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NCO ‘app’ for iPhone a possibility