NBC Report: Joint Nuclear Operations and Targeting Course

U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency Spring - Summer 1998

Vol. TI, No. 2

Nuclear Effects Officer Un~ted States Strateg~c Command Offuti AFB

Omaha. NEu United States

M~litary Academy

2 4 7 Our Vision Army Reactor Office Advanced Civil Schooling Dr: Charles N. Davidson The Second Year Opportunities for Nuclear

Major Brent B. Bredehoft Research and Operations Officers LTC Robert R. Beimler

' 9 12 14 Offensive Nuclear Warfare Joint Pub 3-12.2 Nuclear U.S. NBC Input to NATO LTC James H. Cockle Weapons Employment Effects Data Major ~arnes M . Demyanovich

Dr. David W Bash

17 19 Nuclear and NBC Contamination Joint Nuclear Operations Survivability of Army Equipment and Targeting Course Captain Richard A. Schueneman LTC James H. Cockle

ALSO Surety Update

Letters to the Editor We appreciate comments and suggestions concerning the contents and appearance of the NBC Report as well as observations related to NBC matters. We reserve the right to edit all letters and make final determination on publication. Letters should include your name, organization, address, and telephone number.

Article Submission We welcome articles from all DoD personnel involved with NBC matters. All articles are reviewed and must be approved by the NBC Report Editorial Board prior to publication. We accept articles in many forms -fax, ASCII E-mail, typed copy, etc., but are delighted to receive PC/ Macintosh diskettes with MS Word or Wordperfect articles and CorelDraw (*.CDR), Adobe Illustrator (*.Al), Adobe Photoshop (*.PSD), Windows Metafile (*.wm9, TIFF or JPEG graphics.

Distribution Distribution is to U.S. Army organizations and activities with NBC related missions, to include all combat and materiel developers and all units with chemical and nuclear surety programs, and to each officer assigned FA 52.

Published by the United States Army

Nuclear and Chemical Agency

Director Dr. Charles N. Davidson

NBC REPORT Managing Editor

LTC James H. Cockle

Editorial Board

Eduardo D. Soliven Chemical Division

CPT Richard A. Schueneman Nuclear Division

LTC James H. Cockle Operations Division

LTC Robert R. Beimler FA 52 Proponent Officer

Art Director John Kerpchar

Mailing Address DIRECTOR

US. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency ATTN: ATNA-OP

71 50 Heller Loop, Suite 101 Springfield, VA 22150-31 98

Message Address DIRUSANCA FT BELVOIR VA/ATNA-OP/

Telephone Commercial

(703) 806-7855 DSN

656-7855 STU Ill

(703) 806-6500 DSN 656-6500

Facsimile (703) 806-7900 EMAlL Address

[email protected]

The U.S Army Nuclear and Chem~cal Agency (USANCA) publishes

the NBC Report on a semi-annual basis underthe provisions of AR

25-30. Its purpose is to dissem~nate NBC information within the

USANCA scope of operations to soldiers and DA civilians Theviews

and opinlons expressed in the NBC Report are not necessarily those

of the Department of the Army or HQ, TRADOC.

NBC Report - Spring/Summer 1998 1

Our Vision DR. CHARLES N. DAVIDSON

DIRECTOR UNlTED STATES ARMY NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AGENCY

elcome to the first issue of "NBC Report" since the U.S. Army

Nuclear and Chemical Agency be- came a TRADOC organization! On 1 October 1 99 7, USANCA transferred from the Army Staff to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- mand as part of the redesign and downsizing of Headquarters Depart- ment of theArmy. In our new exist- ence, we report directly to the Deputy Commanding General at TRADOC Headquarters, LTG John N. Abrams. The transition has been relatively seamless, in no small part because both HQ TRADOC and USANCA worked very hard to make it so.

Our mission and physical loca- tion are unchanged, but we have a new vision to go with our new status. We strive to:

Achieve and maintain a dynamic and relevant organization with a core ofcritical nuclear and chenical expertise that can:

Enhance Force XXI sun/ivability in NBC environments. Understand and communicate the impact of nuclear and other weapons of mass de- stnlction on military operations. Enhance interoperability of coalition forces in NBC environments. Maintain the Army's capability to plan the employment of nuclear weapons. Ensure safe and secure storage and demilitarization of the DoD chemical weapon stockpile. Ensure safe and secure operation andmain- tenance of Army nuclearreactors, active or deactivated. Access, develop and manage quality ofic- ers with nuclear expertise.

Let's take a closer look at what we're doing to achieve each of these objectives.

Enhance Force XXI Survivabilrty in NBC Environments.

We consider it our mandate to enhance the survivability of every soldier on the battlefield of the 21st century. To tlis end, managing the Army's nuclear and NBC contarni- nation survivability programs is paramount. Using methodologies we have developed, and that are now contained in internationally approved documents, USANCA issues criteria for nuclear (to include high- altitude electromagnetic pulse) and NRC contamination survivability for all Army mission critical systems. USANCA also adnillisters the waiver process for these criteria when cir- cumstcances dictate. We have vali- dated cost data that prove that achieving this survivability is afford- able, even for commercial-off-the-

shelf equipment. TRADOC Head- qu'arters has recently put procedures in place to ensure USANCA gets a fi- n d look at all drcaft materiel requirements documents prior to their approval. This is a particularly good example of our new partnership with TRADOC. Captain Rich Schueneman details the nuclear 'and NBC contamination survivability process in this issue on page 17.

Understand and Communicate the Impact of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on Military Operations.

Computer modeling can predict weapons effects. Results enable planners to employ weapons effectively, assess vulnerabilities accurately, determine required equipment survivability, manage consequences of ter- rorist use of improvised weapons of mass destruction, and provide maxi- mum safety with minimum resources expended. USANCA provides tlis modeling support to Army 'and other DoD planners with its custom- ized suite of targeting, survivability, and downwind hazard prediction models. To feed these models, USANCA maintains approved nuclear and chemical effects data- bases, and documents Anny requirements for additional effects data where needed.

Enhance lnteroperability of Coali- tion Forces in NBC Environments.

U.S. forces are routinely deployed with international coalition forces where interoperability and standardization are keys to success. USANCA provides the DoD action agent and principal U.S. representative to sev-

2 NBC Report - Spring/Summer 1998

eral NATO groups responsible for standardizing NBC equipment, procedures, and operations. The products of these groups are currently being used in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Want more details? Check out Major Jirn Demyanovich's article on NBC in NATO, beginning on page 14 in this issue. By the way, USANCA also chairs the American- British-Canadian-Australian (Quad-ripartite) Worlung Group on NBC De- fense, which helps to ensure consis- tency in U.S. positions taken in the two international forums.

Maintain the Army's Capability to Plan the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.

The Army plays a vital role in nuclear weapons planning at theater level. USANCA writes Joint Publica- tion 3-12.2, Nuclear Weapons Em- ployment Effects Data. This is the standard joint doctrinal methodology for analyzing the effects of nuclear weapon use by friendly forces. USANCA also prepares a version of this publication for NATO use. Fully trained in Joint Publication 3-12.2 analytical techniques, USANCA's Nuclear Employment Augmentation Teams (NEAT) are prepared to deploy worldwide, providing nuclear target analysis skills to senior Army warfighting commanders. Working with the Defense Special Weapons Agency, USANCA spearheaded initiatives to automate Joint Publications 3-12.2 and to establish the Joint Nuclear Operations and Targeting Course (JNOTC) for teaching its use. This issue of "NBC Report" showcases three articles in this area. One by Lieutenant Colonel Jirn Cockle on page 9 reminds us of the Army's current role in the nuclear weapons employment business. Another by Dr. Dave Bash on page 12 describes the nuclear weapons employment Joint Pubs that USANCA writes. A third on page 19 (again by Jim Cockle) highlights the brand new

training course in the use of these publications.

Ensure Safe and Secure Storage and Demilitarization of the DoD Chemical Weapon Stockpile.

U.S. efforts to eliminate its chemical stockpile have spawned new challenges for the Army. USANCA provides DoD chemical organizations with advice and assistance in meeting safety, security, and surety requirements. Additionally, we provide technical advice and assistance on chemical and radiological accident and incident responses to the Joint Staff, the Army Staff and Army organizations with a nuclear or chemical accidenthncident response and assistance mission. Ex-pert personnel are on a "round-the- clock" immediate recall to augment the Army Operations Center (AOC) and the NMCC's Joint Nuclear Acci- dent and Incident Response Team during actual radiological accidents or incidents and exercises. USANCA authors DA Pam 50-6, Chemical Ac- cident and Incident Response and Assistance Operations, and drafts the Army Regulations for the DA Staff on nuclear and chemical surety. In this issue's Surety Update on page 22, Colonel Harry Sawyer cites several of our ongoing activities in this critical area.

Ensure Safe and Secure Opera- tion and Maintenance of Army Nuclear Reactors, Active or Deac- tivated.

USANCA is home to the Army Reactor Office (ARO). The ARO pro-vides oversight management for, and technical expertise to, the Depart- ment of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on all Army reactor issues. Drawing from strict federal guidelines, the ARO is-sues facility permits and operator li- censes for the Army's two remaining operational reactors. It also issues possession permits for deacti-

vated, but not yet decommissioned, Army reactors. Annual oversight inspections and regular visits to these reactors ensure regulatory compli- ance for safe and secure operations and/or maintenance. Through dedi- cated professionals, the Army Reac- tor Office places a premium on main- taining the integrity of all Army reactors. Major Brent Bredehoft brings us up-to-date in his page 4 article on the Army Reactor Program.

Access, Develop and Manage Quality Officers Wih Nuclear Ex-pertise.

We have the additional responsibility of being the personnel proponent for all Army officers designated Fundional Area 52 (FA52), Nuclear Research and Operations. Through our full-time FA52 Propo- nent Manager, we oversee the personnel life cycle management of the Army's nuclear research and operations officers. USANCA is also responsible for the development and execution of the Nuclear Research and Operations Officer Course (NROOC), conducted annually at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Kirtland AFB, NM. Through close and continuous coordination with the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, we are able to provide quality Army officers to serve in nuclear-related positions in the Army, Joint Staff, De- fense agencies, and the Department of Energy. We believe we've always had a hands-on, personalized phi- losophy in managing FA52 officers, but the advent of OPMS XXI puts a real premium on this.As an example, Lieutenant Colonel Rob Beimler details advanced civilschooling opportunities for FA52 officers in his in- sightful article on page 7 of this issue.

If you have any questions about our new vision or what we're doing to realize it, give us a call or drop us a line. We'd like to hear from you.


ARMY REACTOR OFFICE THE SECOND YEAR

Major Brent B. BredehofC, FA Assistant Manager, Army R~actor Program

he Army Reactor Office stood up during thc fall of 1996 under the provi-

sions of AR 50-7, and in response to findings from a Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) evaluation. This article will detail the history of the Army's i~~volvement in nuclear power, what is going on today, and what the future holds.

Background In the early 19501s, an effort

began within the Army to develop non-weapon uses of nuclear energy. MG Kenneth D. Nichols was appointed as Chief of the newly formed Office of Re- search and Development and the Army began to develop the tech-

nology for power production using nuclear energy. The Atomic Energy Commission formed the Army Reactors Branch in support of the Corps of Engineers Nuclear Power Division in an effort to dc- velop viable nuclear power plants for the U, S. military. The program quickly developed plans for a prototype reactor at Fort Relvoir, Virginia, and funding was approved in 1954. The prototype specifications included the potential for air transportability and a design that would permit the completion of construction within a three-year period.

This prototype was the Army's first operating reactor, the Army Package Power Reactor,

consisting of a pressurized water reactor with a design thermal power of ten megawatts. The rcactor was built at Fort Relvoir and was later renamed the SM-1 (Stationary Medium Power-1 ). An operator training program was organized to provide a sup- ply of qualified reactor operators for the power plants operating in the field. Personnel from a11 three Services were selected to provide the o~erating crews, and training was also performed at Fort Belvoir. After a short 18-month construction period, the SM-1 began producing nuclear power on April 8, 195 7, and began producing electricity three weeks later. It was the first nuclear

ML-l Mobile Nuclear Power Plant


power plant in the United States to provide electrical power to a commercial electric grid and was used to train approximately 800 reactor operations personnel during its 16-year life.

From the late-1950's to the mid-19 i'O1s, the reactor program included:

Two stationarypower reactors at Fort Belvoil; VA and Fort Greely, Alaska. A barge-mounted power reactor that provided electricity to the Panama Canal Zone. A portable-power reactor in Green- land. A prototype mobile, truck-mounted reactor that underwent testing in Idaho. Two prototype reactors to investigate reactor designs both built and tested in Idaho. Five research reactors to investigate radiological effects, in a number of stateside locations. Currently, two fast-burst test

reactors remain in operation at Aberdeen Proving Ground and White Sands Missile Range. These are primarily used for nuclear weapon and radiation effects testing.

Call For Action In 1993, the DAIG conducted

a Nuclear Management Evalua- tion (NME) of the Army's Nuclear Reactor Program. The program at that time was mainly under the management of the Depart- ment of the Army Safety (DASAF) as formalized in AR 385-80 (1984). The 1993 NME was prompted by recurring deficien- cies found during routine inspections. Mainly, there was not a comprehensive program, and DASAF didn't have any organic nuclear engineering expertise. DASAF mainly depended on con- tractors for technical input. The NME reported four major find-

ings: First the Department of De- fense (DoD) was not in full com- pliance with the Presidential De- cision Directive (PDD) of 23 Sep 61. Subsequently, it was found that the referenced PDD was never signed and the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as revised, were the authority for the Army's reactors.

Second, there was not an Army Staff proponent directly responsible for management of the Army Reactor Program. Sub- sequently, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) assumed proponency for the Army Reactor Program and, in August 1996, published AR 50-7, Army Reactor Pro- gram, establishing the policies, responsibilities, and procedures for its implementation. DCSOPS appointed the United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) as the focal point for management of the Army Reac- tor Program. USANCA established the Army Reactor Office with a GS-15 as the Reactor Pro- gram Manager and a Major as the assistant manager, responsible for management of the Army Reactor Program.

Third, the Army lacked overall management of its radiation safety program. As a result, DA formed an Army Staff working group to resolve the Radiation Safety Program issues. This working group revised the occu- pational radiation protection program and the nuclear reactor health and safety program. A final draft regulation, AR 11-XX, that consolidates and updates the numerous publications previously used to stipulate the Army Radiation Protection Program is currently being staffed. Army Safety has created a Director of Army Radiation Safety to provide safety overview.

Fourth, past decisions on the decommissioned reactors required review in light of current standards. Current standards and regulations are generally more restrictive than those in ef- fect when the Army was decom- missioning its reactors. The United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) has designated its Cen- ter for Public Works (CECPW) to manage the deactivated reactors and look at the status of the reactors in light of the current regulations. DCSOPS then tasked

MH-1A Barge-Mounted Nuclear Power Plant


the ARO to provide a cost-ben- efit analysis to decide the best course of action to ensure responsible treatment and final disposition of the deactivated reactors.

The Army Reactor Office As mentioned, the DCSOPS

appointed USANCA as the focal point for management of the Army Reactor Program and home for the Army Reactor Office (ARO). Mr. Tim DeBey was the first program manager, serving from September 1995, one year in advance of the effective date of AR 50-7, until April 1997. Dur- ing his tenure, Mr. DeBey visited seven reactor sites, researched and determined the Army's continuing responsibilities for the past and current reactors, and prepared temporary reactor permits for five sites. Additionally, Mr. DeBey implemented a comprehensive testing program lead- ing to certification of all operators as part of the overall reactor permit process. The ARO is now managed by Mr. Brendan Burns with MAJ Brent Bredehoft the Assistant Program Manager. They continue to monitor the status of the operational fast-burst reactors and the deactivated power and research reactors. They are specifically involved in the decisions concerning monitoring, disposition, and additional cleanup of the deactivated reactors, and reviewing safety analyses and applications from the two fast-burst reactors for extended operating permits.

The Army Reactor Council AR 50-7, Army Reactor Pro-

gram, also requires that an ad hoc council, the Army Reactor Coun- cil (ARC), be formed to provide overall executive oversight of the Army Reactor Program. Council members include personnel from ODCSOPS, DA Safety, USANCA, Corps of Engineers, the Surgeon

General, Army Matcricl Corn- supporting documentation is ap- ~nand , and Tcst and Evaluation proved, reactor pcrmits will be Command. This council rnccts as reissued with additiord spccifi- required but at least semiannu- cations as determined from the ally, and provides a formal review process. The objective of mcchanisin to assure and docu- all this effort is for a HQDA-level ment to the DCSOPS and DA reactor proponent with an active Safety the safety and status of the program to apply current na-Army Reactor Progran~. Thc tional standards, improve over- council conducted its first annual sight, and rcsolve concerns at all operational revicw of the Abcr- Army nuclear reactor facilities. deen Proving Ground and White The Army Reactor Office a t Sands Missile Range reactors in USANCA is working to do just May 1997 and its second in April that. 1998. These comprehensive re-views looked at conlpliance and adequacy of the reactor operations and found the reactors to be reliably and safely operated, maintained, and secured.

Current Status There are currcntly three

shutdown power reactors and one research reactor in storage for long-term radioactive decay, two fast-burst reactors in operation, and the remaining facilities either dismantled and cleaned up or the responsibility of a government agency other than the Army. The three power reactors in storage are the SM-1 at Fort Belvoir, the SM-1A at Fort Greely, and the MH-1A at the James River Re- serve Fleet. The research reactor is the old Diamond Ordnance Ra- diation Facility in Maryland. These facilities had initial defueling and cleanup operations performed at the time of their shutdowns. Final cleanup will be required before the shutdown reactor sites can be turned over for unrestricted use.

Future Activities The first year and a half of

operation under AR 50-7 has resulted in an ongoing, extensive review of all Army reactors to ensure they are being maintained, secured, and operated in a manner that is compatible with current national standards. As the


Advanced Civil Schooling Opportunities for Nuclear Research and Operations Officers

LTC Robert R. Beimler, FA Functional Area 52 Proponent Manager

he most commonly asked questions by officers newly assessed

into Functional Area 52 (FA52), Nuclear Research and Opera- tions, are "What are my opportunities to attend Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS)?," and "For what positions in FA52 does ACS qualify me?"

The Army regulation that governs ACS is AR 62 1-1, Train- ing of Military Personnel at Ci- vilian Institutions. Included in this regulation is a general overview of the ACS program, specific information on the fully- funded officer education programs, and, most importantly, a copy of DA Form 16 18-R (Ap- plication for Detail as Student Officer at a Civilian Educational Institution).

Officers attending ACS normally begin their education be- tween their 6th and 13th years of service, and in no case will selectees exceed a total of 17 years Active Federal Service prior to starting. In practice, the window of opportunity for officers to apply for and attend ACS is bounded by basic branch qualification as a Captain (normally successful company-level command) and a period of approximately 24 months following designation into the Institu- tional Support Career Field by the Career Field Designation Board (CFDB) . The implementation of OPMS XXI has ex-panded the window of opportunity for attendance at Com- mand and General Staff College and will ensure that officers

-

have sufficient time for promo- tion to LTC in the Institutional Support Career Field.

Attending Advanced Civil Schooling prior to Career Field designation under OPMS XXI does not necessarily prohibit an officer from selecting the factors the CFDB will be asked to consider. The officer's total file, the officer's preference, and the needs of the Army will also be considered. Officers with advanced de- grees in the Operational Career Field will have the opportunity to switch to the Institutional Sup- port Career Field at a later date under limited circumstances.

One of the purposes of ACS is to educate selected officers on a full-time basis to an advanced- degree level to meet needs vali- dated by the Army Educational

The academic disciplines that support FA52 ACS training are:

CFB - Physics (Space) CLA - Nuclear Effects Engineering

CU/CLF - Nuclear Engineering

CSX - Engineering Physics

DCK - Radiation Biology

DGX - Geophysics

DLC - Health Physics

DLD - Nuclear Physics

DLE - Physics (Optics)

DLX - Applied Physics

NSAINSB - National Security Affairs (Nuclear)

The academic institutions

-- that support FA52 training include:

Air Force lnstitute of Technology Dayton, OH

Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA

Rensselaer Polytechnic lnstitute Troy, NY

Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology Cambridge, MA

Texas A & M University College Station, TX

Any other school offering a masters of science (M.S.) in the above listed disciplines.

NBC Report - Spring/Summer 1998

Requirements System (AERS). good prior planning and success constant mollitoring by the ap- Using FY95 data, 62 of the 102 in your basic branch. 111 addi- plicant. ~ u t ,the rewards and authorized FA52 positions are tion to the academic prercclui- in becoming profes- supported by the AERS. Current sites, an officer must demon- sioIlally developed in your func- positions in the AERS that sup- strate future service potelltial as tiollal area are well worth the port ACS in FA52 at the entry deternlincd by his basic branch. effort. level include those shown in the This is why the first step of the figure below. ACS begins with thc officer's

In terms of numbers of op- immediate field grade com-

portunities, the yearly goal is to ~nandingofficer forwarding the

have seven to ten FA52 officers application to the appropriate

Research Nuclear Effects

Officer Associate

DOE Nuclear Weapons

Analyst United States Strategic Command Offutt AFB

Omaha, NE - National Laboratories National Ground Intelligence

Center. Charlottesville, VA

- ,r Instructor, Physics

Nuclear Research Officer

United States Current Positions In AERS That Support ACS

Defense nldhgence Agency Military Academy Boiling AFB

1 Entry Level FA52 Washington, DC w Nuclear Physicist1

Reactor Officer Nuclear Research Armed Forces Radiobiology Officer Research Institute (AFRRI) Defense Special

Bethesda, MD Weapons Agency (DSWA)

US Army Nuclear and Director Alexandria, VA

Chemical Agency (USANCA) F~e ld Command DSWA Springfield, VA Kirtland AFB

begin ACS each fiscal year. Cur- division (i .e. Combat Arms, rently, three to four FA52 offic- Combat Support, Combat Ser- ers begin ACS to become in- vice Support) at the U.S. Total structors at USMA. Two to four Army Personnel Command FA52 officers begin in May at (PERSCOM). From there, the the School of Engineering at the application goes t o the ACS Air Force Institute of Technol- Management Officer o r the ogy. One FA52 officer enrolls in FA52 Assign~nents Officer a t his school of choice, and one to PERSCOM. The appl icat ion three FA52 officers enroll in ACS should include official t ran-in support of the Department of scripts from previous educa- Energy Fellowship Program to tional institutions attended, and become military research asso- a recent (normally not more ciates at one of the nuclear na- than 5 years old) copy of Gradu- tional laboratories or staff of- ate Record Examination (GRE) ficers a t DOE research facilities results. in hea l th physics o r o ther The process for selection and nuclear related fields. attendance to advanced civil

The keys to success in apply- schooling is cc~ m p l e x and re-ing for and attending ACS are quires ear ly ac tion, as well as


nuclear weapons were no longer Army functions. This eliminated or reduced many burdensome nuclear-related missions such as the Personnel Reliability Program, Nuclear Surety Inspections, Tech- nical Validation Inspections, Sealed Authentication Systems, and other nuclear requirements that had long surrounded the Army's nuclear program. Many in the Army gladly pushed any thoughts of nuclear weapons and operations from their minds. However, post-Cold War realities dictate that the Army not only think about nuclear warfare, but become an active participant in nuclear planning.

The Army is not out of the nuclear warfare arena; simply the nuclear delivery business. The Army must still be able to oper- ate on the nuclear battlefield. This means functioning in a nuclear,

LTC James H . Cockle, FA Nuclear Weapons Offrer

biological, and chemical (NBC) environment and defending against enemy NBC weapons. It also means the Army must have an active role in the joint planning and execution of the offensive use of nuclear weapons, should the need arise. After all, when a nuclear weapon is used by friendly forces in theater, who (besides the enemy) will be most affected by its use? The short an- swer is the ground forces--the Army and Marines.

The definition of the Army's new role in joint nuclear operations and its translation into doctrine have been evolving in recent years. The first step in this evolution was the development and publication of a totally new series of joint publications dealing with joint nuclear doctrine and procedures. The next step was to create Army doctrine consis-

lication (Joint Pub) 3-12, Doc-trine for Joint Nuclear Opera- tions, is a short, concise pamphlet that lays out nuclear force objectives, employment, and guidance on strategic force integrated operations. Joint Pub 3-12.1, Doc- trine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, provides a detailed explanation of how joint theater nuclear operations will be conducted. It specifies responsibilities of joint commanders and their service component counterparts. This is the basis for the new Army nuclear warfare doctrinal manual, FM 100-30, Nuclear Operations.

Before going into the doctrinal specifics of theater nuclear warfare as outlined in Joint Pub 3- 12.1 and FM 100-30, it is useful to present a general description of how theater nuclear warfare currently works. First, and fore-


most, only the President can make the decision to use nuclear weapons. This aspect of current doctrine is unchanged from pre- Cold War nuclear doctrine. Guid- ance for nuclear weapons employment is developed by tlic National Command Authority (NCA) and promulgated to Joint Combatant Commanders. Individual services may assist in the planning and execution of this mission but are not responsible for it. In theater situa- tions, the Joint Comnlmtant Com- mander is the theater unified Com- mander in Chief (CINC). He works directly with the NCA in nuclear operations, with no direct interme- diaries. The Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) serves as the supporting CINC in nuclear matters to the theater CINC. USSTRATCOM has access to the resources for planning and execution of the nuclear mission for the theater CINC and must do so because the theater CINCs have limited organic nuclear planning capability. In its supporting role, USSTRATCOM fdlows the theater CINC's direction and guidance in planning and executing the nuclear mission. In essence, USSTRATCOM is the technical muscle behind the theater CINC's ideas. He does the work but does not make the decisions.

The limited nuclear planning expertise on the theater CINC's staffs prompted USSTRATCOM to field Theater Planning and Re- sponse Cells (TPRC) capable of de- ploying in theater to augment the CINC's staff in nuclear matters when needed. The TPIK serves as the conduit through which the theater CINC passes his nuclear requirements to USSTRATCOM for planning and execution. The actual planning and analyses are done at USSTRATCOM headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Once the plan is established and ap-

proved by the CINC and NCA, USSTMTCOM coordinates the as- sets required for execution. These requirements are passed to the service components and m i y or may not involve units serving the theater CINC, depending on the strike options and corresponding weapons systems selected for employment. For example, the w c a ~ o n of choice for a specific theater target may be a ballistic missile (land or submarine launched), cruise missile, a U.S.-based bomber, or a theater-based, dual-capable aircraft. This wide array of weapons for theater use is a result of policy changcsrestricting forward de- ployment of nuclcar weapons, and making all nuclcar WC~IXIIIS avail- able for all missions, both theater and strategic.

The doctrinal key to the legiti- macy for Army involvement in theater nuclear operations is Joint Pub 3-12.1. This publication reflects a true picture of how things work in thcater nuclear warfare. Major topic areas discussed arc:

Employment guidance

The role of U. S. theater nuclear operations

Command and control Planning and employment

Command responsibilities and staff procedures

Support coordination

Joint Pub 3-1 2.1 dictates Army require~nents in thca t cr nuclear warfare. First, it requires Joint Force Land Component Com- mander (JFLCC) participation in the nuclear planning process. In thea tcrs where the potential for nuclear weapons use exists, the Army Component Conimander is likely to be dual-hatted as the JFLCC. Second, this publication au- thorizes the JFLCC to nominate targets, and his subordina tc Army or Corps commanclcrs to nominate nuclear targets through him, to the

CINC. This requires the JFLCC and the Corps to have nuclear target analysis capability. Third, the JP recognizes the danger to friendly personnel and potential adverse effects on opcrations when using nuclear weapons in theater. It mandates preclusion analysis to prevent fratricide and requires cal- culation of any collatcral damage that may impede f~t11i.c land operations. The basis of this analysis is Joint Pub 3-1 2.2, Nuclear Weap- ons Elnploy~nent Effects Data, produced for the Joint Staff by tlic U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA). Fourth, it provides the format for the CINC's nuclear command guidance, providing the JFLCC and subordinate commanders a solid basis to determine ground force considerations including acceptable level of troop risk, collateral damage constraints,

fallout restrictions, and target at- tack criteria. Finally, Joint Pub 3- 12.1 recognizes the importance of ground combat and mobile units as legitimate nuclear targets, most likely nominated by ground force commanders.

FM 100-30 is the Army's new nuclcar weapons doctrinal publication. I t redefines the Army's role in theater nuclear warfare in the post-Cold War era, identifies specific command responsilili t ics, and prc~vidcs detailed Tactics, Tech- niques, and Procedures (ITP) for


nuclear target analysis, targeting, and target nomination. The FM is directed to Corps and Echelons above Corps (EAC) Army warfighting headquarters. FM 100-30 codifies the use of the USANCA Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team (NEAT) as a tool for commanders to enhance their nuclear target analysis capability and to meet their doctrinal responsibilities in this area. Rec- ognizing that theater nuclear warfare is a low probability event, but one that must be done right the first time, the NEAT provides the Army commander instant staff expertise in planning nuclear operations. While this does not relieve him from his doctrinal responsibilities to maintain organic nuclear planning capability, it is an eco- nomical way to place additional nuclear expertise in the right place at the right time. Areas of NEAT nuclear warfighting expertise include:

0 Force protection

Effects on future operations 0 Nuclear fire planning 0 Integration of nuclear and conventional

fires

mParaIle1 planning with the USSTRATCOM TPRC

FM 100-30 reflects and comple- ments the joint doctrine found in JP 3-1 2.1. It provides a post-Cold War look at the Army's offensive role on the theater nuclear battlefield. As a field manual, it is very specific in identifying Corps and EAC command and staff responsibilities, and the associated TTPs to make it work. The rapid growth of computer technology and the increasing availability of fissile ma- terials associated with the end of the Cold War have greatly increased the potential for prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology to regional

powers. This has increased the threat of theater nuclear warfare. As a result, there has been a comprehensive Army reexamination of theater nuclear doctrine and the means necessary to execute it. The Army has responded to this in several ways. Nuclear operations have been reintroduced as a part of the Field Artillery School's Officer Ba- sic and Advanced Courses. The Combined Arms Center, the Army Command and General Staff Col- lege, and Army War College are ex- amining the addition of nuclear operations into their advanced warfighting curriculums. The Army Nuclear Target Analysis Course (NTAC) has been restructured using Joint Pub 3-1 2.2 as the new basis for technical nuclear analysis and has added joint nuclear capabilities into its program of instruction. This course is currently taught at the U.S. Army Chemical School. The De- fense Nuclear Weapons School, under Army direction, developed the Joint Nuclear Operations and Targeting Course (JNOTC) which incorporates key elements of the

NTAC curriculum into an advanced school of nuclear planning. Completion of JNOTC by soldiers results in the award of Additional Skill Identifier 5H (Nuclear Target Analyst). 5H personnel requirements are being restructured for implementation into MTOE/TDAs to reflect new doctrinal requirements. The Battlefield Nuclear Training Program (BNT), a commander-friendly automated nuclear target analysis program developed by the Defense Spe- cial Weapons Agency, USANCA, and USSTRATCOM, was designed for use by joint and Army target analysts. Nuclear scenarios for regional contingency exercises have been reinstituted. These actions are only the beginning of a series of initiatives required to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War nuclear world.

The Army's role in theater-level offensive warfare has been signifi- cantly redefined since the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting nuclear drawdown. The greatest challenge we face in executing this role lies not in doctrine or training, but in the education of the Army at large. The lack of knowl- edge on current nuclear doctrine at many levels of Army leadership needs to be reversed. The message that must get out to the Army is that we are not out of the nuclear business and do play a critical role in the joint development of nuclear plans and their successful execution, should the need arise. Army leaders and planners must understand that theater nuclear warfare has changed since the demise of the Soviet Union, and they have a vital responsibility to understand and execute new doctrinal requirements. Soldiers must be prepared to play a role in the planning and execution of any theater-level joint nuclear operation to insure success on the future battlefield.


Joint Pub 3-12.2 Nuclear Weapons Employment

What is Joint Pub 3-12.2? Joint Publication 3-1 2.2 pro-

vides classified nuclear weapon effects data and related information to facilitate detailed planning and execution of nuclear missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U)" (SECRET- RD)(Joint Pub 3-1 2.2), effective 20 December 1995, in response to changing U.S. nuclear requirements. Two factors led to the need for a new nuclear weapons publication: changes in the U.S. nuclear doctrine caused by the end of the Cold War and Presi- dent Bush's directive eliminating the Army's organic nuclear weapons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the Army as lead agent for this new publication. In turn, Department of the Army assigned the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) the task of preparing the publication. USANCA was previously responsible for preparing the four-service "Staff Officers Field Manual for Nuclear Weapons Employ- ment Effects Data" (U) (SECRET -RD) (FM 101-31-2, NWP 28-0- 2, AFP 200-31 VOL 2, and FMFM 1-4A), which emphasized tactical nuclear weapons and was published in the late 1980's. Joint Pub 3-12.2 replaces these separate service manuals on nuclear targeting.

The preface to Joint Pub 3- 12.2 states that the guidance given in Joint Pub 3-1 2.2 is au- thoritative and will be followed

David W Bash, Ph D.

in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures in joint operations and is the doctrinal basis for U.S. involvement in multinational and interagency operations.

What is in Joint Pub 3-12.2? Joint Pub 3-12.2 is a compre-

hensive presentation of the specifications and performance capabilities of the whole range of U.S. nuclear weapons and, as such, is a major analytic work. About 90 percent of the data used to generate the joint publication has been revised since the late 1980's and is based upon a large body of new research. That research includes work from Defense Special Weapon Agency (DSWA)(formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency) documents: EM-1, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons; U.S. Nuclear Weap- ons/Devices Output Handbook; and Nuclear Weapon Character- istics Report. Other threat vehicle responses to nuclear effects data have been obtained from tests on foreign equipment sponsored by USANCA.

This new publication consid- ers the nuclear weapons effects of all U.S. nuclear weapoil systems, and there is a scparate chapter for each system. Weapons effects considered are: safety and collateral damage distances, personnel effects, materiel damage effects, exposed personnel coverage, personnel in open foxholes coverage, personnel in tanks coverage, and moderate damage to n~ateriel coverage. The personnel response data are from the new but un-

Effects Data

published Pcrsonncl Risk and Ca- sualty Criteria (PRCC) document written by USANCA. These new analyses have also led to better definitions and more accurate data about human responses. For exan~ple, the definition of latent lethality of pcrsonnel to nuclear radiation was redefined to latent ineffectiveness and extended con- sistently to blast and thermal radiation as well. For the first time, Joint Pub 3- 12.2 combines thermal radiation injury with nuclear radiation injury for latent ineffectiveness casualties of exposed personnel.

Joint Pub 3-12.2 also includes a detailed description of all targeting techniques (which were previously published in a separate manual), and thus, the current publication now is a com- plete stand alone targeteering document. Additionally, procedures used to determine weapon effects have been simplified. For example, personnel safety, pre- clude distance and collateral damage distance have all been prc- computed since the fuzes of weapons remaining in thc stockpile have fewer options. As such, Joint Pub 3-1 2.2 is a completely new document different from the four service manuals it replaced.

Although Joint Pub 3-12.2 is applicable for immediate worldwide employment, USANCA can also tailor the data for particular environments or areas of operation, as it has in the past. In or- der to provide data tailored to a widc variety of scenarios and tar-


gets, USANCA maintains and continually updates and up- grades the Nuclear Weapons Ef- fects Database System (NWEDS).

USANCA also produced the unclassified Joint Pub 3- 12.3, Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (Notional), 14 Feb- ruary 1996, for training purposes in non-secure environ-ments. However, the data are truly notional and no analyses should be performed using this manual. A PC-Windows environment software package, entitled "Battlefield Nuclear Target- ing (BNT)," that automates the targeteering calulations of Joint Pub 3-1 2.2, has been produced under a contract to DSWA and monitored by USANCA. This software should be ready for distribution in the Summer of 1998.

Use of the Joint Pub 3-12.2 Joint Pub 3- 12.1, Doctrine for

Joint Theater Nuclear Opera- tions, mandates the use of Joint Pub 3-12.2 by theater nuclear planners and target analysts. This includes planners from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Command, Unified Commands, USANCA (Nuclear Employment Augmentation Teams--NEAT), Echelons above Corps, and Corps Fire Support Elements. (See related article on Offensive Nuclear Warfare.) Joint Pub 3-12.2 and some early drafts have already been used in command post exercises and global war games. At the request of some national laboratories and commands, the document was provided for use in their analyses and for integration of the nuclear effects data into computer models of war games. USANCA has also produced a NATO version of Joint Pub 3-12.2 for use at SHAPE. In addition, the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) in AI-

buquerque, NM has started offer- Summary ing a course, entitled "Joint Joint Pub 3-12.2 is a major Nuclear Operations and Targeting document produced by USANCA Course (JNOTC)," that includes for the Department of Defense instruction in the use of the Joint community. The publication's Pub 3-12.2. Besides being open to use has been directed by the all services and of real interest to CJCS and has replaced the USSTRATCOM, JNOTC can grant former service manuals on 5H certification to Army Officers. nuclear targeting. For more in- An addendum to the Joint Pub 3- formation on the Nuclear Weap- 12.2 for the earth penetrating ons Employment Effects Data modification to the B61 bomb, publication, contact the author the mod-1 1, has been prepared at USANCA, Com (703) 806- for use by USSTRATCOM. 7862, DSN 656-7862.


Major James M . Demyanovich, CM Operations Rescarch Armlyst

he U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) prow ides U.S.

military's joint positions on the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO) nuclear, biological and chemical (NRC) technical and operational issues. The input is accomplished by USANCA's participation in a variety of NATO groups. By regulation, USANCA is the Department of Defense lead agency for most non-medical, international NBC defense standardization efforts.

NATO NBC Defense USANCA either participates in

or provides input to the groups shown in the shaded boxes in Fig- ure 1. Participation in the other unshaded NATO groups occurs as needed. NBC defense issues are addressed in the North Atlantic Council by the NATO Army Ar- maments Group (NAAG) and Military Agency for Standardiza- tion (MAS).

USANCA conducts extensive coordination with other U.S. agencies and Services to ensure U.S. products and inform a t' ion presented a t NATO meetings truly represent a tri-Service, U.S. position. A sample of commands and offices that provide input is shown in Figure 2. USANCA has specific points of contact within the Services and commands who review and ratify standardization documents. The specific supporting participants vary depending on the standardization body, but Service operational and technical perspectives are represented.

u.S. NBC

INPUT TO

NATO

USANCA provides the U.S. Head of Delegation (IIOD) to two major NATO bodies: Land Group 7 (LG. 7) and the NRC Defence Op- erations Interservice Working Group (NRC Def WG). Although each group falls under the NATO Army structure, the organizations all have tri-Service reprcsen- tation. USANCA serves as the fa- cilitator for most NRC defense actions generated by NATO and is the conduit through which U.S. input and participation flows back to NATO.

Land Group 7 (LG.7) has the mission to ensure standardization and interoperability of NRC de-fense equipment, and to define

requirements and approaches to nuclear and chemical survivability for armed forces materiel. LG.7 achieves these aims by ex- changing tri-Service inform a t' ion on NRC concepts and technical doctrinc and equipment research, development, and acquisition among NATO members.

NBC Defense Effort The thrce major types of docu-

ments are Standardization Agree- ments (STANAG), Allied Engineer- ing Publications (AEP), and triptychs.

A STANAG is a formal agree- ment that nations and Services use to standardize operations and equipment design. Standardiza- tion is defined by NATO as "the process of developing concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability, interchangeabil- ity and commonality in the fields of operation, administration and materiel." STANAGs are binding on nations that ratify and imple- ment them.

LG.7 STRNAGs address nuclear hardening, protective mask and filter canister thread design, collective protection facility design, shipboard NRC air filters, radiation protection for armored fight- ing vehicles, and the sampling and identification of chemical agents.

AEPs and triptychs are non- binding agreements on general equipment design specific a t' lons. Triptychs are three-part docu-


--

b -Conference o l National Military Armaments Directors Committee

(CNAD)

Military Agency Board

(MAS)

Medical Panel

Working Group

Figure 1. NATO NBC Defense Structure; U.S. NBC Defense Input to NATO.

Office of the Secretary of Defense OATSD(NCB)(C/BM) OASD-ISAINATO Policy

Joint Staff

Defense Special Weapons Agency

Department of the Navy Chief of Naval Operations (N86DC2) Naval Sea Systems Command

C03G1 Damage Control Marine Corps Systems Command (C426) Naval Research Laboratory

Department of the Air Force SAFIAQPT xom-IS0

Department of the Army SARD-ZCS SAUS-IA-IPP DASG-HCO DALO-POD DAMI-POC DAMO-SSD DAMO-FDB

Army Materiel Command CBDCOM TECOM

TRADOC U.S. Army Chemical School Joint Service Integration Group

US. ClNCs

Figure 2. List of U.S. Agencies and Commands That Provide Input and Coordination With USANCA.


ments that define equipment performance specifications, test requirements and acceptance criteria. Several LG.7 AEPs are cov- ered by STANAGs making them binding agreements. AEPs address chemical defense factors in equipment design, nuclear weapons effects simulators, electromagnetic pulse testing and simulation, nuclear protection for mobile shelters, design criteria for protection against transient ra-diation effects on electronics, and nuclear blast/thermal test meth- ods and procedures.

NATO NBC defense concerns have gradually shifted from a general European war scenario to focus on operations other than war. Priority NBC protection issues are currently those that consider hazards from toxic indus- trial chemicals (TICs), low-level radiation (LLR) and biological agents. Detection and protection standards for equipment are being reviewed for possible short- comings in these areas.

The NBC Def WG is the operational counterpart to LG. 7. Where LG.7 deals with equipment issues, the NBC Def WP addresses doctrine, training, and tactics and procedures. The NBC Def WG uses Al- lied Exercise Publications (AXP), Allied Tactical Publications (ATP), and STANAGs to address operational concerns. NBC Def WG STANAGs address a myriad of operational issues such as marking contaminated areas, emergency alarms, radiation exposure, warning and reporting, NBC reconnais- sance, nuclear target analysis, vul- nerability assessments, training standards, performance degrada- tion, contamination control, personnel identification in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), casualty and damage assessments, collective protection use, and MOPP protection levels.

In response to LLR concerns, the NBC Def WG is writing a STANAG as a commander 's guide to operational exposure levels in LLR environments. LG. 7 will address any LLR and TIC equipment issues identified by the NRC Def WG.

In addition to the two major groups, USANCA participates or provides the U.S. Head of Delcga- tion (HOD) to the Challenge Sub- Group (CSG), the Technical Sub- Group (TSG), the Sampling and Identification of Chemical/Bio- logical Agents (SIBCA) Sub-Group and the ATP-45 Custodial Group. The CSG is responsible for deter- mining the likely level of challenge or risk posed by chemical and biological agents as well as TICs to NATO forces. The Techni- cal Sub-Group addresses all aspects of nuclear survivability. The SIBCA Sub-Group is responsible for developing sampling and identification procedures and protocols for chemical/biological agents. ATP-45 is the NATO warning and reporting manual for NRC attacks. In addition to providing the HOD, USANCA provides technical and operational input to the ATP-45 Cus- todial Group. Current work fo- cuses on TICs, biological defense operations and national efforts to automate NRC warning and reporting processes.

USANCA also interacts with several other NATO standardization bodies either directly by providing technical and operational input, or indirectly, by monitoring work conducted by subordinate groups. USANCA also provides a delegate to the NBC Medi- cal Working Group. This group addresses all medical aspects of NBC defense. PG.3 1 on Aqueous Decontaminants, PG.32 on Handheld Riodetectors, and PG.33 on Automated Biodetectors are

monitored, but not controlled by USANCA

The Sampling and Identifica- tion of Chemical/Biological Agents Sub-Group, Naval Sub- Group and Air Sub-Group are subordinate LG.7 bodies. Al-though not directly controlled by USANCA, each sub-group HOD reports to USANCA to coordinate efforts and to ensure an agreed U.S. position exists for standardization issues. These groups clearly exhibit the tri-Service nature of NATO NBC defense standardization.

Presented here was a brief overview of USANCA's role in NATO's NBC defense arena. USANCA provides both coordination and leadership roles in the process. U.S. Service input provided to USANCA is integrated in the U.S. position evolution process. While USANCA has resident NBC defense expertise, USANCA keeps the Services actively involved in NATO NBC defense issue development and resolution. Only through active USANCA coordination and the Service's dili- gent and thoughtful responses to input requests can U.S. NBC defense positions in NATO truly represent the interests and con-cerns of all Services.


Nuclear and NBC Contamination Survivability o f Army Equipment

Captain Richard A. Schueneman, AR

verview. The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

(USANCA) has a very important role in the Army's nuclear survivability (NS) and NBC contamination survivability (NBCCS) programs. Notably, USANCA is in the review process for most requirements documents to ensure that mission critical systems adequately address NS and NBCCS in their characteristics paragraphs of both the mission needs statement (MNS) and the operational requirements document (ORD). Comments and recommended changes are provided to HQDA, ODCSOPS (DAMO-FD), HQ TRADOC and the TRADOC proponent school responsible for the system being developed. USANCA reviews over 200 MNSs and ORDs each year. The NS and NBCCS requirements review process is amplified below.

The United States Army NS and NBCCS programs are addressed in Army Regulation (AR) 70-75 and the mandatory

Nuclear Physicist

procedures contained in the Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5000.2-R. AR 70-75, Survivability of Army Personnel and Materiel, dated 10 Jan 95, states that the ORD must specify if the need is mission critical and that, as a minimum, mission essential or critical items will be high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) survivable. Correspondingly, the AR states that "if an item is designated as mission essential or is a critical component of one or more mission essential end items, it will be nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination survivable." AR 70-75 further defines responsibilities for all organizations involved in the materiel acquisition process. USANCA's primary responsibility as stated in AR 70-75 is to ". . .establish nuclear effects and NBC contamination survivability criteria for requirements contained in MNSs and ORDs that specify nuclear and NBC contamination survivability. " DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory

Procedures for Major Defense Aquisition Programs and Major Automated Informationn System Acquisition Programs, dated 15 Mar 96, requires " mission-critical systems be survivable to the threat levels anticipated in their operating environment."

USANCA is also responsible for issuing NS and NBCCS criteria to both materiel and combat developers for systems with NS and NBCCS requirements. The NS criteria are based on Army approved criteria/standards such as QSTAG-244, QSTAG-1031, AEP-4, and MIL-STD 21 69B, while the NBCCS criteria are based on QSTAG 747 and AEP-7. The criteria are issued for each system upon receipt of an approved ORD. Most Army systems have requirements to survive the effects of HEMP and NBC con-tamination. For NS, many systems are hardened to survive all initial nuclear weapons effects. USANCA issues balanced criteria for systems with a requirement to survive all effects of a nuclear detonation. The concept of bal-

NBC Report - Spring/Summer 1998 1 7

anced hardening is defined in QSTAG-244 and requires the system to survive at levels where the crew will re~nain combat effective to fight the next battle. By utiliz- ing a balanced hardening approach to survivability, the materiel developer can minimize development and acquisition costs. Idistorical acquisition data for Army systems have shown that, when addressed at the start of the program development, the costs for designing nuclear hardening into a system are 1%to 3% of the total system cost. For NBCCS, USANCA issues a single set of criteria/standards. These criteria are applicable to all mission critical/esscntial systen~s and are used in developing an NBC survivable system. It is based on three essential characteristics of the system: hardness, decontaminability and compatibility.

Materiel developers must validate systems with NS and NBCCS requirements through tests, evalu- ations, and/or assessments. The Army and other DoD services maintain testing centers such as White Sands Missile Range and Dugway Proving Ground to con- duct tests to validate a system's NS and NBCCS. AR 70-75 requires all materiel developers of Army systems to utilize existing Army and other government testing facilities when feasible. Using these facilities will minimize testing costs and allow materiel developers to make use of existing test data and institutional NS and NBCCS knowl- edge. NS and NBCCS test results are presented to the indepe~ldent evaluator by the materiel developer. The independent evaluator makes the determination whether or not the system meets NS and NBCCS requirements. If the system does not meet criteria requirements for NS and NBCCS, the materiel developer must either im-

prove the systcrn design or rcqucst a waivcr of the unmct test portion of the criteria from the Army DCSOPS before the system can be fielded.

The Waiver Process The waivcr proccss for Army

systems with NS and NRCCS shortfalls is addressed in AR 15-41, Nuclear and Chemical Surviv- ability Commit tee, dated 20 Fc11 92. It is the procedure that the rnatc- riel developer must follow before the systcn~ can 11c fielded. The materiel developer sulm~its a rcquest for waiver of NS and/or NRCCS criteria to Director, Nuclear and Chemical Survivability Committee (NCSC) Secretariat, USANCA. The waivcr rcquest must include rc- sults of all survivability tests, any posil~lcengineering or materiel solutions that would solve the short- comings, and cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) which wi l l assess the cost cffcctivc- ness of any possil~lc solutions. The NCSC Secretariat reviews the waiver request for completeness and technical content and makes a recommendation to the NCSC whether to grant or dcny the waivcr rcqucst. The NCSC, com- posed of six general officers, rc-

NCSCS Rev~ewsMateriel Developer

And Forwards Subm~ts Wa~ver + Recommendations

Request To USANCA To NCSC

views the NCSC Secretariat's recommendation. The NCSC either concurs or nonconcurs with the Sccrctariat position based upon the information provided and the needs of the Army. The NCSC rcc- onmiendation is then forwarded to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) for his personal review and ap-proval. The DCSOPS is the only person authorized to approve waivers for NS and NRCCS critc- ria. The DCSOPS has three options on the waivcr: dcny the rcqucst, approve, or approve the request with stipulations that shortcom- ings be correctcd. The NS and NRCCS waivcr process is also de- picted in Figure 1.

Conclusion Army systems that arc ~nission

critical arc required to be nuclear and NHC contamination survivable. It is the responsibility of the materiel developer to ensure that NS and NBCCS arc addressed at the start of program development and arc verified through tests, evaluation and/or assessment. USANCA stands ready to assist the materiel developer in the execution of his program to field an NlZC survivable sys tern.

NCSC Rev~ews DCSOPS And Forwards Approves Or Denies

Recommendations Waiver Request To DCSOPS

Figure 1. The Waiver Process.


JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND TARGETING COURSE

Standardized Training For Nuclear Target Analysts -

he reorganization of re-sponsibilities for offensive nuclear warfare (see re-

lated article in this issue) resulted in a myriad of changes for Army and Joint nuclear planners. The Army no longer has the mission of nuclear weapon delivery, but plays an important supporting role in nuclear target analysis for weapons delivered by other Ser- vices. Theater nuclear warfare is inherently joint in nature. It is critical that Army nuclear target analysts and their joint counterparts use standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in this area. The best way to ensure uniformity is through training. The Joint Nuclear Operations and Target- ing Course (JNOTC) has been recently established at the De- fense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, to meet this requirement.

Army Nuclear Target Analyst Training

For many years, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) trained Army nuclear target analysts with the Nuclear and Chemical Target Analy- sis Course (NCTAC). This was later shortened to the Nuclear Target Analysis Course (NTAC) when the U.S. renounced use of chemical weapons. The U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS) also taught these courses and continues to teach NTAC to all Chemical Advanced

LTC ~ a m e s H. Cockle, FA Nuclear Weapons Officer

Course students. Successful completion of NTAC results in the award of Skill Identifier/Ad- ditional Skill Identifier (SI/ASI) 5H (Nuclear Target Analyst). Following the end of the Cold War and the disestablishment of Army nuclear weapons delivery capability, interest in training Army nuclear target analysts waned. The USACMLS contin- ued to teach NTAC as a part of the Chemical Advanced Course, and USAFAS offered NTAC as an optional, separate course. NTAC enrollment at Fort Sill was al- most entirely limited to reserve component officers whose 5H positions were no longer valid. The USACMLS produced large numbers of officers with SI 5H, but very few chemical jobs were

coded for 5H requirements. Most positions coded as 5H were concentrated in nuclear-capable field artillery units; units that no longer had nuclear missions. Training was based on Field Manual (FM) 10 1-3 1 -1, Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures, and FM 101- 3 1-2, Nuclear Weapons Employ- ment Effects Data, both largely obsolete due to the elimination of many tactical nuclear weapon systems. The Army's nuclear doctrine, promulgated then in FM 100-30, Nuclear Op- erations, focused on a tactical nuclear war in central Europe with the Soviet Union; a nation that no longer existed. From a training viewpoint, the Army was teaching the wrong soldiers


-- - -

a skill that they did not require using obsolete TTF! Then things changed.

New Joint Offensive Nuclear Doctrine

In the mid 19901s, the Joint Staff published a series of doctrinal publications on offensive nuclear warfare. Based on this doctrine, the Army rewrote FM 100-30 to reflect more accurately post-Cold War nuclear requirements. New joint nuclear doctrine, promulgated in the 3-12 series of joint publications, redefined joint and individual Service responsibilities. The Army once again had a critical role in offensive theater nuclear operations. The Army's revised role concentrated on troop safety, obstacle avoidance, preclusion of collateral damage, nuclear target analysis and target nomination, and integration of nuclear and conventional fires. The Joint Staff directed the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) to

I update the FM 101-31 series I

manuals to reflect joint requirements. This resulted in the de- 1 velopment and release of Joint ~ Publication (Joint Pub) 3- 12.2,

I

Nuclear Weapons Employment ~ Effects Data, in 1995. It is similar to the old FM, but has simplified computational procedures, contains more sophisticated effects data and, most importantly, includes every nuclear weapon in the U.S. active stockpile database, not just "tactical" nuclear weapons. Joint doctrine requires the use of Joint Pub 3-12.2 by all U.S. nuclear target analysts. USAFAS updated its NTAC using Joint Pub 3-12.2 and exported it to the USACMLS where it remains a part of the Chemical Officer Advanced Course.

The development of the revised NTAC brought USAFAS a new

customer: US Strategic Com- mand (USSTRATCOM). With the addition of joint personnel in the NTAC student base, USANCA ex- plored the possibility of developing a joint course that would better suit the needs of the new NTAC customers, but still meet Army 5H requirements. Such a course would have the advan- tages of Joint/Army standardization and economy of scale, since there were as many (or more) joint students attending the USAFAS NTAC as Army students. The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) agreed to establish a new course to meet Army 5H requirements and the theater nuclear planning responsibilities of joint organizations. The De- fense Nuclear Weapons School, a part of DSWA, was selected to teach the new course, entitled the Joint Nuclear Operations and Tar- geting Course (JNOTC) .

JNOTC JNOTC curriculum was jointly

developed by USANCA, DSWA, DNWS and USAFAS and is taught at DNWS. It is a one-week course designed to train staff nuclear planners in the concepts of nuclear operations, nuclear weapons effects, nuclear targeting considerations, and technical instruction on the mechanics of nuclear target analysis found in Joint Pub 3-12.2. Students must pass a comprehensive written examination and participate in an end-of-course practical exercise to graduate. DNWS, USANCA, and USSTRATCOM provide instructors. After successfully completing JNOTC, students can analyze the effects of friendly nuclear weapons use on ground operations, perform nuclear target nomination procedures, and make informed nuclear weapons employment

recommendations to their commanders. The target audience for JNOTC is those personnel (officers, warrant officers, enlisted, and civilians) whose duties require nuclear target analysis skills. The JNOTC course outline is shown on page 2 1. Organiza- tions requireing these skills include, but are not limited to, the following :

Army Corps Army Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Theater ClNCs Service Components of Theater ClNCs USSTRATCOM The Joint Staff Joint and Service Modeling and Simulation Agencies DS WAIDNWS SHAPEINATO

JNOTC Information JNOTC is taught a t DNWS

three to four times annually. The next class is scheduled for 13-1 7 July 1998. There is no charge for this instruction with the excep- tion of individual temporary duty costs. Students require a Secret Clearance with access to U.S. Restricted Data. Army personnel requiring 5H certification must attend JNOTC, as USAFAS no longer maintains its NTAC course at Fort Sill, although USACMLS continues to teach NTAC to its advanced course students. If in- terested in attending JNOTC, you must request a student quota through your service training system, or call the DNWS registrar a t (505) 846-9168, D S N 2 4 6 - 9 1 6 8 , e m a i l


Joint Nuclear Operations And Targeting Course

DAY ONE Welcome and lntroduction to JNOTC, DNWS Administrative Items Nuclear Physics and Weapons Effects Nuclear Policy, Strategy, and Forces Theater-level Nuclear Employment Theater-level Nuclear Targeting U.S. Nuclear Stockpile and Weapons Characteristics Nuclear Weapons Display Area Tour (Atomic Museum)

Concepts of Damage Estimation

DAY TWO (Joint Pub lntrcfbuction to Nuclear Targeting r 1

,.'Use of Equivalent ~ a r ~ e t Area Conversion Nomograph i visud~Method of Damage Estimation

/.' Index Method of Damage Estimation

; :Nu4merical Method of Damage Estimation for Area Targets

J

1DAY THREE (Joint Pub 3-12.2) 1

merical Method of Damage Estimation for Point Targets /Desired Ground Zero Selection for Multiple Targets Poststrike Analysis i Preclusion Oriented Target Analysis dl

3-12.2 Practical Exercise and Examinatio

D Written Examindtion Examination Review Strategic Targeting and Execution lntroduction to Automated Targeting Tools Battlefield Nuclear Targeting Program Practical Exercise lntroduction to Group Exercise Group Exercise Part One (Peace)

DAY FIVE Group Exercise Part Two (War) Course Critique Graduation

NBC Report - Spring/Summer 1998 2 1

1997 Personnel Reliability Pro- gram (PRP) Status Report USANCA thanks everyone who provided timely input to the annual PRP Status Report. The PRP population remained relatively unchanged from the 1996 report. The reasons for decertifying personnel from the PRP included alcohol and drug abuse (1 9), medical condition (1 8), poor attitude/lack of motiva- tion (7), negligence (6), serious of- fense (6), and inability to wear protective equipment (1 ). You should also note that the U.S. Army is not entirely out of the nuclear weapons PRE The 18 personnel reflected in the report support the Joint Staff by storing sealed authenticators used in the formal release of nuclear weapons. This number should grow further in next year's report as we have uncovered another U.S. Army organization that provides similar support to the warfighting community and has implemented the Army's nuclear PRP but failed to report its personnel numbers for last year's report. The annual PRP Status Report is required by DoD to capture the total picture of DoD's PRl? Thus, it is critical that all Army organizations with either a nuclear or chemical surety mission accurately report their PRP information. (POC: MAJ Nancy Ward, DSN 656-7856).

Coordinating Draft of DA PAM 50-6

USANCA provided DCSOPS with the coordinating draft of DA PAM 50-6, Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance

Colonel Harry J . Sawyer, OD Chief, Operations Division

US Army Personnel Reliability Program Status Report 1997

PRP Nuclear Nuclear Reactor Chemical Personnel Critical (Controlled) (Controlled) (Controlled)

DoD Military 13 1 57 31 0 DoD Civilian 3 1 58 1456 DoD Contractor 0 0 0 964 Total 16 2 115 2730

Decertified Personnel

DoD Military 0 0 DoD Civilian 0 0

SURETY UPDATE


DoD Contractor 0 0 0 20 Total 0 0 0 57

(CAI RA) Operations, in early Clarified Initial Response Force and June. This update represents the Service Response Force responsi- first revision to the publication bilities and delegation authority.

since 1991' DCSoPS be staff- Rewrote Chapter 11, Environmental ing the publication shortly for formal Army approval.

Monitoring, and removed specific Airborne Exposure Limits (guidance

Major changes to the pamphlet provided on where to get current are shown below. USANCA ex- AEL). tends its appreciation to the more than 80 organizations and agencies that participated in the review process. Many of the re- viewers provided very thoughtful comments and recommendations, which have been incorporated into the final coordinating draft. (POC: CPT Scott Watson, DSN 656-7859).

Major Changes To DA PAM 50-6

Rewrote Chapter 14, Remedial Operations, providing guidance to installation commanders.

Strengthened reliance on the CSEPP to foster Army and Federal Agency cooperation during chemical accidentlincident exercises.

Specified that the PAM is not designed for the Army's response to a weapons of mass destruction event.

@ Incorporated lessons learned Rewrite of Army Nuclear and throughout the PAM from Chemical Chemical Surety Regulations Stockpile Emergency Preparedness ~t the request of DCSOPS, Program (CSEPP) exercises. USANCA is in the process of re-

vising AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety, and AR 50-6, Chemical Surety. Other than some interim changes, AR 50-5 has not been updated since 1989 and still reflects the basic policies and responsibilities in place when the Army stored and maintained a nuclear delivery capability. It will undergo a significant downsizing to reflect the Army's reduced involvement in the nuclear weapons arena. The regulation remains relevant since the Army still has organizations subject to the nuclear weapons personnel reliability program (PRP) (see related article on PRP Status Report).

Significant progress has been made on rewriting AR 50-6. The

a Any time an individual in the PRP receives medical treatment, we are being told that we must annotate SF Form 600 with the screening statement specified in AR 50-6, paragraph 2-1 5a(3). Is this really correct?

A. No. The only time the SF 600 must be annotated with the statement is when medical records are reviewed as part of the screening process for the nuclear or chemical PRF? (AR 50-6 and AR 50-5, 3-1 5a(3)) (CPT Grams).

If an individual's screening and evaluation for the PRP has been completed (Parts I through IV of DA Form 3 180) but the individual is still undergoing training for a particular nuclear or chemical duty position, should Part V (Continuing Evaluation/ Assignment Briefing) of the DA Form 3 180-R be completed?

A. Yes. Part V should be completed and the DA Form 31 80-R

process has been facilitated by the excellent input and continuing advice provided by AMC's Chemi- cal Surety Policy Action Commit- tee (CHEMSURPAC). AR 50-6 is a relatively current publication, last published in February 1995, but requires significant updates to clarify certain policy issues and to better reflect today's chemical operational requirements. We are rewriting both regulations in par- allel since the chemical and nuclear PRP programs are essen- tially identical. Look for the two PRP chapters to have very similar wording, with most of the dif- ferences related to the fact that critical positions are unique to the nuclear PRP program. The initial

distributed to ensure that the continuous evaluation requirements are instituted. These individuals should be placed on the Nuclear or Chemical Duty Posi- tion Roster (NDPR or CDPR) in a separate section with their training status clearly indicated or on a separate roster. If a separate roster is used, it should be distributed in the same manner as the NDPR or CDPR. (LTC Brough) .

a Can we reinstate or return to PRP duties an individual who successfully completes a private, ac- credited alcohol abuse treatment program that is shorter in dura- tion than the specified time peri- ods in AR 50-6, paragraph 2- I lb ( l ) ?

A. No. You cannot reinstate or return an individual to PRP duties prior to successfully completing at least the 90-day rehabili- tation program prescribed by a competent medical authority and receiving a favorable prognosis

draft of AR 50-6 should be out for staffing during July 98 with the initial draft of AR 50-5 following shortly thereafter.

We encourage all eligible readers to participate in the review of these regulations. We anticipate that the final coordinating draft of AR 50- 6 will be forwarded to DCSOPS in the Summer of 98 for formal Army approval. (POCs: AR 50-5, MAJ Nancy Ward, DSN 656-7855; AR 50- 6, CPT Stacy Grams, DSN 656-7859)

by a competent medical authority. The intent of the requirement is to ensure that individuals, after completing treatment programs, are monitored for any signs of a relapse in alcohol con- sumption and to observe if they are complying with specified af- tercare requirements, or are re- luctant or refusing to do so. On this issue, AR 50-6 has less strin- gent requirements than DoD Di- rective 5210.42 (DoD's policy guidance on the PRP program), which requires successful completion of at least a 180-day treatment program for alcohol abusers and up to a l-year treatment program for alcohol depen- dent individuals. We anticipate that the next updates to both AR 50-5 and AR 50-6 will incorpo- rate the DoD policy on this matter. (CPT Grams).



Documents

NBC Report: Joint Nuclear Operations and Targeting Course