National Defence Preferences and the Common European Army Project

8/17/2019 National Defence Preferences and the Common European Army Project

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The Common European Army Project between the National

Defence Preferences of the Member States and the Geostrategic

Challenges at the Eastern Borders of the EU

Dacian DUNA1 and Raul - Ciprian DĂNCUŢĂ 2

Abstract. This paper tries to explain the failures and prospects of a common

European army project under the constrains imposed by the national preferences of the

Treaties’ Guardians, the Member States of the European Union, and the conditions imposed

by the external pressures coming from the regional and global geostrategic environments,

particularly at the Eastern borders of the EU. The paper advocates the necessity of

restarting the debate surrounding the development of a strong European common defence

policy. This relates to the precarious geopolitical situation at the Eastern (the Ukraine-

Russia conflict) and Southern borders (the threat of the Islamic State) of the EU and also toeconomic and financial reasons such as a better management of capabilities and assetsunder a common European framework. However, the difficulties for achieving such goals

are not to be underestimated. This paper does not advocate the military option when dealing

with crises such as the Ukrainian one. However, it emphasizes that the current defense

capabilities of the European Union are rather symbolical. The radicalization of Russian

foreign policy and Kremlin’s erratic behavior toward the West are significant signs of

concerns. If the European Union wants to deal with such an actor, it has to be prepared

both politically and militarily. The paper examins these questions in two parts: part 1

focuses on the question of the national preferences (the preferences of the Member States) in

the field of security and defence; part 2 approaches the EU’s strategic environment at the Eastern borders of the European Union.

Keywords: Common European Army, European Union, Member States, Russia,

CSDP, geostrategy, national preferences

I ntroduction

The current precarious geopolitical situation at the Eastern and Southern border of

the European Union provides one of the reasons for renewing the debate surrounding the

development of a strong European common defence policy. It is one of the assumptions

from what this paper begins. There are, of course, not only strategic reasons for this, butalso financial ones. The Member States do not enjoy the same economic prosperity they

used to have decades ago and the austerity policies are already visibly affecting their

military preparedness.

Under such external and internal constrains as those mentioned above, resetting

common goals such as the Europeanization of defence policies and industries might be a

sound strategy. However, there are still major impediments for this to happen, especially

questions of national sovereignty and pride, capability gap and lack of willingness. We

1 PhD, Lecturer at the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj- Napoca. E-mail: [email protected].

2 PhD candidate in International Relations and European Studies of Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-

Napoca. E-mail: [email protected].


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will attempt to address the following questions: Could the Member States’ defence

preferences be reshaped into European defence preferences? Might this lead to the

development of a common European army? Could it be possible that what we term as

’geostrategic imperatives’ will provide the necessary incentives for the true advancement

of the European common defence policy that might lead eventually to European common

defence3? The paper examins these questions in two parts: the first section focuses on the

the question of the national preferences (the preferences of the Member States) in the fieldof security and defence, while the second approaches the EU’s (geo)strategic

environment, mainly at the Eastern borders of the European Union.

1. National defence preferences and the common European army project

The formation of national preferences is a key argument for the liberal

institutionalism theory - a theory that emphasizes that cooperation is possible and

desirable even under the condition of anarchy. The institutional theory “specifies how

states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and minimize the

possibility of defection”4. In return, the formal and informal laws and practices developed

within the institutional framework gradually shape the preferences of the stakeholders.Liberal theories of international relations (the most important in this context being

the liberal intergovernmentalism promoted by Andrew Moravcsik) focuse on the effects of

state-society relations in shaping national preferences or how the societal groups

(companies, bureaucracies, NGOs etc.) „constrain, more or less, the priorities and policies

of governments, depending on the policy area and the anticipated costs and benefits of the

policy in question”5. Naturally, it is far easier to develop such interdependencies in the

economic field. It is far more difficult to develop them in the political-military one.

Foreign and security policies “largely remain the domain of core executives and,

consequently, the formation of national preferences is unlikely to be the outcome of

pluralistic politics”6. If the governments are inclined toward autonomy and unilateral

policies, they tend to be skeptical towards cooperation, whereas those affected by sector-

specific interdependence have a higher inclination to cooperate7. However, whereas the

societal groups (in this case the companies) clearly manifest their desire to merge into

more powerful European consortia, sometimes the governments stop such investmentsthat would boost the European defense industry and the CSDP, for instance. We will

present later the case study of EADS (currently the Airbus Group).

National preferences are influenced by a large number of issues, some comingfrom the domestic (endogenous) environment (e.g. national elections results, changes of

leadership, constitutional changes, changes in the spectrum of political parties etc.), while

some are coming from the external environments (e.g. the EU level, the international

system). Even though there are certain changes in the domestic environment, like the

emergence of extremist parties after the European elections in many European Member

3 This seemingly tautological expression is actually an enduring one in the European Treaties. The

most recent one, the Treaty of Lisbon states: “the progressive framing of a common defence policy

that might lead to a common defence” (article 11). 4 James Walsh, „National Preferences and European Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary

Integration” (paper for the Political Studies Association – UK 50th Annual Conference, London, 10-

13 April, 2000), 2, accessed in December 11, 2014, https://www.researchgate.net/.5 Maurizio Carbone, National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon

Treaty (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 3.6 Ibid., 91.

7 Ibid., 91-92.


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threats (like the Soviet threat during the Cold War or the much older German threat)

makes the national publics more resistant to change involving the national sovereignty.

The post-Cold War strategic environment presents an excellent case: the dissolution of

USSR and the breakup of communism have brought the illusion of history’s end, many

celebrating the victory of political and economic neoliberalism. A “farewell to arms”

symptom emerged following the belief that the nation-state should become minimal and

the governmental spending should be drastically cut or be redirected toward investmentsin the private sphere. Perhaps nowhere was this reality more vividly sensed than in the

case of national military forces. Soon after the collapse of Soviet Union and the

rapprochement with the East, it became clear for most Western governments that the time

came for drastic reductions in military personnel, capabilities and budgets. Unfortunately,

few came with the idea that the national armies could become utterly obsolete and the

development of a common European army could actually save tax payers’ money.

One of the main reasons for rejecting the furthering of the European project,

especially in the field of security and defense, is related to the functioning of the

democratic system: preferences are not shaped by autocrats (as is the case of dictatorships

and totalitarian systems). In a democracy preferences are intersubjective constructed by politicians, civil society, and most of it by citizens. It is not a surprise the tendency of

democracy to foster enduring preferences. They are not dependent on arbitrary decisions

taken by some individuals. They depend on majorities and majorities negotiate changes

using the lowest common denominator especially during the times of peace. Under such

circumstances, the change is rather gradual than revolutionary. The same applies to the

intergovernmental bargaining that is shaping the EU policies: “bargaining tends to

converge toward the lowest common denominator of large state interests”12.

While the lack of global strategic challengers was clear during the 1990s another

pattern was emerging: the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have led to ethnic

open or frozen conflicts (the wars in former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Transnistria, Nagorno-

Karabakh, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict). A spectrum of ‘new’ security threats provided the

necessity to even redefine the concept of security itself: ethnic conflicts, organized crime,

terrorism, mass migration, WMDs, nuclear proliferation, cybernetic warfare, climate change

etc. The containment of such threats could not be solved in the same manner as the oneemployed during the Cold War. Compared with other historical periods, this period was one of

hegemonic stability, with the United States and its Western allies almost lacking a global

challenger. Nevertheless, the ‘unipolar’ moment was clearly missed, without materializing intoanother American hegemonic period, like the one from 1945 to 1971.

Since September 11, 2001, the international system has been visibly challenged by

revisionist or anarchist actors. Most of them are non-state, transnational actors, yet few of

them could be nation-states. While the new global ‘rivalry’ is visibly asymmetrical, still

favoring the West, one knows that lesser actors are sometimes more motivated in executing

threats than the major ones. The ‘breaking news’ of military clashes in Eastern Ukraine, or

the terrorist attacks in European capitals (like the recent Charlie Hebdo attempt and the

follow-up murders in France), the horrible crimes in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan committed by

the ‘Islamic State’ or Al-Qaida, all indicate major security breaches in the fabric of the

international system. The international organizations and even their members have not yet

overcome the reactive working method in favor of a proactive one.

12 Andrew Moravcsik, „ Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional

Statecraf t in the European Community,” International Organization 45, 1 (Winter 1991): 19-56.


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Even though the European integration challenged the old realities on the European

continent, one cannot ignore that there are still major powers in the European Union. The

most visible are France, Germany, and Great Britain. They are traditional Great Powers,

with former imperialist power projections, with a long tradition of activity in international

politics. It would be interesting to analyze to what extent their cooperation inside the

European institutions has changed (Europeanized) their interests and preferences in the

conduct of foreign, security and defense policies. An interesting case is provided byCharles de Gaulle, founder and first president of the French V Republic (1958-1969).

One could say that the case is too outdated to account for the modern changes in

European politics. However, Charles de Gaulle’s legacy remains powerful even in the

process of European integration. The intergovernmental method still rules many fields of

European integration, particularly those related to the CFSP-CSDP. De Gaulle inspired a

new form of European integration in which the Member States retain their essential

sovereignty, taking the most critical decisions, such as the general guidelines of future

European policies. This decision-making method was not actually new. It was based on

the old ‘Concert of Europe’. It was Great Powers’ politics, favoring the French intérêt

national . The Germans had become also attracted by what De Gaulle has been dreaming,the establishment of a European hard core, formed from France and Germany, linking the

French global ambitions with the German economic and technological supremacy.

Here, one needs to emphasize that the European integration process was and still

is an elitist one. Personalities like Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle, or Jacques Delors had

certain abilities to influence national preferences more than the bureaucracies that served

them. However, it is clear that the democratic political leaders are rather inclined to

support policies that are accepted by the majorities that elect them. Even though their own

personal ideas and agendas play a major role, they usually reflect their desire to be

reelected. The interplay between what the leadership thinks is best for the country and

what the citizens really want from the leadership probably explains what we term politics.

However, the leaders are more comfortable with large national majorities supporting their

European policies. This is why they are usually cautious in advancing radical changes in

the European integration process that diverge from the national interest. Never this is

clearer than in the case of the Great Powers. The national preferences of the Great Powersare ubiquitous - they are constructed in past, present, and future.

Charles de Gaulle’s policies are translated by historiography in two opposite

meanings: an ‘orthodox’ view suggesting that the French president sought a master plan, agrand-strategy or grand-design to restore France’s grandeur nationale, while the other, the

‘revisionist’ view affirming that his policies were actually aiming at economic gains13.

The traditionalists believed that de Gaulle wanted a European Union that would have

served France’s Great Power ambitions in relation with the US and the Soviet Union. It

was essentially a geopolitical interpretation of the Fouchet Plans. The revisionists’ view is

supported by the actual gain for the De Gaulle’s European policy: the firm establishment

of the CAP, a compromise between France and Germany. Nevertheless, what Charles de

Gaulle taught us is that even the most suspicious and Euro-skeptical leaders could not

ignore the potential of the united Europe. In their attempt to advance military or economic

national interests they made a service for the future of the European integration. The

domestic and foreign pressures could be better tamed under a European framework than

by isolating one’s country.

13 See Andrew Moravcsik „Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The New Revisionism,” Journal of Cold

War Studies 14, 1 (Winter 2012): 53-77.


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The balance of power calculus was not entirely abandoned by the leaders of the

European Great Powers. A bipolar balance is one that can be better controlled. Since the

times of Charles de Gaulle, France and Germany have developed a political-military

interdependence that shaped the national preferences of the two powers. The French-

German tandem, or le noyau dur of the European integration helps in explaining the main

decisions taken since the 1960s with European repercussions, including the establishment

of political cooperation which lead to the establishment of the CFSP with the Treaty ofMaastricht. However, with the British accession to the European Communities in 1973 the

game has become much more interesting. A tripolar balance of power could have been

installed inside the European institutions. The ambiguous European discourse of the

British (radical Euro-skeptical during the mandate of Margaret Thatcher) sometimes

excluded them from the main decision-making, the French-German tandem succeeding in

leading Europe until the mid-1990s. However, the French-British compromise of 199814

was the key element in the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy.

Nevertheless, cooperation and skepticism have continued to mark the tripolar relationship.

In our opinion only the rapprochement between Germany, France and the United

Kingdom could finalize the process of European political union.A positive example would be the development of a common European defense

industry. One must remember that the European integration started with the establishment

of the Council of Europe, which harmonized the democratic principles and values prized

by the European states. Later, the development of the European Coal and Steel

Community helped at unifying, in a functionalist manner, the economic interests of the six

initial Member States. Even though it was not military or defensive in nature, the ECSC

managed to put together the main industries that were behind the war machines that

almost destroyed Europe during the two world wars. From this point forward the ECSC

had provoked the spillovers that eventually created the European Economic Community

and later the European Union. Is it impossible to think that creating a true common

European defence industry could create the conditions for other spillovers, such as the

establishment of a common European army?

There is already the example of EADS consortium which was reorganised in 2014

as the Airbus Group. The consortium generates revenues of tens of billion Euro, with anexternal sourcing turnover in 2013 of €42.3 billion 15 . The Airbus Groups combines

companies from around the world, but it is essentially a European multinational

aerospatial and defense corporation registered in the Netherlands and with headquarters inTolouse, France. The main companies are from France (Aérospatiale-Matra), Germany

(Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG) and Spain (Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA). It is the

most important rival of the US giant company, Boeing, at least in the civilian aero-space

field. However, the Airbus Group is not the largest European defense company. This

status is enjoyed by the British multinational company, BAE Systems, which is also

involved in aero-space technology.

BAE Systems is a combination of British Aerospace ( BAe) and Marconi

Electronic Systems ( MES ), headquartered in London. BAE Systems Inc. is the successor

of the most important British defense firms, including de Havilland, British Aircraft

Corporation, Supermarine etc. It is one of the world’s largest defence contractors,

supplying even the US Department of Defense. It is involved in the development of F-35

14 After the French-British Summit of Saint-Malo closed with the signing of the Joint Declaration on

European Defense, 4 December 1998.15

Data from the Airbus Group Website: http://www.airbusgroup.com/int/en/group-vision.html.


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Lightning II, and it is also one of the three European companies developing the famous

multirole fighter Eurofighter Typhoon. One of the other two is Airbus Group.

During the last years there have been discussions regarding a merger between the

Airbus Group (at that time EADS) and BAE Systems. What is really interesting is that

most of the stakeholders were happy about the prospects of these two giants joining

together, including the French and British governments. The veto came, this time, from

Germany. An article from The Economist vividly criticized the decision of the GermanChancellor, Angela Merkel: „ Fearing that a powerful Anglo-French axis might

marginalise the German bit of EADS (especially Cassidian, the group’s Bavarian -based

defence and security arm), Angela Merkel used her rights under a politicised

shareholding agreement to issue a stern “nein”„16 . It is clear that a merger of this

magnitude would have introduced an important actor not only in the business field but

also in the political one. The influence of a wider European defence consortium on the

national preferences of the Member States would have been much powerful with possible

implications for the development of a common European army.

Currently, most Member States of the European Union still prefer organizing their

armed forces based on national capabilities. For some of them it is a question of national pride (e.g. France or Britain), for others it is a question of constitutional design limiting

their participation to external military operations (Germany17), while for some it is a

question of NATO reliance (Holland). In reality, all the EU Member States still emphasise

the national character of their defenses. Above all, there is the North-Atlantic Alliance

(NATO) which is still holding the keys of European security and defense. But this

depends on the willingness and availability of US forces to defend Europe, since most

European military forces are demonstrative and tailored to match the power of the

neighbors, not to tackle the threats from the wider neighborhood. The US forces have

constantly retreated from Europe since the end of the Cold War, except for some tactical

redeployment in Eastern Europe (most notably Poland and Romania) related to the US

interests in the Middle East.

2. Geostrategic chal lenges at the Eastern borders of the European Union

Increasingly, in the recent years the necessity of adopting new measures forensuring the security of the European Union has been taken under discussion. This relates

on the one hand to the growing number of risks and threats exploiting old and new

security vulnerabilities of the European continent, while, on the other hand, to thecontinuing economic crisis and the budgetary cuts in the field of defence.

Even if the beginning of the 21st century was marked by high level terrorist

attacks, particularly against Western interests, one could notice that the traditional (hard)

threats have maintained their relevance. This is mainly due to the development of the

military capabilities of some important players of the world stage - such as the Russian

Federation or China - and of other relevant regional actors, very vocal, such as Iran, India,

Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. Faced with these challenges, the traditional approach of

securing the limes might become an imperative for the European Union. Of course, the

16 „Europe’s Defence Industry: A Hard Pounding, This,” The Economist , 2 March 2013.

17 In fact, there is no specific interdiction in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany for

German military to participate to military interventions. The Basic Law just stipulates the necessityof parliamentary approval. However, it is a German national preference (shared by most politicians

and citizens) of not participating to military operations outside the NATO area. This is related to

Germany’s past as aggressor, which is deeply resented by today’s German people.


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danger of interstate wars is diminished, but the conventional (or nuclear, if available)

forces could be used in other manners that might endanger the interests of other actors.

Placed at the Western edge of Eurasia, the European Union has two flanks (the

Eastern and the Southern one) with limited military protection, while the Western and

Northern flanks are fairly protected. Some of the EU policies have tried to secure the two

exposed flanks, using what the European Union knows best: soft power. However, the

European Neighborhood Policy, with its Eastern and Southern partnerships, has proveninsufficient in a virtual confrontation with hard powers, with their military and economic

threats. The EU failed in deterring a forceful Russian action into Ukraine, even though this

operation was largely 'announced' by the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. Then and now

the geostrategic situation at the Eastern borders of the European Union has been

highlighting the fragility of the European defense and it’s total reliance on US military

support. Moreover, even though lately the Europeans have usually tried to appease Russia

– emphasising that the EU is not a geopolitical entity wanting to oppose Russian interests

in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space - this seems to be exactly how it was

perceived by the Kremlin.

Nor the Atlantic Alliance was more successful. Even though it had launched aninteresting initiative of ‚smart defence’, that meant „harmonising requirements, pooling

and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better ” (NATO

Website) and it signalled it’s dissatisfaction with Russian policy toward Ukraine, a

respected NATO partner, NATO could not deter the Russian Federation in occupying

Crimea and in arming the rebels in Eastern Ukraine. However, NATO officials are the

most critical when discussing Russia’s new strategic stance. No later than in April the 4th

2014, NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow addressed the

following remarks at the 21st International Conference on Euro-Atlantic Security,

Krakow, Poland. The discourse generally sums up the challenges at the Eastern borders of

EU and NATO: „For 20 years, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has been based on

the premise that we do not face an adversary to our east. This premise is now in doubt.

Russia’s recent actions against Ukraine have been a wake-up call for everyone in the

Euro-Atlantic community. They follow a pattern of behaviour that we already observed in

Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The pattern is to influence, destabilize andeven intervene in countries on Russia’s borders, to prolong “frozen” conflicts by

supporting corrupt, separatist groups, and to thereby deny sovereign states the ability to

choose their own security arrangements and to chart their own political destinies”18.

Starting from the conditions mentioned above, this section will attempt to sketch a

general geostrategic tableau of the European strategic environment, outlining possible

geostrategic imperatives that could lead to the re-opening of the debate surrounding the

establishment of a European Common Army able to solve the military threats in the

immediate proximity of the European Union alongside NATO and within the smart

defence framework proposed by the Alliance.

The analysis starts from the observation that geostrategy is focused on measures

capable to ensure the security of states or alliances, maintain protection, influence,

domination, or other benefits in areas of strategic importance19. Therefore, in order to

18 Alexander Vershbow, “A New Strategic Reality in Europe” (speech by NATO Deputy Secretary

General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow to the 21st International Conference on Euro-AtlanticSecurity, Krakow, Poland, April the 4th, 2014), accessed in December 30, 2014,

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108889.htm?selectedLocale=en.19

Michel Foucher, Fronts et frontières: Un tour du monde géopolitique (Paris: Fayard, 1991).


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identify geostrategic imperatives linked to the need for an ECA 20 we followed the

following steps: (1) the analysis of the geostrategic area of interest and its key elements;

(2) the evaluation of the actors’ geostrategic interests and their relative strength, and (3)

issuing some considerations regarding the elaboration of counter-strategies from the point

of view of the EU and its Member States.

Table 1: East-European space: area and population.

No Country Area (sq km)% from Area sq

kmPopulation

% from

population

1Russian Federation –

European side3.960.000 79,5% 110.000.000

21 63,26

2 Ukraine 603.700 12,12 %44.291.413

(July 2014 est.)24,47

3 Belarus 207.600 4,16 %9.608.058

(July 2014 est.)5,52

4 Lithuania 65.300 1,31 % 2.971.905 1,7

5 Latvia 64.589 1,29 % 2.165.165(July 2014 est.)

1,24

6 Estonia 45.228 0,9 %1.257.921

(July 2014 est.)0,72

7 Moldova 33.851 0,67 %3.583.288

(July 2014 est.)2,06

Total 4.980.268 173.877.750Source: CIA factbook 23, UN database24

Located at the crossroads of Mackinder’s heartland and Spykman’s rimland25 the

Eastern European geostrategic space appears to be a transit platform between Asia andEurope. If we consult the maps, the area appears as a constriction of the huge territory of

Eurasia, beginning in the Pacific and continuing toward a general East-West direction.

This ‘bottleneck’ is imposed by the pressure of the two inland seas: the Baltic Sea and theBlack Sea. This geographical description has marked the history of the area. It explainswhy the Eastern Europe has become an area exposed to great invasions and a stage for

20 Abbreviation from European Common Army.

21 Anatoly Vishnevsky, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution for Russia?” (Expert Group Meetingon Policy Responses to Population Ageing and Population Decline, Population Division,

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariats, New York, 16-18 October2000), UN/POP/PRA/2000/14, 15 August 2000, accessed December 30, 2014, http://www.un.org/

esa/population/publications/popdecline/vishnevsky.pdf.22

Statistics Lithuania (the national statistical agency of Lithuania) estimates the country's total

population at the start of 2013 to be 2, 971, 905, which takes into account the findings of Lithuania's

2011 census and the high rate of net emigration since the country joined the EU in 2004 (July 2014 est.)23

Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” accessed in January 04, 2015,

https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/.24

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), The Population Division,

“World Population Prospects,” accessed in December 28, 2014, http://esa.un.org/unpd/

wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm.25 Gheorghe Văduva, „Coridorul strategic energetic în geopolitica şi geostrategia spaţiului euro-

asiatic” [The strategic energy corridor in the geopolitics and geostrategy of the Euro-Asian space]

(Bucureşti: Institutul de Studii strategice „Dimitrie Cantemir,” 2013), accessed December 30, 2014,

http://www.iss.ucdc.ro/studii-pdf/Marea%20Neagr%E3%20Coridorul%20energetic%20euroasiatic.pdf.


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huge confrontations, since the time of the Turanic migrations that lead to the destruction

of the Western Roman Empire and reaching the highest point during the years of the

Second World War, when armies of millions were facing eachother to death. But what

turns this space to become a limes of clashes and a highway for invasions?

Analyzed in terms of geography, the Eastern European area is bounded to the

West by Central Europe - the Eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania; to

the North - by Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea with the Gulf of Finland extension; tothe East - by the line descending from the Urals to the Caucasus mountains and closes the

European part of Russia. The area is contained by the Southern limit formed by the

Caucasus mountains and by the Black Sea.

Speaking in geographical terms, the landscape is dominated by plain or a heavily

eroded plateau (with maximum heights of 400 meters), crossed by navigable rivers

interconnected by channels linking the Black and the Baltic Seas and, at the same time,

between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The lack of mountains, coupled with the

relatively low flow of these rivers have turned this area into a transit one: hard to defend,

easy to conquer. In this space, stretched from the North to the South, between the Baltic

Sea and the Black Sea, only the Pinsk Marshes, at the border between Belarus andUkraine, represented a major obstacle for the East-West transit or, vice versa. Although

permeable, the 'strength' of this region lies precisely in its vastity.

The states of this area are: Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Estonia, Ukraine, Republic

of Moldova, the Russian Federation – covering a total area of 4,980,268 square kilometers

and a population of 173,877,750 people. Although larger in size than the EU (4,248,030

sq km) its population represents only 36% of the EU population26.

For comparison, the total for the EU: 4,423,147 sq km, and population 507, 416, 60727.

2.1. The geostrategic importance of states is generated by the functions that they perform

Historically, the first function performed by this area was one of transit for the

Central Asian populations toward the European continent28. Currently, this function stopped

being an important issue in security assessments that are made for this space. Transit

populations were replaced but the issue of completion of territorial division between

sedentary populations living here. Unfortunately, the issue is far from being closed, eventhough the Helsinki Final Act of 197529 should have done it. The Soviet implosion reopened

the territorial or border issues between the Soviet successor states. With the recent events in

Eastern Ukraine it became clear that the issue of borders is an important source of violentconflicts in an area with so many 'frozen’ conflicts. A key feature of border demarcation

issue in this space is given by the fact that all fontiers are challenged, some strongly (by the

Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Armenia), while others are at

merely historical frustration level (Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, the

Baltic countries).

26 The population of the European Union without the Baltic states is 474.821.000, acording to

EUROSTAT.27

EUROSTAT, „Population on 1 January 2014,” accessed in December 27, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/

eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1.28

Victor Spinei, Marile migraţii din estul şi sud -estul Europei în secolele IX-XIII [The great

migrations in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe from the 9th to the 13th centuries ] (Iaşi: EdituraInstitutul European, 2000), Foreword.

29 „Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act,” Helsinki, 1975, accessed January

04, 2015, https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true.

http://ec.europa.eu/http://ec.europa.eu/http://ec.europa.eu/


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All these issues are creating uncertainty in the entire area, having a more or less

direct influence on the European security as a whole. Even if the EU Member States

located on the Eastern Frontier of the EU and NATO have accepted the status quo, agreed

through bilateral and multilateral treaties, stipulated especially in the Helsinki Final Act,

the states that used to be ‚unional republics’ of the USSR 30 at the time the treaty was

signed, have restarted the territorial disputes immediately after declaring their

independence in 1991.Another strategic function performed by the Eastern European space is its

characteristic of being a strategic energy corridor. This function is sustained, on the one

hand, by the existence of huge energy resources in the Caspian Sea region, and especially

in Central Asia and Western Siberia and on the other hand by the energy dependence of

the EU Members on these resources. The energy corridor comprises the following routes

(Văduva, 2013):

the strategic maritime corridor (linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean

Sea) with connection to the strategic Caspian-Asian energy corridor (Caucasus, the

Caspian Sea, Central Asia) and also towards the South-West Asia strategic corridor

(Black Sea, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf); the Balkan strategic corridor, from Bulgaria to Greece and Italy with

connections to the same Asian corridors;

the Danube strategic corridor with Western connection to the Rhine and

Eastern to the Asian corridors;

the Central European strategic corridor, through the Great North European

Plain (Russia-Belarus-Poland-Germany) connected to the Don, Volga, Western Siberia;

the Baltic strategic corridor with Western connection to the North Sea and

Atlantic Ocean and Eastern connection to the Central and Northern Siberia strategic corridors.

We appreciate that this function of Eastern European limes has become of

paramount importance because the economic development of the countries in the region is

linked and depends on keeping the operational status of these corridors.

The geopolitical function of the Eastern European space is generated by its

location at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. According to Sir

Halford Mackinder, one of the founding fathers of geopolitics, the heartland that he calls„the heart of the world” is the area stretching from Eastern Europe (from the Caspian Sea

and Volga) to the Pacific Ocean. This ‘pivot’ area is rich in natural resources and holds a

key position in terms of communication between different regions of the world.

Mackinder surrounded this pivotal area with an „Inner or Marginal Crescent”31, consisting

of a maritime frontal, comprising the continental states with access to the Planetary Ocean

(like Germany, Turkey, India, China). Another space that he delimited was the „Outer

Crescent”, represented by the states that are external to the pivot area (Great Britain, South

Africa and Japan). These political geographical considerations determined Mackinder to

set three conditions that he believed to be necessary in order to achieve world domination:

„Who rules Eastern Europe, commands the heartland; who rules the Heartland commands

the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world” 32 . In other words,

30 John Hiden et al., The Baltic Question during the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2008), 209.

31 Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Society 23, 4(April 1904), 435.

32 Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in Political Reconstruction (New

York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), 194.


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whoever controls the heartland will forever seek to dominate the Eurasian landmass and

ultimately the world33.

Even if Makinder's theory has many speculative elements, certainly it was not

neglected nor forgotten, especially if we consider the developments in the region

happening soon after his work. First of all, though it was generally discredited in Britain,

the ideas of Mackinder inspired the German school of geopolitics founded by general

Haushofer. Moreover, Mackinder predicted that if Russia will be victorious in the war forthe control of the Heartland, it will have the most advantageous strategic position and it

will be the greatest power on land. Indeed, the end of the Second World War left the

Soviet Union in full control over the Eastern Europe. During the Cold War Russia made

the most of this position, but lost it after the dissolution of the USSR. In the new Russian

Federation, the strategic successor of the Soviet Union, the old lectures of geopolitics have

emerged once again in the voices of several supporters, like Alexandr Dughin, forcing the

West to rediscover Halford Mackinder. It was precisely what an important American

writter, Robert D. Kaplan, tried in one of his latest books: The Revenge of Geography:

What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York:

Random House, 2012).Clearly, many authors from past and present attribute to the Eastern European

space a crucial importance, especially for the European access to the resources of Central

Asia and the Caucasus. The control of this space would allow Russia, the dominant power

in the region, to have access to the warm seas, which are essential for free trade, even in

the age of the airplane (most part of the goods necessary for human existence still travel

on ships). On the other hand, the control of this space would allow Europe to protect its

territory from major sources of political instability from the Northern Caucasus, for

instance. A fight for control of this area currently seems improbable, even though the

Kremlin considers it in its strategies. Russian president Vladimir Putin even implied it in

his speeches that the EU is responsible for the chaos in Ukraine following the so-called

coup that removed pro-Russian president Yanukovych from power. Even Western

political scientists and commentators such as John Mearsheimer puts that the blame for

the Ukrainian crisis not entirely falls on Putin’s hands: “(…) the United States and its

European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of

Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion

eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginningwith the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s,

Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they

have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important

neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s

democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” --

was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a

NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join

the West”34. Indeed, it seems clear now that the West failed to anticipate Russia’s moves

due to a sharp difference in values. The West fails to realize that there are still cultures, if

33 Charles Clover, „Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 9.

34 John Mearsheimer, „Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That

Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs XCIII, 5 (September/October 2014): 1.


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not civilizations, that do not automatically share its neoliberal peaceful enthusiasm. And

now the stage for a new cold war seems set.

2.2. An analysis of geostrategic perspectives on the Eastern European space

From a geostrategic point of view, the control of border areas, situated between

the Eastern European space and Central Europe, is essential for achieving strategic

advantages – both military and economic - over competitors. Even if the whole Easternlimes of the EU is an area of interest for Russia, we can say that, there are several key

positions that might allow Russia to gain an advantage over the EU. From the North to the

South there are:

● Russian enclave of Kaliningrad : a former German province within East

Prussia, having the administrative center in Königsberg – the current Kaliningrad - is

essential for maintaining the position of the Russians in the Baltic area and near the

Eastern borders of Poland, with direct connection to the harbor-towns placed to the Baltic

and the North Seas35. Because Russia holds this strategic enclave it has the possibility to

outflank the positions occupied by the Western organizations in the Baltic countries;

● Belarus: although it is an independent country, its behavior suggests more the position of a vassal of Russia; it depends on Russia both politically and economically.

Economic agreements between the two countries consolidate the Russian control of

Belarus; this control is essential for the Russian strategy of protecting itself against the

Western influence36. Moreover, Brest-Smolensk-Moscow route is the easiest axis used by

all those who invaded Russia and axis along which were propagated also the Russian

invasions of Europe37;

● Transnistria : the positioning of Russians in Transnistria – nominally, both not

effectively a part of Moldova - guarantees the existence of a Russian bridgehead toward

the Balkans, with a secondary role in exerting pressure on to the Danube. Maintaining a

significant Russian military presence in the region - despite the commitments made by

Russia regarding a military withdrawal from Transnistria - underlines the strategic

importance of the region for the Russian grand strategy38;

● Crimea : although after the break-up of the USSR Russia accepted that Ukraine

has the administrative control of the peninsula, in exchange for control of the deep-water port of Sebastopol and several airfields39, Russia finally decided to initiate a military

invasion of the peninsula in 2014, in order to end the Ukrainian claims on this region.

Owning the Crimea, it allows Russia to have a strong military control both of the Black

Sea and of the Straits of Danube. Positions held by Romania and Bulgaria (NATO

members) on the Black Sea is thus neutralized.

35 Alexander Diener and Joshua Hagen, “Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad Exclave and Enclave:

Russian and EU Perspectives,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 52, 4 (Marshall University,

2011): 568, accessed January 04, 2015, http://mds.marshall.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

article=1006&context=geography_faculty.36

Stratfor, “Challenges for Belarus' Political and Economic Model,” Stratfor Analysis, 5, March 2012,

accessed January 05, 2015, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/challenges-belarus-political-and-

economic-model#axzz3PlyQ8NrS.37

Stratfor, “Belarus' Geographic Challenge,” Stratfor Media Center , 23 July, 2012, accessed January

05, 2015, http://www.stratfor.com/video/belarus-geographic-challenge#axzz3PlyQ8NrS.38

GlobalSecurity.org, “Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova,” accessed January 05, 2015,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-moldova.htm.39

Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 600.


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● Abkhazia and South Ossetia : being situated south to the Caucasus Mountains,

the fact that Russia holds Abkhazia allows having the control of Georgian ports and, at the

same time, to carry out – holding also strategic positions in South Ossetia - an invasive

control over the energy corridors between the Caspian and Black Seas.

● Armenia: Russian positions held in Armenia put pressure on Azerbaijan, state

supported both by Turkey and the West 40. Although it is difficult to maintain it, the

position is essential for closer cooperation with Iran, at the expense of the West or theTurkish, and, especially, to have the control over energy corridors from Central Asia, but

also for the probable energy corridors from Iran to Europe, if a rapprochement between

the two may become one day possible.

Behind this seemingly impressive strategic mechanism, the inner area controlled

by the Russians, allows them to make significant transfers of forces and means, both in

depth toward the contact line, and parallel to the contact line, the area having major

communication routes, and even network channels for transferring naval forces North-

South and East-West. The Volga - Don Channel, having 101 km length, ensures a link

between the Caspian and Black Seas, allowing the access of ships of approx. 5,000 tons,

including warships41. Other channels connect Volga River with the Baltic Sea, Don Riverwith Pripet and Bug. The remarkable dimensions of this strategic apparatus and especially

the firmness with which the Russians are trying to maintain it42 show the determination

with which the Russians are trying to protect this strategic mechanism, and, at the same

time, to put pressure on the European Union's Eastern borders.

Facing this clear pressures exerted by the Russians, and the possibilities of

extending them toward the Moldovan, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and especially Ukrainian

spaces, the European Union should take its own countermeasures if it want to keep the

pace. The Western strategic apparatus appears from the North to the South as follows:

● Finland : with its positions held in the Gulf of Finland, this country controls the

access of the Russians to the Baltic. The fragility of positions held by the West is given by

the fact that Finland is only EU member and because the US is less involved in this

region. Moreover, Finland’s attitude towards Russian interests is deferent, inspiring the

term Finlandization;

● The Balti c States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia): their inclusion into the EUand NATO allowed the West to move strongly into the Russian heartland and to block the

access of Russians to the Baltic ports. Moreover, the Western positions directly threat

Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia’s most essential cities.

● Poland, Romania : these are two countries firmly controlled by the West

through NATO and the EU, but also through direct American involvement with troops and

recently, through the settlement of permanent US military bases. The control of the two

countries which have the largest share of the Eastern limes of the EU, helps protecting the

Central Europe and the Balkans.

● Turkey: NATO member, having its own interests in the Black Sea and the

Caucasus, this country empowers the Western mechanism, especially through the control

40 Lionel Beehner, „Russia and the Frozen Wars,” The Council on Foreign Relations, 6 September 2006,

accessed December 02, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/russia-and-central-asia/russia-frozen-wars/p11361.41

“Volga-Don Shipping Canal,” International Marine Consultancy, 31 Jan. 2007, accessed December

02, 2014, http://www.imcbrokers.com/blog/overview/detail/volga-don-shipping-canal.42

See the civilian war in Moldova (1992), the Azerbaidjan-Armenia War (1994), the Russian-

Georgian war (2008), the cyber-attacks on Estonia (2007), the invasion of the Crimea (2014) and

the current civil war in Ukraine with seemingly direct Russian involvement.


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that it exercises over the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Turkey alongside

Denmark is essential into controlling the Russian access to the Baltic Sea and to the

Mediterranean Sea.

Fig.1. The East-European strategic mecanism

Pivot states for Russian interests

Pivot states for Western interests

Russian pressure: Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Central Europe, Danube River,

Straits, Turkey, South Caucassus

Western pressure: Belarus, Ukrain, Moldova

conflict: East Ukraine

Source: Europe Physical Map43 and design by Raul Dăncuţă.

Between the two strategic mechanisms – the Russian and the European – there are buffer states or areas of possible confrontation: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and

Azerbaijan. The interest of competitors is to conquer strong positions within areas of

confrontation that provide advantages over the opponent. The means by which they do itare different: while the EU prefers soft power mechani sms - political and economic

43 “Europe Physical Map,” accessed January 04, 2015, http://chekel.co/tag/europe-physical-map.

East-European

space4.980.268 sq

km


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agreements, promoted in particular by the neighborhood policy known as the Eastern

Partnership, Russia prefers hard power actions , characterized by strong actions and

threats done by the policymakers, psychological warfare, information or cyber type

warfare, manipulating elections, interfering troops, opposing or supporting different

societal groups. Russia tried and failed to develop its own soft power capabilities,

therefore remaining with the only other options. Unfortunately, the two sides both seem to

suffer from a lack of smart power capabil iti es . The force of the virtual Western strategic mechanism consists of the unitary

character of the area (in terms of respect for democracy, rule of law and market economy)

and on the fact that the countries belong to the same system of alliances: NATO and/or

EU. However, it should be noted that the EU has not yet developed its own strategic

mechanism, its protection being ensured in particular by NATO and the US. The relative

lack of consistency in European action has to do with the lack of military resources and by

the lack of support that it can be positioned at the Eastern border. The first consequence

was the loss of positions in Ukraine and Georgia and the vulnerable position of Moldova.

Therefore, it could become necessary for the EU to adopt measures able to show that

Europeans support their interests firmly.

2.3. The balance of military power at the European Union’s Eastern limes

Comparing the Eastern European Union’s military apparatus to the Russian one,

one cannot but notice an obvious imbalance. The Russian military advantage (see table 2)

is given, in particular, by the amount of troops and equipment owned by the Russian

Army, by the possibility for inside the line maneuvers and especially by political and

military decision-making mechanisms. On the other side, the Europeans have a limes

covered by poorly equipped armies, under-financed and under-staffed, with no coherent

cooperation strategies and no coherent European chain of command, too slow to cope with

the rapid deployment requirements necessary in times of crisis and in the modern warfare.

Under the circumstances, only the NATO membership of the states composing the

Eastern limes can ensure a relative balance of power but only at the decisional level, not at

the implementation one. This seemingly shocking statement takes into consideration the

lack of permanent NATO bases at the vicinity of the Eastern borders of the EU and NATO, and the reduced number of American soldiers deployed in the region. Regarding

the Americans - the only ones who have effective military capabilities to rapidly engage a

challenger such as Russia - they keep their main troops deployed in Germany, Italy and

UK 44 (the European operational theater), being tributary to the previous agreements

concluded with the Russians. However, we find - not surprisingly - that the downsizing of

American troops and of resources allocated to US military facilities in Europe continues

relentlessly despite the official rhetoric stating that America remains engaged in the

European security. Soon, another 15 US military facilities from UK, Germany, Italy and

Belgium will be closed and transferred to the respective states (Rettman, 2015). American

troops deployed in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria can only be considered as a political

guarantee provided for these NATO members, indicating the American commitment to the

region45; but, one can not fail notice their relative weakness and low combative value.

44 Defense Manpower Data Center, “Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength by Service,

Regional Area, and Country,” 30 September 2014, accessed January 04, 2015, www.dmdc.osd.mil.45

Vasile Popa, Redislocarea bazelor militare ale SUA în Europa de Est-România [The redeployment

of US Military Bases in East Europe - Romania] (Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de

Apărare, 2005), 16.


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Under these considerations, measures should be undertaken able to transform the

EU into a credible player, active in its own security environment, using the CFSP and

CSDP capabilities and assets. Obviously, the states at the Eastern limes (maybe, except the

Northern ones) are far from being able to fill the gap in military potential they have

compared to Russia. In this case, the EU should intervene, identifying a solution, even if

this will take some time, such as the establishment of military structures capable of

providing additional security guarantees for the Eastern limes.

Fig. 2. The military balance in Eastern Europe.

Source: Der Spiegel .46

One could argue that the establishment of European Battle Groups, with the role

of maintaining strong positions in the proximity of Russian-European ‘confrontation’ area,

may be a step toward the establishment of a European military force, a step toward the

establishment of common European Army. The approach of establishing the battle-groups

is included in the implementation principles of the Common Security and Defense Policy

and particularly of the Helsinki Headline Goal47

, and it could supplement the precariousmilitary means that the European states have at their disposal to defend the European

limes. The reaction of Poland and of Romania seeking direct US military support in thecontext of increasing Russian pressure has highlighted the lack of consistency of European

Union’s security policies, especially the lack of military capabilities available in the

46 The map presented by Der Spiegel was immediately criticized by Russia media. An example is an

article published on a Russian blog site (belonging to Dmitry Gorenburg) entitled „How Not to Do

Maps of Military Strength,” contesting the map data as an exaggeration made by the German publication of the Russian power in the area: https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2014/03/31/how-not-

to-do-maps-of-military-strength/.47

The Headline Goal was established at the European Council of Nice, December 7-9, 2000.


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immediate proximity of the Eastern border 48. We must emphasize that the CSDP does not

currently include the deployment of military assets in the countries belonging to the

Eastern Frontier, necessary to compensate those that NATO failed to deploy after the

enlargement of the Alliance. Out of this strategic deadlock of Western institutions Russia

took the initiative strengthening its strategic mechanism.

Table 2. East-European military balance.

Country Troops Tanks Combat aircraft

Russia 845.000 22.500 1.399

Armenia 44.800 109 15

Belarus 48.000 515 72

Azerbaidjan 66.950 433 44

Georgia 22.650 123 12

R. Moldova 5.350

Ukraine 129.950 1.150 231

Lithuania 11.800

Latvia 5.310

Estonia 5.750

Poland 99.300 893 106

Slovakia 15.850 30 20

Hungary 26.500 30 14

Romania 71.400 437 69

Turkey 510.600 2504 352Source: The Military Balance 201449

Currently, the Euro-battle groups organized by the Eastern Members of the

European Union are not aimed at strengthening the Eastern borders of the EU, but only as

the coagulation of military means able to be used in Petersberg task missions50 (and not

the whole spectrum). This fact generates the fragility of such military units, having a

limited combat capacity. This relates to the lack of involvement of key players with higher

military experience and tradition: particularly France, Britain or Germany. Only the

Northern flank enjoys the joint military units, with high combative value, clustered around

the ‘Northern Initiative’. The Central and the Southern parts of the European strategic

landscape remain dependent on the US security contribution which, as we stated above, is

constantly shrinking. Confronted with such shortcomings, the Europeans should

reconsider their own position on Russian pressures and initiate concrete actions to

strengthen the Eastern limes.

Although the strengthening of this position would have no immediate military

value, we can say that the political impact should be a ‘first class’ one, showing strength

and determination in ensuring the security of the European Union. The sequence of steps

48 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S.

Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,” June 03, 2014, accessed January 04, 2015,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-

and-other-us-efforts-support-.49

The International Institute for Str ategic Studies, “The Military Balance,” London, 05 February 2014. 50

Anna Barcikowska, “EU Battlegroups – Ready to Go?,” Brief Issue (European Union Institute for

Security Studies, November 2013): 4.


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necessary in the development of such an institutional arrangement that could be labelled

‘common army’ could be: battle group joint brigade European corps Common

European Army.

Our concluding remarks regarding the geostrategic situation at the Eastern limes

of the European Union are the following:

the security deficit on the eastern flank of the European strategic apparatus

cannot be reduced only by European involvement; the lack of a superior military force deployed near the eastern borders of the

EU may further weaken the cohesion among the Allies;

the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted further the EU's dependence on the US

military capabilities and assets, while the US is honoring previous commitments to reduce

their military involvement in Europe;

the EU battle groups seem to be more a political show-up initiative of several

Western Member States (particularly France and Germany) than a geostrategic one, since

the military units composed by the countries situated at the estern limes present a lower

combat level than their Western counterparts;

the establishment of European military structures, such as a EuropeanCommon Army (or another label of it), can compensate for the lack of CSDP

effectiveness;

without a credible military force the credibility of the European crisis

diplomacy fades away, the sanctions being unable to deter a determined player.

Our geostrategic analysis did not deliberately approached the nuclear balance of

power between NATO and Russia. We analysed the conventional means involved in the

defense of the European Union’s limes, on the assumption that nuclear forces cannot be

used without mutual assured destruction. Essentially, we assumed that the players are

rational, using the capabilities to obtain the achievement of national interests, such as

territorial agrandizement for Russia or the defense of the Baltics for NATO. However, the

situation in Ukraine has showed us that conventional weaponry still matters in the modern

warfare, even though not in wars between the Great Powers. Nevertheless, a war of

‚insurgency’ could destabilize the region just like other type of warfare. With intention or

not, this is what Vladimir Putin achieved when Russia annexed Crimea and backed therebels in East Ukraine.

Conclusions

The scenario we presented in the second part of our paper may seem outrageous

for some, especially for those that still believe that there are no challenges to the

neoliberal peaceful order, that international conflict is something of the past. However, it

is not hard to see that there is a considerable gap between the rhetoric used by the

institutions involved in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union

and the field reality. In fact, there is a gap between on the one hand words condemning the

presumed Russian aggression – words which are clearly backed by the current

international law – and on the other hand the lack of willingness to define political-

military options. It is not about intervention per se, it is about deterrence.

Some of the EU Member States, if not most of them, oscillate between normative

commitments to democracy and rule of law and the desire to appease a visibly assertive

and revisionist Russian Federation. It is clear that behind this dilemma there areconflictive national preferences: one claiming the democratic peace dividend (based on

the belief that the principles of liberal democracy are currently shared by everybody), the

other one preferring to maintain the economic ties even with a seemingly failed


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democracy such as Russia. The paradox is that on the one side of the coin there stand the

neoliberal principles while on the other side the economic interdependence. The problem

comes from the fact that democratization has remained far behind the economic

liberalization. In fact, the global economic crisis – a market crisis – has managed to stop

the democratization process and even reverse it in many areas of the world, particularly

Russia and the Middle East: the two neighboring regions of the European Union. The

West just hopes that the crisis will end by itself, but it has not yet covered the wholeworld. Moreover, it doesn’t affect only Western type democracies.

The lessons of the Ukrainian crisis that began in 2013 are complex. The EU

diplomacy lacks consistency and credibility due to the lack of military strength to back-up

sanctions. The European Union remains a soft power player unable to use effective hard

power capabilities. However, the Europeans tend to see the world they live in after their

image, ignoring the fact that there are players which - if not totally reject this perspective

– tend to consider the current global establishment as one favoring the West and over

imposed to the East. Unfortunately, it seems that the Western perceptions on enlargement

and regional cooperation, based on conditionality, are seen by Russia and other actors as a

kind of neo-imperialism. We must partly agree with John Mearsheimer that the West isresponsible for the Ukrainian crisis, but we emphasize the shared responsibility.

This paper doesn’t advocate the military option when dealing with crises such as

the Ukrainian one. Diplomacy is always the preferable solution. However, it emphasizes

that the current defense capabilities of the European Union are rather symbolical. The

radicalization of Russian foreign policy and Kremlin’s erratic behavior toward the West

are significant signs of concerns. If the European Union wants to deal with such an actor,

it has to be prepared both politically and militarily. This is the main argument for the

strengthening of European defense cooperation which should lead to a common defense

policy. However, the decision rest in the hand of the Member States, the Treaties’

Guardians and their national preferences are hard to change.

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C o p y r i g h t o f E u r o l i m e s i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f I n s t i t u t e f o r E u r o r e g i o n a l S t u d i e s O r a d e a - D e b r e c e n

a n d i t s c o n t e n t m a y n o t b e c o p i e d o r e m a i l e d t o m u l t i p l e s i t e s o r p o s t e d t o a l i s t s e r v w i t h o u t

t h e c o p y r i g h t h o l d e r ' s e x p r e s s w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . H o w e v e r , u s e r s m a y p r i n t , d o w n l o a d , o r

e m a i l a r t i c l e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l u s e .

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National Defence Preferences and the Common European Army Project