National Cyber Security Strategy · 1 Introduction ... cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State. ... (IDG) on internet governance and international cyber policy

National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024

Table of Contents Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 3

Measures .............................................................................................................................. 5

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 8

2 Vision ........................................................................................................................... 11

3 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 12

4 Risk and the Information Society .................................................................................. 13

4.1 Strategic Risks ....................................................................................................... 13

4.2 Hybrid Threats........................................................................................................ 14

4.3 Risks to Critical National Infrastructure and Public Sector Systems and Data ........ 15

4.4 Citizen and Business .............................................................................................. 17

5 National Capacity Development ................................................................................... 19

5.1 State of Play ........................................................................................................... 19

5.2 Objective ................................................................................................................ 23

5.3 Measures ............................................................................................................... 23

6 Critical National Infrastructure Protection ..................................................................... 25

6.1 State of Play ........................................................................................................... 25

6.2 Objective ................................................................................................................ 26

6.3 Measures ............................................................................................................... 27

7 Public Sector Data and Networks ................................................................................. 31

7.1 State of Play ........................................................................................................... 31

7.2 Objective ................................................................................................................ 32

7.3 Measures ............................................................................................................... 32

8 Skills ............................................................................................................................ 36

8.1 State of Play ........................................................................................................... 36

8.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................. 38

8.3 Measures ............................................................................................................... 38

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9 Enterprise Development ............................................................................................... 41

9.1 State of Play ........................................................................................................... 41

9.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................. 41

9.3 Measures ............................................................................................................... 41

10 Engagement .............................................................................................................. 43

10.1 State of Play ....................................................................................................... 43

10.2 Objective ............................................................................................................. 44

10.3 Measures ............................................................................................................ 44

11 Citizens ..................................................................................................................... 47

11.1 State of Play ....................................................................................................... 47

11.2 Objective ............................................................................................................. 48

11.3 Measures ............................................................................................................ 48

12 Governance Framework and Responsibilities ............................................................ 50

12.1 Governance Structure ......................................................................................... 50

12.2 Delivery of the National Cyber Security Strategy ................................................. 50

Appendix 1 List of Actions ................................................................................................... 51

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Executive Summary Ireland ranks among the leading EU Member States in terms of the uptake and use of digital

technologies. Like the rest of the developed world, these technologies have come to play a

central role in supporting and facilitating economic and social life. Ireland has also gained

very significantly in economic terms from development of a global data ecosystem; our

geographic position, open economy and EU membership have ensured that we have

become host to a significant amount of data and economic activity.

However the progressive development and deployment of the internet and its constellation of

connected devices has been accompanied by an increasing dependence on these systems.

This dependence has created a complex and evolving set of risks, some of which flow from

flaws in the design or operation of systems, leading to unexpected loss of service. Others

exist as a consequence of deliberate actions by organised groups, including Nation States,

seeking to subvert or compromise these systems for a range of reasons. These

compromises can take the form of theft or destruction of data or money and the physical

disruption or destruction of services or infrastructure. In turn, these risks have a complex and

interrelated set of consequences for States, ranging from the protection of citizens data, to

the protection of key infrastructure and services.

Cyber Security is often defined as the means of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity,

authenticity and availability of networks, devices and data. However, as network and

information systems become more embedded and complex, securing these becomes

simultaneously more important and difficult. While these responses have evolved quickly in

an attempt to keep pace with technological and market developments, this process is made

vastly more challenging by the extremely dynamic nature of developments, both in terms of

technology and in terms of the global strategic environment.

Ireland’s first National Cyber Security Strategy was agreed by Government and published in

July 2015. It set out a road map for the development of the National Cyber Security Centre

(NCSC) and a series of measures to better protect Government data and networks, and

critical national infrastructure. This period since that time has seen the NCSC grow

significantly in scale and capacity, and the introduction of EU Network and Information

Security Directive 2016/1148 (NIS Directive), a significant set of measures to support

Government Departments and Agencies in managing their systems.

Furthermore, approximately 70 critical national infrastructure operators have been legally

designated as such, and have been made subject to binding security requirements and to a

binding incident notification requirement. Together, these mean that the State and critical

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national infrastructure operators are far better prepared to deal with cyber security related

risks than before.

The technology sector is characterised by its extreme dynamism however, and it appears

likely that a fresh wave of developments are about to emerge, centred around virtualised

networks using advanced communications protocols (such as 5G), Artificial Intelligence and

the Internet of Things. In turn, these recursively linked developments will likely have a vast

range of use cases, meaning that they will penetrate further into the lives of citizens and the

key infrastructure that services depend on. Moreover, the software based nature of this

technology is such that new regulatory and governance tools are likely to be required to

ensure that both data and services are resilient and secure.

These developments have been accompanied by the rapid growth of a global industry

providing products and services aimed at securing digital systems and infrastructure. With

over 6,500 people employed in the cyber security sector in Ireland, the industry is already a

key part of the technology sector here, both in its own right and as an enabler for investment

in related sectors here. Sustaining and building on this success is an essential part of

ensuring future economic growth and high value jobs, and also ensuring that a cyber

security ecosystem with adequate critical mass exists in the State.

The integration of digital technologies at a national level remains an ongoing process also,

and one that has seen considerable Government action. The 2015 Public Service ICT

Strategy has been augmented by ‘Our Public Service 2020’, a new policy framework

designed to build on these previous reforms while expanding the scope of reform to focus on

collaboration, innovation and evaluation. At a national level, the National Broadband Plan

will ensure that more than half a million people will have access to high speed broadband for

the first time, and the forthcoming National Digital Strategy will set out how Government

intends to ensure that the benefits of digitisation are available for all. Taken together, these

will continue to have positive effects on economic growth, regional balance and individual

opportunity; however this digitisation also brings a degree of risk.

This Strategy sets out how Ireland will embrace these challenges, and also how we plan to

take advantage of the enterprise and job creation opportunities flowing from these global

technological developments. This Strategy sets out a series of measures designed to

address some of the complex challenges associated with sustaining and growing the

number of people employed in this sector.

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Lastly, the development of network and information security as a key policy theme has

important international dimensions also, both in terms of the centrality of internet governance

and, critically, in the general diplomatic sphere. Cyber Security is a first tier international

relations issue; this Strategy establishes how Ireland will continue to play a role in shaping

this environment at a global level.

Measures Government will, over the period 2019-2024, implement the following systematic measures

to protect our nation, to develop our cyber security sector, and to deepen our international

engagement on the future of the internet.

1 The National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, particularly with

regard to expand its ability to monitor and respond to cyber security incidents and

developing threats in the State.

2 Threat intelligence and analysis prepared by the National Cyber Security Centre will

be integrated into the work of the National Security Analysis Centre.

3 The existing Critical National Infrastructure Protection system flowing from the NIS

Directive will continue to be deployed and developed, with particular focus on the

ongoing compliance and audit programmes to mitigate risks to key services.

4 The NCSC, with the assistance of the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána, will

perform an updated detailed risk assessment of the current vulnerability of all

Critical National Infrastructure and services to cyber attack.

5 The existing Critical National Infrastructure protection system will be expanded and

deepened over the life of the Strategy to cover a broader range of Critical National

Infrastructure, including aspects of the electoral system.

6 The existing information sharing groups operated by the National Cyber Security

Centre will be further developed, with the existing Threat Sharing Group being

broadened to include a wider range of Critical National Infrastructure.

7 Government will introduce a further set of compliance standards to support the

cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State.

8 The NCSC will develop a baseline security standard to be applied by all

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Government Departments and key agencies.

9 The existing ‘Sensor’ Programme will be expanded to all Government Departments,

and an assessment will be conducted as to the feasibility of expanding Sensor to

cover all of Government networks.

10 A Government IT Security Forum will be created, open to all Heads of IT Security

across Government, to facilitate information sharing on best practice for cyber

security and to allow the NCSC support the deployment of the baseline security

standard.

11 The NCSC will be tasked by Government to issue recommendations with regard to

the use of specific software and hardware on Government IT and

telecommunications infrastructure.

12 Government will continue to ensure that second and third level training in computer

science and cyber security is developed and deployed, including by supporting the

work of Skillnets Ireland in developing training programmes for all educational

levels and supporting SOLAS initiatives for ICT apprenticeship programmes in

cyber security.

13 Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) will promote cyber security as a career option in

schools and colleges by means of their Smart Futures Programme.

14 Science Foundation Ireland, along with DBEI and DCCAE, will explore the

feasibility through the SFI Research Centre Programme, the Research Centre

Spoke programme or other enterprise partnership programmes, to fund a significant

initiative in Cyber Security Research.

15 Government will continue to support and fully engage with the IDA funded Cyber

Ireland Programme and explore new mechanisms to support

Industry/Academia/Government cyber security collaboration.

16 Enterprise Ireland will develop a cyber security programme to facilitate collaborative

links between enterprise and the research community that leads to the practical

application of research in business.

17 We will reinforce Ireland’s diplomatic commitment to cyber security, including by

stationing cyber attaches in key diplomatic missions and by engaging in sustainable

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capacity building in third countries.

18 We will create an interdepartmental group (IDG) on internet governance and

international cyber policy to coordinate national positions across Departments.

19 We will deepen our existing engagement in international organisations, including by

joining the Cyber Security Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Tallinn, Estonia.

20 Government will develop a national cyber security information campaign which will

use information provided by the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber Crime

Bureau and be delivered by entities which are directly engaged in information

provision.

A detailed implementation plan of actions relating to these measures, including timelines and

responsible organisations, are set out in the accompanying Annex.

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1 Introduction Ireland is among the leading ranks of EU Member States in terms of the uptake and use of

digital technologies (7th out of the 28 EU Member States in the European Commission

Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2019). In practical terms, this means that the

internet and the vast array of technology and devices connected to it have played a central

role in delivering and enabling our economic success. Moreover, they have also allowed for

considerable improvements in productivity and quality of life, and for greater efficiency and

sustainability in the use of resources. However, these same technologies also bring with

them an embedded set of risks and vulnerabilities. This is a dynamic issue; it is rendered

more complex and challenging as systems become more embedded, connected to the

internet and integrated into virtually every aspect of our lives.

Meeting this challenge, both in terms of the resilience of key infrastructure and services and

the ability of the State to manage and respond to incidents is already critical to the social and

economic wellbeing of the State and its people. It is not a simple task. Cyber security brings

with it a complex web of issues to be dealt with. Internet enabled and connected

technologies already permeate every aspect of our lives, both at a personal level and in

providing the services that we rely upon. The diverse nature of these various sectors, with

different ownership models and technologies, means that there is no single model or

solution, technical or otherwise, that will suit every sector. In formulating a national response,

a dynamic and flexible approach is required, one in which different solutions are applied

according to the nature of the sector and to the risk posed to society, to human life, and to

the economy.

The global nature of the internet has significant geopolitical implications also - infrastructure

of any kind attached to the internet is vulnerable to threats from anywhere on the planet. As

such, the geography of national security has changed, posing some profound national

security policy questions for Ireland. In the first instance, the global management of the

Internet, how it is governed and how States and others behave and act, is now a key

national concern. Secondly, the security of every process, service and piece of infrastructure

in Ireland, from the electoral process through to military infrastructure and the security of

public sector data has to be approached in a different way, because they are all, to some

extent, dependent on connected devices and can now be targeted directly from anywhere on

the planet.

Lastly, the nature of our economy has changed radically. Ireland is home, according to some

estimates, to over 30% of all EU data, and to the European Headquarters of many of the

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world’s largest technology companies. Our economic success is therefore closely bound up

with our ongoing ability to provide a secure environment for these companies to operate

here.

The security of our network and information systems is therefore crucial for the continued

economic and social development of Irish society. The first National Cyber Security Strategy,

published in 2015, has resulted in the establishment of a functional and evolving National

Cyber Security Centre, and the development of a comprehensive set of measures around

protecting key critical national infrastructure and the security of Government systems and

data. Given the expanding nature of the threat and the evolving complexity of systems, this

Strategy takes a broader perspective and sets out a series of measures that go well beyond

those in the 2015 Strategy. These measures also embrace a broader set of issues than

before; there are challenges around skills, enterprise development and research that require

specific actions.

The process for drawing up this Strategy was managed by a High Level Steering Group,

chaired by the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, with

representation from the Department of the Taoiseach, the Department of Foreign Affairs and

Trade, the Department of Employment and Social Protection, the Department of Defence,

the Office of the Chief Government Information Officer, the Department of Justice and

Equality and the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation.

The process was also guided by a set of consultation mechanisms. Firstly, a set of five

sector specific engagement groups were drawn together, comprising of stakeholders from

across the public and private sector. These groups covered National Security and Policing,

Enterprise Development, Skills and Research, Public Sector ICT Security and Critical

National Infrastructure Protection, and were designed to ensure that the Strategy was

comprehensive and accurately reflected the diverse range of issues to be tackled. These

groups were each convened twice, once before the public consultation to ensure that the

consultation document and questions were appropriate, and to identify those fundamental

concerns affecting each sector. The second meeting occurred after the public consultation

was closed, and the groups were provided with the outcome of this, and with the proposed

outcome of the Strategy. These groups provided a forum in which participants could freely

voice opinions, concerns and ideas, and were extremely valuable in framing and

contextualising the Strategy, and in identifying solutions to some of the challenges faced.

A public consultation was run between March and May 2019, in which a brief draft of the

strategy was published as part of a public consultation process to gather the views of the

public and wider industry. Members of the public had 30 working days to make submissions

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of the draft brief of the strategy, and a total of 47 submissions were received. These

submissions were then assessed by the Steering Group and the five sector specific

engagement groups, and the suggested measures from each were extracted and tabulated

for further analysis. This analysis also involved an assessment of more than 30 national

strategies from across Europe and beyond, as well as best practice documents from bodies

like the OECD and ENISA.

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2 Vision Our vision is of an Irish society that can continue to safely enjoy the benefits of the digital

revolution and can play a full part in shaping the future of the internet. To that end, we will;

Protect the State, its people and critical national infrastructure from threats in the

cyber security realm in a dynamic and flexible manner, and in a way that fully

respects the rights of individuals and proportionately balances risks and costs.

Develop the capacity of the State, research institutions, businesses, the public sector

and of the people to both better understand and manage the nature of the challenges

we face in this space and to ensure that businesses and individuals can continue to

benefit from economic and employment opportunities in information technology, and

in particular in cyber security.

Engage nationally and internationally in a strategic manner, supporting a free, open,

peaceful and secure cyber space, and ensuring that cyber security is a key

component of our diplomatic posture across the full range of engagement.

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3 Objectives

To continue to improve the ability of the State to respond to and manage cyber

security incidents, including those with a national security component

To identify and protect critical national infrastructure by increasing its resilience to

cyber attack and by ensuring that operators of essential services have appropriate

incident response plans in place to reduce and manage any disruption to services

To improve the resilience and security of public sector IT systems to better protect

data and the services that our people rely upon

To invest in educational initiatives to prepare the workforce for advanced IT and

cybersecurity careers

To raise awareness of the responsibilities of businesses around securing their

networks, devices and information and to drive research and development in cyber

security in Ireland, including by facilitating investment in new technology

To continue to engage with international partners and international organisations to

ensure that cyber space remains open, secure, unitary, free and able to facilitate

economic and social development

To increase the general level of skills and awareness among private individuals

around basic cyber hygiene practices and to support them in this by means of

information and training

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4 Risk and the Information Society From its very origins as ‘Arpanet’ in the United States in the 1960s, the internet was

designed to be an open system that allowed any one point on a network to receive

messages from any other point, and to allow information find multiple routes from one point

to the other. Despite the fact that there are now billions of connected devices connected to a

network that spans the globe, that fundamental principal persists, and in fact has been

central to the rapid growth of the internet and its utility to humanity.

However this openness and ease of connection also facilitates the use of the network for

malicious activities. Over time, and as the internet has grown in importance, the potential

range and impact of such actions have grown, bringing with them a wide range of new risks

to critical social and economic functions. This Section outlines those key risks for Ireland.

4.1 Strategic Risks At a very high level, developments in cyber security pose two fundamental challenges for

Ireland. Firstly, the a-spatial nature of the internet exposes the State to new and rapidly

developing global threats, including those developed and deployed by threat actors with very

significant resources and expertise. These threats manifest at a national level in a variety of

ways that make detecting and mitigating the associated risks difficult. The fact that the global

security environment is in a particularly dynamic phase is also pertinent; the apparent return

of ‘great power’ politics in international relations, accompanied by tensions over trade and

technology vendors, pose particular challenges for small, open economies like Ireland.

Secondly, the technological base of the Irish economy has developed significantly in recent

years; the State is now home to a large proportion of Europe’s data (upwards of 30%

according to some industry assessments) and the European headquarters of a number of

the world’s largest technology firms. Critically also, the conceptual evolution of cloud

computing has had profound implications for Ireland. In many cases, rather than being

passive repositories of data, these centres are now home to live operational software

environments; an outage or incident affecting one of those facilities could therefore have

immediate disruptive effects on infrastructure or business across the EU or globally.

In turn, this means that the infrastructure supporting these centres, public and private, now

has an elevated security and economic risk associated with it.

Recent years have seen the development and regular use of very advanced tools for cyber

enabled attacks and espionage, and, likely for the first time, the physical destruction of

Critical National Infrastructure by cyber enabled means. As such, the field of cyber security

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is characterised by an ongoing and high stakes technological arms race, between attack and

defence.

The nature of network connected infrastructure adds a further complexity. Firstly, these are

ultimately global systems, both in terms of the supply chains for devices and software and in

terms of the network that links them together; this means that any single State can only

exercise a degree of control over the operation of the network in its territory. Also, and

critically, these devices and systems are owned by a very wide range of types of businesses

and organisations. In fact, many private homes already have several connected devices,

something that is likely to become more prevalent with the ongoing rise of the Internet of

Things (‘IoT’). This means that coordinating protective measures or responses to incidents

or attacks across this very wide range of potential targets is a very complex challenge.

Moreover, unless Governments are willing to insist on an intrusive system of monitoring,

they have limited options available to them to predict or prevent all attacks or incidents on

their territory or against their citizens or infrastructure. The challenges in this space extend to

the most fundamental; the nature of cyber-attacks have often been such that many of them

have traditionally not been reported or publicised, posing an obvious issue for Governments

in understanding and responding to the underlying question.

The increasingly complex and dynamic nature of the security challenges facing the State

have already been recognised by Government with the establishment of a Cabinet

Committee dealing with national security matters. The Government has also established the

National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC) which will work across Government to support a

coherent approach to assessing, understanding and addressing national security challenges,

resulting in enhanced strategic advice for Government.

4.2 Hybrid Threats One of the more challenging issues to emerge in recent years has been the active use and

refinement of hybrid threats. These threats are defined by the EU as being

“multidimensional, combining coercive and subversive measures, using both conventional

and unconventional tools and tactics (diplomatic, military, economic, and technological) to

destabilise the adversary ”, and have arisen in a number of EU countries in the recent past.

Many of these threats have had a cyber component, the most common of which has been

the use of cyber tools to steal information for subsequent use in disinformation campaigns

(so called ‘hack and leak’). By their nature, these campaigns are designed to be difficult to

detect, and because of their explicitly political goals, even more difficult for public authorities

to counteract.

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As an open liberal democracy, Ireland is vulnerable to campaigns of this type in much the

same way as other EU Member States. In December 2017, the Government established the

first ‘Interdepartmental Group on Security of Ireland’s Electoral Process and Disinformation’,

which is coordinated by the Department of the Taoiseach. The group is tasked with

assessing the risks to Ireland’s electoral process, taking into account the substantive issues

arising from recent experiences in other democratic countries with regard to the use of

social media by external, anonymous third parties. The Group published its first report in

July 2018 which overall found that while the risks to the electoral process in Ireland are

relatively low at present there is potential for future risks due to the spread of disinformation

online and the risk of cyber-attacks on the electoral system. The group has proposed a

number of measures to protect against these risks, including establishing an Electoral

Commission, modernising voter registration, regulating online political advertising and

supporting EU efforts to tackle disinformation. At a European level also, there has been

significant work, including the creation of the Hybrid Fusion Cell, set up in the European

External Action Service to facilitate the rapid sharing of information relating to the potential

hybrid type actions affecting multiple EU Member States.

4.3 Risks to Critical National Infrastructure and Public Sector Systems and Data

While general risks arise for society as a consequence of developments in cyber space,

there are particular sectors in which these incidents have potentially far greater implications.

In broad terms, these include those infrastructure sectors that are critical for societal and

economic functions, often termed Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), and Public Sector

Systems and Data.

The traditional conceptualisation of CNI has encompassed the energy and transport sectors,

the financial services sector, healthcare and the telecommunications system itself.

Government IT systems, in turn, are central to the delivery of many functions that are

essential to allow a modern society to function, including social services and payment

systems, tax collection and the functioning of democracy.

Recent decades have seen the development and use of tools to compromise, disrupt and

even destroy these systems. These threats have emanated from a wide range of actors,

varying in terms of access to resources and capability. These range from individuals acting

alone or in small groups engaged in nuisance type attacks, such as website defacement and

small scale denial of service attacks, through to ‘hacktivists’, criminals of various scales, and

Nation States. Among the higher level threats, organised criminal gangs are often

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indistinguishable from Nation States in that they sometimes deploy advanced techniques to

infect and compromise networks and data.

Lastly, at the top of this pyramid, are those State sponsored entities, usually military or

security organisations, seeking to use network and information systems to conduct

operations ranging from the exfiltration of data to the destruction of physical infrastructure.

These threat actors, usually referred to as ‘advanced persistent threats’ (or APTs) have been

shown to be involved in attacks across a wide range of sectors, but with a particular focus on

Government IT systems, telecommunications networks, financial services and technology

companies. The resources at their disposal, their persistence and their expertise mean that

that these entities pose a very particular challenge, they are difficult to detect and difficult to

remove and therefore pose a serious and ongoing challenge to the security of network and

information systems.

Historically, States could hope to secure both Critical National Infrastructure and public

sector systems and data by securing a very small number of key installations. They could

make laws to prohibit parties using their territories for illicit purposes or activities, and they

could use physical borders as a means of defending against external threats. None of these

measures are as effective in the digital age. Moreover, for practical and legal reasons,

Governments generally do not have visibility of, or cannot secure, the vast range of devices

in their territory or the traffic flowing to and from them. This is because networks are privately

owned, as are both connected devices and a very large proportion of critical national

infrastructure.

For much of the period until 2016, the approach taken by many National Governments has

been to support organisations by providing information as to threats and to risk mitigation

measures, and by providing an incident response function. In Ireland, the signing into law of

the 2018 Network and Information Security Regulations (S.I. 360 of 2018) has resulted in a

far more proactive approach to the protection of Critical National Infrastructure, including the

formal identification of operators, and the commencement of a programme of security

measures that include assessments and audits of compliance, in line with measures being

taken across Europe. These will, over time, result in an increase in the resilience of these

key services against attack or incident. Risks remain however, both in those sectors covered

by the NIS Regulations and outside of these.

In the first instance, the adherence to the security measures in the NIS Regulations is a risk

reduction methodology, not a guarantee of absolute security. Secondly, the NIS Directive

and Regulations are explicitly limited to seven named sectors. Both the assessment of

Critical National Infrastructure carried out by the NCSC during the designation process and

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the application of the security measures after designation have shown that some of the

infrastructure in the State outside of the scope of the NIS Regulations is in fact also critical,

and that there are a number of interdependencies between Critical National Infrastructure

sectors that are likely to give rise to particular risks.

Although the security of public sector ICT has seen considerable investment and attention,

not least due to the advent of the General Data Protection Regulation, the nature of the

sector poses some particular challenges. Some Departments and Agencies can readily

demonstrate compliance with international best practice (and international standards like

ISO27001) but challenges remain in ensuring a consistently high level of security across

Government Departments and agencies. Particular issues remain around the formal

governance of ICT security, both in general and in the context of national classified

information and classified information of other States and international bodies. Similar issues

exist in obtaining Facilities Security Clearance for companies engaged in the handling and

storage of confidential information. Some measures are being developed to deal with these

challenges, including the growing use of (and plans for) shared IT infrastructure between

Departments, but some fundamental challenges remain.

Critically, ongoing technological developments, including revolutions in telecommunications

are likely to render this situation even more complex. In allowing for low latency and high

bandwidth transmission of information, the deployment of 5G technologies will likely serve as

a key enabling infrastructure for a series of other technologies and use cases.

These potentially include customer facing services like autonomous vehicles, eHealth

services and entertainment, and industry oriented services. On that basis, it seems likely that

5G networks will form the backbone of a new set of services critical to the operation of vital

societal and economic functions. The nature of these networks and technology is relevant

also; being software defined and virtualised means that new types of security measures will

likely be required in this sector to ensure the security of both the 5G network and of the

services dependent on it.

4.4 Citizen and Business For private citizens, of all ages, many of the issues associated with cyber security are closely

related to online safety and the prevention of cyber crime. These matters usually refer to the

online behaviour of individuals, or the manner in which they maintain or use their personal or

home devices. These risks involve the potential loss of data to cryptoware attacks, or the

loss or theft of personal information including credentials or bank details.

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For businesses, one of the more common and more damaging outcomes of the rise of

malicious online activity relates to attacks on businesses for financial gain. Despite an

increased level of awareness, Cyber Crime incidents in Ireland are increasing with 61% of

Irish organisations reported to have suffered cybercrime such as Fraud in the last two years

with an estimated loss on average of €3.1m.

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5 National Capacity Development

5.1 State of Play Until 2011, governmental responsibility for cybersecurity in Ireland was spread across a

number of different organisations, including both military and civilian authorities. In July

2011, the Government decided to establish the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in

what is now the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, bringing

responsibility for all cyber security matters into one operational unit. This decision was based

on a detailed analysis of the evolving threats to security, and an assessment of the most

appropriate type of organisation to respond to issues and to proactively improve the

resilience of key infrastructure and services. This organisational concept has since come to

represent best practice in Europe, primarily because it allows for the creation of a single

critical mass of experience and operational expertise, and for the end to end management of

incidents of all types.

The first National Cyber Security Strategy, agreed by Government in 2015, set out a series

of measures that would be taken to build the capability of the National Cyber Security Centre

(NCSC) and to achieve a high level of security for computer networks and Critical National

Infrastructure in the State. These measures focusing capacity development within the NCSC

on the Computer Security Incident Response Team (or ‘CSIRT’), and a parallel series of

measures aimed at improving the network and information security of Public Bodies. The

Strategy also established how the resilience of critical national infrastructure would be

improved, in part by the transposition of the NIS Directive, and how the national incident

response process would be developed through ongoing participation in the National

Emergency Management System.

The initial focus of the NCSC was to be in the creation of a Computer Security Incident

Response Team, within the organisation. CSIRTs are an internationally recognised

organisation type with a set of formal roles around cyber security incident response and

information sharing. At their most basic, they are designed to act as focal points for

information; by taking in and anonymising incident reports from victims, and then sharing the

technical details of both incidents and mitigation strategies with their constituents (those

bodies they have been assigned to assist), they can ensure that the broader constituent

group has a higher degree of situational awareness as to what is occurring.

In this way, CSIRTs are expressly designed to obviate some of the structural challenges

emanating from the fragmented ownership of IT systems.

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The CSIRT in the NCSC, called CSIRT-IE, went through an extended phase of capacity

building and upskilling. In the early stages, the focus was first on the primary tasks of being

able to securely and professionally manage and track incidents and share information with

constituents. To do so requires both a pool of trained and experienced staff, and a secure

stand-alone IT infrastructure. These have been very significantly developed since 2015, and

have resulted in the creation of an expert unit with significant capacity in the full range of

cyber security incident response functions. The Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána

were central to the early stages of this process, providing both seconded staff and expertise

in security, process development and threat intelligence assessment. Also, the UCD Centre

for Cybercrime Investigation has been critical in the development of cyber security skills in

Ireland; much of the knowledge base that established the NCSC flowed from students and

staff of UCD.

The development of the CSIRT’s operational capacity was designed to lead to a point where

the unit would have a high degree of situational awareness as to cyber security activity in the

State, and would have a network of ‘constituents’ with which it could securely share the

technical details of incidents, in an anonymised fashion, to allow them take measures to

protect their systems and services. These constituents include Government Departments

and agencies, and Critical National Infrastructure operators, and number in excess of 130

entities. However, the NCSC was involved in a number of serious cyber security incidents in

2016 and 2017 which pointed both to issues not comprehended in the Strategy. The

analysis of these incidents pointed to the need to evolve some of the tools of the NCSC to

better respond to future incidents. As such, the NCSC took a series of initiatives during this

period to support both critical national infrastructure operators and Government

stakeholders. Examples of this include: (i) formalising and augmenting the system of

advisories and alerts (which flowed from lessons learned in the incident management

process for WannaCry2 and NotPetya), and (ii) the formation in 2017 of the Threat Sharing

Group, which acts both as a forum for critical national infrastructure operators, and a means

for State Actors (including Gardaí and Defence Forces) to share information with these

operators and to engage with cyber security professionals. These same incidents also

reinforced the centrality of cyber security to the key security challenges facing the State, and

of the need for ongoing and close cooperation with the State’s security services on

operational matters.

The NCSC has developed significantly in terms of capacity and resources, and its roles have

been formally established in law, including responsibilities around Critical National

Infrastructure protection and dealing with EU requirements around the security of some

21

Digital Service Providers. The responsibilities of the CSIRT itself with regard to risk and

incident handling have been defined in law as requiring it to;

“(a) monitor incidents within the State,

(b) provide early warnings, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information

about risk and incidents to relevant stakeholders,

(c) respond to incidents notified to it under NIS Regulation 18 or 22,

(d) provide dynamic risk and incident analysis and situational awareness,

(e) participate and co-operate in the CSIRTs network,

(f) establish relationships with persons in the private sector to facilitate co-operation

with that sector1”.

The CSIRT received its first international accreditation in late 2017, (Trusted Introducer

accreditation), signifying that the team had reached a defined level of best practice and

maturity. The NCSC has developed a threat intelligence database that is being used to

assist Agencies and Departments in protecting their networks. There has also been a

comprehensive expansion of the NCSC constituent base to over 130 members. This base

now includes Government Departments and Agencies, and key entities across the Financial

Sector, Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) providers and other Operators of Essential

Services (OES).

Since that period, the CSIRT has further developed its incident response capacity by means

of an integrated incident response and analytics platform, and a highly augmented system of

advisories to constituents across Government and Critical National Infrastructure.

Furthermore, the CSIRT has pivoted from a solely reactive stance to a more proactive

position. This includes the deployment and use of MISPs (Malware Information Sharing

Platform) to share threat intelligence directly with Critical National Infrastructure Providers,

and the evolution and use of a series of tools to identify, parse and analyse open source

intelligence (OSINT). The CSIRT has also developed, tested and deployed the ‘Sensor’

platform, now operational on the infrastructure of a number of Government Departments, to

detect and warn of certain types of threat.

The evolution of the NCSC was accompanied by developments in related areas. The 2015

Defence White Paper notes that “… the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural

Resources has lead responsibilities relating to cyber security” and explained that “The 1 Regulation 10 of S.I. 360 of 2018

22

primary focus of the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces will remain the

protection of Defence networks” but that “… as in any emergency/crisis situation, once

Defence systems are supported, the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces will

provide support to the CSIRT-IE team in so far as resources allow”. As such, the role of

Defence Forces with regard to cyber security is explicitly a supporting one, with their primary

responsibilities in this area relating to the protection of their own systems. This supporting

role has evolved over time, and the Defence Forces continue to play a central role in

facilitating the operations of the NCSC. The NCSC maintains close cooperation with the

Defence Forces and the Gardaí on national security issues, and has a secondment

arrangement with both entities.

An Garda Síochána also have a set of responsibilities in the sector, both in preventing,

investigating and prosecuting cyber-crime and as a consequence of their national security

roles. Their capacity and organisation has evolved somewhat in recent years, as the

Computer Crime Investigation Unit (established in 1991) was re-established as the Garda

National Cyber Crime Bureau (GNCCB) in 2017. The Bureau is the national Garda unit

tasked with the forensic examination of computer media seized during the course of any

criminal investigations. In addition, the bureau conducts investigation into cyber dependent

crime including network intrusions, data interference and attacks on websites belonging to

Government Departments, institutions and corporate entities, An Garda Síochána has

invested heavily in the area, with a particular focus on developing capacity in the regions.

The NCSC and Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau have developed a positive co-operative

relationship with ongoing shared training and secondment opportunities for staff.

Key Developments

1. The CSIRT has been made fully operational and internationally accredited.

2. The information sharing and outreach programmes operated by the NCSC have very

significantly developed, including by means of the deployment of Malware

Information Sharing Platforms (MISPs).

3. The CSIRT has developed, tested and deployed the Sensor platform.

4. The Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau has been established, and the capacity of

the organisation significantly augmented.

5. The National Security Assessment Centre has been established in the Department of

the Taoiseach.

23

5.2 Objective To continue to improve the ability of the State to respond to and manage cyber security

incidents, including those with a national security component.

5.3 Measures The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) will remain the primary Cyber Security authority

in the State, and will further develop its capacity to deliver on its two key roles; leading the

national response to cyber security incidents and building the resilience of key networks and

devices across the State. The core response element of the NCSC will continue to grow, and

its pivot from a reactive stance towards a proactive one will be maintained, including by

means of new ways of detecting threats before they impact on services and citizens. By the

end of 2022 the NCSC will also have a number of new and expanded roles in protecting

Government networks and data, and will continue to work with the Office of the Government

Chief Information Officer to develop and implement policies and practices relating

specifically to Government and public services.

1. The National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, particularly with regard to expand its ability to monitor and respond to cyber security incidents and developing threats in the State.

The CSIRT within the NCSC will be developed into a ‘Joint Security Operations Centre’

(or JSOC) by the end of 2020 to better support the security of both Government ICT,

and Critical National Infrastructure. Separate specialist teams will be formed within the

JSOC, including Threat Intelligence, Incident Response and Network Monitoring. This

will facilitate the ongoing development of the response team while allowing for the

maintenance and progressive development of the capacity of the NCSC to monitor

network activity across Government and Critical National Infrastructure. This unit will

continue to function as the national point of contact for all cyber security incidents, and

will continue to lead the response to cyber security incidents of all scales.

2. Threat intelligence and analysis prepared by the National Cyber Security Centre will be integrated into the work of the National Security Analysis Centre.

The National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC) in the Department of the Taoiseach will

play a central role in coordinating the strategic analysis of threats to National Security,

24

and in providing improved situational awareness to Government. The NCSC will assist in

ensuring that new and emerging cyber security challenges that have a national security

impact are fully reflected in the work of the NSAC, including in the development a new

National Security Strategy.

Measure 1: The National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, particularly with regard to expand its ability to monitor and respond to cyber security incidents and developing threats in the State.

Actions for Delivery Timeline by

Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Develop detailed technical and

organisational plan for the JSOC.

Q4 2020 NCSC DCCAE

2 Receive sanction for resourcing and

staffing for NCSC expansion.

Q2 2021 NCSC DCCAE,

D/PER

3 Build prototype JSOC in interim facility Q4 2021 NCSC OPW,

DCCAE

4 Commission Final JSOC Facility in

NCSC HQ

Q2 2023 NCSC OPW,

DCCAE

Measure 2: Threat intelligence and analysis prepared by the National Cyber Security Centre will be integrated into the work of the National Security Analysis Centre.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish Formal Reporting and

Information Sharing arrangements with

NSAC

Q1 2020 NCSC NSAC

25

6 Critical National Infrastructure Protection

6.1 State of Play Until relatively recently, accepted best practice in Europe for the protection of critical national

infrastructure and services against cyber-attack involved two types of actions, (1) the

creation of a national incident response function such as the NCSC, and (2) instituting formal

information sharing arrangements whereby information relating to threats to this

infrastructure could be shared with owners and operators, including urgent information

relating to imminent threats. The NCSC established and still runs precisely these services

and has worked, on an ongoing basis, with utility operators and with similar bodies in other

jurisdictions to manage risks to Critical National Infrastructure in Ireland, including the active

management of ongoing incidents.

However, experience over time across Europe and elsewhere has made it clear that there is

a risk asymmetry between the public interest and that of many operators of this type of

infrastructure. In many cases, critical services remained vulnerable despite comprehensive

attempts by Government to provide information and support to operators. As such, and

building on work underway in some EU Member States and on previous Directives in

Telecommunications, the European Commission published a draft of the ‘Network and

Information Security Directive’ in 2013. This NIS Directive, which was formally agreed in

2016, included a series of measures aimed at improving the resilience of Critical National

Infrastructure across 7 different sectors (including energy, transport, drinking water, banking,

financial markets, healthcare and digital infrastructure). These measures include requiring

Member States to formally assess their infrastructure, and legally designate so called

‘Operators of Essential Services’ – those entities that are critical to the provision of these

services in each State. Moreover, these entities are required to be made subject to a formal

set of security requirements, and to a binding incident reporting requirement. As such, the

NIS Directive aims to (a) compel improvements in the security and resilience of Critical

National Infrastructure, and (b) improve State awareness of cyber security incidents across

Europe, and (c) allow for greater consistency and coordination of response at an EU level.

The 2015 strategy was written in anticipation of the NIS Directive, and detailed work was

underway from before the Strategy was complete on a detailed assessment of Critical

National Infrastructure in Ireland, which included an Infrastructure Interdependency Study

with the UK (completed mid in 2017). These assessments were then used to derive a

national list of Operators of Essential Services (OES), which were formally designated

following the transposition of the NIS Directive in Ireland in September 2018 by S.I. 360 of

26

2018. Enforcement powers under the NIS Regulations allow Authorised Officers of the

NCSC to conduct security assessments and audits in 5 of the 7 sectors (the Central Bank of

Ireland retains responsibility for the application of security measure to the Financial Services

sectors), and require the provision of information and issue binding instructions to remedy

any deficiencies. The NCSC has also prepared detailed guidance documents relating to

security measures, compliance and incident reporting to provide additional support to the

OES, which were published for public consultation in January 2019.

For the purposes of this document Critical National Infrastructure is defined as “… an asset,

system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of

vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and

the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a

result of failure to maintain those functions.” The aim of Government is to secure our CNI

from attack by mandating that measures are taken by operators to manage risks to this

infrastructure, including by having appropriate incident response plans in place to cope with

any disruption to services.

The progressive dependence of Critical National Infrastructure and services on network

connected devices has led to the State taking a series of measures to ensure the resilience

of certain categories of critical national infrastructure. However, given the nature and extent

of the risk, and because of developing technologies, this system needs to be further

developed and expanded. To that end, Government will take the following measures to

further protect Critical National Infrastructure and services;

Key Developments 1. The Critical Infrastructure Protection methodology set out in the EU NIS Directive

has been implemented.

2. This has resulted in the designation of Operators of Essential Services across 7 key

sectors, and the commencement of a series of formal assessments of readiness by

Operators.

3. The introduction of tailored information sharing mechanisms to share sensitive

information with key Operators.

6.2 Objective To identify and protect critical national infrastructure by increasing its resilience to cyber

attack and by ensuring that operators of essential services have appropriate incident

response plans in place to reduce and manage any disruption to services.

27

6.3 Measures The NCSC will also continue to implement its existing Critical National Infrastructure

protection programme, premised on the already implemented NIS Directive process, but will

significantly evolve this, based on a broad ranging piece of analysis. It will be supported in

this in particular effort by the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána, and will engage

across Government to ensure that cyber security concerns are integrated into all relevant

policy matters.

3. The existing Critical National Infrastructure Protection system flowing from the NIS Directive will continue to be deployed and developed, with particular focus on the ongoing compliance and audit programmes to mitigate risks to key services.

The main objective of the NIS Directive is to ensure that there is a high common level of

cyber security across Member States. The NCSC is the national competent authority

charged with providing guidance on the security of Critical National Infrastructure, and

with auditing the application of security controls for many of these sectors. The NCSC

will continue to develop and apply these measures to ensure that the NIS Directive is

fully applied in Ireland, and that this application keeps pace with changes in technology

and best practice.

4. The NCSC, with the assistance of the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána will perform an updated detailed risk assessment of the current vulnerability of all Critical National Infrastructure and services to cyber attack.

Building on the existing assessment process conducted under the NIS Directive, the

NCSC will conduct a detailed risk assessment of the vulnerability of all Critical National

Infrastructure and services to cyber attack. This will include an assessment of the

criticality of a wide variety of services and a mapping of interdependencies between

these. The output from this process will inform the expanded scope of the existing cyber

security Critical National Infrastructure protection process.

5. The existing Critical National Infrastructure protection system will be expanded

and deepened over the life of the Strategy to cover a broader range of Critical National Infrastructure, including aspects of the electoral system.

28

We will broaden and deepen the existing regulatory system for the cyber security of CNI

to include a wider range of operators across a broader range of sectors and to allow for

the closer monitoring of compliance. This expanded system is likely to include aspects

of higher education and electoral systems and will build upon the work already in place

as a consequence of the NIS Directive.

6. The existing information sharing groups operated by the National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, with the existing Threat Sharing Group being broadened to include a wider range of Critical National Infrastructure.

The existing cyber security information sharing forums, such as the ‘Threat Sharing

Group’ (TSG) and the ‘All Island Information Exchange’ (AIIE) will be substantially

developed.

7. Government will introduce a further set of compliance standards to support the

cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State.

We will introduce a new and specific set of security requirements for the

telecommunications sector, with detailed risk mitigation measures to be developed by

the NCSC to assist Comreg in fulfilling their statutory functions under existing EU

Security Regulations (transposed by S.I. 333 of 2011), and the forthcoming EU

Telecommunications Code ( Directive 2018/1972)

Measure 3: The existing Critical Infrastructure Protection system flowing from the NIS Directive will continue to be deployed and developed, with particular focus on the ongoing compliance and audit programmes to mitigate risks to key services.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Complete first phase of Operators of

Essential Services (OES) Self-

Assessment against Security Control

Framework

Q1 2020 NCSC Designated

OES

2 Commence Security Control Testing of

Operators of Essential Services (OES)


OES

3 Reassess Register of Designated OES Q3 2020 NCSC

29

and Security Guidelines

4 Security Control testing post incidents,

and ongoing audits of OES compliance

Ongoing NCSC Designated

OES

Measure 4: The NCSC, with the assistance of the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána, will perform an updated detailed risk assessment of the current vulnerability of all Critical National Infrastructure and services to cyber attack.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Steering Group formed and terms of

reference for the review agreed

Q1 2020 NCSC AGS, DF,

NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

2 Information gathering phase complete,

and methodology agreed


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

3 Complete Assessment Process,

including international consultation and

detailed assessment of cross sectoral

interdependencies.


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

4 Final Report and Recommendations

Complete


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

Measure 5: The existing Critical National Infrastructure protection system will be expanded and deepened over the life of the Strategy to cover a broader range of Critical National Infrastructure, including aspects of the electoral system.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Draft Heads of Bill for Agreement by

Government

Q4 2021 DCCAE AGO

2 Drafting Process with AGO Q1 2022 DCCAE AGO

30

3 Oireachtas Process Q2 2022 DCCAE AGO,

Oireachtas

Measure 6: The existing information sharing groups operated by the National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, with the existing Threat Sharing Group being broadened to include a wider range of critical national infrastructure.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Expand the current Threat Sharing

Group (TSG) representatives to include

CNI, with new Terms of Reference.


CNI

2 Refine existing arrangements with the

UK on information sharing and incident

response, with particular reference to

North-South critical infrastructure

protection.

Q4 2020 NCSC OEP, CPNI

UK

Measure 7: Government will introduce a further set of compliance standards to support the cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Transposition of Directive 2018/1972 Q4 2020 DCCAE NCSC,

Comreg

2 Provision of Technical Support to

Comreg

Q4 2020 NCSC Comreg

3 Application of revised security

measures

Q1 2021 Comreg DCCAE,

NCSC,

Telecoms

Operators

31

7 Public Sector Data and Networks

7.1 State of Play Responsibility for the operation and security of public sector IT systems sits with individual

Departments and Agencies, with the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer

having an overarching role in leading the implementation of the Public Service ICT Strategy

and managing the network which Departments and Agencies use to connect with each other

and the wider internet. The primary role of the CSIRT within the NCSC in its early years

involved establishing an incident response function to support these Departments and

agencies when they reported incidents to the NCSC, and to build an Advisory system to

allow for the rapid dissemination of specific information relating to threats and incidents, and

best practice with regard to cyber security. The NCSC had no direct insight into activities on

Government networks however, and no formal or precise means of determining what

security measures might be in place in individual Departments or agencies.

On this basis, and in tandem with the ongoing development of the CSIRT and the expanding

toolset that are available to all constituents, the NCSC began to rollout a project titled

‘Sensor’; this is essentially an additional layer of boundary protection for Government

Departments that alerts the NCSC when particular types of activity are observed transiting

Government networks. Also, the NCSC issued a ‘5 Point Guide’ for Departments in late

2018, setting out a recommended baseline of security measures that Departments might

take, based on some of the common incidents that the CSIRT had reported to it over the

previous period.

Key Developments

1. The Advisory system operated by the NCSC has been augmented substantially to

allow for the rapid dissemination of information.

2. The NCSC has developed, tested and deployed the Sensor platform across a

number of Government Departments, improving the security of IT systems and data

against high level threats.

3. Government Departments and agencies have invested heavily in security, supported

by guidance from the NCSC.

32

7.2 Objective To improve the resilience and security of public sector IT systems to better protect services

that our people rely upon, and their data.

7.3 Measures The Public Sector relies heavily on Information Technology to deliver practically all of the

services it provides; these services therefore need to be secure, resilient and capable of

ensuring that personal information remains private. To that end, Government will take the

following specific initiatives;

8. The NCSC will develop a baseline security standard to be applied by all Government Departments and key agencies.

The NCSC, in conjunction with the OGCIO, will formulate a minimum cyber security

baseline standard for Government ICT. This will be aligned with international standards

and phased in across all Government bodies, beginning with Government Departments.

These standards typically include measures and controls in relation to staff training,

identity and access management. It is envisaged that the standard will be audited at a

local Departmental level with support and guidance provided by the NCSC.

9. The existing ‘Sensor’ Programme will be expanded to cover all Government Departments, and an assessment will be conducted as to the feasibility of expanding Sensor to cover all of Government networks.

The NCSC Sensor Programme will be rolled out across all Government Departments

with a view to improving the early detection and removal of threats. The NCSC will

support its application across the public sector, and the Joint Security Operations Centre

will be developed to support and operationalise this system. It is envisaged that every

significant Government Department and Agency will be monitored by the Joint SOC

managed by the NCSC.

10. A Government IT Security forum will be created, open to all Heads of IT Security across Government, to facilitate information sharing on best practice for cyber security and to allow the NCSC support the deployment of the baseline security standard.

33

The NCSC will lead in creating, chairing and implementing a new Public Sector IT

Security forum, with Heads of IT security from across Government Departments and

Agencies. The forum will meet quarterly to exchange and share information around best

practice, inter organisational processes, cyber security threats and measures to comply

with the new public sector cyber security baseline standard.

11. The NCSC will be tasked by Government to issue recommendations with regard to the use of specific software and hardware on Government IT and telecommunications infrastructure.

The NCSC will be tasked to issue recommendations with regard to the procurement and

use of certain types of IT infrastructure and software in securing Government data and

services, and to recommend the prohibition or removal of certain infrastructure from

Government IT networks and communications if the NCSC determines that its presence

poses an unacceptable risk to the security of Government data.

Measure 8: The NCSC will develop a baseline security standard to be applied by all Government Departments and key agencies.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Design suitable minimum standard

for Government IT, in conjunction

with Government IT Security

Forum.

Q4 2021 NCSC/OGCIO/Govt

IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

2 Develop detailed measures,

controls and implementation

procedures.


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

3 Draft guidance and support

materials for IT teams and Internal

Audit Units on compliance

assessment.


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

4 Support Government Departments

and Key Agencies in

implementation of the baseline

Ongoing NCSC/OGCIO/Govt

IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

34

standard. agencies

5 Conduct assessment of the


standard


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

Measure 9 The existing ‘Sensor’ Programme will be expanded to all Government Departments, and an assessment will be conducted by the same date as to the feasibility of expanding Sensor to cover all of Government networks.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Deploy Sensor on the IT infrastructure

of all 15 Government Departments.

Q4 2020 NCSC All

Government

Departments,

Gov IT

Security

Forum

2 Review costs and legal issues

associated with the application of

Sensor on Government Networks,

covering all of public sector ICT, and

bring outcome to Government for

decision.

Q4 2021 NCSC OGCIO, AGO,

D/PER

Measure 10: A Government IT Security forum will be created, open to all Heads of IT Security across Government, to facilitate information sharing on best practice for cyber security and to allow the NCSC support the deployment of the baseline security standard.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Resource the creation of Public Sector

IT Team in the NCSC, and establish

Terms of Reference for the Forum

Q1 2020 NCSC OGCIO, All

Government

Departments

2 Plan a briefing session for all Heads of

IT Security to outline the purpose of the


Government

35

Security Forum Departments

3 Establish quarterly meetings of the

Forum and appoint a Chairperson and

Secretary


Government

Departments

Measure 11: The NCSC will be tasked by Government to issue Recommendations with regard to the use of specific software and hardware on Government IT and telecommunications infrastructure.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Rationale and Terms of Reference

Prepared and brought to Government

for Agreement

Q3 2020 NCSC OGCIO,

AGS, DF,

NSAC

2 Entry into effect of NCSC

Recommendation Process

Q4 2020 NCSC OGCIO,

AGS, DF,

NSAC

36

8 Skills

8.1 State of Play A number of substantial skills gaps have emerged in cyber security, largely as a

consequence of its rapid development as a societal challenge. This skills gap is a global

issue, with upwards of 2 million unfilled cyber security vacancies worldwide in 2019. At a

national level, ensuring a ready supply of staff is critical to both preserving the ability to

secure our own infrastructure, and to be able to continue to attract and retain data heavy

investment. In turn, meeting this demand requires not only the training of new entrants but

the encouragement of cross training and upskilling from professionals in ICT and other

relevant sectors. In recent years Ireland has made important strides towards addressing and

improving skills, developing research capabilities and raising awareness of cyber security as

a career. However there remains a time lag between industry and academia in fast moving

sectors like this, and a need to ensure that graduates are leaving third level institutions with

the requisite skills for the employment requirements in industry.

The Government is seeking to address the growing demand for cyber security skills through

the implementation of Technology Skills 2022, the third ICT Skills Action Plan. Cyber

security was identified in the underlying research for the plan, undertaken by the Expert

Group on Future Skills Needs, as one of the key emerging fields that will drive the demand

for high level ICT skills in Ireland in the coming years. The cyber security skills agenda is

being advanced in the context of Technology Skills 2022 through a number of channels,

including Skillnet Ireland, the expansion of provision in higher education and the promotion

of ICT apprenticeships through SOLAS, the Further Education and Training Authority.

In October 2018, a new Cyber Security Skills Initiative was launched by Skillnet Ireland in

partnership with the NCSC, Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau, and other agencies and

third level institutions. The core aims of the initiative are to develop awareness, bridge the

skills gap and to set standards for skills and competencies for Cyber Security roles. The

three year plan is focused on building training and accreditation in the field to address skills

gaps, attracting more young people, and in particular women into the sector and promoting

Continuous Professional Development. Skillnet Ireland estimates that the initiative will

deliver Cyber Security training to in excess of 5,000 people in the industry over the next

three years. Also, the third level sector in Ireland has also begun to offer a significant

number of courses in cyber security, with at least 8 Masters level courses now on offer.

37

Developed by industry led consortia, apprenticeships combine both work-based and off the

job training while in employment. Approved by the Apprenticeship Council and funded under

the National Training Fund, apprenticeships provide a pathway to careers for school leavers,

jobseekers and those looking to change career. A 2 year Associate Professional in

CyberSecurity apprenticeship at QQI level 6 was launched in February 2019 with SAP as the

industry lead and Fastrack to Information Technology (FIT) as the coordinating provider.

Also, the third level sector in Ireland has also begun to offer a significant number of courses

in cyber security, with at least 8 Masters level courses now on offer. Cyber security

programmes are also being supported through the Springboard+ programme, which is

increasingly facilitating those already in employment to reskill into alternative roles or

occupations. This will be important with the rising demand for cyber security skillsets.

The Department of Business Enterprise and Innovation with the Department of the

Taoiseach launched Future Jobs Ireland in March 2019, a new multi-annual framework to

ensure our enterprises and workers are resilient and prepared for future challenges and

opportunities. Future Jobs Ireland will also ensure our enterprises and workers are well

positioned to adapt to the technological and other transformational changes our economy

and society will face in the years ahead. Although wide ranging in scope, one of the five

Pillars within Future Jobs Ireland is “Embracing Innovation and Technological Change”. The

framework recognises the need for new and diverse skillsets to meet our changing economy

and “exploit cutting edge technological areas such as Artificial Intelligence, Data Analytics,

the Internet of Things and Blockchain to facilitate and help companies co-innovate and

develop solutions”.

A series of ambitions and deliverables have been identified to achieve these aims including

increasing the capacity of SMEs to engage in research & development, providing high

quality education and training, encouraging lifelong learning, and enhancing participation in

apprenticeship programmes. A number of initiatives have already commenced under the

medium-term ambitions outlined in Future Jobs Ireland 2019. Each year Future Jobs Ireland

will set out new steps to deliver on these ambitions.

Key Developments

1. Technology Skills 2022 has been published and implemented.

2. Skillnet Ireland launched their Cyber Security Skills Initiative to deliver a broad

programme of initiatives in the field.

3. Fastrack to Information Technology have launched a Cyber Security Programme for

apprentices.

38

4. Government has launched Future Jobs Ireland, a multiannual framework for skills

and enterprise development, including the technology sector.

8.2 Objectives To invest in educational initiatives to prepare the workforce for advanced IT and

cybersecurity careers.

8.3 Measures Through the implementation of Technology Skills 2022, Future Jobs Ireland, and this

Strategy Government aims to ensure that the employment market has sufficient skilled and

trained staff to meet demands from employers.

12. Government will continue to ensure that second and third level training in computer science and cyber security is developed and deployed, including by supporting the work of Skillnets Ireland in developing training programmes for all educational levels and supporting SOLAS initiatives for ICT apprenticeship programmes in cyber security.

Government will continue to support the work of Skillnets Ireland in developing and

delivering training to private industry aimed to promote cyber workforce participation,

upskilling and general career development. The NCSC will provide assistance in

developing initiatives which encourage women into the cyber security field and

encourage participants from other disciplines to cross train.

13. Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) will promote cyber security as a career option in

schools and colleges by means of their Smart Futures Programme.

Smart Futures is a collaborative education programme run by Science Foundation

Ireland that provides second-level students in Ireland with information about careers in

Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths (STEM). SFI will develop a Cyber Security

component, using input from industry professionals, for inclusion in Smart Futures so

students remain aware of the wide range of career opportunities available in the field.

14. Science Foundation Ireland along with DBEI and DCCAE, will explore the feasibility through the SFI Research Programme, the Research Centre Spoke

39

programme or other enterprise partnership programmes to fund a significant initiative in Cyber Security Research.

This research centre would link scientists and engineers in partnership across academia

and industry to address crucial research questions.

Measure 12: Government will continue to ensure that second and third level training in computer science and cyber security is developed and deployed, including by supporting the work of Skillnets Ireland in developing training programmes for all educational levels and supporting SOLAS initiatives for ICT apprenticeship programmes in cyber security.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Provide support to initiatives under

Technology Skills 2022 including

development of Skillnets and ICT

apprenticeship initiatives

Ongoing DCCAE Skillnets,

SOLAS, DES

2 Add education and upskilling as a

standing item on the agenda of the Gov

IT Security Forum

Q2 2020 NCSC Gov IT

Security

Forum

3

Support the development of a Junior

Cycle short course in cyber security,

which will provide for the inclusion of

cyber security education in second level

Q4 2020 NCSC NCCA

4

Support initiatives which encourage

women into the cyber security field

Ongoing NCSC/DES Industry

Measure 13: Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) will promote cyber security as a career option in schools and colleges by means of their Smart Futures Programme.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 NCSC to seek industry partners to

participate in Smart Futures

Q1 2020 NCSC SFI,Industry

2 NCSC will work with Smart Futures to

support initiatives which encourage

Q1-Q4 NCSC SFI

40

female students into the cyber security

field

Measure 14: Science Foundation Ireland along with DBEI and DCCAE, will explore the feasibility through the SFI Research Centre Programme, the Research Centre Spoke programme or other enterprise partnership programmes to fund a significant initiative in Cyber Security Research.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Issue calls to which cyber security

community can respond

Q4 2020 SFI NCSC,DBEI,

SFI

2 Assess proposals based on

independent international peer review.


SFI

41

9 Enterprise Development

9.1 State of Play IDA Ireland has supported the establishment of the ‘Cyber Ireland’ Programme by Cork

Institute of Technology (CIT), to establish and grow an Irish Cyber Security Cluster in

Ireland. Cyber Ireland was officially launched on 20th May 2019 and is hosted by Cork

Institute of Technology (CIT). This national cluster aims to represent the needs of the sector

in Ireland and includes stakeholders from industry, academia and government. It will

encourage co-operation, raise awareness of education and career opportunities, drive

innovation and stimulate new business in the Cyber Security field. CIT has secured 2 years

funding from the IDA to facilitate the establishment of developing the cluster and has drafted

a 7 phase structured programme to achieve this aim. The development of Cyber Ireland is

included in Future Jobs Ireland 2019 underscoring the Government’s commitment to

developing the sector.

Key Developments

1. The Cyber Ireland Initiative has been launched, funded by the IDA, to assist in the

development of the sector in Ireland.

9.2 Objectives To raise awareness of the responsibilities of businesses around securing their networks,

devices and information and to drive research and development in cyber security in Ireland,

including by facilitating investment in new technology.

9.3 Measures

15. Government will continue to support and fully engage with the IDA funded Cyber Ireland Programme and explore new mechanisms to support Industry/Academia/ Government cyber security collaboration.

The NCSC, along with the IDA and Enterprise Ireland, will participate as active inaugural

board members of Cyber Ireland supporting their initiative of bringing together industry,

academia and government to enhance the cyber security environment in Ireland. Cyber

42

Ireland are actively involved in promoting education and skills, forums for

communications, attracting foreign direct investment and research and development.

16. Enterprise Ireland will develop a cyber security programme to facilitate

collaborative links between enterprise and the research community that lead to the practical application of research in business.

Consistent with Enterprise Ireland’s mission, Enterprise Ireland will leverage its sectoral

knowledge and experience of industrial-academic collaborative initiatives and engage

with the NCSC to explore opportunities to support economically beneficial cyber security

collaborative links between enterprise and the research community.

Measure 15: Government will continue to support and fully engage with the IDA funded Cyber Ireland Programme and explore new mechanisms to support Industry/Academia/Government cyber security collaboration.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Support given to Cyber Ireland in

developing a Cyber Security Cluster of

Industry, Academia and Government

Ongoing IDA Cyber

Ireland, EI,

NCSC, DBEI

Measure 16: Enterprise Ireland will develop a cyber security programme to facilitate collaborative links between enterprise and the research community that lead to the practical application of research in business.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish a National Cyber Security

Competence Centre

Q1 2021 NCSC NCSC, EI,

DBEI.

43

10 Engagement

10.1 State of Play Cyber security is inherently an international field, and has multiple implications for many

aspects of the State’s international engagement. We recognise the importance of cyber

security as a priority for foreign policy. Developments in this field have been an integral part

of foreign policy making in Ireland for some time already but there is a clear need to evolve

and develop that engagement, both in general and specifically across the European Union.

At a global level the last 10 years have been marked by a number of increasingly high profile

attacks and incidents, including attacks on electricity infrastructure in Ukraine in 2015 and

the ‘Wannacry2’ and ‘NotPetya’ incidents in 2017. These have brought with them a

reinvigorated debate about the role of States and the international community in moderating

State behaviour online, and as to the appropriate set of measures for countries to use within

their own territory to ensure the integrity and resilience of key systems.

A number of international organisations have brought forward initiatives to try and frame

these issues within existing international relations frameworks. The most notable of these

has been the UN Group of General Government Experts (or GGE). This was established in

2004 on the basis of discussions that had been underway since 1998, on the basis of

Resolution 53/70. In the period since 2004, there have been five separate iterations of the

GGE, with three agreeing on substantive reports, and two, including the most recent one in

2017 failing to reach agreement.

In late 2018, the UN adopted two new resolutions on cyber security matters. The first

established an open-ended working group, which convened initially in June 2019 and will

focus on raising awareness, building common understanding and advancing implementation

of previously agreed norms and principles of responsible State behaviour. The second

underlined the three successful GGE reports and called for the establishment of another

GGE, with a focus on the application of international law to cyberspace and advancing the

consensus on responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

At a regional level, both the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

and the European Union has also played an increasingly progressive role in the area of

Cybersecurity. The OSCE has produced two sets set of draft confidence-building measures

(CBMs) in 2013 and 2016 to “enhance interstate co-operation, transparency, predictability,

and stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem

from the use of ICTs”.

44

Key Developments

1. The UN adopted two new resolutions focusing on co-operation and building

awareness of cyber security matters.

2. The OSCE produced two sets of confidence building measures enhancing co-

operation and stability.

10.2 Objective To continue to engage with international partners and international organisations to ensure

that cyber space remains open, secure, unitary and free and able to facilitate economic and

social development.

10.3 Measures

17. We will reinforce Ireland’s diplomatic commitment to cyber security, including by stationing cyber attachés in key diplomatic missions and by engaging in sustainable capacity building in third countries.

Ireland will reinforce its diplomatic commitment to cyber security as part of the ‘Global

Ireland’ initiative, by assigning designated Cyber Attachés to key diplomatic missions.

Based on our support for an open, free, peaceful and secure cyberspace, we will

advocate for preventative diplomacy in our international engagement. We will support

international cooperation to combat cybercrime and promote formal and informal

cooperation in cyberspace, including by engaging in sustainable capacity building in

third countries. As part of our commitment to combatting cybercrime, we will ratify the

Budapest convention as early as practicable. The applicability of international law,

including international humanitarian law, and respect for human rights will guide our

international commitment to cybersecurity. We will provide sustainable capacity-building

support to developing countries and civil society actors and ensure we are fully aware of

potential human rights abuses, targeting of human rights defenders, and

monitoring/controlling ethnic minorities through technology.

18. We will create an interdepartmental group (IDG) on internet governance and international cyber policy to coordinate national positions across Departments.

45

We will create an Interdepartmental Group (IDG) on international cyber policy matters to

coordinate engagement on issues with a geopolitical dimension and to develop a

coordinated position on internet governance and cyber security matters.

19. We will deepen our existing engagement in international organisations, including by joining the Cyber Security Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Tallinn, Estonia.

We will deepen our engagement in International Organisations in dealing with the full

range of issues arising under this Strategy. As such, Ireland will join and play a full part

in the Cyber Security Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. This will

include the secondment, initially, of a member of the Defence Forces2 to the Centre in

due course. We will also fully support the UN processes in seeking to develop and

implement a framework for stability in cyberspace.

Measure 17: We will reinforce Ireland’s diplomatic commitment to cyber security, including by stationing cyber attachés in key diplomatic missions and by engaging in sustainable capacity building in third countries.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Appoint Cyber Attachés to key

Diplomatic Missions.

Q3 2020 DFAT NCSC

2 Ratify the Budapest Convention Q2 2021 D/Justice NCSC,

D/Taoiseach

3 Develop a sustainable capacity building

programme for developing countries

Q2 2021 DFAT,

NCSC

NCSC

Measure 18: We will create an interdepartmental group (IDG) on internet governance and international cyber policy to coordinate national positions across Departments.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish a IDG to coordinate on cyber

policy matters

Q2 2020 DFAT NCSC, All

Govt

2 While the initial deployment to the CCD-COE will be from the Defence Forces, the persons deployed

thereafter may be either civilian or military in accordance with the Government approval.

46

Departments

Measure 19: We will deepen our existing engagement in international organisations, including by joining the Cyber Security Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Tallinn, Estonia.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Secondment of a member of DF to

CCD-COE

Q4 2020 NCSC DF,

D/Defence,

DFAT

47

11 Citizens

11.1 State of Play In terms of cyber security awareness, there have been a number of important national

initiatives over the last number of years, particularly in the educational system. To begin

with, Webwise, an internet safety initiative co-funded by the Department of Education and

Skills and operated by the Professional Development Service for Teachers (PDST)

Technology in Education, promotes the autonomous, effective, and safer use of the internet

by young people through a sustained information and awareness strategy targeting parents,

teachers, and children themselves with consistent and relevant messages including

guidance on acceptable usage in schools.

A range of resources have been developed including “UP2US”, “My Selfie and the wider

world” and “Lockers”; the online Parenting Hub: Webwise Parents; and ‘Be in Ctrl’, which

supports teachers to address the topic of online sexual coercion and extortion with their

students. In mid 2019, the ‘HTML Heroes’ resource was launched, which aims to assist and

support educators when teaching children aged 7–10 years about the safe and responsible

use of the Internet, including social media.

Smart Futures is coordinated by Science Foundation Ireland in partnership with

organisations and academia. The programme provides second-level school students in

Ireland with information about careers in science, technology, engineering and maths

(STEM). Smart Futures engages with guidance counsellors, teachers and industry to

develop resources and activities to stimulate interest in students. The Smart Futures website

provides information on the wide range of opportunities available such as courses,

apprenticeships, festival and events. In February 2019, Smart Futures launched a new

national campaign titled “I get paid to do this” in partnership with the Department of

Education and Skills. The campaign centres around an online resource of profiles on

professionals working in STEM related industries to give students insight into what they can

expect from a career in STEM and the diverse opportunities open to them.

The programme is currently being implemented by a Sponsors Group under the Chair of the

Department of Education & Skills. Enactment of the Online Safety Act which will set out how

we can ensure the further safety of children online has been brought forward. This will

involve, for the first time, setting a clear expectation for service providers to take reasonable

steps to ensure the safety of the users of their service.

48

Key Developments

1. Through a sustained information and awareness programme Webwise has provided

parents, teachers, and children with guidance on the safe use of the internet.

2. Smart Futures has been launched to provide second-level students with information

about careers in science, technology, engineering and maths related disciplines.

11.2 Objective To increase the general level of skills and awareness among private individuals around basic

cyber hygiene practices and to support them by means of information and training.

11.3 Measures By developing good cyber hygiene practices in the wider population we can create a more

secure society. Awareness of cyber risks is of particular importance in vulnerable parts of the

population.

20. Government will develop a national cyber security information campaign which will use information provided by the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau and be delivered by entities which are directly engaged in information provision.

A National Cyber awareness campaign will be developed and delivered to the public.

This programme will harness the experience of the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber

Crime Bureau, and will be developed as a collaborative effort between multiple partners,

to include PDST and the Online Safety Commissioner. The aim of this campaign will be

to improve societal awareness around common cyber risks such as basic cyber hygiene

and social engineering. It will also facilitate more targeted awareness campaigns aimed

at vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly, including by the provision of

information to Webwise.

49

Measure 20: Government will develop a national cyber security information campaign which will use information provided by the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau and be delivered by entities which are directly engaged in information provision.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Support the continued inclusion of

cyber security elements in Webwise

programmes

Q4 2020 DCCAE AGS, DES

2 Develop a public awareness campaign

to include information on cyber security

and cyber crime prevention.

Q1 2021 NCSC, Online

Safety

Commissioner

DCCAE,

AGS, DJE,

DES

50

12 Governance Framework and Responsibilities

12.1 Governance Structure Delivering the National Cyber Security Strategy will require a governance framework and

structure, both in terms of operational response and the overarching components of the

Strategy itself.

12.2 Delivery of the National Cyber Security Strategy The Cabinet Committee on Security will be the primary means of coordinating responses to

national security matters. However, a High Level Interdepartmental Committee will be

created, meeting twice a year, tasked with assessing and reporting on progress towards

meeting the Measures under this Strategy, and with agreeing any amendments to the

actions to be taken to meet these.

51

Appendix 1 List of Actions

National Capacity Development

Measure 1: The National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, particularly with regard to expand its ability to monitor and respond to cyber security incidents and developing threats in the State.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Develop detailed technical and

organisational plan for the JSOC.

Q4 2020 NCSC DCCAE

2 Receive sanction for resourcing and staffing

for NCSC expansion

Q2 2021 NCSC DCCAE,

D/PER

3 Build prototype JSOC in interim facility Q4 2021 NCSC OPW, DCCAE

4 Commission Final JSOC Facility in NCSC

HQ

Q2 2023 NCSC OPW, DCCAE

Measure 2: Threat intelligence and analysis prepared by the National Cyber Security Centre will be integrated into the work of the National Security Analysis Centre.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish Formal Reporting and Information

Sharing arrangements with NSAC

Q1 2020 NCSC NSAC

52

Critical National Infrastructure Protection

Measure 3: The existing Critical Infrastructure Protection system flowing from the NIS Directive will continue to be deployed and developed, with particular focus on the ongoing compliance and audit programmes to mitigate risks to key services.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Complete first phase of Operators of

Essential Services (OES) Self-Assessment

against Security Control Framework


OES

2 Commence Security Control Testing of

Operators of Essential Services (OES)


OES

3 Reassess Register of Designated OES and

Security Guidelines

Q3 2020 NCSC

4 Security Control testing post incidents, and

ongoing audits of OES compliance

Ongoing NCSC Designated

OES

Measure 4: The NCSC, with the assistance of the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána, will perform an updated detailed risk assessment of the current vulnerability of all Critical National Infrastructure and services to cyber attack.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Steering Group formed and terms of

reference for the review agreed


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

2 Information gathering phase complete, and

methodology agreed


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

3 Complete Assessment Process, including

international consultation and detailed


NSAC, CBI,

53

assessment of cross sectoral

interdependencies.

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

4 Final Report and Recommendations

Complete


NSAC, CBI,

COMREG,

CRU, IAA

Measure 5: The existing Critical National Infrastructure protection system will be expanded and deepened over the life of the Strategy to cover a broader range of Critical National Infrastructure, including aspects of the electoral system.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Draft Heads of Bill for Agreement by

Government

Q4 2021 DCCAE AGO

2 Drafting Process with AGO Q1 2022 DCCAE AGO

3 Oireachtas Process Q2 2022 DCCAE AGO,

Oireachtas

Measure 6: The existing information sharing groups operated by the National Cyber Security Centre will be further developed, with the existing Threat Sharing Group being broadened to include a wider range of critical national infrastructure.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Expand the current Threat Sharing Group

(TSG) representatives to include CNI, with

new Terms of Reference.

Q2 2020 NCSC AGS, DF, CNI

2 Refine existing arrangements with the

UK on information sharing and incident

response, with particular reference to

North-South critical infrastructure

protection

Q4 2020 NCSC OEP, CPNI

UK

54

Measure 7: Government will introduce a further set of compliance standards to support the cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Transposition of Directive 2018/1972 Q4 2020 DCCAE NCSC,

Comreg

2 Provision of Technical Support to Comreg Q4 2020 NCSC Comreg

3 Application of revised security measures Q1 2021 Comreg DCCAE,

NCSC,

Telecoms

Operators

Public Sector Data and Networks

Measure 8: The NCSC will develop a baseline security standard to be applied by all Government Departments and key agencies.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Design suitable minimum standard for

Government IT, in conjunction with

Government IT Security Forum.


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

2 Develop detailed measures, controls

and implementation procedures.


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

3 Draft guidance and support materials

for IT teams and Internal Audit Units on

compliance assessment.


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

4 Support Government Departments and

Key Agencies in implementation of the

baseline standard.

Ongoing NCSC/OGCIO/Govt

IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

55

agencies

5 Conduct assessment of the


standard


IT Forum

Government

Departments

and key

agencies

Measure 9: The existing ‘Sensor’ Programme will be expanded to all Government Departments, and an assessment will be conducted by the same date as to the feasibility of expanding Sensor to cover all of Government networks.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Deploy Sensor on the IT infrastructure of all

15 Government Departments.

Q4 2020 NCSC All

Government

Departments,

Gov IT

Security

Forum

2 Review costs and legal issues associated

with the application of Sensor on

Government Networks, covering all of

public sector ICT, and bring outcome to

Government for decision.

Q4 2021 NCSC OGCIO, AGO,

D/PER

Measure 10: A Government IT Security forum will be created, open to all Heads of IT Security across Government, to facilitate information sharing on best practice for cyber security and to allow the NCSC support the deployment of the baseline security standard.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Resource the creation of Public Sector IT

Team in the NCSC, and establish Terms of

Reference for the Forum


Government

Departments

2 Plan a briefing session for all Heads of IT Q1 2020 NCSC OGCIO, All

56

Security to outline the purpose of the

Security Forum

Government

Departments

3 Establish quarterly meetings of the Forum

and appoint a Chairperson and Secretary


Government

Departments

Measure 11: The NCSC will be tasked by Government to issue Recommendations with regard to the use of specific software and hardware on Government IT and telecommunications infrastructure.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Rationale and Terms of Reference

Prepared and brought to Government for

Agreement

Q3 2020 NCSC OGCIO, AGS,

DF, NSAC

2 Entry into effect of NCSC Recommendation

Process

Q4 2020 NCSC OGCIO, AGS,

DF, NSAC

Skills

Measure 12: Government will continue to ensure that second and third level training in computer science and cyber security is developed and deployed, including by supporting the work of Skillnets Ireland in developing training programmes for all educational levels and supporting SOLAS initiatives for ICT apprenticeship programmes in cyber security.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Provide support to initiatives under

Technology Skills 2022 including

development of Skillnets and ICT

apprenticeship initiatives

Ongoing DCCAE Skillnets,

SOLAS, DES

2 Add education and upskilling as a standing

item on the agenda of the Gov IT Security

Forum

Q2 2020 NCSC Gov IT

Security

Forum

57

3

Support the development of a Junior Cycle

short course in cyber security, which will

provide for the inclusion of cyber security

education in second level

Q4 2020 NCSC NCCA

4

Support initiatives which encourage women

into the cyber security field

Ongoing NCSC/DES/ Industry

Measure 13: Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) will promote cyber security as a career option in schools and colleges by means of their Smart Futures Programme.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 NCSC to seek industry partners to

participate in Smart Futures

Q1 2020 NCSC SFI, Industry

2 NCSC will work with Smart Futures to

support initiative which encourage female

students into the cyber security field

Q1- Q4 NCSC SFI

Measure 14: Science Foundation Ireland along with DBEI and DCCAE, will explore the feasibility through the SFI Research Centre Programme, the Research Centre Spoke programme or other enterprise partnership programmes to fund a significant initiative in Cyber Security Research.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Issue calls to which cyber security

community can respond


SFI

2 Assess proposals based on independent

international peer review.

Q1 2021 SFI NCSC,DBEI,SFI

58

Enterprise Development

Measure 15: Government will continue to support and fully engage with the IDA funded Cyber Ireland Programme and explore new mechanisms to support Industry/Academia/Government cyber security collaboration.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Support given to Cyber Ireland in

developing a Cyber Security Cluster of

Industry, Academia and Government

Ongoing IDA Cyber Ireland,

NCSC, EI,

DBEI

Measure 16: Enterprise Ireland will develop a cyber security programme to facilitate collaborative links between enterprise and the research community the leads to practical application of research in business.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish a National Cyber Security

Competence Centre

Q1 2021 NCSC NCSC, DBEI,

EI

Engagement

Measure 17: We will reinforce Ireland’s diplomatic commitment to cyber security, including by stationing cyber attachés in key diplomatic missions and by engaging in sustainable capacity building in third countries.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Appoint Cyber Attachés to Key Diplomatic

Missions.

Q3 2020 DFAT NCSC

2 Ratify the Budapest Convention Q2 2021 D/Justice NCSC,

D/Taoiseach

3 Develop a sustainable capacity building

programme for developing countries

Q2 2021 DFAT, NCSC NCSC

59

Measure 18: We will create an interdepartmental group (IDG) on internet governance and international cyber policy to coordinate national positions across Departments.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Establish a IDG to coordinate on cyber

policy matters.

Q2 2020 DFAT NCSC,, All

Gov

Departments

Measure 19: We will deepen our existing engagement in international organisations, including by joining the Cyber Security Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Tallinn, Estonia.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Secondment of a member of DF to CCD-

COE

Q4 2020 NCSC DF,

D/Defence,

DFAT

Citizens

Measure 20: Government will develop a national cyber security information campaign which will use information provided by the NCSC and the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau and be delivered by entities which are directly engaged in information provision.


Quarter

Lead Key

Stakeholders

1 Support the continued inclusion of

cyber security elements in Webwise

programmes

Q4 2020 DCCAE AGS, DES

2 Develop a public awareness campaign to

include information on cyber security and

cyber crime prevention.

Q1 2021 NCSC, Online

Safety

Commissioner

DCCAE, AGS,

DJE, DES

Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála 2019-2024

Clár na nÁbhar Achoimre Fheidhmeach ........................................................................................................ 3

Bearta ................................................................................................................................... 5

1 Réamhrá ........................................................................................................................ 8

2 Fís................................................................................................................................ 11

3 Cuspóirí ....................................................................................................................... 12

4 Riosca agus an tSochaí Faisnéise ............................................................................... 13

4.1. Rioscaí Straitéiseacha ........................................................................................ 13

4.2. Bagairtí Hibrideacha ........................................................................................... 14

4.3. Rioscaí don Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus do Chórais agus Sonraí na

hEarnála Poiblí ................................................................................................................ 15

4.4. Saoránaigh agus Gnó ......................................................................................... 18

5 Forbairt Náisiúnta Cumais ............................................................................................ 19

5.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 19

5.2. Cuspóir ............................................................................................................... 23

5.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 23

6 Cosaint Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil ......................................................................... 26

6.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 26

6.2. Cuspóir ............................................................................................................... 28

6.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 28

7 Sonraí agus Líonraí na hEarnála Poiblí ........................................................................ 33

7.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 33

7.2. Cuspóir ............................................................................................................... 34

7.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 34

8 Scileanna ..................................................................................................................... 38

8.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 38

8.2. Cuspóirí .............................................................................................................. 40

2

8.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 40

9 Forbairt Fiontar ............................................................................................................ 44

9.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 44

9.2. Cuspóirí .............................................................................................................. 44

9.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 44

10 Rannpháirtíocht ......................................................................................................... 46

10.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 46

10.2. Cuspóir ............................................................................................................... 47

10.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 47

11 Saoránaigh ................................................................................................................ 50

11.1. An Cás Mar Atá................................................................................................... 50

11.2. Cuspóir ............................................................................................................... 51

11.3. Bearta ................................................................................................................. 51

12 Creat Rialachais agus Freagrachtaí .......................................................................... 53

12.1. Struchtúr Rialachais ............................................................................................ 53

12.2. An Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála a Chur ar Fáil ......................................... 53

Aguisín 1 Liosta Gníomhartha ............................................................................................. 54

3

Achoimre Fheidhmeach Tá Éire rangaithe i measc na bpríomh-Bhallstát AE chomh fada is a bhaineann le roghnú

agus úsáid teicneolaíochtaí digiteacha. Cosúil leis an gcuid eile den domhan forbartha, tá ról

lárnach ag na teicneolaíochtaí seo i dtacú leis an saol geilleagrach agus sóisialta, agus an

saol sin a éascú. Chomh maith leis sin, bhain Éire tairbhe shuntasach i dtéarmaí

geilleagracha as forbairt éiceachóras domhanda sonraí; chinntigh ár suíomh geografach,

geilleagar oscailte agus ballraíocht AE go bhfuilimid ag déileáil le líon suntasach sonraí agus

gníomhaíochta geilleagraí.

É sin ráite, chiallaigh forbairt agus úsáid leanúnach an Idirlín agus na gléasanna nasctha a

bhaineann leis go bhfuil daoine ag brath níos mó ná riamh ar na córais seo. De bhrí go bhfuil

daoine ag brath chomh mór sin ar na córais seo, tá tacar casta agus forbarthach rioscaí

cruthaithe, cuid acu a eascraíonn as fabhtanna i ndearadh nó in oibriú na gcóras, rud is cúis

le caillteanas seirbhíse gan choinne. Eascraíonn cuid eile fós as iarmhairt gníomhartha atá á

ndéanamh d’aon turas ag grúpaí eagraithe, Náisiúnstáit san áireamh, atá ag iarraidh na

córais seo a threascairt nó a chur i mbaol le haghaidh cúiseanna éagsúla. D’fhéadfadh go

mbeadh na córais seo á gcur i mbaol trí ghoid nó scriosadh sonraí nó airgid, agus trí chur

isteach ar nó scriosadh fisiciúil seirbhísí nó bonneagair. Dá réir sin, tá tacar iarmhairtí casta

agus idirghaolmhara ag na rioscaí seo do Stáit, idir cosaint sonraí saoránach, agus cosaint

príomhbhonneagair agus príomhsheirbhísí.

Go minic, deirtear gurb éard atá i gceist le Cibearshlándáil modh chun rúndacht, sláine,

údaracht agus infhaighteacht líonraí, gléasanna agus sonraí a chinntiú. De réir mar a éiríonn

córais líonra agus faisnéise níos leabaite agus níos casta, áfach, éiríonn sé níos tábhachtaí

agus níos deacra iad seo a choinneáil slán go comhuaineach. Cé gur fhorbair na freagairtí

seo go tapa mar iarracht coinneáil suas leis na forbairtí teicneolaíocha agus margaidh, tá an

próiseas seo i bhfad níos dúshlánaí mar gheall ar nádúr dinimiciúil na bhforbairtí, i dtéarmaí

na teicneolaíochta agus i dtéarmaí na timpeallachta domhanda straitéisí.

Chomhaontaigh agus d’fhoilsigh an Rialtas an chéad Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála in

Éirinn i mí Iúil 2015. Leagadh amach ann treochlár d’fhorbairt an Lárionaid Náisiúnta

Cibearshlándála (LNCS) agus sraith beart chun sonraí agus líonraí Rialtais, agus bonneagar

náisiúnta criticiúil a chosaint. Tá fás suntasach tagtha ar scála agus ar acmhainn LNCS ó

shin, agus tugadh isteach Treoir an AE maidir le Slándáil Líonra agus Faisnéise 2016/1148

(Treoir NIS), tacar suntasach beart chun tacú le Ranna agus le Gníomhaireachtaí Rialtais a

gcórais a bhainistiú. Os a choinne sin, tá thart ar 70 oibreoir bonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil

ainmnithe go dleathach, agus tá siad faoi réir ceanglas ceangailteach slándála agus

4

ceanglas ceangailteach maidir le fógairt teagmhas. I dteannta a chéile, ciallaíonn siad seo

go bhfuil an Stát agus na hoibreoirí bonneagar náisiúnta critiúil ullmhaithe níos fearr chun

déileáil le rioscaí cibearshlándála ná mar a bhí roimhe seo.

Tá an earnáil teicneolaíochta an-dinimiciúil, agus is cosúil go bhfuil neart forbairtí nua ar na

bacáin, bunaithe ar líonraí fíorúlaithe a bhfuil ardphrótacail chumarsáide (cosúil le 5G),

Intleacht Shaorga agus Idirlíon na nEarraí, in úsáid acu. Dá réir sin, is cosúil go mbeidh raon

leathan cásanna úsáide luaite leis na forbairtí athchúrsacha nasctha seo, rud a chiallaíonn

go mbeidh níos mó tionchair acu ar shaol saoránach agus ar an bpríomhbhonneagar a bhfuil

seirbhísí ag brath air. Sa bhreis air sin, ciallaíonn nádúr bogearraí-bhunaithe na

teicneolaíochta seo gur dócha go mbeidh gá le huirlisí nua rialála agus rialachais lena

chinntiú go bhfuil sonraí agus seirbhísí seasmhach agus slán.

Ar aon dul leis na forbairtí seo, d’fhorbair an tionscal domhanda atá ag soláthar táirgí agus

seirbhísí a bhfuil sé mar aidhm aige córais agus bonneagar digiteach a choimeád slán. Tá

os cionn 6,500 duine fostaithe san earnáil cibearshlándála in Éirinn, agus is cuid

thábhachtach den earnáil teicneolaíochta é an tionscadal anseo cheana féin, ina cháil féin

agus mar chumasóir le haghaidh infheistíochta in earnálacha gaolmhara anseo. Is

dlúthchuid d’fhás geilleagrach amach anseo agus poist ardluacha é an rath seo a

chothabháil agus cur leis, mar aon lena chinntiú gur ann d’éiceachóras cibearshlándála sa

Stát ag a bhfuil mais chriticiúil oiriúnach.

Is próiseas leanúnach freisin é comhtháthú teicneolaíochtaí digiteacha ag leibhéal náisiúnta,

próiseas a bhfuil neart gníomhaíochta Rialtais déanta ina leith. Tá Straitéis TFC na

Seirbhíse Poiblí 2015 méadaithe ag ‘Ár Seirbhís Phoiblí 2020’, creat beartais nua atá

deartha chun cur leis na hathchóirithe roimhe seo agus ag an am céanna scóip an leasaithe

chun díriú ar chomhoibriú, nuálaíocht agus meastóireacht a leathnú. Ag leibhéal náisiúnta,

cinnteoidh an Plean Náisiúnta Leathanbhanda go mbeidh rochtain ag breis is leathmhilliún

duine ar leathanbhanda ardluais den chéad uair, agus leagfar amach sa Straitéis Náisiúnta

Dhigiteach atá le foilsiú conas a bhfuil sé beartaithe ag an Rialtas a chinntiú gur féidir le

gach duine tairbhe a bhaint as na buntáistí a bhaineann le digitiú. I dteannta a chéile,

leanfaidh siad seo le héifeachtaí dearfacha a bheith acu ar fhás geilleagrach, cothromaíocht

réigiúnach agus deis don duine aonair; baineann riosca áirithe le digitiú freisin, áfach.

Leagtar amach sa Straitéis seo conas a rachaidh Éire i ngleic leis na dúshláin seo, agus

conas a bhfuil sé beartaithe againn tairbhe a bhaint as na deiseanna fiontraíochta agus

cruthaithe fostaíochta a eascróidh as na forbairtí domhanda teicneolaíocha seo. Leagtar

amach sa Straitéis seo tacar beart atá deartha chun déileáil le roinnt de na dúshláin chasta a

bhaineann le líon na ndaoine atá fostaithe san earnáil seo a chothabháil agus a fhorbairt.

5

Ar deireadh, tá gnéithe tábhachtacha idirnáisiúnta ag baint le forbairt na slándála líonra agus

faisnéise freisin, i dtéarmaí lárnacht an rialachais Idirlín agus, níos tábhachtaí fós, sa sféar

ginearálta taidhleoireachta. Is saincheist caidreamh idirnáisiúnta den chéad sraith é

Cibearshlándáil; leagtar síos sa Straitéis seo conas a leanfaidh Éire le ról a bheith aici sa

timpeallacht seo a mhúnlú ag leibhéal domhanda.

Bearta Cuirfidh an Rialtas, sa tréimhse 2019-2024, na bearta córasacha seo a leanas i bhfeidhm

chun ár náisiún a chosaint, ár n-earnáil cibearshlándála a fhorbairt, agus ár rannpháirtíocht

idirnáisiúnta maidir le todhchaí an Idirlín a fhorbairt.

1 Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, go háirithe

ag féachaint dá chumas monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar agus freagairt do

theagmhais chibearshlándála agus bagairtí atá ag forbairt sa Stát.

2 Comhtháthófar faisnéis agus anailís bhagartha ullmhaithe ag an Lárionad Náisiúnta

Cibearshlándála le hobair an Ionaid Náisiúnta um Anailís Slándála.

3 Leanfar leis an gcóras reatha do Chosaint an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil

bunaithe ar an Treoir NIS a úsáid agus a fhorbairt, agus leagfar béim ar leith ar

chláir leanúnacha chomhlíontachta agus iniúchta chun rioscaí do phríomhsheirbhísí

a mhaolú.

4 Déanfaidh LNCS, le cúnamh ó na Fórsaí Cosanta agus An Garda Síochána,

measúnú riosca mionsonraithe nuashonraithe ar leochaileacht reatha gach

Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus seirbhísí do chibirionsaí.

5 Forbrófar agus leathnófar córas cosanta reatha an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil

thar shaolré na Straitéise chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil

a chur san áireamh, lena n-áirítear gnéithe den chóras toghcháin.

6 Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar na grúpaí comhroinnte faisnéise atá á n-oibriú ag an

Ionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála cheana féin, agus leathnófar an Grúpa

Comhroinnte Bagartha atá ann cheana féin chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar

Náisiúnta Criticiúil a chur san áireamh.

7 Bunóidh an Rialtas tacar breise de chaighdeáin chomhlíontachta chun tacú le

cibearshlándáil an bhonneagair teileachumarsáide sa Stát.

8 Forbróidh LNCS caighdeán slándála bonnlíne atá le cur i bhfeidhm ag gach Roinn

Rialtas agus príomhghníomhaireacht.

6

9 Cuirfear an Clár ‘Sensor’ reatha i bhfeidhm i ngach Roinn Rialtais, agus déanfar

measúnú ar an bhféidearthacht a bhaineann le Sensor a chur i bhfeidhm i ngach

líonra Rialtais.

10 Cruthófar Fóram Slándála TF an Rialtais, a mbeidh cead ag Ceannasaithe

Shlándáil TF ar fud an Rialtais a bheith páirteach ann, chun comhroinnt faisnéise

maidir le dea-chleachtas le haghaidh cibearshlándáil a éascú agus chun cead a

thabhairt do LNCS tacú le húsáid a bhaint as an gcaighdeán slándála bonnlíne.

11 Éileoidh an Rialtas ar LNCS moltaí a eisiúint ag féachaint d’úsáid bogearraí agus

crua-earraí sonracha ar bhonneagar TF agus teileachumarsáide an Rialtais.

12 Leanfaidh an Rialtas lena chinntiú go bhfuil oiliúint dara agus tríú leibhéal san

eolaíocht ríomhaireachta agus sa chibearshlándáil á forbairt agus á húsáid, lena n-

áirítear trí thacú leis an obair atá ar bun ag Skillnet Ireland chun cláir oiliúna a

fhorbairt do gach leibhéal oideachais agus chun tacú le tionscnaimh SOLAS do

chlár TFC printíseachta i gcibearshlándáil.

13 Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann (SFI) cibearshlándáil a chur chun cinn

mar rogha gairme i scoileanna agus i gcoláistí tríd an gClár Smart Futures.

14 Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann, i dteannta le RGFN agus RCGAC,

scrúdú ar an bhféidearthacht trí Chlár Ionad Taighde SFI, clár Spoke an Ionaid

Taighde nó cláir chomhpháirtíochta fiontair eile, chun tionscnamh suntasach i

réimse an Taighde Cibearshlándála a mhaoiniú.

15 Leanfaidh an Rialtas ag tacú le agus le rannpháirtíocht iomlán le Clár Cyber

Ireland, clár atá á mhaoiniú ag an IDA, agus scrúdóidh sé meicníochtaí nua chun

tacú le comhoibriú cibearshlándála Tionscail/Acadúil/Rialtais.

16 Forbróidh Fiontraíocht Éireann clár cibearshlándála chun naisc chomhoibríocha a

éascú idir lucht fiontar agus an pobal taighde, na daoine a bheidh i gceannas ar

chur chun feidhme praiticiúil taighde i ngnó.

17 Neartófar tiomantas taidhleoireachta na hÉireann do chibearshlándáil, lena n-

áirítear cibear-attachés a bhunú i bpríomh-mhisin taidhleoireachta agus trí pháirt a

ghlacadh i bhforbairt acmhainní inbhuanaithe i dtríú tíortha.

18 Cruthóimid grúpa idir-rannach (GIR) maidir le rialachas Idirlín agus cibirbheartais

idirnáisiúnta chun seasamh náisiúnta a chomhordú i Ranna.

19 Cuirfimid lenár rannpháirtíocht reatha le heagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear

7

trí bheith páirteach san Ionad Barr Feabhais Cibearshlándála (CCD-COE) i

dTaillinn, san Eastóin.

20 Forbróidh an Rialtas feachtas náisiúnta faisnéise cibearshlándála a úsáidfidh

faisnéis a bheidh curtha ar fáil ag LNCS agus Biúró Cibearchoireachta Náisiúnta an

Gharda Síochána, agus beidh eintitis a bhfuil baint dhíreach acu le soláthar

faisnéise i mbun reáchtáil an fheachtais.

Tá plean cur feidhme mionsonraithe gníomhartha a bhaineann leis na bearta seo, lena n-

áirítear amlínte agus eagraíochtaí freagracha, leagtha amach san Iarscríbhinn tionlacain.

8

1 Réamhrá Tá Éire rangaithe i measc na bpríomh-Bhallstát AE chomh fada is a bhaineann le roghnú

agus úsáid teicneolaíochtaí digiteacha (7 as 28 Ballstát den Aontas Eorpach in Innéacs

Geilleagair Dhigitigh agus Sochaí Digití (DESI) an Choimisiúin Eorpaigh 2019). Go

praiticiúil, ciallaíonn sé seo go raibh ról lárnach ag an Idirlíon agus ag an éagsúlacht mhór

teicneolaíochta agus gléasanna atá nasctha leis inár rath geilleagrach a sholáthar agus a

chumasú. Os a choinne sin, cheadaigh siad feabhas suntasach ar tháirgiúlacht agus ar

cháilíocht na beatha, agus breis éifeachtúlachta agus inbhuanaitheachta in úsáid acmhainní.

Ag an am céanna, áfach, baineann tacar leabaithe rioscaí agus leochaileachtaí leis na

teicneolaíochtaí seo. Is saincheist dhinimiciúil é seo; éiríonn rudaí níos casta agus níos

dúshlánaí de réir mar a bhíonn córais níos leabaithe, nasctha leis an Idirlíon, agus

comhtháite i mbeagnach gach gné dár saol.

Baineann fíorthábhacht le déileáil leis an dúshlán seo cheana féin, i dtéarmaí seasmhacht

príomhbhonneagair agus príomhsheirbhísí agus cumas an Stáit teagmhais a bhainistiú agus

freagairt dóibh, ar mhaithe le leas sóisialta agus geilleagrach an Stáit agus an phobail. Níl an

tasc seo simplí. Tá sraith chasta saincheisteanna nach mór déileáil leo i gceist le

cibearshlándáil. Tá ról ag teicneolaíochtaí Idirlíon-chumasaithe agus nasctha i ngach gné

dár saol, ag leibhéal pearsanta agus chomh fada is a bhaineann leis na seirbhísí a bhfuilimid

ag brath orthu a chur ar fáil. Ciallaíonn éagsúlacht na n-earnálacha éagsúla seo, le

samhlacha agus teicneolaíochtaí úinéireachta difriúla, nach bhfuil aon samhail nó réiteach

amháin ann, teicniúil nó eile, a bheidh oiriúnach do gach earnáil. Nuair atá freagairt náisiúnta

á forbairt, tá gá le cur chuige dinimiciúil agus solúbtha, freagairt ina gcuirtear réitigh dhifriúla

i bhfeidhm de réir nádúr na hearnála agus an riosca don tsochaí, do shaol an duine, agus

don gheilleagar.

Tá impleachtaí suntasacha geopholaitiúla ag nádúr domhanda an Idirlín freisin - tá

bonneagar de chineál ar bith atá nasctha leis an Idirlíon leochaileach do bhagairtí ó áit ar

bith ar domhan. Dá réir sin, tá athrú tagtha ar gheografaíocht na slándála náisiúnta, agus tá

roinnt cruacheisteanna náisiúnta maidir le beartas slándála le freagairt ag Éire. Ar an gcéad

dul síos, bainistíocht dhomhanda an Idirlín, conas a bhfuil an tIdirlíon á rialú agus conas a

iompraíonn agus a ngníomhaíonn Stáit, arb ionann é agus príomhábhar imní náisiúnta

anois. Ar an dara dul síos, ní mór déileáil ar bhealach difriúil le slándáil gach próiseas,

seirbhís agus píosa bonneagair in Éirinn, ón bpróiseas toghcháin go dtí an bonneagar

míleata agus slándáil shonraí na hearnála poiblí, mar go bhfuil siad ar fad, go pointe áirithe,

ag brath ar ghléasanna nasctha agus is féidir díriú orthu ó áit ar bith ar fud an domhain. Ar

deireadh, tá athrú suntasach tagtha ar nádúr ár ngeilleagair. Is in Éirinn atá, de réir roinnt

9

meastachán, breis is 30% de shonraí uile an AE, agus Ceanncheathrú Eorpach go leor de

na cuideachtaí teicneolaíochta is mó ar domhan. Dá réir sin, tá ár rath geilleagrach nasctha

go dlúth lenár gcumas leanúnach timpeallacht shlán a chur ar fáil do na cuideachtaí seo

ionas gur féidir leo oibriú anseo.

Dá réir sin, baineann fíorthábhacht le slándáil ár gcóras líonra agus faisnéise d’fhorbairt

leanúnach gheilleagrach agus shóisialta shochaí na hÉireann. Mar thoradh ar an gcéad

Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, a foilsíodh in 2015, bunaíodh Lárionad Náisiúnta

Cibearshlándála feidhmiúil agus forbarthach, agus forbraíodh tacar cuimsitheach beart

bunaithe ar phríomhbhonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil agus slándáil chórais agus shonraí

Rialtais a chosaint. Bunaithe ar nádúr forbarthach na bagartha agus castacht na gcóras,

glactar le peirspictíocht níos leithne sa Straitéis seo agus leagtar amach sraith beart atá níos

forbartha ná mar atá sonraithe i Straitéis 2015. Ina theannta sin, cuimsítear sna bearta seo

tacar níos leithne saincheisteanna ná roimhe seo; baineann dúshláin le scileanna, forbairt

fiontar agus taighde a éilíonn gníomhartha sonracha.

Bhí an próiseas a bhain leis an Straitéis seo a fhorbairt á bhainistiú ag Grúpa Stiúrtha

Ardleibhéil, faoi chathaoirleacht na Roinne Cumarsáide, Gníomhaithe ar son na hAeráide

agus Comhshaoil, le hionadaíocht ó Roinn an Taoisigh, an Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha agus

Trádála, an Roinn Gnóthaí Fostaíochta agus Coimirce Sóisialaí, an Roinn Cosanta, Oifig

Phríomh-Oifigeach Faisnéise an Rialtais, an Roinn Dlí agus Cirt agus Comhionannais, agus

an Roinn Gnó, Fiontar agus Nuálaíochta.

Bhí an próiseas á threorú ag tacar meicníochtaí comhairliúcháin chomh maith. Ar an gcéad

dul síos, tugadh tacar de chúig ghrúpa shonracha rannpháirtíochta earnála le chéile, ar a

raibh páirtithe leasmhara as ar fud na hearnála poiblí agus príobháidí. Rinne na grúpaí seo

ionadaíocht ar Shlándáil agus Póilíneacht Náisiúnta, Forbairt Fiontar, Scileanna agus

Taighde, Slándáil TFC na hEarnála Poiblí agus Cosaint an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil,

agus dearadh iad lena chinntiú go raibh an Straitéis cuimsitheach agus go raibh léargas á

thabhairt inti ar an raon éagsúil saincheisteanna nach mór déileáil leo. Tionóladh na grúpaí

seo faoi dhó, uair amháin roimh an gcomhairliúchán poiblí lena chinntiú go raibh an

doiciméad agus na ceisteanna comhairliúcháin oiriúnach, agus chun na hábhair bhunúsacha

atá ag déanamh imní do gach earnáil a shainaithint. Reáchtáladh an dara cruinniú nuair a

bhí an comhairliúchán poiblí dúnta, agus cuireadh an toradh in iúl do na grúpaí, mar aon leis

an toradh a rabhthas ag súil leis a bheadh ag an Straitéis. Sholáthair na grúpaí seo fóram

ina bhféadfadh rannpháirtithe tuairimí, ábhair imní agus smaointe a chur in iúl go héasca,

fóram a bhí an-luachmhar chomh fada is a bhain leis an Straitéis a fhrámú agus a chur i

gcomhthéacs, agus réitigh ar roinnt de na dúshláin atá le sárú a shainaithint.

10

Reáchtáladh comhairliúchán poiblí idir Márta agus Bealtaine 2019, agus foilsíodh dréacht

achomair den straitéis mar chuid de phróiseas comhairliúcháin phoiblí a raibh sé mar aidhm

leis tuairimí an phobail agus an tionscail trí chéile a bhailiú. Bhí 30 lá oibre ag baill den

phobal chun aighneachtaí a dhéanamh faoi dhréacht achomair na straitéise, agus fuarthas

47 aighneacht ar fad. Ina dhiaidh sin, rinne an Grúpa Stiúrtha agus na cúig ghrúpa

shonracha rannpháirtíochta earnála na haighneachtaí seo a mheas, agus rinneadh na

bearta molta a asbhaint agus a tháblú chun breis anailíse a dhéanamh. San áireamh san

anailís seo freisin bhí measúnú ar bhreis is 30 straitéis náisiúnta as ar fud na hEorpa agus

níos faide ó bhaile, mar aon le doiciméid dea-chleachtais ó chomhlachtaí cosúil le OECD

agus ENISA.

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2 Fís Is í an fhís atá againn gur féidir le sochaí na hÉireann leanúint ar aghaidh ag baint tairbhe

go sábháilte as an réabhlóid dhigiteach agus ról iomlán a ghlacadh i múnlú thodhchaí an

Idirlín. Chuige sin, déanfaimid an méid seo a leanas:

Cosnóimid an Stát, agus a phobal agus an bonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil ó bhagairtí

sa réimse cibearshlándála ar bhealach dinimiciúil agus solúbtha, agus ar bhealach a

léiríonn meas iomlán ar chearta daoine agus a chinntíonn cothromaíocht

chomhréireach idir rioscaí agus costais.

Forbróimid cumas an Stáit, institiúidí taighde, gnóthaí, na hearnála poiblí agus

daoine chun na dúshláin atá os ár gcomhair sa réimse seo a thuiscint agus a

bhainistiú níos fearr, agus lena chinntiú gur féidir le gnóthaí agus le daoine aonair

leanúint le tairbhe a bhaint as na deiseanna geilleagracha agus fostaíochta a

bhaineann leis an teicneolaíocht faisnéise, agus go háirithe leis an gcibearshlándáil.

Beimid rannpháirteach ar bhonn straitéiseach go náisiúnta agus go hidirnáisiúnta,

agus tacóimid le cibearspás saor, oscailte, síochánta agus slán, agus cinnteoimid gur

gné lárnach é cibearshlándáil dár seasamh taidhleoireachta sa raon rannpháirtíochta

trí chéile.

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3 Cuspóirí

Leanúint le cumas an Stáit freagairt do agus bainistíocht a dhéanamh ar theagmhais

chibearshlándála a fheabhsú, lena n-áirítear iad siúd le comhpháirt slándála

náisiúnta.

An bonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil a shainaithint agus a chosaint trína sheasmhacht do

chibirionsaí a mhéadú agus trína chinntiú go bhfuil pleananna oiriúnacha freagartha

teagmhas bunaithe ag oibreoirí seirbhísí bunriachtanacha chun aon chur isteach ar

sheirbhísí a laghdú agus a bhainistiú.

Seasmhacht agus slándáil chórais TF na hearnála poiblí a fheabhsú chun na sonraí

agus na seirbhísí a mbraitheann daoine orthu a chosaint ar bhealach níos fearr.

Infheistiú i dtionscnaimh oideachais chun an lucht oibre a ullmhú le haghaidh

gairmeacha TF agus cibearshlándála.

Feasacht a mhúscailt faoi fhreagrachtaí gnóthaí maidir le slándáil a líonraí,

gléasanna agus faisnéis, agus dlús a chur faoi thaighde agus forbairt sa

chibearshlándáil in Éirinn, lena n-áirítear infheistíocht i dteicneolaíocht nua a éascú.

Leanúint le rannpháirtíocht le comhpháirtithe idirnáisiúnta agus le heagraíochtaí

idirnáisiúnta lena chinntiú go bhfuil an cibearspás oscailte, slán, aonadach, saor agus

in ann forbairt gheilleagrach agus shóisialta a éascú.

Cur leis an leibhéal ginearálta scileanna agus feasachta i measc daoine maidir le

cleachtais bhunúsacha chibearshláinteachais agus tacú leo trí fhaisnéis agus trí

oiliúint.

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4 Riosca agus an tSochaí Faisnéise Ó laethanta tosaigh ‘Arpanet’ sna Stáit Aontaithe sna 1960idí, dearadh an tIdirlíon mar

chóras oscailte a cheadaigh d’aon phointe ar líonra teachtaireachtaí a fháil ó aon phointe

eile, agus a cheadaigh d’fhaisnéis bealaí iolracha ó phointe amháin go dtí pointe eile a

aimsiú. D’ainneoin go bhfuil na billiúin gléasanna nasctha anois nasctha le líonra a théann

mórthimpeall an domhain, tá an bunphrionsabal sin fós i gceist, agus go deimhin bhí ról

lárnach aige i bhforbairt thapa an Idirlín agus an úsáid atá á baint ag an duine as.

É sin ráite, áfach, éascaíonn an oscailteacht seo agus an éascaíocht a bhaineann le

nascadh úsáid a bhaint as an líonra le haghaidh gníomhaíochtaí mailíseacha. Le himeacht

ama, agus de réir mar a d’éirigh an tIdirlíon níos tábhachtaí, tá forbairt tagtha ar raon agus

tionchar féideartha a leithéid de ghníomhartha, rud a chiallaíonn go bhfuil raon leathan de

rioscaí nua d’fheidhmeanna criticiúla sóisialta agus geilleagracha le cur san áireamh.

Déantar cur síos sa Rannóg seo ar na príomhrioscaí atá ann d’Éirinn.

4.1. Rioscaí Straitéiseacha Ag leibhéal an-ard, cruthaíonn forbairtí i gcibearshlándáil dhá dhúshlán bhunúsacha

d’Éirinn. Ar an gcéad dul síos, ciallaíonn nádúr neamhspásúil an Idirlín go bhfuil an Stát i

mbaol bagairtí domhanda nua agus atá ag fás go tapa, lena n-áirítear iad siúd atá forbartha

agus in úsáid ag gníomhaithe bagartha ag a bhfuil acmhainní agus saineolas suntasach.

Tagann na bagairtí seo chun solais ag leibhéal náisiúnta ar bhealaí éagsúla a chiallaíonn

go bhfuil sé deacair na rioscaí gaolmhara a bhrath agus a mhaolú. Baineann tábhacht

chomh maith leis an bpointe go bhfuil an timpeallacht slándála domhanda ag céim

dhinimiciúil; cruthaíonn an filleadh ar pholaitíocht ‘na cumhachta móire’ i gcaidreamh

idirnáisiúnta, i dteannta le teannas maidir le díoltóirí trádála agus teicneolaíochta, dúshláin

ar leith do gheilleagair bheaga, oscailte cosúil le hÉireann.

Ar an dara dul síos, tá forbairt shuntasach tagtha ar bhonn teicneolaíoch gheilleagar na

hÉireann le blianta beaga anuas; is sa Stát atá céatadán mór de shonraí na hEorpa anois

(níos mó ná 30% de réir measúnuithe tionscail áirithe) agus ceanncheathrú Eorpach cuid

de na gnólachtaí teicneolaíochta is mó ar domhan. Go suntasach chomh maith, bhí

impleachtaí móra ag éabhlóid choincheapúil na néalríomhaireachta ar Éirinn. Ina lán

cásanna, seachas a bheith ag feidhmiú mar stórtha éighníomhacha sonraí, is timpeallachtaí

beo oibríochtúla bogearraí iad; dá réir sin, d’fhéadfadh éaradh seirbhíse nó teagmhas a

chuirfeadh isteach ar cheann de na háiseanna seo éifeachtaí láithreacha bunathraitheacha

a bheith acu ar bhonneagar nó ar ghnó ar fud an AE nó ar fud an domhain. Ciallaíonn sé

sin, go bhfuil riosca níos mó slándála agus geilleagrach ag baint leis an mbonneagar atá ag

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tacú leis na hionaid seo, poiblí agus príobháideach.

Le blianta beaga anuas, tá forbairt agus úsáid rialta á baint as ard-uirlisí le haghaidh

ionsaithe agus spiaireacht chibirchumasaithe, agus, den chéad uair seans, scriosadh

fisiciúil an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil trí mhodhanna cibirchumasaithe. Dá réir sin,

dlúthchuid de réimse na cibearshlándála é rás leanúnach agus contúirteach

teicneolaíochta, idir ionsaí agus chosaint.

Ciallaíonn nádúr an bhonneagair nasctha líonra go bhfuil cúrsaí níos casta fós. Ar an gcéad

dul síos, is córais dhomhanda iad seo, i dtéarmaí na slabhraí soláthair do ghléasanna agus

do bhogearraí agus i dtéarmaí an líonra a nascann le chéile iad; ciallaíonn sé seo nach

féidir le haon Stát ar leith ach méid áirithe smachta a bheith aige ar oibriú an líonra ina

dhlínse féin. Chomh maith leis sin, tá na gléasanna agus na córais seo faoi úinéireacht raon

leathan cineálacha gnóthaí agus eagraíochtaí. Go deimhin, tá roinnt gléasanna nasctha ina

lán tithe príobháideacha cheana féin, rud éigin a bhfuiltear ag súil leis a éireoidh níos

coitianta mar thoradh ar an méadú atá ag teacht ar Idirlíon na nEarraí (‘IoT’). Ciallaíonn sé

seo gur dúshlán casta é bearta nó freagairtí cosantacha ar theagmhais nó ar ionsaithe thar

an raon leathan spriocanna féideartha seo a chomhordú. Os a choinne sin, mura bhfuil

Rialtais toilteanach córas faireacháin ionsáite a éileamh, beidh roghanna teoranta ar fáil

dóibh chun gach ionsaí nó teagmhas ar a ndlínse nó in aghaidh a saoránach nó bonneagair

a thuar nó a chosc. Áirítear i measc na ndúshlán a bhaineann leis an réimse seo na

dúshláin is bunúsaí; go minic, mar gheall ar a nádúr, ní raibh cibirionsaithe á dtuairisciú ná

á bpoibliú, rud a chruthaigh saincheist shoiléir do Rialtais chomh fada is a bhaineann leis an

gceist bhunúsach a thuiscint agus a fhreagairt.

Tá aitheantas tugtha ag an Rialtas cheana féin do nádúr níos casta agus dinimiciúil na

ndúshlán slándála atá os comhair an Stáit trí Choiste Comh-Aireachta a bhunú atá ag

déileáil le saincheisteanna slándála náisiúnta. Chomh maith leis sin, tá Lárionad Náisiúnta

Cibearshlándála (LNCS) bunaithe ag an Rialtas a oibreoidh leis an Rialtas chun tacú le cur

chuige soiléir maidir le dúshláin slándála náisiúnta a mheas, a thuiscint agus déileáil leo,

cur chuige a mbeidh comhairle straitéiseach níos fearr á cur ar fáil don Rialtas dá bharr.

4.2. Bagairtí Hibrideacha Ceann de na saincheisteanna is dúshlánaí a tháinig chun cinn le blianta beaga anuas ba ea

úsáid agus mionchoigeartú gníomhach bagairtí hibrideacha. Seo a leanas an sainmhíniú

atá luaite ag an AE leis na bagairtí seo “bearta iltoiseacha, a chomhcheanglaíonn gnéithe

comhéigneacha agus treascracha, ag úsáid uirlisí agus beartaíochta gnásúla agus

neamhghnásúla (taidhleoireachta, míleata, geilleagrach, agus teicneolaíoch) chun an

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coimhlinteoir a dhíchobhsú”, agus atá tagtha chun cinn i roinnt tíortha san AE le blianta

beaga anuas. Bhí cibir-chomhpháirt i gceist in go leor de na bagairtí seo, arb é an cineál is

coitianta úsáid a bhaint as cibir-uirlisí chun faisnéis a ghoid le húsáid i bhfeachtais

bhréagaisnéise ina dhiaidh sin (ar a dtugtar ‘haiceáil agus sceitheadh faisnéise’). De réir a

nádúir, tá na feachtais seo deartha ar shlí nach furasta iad a bhrath, agus mar gheall ar na

cuspóirí sainráite polaitiúla a bhaineann leo, tá sé níos deacra fós d’údaráis phoiblí

gníomhú ina n-aghaidh.

Mar dhaonlathas liobrálach oscailte, tá Éire leochaileach d’fheachtais den chineál seo ar

bhealach mórán mar an gcéanna le Ballstáit eile an AE. I mí na Nollag 2017, bhunaigh an

Rialtas an chéad ‘Grúpa Idir-Rannach maidir le Slándáil Phróiseas Toghcháin agus

Bréagaisnéise na hÉireann’, atá á chomhordú ag Roinn an Taoisigh. Tá sé de dhualgas ar

an ngrúpa seo measúnú a dhéanamh ar na rioscaí do phróiseas toghcháin na hÉireann, ag

cur san áireamh na saincheisteanna substainteacha a eascraíonn ó eispéiris le déanaí i

dtíortha daonlathacha eile maidir le húsáid a bheith á baint ag na meáin shóisialta as tríú

páirtithe seachtracha, anaithnide. D’fhoilsigh an Grúpa a chéad tuarascáil i mí Iúil 2018 inar

aimsíodh cé go bhfuil na rioscaí don phróiseas toghcháin in Éirinn sách íseal faoi láthair, go

bhfuil seans ann go mbeidh rioscaí ann amach anseo amr gheall ar scaipeadh

bréagaisnéise ar líne agus an riosca a bhaineann le cibirionsaithe ar an gcóras toghcháin.

Tá roinnt beart molta ag an ngrúpa seo chun cosaint i gcoinne na rioscaí seo, lena n-áirítear

Coimisiún Toghcháin a bhunú, clárú vótálaithe a nuachóiriú, fógraíocht pholaitiúil ar líne a

rialú, agus tacú le hiarrachtaí AE dul i ngleic le bréagaisnéis. Ag leibhéal Eorpach freisin,

rinneadh obair shuntasach, lena n-áirítear an Hybrid Fusion Cell a chruthú, atá bunaithe sa

tSeirbhís Eorpach Gníomhaíochta Seachtraí chun comhroinnt thapa faisnéise a bhaineann

leis na gníomhartha hibrideacha a bhfuil tionchar acu ar roinnt Ballstát den AE a éascú.

4.3. Rioscaí don Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus do Chórais agus Sonraí na hEarnála Poiblí

Cé go mbíonn rioscaí ginearálta i gceist don tsochaí mar iarmhairt ar fhorbairtí sa

chibearspás, tá earnálacha áirithe ann ina bhféadfadh impleachtaí i bhfad níos mó a bheith

ag na teagmhais seo. Go ginearálta, áirítear ina measc seo earnálacha bonneagair atá

riachtanacha d’fheidhmeanna sochaíocha agus geilleagracha, ar a dtugtar Bonneagar

Náisiúnta Criticiúil (BNC), agus Córais agus Sonraí na hEarnála Poiblí go minic.

Cuimsíodh i gcoincheapú traidisiúnta BNC na n-earnálacha fuinnimh agus iompair, earnáil

na seirbhísí airgeadais, cúram sláinte agus an córas teileachumarsáide féin. Tá ról lárnach

ag córais TF Rialtais, i seachadadh go leor feidhmeanna atá riachtanach chun cur ar

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chumas sochaí nua-aimseartha feidhmiú, lena n-áirítear seirbhísí sóisialta agus córais

íocaíochta, bailiúchán cánach agus feidhmiú an daonlathais.

Le blianta anuas tá forbairt tagtha agus tá úsáid bainte as uirlisí chun na córais seo a chur i

mbaol, cur isteach orthu, agus iad a scriosadh fiú. D’eascair na bagairtí seo as raon leathan

gníomhaithe, agus tá éagsúlacht le tabhairt faoi deara chomh fada is a bhaineann le

rochtain ar acmhainní agus cumas. Ina measc tá daoine aonair ag obair leo féin nó i

ngrúpaí beaga chun ionsaithe núise a dhéanamh, cosúil le haghlot suímh ghréasáin agus

ionsaithe diúltaithe mionscála, agus ‘haiceálaithe cúise’, coirpigh de chineálacha éagsúla,

agus Náisiúnstáit. I measc na mbagairtí ag leibhéal níos airde, go minic bíonn grúpaí

coireachta eagraithe inaitheanta ó Náisiúnstáit sa mhéid is go n-úsáideann siad, uaireanta,

ardteicnící chun líonraí agus sonraí a ionfhabhtú agus cur isteach orthu.

Ag deireadh, ag barr na pirimide seo, tá na heintitis atá urraithe ag an Stát, eagraíochtaí

míleata nó slándála go hiondúil, a dhéanann iarracht córais líonra agus faisnéise a úsáid

chun oibríochtaí a dhéanamh, idir ghadaíocht sonraí agus scriosadh bonneagar fisiciúil. Tá

sé léirithe go raibh baint ag na gníomhaithe bagartha seo, ar a dtugtar ‘ardbhagairtí

seasmhacha’ (nó ABSanna) de ghnáth, le hionsaithe i raon leathan earnálacha, ach go

raibh béim ar leith ar chórais TF an Rialtais, líonraí teileachumarsáide, seirbhísí airgeadais

agus cuideachtaí teicneolaíochta. Ciallaíonn na hacmhainní atá acu, a seasmhacht agus a

saineolas go mbaineann dúshlán ar leith leis na heintitis seo, tá sé deacair iad a bhrath

agus tá sé deacair iad a bhaint agus, dá réir sin, cruthaíonn siad dúshlán tromchúiseach

agus leanúnach do shlándáil an líonra agus na gcóras faisnéise.

Go stairiúil, bheadh Stáit ag súil le Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus córais agus sonraí

na hearnála poiblí a choimeád slán trí líon an-bheag príomhshuiteálacha. D’fhéadfaidís

dlíthe a dhéanamh chun páirtithe a thoirmeasc óna ndlínsí a úsáid chun críocha nó

gníomhaíochtaí aindleathacha, agus d’fhéadfaidís teorainneacha fisiciúla a úsáid mar

mhodh cosanta in aghaidh bagairtí seachtracha. Níl aon cheann de na bearta seo chomh

héifeachtach céanna sa ré dhigiteach. Os a choinne sin, le haghaidh cúiseanna praiticiúla

agus dlíthiúla, go ginearálta ní fheiceann Rialtais, nó ní féidir leo an raon leathan gléasanna

ina ndlínse nó an trácht ag sreabhadh chucu agus uathu a choinneáil slán. Is amhlaidh atá

mar go bhfuil na líonraí faoi úinéireacht phríobháideach, mar atá gléasanna nasctha agus

céatadán mór den bhonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil.

Le haghaidh go leor den tréimhse go dtí 2016, ba é an cur chuige a bhí ag go leor Rialtas

Náisiúnta tacú le heagraíochtaí trí fhaisnéis a sholáthar maidir le bagairtí agus bearta

maolaithe riosca, agus feidhm tuairisce teagmhas a sholáthar. In Éirinn, chiallaigh síniú i

ndlí na Rialachán maidir le Slándáil Líonra agus Faisnéise 2018 (I.R. 360 de 2018) go bhfuil

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cur chuige i bhfad níos réamhghníomhaí ann anois maidir le cosaint an Bhonneagair

Náisiúnta Chriticiúil, lena n-áirítear sainaithint fhoirmiúil oibreoirí, tús a chur le clár beart

slándála a áirítear ann measúnuithe agus iniúchtaí ar chomhlíontacht, ar aon dul le bearta

atá á gcur i gcrích ar fud na hEorpa. Le himeacht ama, beidh méadú ar sheasmhacht na

bpríomhsheirbhísí seo in aghaidh ionsaithe nó teagmhais. Tá rioscaí fós ann, áfach, sna

hearnálacha atá clúdaithe ag Rialacháin NIS agus lasmuigh díobh seo.

Sa chéad chás, is modheolaíocht laghdaithe riosca, seachas ráthaíocht maidir le slándáil

absalóideach, é cloí leis na bearta slándála atá sonraithe sna Rialacháin NIS. Ar an dara

dul síos, tá an Treoir agus Rialacháin NIS teoranta go sainráite do sheacht n-earnáil

ainmnithe. Léiríodh sa mheasúnú a rinneadh ar an mBonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil a rinne

LNCS i rith an phróisis ainmnithe agus cur chun feidhme na mbeart slándála i ndiaidh

ainmnithe go bhfuil cuid den bhonneagar sa Stát lasmuigh de scóip na Rialachán NIS

fíorthábhachtach freisin, agus go bhfuil roinnt idirspleáchas idir earnálacha Bonneagar

Náisiúnta Criticiúil ar dócha go mbeidh siad mar bhonn le rioscaí ar leith.

Cé go bhfuil infheistíocht shuntasach agus aird shuntasach dírithe ar shlándáil TFC na

hearnála poiblí, ní hamháin mar gheall ar an Rialachán Ginearálta maidir le Cosaint Sonraí,

baineann roinnt dúshlán ar leith le nádúr na hearnála. Is féidir le roinnt Rann agus

Gníomhaireachtaí a gcomhlíontacht le dea-chleachtas idirnáisiúnta a léiriú go héasca (agus

caighdeáin idirnáisiúnta cosúil le ISO27001) ach fós féin baineann dúshláin le hardleibhéal

slándála a chinntiú ar bhonn comhsheashmhach i Ranna agus i ngníomhaireachtaí Rialtais.

Baineann saincheisteanna áirithe le rialachas foirmiúil shlándáil TFC, go ginearálta agus i

gcomhthéacs faisnéis rangaithe náisiúnta agus faisnéis rangaithe Stát agus comhlachtaí

idirnáisiúnta eile. Baineann saincheisteanna cosúla le hImréiteach Slándála Saoráidí a fháil

le haghaidh cuideachtaí a bhfuil baint acu le láimhseáil agus le stóráil faisnéis rúnda. Tá

roinnt beart á forbairt chun déileáil leis na dúshláin seo, lena n-áirítear níos mó úsáide a

bhaint as (agus pleananna le haghaidh) bonneagar TF comhroinnte idir Ranna, ach tá

roinnt dúshlán bunúsach fós le sárú.

Go criticiúil, is cosúil go n-éireoidh an cás seo níos casta fiú fós mar thoradh ar fhorbairtí

leanúnacha teicneolaíocha, lena n-áirítear réabhlóidí san earnáil teileachumarsáide. Trí aga

folaigh íseal agus tarchur ard bandaleithid faisnéise a cheadú, is dócha go bhfeidhmeoidh

úsáid teicneolaíochtaí 5G mar phríomhbhonneagar cumasaithe do shraith teicneolaíochtaí

eile agus cásanna úsáide. D’fhéadfaí go n-áireofaí ina measc seo seirbhísí do chustaiméirí

cosúil le feithiclí uathrialaitheacha, seirbhísí ríomhshláinte agus siamsaíocht, agus seirbhísí

atá dírithe ar an earnáil thionsclaíoch. Ar an mbonn sin, is cosúil go mbeidh líonraí 5G mar

bhonn le tacar nua seirbhísí a bheidh riachtanach d’oibriú feidhmeanna riachtanacha

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sochaíocha agus geilleagracha. Tá nádúr na líonraí agus na teicneolaíochta seo ábhartha

freisin; ó tharla go bhfuil sé sainithe agus fíorúlaithe ar bhogearraí ciallaíonn sé gur dócha

go mbeidh gá le cineálacha nua beart slándála san earnáil seo chun slándáil an líonra 5G

agus na seirbhísí a bhraitheann air a chinntiú.

4.4. Saoránaigh agus Gnó Maidir le saoránaigh phríobháideacha, de gach aois, tá dlúthnasc idir go leor

saincheisteanna a bhaineann le cibearshlándáil agus sábháilteacht ar líne agus

cibearchoireacht a chosc. Is iondúil go dtagraíonn na nithe seo d’iompar ar líne daoine

aonair, nó don tslí ina gcoimeádann nó ina n-úsáideann siad a ngléasanna pearsanta nó

baile. Áirítear sna rioscaí seo caillteanas sonraí mar thoradh ar ionsaithe criptea-earraí, nó

caillteanas nó goid faisnéis phearsanta lena n-áirítear faisnéis aitheantais nó sonraí bainc.

I gcás gnóthaí, baineann ceann de na torthaí is coitianta agus is mó damáiste a eascraíonn

as an méadú ar ghníomhaíocht mhailíseach ar líne le hionsaithe ar ghnóthaí chun críche

tairbhe airgeadais. D’ainneoin leibhéal méadaithe feasachta, tá líon na dteagmhas

Cibearchoireachta in Éirinn ag méadú, agus thuairiscigh 61% d’eagraíochtaí Éireannacha

cibearchoireacht cosúil le Calaois le dhá bhliain anuas, rud is cúis le caillteanas de €3.1m

ar an mean.

19

5 Forbairt Náisiúnta Cumais 5.1. An Cás Mar Atá Go dtí 2011, bhí freagracht rialtais as cibearshlándáil in Éirinn luaite le roinnt eagraíochtaí

difriúla, lena n-áirítear údaráis mhíleata agus sibhialtaigh. I mí Iúil 2011, chinn an Rialtas an

Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála (LNCS) a bhunú arb ionann é anois agus an Roinn

Cumarsáide, Gníomhaithe ar son na hAeráide agus Comhshaoil, a chiallaíonn go bhfuil an

fhreagracht as na nithe cibearshlándála ar fad anois cuimsithe in aonad oibríochtúil amháin.

Bunaíodh an cinneadh seo ar anailís mhionsonraithe ar na bagairtí slándála atá ag forbairt,

agus ar mheasúnú ar an gcineál eagraíochta is oiriúnaí chun freagairt do shaincheisteanna

agus feabhas a chur go réamhghníomhach ar sheasmhacht príomhbhonneagair agus

príomhsheirbhísí. Is ionann an coincheap eagraíochtúil seo anois agus dea-chleachtas san

Eoraip, go príomha mar go gceadaíonn sé mais chriticiúil taithí agus saineolas oibríochtúil a

chruthú, agus bainistíocht ceann go ceann teagmhas de gach cineál.

Leagadh amach sa chéad Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, a chomhaontaigh an Rialtas

in 2015, sraith beart ar a bhforbrófaí cumas an Lárionaid Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála (LNCS)

agus chun ardleibhéal slándála a bhaint amach do líonraí ríomhaireachta agus don

Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil sa Stát. Díríonn na bearta seo ar fhorbairt cumais laistigh de

LNCS ar an bhFoireann Freagartha i gcás Teagmhas Slándála Ríomhaireachta (nó

‘CSIRT’), agus sraith chomhthreomhar beart a bhfuil sé mar aidhm leo slándáil líonra agus

faisnéise Comhlachtaí Poiblí a fheabhsú. Bunaíodh sa Straitéis seo chomh maith conas a

d’fhéadfaí seasmhacht an bhonneagair náisiúnta chriticiúil a fheabhsú, i bpáirt trí thrasuíomh

Threoir NIS, agus conas a bhforbrófaí an próiseas freagartha náisiúnta maidir le teagmhais

trí rannpháirtíocht leanúnach sa Chóras Náisiúnta Bainistíochta Éigeandála.

Ar dtús, bhí an bhéim á leagan in LNCS ar Fhoireann Freagartha i gcás Teagmhas Slándála

Ríomhaireachta a bhunú, laistigh den eagraíocht. Is cineál eagraíochta aitheanta

idirnáisiúnta iad CSIRTanna ag a bhfuil sraith ról foirmiúil maidir le freagairt do theagmhas

cibearshlándála agus comhroinnt faisnéise. Ag an leibhéal is bunúsaí, tá siad deartha chun

feidhmiú mar phointí fócais le haghaidh faisnéise; trí ghlacadh le agus tuairiscí teagmhais ó

íospartaigh a anaithnidiú, agus ansin sonraí teicniúla an dá theagmhas agus straitéisí

maolaithe a chomhroinnt lena gcomhbhaill (na comhlachtaí sin a bhfuil siad sannta cabhrú

leo), is féidir leo a chinntiú go bhfuil an grúpa comhbhall níos mó agus go bhfuil leibhéal níos

airde feasachta staide acu maidir lena bhfuil ag tarlú. Ar an tslí seo, tá CSIRTanna deartha

go sainráite chun roinnt de na dúshláin struchtúrtha a eascraíonn ó úinéireacht ilroinnte

chórais TF a chosc.

20

Caitheadh tréimhse fhada i mbun cumas a fhorbairt agus uasoiliúint san CSIRT in LNCS, ar

a dtugtar CSIRT-IE. I rith na gcéimeanna tosaigh, leagadh an bhéim ar na tascanna

bunúsacha a bhain le bheith in ann teagmhais a bhainistiú agus a rianú go slán agus go

gairmiúil agus faisnéis a chomhroinnte leis na comhbhaill. Chun é sin a dhéanamh,

teastaíonn foireann oilte agus le taithí, mar aon le bonneagar TF slán saorsheasaimh. Tá

forbairt shuntasach déanta orthu ó 2015, agus mar thoradh orthu cruthaíodh aonad

saineolaithe ag a bhfuil cumas suntasach sa raon iomlán feidhmeanna freagartha do

theagmhais chibearshlándála. Bhí ról lárnach ag na Fórsaí Cosanta agus ag An Garda

Síochána i gcéimeanna tosaigh an phróisis, ag soláthar foireann ar iasacht agus saineolas

slándála, forbairt próisis agus measúnú ar fhaisnéis bagartha. Chomh maith leis sin, bhí ról

tábhachtach ag an Ionad um Iniúchadh Cibearchoireachta in UCD i bhforbairt scileanna

cibearshlándála in Éirinn; tháinig go leor den bhonn eolais ar a bunaíodh LNCS ó mhic léinn

agus ó bhaill foirne in UCD.

Dearadh forbairt chumas oibríochtúil CSIRT ionas go mbeadh ardleibhéal feasachta suímh

san aonad maidir le gníomhaíocht cibearshlándála sa Stát, agus go mbeadh líonra de

‘chomhbhaill’ aige a bheadh in ann sonraí teicniúla teagmhas a chomhroinnt go slán, ar

bhealach anaithnidithe, chun cead a thabhairt dóibh bearta a dhéanamh chun a gcórais

agus seirbhísí a chosaint. Áirítear i measc na gcomhbhall seo Ranna agus

gníomhaireachtaí Rialtais, agus oibreoirí Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil, agus tá breis is 130

eintiteas i gceist. In 2016 agus 2017, áfach, bhí baint ag LNCS le roinnt teagmhas

tromchúiseach cibearshlándála a raibh baint acu le saincheisteanna nár tuigeadh sa

Straitéis. Thug an anailís ar na teagmhais seo le fios go raibh sé riachtanach roinnt uirlisí

LNCS a fhorbairt chun freagairt níos fearr do theagmhais amach anseo. Dá réir sin, thug

LNCS faoi shraith tionsncamh i rith na tréimhse seo chun tacú le hoibreoirí bonneagar

náisiúnta criticiúil agus páirtithe leasmhara Rialtais. Áirítear i measc na samplaí: (i) an

córas comhairlí agus foláireamh a leagan síos ar bhonn foirmiúil agus a mhéadú (bunaithe

ar cheachtanna foghlamtha sa phróiseas bainistíochta teagmhas le haghaidh WannaCry2

agus NotPetya), agus (ii) bunú, in 2017, an Ghrúpa Comhroinnte Bagartha, a fheidhmíonn

mar fhóram d’oibreoirí an bhonneagair náisiúnta chriticiúil, agus mar mhodh do

Ghníomhaithe Stáit (An Garda Síochána agus Na Fórsaí Cosanta san áireamh) chun

faisnéis a chomhroinnt leis na hoibreoirí seo agus chun oibriú i gcomhpháirt le gairmithe

cibearshlándála. Chomh maith leis sin, neartaigh na teagmhais chéanna lárnacht na

cibearshlándála i bpríomhdhúshláin slándála an Stáit, agus an gá atá le comhar leanúnach

agus dlúthchomhar le seirbhísí slándála an Stáit maidir le nithe oibríochtúla.

21

Tá forbairt shuntasach tagtha ar LNCS i dtéarmaí cumais agus acmhainní, agus tá a róil

bunaithe go foirmiúil le dlí, lena n-áirítear freagrachtaí maidir le cosaint an Bhonneagair

Náisiúnta Chriticiúil agus déileáil le ceanglais AE maidir le slándáil roinnt Soláthraithe

Seirbhíse Digití. Tá sainmhíniú sa dlí tugtha ar fhreagrachtaí CSIRT maidir le láimhseáil

rioscaí agus teagmhas chun an méid seo a leanas a dhéanamh;

“(a) monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar theagmhais laistigh den Stát,

(b) rabhaidh, foláirimh, fógraí agus scaipeadh faisnéise maidir le rioscaí agus

teagmhais a chur ar fáil do pháirtithe leasmhara ábhartha go luath,

(c) freagairt do theagmhais fógartha faoi Rialachán NIS 18 nó 22,

(d) anailís dhinimiciúil riosca agus teagmhas agus feasacht suímh a sholáthar,

(e) páirt a ghlacadh in agus comhoibriú i líonra CSIRT,

(f) caidreamh a bhunú le daoine san earnáil phríobháideach chun comhoibriú leis an

earnáil sin a éascú1”.

Fuair CSIRT a chéad chreidiúnú idirnáisiúnta ag deireadh 2017, (creidiúnú Tionscnóir

Iontaofa), fianaise go raibh leibhéal sainithe dea-chleachtais agus aibíochta bainte amach

ag an bhfoireann. Tá bunachar sonraí faisnéise bagartha forbartha ag LNCS atá á úsáid

chun cabhrú le Gníomhaireachtaí agus Ranna a líonraí a gcosaint. Tá forbairt chuimsitheach

déanta ar bhonn comhbhall LNCS freisin go dtí breis is 130 ball. Áirítear ina measc anois

Ranna agus Gníomhaireachtaí Rialtais, agus príomh-eintitis san Earnáil Airgeadais,

soláthróirí an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil (BNCI) agus Oibreoirí eile Seirbhísí

Bunriachtanacha (OSB).

Ón tréimhse sin i leith, tá tuilleadh forbartha déanta ag CSIRT ar a chumas freagartha do

theagmhais trí ardán comhtháite freagartha do theagmhais agus anailísíochta, agus córas

méadaithe de chomhairleoirí do chomhbhaill ar fud an Rialtais agus an Bhonneagair

Náisiúnta Chriticiúil. Os a choinne sin, tá an CSIRT athraith ó sheasamh fhrithghníomhach

amháin a bheith aige go dtí seasamh níos réamhghníomhaí. Áirítear anseo úsáid a bhaint as

ACFBManna (Ardán Comhroinnte Faisnéise Bogearraí Mailíseacha) chun faisnéis bagartha

a chomhroinnt go díreach le Soláthraithe Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil, agus forbairt agus

úsáid sraith uirlisí chun faisnéis foinse oscailte (OSINT) a shainaithint, a pharsáil agus a

anailísiú. Chomh maith leis sin, tá an t-ardán ‘Sensor’ forbartha, tástáilte agus úsáidte ag

1 Rialachán 10 de I.R. 360 de 2018

22

CSIRT, atá anois ag obair ar an mbonneagar i roinnt Rann Rialtais, chun cineálacha áirithe

bagartha a bhrath agus rabhadh a thabhairt maidir leo.

Tharla roinnt forbairtí i réimsí gaolmhara taobh le forbairt LNCS. Sonraítear an méid seo a

leanas i bPáipéar Bán Cosanta 2015 “… tá an phríomhfhreagracht ar an Roinn Cumarsáide,

Fuinnimh agus Acmhainní Nádúrtha as cibearshlándáil” agus míníodh ann “Beidh

príomhbhéim á leagan ag an Roinn Cosanta agus ag na Fórsaí Cosanta ar chosaint na

líonraí Cosanta” ach “… mar a bheadh i gceist in aon chás éigeandála/géarchéime, fad is go

bhfuil tacaíocht á tabhairt do chórais Chosanta, soláthróidh an Roinn Cosanta agus na

Fórsaí Cosanta tacaíocht d’fhoireann CSIRT-IE bunaithe ar na hacmhainní a bheith ar fáil”.

Dá réir sin, is ról tacaíochta go sainráite é ról na bhFórsaí Cosanta maidir le cibearshlándáil,

agus baineann na príomhfhreagrachtaí sa réimse seo le cosaint a gcóras féin. D’fhorbairt an

ról tacaíochta seo le himeacht ama, agus tá na Fórsaí Cosanta ag leanúint le ról lárnach a

bheith acu in oibríochtaí LNCS a éascú. Tá dlúthchomhar idir LNCS agus na Fórsaí Cosanta

agus An Garda Síochána maidir le saincheisteanna slándála náisiúnta, agus tá socrú

iasachtaithe i bhfeidhm leis an dá eintiteas.

Chomh maith leis sin, tá tacar freagrachtaí ar An Garda Síochána san earnáil, chomh fada is

a bhaineann le cibearchoireacht a chosc, a iniúchadh agus a ionchúiseamh agus mar

iarmhairt a bhaineann le róil slándála náisiúnta. Tá roinnt mhaith forbartha tagtha ar a

gcumas agus eagrú le blianta beaga anuas, mar gur athbhunaíodh an tAonad Imscrúdaithe

um Choireacht Ríomhaire (a bunaíodh in 1991) mar Bhiúró Cibearchoireachta an Gharda

Síochána (BCCGS) in 2017. Is é an Biúró aonad náisiúnta an Gharda Síochána atá

freagrach as scrúdú fóiréinseach a dhéanamh ar aon mheáin ríomhaireachta gafa i rith aon

imscrúduithe coiriúla. Lena chois sin, déanann an biúró imscrúdú ar choireacht chibirspleách

lena n-áirítear ionraí líonra, trasnaíocht sonraí agus ionsaithe ar shuíomhanna gréasáin de

chuid Ranna Rialtais, institiúidí agus eintiteas corparáideach, tá infheistíocht shuntasach

déanta ag An Garda Síochána sa réimse, le béim ar leith ar chumas a fhorbairt sna réigiúin.

Tá caidreamh dearfach comhoibríoch bunaithe ag LNCS agus ag Biúró Cibearchoireachta

an Gharda Síochána agus tá deiseanna leanúnacha comhroinnte oiliúna agus iasachtaithe á

gcur ar fáil do bhaill foirne.

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Tá CSIRT lánoibríochtúil agus creidiúnaithe go hidirnáisiúnta.

23

2. Tá forbairt shuntasach déanta ar na cláir chomhroinnte faisnéise agus for-rochtana

atá á n-oibriú ag LNCS, lena n-áirítear trí mhodhanna úsáide Ardán Comhroinnte

Faisnéise Bogearraí Mailíseacha (ACFBM).

3. Tá an t-ardán Sensor forbartha, tástáilte agus úsáidte ag CSIRT.

4. Tá Biúró Cibearchoireachta an Gharda Síochána bunaithe, agus tá cumas na

heagraíochta méadaithe go suntasach.

5. Tá an Lárionad Measúnachta Náisiúnta Slándála bunaithe i Roinn an Taoisigh.

5.2. Cuspóir Leanúint le cumas an Stáit freagairt do agus bainistíocht a dhéanamh ar theagmhais

chibearshlándála a fheabhsú, lena n-áirítear iad siúd le comhpháirt slándála náisiúnta.

5.3. Bearta Is é an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála (LNCS) an príomh-údarás Cibearshlándála a

bheidh sa Stát, agus déanfaidh sé tuilleadh forbartha ar a chumas a dhá phríomhról a chur i

gcrích; an fhreagairt náisinta ar theagmhais chibearshlándála a threorú agus seasmhacht

príomhlíonraí agus gléasanna ar fud an Stáit a fhorbairt. Leanfaidh príomhghné freagartha

LNCS ag fás, agus leanfar leis an athrú ó sheasamh frithghníomhach go dtí seasamh

réamhghníomhach, lena n-áirítear trí theacht ar bhealaí nua chun bagairtí a bhrath sula

mbíonn tionchar acu ar sheirbhísí agus ar shaoránaigh. Faoi dheireadh 2022, beidh roinnt

ról nua agus níos leithne ag LNCS maidir le líonraí agus sonraí Rialtais a chosaint, agus

leanfaidh sé ag obair le hOifig Phríomh-Oifigeach Faisnéise an Rialtais chun beartais agus

cleachtais a fhorbairt agus a chur chun feidhme a bhaineann go sonrach le seirbhísí Rialtais

agus poiblí.

1. Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, go háirithe ag féachaint dá chumas monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar agus freagairt do theagmhais chibearshlándála agus bagairtí atá ag forbairt sa Stát.

Forbrófar an CSIRT laistigh de LNCS mar ‘Ionad Comh-Oibríochtaí Slándála’ (nó JSOC)

faoi dheireadh 2020 chun tacú níos fearr le slándáil TFC an Rialtais, agus Bonneagar

Náisiúnta Criticiúil. Bunófar foirne speisialaithe laistigh de JSOC, lena n-áirítear Faisnéis

Bagartha, Freagairt do Theagmhais agus Monatóireacht Líonra. Éascóidh sé seo forbairt

leanúnach na foirne freagartha agus ceadóidh sé cothabháil agus forbairt

fhorchéimnitheach chumas LNCS monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar ghníomhaíocht líonra i

24

mBonneagar Rialtais agus Náisiúnta Criticiúil. Leanfaidh an t-aonad seo ag feidhmiú mar

phointe teagmhála náisiúnta do gach teagmhas cibearshlándála, agus leanfaidh sé leis

an bhfreagairt do theagmhais chibearshlándála de gach uile chineál a threorú.

2. Comhtháthófar faisnéis agus anailís bhagartha ullmhaithe ag an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála le hobair an Ionaid Náisiúnta um Anailís Slándála.

Beidh ról lárnach ag an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála (LNCS) i Roinn an Taoisigh

san anailís straitéiseach ar bhagairtí don tSlándáil Náisiúnta a chomhordú, agus i

bhfeasacht suímh feabhsaithe a sholáthar don Rialtas. Cabhróidh LNCS lena chinntiú go

bhfuil léargas iomlán á thabhairt ar dhúshláin nua agus fhorbarthacha cibearshlándála a

bhfuil tionchar acu ar an tslándáil náisiúnta in obair LNCS, lena n-áirítear forbairt

Straitéis Náisiúnta Slándála nua.

Beart 1: Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, go háirithe ag féachaint dá chumas monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar agus freagairt do theagmhais chibearshlándála agus bagairtí atá ag forbairt sa Stát.

Gníomhartha le Cur i gCrích Amlíne de réir na Ráithe

Ceannasaí Príomhpháirtithe Leasmhara

1 Plean mionsonraithe teicniúil agus eagraíochtúil do JSOC.

Ráithe 4 2020

LNCS RCGAC

2 Ceadú a fháil acmhainní agus foireann a chur ar fáil le haghaidh fhorbairt LNCS.

Ráithe 2 2021

LNCS RCGAC, RCPA

3 JSOC fréamhshamhla a fhorbairt in acmhainn eatramhach

Ráithe 4 2021

LNCS ONP, RCGAC

4 Áis Deiridh JSOC a Choimisiúnú i gCeanncheathrú LNCS

Ráithe 2 2023

LNCS ONP, RCGAC

25

Beart 2: Comhtháthófar faisnéis agus anailís bhagartha ullmhaithe ag an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála le hobair an Ionaid Náisiúnta um Anailís Slándála.

Gníomhartha le Cur i gCrích Amlíne de

réir na

Ráithe

Ceannasaí Príomhpháirtithe

Leasmhara

1 Socruithe Foirmiúla Tuairiscithe agus

Comhroinnte Faisnéise a bhunú le

INAS

Ráithe 1

2020

LNCS INAS

26

6 Cosaint Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil 6.1. An Cás Mar Atá Go dtí le déanaí, bhí dhá chineál ghníomh i gceist leis an dea-chleachtas a raibh glacadh

leis san Eoraip le haghaidh chosaint an bhonneagair náisiúnta chriticiúil agus seirbhísí in

aghaidh cibirionsaithe, (1) feidhm freagartha náisiúnta teagmhas cosúil le LNCS a chruthú,

agus (2) socruithe foirmiúla comhroinnte faisnéise a bhunú trína bhféadfaí faisnéis maidir le

bagairtí don bhonneagar seo a chomhroinnt le húinéirí agus le hoibreoirí, lena n-áirítear

faisnéis phráinneach maidir le bagairtí atá ar tí tarlú. Bhunaigh agus reáchtálann LNCS na

seirbhísí seo go beacht agus d’oibrigh sé, ar bhonn leanúnach, le hoibreoirí fóntas agus le

comhlachtaí cosúla i ndlínsí eile chun rioscaí don Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil in Éirinn a

bhainistiú, lena n-áirítear bainistíocht ghníomhach teagmhas leanúnach.

Is léir bunaithe ar thaithí, áfach, le himeacht ama ar fud na hEorpa agus in áiteanna eile, go

bhfuil neamhshiméadracht riosca idir leas an phobail agus leas go leor oibreoirí an chineáil

seo bonneagair. Ina lán cásanna, bhí seirbhísí criticiúla fós leochaileach d’ainneoin

iarrachtaí cuimsitheacha a bheith déanta ag an Rialtas faisnéis agus tacaíocht a chur ar fáil

d’oibreoirí. Dá réir sin, agus obair ar bun i roinnt Ballstát den AR agus ar Threoracha

Teileachumarsáide roimhe seo, d’fhoilsigh Coimisiún na hEorpa dréacht den ‘Treoir maidir le

Slándáil Líonra agus Faisnéise’ in 2013. Áiríodh sa Treoir NIS seo, a comhaontaíodh go

foirmiúil in 2016, sraith beart a bhfuil sé mar aidhm leo athléimneacht an Bhonneagair

Náisiúnta Chriticiúil a fheabhsú in 7 n-earnáil dhifriúla (lena n-áirítear fuinneamh, iompar,

uisce óil, baincéireacht, margaí airgeadais, cúram sláinte agus bonneagar digiteach).

Áirítear i measc na mbeart seo a éileamh ar Bhallstáit measúnú foirmiúil a dhéanamh ar a

mbonneagar, agus ‘Oibreoirí Seirbhísí Bunriachtanacha’ a ainmniú go dleathach – na

heintitis sin atá fíorthábhachtach chomh fada is a bhaineann le soláthar na seirbhísí seo i

ngach Stát. Os a choinne sin, éilítear ar na heintitis seo a bheith faoi réir sraith fhoirmiúil

ceanglas slándála, agus ceanglais cheangailteacha tuairiscithe teagmhas. Dá réir sin, tá sé

mar aidhm le Treoir NIS (a) feabhsuithe a dhéanamh i slándáil agus seasmhacht an

Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil, agus (b) feasacht an Stáit ar theagmhais chibearshlándála

ar fud na hEorpa a fheabhsú, agus (c) breis comhsheasmhachta agus comhordaithe na

freagartha ag leibhéal AE a cheadú.

Scríobhadh straitéis 2015 roimh Threoir NIS, agus bhí tús curtha le hobair mhionsonraithe

sula raibh an Straitéis críochnaithe ar mheasúnú mionsonraithe ar an mBonneagar Náisiúnta

Criticiúil in Éirinn, a áiríodh ann Staidéar Idirspleáchais Bonneagair leis an Ríocht Aontaithe

(críochnaithe i lár 2017). Ansin, úsáideadh na measúnuithe seo chun liosta náisiúnta

27

d’Oibreoirí Seirbhísí Bunriachtanacha (OSB) a chur i dtoll a chéile, a ainmníodh go foirmiúil i

ndiaidh thrasuíomh na Treorach NIS in Éirinn i Meán Fómhair 2018 trí I.R. 360 de 2018.

Ceadaíonn cumhachtaí forfheidhmiúcháin faoi na Rialacháin NIS d’Oifigigh Údaraithe LNCS

measúnuithe agus iniúchtaí slándála a dhéanamh i 5 as 7 n-earnáil (tá freagracht ag Banc

Ceannais na hÉireann as an mbeart slándála a chur chun feidhme sna hearnálacha Seibhísí

Airgeadais), agus éilíonn siad soláthar faisnéise agus treoracha ceangailteachta a eisiúint

chun aon easnamh atá ann a réiteach. Chomh maith leis sin, d’ullmhaigh LNCS doiciméid

treorach mionsonraithe a bhaineann le bearta slándála, comhlíontacht agus tuairisciú

teagmhas chun breis tacaíochta a chur ar fáil do OSB, a foilsíodh le haghaidh

comhairliúcháin phoiblí in Eanáir 2019.

Chun críche an doiciméid seo, is é an sainmhíniú atá luaite le Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil

“… sócmhainn, córas nó cuid de atá lonnaithe i mBallstáit atá riachtanach le haghaidh

chothabháil feidhmeanna riachtanacha sochaíocha, sláinte, sábháilteacht, slándáil, folláine

gheilleagrach nó shóisialta daoine, agus cur isteach ar nó scriosadh a mbeadh tionchar

suntasach aige ar Bhallstát mar thoradh ar theip na bhfeidhmeanna seo a chothabháil.” Is é

an aidhm atá ag an Rialtas ár BNC a choinneáil slán ó ionsaí trína shainordú go bhfuil

bearta á ndéanamh ag oibreoirí chun rioscaí don bhonneagar seo a bhainistiú, lena n-

áirítear trí phleananna oiriúnacha freagartha teagmhas a bheith déanta chun déileáil le haon

chur isteach ar sheirbhísí.

De bharr spleáchas forchéimnitheach an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil agus seirbhísí ar

líonra gléasanna nasctha, chuir an Stát sraith beart i gcrích chun seasmhacht catagóirí

áirithe de bhonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil a chinntiú. I bhfianaise nádúr agus fairsinge an

riosca, áfach, agus mar gheall ar theicneolaíochtaí forbarthacha, ní mór tuilleadh forbartha

agus fairsingithe a dhéanamh ar an gcóras seo. Chuige sin, cuirfidh an Rialtas na bearta seo

a leanas i gcrích chun tuilleadh cosanta a dhéanamh ar Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus

seirbhísí;

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Tá an mhodheolaíocht do Chosaint an Bhonneagair Chriticiúil atá leagtha amach i

dTreoir NIS an AE curtha chun feidhme.

2. Mar thoradh air seo, ainmníodh 7 nOibreoirí Seirbhísí Bunriachtanacha in 7

bpríomhearnáil, agus chuir Oibreoirí tús le sraith de mheasúnachtaí foirmiúla

ullmhachta.

3. Cuireadh tús le meicníochtaí saincheaptha comhroinnte faisnéise chun faisnéis

íogair a chomhroinnt le príomh-Oibreoirí.

28

6.2. Cuspóir An bonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil a shainaithint agus a chosaint trína sheasmhacht do

chibirionsaí a mhéadú agus trína chinntiú go bhfuil pleananna oiriúnacha freagartha

teagmhas bunaithe ag oibreoirí seirbhísí bunriachtanacha chun aon chur isteach ar

sheirbhísí a laghdú agus a bhainistiú.

6.3. Bearta Leanfaidh LNCS ag cur a chlár reatha cosanta Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil chun feidhme,

bunaithe ar phróiseas curtha chun feidhme na Treorach NIS cheana féin, ach déanfaidh sé

forbairt shuntasach ar an Treoir seo, bunaithe ar mhórphíosa anailíse. Tacóidh Na Fórsaí

Cosanta agus An Garda Síochána leis an iarracht seo, agus oibreofar leis an Rialtas trí

chéile lena chinntiú go bhfuil ábhair imní cibearshlándála á gcomhtháthú i ngach ábhar

beartais ábhartha.

3. Leanfar leis an gcóras reatha do Chosaint an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil bunaithe ar an Treoir NIS a úsáid agus a fhorbairt, agus leagfar béim ar leith ar chláir leanúnacha chomhlíontachta agus iniúchta chun rioscaí do phríomhsheirbhísí a mhaolú.

Is é príomhchuspóir na Treorach NIS a chinntiú go bhfuil ardleibhéal de chibearshlándáil

choiteann sna Ballstáit trí chéile. Is é an LNCS an t-údarás inniúil náisiúnta atá

freagrach as treoir a sholáthar maidir le slándáil an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil,

agus as iniúchadh a dhéanamh ar chur chun feidhme na rialaithe slándála le haghaidh

go leor de na hearnálacha seo. Leanfaidh an LNCS leis na bearta seo a fhorbairt agus a

chur chun feidhme lena chinntiú go bhfuil an Treoir NIS á cur chun feidhme ina

hiomláine in Éirinn, agus go mbíonn an cur chun feidhme seo ag tarlú ag an luas

céanna le hathruithe teicneolaíochta agus dea-chleachtais.

4. Déanfaidh LNCS, le cúnamh ó na Fórsaí Cosanta agus An Garda Síochána, measúnú riosca mionsonraithe nuashonraithe ar leochaileacht reatha gach Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus seirbhísí do chibirionsaí.

Ag cur leis an bpróiseas measúnaithe reatha a reáchtáladh faoin Treoir NIS, déanfaidh

LNCS measúnú riosca mionsonraithe ar leochaileacht gach Bonneagar Náisiúnta

Criticiúil agus seirbhísí do chibirionsaí. Áireofar anseo measúnú ar chriticiúlacht raon

29

leathan seirbhísí agus mapáil idirspleáchas eatarthu seo. Úsáidfear an t-aschur ón

bpróiseas seo mar bhonn le scóip fairsingthe phróiseas reatha cosanta cibearshlándála

an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil.

5. Forbrófar agus leathnófar córas cosanta reatha an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil thar shaolré na Straitéise chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil a chur san áireamh, lena n-áirítear gnéithe den chóras toghcháin.

Déanfaimid forbairt ar an gcóras rialála reatha do chibearshlándáil BNC chun raon níos

leithne oibreoirí a chur san áireamh i raon níos leithne earnálacha agus chun

monatóireacht níos géire ar chomhlíontacht a cheadú. Glactar leis go n-áireofar sa

chóras fairsingithe seo gnéithe de chórais ardoideachais agus toghcháin agus cuirfidh

siad leis an obair atá déanta cheana féin mar thoradh ar an Treoir NIS.

6. Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar na grúpaí comhroinnte faisnéise atá á n-oibriú ag an Ionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála cheana féin, agus leathnófar an Grúpa Comhroinnte Bagartha atá ann cheana féin chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil a chur san áireamh.

Déanfar forbairt shuntasach ar na fóraim comhroinnte faisnéise cibearshlándála atá ann

cheana féin, cosúil leis an ‘Grúpa Comhroinnte Bagartha’ (GCB) agus an ‘Malartú

Faisnéise Uile-oileáin’ (MFUO).

7. Bunóidh an Rialtas tacar breise de chaighdeáin chomhlíontachta chun tacú le cibearshlándáil an bhonneagair teileachumarsáide sa Stát.

Bunóimid sraith nua agus shonrach ceanglas slándála don earnáil teileachumarsáide,

agus beidh bearta maolaithe riosca mionsonraithe le forbairt ag LNCS chun tacú le

Comreg a fheidhmeanna reachtúla a chomhlíonadh faoi Rialacháin Slándála reatha an

AE (trasuite ag I.R. 333 de 2011), agus Cód Teileachumarsáide an AE atá le foilsiú

(Treoir 2018/1972)

30

Beart 3: Leanfar leis an gcóras reatha do Chosaint an Bhonneagair Chriticiúil bunaithe ar an Treoir NIS a úsáid agus a fhorbairt, agus leagfar béim ar leith ar chláir leanúnacha chomhlíontachta agus iniúchta chun rioscaí do phríomhsheirbhísí a mhaolú.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 An chéad chéim d’Fhéinmheasúnú

na nOibreoirí Seirbhísí

Bunriachtanacha (OSB) i gcomparáid

leis an gCreat Rialaithe Slándála a

chur i gcrích

Ráithe 1

2020

LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

2 An chéad chéim de Thástáil Rialaithe

Slándála d’Oibreoirí Seirbhísí

Bunriachtanacha (OSB) a chur i

gcrích

Ráithe 3

2020

LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

3 Athmheasúnú a dhéanamh ar Chlár

na OSB Ainmnithe agus Treoirlínte

Slándála

Ráithe 3

2020

LNCS

4 Tástáil Rialaithe Slándála i ndiaidh

teagmhas, agus iniúchtaí leanúnacha

ar chomhlíontacht OSB

Go

leanúnach

LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

Beart 4: Déanfaidh LNCS, le cúnamh ó na Fórsaí Cosanta agus An Garda Síochána, measúnú riosca mionsonraithe nuashonraithe ar leochaileacht reatha gach Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus seirbhísí do chibirionsaí.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Grúpa Stiúrtha bunaithe agus téarmaí

tagartha don athbhreithniú

Ráithe 1

2020

LNCS CCGS, FC,

INAS, BCÉ,

31

comhaontaithe COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

2 An chéim bailithe faisnéise

críochnaithe, agus modheolaíocht

comhaontaithe

Ráithe 3

2020

LNCS CCGS, FC,

INAS, BCÉ,

COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

3 An Próiseas Measúnaithe a

chríochnú, lena n-áirítear

comhairliúchán idirnáisiúnta agus

measúnú mionsonraithe ar

idirspleáchais thrasearnála.

Ráithe 2

2021

LNCS CCGS, FC,

INAS, BCÉ,

COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

4 Tuarascáil Deiridh agus Moltaí

Curtha i gCrích

Ráithe 4

2021

LNCS CCGS, FC,

INAS, BCÉ,

COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

Beart 5: Forbrófar agus leathnófar córas cosanta reatha an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil thar shaolré na Straitéise chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil a chur san áireamh, lena n-áirítear gnéithe den chóras toghcháin.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Cinn Billí a Dhréachtú le Comhaontú

ag an Rialtas

Ráithe 4

2021

RCGAC OAA

2 Próiseas Dréachtaithe le OAA Ráithe 1

2022

RCGAC OAA

3 Próiseas Oireachtais Ráithe 2

2022

RCGAC OAA,

Oireachtas

32

Beart 6: Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar na grúpaí comhroinnte faisnéise atá á n-oibriú ag an Ionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála cheana féin, agus leathnófar an Grúpa Comhroinnte Bagartha atá ann cheana féin chun raon níos leithne de bhonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil a chur san áireamh.

Gníomhartha le Cur i gCrích Amlíne de réir na Ráithe

Ceannasaí Príomhpháirtithe Leasmhara

1 Cur le hionadaithe reatha an Ghrúpa

Comhroinnte Bagartha (GCB) chun

BNC a chur san áireamh, le Téarmaí

Tagartha nua.

Ráithe 2 2020

LNCS CCGS, FC, BNC

2 Socruithe reatha na Ríochta

Aontaithe maidir le comhroinnt

faisnéise agus freagairt do

theagmhas a bheachtú, le béim ar

leith ar chosaint bonneagair chriticiúil

Thuaidh-Theas.

Ráithe 4 2020

LNCS OPÉ, CPNI na Ríochta Aontaithe

Beart 7: Bunóidh an Rialtas tacar breise de chaighdeáin chomhlíontachta chun tacú le cibearshlándáil an bhonneagair teileachumarsáide sa Stát.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Trasuíomh Threoir 2018/1972 Ráithe 4

2020

RCGAC LNCS, Comreg

2 Tacaíocht Theicniúil a chur ar fáil

do Comreg

Ráithe 4

2020

LNCS Comreg

3 Cur chun feidhme beart slándála

athbhreithnithe

Ráithe 1

2021

Comreg RCGAC, LNCS,

Oibreoirí

Teileachumarsáide

33

7 Sonraí agus Líonraí na hEarnála Poiblí 7.1. An Cás Mar Atá Baineann freagracht as oibriú agus slándáil chórais TF na hearnála poiblí le Ranna agus

Gníomhaireachtaí aonair, agus tá ról uileghabhálach ag Oifig Phríomh-Oifigeach Faisnéise

an Rialtais i gcur chun feidhme Straitéis TFC na Seirbhíse Poiblí agus an líonra a úsáideann

Ranna agus Gníomhaireachta chun nascadh lena chéile agus leis an Idirlíon go ginearálta a

bhainistiú. Sna blianta tosaigh, d’áirigh príomhról CSIRT laistigh de LNCS feidhm freagartha

teagmhais a bhunú chun tacú leis na Ranna agus leis na gníomhaireachtaí seo nuair a

thuairiscigh siad teagmhais do LNCS, agus chun córas Comhairleach a fhorbairt chun

scaipeadh tapa faisnéis shonrach a bhaineann le bagairtí agus le teagmhais a cheadú, agus

dea-chleachtas maidir le cibearshlándáil. Ní raibh aon léargas díreach ag LNCS ar

ghníomhaíochtaí ar líonraí Rialtais, áfach, ach oiread le haon mhodh foirmiúil nó beacht

chun cinneadh a dhéanamh maidir leis na bearta slándála a d’fhéadfadh a bheith bunaithe i

Ranna nó i ngníomhaireachtaí aonair.

Ar an mbonn sin, agus ag teacht le forbairt leanúnach CSIRT agus an tacar uirlisí níos mó

atá ar fáil do gach comhbhall, chuir LNCS tús le tionscadal dar teideal ‘Sensor’ a rolladh

amach; arb ionann é go bunúsach agus sraith bhreise cosanta do Ranna Rialtais a

chuireann in iúl do LNCS nuair a thugtar faoi deara go bhfuil cineálacha áirithe

gníomhaíochta ag trasdul líonraí Rialtais. Chomh maith leis sin, d’eisigh LNCS ‘Treoir 5

Phointe’ do Ranna ag deireadh 2018, ina leagtar amach bonnlíne de bhearta slándála a

d’fhéadfadh Ranna a dhéanamh, bunaithe ar roinnt de na teagmhais choitianta a bhí

tuairiscithe ag CSIRT dó sa tréimhse roimhe sin.

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Tá an córas Comhairleach atá á oibriú ag LNCS méadaithe go suntasach chun

scaipeadh tapa faisnéise a cheadú.

2. Tá an t-ardán Sensor forbartha, tástáilte agus úsáidte ag LNCS i roinnt Rann

Rialtais, rud a bhí mar bhonn le slándáil chórais TF agus sonraí a fheabhsú i gcoinne

bagairtí ardleibhéil.

3. Tá infheistíocht shuntasach déanta ag Ranna agus gníomhaireachtaí Rialtais i

slándáil, le treoir ó LNCS.

34

7.2. Cuspóir Seasmhacht agus slándáil chórais TF na hearnála poiblí a fheabhsú chun na seirbhísí a

mbraitheann daoine orthu a chosaint ar bhealach níos fearr, agus a gcuid sonraí.

7.3. Bearta Braitheann an Earnáil Phoiblí ar Theicneolaíocht Faisnéise chun na seirbhísí ar fad

beagnach atá á soláthar aici a chur ar fáil; dá réir sin, ní mór go mbeadh na seirbhísí seo

slán, seasmhach agus in ann a chinntiú go bhfanann faisnéis phearsanta príobháideach.

Chuige sin, cuirfidh an Rialtas na tionscnaimh shonracha seo i bhfeidhm;

8. Forbróidh LNCS caighdeán slándála bonnlíne atá le cur i bhfeidhm ag gach Roinn Rialtas agus príomhghníomhaireacht.

Forbróidh LNCS, i gcomhar le OPOFR, íoschaighdeán bonnlíne cibearshlándála do

TFC an Rialtais. Athlíneofar é seo le caighdeáin idirnáisiúnta agus cuirfear i bhfeidhm ar

bhonn céimnithe é i ngach comhlacht Rialtais, ag tosú le Ranna Rialtais. Áirítear i

measc na gcaighdeán seo go hiondúil, bearta agus rialuithe a bhaineann le hoiliúint

foirne, aitheantas agus bainistíocht rochtana. Meastar go ndéanfar an caighdeán a

iniúchadh ag leibhéal na Roinne áitiúla agus go mbeidh tacaíocht agus treoir á cur ar fáil

ag LNCS.

9. Cuirfear an Clár ‘Sensor’ reatha i bhfeidhm i ngach Roinn Rialtais, agus déanfar measúnú ar an bhféidearthacht a bhaineann le Sensor a leathnú chun é a chur i bhfeidhm i ngach líonra Rialtais.

Déanfar Clár Sensor LNCS a rolladh amach i ngach Roinn Rialtais agus é mar aidhm

luathbhrath a fheabhsú agus deireadh a chur le bagairtí. Tacóidh LNCS lena cur chun

feidhme ar fud na hearnála poiblí, agus forbrófar an tIonad Comh-Oibríochtaí Slándála

chun tacú leis an gcóras seo agus é a oibríochtú. Meastar go ndéanfaidh an tIonad

Comh-Oibríochtaí Slándála monatóireacht ar gach Roinn agus Gníomhaireacht Rialtais

atá á bainistiú ag LNCS.

10. Cruthófar fóram Slándála TF an Rialtais, a mbeidh cead ag Ceannasaithe Shlándáil TF ar fud an Rialtais a bheith páirteach ann, chun comhroinnt faisnéise

35

maidir le dea-chleachtas le haghaidh cibearshlándáil a éascú agus chun cead a thabhairt do LNCS tacú le húsáid a bhaint as an gcaighdeán slándála bonnlíne.

Beidh ról ceannasaíochta ag LNCS i bhfóram nua Slándála TF na hEarnála Poiblí a

chruthú, cathaoirleacht a dhéanamh air agus é a chur chun feidhme, le Ceannasaithe

shlándáil TF ó Ranna agus Gníomhaireachtaí Rialtais. Buailfidh an fóram le chéile gach

ráithe chun faisnéis maidir le dea-chleachtas, próisis idir-eagraíochtúla, bagairtí agus

bearta cibearshlándála a mhalartú agus a chomhroinnt chun caighdeán nua bonnlíne

cibearshlándála na hearnála poiblí a chomhlíonadh.

11. Éileoidh an Rialtas ar LNCS moltaí a eisiúint ag féachaint d’úsáid bogearraí agus crua-earraí sonracha ar bhonneagar TF agus teileachumarsáide an Rialtais.

Beidh sé de dhualgas ar LNCS moltaí a eisiúint maidir le soláthar agus úsáid cineálacha

áirithe bonneagar agus bogearraí TF chun sonraí agus seirbhísí Rialtais a choinneáil

slán, agus chun toirmeasc nó baint bonneagair áirithe ó líonraí TF agus cumarsáide an

Rialtais a mholadh má chinneann LNCS go gcruthaíonn a láithreacht riosca do-ghlactha

do shlándáil shonraí an Rialtais.

Beart 8: Forbróidh LNCS caighdeán slándála bonnlíne atá le cur i bhfeidhm ag gach Roinn Rialtas agus príomhghníomhaireacht.


réir na Ráithe

Ceannasaí Príomhpháirtith

e Leasmhara

1 Íoschaighdeán oiriúnach a dhearadh do

TF an Rialtais, i gcomhar le Fóram

Slándála TF an Rialtais.

Ráithe 4 2021 LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomha

ireachtaí

2 Bearta, rialuithe agus nósanna imeachta

cur chun feidhme mionsonraithe a

fhorbairt.


/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomha

ireachtaí

3 Ábhar treorach agus tacaíochta maidir le

measúnú comhlíontachta a dhréachtú

d’fhoirne TF agus d’Aonaid Iniúchta


/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomha

36

Inmheánacha. ireachtaí

4 Tacú le Ranna Rialtais agus le

Príomhghníomhaireachtaí le cur chun

feidhme an chaighdeáin bonnlíne.

Go leanúnach LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomha

ireachtaí

5 Measúnú a dhéanamh ar chur chun

feidhme an chaighdeáin bonnlíne


/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomha

ireachtaí

Beart 9: Cuirfear an Clár ‘Sensor’ reatha i bhfeidhm i ngach Roinn Rialtais, agus déanfar measúnú faoin dáta céanna ar an bhféidearthacht a bhaineann le Sensor a chur i bhfeidhm i ngach líonra Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Sensor a úsáid sa bhonneagar TF sa 15

Roinn Rialtais. Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS Gach Roinn

Rialtais, Fóram

Slándála TF an

Rialtais

2 Athbhreithniú a dhéanamh ar chostais

agus ar shaincheisteanna dlí a

bhaineann le cur chun feidhme Sensor i

Líonraí an Rialtais, ag cumhdach TFC na

hearnála poiblí, agus an toradh a chur

faoi bhráid an Rialtais chun cinneadh a

dhéanamh.

Ráithe 4 2021 LNCS OPOFR OAA,

RCPA

37

Beart 10: Cruthófar fóram Slándála TF an Rialtais, a mbeidh cead ag Ceannasaithe Shlándáil TF ar fud an Rialtais a bheith páirteach ann, chun comhroinnt faisnéise maidir le dea-chleachtas le haghaidh cibearshlándáil a éascú agus chun cead a thabhairt do LNCS tacú le húsáid a bhaint as an gcaighdeán slándála bonnlíne.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Acmhainní a chur ar fáil chun Foireann

TF na hEarnála Poiblí a chruthú in LNCS,

agus Téarmaí Tagartha a bhunú don

Fhóram

Ráithe 1 2020 LNCS OPOFR, Gach

Roinn Rialtais

2 Seisiún faisnéisithe a phleanáil do gach

Ceannasaí Slándála TF chun cur síos a

dhéanamh ar aidhm an Fhóraim Slándála


Roinn Rialtais

3 Cruinnithe ráithiúla den Fhóram a bhunú

agus Cathaoirleach agus Rúnaí a

cheapadh


Roinn Rialtais

Beart 11: Éileoidh an Rialtas ar LNCS Moltaí a eisiúint ag féachaint d’úsáid bogearraí agus crua-earraí sonracha ar bhonneagar TF agus teileachumarsáide an Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Réasúnaíocht agus Téarmaí Tagartha

Ullmhaithe agus curtha faoi bhráid an

Rialtais lena gComhaontú

Ráithe 3 2020 LNCS OPOFR, CCGS,

FC, INAS

2 Éifeacht tugtha do Phróiseas Molta

LNCS


FC, INAS

38

8 Scileanna 8.1. An Cás Mar Atá Tá roinnt bearnaí suntasacha scileanna tagtha chun solais i gcibearshlándáil, den chuid is

mó mar gheall ar a forbairt thapa mar dhúshlán sochaíoch. Is saincheist dhomhanda é an

bhearna scileanna seo, agus tá suas le 2 mhilliún folúntas cibearshlándála gan líonadh ar

fud an domhain in 2019. Ag leibhéal náisiúnta, baineann fíorthábhacht le soláthar foirne

chun an cumas ár mbonneagar féin a choinneáil slán a chaomhnú, agus chun leanúint le

hinfheistíocht shuntasach sonraí a mhealladh agus a choimeád. Dá réir sin, chun an t-

éileamh seo a chomhlíonadh ní mór oiliúint a chur ar iontrálaithe nua agus tras-oiliúint agus

uasoiliúint ó ghairmithe san earnáil TFC agus in earnálacha ábhartha eile a spreagadh. Le

blianta beaga anuas, tá dul chun cinn tábhachtach déanta ag Éire chomh fada is a

bhaineann le déileáil le agus feabhas a chur ar scileanna, acmhainní taighde a fhorbairt

agus feasacht maidir leis an gcibearshlándáil mar ghairm bheatha a mhúscailt. Tá aga moille

fós ann, áfach, idir an lucht tionscail agus an lucht acadúil in earnálacha mar seo atá ag

athrú go tapa, agus tá gá lena chinntiú go bhfuil céimithe ag fágáil institiúidí tríú leibhéal leis

na scileanna a theastaíonn chun na riachtanais fostaíochta sa tionscal a chomhlíonadh.

Tá iarracht á déanamh ag an Rialtas dul i ngleic leis an éileamh méadaitheach ar scileanna

cibearshlándála trí chur chun feidhme Scileanna Teicneolaíochta 2022, an tríú Plean

Gníomhaíochta Scileanna TFC. Sainaithníodh cibearshlándáil sa bhuntaighde don phlean,

déanta ag an Sainghrúpa ar Riachtanais Scileanna sa Todhchaí, mar cheann de na

príomhréimsí atá ag teacht chun cinn a bheidh mar bhonn le dlús a chur faoin éileamh ar

scileanna TFC ardleibhéil in Éirinn amach anseo. Tá an clár oibre scileanna cibearshlándála

á chur chun cinn i gcomhthéacs Scileanna Teicneolaíochta 2022 trí roinnt cainéal, lena n-

áirítear Skillnet Ireland, leathnú an tsoláthair in ardoideachas agus cur chun cinn

printíseachtaí TFC trí SOLAS, an tÚdarás Breisoideachais agus Ardoideachais.

I nDeireadh Fómhair 2018, sheol Skillnet Ireland Tionscnamh Scileanna Cibearshlándála

nua i gcomhpháirt le LNCS, Biúró Cibearchoireachta an Gharda Síochána, agus

gníomhaireachtaí agus institiúidí tríú leibhéal eile. Is iad príomhaidhmeanna an tionscnaimh

feasacht a fhorbairt, an bhearna scileanna a líonadh agus caighdeáin a shonrú le haghaidh

scileanna agus inniúlachtaí do róil Chibearshlándála. Tá an plean trí bliana dírithe ar oiliúint

agus ar chreidiúnú a fhorbairt sa réimse chun dul i ngleic le bearnaí scileanna, níos mó

daoine óga a mhealladh i dtreo na hearnála, mná go háirithe, agus Forbairt Ghairmiúil

Leanúnach a chur chun cinn. Measann Skillnet Ireland go mbeidh oiliúint Chibearshlándála á

cur ar fáil do bhreis is 5,000 duine sa tionscal sna trí bliana amach romhainn mar thoradh ar

39

an tionscnamh. Ina theannta sin, tá tús curtha ag an earnáil tríú leibhéal in Éirinn le líon

suntasach cúrsaí sa chibearshlándáil, agus tá ar a laghad 8 gcúrsa Máistreachta á dtairiscint

anois.

Tá printíseachtaí á bhforbairt ag cuibhreannais atá á stiúradh ag an earnáil thionsclaíoch,

agus áirítear iontu oiliúint obairbhunaithe agus oiliúint lasmuigh den láthair oibre le linn a

bheith i mbun fostaíochta. Tá printíseachtaí á bhfaomhadh ag an gComhairle Printíseachta

faoin gCiste Náisiúnta Oiliúna agus cuireann siad ar chumas fágálaithe scoile, cuardaitheoirí

poist agus iad siúd ar mian leo tabhairt faoi ghairm nua, gairm a aimsiú dóibh féin. I mí

Feabhra 2019 seoladh printíseacht nua 2 bhliain ar a dtugtar Gairmí Comhlach sa

Chibearshlándáil ag leibhéal 6 QQI, agus is é SAP an treoraí tionscail agus is é Fastrack to

Information Technology (FIT) an soláthraí comhordúcháin.

Ina theannta sin, tá tús curtha ag an earnáil tríú leibhéal in Éirinn le líon suntasach cúrsaí sa

chibearshlándáil, agus tá ar a laghad 8 gcúrsa Máistreachta á dtairiscint anois. Tá tacaíocht

á tabhairt do chláir chibearshlándála tríd an gclár Springboard+ chomh maith, atá ag cabhrú

leo siúd atá i mbun fostaíochta cheana féin athsciliú chun tabhairt faoi róil nó faoi

ghairmeacha nua. Bainfidh tábhacht leis seo de réir mar a bheidh méadú ag teacht ar an

éileamh ar scileanna cibearshlándála.

Sheol an Roinn Gnó, Fiontar agus Nuálaíochta i dteannta le Roinn an Taoisigh, Future Jobs

Ireland i Márta 2019, creat ilbhliantúil nua lena chinntiú go bhfuil ár bhfiontair agus oibrithe

seasmhach agus ullmhaithe le haghaidh na ndúshlán agus na ndeiseanna a bheidh ann

amach anseo. Chomh maith leis sin, cinnteoidh Future Jobs Ireland go mbeidh fiontair agus

oibrithe in ann dul in oiriúint do na hathruithe teicneolaíocha agus claochlaitheacha a mbeidh

ar ár ngeilleagar agus ár sochaí dul i ngleic leo sna blianta amach romhainn. Cé go bhfuil sé

fadréimseach, is é ceann den chúig Cholún laistigh de Future Jobs Ireland “Glacadh leis an

Nuálaíocht agus leis an Athrú Teicneolaíoch”. Aithnítear sa chreat an gá atá le tacar

scileanna nua agus éagsúil chun freastal ar ár ngeilleagar athraitheach agus “tairbhe a

bhaint as réimsí ceannródaíocha teicneolaíocha cosúil le hIntleacht Shaorga, Anailísíocht

Sonraí, Idirlíon na nEarraí agus Blocshlabhra chun cabhrú le cuideachtaí a bheith i mbun

nuálaíochta i dteannta a chéile agus réitigh a fhorbairt”.

Tá sraith uaillmhianta agus táirgí insoláthartha sainaitheanta chun na haidhmeanna seo a

chomhlíonadh lena n-áirítear trí chumas FBManna a mhéadú chun páirt a ghalacadh i

dtaighde & forbairt, oideachas agus oiliúint ar ardchaighdeán a sholáthar, foghlaim ar feadh

an tsaoil a spreagadh, agus rannpháirtíocht i gcláir phrintíseachta a fheabhsú. Tá tús curtha

cheana féin le roinnt tionscnamh faoi na huaillmhianta méantéarmacha atá sonraithe in

40

Future Jobs Ireland 2019. Gach bliain, sonróidh Future Jobs Ireland céimeanna nua chun

na huaillmhianta seo a bhaint amach.

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Tá Scileanna Teicneolaíochta 2022 foilsithe agus curtha i bhfeidhm.

2. Sheol Skillnet Ireland a Thionscamh Scileanna Cibearshlándála chun clár leathan

tionscnamh a chur ar fáil sa réimse.

3. Sheol Mearchlár Teicneolaíochta Faisnéise Clár Cibearshlándála do phrintísigh.

4. Sheol an Rialtas Future Jobs Ireland, creat ilbhliantúil d’fhorbairt scileanna agus

fiontar, lena n-áirítear an earnáil teicneolaíochta.

8.2. Cuspóirí Infheistiú i dtionscnaimh oideachais chun an lucht oibre a ullmhú le haghaidh gairmeacha TF

agus cibearshlándála.

8.3. Bearta Trí chur chun feidhme Scileanna Teicneolaíochta 2022, Future Jobs Ireland, agus an

Straitéis Rialtais seo, tá sé mar aidhm a chinntiú go bhfuil dóthain ball foirne oilte chun éilimh

fostóirí a chomhlíonadh.

12. Leanfaidh an Rialtas lena chinntiú go bhfuil oiliúint dara agus tríú leibhéal san eolaíocht ríomhaireachta agus sa chibearshlándáil á forbairt agus á húsáid, lena n-áirítear trí thacú leis an obair atá ar bun ag Skillnet Ireland chun cláir oiliúna a fhorbairt do gach leibhéal oideachais agus chun tacú le tionscnaimh SOLAS do chlár TFC printíseachta i gcibearshlándáil.

Leanfaidh an Rialtas ag tacú leis an obair atá ar bun ag Skillnet Ireland chun oiliúint a

fhorbairt agus a chur ar fáil don tionscal príobháideach a bhfuil sé mar aidhm aige

rannpháirtíocht sa lucht oibre cibearshlándála, uasciliú agus forbairt ghinearálta ghairme

a chur chun cinn. Cabhróidh LNCS le tionscnaimh a fhorbairt a spreagann mná tabhairt

faoi ghairm sa réimse cibearshlándála agus rannpháirtithe ó dhisciplíní eile a spreagadh

chun tabhairt faoi thras-oiliúint.

13. Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann (SFI) cibearshlándáil a chur chun cinn mar rogha gairme i scoileanna agus i gcoláistí tríd an gClár Smart Futures.

41

Is clár comhoibríoch oideachais é Smart Futures atá á reáchtáil ag Fondúireacht

Eolaíochta Éireann a sholáthraíonn eolas faoi ghairmeacha in Eolaíocht, Teicneolaíocht,

Innealtóireacht agus Matamaitic (STEM), do mhic léinn dara leibhéal in Éirinn. Forbróidh

SFI an chomhpháirt Chibearshlándála, trí thairbhe a bhaint as ionchur ó ghairmithe ón

tionscal, le cur san áireamh in Smart Futures ionas go mbeidh mic léinn ar an eolas faoi

raon leathan deiseanna gairme sa réimse.

14. Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann i dteannta le RGFN agus RCGAC, scrúdú ar an bhféidearthacht trí Chlár Taighde SFI, clár Spoke an Ionaid Taighde nó cláir chomhpháirtíochta fiontair eile chun tionscnamh suntasach i réimse an Taighde Cibearshlándála a mhaoiniú.

Chruthódh an t-ionad taighde seo nasc idir eolaithe agus innealtóirí i gcomhpháirt i

measc an lucht acadúil agus an tionscail chun déileáil le ceisteanna tábhachtacha

taighde.

Beart 12: Leanfaidh an Rialtas lena chinntiú go bhfuil oiliúint dara agus tríú leibhéal san eolaíocht ríomhaireachta agus sa chibearshlándáil á forbairt agus á húsáid, lena n-áirítear trí thacú leis an obair atá ar bun ag Skillnet Ireland chun cláir oiliúna a fhorbairt do gach leibhéal oideachais agus chun tacú le tionscnaimh SOLAS do chlár TFC printíseachta i gcibearshlándáil.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tacaíocht a chur ar fáil do

thionscnaimh faoi Scileanna

Teicneolaíochta 2022 lena n-áirítear

tionscnaimh phrintíseachta Skillnet

agus TFC a fhorbairt

Go

Leanúnach

RCGAC Skillnet,

SOLAS, ROS

2 Oideachas agus uasoiliúint a chur le

clár oibre Fhóram Slándála TF an

Rialtais mar mhír sheasta

Ráithe 2

2020

LNCS Fóram Slándála

TF an Rialtais

42

3

Tacú le forbairt gearrchúrsa

cibearshlándála don tSraith

Shóisearach, a chinnteoidh go

mbeidh oideachas cibearshlándála á

chur ar fáil ag an dara leibhéal

Ráithe 4

2020

LNCS NCCA

4

Tacú le tionscnaimh a spreagann

mná chun tabhairt faoi ghairm sa

réimse cibearshlándála

Go

Leanúnach

LNCS/ROS Tionscal

Beart 13: Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann (SFI) cibearshlándáil a chur chun cinn mar rogha gairme i scoileanna agus i gcoláistí tríd an gClár Smart Futures.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tá LNCS chun comhpháirtithe

tionscail a lorg chun páirt a ghlacadh

in Smart Futures

Ráithe 1

2020

LNCS SFI, Tionscal

2 Oibreoidh LNCS le Smart Futures

chun tacú le tionscnaimh a

spreagann mic léinn bhaineanna

spéis a léiriú sa réimse

cibearshlándála

Ráithe 1-

Ráithe 4

LNCS SFI

Beart 14: Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann i dteannta le RGFN agus RCGAC, scrúdú ar an bhféidearthacht trí Chlár Ionad Taighde SFI, clár Spoke an Ionaid Taighde nó cláir chomhpháirtíochta fiontair eile chun tionscnamh suntasach i réimse an Taighde Cibearshlándála a mhaoiniú.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

43

1 Gairmeacha a eisiúint ar féidir leis an

bpobal cibearshlándála iad a

fhreagairt

Ráithe 4

2020

SFI LNCS, RGFN,

SFI

2 Tograí a mheas bunaithe ar

phiarmheasúnú neamhspleách

idirnáisiúnta.

Ráithe 1

2021

SFI LNCS, RGFN,

SFI

44

9 Forbairt Fiontar 9.1. An Cás Mar Atá Thacaigh IDA Ireland le hInstitiúid Teicneolaíochta Chorcaí (CIT) le bunú an Chláir ‘Cyber

Ireland’, chun Braisle Cibearshlándála na hÉireann a fhorbairt in Éirinn. Seoladh Cyber

Ireland go hoifigiúil ar an 20 Bealtaine 2019 agus is é Institiúid Teicneolaíochta Chorcaí

(CIT) atá i gceannas air. Tá sé mar aidhm ag an mbraisle náisiúnta seo ionadaíocht a

dhéanamh ar riachtanais na hearnála in Éirinn agus páirteach ann tá páirtithe leasmhara ón

tionscal, lucht acadúil agus ionadaithe rialtais. Spreagfaidh sé comhoibriú, cuirfidh sé le

feasacht ar dheiseanna oideachais agus gairme, cuirfidh sé dlús faoi nuálaíocht, agus

spreagfaidh sé gnó nua sa réimse Cibearshlándála. Tá maoiniú le haghaidh 2 bhliain faighte

ag CIT ón IDA chun an bhraisle a fhorbairt agus tá clár struchtúrtha 7 gcéim forbartha chun

an aidhm seo a chomhlíonadh. Áirítear forbairt Cyber Ireland in Future Jobs Ireland 2019

fianaise ar thiomantas an Rialtais don earnáil a fhorbairt.

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Tá an Tionscnamh Cyber Ireland seolta, maoinithe ag an IDA, chun cabhrú le forbairt

na hearnála in Éirinn.

9.2. Cuspóirí Feasacht a mhúscailt faoi fhreagrachtaí gnóthaí maidir le slándáil a líonraí, gléasanna agus

faisnéis, agus dlús a chur faoi thaighde agus forbairt sa chibearshlándáil in Éirinn, lena n-

áirítear infheistíocht i dteicneolaíocht nua a éascú.

9.3. Bearta

15. Leanfaidh an Rialtas ag tacú le agus le rannpháirtíocht iomlán le Clár Cyber Ireland, clár atá á mhaoiniú ag an IDA, agus scrúdóidh sé meicníochtaí nua chun tacú le comhoibriú cibearshlándála Tionscail/Acadúil/Rialtais.

Glacfaidh LNCS, i dteannta leis an IDA agus Fiontraíocht Éireann, páirt mar bhaill boird

ghníomhacha tionscnaimh Cyber Ireland ag tacú lena dtionscnamh an tionscal, an lucht

acadúil agus an rialtas a thabhairt le chéile, chun an timpeallacht chibearshlándála in

Éirinn a fheabhsú. Tá baint ghníomhach ag Cyber Ireland le hoideachas agus scileanna

45

a chur chun cinn, fóraim chumarsáide, infheistíocht dhíreach eactrach a mhealladh,

agus taighde agus forbairt.

16. Forbróidh Fiontraíocht Éireann clár cibearshlándála chun naisc chomhoibríocha a éascú idir lucht fiontar agus an pobal taighde, na daoine a bheidh i gceannas ar chur chun feidhme praiticiúil taighde i ngnó.

Ag teacht le misean Fhiontraíocht Éireann, treiseoidh Fiontraíocht Éireann a eolas agus

saineolas earnálach ar thionscnaimh chomhoibríocha thionsclaíocha-acadúla le LNCS

chun scrúdú a dhéanamh ar dheiseanna chun tacú le naisc chomhoibríocha

chibearshlándála a chruthaíonn tairbhe don gheilleagar idir an lucht fiontair agus an

pobal taighde.

Beart 15: Leanfaidh an Rialtas ag tacú le agus le rannpháirtíocht iomlán le Clár Cyber Ireland, clár atá á mhaoiniú ag an IDA, agus scrúdóidh sé meicníochtaí nua chun tacú le comhoibriú cibearshlándála Tionscail/Acadúil/Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tacaíocht tugtha do Cyber Ireland

chun Braisle Chibearshlándála de

Lucht Tionscail, Acadúil agus Rialtais

a fhorbairt

Go

Leanúnach

IDA Cyber Ireland,

FÉ, LNCS,

RGFN

Beart 16: Forbróidh Fiontraíocht Éireann clár cibearshlándála chun naisc chomhoibríocha a éascú idir lucht fiontar agus an pobal taighde, na daoine a bheidh i gceannas ar chur chun feidhme praiticiúil taighde i ngnó.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Lárionad Náisiúnta Inniúlachta

Cibearshlándála a bhunú

Ráithe 1

2021

LNCS LNCS, FÉ,

RGFN.

46

10 Rannpháirtíocht 10.1. An Cás Mar Atá Is réimse idirnáisiúnta é Cibearshlándáil, agus tá go leor impleachtaí aige ar go leor gnéithe

de rannpháirtíocht idirnáisiúnta an Stáit. Tuigimid an tábhacht a bhaineann le cibearshlándáil

mar thosaíocht do bheartas eachtrach. Is dlúthchuid de dhéanamh beartais eachtraigh in

Éirinn le fada é forbairtí sa réimse ach tá sé riachtanach an rannpháirtíocht sin a fhorbairt,

go ginearálta agus ar fud an Aontais Eorpaigh go sonrach.

Ar leibhéal domhanda le 10 mbliana anuas tá méadú tagtha ar an líon ionsaithe agus

teagmhas ardphróifíle, lena n-áirítear ionsaithe ar bhonneagar leictreachais sa Úcráin in

2015 agus na teagmhais ‘Wannacry2’ agus ‘NotPetya’ in 2017. Spreag na teagmhais seo

díospóireacht nua faoi ról na Stát agus an phobail idirnáisiúnta in iompraíocht ar líne Stáit a

mhaolú, agus faoin sraith oiriúnach beart ba cheart do thíortha a úsáid laistigh dá ndlínse

féin chun ionracas agus seasmhacht príomhchóras a chinntiú.

Tá tionscnaimh forbartha ag roinnt eagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta mar iarracht na

saincheisteanna seo a fhrámú laistigh de chreataí reatha caidreamh idirnáisiúnta. Is é an

ceann is suntasaí díobh seo Grúpa na NA de Shaineolaithe Ginearálta Rialtais (nó GGE).

Bunaíodh é seo in 2004 bunaithe ar phlé a bhí ar siúl ó 1998, bunaithe ar Rún 53/70. Sa

tréimhse ó 2004, bhí cúig atriall ar leith de GGE, agus chomhaontaigh trí cinn ar

thuarascálacha substainteacha, agus theip ar dhá cheann, lena n-áirítear an ceann is

déanaí in 2017, teacht ar chomhaontú.

Ag deireadh 2018, ghlac na Náisiúin Aontaithe le dhá rún nua maidir le ceisteanna

cibearshlándála. Bhunaigh an chéad rún grúpa oibre neamhiata, a tionóladh ar dtús i

Meitheamh 2019 agus a dhíreoidh ar fheasacht a mhúscailt, cur le comhthuiscint agus dlús

a chur faoi chur chun feidhme norm agus prionsabal d’iompar freagrach Stáit a

comhaontaíodh roimhe seo. Tharraing an dara rún aird ar na trí thuarascáil rathúla GGE

agus lorgaíodh GGE eile, le béim ar chur chun feidhme dlí idirnáisiúnta ar chibearspás agus

dlús a chur faoin gcomhaontú maidir le hiompar freagrach Stáit i gcibearspás.

Ag leibhéal réigiúnach, bhí ról níos forchéimnithí ag an Eagraíocht um Shlándáil agus

Comhar san Eoraip (ESCE) agus ag an Aontas Eorpach sa réimse Cibearshlándála. Tá dhá

thacar de bhearta tógála muiníne (BTM) curtha i dtoll a chéile ag ESCE in 2013 agus 2016

chun “comhoibriú idirstáit, trédhearcacht, intuarthacht, agus cobhsaíocht a fheabhsú, agus

chun na rioscaí míbhraistinte, géaraithe, agus coinbhleachta a d’fhéadfadh eascairt as úsáid

TFCanna a laghdú”.

47

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Ghlac na Náisiúin Aontaithe le dhá rún nua atá dírithe ar chomhoibriú agus ar

fheasacht faoi cheisteanna cibearshlándála a mhúscailt.

2. Chuir ESCE dhá thacar de bhearta tógála muiníne i dtoll a chéile a bhfuil comhoibriú

agus cobhsaíocht á bhfeabhsú acu.

10.2. Cuspóir Leanúint le rannpháirtíocht le comhpháirtithe idirnáisiúnta agus le heagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta

lena chinntiú go bhfuil an cibearspás oscailte, slán, aonadach agus saor agus in ann forbairt

gheilleagrach agus shóisialta a éascú.

10.3. Bearta 17. Neartófar tiomantas taidhleoireachta na hÉireann do chibearshlándáil, lena n-

áirítear cibir-attachés a bhunú i bpríomh-mhisin taidhleoireachta agus trí pháirt a ghlacadh i bhforbairt acmhainní inbhuanaithe i dtríú tíortha.

Neartóidh Éire a tiomantas taidhleoireachta do chibearshlándáil mar chuid den

tionscnamh ‘Global Ireland’, trí Chibir-Attachés ainmnithe a shannadh do phríomh-

mhisin taidhleoireachta. Bunaithe ar ár dtacaíocht do chibearspás oscailte, saor,

síochánta agus slán, beidh taidhleoireacht choisctheach á héileamh againn inár

rannpháirtíocht idirnáisiúnta. Tacóimid le comhar idirnáisiúnta chun cibearchoireacht a

chomhrac agus comhar foirmiúil agus neamhfhoirmiúil sa chibearspás a chur chun cinn,

trí bheith rannpháirteach i bhforbairt acmhainne inbhuanaithe i dtríú tíortha. Mar chuid

dár dtiomantas do chibearchoireacht a chomhrac, daingneoimid Coinbhinsiún

Bhúdaipéist a luaithe agus is féidir. Beidh infheidhmeacht dlí idirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear

dlí daonnúil idirnáisiúnta, agus meas ar chearta an duine mar bhonn lenár dtiomantas

idirnáisiúnta do chibearshlándáil. Soláthróimid tacaíocht inbhuanaithe forbartha

acmhainne do thíortha atá i mbéal forbartha agus do ghníomhaithe sa tsochaí shibhialta

agus cinnteoimid go bhfuil tuiscint iomlán againn ar mhí-úsáidí a d’fhéadfaí a dhéanamh

do chearta an duine, ag díriú ar chosantóirí chearta an duine, agus ag déanamh

monatóireachta/rialaithe ar mhionlaigh eitneacha trí theicneolaíocht.

48

18. Cruthóimid grúpa idir-rannach (GIR) maidir le rialachas Idirlín agus cibirbheartais idirnáisiúnta chun seasamh náisiúnta a chomhordú i Ranna.

Cruthóimid Grúpa Idir-rannach (GIR) maidir le saincheisteanna idirnáisiúnta

cibirbheartais chun rannpháirtíocht maidir le saincheisteanna a mbaineann gné

gheopholaitiúil leo a chomhordú agus chun seasamh comhordaithe maidir le rialachas

Idirlín agus saincheisteanna cibearshlándála a fhorbairt.

19. Cuirfimid lenár rannpháirtíocht reatha le heagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear trí bheith páirteach san Ionad Barr Feabhais Cibearshlándála (CCD-COE) i dTaillinn, san Eastóin.

Cuirfimid lenár rannpháirtíocht in Eagraíochtaí Idirnáisiúnta atá ag déileáil leis an raon

iomlán saincheisteanna atá i gceist faoin Straitéis seo. Dá réir sin, beidh Éire páirteach

in agus beidh ról iomlán aici san Ionad Barr Feabhais Cibearshlándála (CCD-COE) i

dTaillinn, an Eastóin. Áireofar anseo, ar dtús, iasachtú baill de na Fórsaí Cosanta2 chuig

an Ionad in am agus i dtráth. Soláthróimid tacaíocht iomlán do na próisis NA atá ag

iarraidh creat le haghaidh cobhsaíocht sa chibearspás a fhorbairt agus a chur chun

feidhme.

Beart 17: Neartófar tiomantas taidhleoireachta na hÉireann do chibearshlándáil, lena n-áirítear cibir-attachés a bhunú i bpríomh-mhisin taidhleoireachta agus trí pháirt a ghlacadh i bhforbairt acmhainní inbhuanaithe i dtríú tíortha.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Cibir-Attachés a cheapadh do

Phríomh-Mhisin Taidhleoireachta.

Ráithe 3

2020

RGET LNCS

2 Coinbhinsiún Bhúdaipéist Ráithe 2

2021

Roinn Dlí

agus Cirt

LNCS, Roinn an

Taoisigh

2 Cé go ndéanfar an t-imlonnú tosaigh chuig CCD-COE ó na Fórsaí Cosanta, d’fhéadfadh go mbeadh na ndaoine a n-imlonnaítear ina dhiaidh sin ina mbaill foirne sibhialta nó míleata de réir fhaomhadh ón Rialtas.

49

3 Clár d’fhorbairt acmhainne

inbhuanaithe do thíortha atá i mbéal

forbartha a fhorbairt

Ráithe 2

2021

RGET,

LNCS

LNCS

Beart 18: Cruthóimid grúpa idir-rannach (GIR) maidir le rialachas Idirlín agus cibirbheartais idirnáisiúnta chun seasamh náisiúnta a chomhordú i Ranna.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 GIR a bhunú chun nithe a bhaineann

le cibirbheartas a chomhordú

Ráithe 2

2020

RGET LNCS, Gach

Roinn Rialtais

Beart 19: Cuirfimid lenár rannpháirtíocht reatha le heagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear trí bheith páirteach san Ionad Barr Feabhais Cibearshlándála (CCD-COE) i dTaillinn, san Eastóin.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Iasachtú bhall FC do CCD-COE Ráithe 4

2020

LNCS FC, R/Cosanta,

RFET

50

11 Saoránaigh 11.1. An Cás Mar Atá I dtéarmaí feasacht maidir le cibearshlándáil, tá roinnt tionscnamh náisiúnta tábhachtach

bunaithe le blianta beaga anuas, go háirithe sa chóras oideachais. Ina measc tá Webwise,

tionscnamh sábháilteachta Idirlín atá á chómhaoiniú ag an Roinn Oideachais agus

Scileanna agus á oibriú ag an tSeirbhís um Fhorbairt Ghairmiúil do Mhúinteoirí (PDST)

Teicneolaíocht san Oideachas, a thacaíonn le húsáid uathrialaitheach, éifeachtach, agus

níos sábháilte an Idirlín i measc daoine óga trí straitéis leanúnach faisnéise agus feasachta

atá dírithe ar thuismitheoirí, múinteoirí, agus leanaí iad féin, le teachtaireachtaí

comhsheasmhacha agus ábhartha lena n-áirítear treoir maidir le húsáid inghlactha i

scoileanna.

Tá raon acmhainní forbartha lena n-áirítear “UP2US”, “My Selfie and the wider world” agus

“Lockers”; agus an Mol Tuismitheoireachta ar líne: Webwise Parents; agus ‘Be in Ctrl’, a

thacaíonn le múinteoirí labhairt lena mic léinn faoi chomhéigean gnéasach agus sracadh ar

líne. I lár 2019, seoladh an acmhainn ‘HTML Heroes’, a bhfuil sé mar aidhm leis cabhrú agus

tacú le hoideoirí cabhrú le leanaí idir aois 7–10 mbliana foghlaim faoi úsáid shábháilte agus

fhreagrach an Idirlín, na meáin shóisialta san áireamh.

Tá Smart Futures á chomhordú ag Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann i gcomhpháirt le

heagraíochtaí agus le lucht acadúil. Soláthraíonn an clár eolas faoi ghairmeacha in

eolaíocht, teicneolaíocht, innealtóireacht agus matamaitic (STEM), do mhic léinn dara

leibhéal in Éirinn. Cothaíonn Smart Futures rannpháirtíocht idir treoirchomhairleoirí,

múinteoirí agus an tionscal chun acmhainní agus gníomhaíochtaí a fhorbairt chun spéis a

chothú i measc mac léinn. Tá eolas le fáil ar an suíomh gréasáin Smart Futures faoin raon

leathan deiseanna atá ar fáil cosúil le cúrsaí, printíseachtaí, féilte agus imeachtaí. I mí

Feabhra 2019, sheol Smart Futures feachtas náisiúnta nua dar teideal “I get paid to do this” i

gcomhpháirt leis an Roinn Oideachais agus Scileanna. Tá an feachtas dírithe ar acmhainn

ar líne de phróifílí faoi ghairmithe atá ag obair i dtionscail STEM chun léargas a thabhairt do

mhic léinn ar an méid is féidir leo a bheith ag súil leis ó ghairm in STEM agus na deiseanna

éagsúla a bheidh ar fáil dóibh.

I láthair na huaire, tá an clár seo á chur chun feidhme ag Grúpa Urraitheoirí faoi

Chathaoirleacht na Roinne Oideachais & Scileanna. Leagfar amach in achtú Acht um

Shábháilteacht Ar Líne conas is féidir linn a chinntiú go bhfuil dul chun cinn déanta maidir le

breis sábháilteachta leanaí ar líne. Áireofar anseo, den chéad uair, ionchas soiléir a shonrú

51

do sholáthraithe seirbhíse chun céimeanna réasúnacha a dhéanamh chun sábháilteacht

úsáideoirí na seirbhíse a chinntiú.

Príomhfhorbairtí

1. Trí chlár leanúnach faisnéise agus feasachta, sholáthair Webwise treoir do

thuismitheoirí, múinteoirí agus leanaí maidir le húsáid shábháilte an Idirlín.

2. Tá Smart Futures seolta chun eolas a chur ar fáil do mhic léinn dara leibhéal maidir

le gairmeacha i ndisciplíní a bhaineann le heolaíocht, teicneolaíocht, innealtóireacht

agus matamaitic.

11.2. Cuspóir Cur leis an leibhéal ginearálta scileanna agus feasachta i measc daoine aonair maidir le

cleachtais bhunúsacha chibearshláinteachais agus tacú leo trí fhaisnéis agus trí oiliúint.

11.3. Bearta Trí dhea-chleachtais chibearshláinteachais a fhorbairt sa daonra trí chéile is féidir linn sochaí

níos sláine a chruthú. Baineann tábhacht ar leith le feasacht ar chibir-rioscaí i ngrúpaí

leochaileacha den daonra.

20. Forbróidh an Rialtas feachtas náisiúnta faisnéise cibearshlándála a úsáidfidh faisnéis a bheidh curtha ar fáil ag LNCS agus Biúró Cibearchoireachta Náisiúnta an Gharda Síochána, agus beidh eintitis a bhfuil baint dhíreach acu le soláthar faisnéise i mbun an fheachtais a reáchtáil.

Forbrófar agus cuirfear Cibirfheachtas feasachta náisiúnta i bhfeidhm i measc an

phobail. Bainfidh an clár seo leas as taithí LNCS agus Biúró Cibearchoireachta an

Gharda Síochána, agus forbrófar é seo mar iarracht chomhoibríoch idir roinnt

comhpháirtithe, lena n-áirítear PDST agus an Coimisinéir um Shábháilteacht Ar Líne. Is

é an aidhm atá leis an bhfeachtas seo feasacht na sochaí maidir le cibir-rioscaí coitianta

a fheabhsú cosúil le cibearshláinteachas bunúsach agus cumadh cúinse. Chomh maith

leis sin, éascóidh sé feachtais feasachta níos spriocdhírithe atá dírithe ar ghrúpaí

leochaileacha cosúil le leanaí agus daoine scothaosta, lena n-áirítear faisnéis a chur ar

fáil do Webwise.

52

Beart 20: Forbróidh an Rialtas feachtas náisiúnta faisnéise cibearshlándála a úsáidfidh faisnéis a bheidh curtha ar fáil ag LNCS agus Biúró Cibearchoireachta Náisiúnta an Gharda Síochána, agus beidh eintitis a bhfuil baint dhíreach acu le soláthar faisnéise i mbun reáchtáil an fheachtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tacú le cur san áireamh leanúnach

míreanna cibearshlándála i gcláir

Webwise

Ráithe 4

2020

RCGAC CCGS, ROS

2 Feachtas feasachta poiblí a fhorbairt

chun faisnéis maidir le

cibearshlándáil agus cosc na

cibearchoireachta a chur san

áireamh.

Ráithe 1

2021

LNCS, An

Coimisinéir um

Shábháilteacht

ar Líne

RCGAC, CCGS,

RDC, ROS

53

12 Creat Rialachais agus Freagrachtaí

12.1. Struchtúr Rialachais Éileoidh an Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála a chur ar fáil creat agus struchtúr rialachais, i

dtéarmaí freagairt oibríochtúil agus comhpháirteanna uileghabhálacha na Straitéise féin.

12.2. An Straitéis Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála a Chur ar Fáil Is é an Coiste Comh-Aireachta um Shlándáil an príomh-mhodh a bheidh ann chun freagairtí

ar shaincheisteanna slándála náisiúnta a chomhordú. Cruthófar Coiste Idir-rannach

Ardleibhéil, áfach, a bhuailfidh le chéile faoi dhó sa bhliain, a bheidh freagrach as dul chun

cinn chomh fada is a bhaineann leis na Bearta faoin Straitéis seo a mheas agus a

thuairisciú, agus as comhaontú maidir le haon leasuithe ar na gníomhartha atá le déanamh

chun iad seo a chomhlíonadh.

54

Aguisín 1 Liosta Gníomhartha Forbairt Náisiúnta Cumais

Beart 1: Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála, go háirithe ag féachaint dá chumas monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar agus freagairt do theagmhais chibearshlándála agus bagairtí atá ag forbairt sa Stát.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Plean mionsonraithe teicniúil agus

eagraíochtúil do JSOC.

Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS RCGAC

2 Ceadú a fháil acmhainní agus foireann a

chur ar fáil le haghaidh fhorbairt LNCS

Ráithe 2 2021 LNCS RCGAC, RCPA

3 JSOC fréamhshamhla a fhorbairt in

acmhainn eatramhach

Ráithe 4 2021 LNCS ONP, RCGAC

4 Áis Deiridh JSOC a Choimisiúnú i

gCeanncheathrú LNCS

Ráithe 2 2023 LNCS ONP, RCGAC

Beart 2: Comhtháthófar faisnéis agus anailís bhagartha ullmhaithe ag an Lárionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála le hobair an Ionaid Náisiúnta um Anailís Slándála.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Socruithe Foirmiúla Tuairiscithe agus

Comhroinnte Faisnéise a bhunú le INAS

Ráithe 1 2020 LNCS INAS

55

Cosaint Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil

Beart 3: Leanfar leis an gcóras reatha do Chosaint an Bhonneagair Chriticiúil bunaithe ar an Treoir NIS a úsáid agus a fhorbairt, agus leagfar béim ar leith ar chláir leanúnacha chomhlíontachta agus iniúchta chun rioscaí do phríomhsheirbhísí a mhaolú.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 An chéad chéim d’Fhéinmheasúnú na

nOibreoirí Seirbhísí Bunriachtanacha

(OSB) i gcomparáid leis an gCreat

Rialaithe Slándála a chur i gcrích

Ráithe 1 2020 LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

2 An chéad chéim de Thástáil Rialaithe

Slándála d’Oibreoirí Seirbhísí

Bunriachtanacha (OSB) a chur i gcrích

Ráithe 3 2020 LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

3 Athmheasúnú a dhéanamh ar Chlár na

OSB Ainmnithe agus Treoirlínte Slándála

Ráithe 3 2020 LNCS

4 Tástáil Rialaithe Slándála i ndiaidh

teagmhas, agus iniúchtaí leanúnacha ar

chomhlíontacht OSB

Go leanúnach LNCS OSB Ainmnithe

Beart 4: Déanfaidh LNCS, le cúnamh ó na Fórsaí Cosanta agus An Garda Síochána, measúnú riosca mionsonraithe nuashonraithe ar leochaileacht reatha gach Bonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil agus seirbhísí do chibirionsaí.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Grúpa Stiúrtha bunaithe agus téarmaí

tagartha don athbhreithniú

comhaontaithe

Ráithe 1 2020 LNCS CCGS, FC, INAS,

BCÉ, COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

2 An chéim bailithe faisnéise críochnaithe,

agus modheolaíocht comhaontaithe


BCÉ, COMREG,

56

CRF, ÚEÉ

3 An Próiseas Measúnaithe a chríochnú,

lena n-áirítear comhairliúchán

idirnáisiúnta agus measúnú

mionsonraithe ar idirspleáchais

thrasearnála.


BCÉ, COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

4 Tuarascáil Deiridh agus Moltaí Curtha i

gCrích


BCÉ, COMREG,

CRF, ÚEÉ

Beart 5: Forbrófar agus leathnófar córas cosanta reatha an Bhonneagair Náisiúnta Chriticiúil thar shaolré na Straitéise chun raon níos leithne de Bhonneagar Náisiúnta Criticiúil a chur san áireamh, lena n-áirítear gnéithe den chóras toghcháin.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Cinn Billí a Dhréachtú le Comhaontú ag

an Rialtas

Ráithe 4 2021 RCGAC OAA

2 Próiseas Dréachtaithe le OAA Ráithe 1 2022 RCGAC OAA

3 Próiseas Oireachtais Ráithe 2 2022 RCGAC OAA, Oireachtas

Beart 6: Déanfar tuilleadh forbartha ar na grúpaí comhroinnte faisnéise atá á n-oibriú ag an Ionad Náisiúnta Cibearshlándála cheana féin, agus leathnófar an Grúpa Comhroinnte Bagartha atá ann cheana féin chun raon níos leithne de bhonneagar náisiúnta criticiúil a chur san áireamh.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Cur le hionadaithe reatha an Ghrúpa

Comhroinnte Bagartha (GCB) chun BNC

a chur san áireamh, le Téarmaí Tagartha

nua.

Ráithe 2 2020 LNCS CCGS, FC, BNC

57

2 Socruithe reatha na Ríochta

Aontaithe maidir le comhroinnt

faisnéise agus freagairt do

theagmhais a bheachtú, le béim ar

leith ar chosaint bonneagair chriticiúil

Thuaidh-Theas

Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS OPÉ, CPNI na

Ríochta Aontaithe

Beart 7: Bunóidh an Rialtas tacar breise de chaighdeáin chomhlíontachta chun tacú le cibearshlándáil an bhonneagair teileachumarsáide sa Stát.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Trasuíomh Threoir 2018/1972 Ráithe 4 2020 RCGAC LNCS, Comreg

2 Tacaíocht Theicniúil a chur ar fáil do

Comreg

Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS Comreg

3 Cur chun feidhme beart slándála

athbhreithnithe

Ráithe 1 2021 Comreg RCGAC, LNCS,

Oibreoirí

Teileachumarsáide

58

Sonraí agus Líonraí na hEarnála Poiblí

Beart 8: Forbróidh LNCS caighdeán slándála bonnlíne atá le cur i bhfeidhm ag gach Roinn Rialtas agus príomhghníomhaireacht.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Íoschaighdeán oiriúnach a dhearadh do

TF an Rialtais, i gcomhar le Fóram

Slándála TF an Rialtais.

Ráithe 4

2021

LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomhair

eachtaí

2 Bearta, rialuithe agus nósanna imeachta

cur chun feidhme mionsonraithe a

fhorbairt.

Ráithe 1

2022

LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomhair

eachtaí

3 Ábhar treorach agus tacaíochta maidir le

measúnú comhlíontachta a dhréachtú

d’fhoirne TF agus d’Aonaid Iniúchta

Inmheánacha.

Ráithe 2

2022

LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomhair

eachtaí

4 Tacú le Ranna Rialtais agus le

Príomhghníomhaireachtaí le cur chun

feidhme an chaighdeáin bonnlíne.

Go

leanúnach

LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomhair

eachtaí

5 Measúnú a dhéanamh ar chur chun

feidhme an chaighdeáin bonnlíne

Ráithe 4

2023

LNCS/OPOFR

/Fóram TF an

Rialtais

Ranna Rialtais

agus

príomhghníomhair

eachtaí

59

Beart 9: Cuirfear an Clár ‘Sensor’ reatha i bhfeidhm i ngach Roinn Rialtais, agus déanfar measúnú faoin dáta céanna ar an bhféidearthacht a bhaineann le Sensor a chur i bhfeidhm i ngach líonra Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Sensor a úsáid sa bhonneagar TF sa 15

Roinn Rialtais.

Ráithe 4

2020

LNCS Gach Roinn

Rialtais, Fóram

Slándála TF an

Rialtais

2 Athbhreithniú a dhéanamh ar chostais

agus ar shaincheisteanna dlí a

bhaineann le cur chun feidhme Sensor i

Líonraí an Rialtais, ag cumhdach TFC

na hearnála poiblí, agus an toradh a

chur faoi bhráid an Rialtais chun

cinneadh a dhéanamh.

Ráithe 4

2021

LNCS OPOFR OAA,

RCPA

Beart 10: Cruthófar fóram Slándála TF an Rialtais, a mbeidh cead ag Ceannasaithe Shlándáil TF ar fud an Rialtais a bheith páirteach ann, chun comhroinnt faisnéise maidir le dea-chleachtas le haghaidh cibearshlándáil a éascú agus chun cead a thabhairt do LNCS tacú le húsáid a bhaint as an gcaighdeán slándála bonnlíne.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Acmhainní a chur ar fáil chun Foireann

TF na hEarnála Poiblí a chruthú in LNCS,

agus Téarmaí Tagartha a bhunú don

Fhóram


Roinn Rialtais

2 Seisiún faisnéisithe a phleanáil do gach

Ceannasaí Slándála TF chun cur síos a

dhéanamh ar aidhm an Fhóraim Slándála


Roinn Rialtais

60

3 Cruinnithe ráithiúla den Fhóram a bhunú

agus Cathaoirleach agus Rúnaí a

cheapadh


Roinn Rialtais

Beart 11: Éileoidh an Rialtas ar LNCS Moltaí a eisiúint ag féachaint d’úsáid bogearraí agus crua-earraí sonracha ar bhonneagar TF agus teileachumarsáide an Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Réasúnaíocht agus Téarmaí Tagartha

Ullmhaithe agus curtha faoi bhráid an

Rialtais lena gComhaontú


FC, INAS

2 Éifeacht tugtha do Phróiseas Molta

LNCS


FC, INAS

Scileanna

Beart 12: Leanfaidh an Rialtas lena chinntiú go bhfuil oiliúint dara agus tríú leibhéal san eolaíocht ríomhaireachta agus sa chibearshlándáil á forbairt agus á húsáid, lena n-áirítear trí thacú leis an obair atá ar bun ag Skillnet Ireland chun cláir oiliúna a fhorbairt do gach leibhéal oideachais agus chun tacú le tionscnaimh SOLAS do chlár TFC printíseachta i gcibearshlándáil.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tacaíocht a chur ar fáil do thionscnaimh

faoi Scileanna Teicneolaíochta 2022 lena

n-áirítear tionscnaimh phrintíseachta

Skillnet agus TFC a fhorbairt

Go

Leanúnach

RCGAC Skillnet, SOLAS,

ROS

2 Oideachas agus uasoiliúint a chur le clár

oibre Fhóram Slándála TF an Rialtais

mar mhír sheasta

Ráithe 2 2020 LNCS Fóram Slándála

TF an Rialtais

3 Tacú le forbairt gearrchúrsa Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS NCCA

61

cibearshlándála don tSraith Shóisearach,

a chinnteoidh go mbeidh oideachas

cibearshlándála á chur ar fáil ag an dara

leibhéal

4

Tacú le tionscnaimh a spreagann mná

chun tabhairt faoi ghairm sa réimse

cibearshlándála

Go

Leanúnach

LNCS/ROS/ Tionscal

Beart 13: Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann (SFI) cibearshlándáil a chur chun cinn mar rogha gairme i scoileanna agus i gcoláistí tríd an gClár Smart Futures.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tá LNCS chun comhpháirtithe tionscail a

lorg chun páirt a ghlacadh in Smart

Futures

Ráithe 1 2020 LNCS SFI, Tionscal

2 Oibreoidh LNCS le Smart Futures chun

tacú le tionscnamh a spreagann mic léinn

bhaineanna spéis a léiriú sa réimse

cibearshlándála

Ráithe 1-

Ráithe 4

LNCS SFI

Beart 14: Déanfaidh Fondúireacht Eolaíochta Éireann i dteannta le RGFN agus RCGAC, scrúdú ar an bhféidearthacht trí Chlár Ionad Taighde SFI, clár Spoke an Ionaid Taighde nó cláir chomhpháirtíochta fiontair eile chun tionscnamh suntasach i réimse an Taighde Cibearshlándála a mhaoiniú.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Gairmeacha a eisiúint ar féidir leis an

bpobal cibearshlándála iad a fhreagairt

Ráithe 4 2020 SFI LNCS, RGFN,

SFI

2 Tograí a mheas bunaithe ar

phiarmheasúnú neamhspleách

idirnáisiúnta.

Ráithe 1 2021 SFI LNCS,RGFN,SFI

62

Forbairt Fiontar

Beart 15: Leanfaidh an Rialtas ag tacú le agus le rannpháirtíocht iomlán le Clár Cyber Ireland, clár atá á mhaoiniú ag an IDA, agus scrúdóidh sé meicníochtaí nua chun tacú le comhoibriú cibearshlándála Tionscail/Acadúil/Rialtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Tacaíocht tugtha do Cyber Ireland chun

Braisle Chibearshlándála de Lucht

Tionscail, Acadúil agus Rialtais a

fhorbairt

Go

Leanúnach

IDA Cyber Ireland,

LNCS, FÉ, RGFN

Beart 16: Forbróidh Fiontraíocht Éireann clár cibearshlándála chun naisc chomhoibríocha a éascú idir lucht fiontar agus an pobal taighde, na daoine a bheidh i gceannas ar chur chun feidhme praiticiúil taighde i ngnó.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Lárionad Náisiúnta Inniúlachta

Cibearshlándála a bhunú

Ráithe 1 2021 LNCS LNCS, RGFN, FÉ

Rannpháirtíocht

Beart 17: Neartófar tiomantas taidhleoireachta na hÉireann do chibearshlándáil, lena n-áirítear cibir-attachés a bhunú i bpríomh-mhisin taidhleoireachta agus trí pháirt a ghlacadh i bhforbairt acmhainní inbhuanaithe i dtríú tíortha.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Cibir-Attachés a cheapadh do Phríomh-

Mhisin Taidhleoireachta.

Ráithe 3 2020 RGET LNCS

63

2 Coinbhinsiún Bhúdaipéist Ráithe 2 2021 Roinn Dlí

agus Cirt

LNCS, Roinn an

Taoisigh

3 Clár d’fhorbairt acmhainne inbhuanaithe

do thíortha atá i mbéal forbartha a

fhorbairt

Ráithe 2 2021 RGET, LNCS LNCS

Beart 18: Cruthóimid grúpa idir-rannach (GIR) maidir le rialachas Idirlín agus cibirbheartais idirnáisiúnta chun seasamh náisiúnta a chomhordú i Ranna.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 GIR a bhunú chun nithe a bhaineann le

cibirbheartas a chomhordú.

Ráithe 2 2020 RGET LNCS, Gach

Roinn Rialtais

Beart 19: Cuirfimid lenár rannpháirtíocht reatha le heagraíochtaí idirnáisiúnta, lena n-áirítear trí bheith páirteach san Ionad Barr Feabhais Cibearshlándála (CCD-COE) i dTaillinn, san Eastóin.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

1 Iasachtú bhall FC do CCD-COE Ráithe 4 2020 LNCS FC, R/Cosanta,

RFET

Saoránaigh

Beart 20: Forbróidh an Rialtas feachtas náisiúnta faisnéise cibearshlándála a úsáidfidh faisnéis a bheidh curtha ar fáil ag LNCS agus Biúró Cibearchoireachta Náisiúnta an Gharda Síochána, agus beidh eintitis a bhfuil baint dhíreach acu le soláthar faisnéise i mbun reáchtáil an fheachtais.


réir na

Ráithe


Leasmhara

64

1 Tacú le cur san áireamh leanúnach

míreanna cibearshlándála i gcláir

Webwise

Ráithe 4 2020 RCGAC CCGS, ROS

2 Feachtas feasachta poiblí a fhorbairt

chun faisnéis maidir le cibearshlándáil

agus cosc na cibearchoireachta a chur

san áireamh.

Ráithe 1 2021 LNCS, An

Coimisinéir um

Shábháilteacht

ar Líne

RCGAC, CCGS,

RDC, ROS

Documents

National Cyber Security Strategy · 1 Introduction ... cyber security of telecommunications infrastructure in the State. ... (IDG) on internet governance and international cyber policy