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National Critical Intelligence Estimate: Counter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) in the US
Team WyvernFor Approval: Professor of Practice, UAS – Cybersecurity
Randall K. Nichols, DTM, Kansas State University Polytechnic, Salina KS
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Team Wyvern
Wyverns
Jeremy Shay - TL
John Hood
Jordan McDonald
Candice Carter
Prof RandallNichols
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“Victory comes only to those prepared to make it, and take it”
-- Tom Clancy
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Agenda
• Executive Summary• C-UAS Overview• Key Indicators
• Political• US Legislation• Economic• Military
• Summary• Open Source• References
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Useful Definitions
• The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses the following definition:• “An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), sometimes
called a drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot on board – instead, the UAS is controlled from an operator on the ground”
• UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle• sUAS = Small Unmanned Aerial System
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Executive Summary Key Indicators
• Political
• US Legislation
• Economic
• Military
• Commercial
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Executive Summary
• UAS technology is a rapidly growing and dynamic industry
• US aerospace and privacy laws have been slow to address the developments in this industry
• There is a domestic and military need for the ability to prevent UAS intrusion AND the ability to deter the offending system, pilot, and command signals
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Executive Summary Political
• Recent bipartisan support of HR 302 passage and signing into law is a major positive step in advancing UAS & C-UAS regulations and legal environment
• Continued legislative & agency intercooperation is necessary to make the next leaps toward integrating UAS and C-UAS systems into the national air space
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Executive Summary Legislative
• Federal & State laws, as well as FAA guidelines are lagging this dynamic industry and have NOT been able to keep up with the industry's fast-paced evolution
• Advances in C-UAS are attempting to contain the UAS threat while staying within the law
• Understand the need for faster regulatory advancements
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Executive Summary Economic
• Economic and security needs of several domestic organizations to use C-UAS or Counter-Drone technology
• The potential for growth in the C-UAS market will mirror, if not exceed, the domestic UAS market, as concerns for personal, public, & corporate security elevate with UAS technology advancement
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Executive Summary Military
• US military’s need to stay technologically ahead of any adversary's capability
• Joint force doctrine concerning UAS and C-UAS employment has lagged
• Efforts are underway to understand and capture lessons learned from other global conflicts which can prepare and protect US and allied forces
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Executive Summary Commercial
Understand the need for better C-UAS
• Necessary for the US to keep pace in the domestic UAS & C-UAS fields
• Cybersecurity of UAS is a major area of exploitation by C-UAS• As UAS industry strengthens and hardens their
systems, challenges to C-UAS industry will continue to grow
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C-UAS Overview
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C-UAS Overview
• C-UAS are needed both in the commercial and military sectors
• Evolving UAS technology brings a complex threat environment for defense, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to counter and avert
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C-UAS Primary Defense Types
• Identification
• Tracking
• Detection
• Detention
• Disruption
• Destruction
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C-UAS
• A significant amount of innovation and improvement in UAS technology is coming from the commercial recreation industry
• Commercial sector is driving more and more advanced capabilities
• Very cheap
• Small packages offering better optics
• Better communications
• Data links and navigation capabilities
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Categories of C-UAS
Detectors
• Elaborate technical passive tracking systems that locate and follow the UAS, its control unit (ergo, the pilot), and any radio frequency (RF) emissions from the system
• Only legal option to civilian C-UAS users
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Categories of C-UAS
Defenders
• Often work in tandem with Detectors
• Active systems that jam UAS RF communications, or their sensors and signals, deploy defensive UAS, aerial denial systems, kinetic weapons, and even birds of prey
• Illegal for all but the military and law enforcement
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C-UAS Counter-Reconnaissance
• Counter-reconnaissance seeks to undermine the threat’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance efforts
• UAS plays a significant role in reconnaissance for both threat and friendly forces;
• Thus, all counter-reconnaissance plans must account for UAS
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C-UAS Cyberspace • The cyber domain and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) will be
more contested in the future
• Many commercial & some military UAS are dependent on cyberspace and EMS capabilities for planning, command, and control
• These capabilities can be targeted and attacked in the same way as tangible facilities
• These efforts are likewise integrated through targeting and must involve joint and multinational partners
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C-UAS as Detectors
• Reflectance of: Ultra Violet, Visible, Near Infrared (IR) Reflectance, Short Wave IR, Medium Wave IR, and Long Wave IR photons• Reflectance of a particular photon
• Radar reflectance
• Audio Sensors—to “hear” invaders
• Optical Sensors—to “see” invaders
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C-UAS as Detectors
Additional defensive measures are primarily used for the classification of drones:
• Acoustic emission
• Electromagnetic emission from onboard radios
• Wi-Fi
• Altimeters
• Radar
• Induced magnetic field
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C-UAS Electronic Warfare Operations
• The overall goal of Offensive Electronic Attack (OEA) involves the use of Electromagnetic (EM) energy and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy
• Primary goal of using electronic countermeasures ceasing overall drone operation
• prevent successful reception
• transmission of data
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C-UAS Electronic Warfare Operations
• Electronic Warfare (EW) efforts are integrated through targeting and will occur at all echelons as applicable and must be synchronized
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C-UAS Electronic Warfare Operations
• All EW efforts require effective spectrum management operations to eliminate spectrum fratricide and protect friendly UAS operations
• Electronic countermeasure is expected to emerge as the fastest growing sector
• High-power electromagnetic
• Microwave weapons
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Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
IAMD plays a key role in C-UAS
• Commanders and air defense planners must account for the UAS threat when establishing critical/defended asset lists, planning system deployments, and developing rules of engagement
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Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Current and future integrated aircraft and missile defenses (IAMD) capabilities need to include
• Surface-to-air systems
• Air-to-air systems
• Command and Control systems
• Are adequate to deal with large & small UAS
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Command & Control Strike
• Attacking launch, maintenance, and command and control facilities is a method in C-UAS
• While not all UAS will have large and/or visible facilities, those that do, can be targeted
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Command & Control Strike
• These actions will likely take place at higher echelons will be integrated through the targeting process
• While this line of effort is identified as a left-of-launch initiative, in practice it must occur throughout operations
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C-UAS Functionality and Threat
• Collect data and information to aid military tactics
• Send swarms of small drones to distract, disorient, and disrupt military operations
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C-UAS Functionality and Threat
The two major types of mitigation
• Destructive• Laser System
• Missile Effector
• Electromagnetic Countermeasures
• Non-Destructive• Identification
• Tracking
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C-UAS Functionality Challenges
Electro-optical systems
• Most Electro-optical systems can only operate during daytime
• May confuse a UAS with a bird or an airplane
• May be less effective if UAS not operating within direct line of sight of the sensor
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C-UAS Functionality Challenges
• New UAS may not be covered by sound file library
• Library files will need to be regularly updated
Acoustic Pointer - Acoustic UAS SensorMicroflown AVISA March 2016
Acoustic sensors are a primary method of detecting & tracking UAS
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C-UAS Functionality Challenges
• Most RF detection systems only detect narrow frequency bands
• Look for known UAS RF signatures
• Library files need to be regularly updated
• Can never cover 100% of drones
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C-UAS Challenges
C- UAS combined issue, “It is kind of a cat and mouse game between what the industry is driving for public use versus how adversaries can now militarize commercial-off-the shelf products and use them on the battlefield or against civilian targets”
Stephen Bramlett Army Aviation and Missile Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC)
at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
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C-UAS Challenge
• It is not just the sheer number of drones, it's the hundreds of UAS variants being produced worldwide
• Various weights, shapes, and sizes
• Operating characteristics such as speed, flight duration, maneuverability, and payload capacity
• UAS variations make tracking difficult
• Hard for radars and other surveillance systems to identify exactly what's out there
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C-UAS Challenge
• US Government, DoD, and the Department of Homeland Security are trying to keep up with a commercially competitive-driven hobbyist area of the economy
• They want to understand how UAS is used by people with bad intent
• It is very hard for the US gov to
keep pace with that
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C-UAS Disruptions
• UAS that have their flight interrupted by physical means may fall to the ground at considerable speed
• Net-based systems equipped with a parachute intended to bring an ensnared UAS down to the ground in a controlled manner are risky
• Inappropriate for use over crowds (i.e. stadiums)
• Limited to military and law enforcement uses
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C-UAS Disruptions
• C-UAS jamming systems can interfere with legitimate communication links in the vicinity• Jam or Spoof GPS signals
• Some UAS can operate in GPS-denied environments
• Jam RF signals
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C-UAS Disruptions
• UAS can be built with protected communication links• Advanced jamming systems that only block the
frequency on which the targeted drone is operating are in development
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C-UAS Key IndicatorsPolitical
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Government C-UAS Operators• Army C-UAS
• Navy C-UAS
• Air Force C-UAS
• Marine C-UAS
• Coast Guard C-UAS
• Border Security C-UAS
• Law Enforcement C-UAS
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Asia Pacific UAS
Asia Pacific is expected to witness considerable growth over the coming years
• Governments spending in development of aerospace and defense infrastructure
• China, India, and Japan UAS 2018 Asia Pacific
thestockanalysis.com June 2018
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China UAS
• Already considered the number one exporter of UAS technology• DJI is top UAS company globally
• China produces many variants of US military grade UAS• Can produce these systems cheaper than US
• Less export control on Chinese systems• Many are capable of carrying munitions for strike
missions
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China C-UAS
• 2017 China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released images online showing the test-firing in Beijing
• Images show a thin metal plate carried by a DJI Phantom 2 drone, being targeted by a laser
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China C-UAS
• Shelter based (ISO container) & truck mounted laser C-UAS• Chinese MND refers to it as a short-range air
defense system• Detection and jamming
equipment• Laser-based weapon capable
of disabling a Group 1 sized UAS in less than 5 seconds of detection
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China C-UAS
• China currently has 20 different C-UAS• Traditional Jamming • Radar• Laser
• US currently has 60 different C-UAS• Radio Frequencies• Radar• Electro-optical
• Acoustic detection
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Russia C-UAS
• Reports of Russian C-UAS efforts at its Syrian Air Base (Khmeimim) mixed:• Unsubstantiated Tweets by a Russian military
expert claimed:• Pantir-S1 air defense system successfully engaged UAS
targets with a 19% success rate
• Tor-M2U short-to-medium range surface to air missile system engaged over 80 UAS targets with an 80% success rate
• Tweets have since been deleted
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Russia C-UAS
Pantir-S1 Tor-M2U
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Russia & Drones• Earlier in 2014, the
Russian Defense Ministry vowed to spend $9.2 billion on drones by 2020
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Russia & Drones
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in2014 the RussianArmy received 179 new UAS types, which is “almost as many as we received in all the previous years”
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Russia C-UAS
• Russia’s defence ministry Southern Military District (YuVO)• Units are now being trained to protect airfields
against drone swarms using (EW) systems
• Specialists detect reconnaissance UAS and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) • Flying at various altitudes
• Send target data to air defense systems
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C-UAS Key IndicatorsUS Legislation
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US Legislation
• C-UAS legislation had bipartisan support signed into law October 2018 [HR 302]• Allows government agencies to test and evaluate
counter drone systems and technology in the US
• Defense and Energy Departments are already permitted limited deployments of C-UAS domestically • Protect critical facilities but so far there have been few
deployments
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018, HR 302
• Critical 5-year reauthorization of FAA programs• Invests and funds national airport infrastructure
• Focuses on integration of UAS into the national air space (NAS)
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FAA Current Policy
• Prior to HR 302 the FAA had not authorized any UAS detection or C-UAS at any airports• EXCEPT those participating in the FAA’s UAS
detection program through a cooperative research & development agreement
• Research part of the FAA’s 2016 Focus Area Pathfinder initiative
• Unclear if this initiative is still ongoing or has been concluded
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US Legislation
• Prior to HR 302 the FAA, House Transportation/Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation and Civil Aviation• Concerned with C-UAS that work by jamming the
frequencies a drone operates on• Unknown how technology might affect the
operation of legitimate manned aircraft nearby
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US Legislation
Active kinetic C-UAS Tech
• Anticipation of limits being relaxed in the US for active systems
• More aggressively pursued vs passive
• More vendors producing active systems
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FAA Reauthorization
• Expedite the development and implementation of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system
• Give the FAA the flexibility needed to appropriately regulate all UAS, including to impose remote identification and tracking requirements
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• Establish a process to develop consensus industry standards in lieu of protracted type and airworthiness certification
• Improve the pathway to safely enable ubiquitous UAS delivery operations through a rigorous, risk-based certification process
• Increase transparency in the Part 107 waiver approval process
FAA Reauthorization
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• Congress has authorized the government to establish appropriate remote identification and tracking and countermeasure programs
• Enable federal law enforcement to conduct tailored countermeasures operations with due consideration to the ongoing safety of • National airspace • Privacy • Civil liberties
FAA Reauthorization
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FAA Reauthorization
Commercial Drone Deliveries
• In Section 348 of HR 302, the FAA is given one year to update existing regulations• Authorize the carriage of property by operators of
small UAS for compensation or hire
• Certification process for UAS operators who want to carry/deliver property for compensation or hire
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HR 302 Section 364 C-UAS
• FAA is asked to review agencies currently authorized to operate C-UAS
• Also amending all old law that prevent C-UAS in the United States • Jamming
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FAA Reauthorization Act Vs Hobbyist
• The Reauthorization Act cannot be fully implemented immediately
• Continue to follow all current policies and guidance with respect to recreational use of drones• Fly for hobby or recreation only
• Register your aircraft
• Fly within visual line-of-sight
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FAA Reauthorization Act Vs Hobbyist
• Follow community-based safety guidelines and fly within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization
• Fly a drone under 55 lbs unless certified by a community-based organization
• Never fly near other aircraft
• Never fly near emergency response efforts
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FAA Reauthorization Act Vs Hobbyist
• Up to now, hobbyists only had to register themselves as pilots
• FAA is exploring alternate certification options for hobbyist pilots such a knowledge test for hobbyists
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FAA Reauthorization Act Vs AMA
• Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) leading a repeal effort of HR 302
• Some key points of contention:• Bill does little to stop or deter irresponsible drone
operators • In the opinion of the AMA, it only harms the safe
and long-standing model aviation community• The bill curtails events with ceiling restrictions for
model aircraft, which could lead to stifling youth involvement in STEM education
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FAA Reauthorization Act Vs AMA
“While we support commercial drone endeavors, Congress should not allow for-
profit companies to dictate legislation abolishing a segment of the hobby with a
strong, eighty-plus year safety record.”
From a statement issued by the AMA
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UTM and Remote ID
• UTM services to expand operations beyond visual line of sight while maintaining the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016
• Commercial UAS operations must have and be included in the local UTM and their vehicles must have Remote ID
• UTM will be used to track who’s flying what & where
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Interdepartmental Cooperation
• Using existing “special security instructions” authority, the FAA has incrementally addressed the threat of “malicious drone operations”
• FAA is establishing airspace over specific sites deemed critical to national security as off-limits to UAS
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Interdepartmental Cooperation
No-Drone Zones Address DOD C-UAS Request
• In April 2017, FAA made the airspace over 133 DOD installations a No-Drone Zone
• Responding to a DOD request the FAA recently made the airspace over 3 new facilities No-Drone Zones
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No Drone Zones
• Privately owned drones routinely violate restricted airspace over military bases, ships, and airfields
• Pentagon wants authority to shoot down• US military can disrupt or destroy sUAS over
certain secure facilities • FAA limits C-UAS military can deploy against
small drones because some systems pose a threat to manned commercial & civilian aircraft
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C-UAS Key IndicatorsEconomic
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
• Global C-UAS market projected to reach $1.85 billion by 2024
• Driving this worldwide economic boom:• Increased exports of UAS technology• Rise in incidents by unauthorized or illegal UAS
• Increase acts of terror involving UAS
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
• This forces commercial companies and public safety departments to increasingly deploy C-UAS measures
• Kinetic C-UAS accounted for the largest market share in 2016• Expected to maintain their market dominance in
near term
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
• Detection and tracking C-UAS is expected to emerge as the highest revenue generating sector of the C-UAS market• Due to evolving and friendly laws to C-UAS
• Public demand increase as nefarious UAS operations become more common
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
Grandviewresearch.com
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
• Military and defense markets are anticipated to remain the largest revenue source for the C-UAS industry• Attributed to:
• Increase in illicit & terrorist use of UAS• Rising security breaches over facilities worldwide
• Commercial segment accounted for close to 20% of C-UAS market in 2016
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US Industries & UAS
• Current US industry projections to be driving the UAS market by 2020• Military—65%
• Agricultural—32%
• Oil & Gas—3%
• Logistics—0.3%
• Public Safety—0.2%
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Commercial Spending in Industry
• UAS technology is finding ways to cut costs and improve safety in many diverse industries
• Systems used for:• Inspection• Mapping• Damage assessments• Search & rescue• Situational oversight
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C-UAS Key Indicator - Economic
Grandviewresearch.com
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Economic: Future Trends
UAS Platform Modification:
• Size (bigger and smaller)
• Payload (types and sizes increase)
• Gross weight (increase and decrease)
• Increased focus on stealth (reduced sound, visual, electronic emissions, infrared, etc.)
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Economic: Future Trends
UAS Platform Operation Advances:
• Increases in speed
• Increased range and endurance
• Crossover tech (electronic and mechanical capabilities from other markets)
• Detection, Identification, and Tracking
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Economic: Future Trends
UAS Autonomy
• Sophistication increase
• Achieve higher levels of autonomous and cooperative operations
• Improved communication between systems
• Perform any number of functional programmable operation
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Economic: Future Trends
Swarming
• Rapid advancement in domestic sector
• Programmable and purchasable
• Wide availability
• Ability for single drones or groups of drones to simultaneously perform inter-related independent objectives
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Economic: Future Trends
• Simultaneous UAS Target Tracking
• Currently major gaps exists in tracking multiple UAS (Swarming)
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Economic: Future Trends
Threat Response
• Technology developed by industry and Government agencies to counter domestic UAS threat
• Most kinetic solutions will still be unavailable or illegal in the domestic US market
• Advancement of systems that seek the reduction of collateral damage
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C-UAS Key IndicatorsMilitary
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Military• Military and defense is
expected to emerge as the largest end-use segment of C-UAS
• Market for anti-drone systems in military and defense applications is expected to cross $900 million by 2024
US Army Gray Eagle UAS 2018 Military.com
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Co-op Man / Unmanned Teaming
• AH-64D/E teamed with Grey Eagle and Shadow UAS for target(s) locating and handoff
AH-64 w/ Grey Eagle AH-64 w/ Shadow
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Total Expenditure for UAS by DOD Branch
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Military - Proliferation Challenges
• US and allies must attempt to control the proliferation of advanced UAS technologies
• Preventing adversarial nations and non-state actors from acquiring this tech is vital to US interests
C-UAS www.433aw.afrc.af.mil
93
Military - Proliferation Challenges
• Simplicity and low cost of UAS technologies make their proliferation difficult to control, some levels of interference are possible• January 2018, over 1 million drones registered with
FAA, 878,000 registered to ‘hobbyists’
• C-UAS top priority for US defense agencies
• Increased challenges in identifying friend or foe and if foe employing the appropriate countermeasures
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Joint C-UAS Challenges
• US military is accustomed to 3 decades of conducting ground and air operations in uncontested airspace environment
• SHOrt Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems have declined and passive air defense skills have atrophied across US forces
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Joint C-UAS Challenges
• Continued UAS technology development
• UAS fielding acceleration
• “Bad actor” successes around the world
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Joint C-UAS Challenges
• US forces are “numb” to UAS presence• Recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
indicates troops are highly accustomed to friendly UAS always available
• Enemy UAS on the battlefield have been a non actor to this point
• US forces lack UAS recognition training, making it difficult to observe characteristics of enemy UAS visually
97
Joint C-UAS Challenges
• All military leaders must take C-UAS into planning considerations
• Small, slow, and low profiles provide significant challenges to traditional air defenses • Recall earlier Russian experience for example
• Reduction of dedicated SHORAD units creates potential gaps in air defense coverage
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Joint C-UAS Problem
• Problem compounded by the ever-increasing proliferation of new UAS designs and off-the-shelf systems sold to multiple countries
• US military doctrine has not kept pace with the threat
• C-UAS training has not been a priority for most units
• Many units have not updated plans to address the hazards UAS present
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Swarming
Politico.com image
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Swarming
• Military Applications• Coordinated Attack
• Reconnaissance
• Manned / Unmanned Teaming
• Major Gaps remain in tracking large UAS swarms • Current systems cannot track and destroy large
numbers of targets quickly
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Swarming Types
• Cooperative Swarming: Performing complex functions en masse• Land Surveying
• Mapping
• Complex entertainment performances
• Effective man / unmanned teaming for the military
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Cooperative Swarming
• Tech example: over 1000 sUAS performed an aerial display in Guangzhou China, February 2017
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Swarming Types
• Coordinated Swarming: performing separate tasks with multiple UAS at the same time
• Example: Transmission line repair (four drones)• 1x Line observation and situational awareness
• 1x Line testing
• 2x Line repair
104
Coordinated Swarming
• Military Application• Perdix Swarm Demo at China Lake
• sUAS launched from pod aboard F-18 fighter
• Collective organism, one brain for decision making
USN F-18 dployong 103 Perdix mini UAS
USN photo
Perdix Mini UAS
Perdix image
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Russian C-Swarm
Panstir-S aka SA-22 Greyhound
• Upgrades to allow the engagement of multiple UAS up to 10 km
• Employed against Swarm in Syria with mixed results• Planned to be part of a comprehensive C-UAS
umbrella that includes man portable EM systems
Pantsir-S in dynamic display at Army 2018 near Kubinka
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US C-Swarm
Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
● Provides 360-degree protection
● Provides ability to simultaneously engage threats arriving
from different directions
● Allows the use of a variety of missiles and warhead types
107
C-UAS: A Layered Approach Group 1: Micro / Mini
Tactical
● 0-20 lbs
● < 1200 ft Above ground
level (AGL)
● < 100 kts
Group 2: Small Tactical
● 21-55 lbs
● < 3500 ft AGL
● < 250 kts
Group 3: Tactical
● < 1320 lbs
● < Flight level (FL) 180
(18,000 ft)
● < 250 kts
US Army Raven:
Group 1
US Navy Scan Eagle: Group
2
US Army Shadow:
Group 3
108
C-UAS: A Layered Approach
Group 4: Persistent
● >1320 lbs
● < FL 180
● >250 kts
Group 5: Penetrating
● >1320 lbs
● > FL 180
● > 250 kts
US Army Grey Eagle: Group 4
US Air Force Reaper:
Group 5
US Air Force Global Hawk:
Group 5
109
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1
• Weight 0-20 lbs
• Above Ground Level < 1200 ft
• Speed < 100 kts
• Low, Slow, and Small (LSS) UAS are tactical-level drones operating at relatively low altitudes
DJI Phantom 3 Professional photograph by Jordan McDonald
110
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1
• LSS UAS provide cost effective, high payoff means of surveillance and reconnaissance
• IAMD have difficulty tracking, identifying, and defeating LSS UAS
• Advancements in LSS UAS allow asymmetrical approaches to conduct attacks, collect information, or trigger other threatening events
111
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1
Believer Mini UAS
Photo by Jordan McDonald
V-22 and X-UAS Talon Mini UAS
Photo by Jordan McDonald
112
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
• Group 1 (0-1200 ft, <100kts)• Vehicle mounted machine guns
• M2A1 .50 cal
• M-240B
• M-249
• Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)• Air Intercept Missile (AIM) 92 Stinger
113
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
Top C-UAS Challenges of Group 1 Drones
• Purchasing a Group 1 drone is easy
• Building a drone is not difficult
• Right motor prop combination can give an endurance range from 15 min to 2 hours
• All an adversarial builder needs is imagination, will, and internet access
114
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
• Group 1 (0-1200 ft, <100kts)• Man Portable Systems
• EM guns
• Guns firing nets or projectiles
• Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) Rotary Cannon System
• Birds of Prey
• Defensive UAS
115
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
• Birds of Prey are being trained as C-UAS agents
• Dutch police were specifically training eagles to attack the small UAS machines as a C-UAS tool
• As of 2017 they canceled their program due to the eagles not performing what they're trained to do
• Using birds of prey like the falcon is still on the table for many organizations
116
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
• USAF has funded anti-drone research with Oxford University, using trained falcons
• The falcons would be used for• Airport
• Prisons
• Battlefields
• The program is still ongoing
117
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
118
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
• 12 gauge rounds are 2 3/4” long
• Web expands to 5' in diameter net
• Cords wrap around drones to bring them down
• If the SKYNET round misses the target, it is designed to parachute safely to the ground to reduce any unwanted damage or injury
• $19.99 for a box of 3 rounds
119
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS
120
Small - Tactical Group 2
• Weight 21-55 lbs
• Above Ground Level < 3500 ft
• Speed < 250 kts
USN Scan Eagle, USN image
121
Small - Tactical Group 2
• US Navy Scan Eagle is currently the only known UAS in this class operated by US military
• Used to expand patrol range of US Navy’s Special Operations Command units
USN Scan Eagle Launch, USN image
122
Small - Tactical Group 2 C-UAS
• Group 2 (0-3500 ft, >250kts)• MANPADs
• Shoulder Fired AIM 92 Stinger
• Truck Mounted Avenger weapon system• AIM 92 Stinger
• C-RAM Rotary Cannon System
• Rotary Wing Attack Weapons Team• AH-64 Apache
123
Micro/Mini - Tactical Group 1 C-UAS& Small - Tactical Group 2 C-UAS
AIM 92 Stinger
M-249 Light MG (mounted)
AIM 92 Stinger AVENGER
Truck Mounted C-RAM
124
Tactical Group 3
• Weight 55-1320 lbs
• Above Ground Level < 18,000 ft
• Speed < 250 kts
RQ-5 HUNTER US Army image
125
Tactical Group 3
• RQ-7 Shadow, MQ-5 Hunter, and Fire Scout
• US Army Brigade level employment
• US Navy ship launched, wide area security
• Medium endurance
US Army RQ 7 Shadow US Navy Fire Scout
126
C-UAS Tactical Group 3 C-UAS
• Group 3 (0-18,000ft, >250kts)• Patriot Missile System
• Fixed Wing Combat Air Patrol• F-15
• F-16
• F-18
• F-22
• F-35
• Rotary Wing Attack Weapons Team• AH-64 Apache
127
Persistent Group 4
• Weight > 1320 lbs
• Above Ground Level < 18,000 ft
• Speed = Any airspeed
• Long Endurance
• Offensive or ISR payload
• Runway required for launch / recovery
128
Persistent Group 4
MQ-1C Grey Eagle
General Atomics Image
129
Persistent Group 4 C-UAS
• Group 4 (0-18,000ft, any airspeed)• Patriot Missile System
• Fixed Wing Fighter Aircraft Types: • F-15 Eagle
• F-16 Fighting Falcon
• F-18 Hornet
• F-22 Raptor
• F-35 Lightning II
• Rotary Wing Attack Weapons Team• AH-64 Apache
130
Penetrating Group 5
• Weight > 1320
• Above Ground Level > 18,000 ft
• Speed = Any airspeed
• MQ-9 ReaperMQ-9 Reaper, USAF image
131
Penetrating Group 5
• RQ-4 Global Hawk
• Extreme endurance, very large payload
• Strategic level employment USAF Global Hawk, USAF image
132
Penetrating Group 5 C-UAS
• Group 5 (>18,000ft, >250kts) • Air Defense Missile Systems
• Patriot Missile System
• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System
• Hawk Surface to Air Missile System
Patriot THAAD Hawk
133
Penetrating Group 5 C-UAS
• Group 5 (>18,000ft, >250kts)• Fixed Wing Combat Fighters:
Legacy Aircraft: F-15, F-18 and F-16
5th Generation Aircraft: F-22, F-35
134
Tactical Group 3 C-UASPersistent Group 4 C-UAS
Penetrating Group 5 C-UAS
Patriot Missile System Groups 3-5 F-22 Raptor Groups 3-5
F-35 Lightning II Groups 3-5AH-64D/E Group 3
135
DOD Challenges / Way Forward
• Must close the C-UAS capability gaps identified in current systems
• Provide command and control across the detect, track, identify, and defeat cycle
• Ensure digital interoperability with joint integrated air and missile defense
• Field non-kinetic/kinetic capabilities versus UAS in defense of global US forces
136
C-UAS Key IndicatorsMilitary - US Army
137
ATP 3-01.81
• Army publication that focuses on the Brigade and below levels for C-UAS defense
• Examines the layered defense approach
• Demonstrates current tactics, techniques, and procedures for the C-UAS fight
138
US Army C-UAS Planning
• Brigade Commander planning considerations should include:• Reporting techniques• Positive identification• Alert dissemination to all friendly forces• Rules of engagement
139
US Army C-UAS Planning
• Brigade C-UAS planning considerations are: • Refine defended asset list based on Information
Preparation of Battlefield priorities, risk, and commander’s assessment
• Define the UAS rules of engagement (hostile criteria/ hostile acts)
• Disseminate weapons control status (can be different for UAS, fixed-,or rotary wing)
• Establish the level of command & control (lowest level possible)
140
US Army C-UAS Planning
• More Brigade C-UAS planning considerations: • Determine the identification authority (lowest level
possible)• Determine the engagement authority (lowest level
possible)• Inform Soldiers of C-UAS criteria• Establish general and local air defense warnings
(based on running estimates of the air threat)
141
US Army C-UAS Planning
• Coordinate coverage which may extend beyond the brigade’s organic sensor capabilities
• Coordinate with friendly mission command centers and airspace users to reduce friendly fire casualties
• Establish notification procedures
142
US Army C-UAS Passive Defense
• Passive defense measures employed to deceive enemy observation
• Passive measures include: • Camouflage• Cover• Concealment• Hardening (locating units on prepared sites)
• Other examples are moving units at night, noise and light discipline, and employing obscuration techniques
143
US Army C-UAS Passive Defense
• Brigades must train their forces to avoid direct and indirect attacks from air threats
• Two key methods for air defense are:• Damage-limiting measures
• Attack avoidance measures
144
US Army C-UAS Active Defense
• Active defense plans should be coordinated with airspace managers and air defense personnel
• Plans should consider the use of:• Air defense weapons• Small arms weapons• Electronic warfare• Any other assets available to the brigade that can
detect and mitigate hostile aerial platforms
145
US Army C-UAS Active Defense
• Active defense planning measures taken in support of the mission must adhere to the commander’s ROE and consider potential collateral damage associated with the weapon system and to the surrounding area
• Early detection and defeat of threat UAS also increases the chance of capturing or destroying both the threat UAS and its ground station
146
US Army Air & Missile Defense Way AheadS
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147
Active and Under DevelopmentC-UAS
• Electronic Warfare Systems
• Kinetic Systems
• High Energy Systems
148
Overview of EM Warfare Weapons
• This form of C-UAS has the overall goal of OEA
• It involves the use of EM energy and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy
149
EM Weapons
• Requires effective EMS management and communications to prevent and eliminate damage to friendly systems
150
Man Portable EM C-UAS
• A US Army soldier uses a Drone Defender to capture and control an UAS 6 March 2018
• Drone Defender uses an EM pulse to disable its target• Range up to 600
meters
US Army image
151
Vehicle Mounted EM C-UAS
• Silent Archer technologies work together to provide a complete, end-to-end C-UAS solution for applications such as:
• Force protection in contested environments
• Critical infrastructure protection
• Security for VIPs and high profile events
• Urban environment surveillance
152
Silent Archer EM C-UAS• Syracuse Research Corporation (SRC) announced on 2 February
2017 that it has been awarded a $65 million contract by the US Army to deliver an integrated C-UAS solution, “to meet an urgent requirement to detect and defeat drones”
• SRC will focus on engineering, production and sustainment, with additional work being performed by Diagnostic /Retrieval Systems (DRS) Technologies
SRC image
153
Kinetic Area / Facility Defense C-UAS
• US Army C-RAM Rotary Cannon System • Modified for use as a C-UAS
154
Kinetic SHORAD
• AIM 92 Stinger Upgrades Near Term
• AN/TWQ-1 Avenger System Upgrades
AIM 92 Stinger, US Army image AIM 92 Avenger, US Army image
155
Future Kinetic SHORAD• Lockheed Martin conducted
its initial ballistic flight test of
the new M-SHORAD Future
Interceptor on 14 Nov 18
• Provides greater range and
maneuverability over the
AIM 92 Stinger
• Same diameter and envelope as
the AGM 114L Hellfire missile
Lockheed Martin image
156
C-UAS Energy Systems
• US Army moves forward with 100 kW-class laser weapon program
• Dynetics and Lockheed Martin have been awarded $10 million for the next phase of development in the US Army’s 100kW-class laser weapon system
Dynetics/Lockheed image
157
C-UAS Key IndicatorsMilitary - US Navy
158
Navy C-UAS Doctrine
• Centered around maritime defense techniques
• Layered air defense to protect the fleet
• Currently, the US Navy is permitted to disable, track and shoot down unauthorized UAS
The C-RAM air defense system. Photo by Staff Sgt. Sean Martin
159
Navy C-UAS Doctrine
• They can already take down rogue drones that are seen as a threat
• Uses existing kinetic systems with many EM and energy systems under development
• LSS not a significant threat while at sea
160
US Navy C-UAS Kinetic Systems
• 2 Jan 2018 -- BAE Systems will design and produce 4 prototype Mk 38 MOD 2 C-UAS kits and then conduct performance testing of the system at Navy test ranges
BAE image
161
US Navy Kinetic SHORAD
• RIM 7P NATO Sea Sparrow medium range multi-purpose anti air system
• SeaRAM (Sea Rolling Airframe Missile) short range anti-air system
Sea Sparrow, US Navy image SeaRAM, US Navy image
162
US Navy C-UAS Way Ahead
• High Energy Laser and Integrated Optical-dazzler with Surveillance (HELIOS) System• Designed to
incinerate enemyUAS and performISR missions trackingtargets, such as incoming enemymissiles, aircraft,or ships
Lockheed Martin image
163
US Navy Counter-Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
● Sea Hunter Anti Submarine Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)
• Potential to traverse thousands of km’s of open ocean for months with no onboard crew
• Significant reduction in surface vessel operational costs from $700,000 / day per destroyer to $15,000 / day per USV
Office of Naval Research image
164
C-UAS Key IndicatorsMilitary - USMC
165
USMC Doctrine and Systems
• Similar in nature to US Army Doctrine
• Focused on LSS UAS threats
• Expeditionary mindset: systems are small, compact, mainly kinetic
• Continuing to develop C-UAS in partnership with the Army
166
USMC C-UAS
• A Marine M-ATV (left) and a MRZR (right) equipped with a ground-based air defense C-UAS
USN image
167
USMC Systems Under Development(C-UAS Dune Buggy)
• Raytheon MTS Sensor package:• modified to track types
of drones preferred by terrorist’s
• Class 1 drones under 20 pounds and
• Class 2 drones, between 20 and 55 pounds
Raytheon image
168
USMC C-UAS cont’d
• Technology under development to counter Aerial IED delivery in urban environments
Drone Killer Counter-UAS Technology during Urban Advanced Naval Technology Exercise
2018 (ANTX-18) at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA on March 21, 2018--US Marine
Corps Photo
169
USMC C-UAS Way Forward
• Publish a Marine Corps interim publication titled MAGTF Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations to provide developmental tactics, techniques, and procedures for personnel at all levels of the MAGTF to counter the growing threat
170
USMC C-UAS Way Forward
• Update the Marine Corps Intelligence Agency’s UAS Handbook to describe UAS and their capabilities
• Include C-UAS operations in the Ground-Based Air Defense Marine Corps Task (GBAD-T) in order to drive changes to Low-Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Training and Readiness Manual to include individual and collective C-UAS skills
171
C-UAS Key IndicatorsMilitary- USAF
172
Air Force C-UAS Doctrine
• Centered around facility defense
• Recognizes the threat of drone swarm
• Mainly focused on non-kinetic systems
• Doctrine remains under development
173
USAF C-UAS Program Development
• USAF Pays $15.6 million for Drone Guard C-UAS• ELTA North America Systems will produce 21
systems for facility defense
IAI (ELTA) Drone Guard, IAI image
174
USAF C-UAS
• A spokesperson from Hanscom AFB, MA, which is managing the ELTA contract, told Air Force Magazine by email that “the Air Force is exploring and testing multiple technologies and systems” to respond to the UAS threat
175
USAF C-UAS
• “Non-kinetic options ranging in size from handheld technology to larger stationary and mobile systems that can be operated on the ground or in the air,” but that “kinetic options to defeat small UAS are also being explored”
176
USAF C-UAS
• While refusing to comment specifically on the nature of the ELTA system, the spokesperson said, “The Air Force expects to have a counter small UAS program of record by the end of fiscal year 2018”
177
Air Force C-UAS• Liteye’s Containerized Anti-Unmanned
Air Systems (C-AUDS) capabilities will detect, track, identify, and defeat enemy UAS with layers of different technologies
• All systems will come together to create a solid line of defense
Liteye image
178
Allied C-UAS
• Israeli Drone Guard• Communications Intel (COMINT) • 3D Radar• Active Jammers • Uses Broadcast Frequencies for Precise:
• Detection• Classification • Identification • Counter single UAS• Counter Swarm
Drone Guard Array, IAI image
179
Military Use Case• Department of Energy’s national security
missions • Broader protection of the energy sector & electric
grid• Defense of:
• Nuclear facilities• Materials• Technologies
• Use reasonable force against a UAS over any facility designed to store or use special nuclear material
180
Military Use Case
• Drones attacked a Russian air base 06 Jan 2018 • Over a dozen used
• Was deemed a failure (although reports of aircraft damage were made by independent news sources)
• Caught the Russians off guard
181
Military Use Case
• In 2018 alone:• Chinese Customs officials arrested 26 individuals
who had smuggled $80 million worth of iPhones from Hong Kong to China’s Shenzhen province
• The FBI Hostage Rescue Team had an observation team buzzed by ‘several’ drones in an attempt by the accused assailant to flush them out of cover• Details of this incident are still sensitive and have not
been released
182
Military Use Case
• Saudi Al-Madinah Frigate 30 Jan 2018• Yemen Houthi Rebels conducted attack
• Three ‘drone’ boats used
• All armed with high explosives
• Killed 2 Saudi sailors, injured 3 others
183
C-UAS Key IndicatorsCommercial
184
Commercial C-UAS
• Increasing need for anti-drone systems at commercial locations, including prisons, airports, critical infrastructure, and live events, have driven the growth of this market segment
• Dedrone is an industry leader with their automatic anti-drone system
• Web based software and hardware components
185
Commercial C-UAS
• Industries that are trying to get ahead of the UAS situation• Law Enforcement Agencies
• Private Security
• Sports Teams and Stadiums
• Amusement Parks
186
Commercial C-UAS
• More industries that are trying to get ahead of the UAS situation• Airports
• Utilities
• Industrial/Business/Manufacturing
• Universities
187
Domestic Detect & Track Systems
• Effectiveness by combining sensor data from different sources with latest data fusion, signal analysis and jamming technologies
• It uses operational radars, infrared cameras and direction finders from Airbus Defense and Space
• Identify the drone and assess its threat potential at ranges between 3.1 and 6.2 miles
188
Domestic Detect & Track Systems
• A jammer interrupts the link between drone and pilot and/or its navigation
• Finder tracks the position of the pilot who subsequently can be dealt with by law enforcement
189
Domestic Detect & Track Systems
190
Drone Catcher C-UAS
• Octocopter fired a net, ensnaring the smaller UAS & holding it captive below it
• Net machine will not destroy the UAS• Net gun has a range of up to 40 feet
• Can carry its ‘prisoner’ to a waiting ground team
• Drone-catcher can be piloted by either a human on the ground or have an autonomous control system• Can also be combination
191
Sonic Weapon C-UAS
• Chinese researchers demonstrated sonic weapon technology at Black Hat Security convention • The team, led by Alibaba security researcher
• Used audible sound and ultrasound emitters to disrupt the microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) chips, including accelerometers and gyroscopes, which today's UAS use to sense the physical world
192
Sonic Weapon C-UAS
• Emitters work by mimicking the MEMs output and ‘blurring’ it with electronic noise
193
• UAS are usually operated remotely with a 2.4ghz or 5.8ghz wireless signal
• Drones also use GPS signals to locate operations
• Jammer can quickly block 2.4 GHZ 5.8 GHZ drone signals and GPS signals
• Jammer range is 150m-1500m, which is the operating area of low-altitude drones
Jammer
194
HDT-960 Desktop Drone RF Jammer 8 Bands 2.4 GHz+GPS+5.8 GHz $881.89
Jammer
195
DB260P Portable Waterproof Drone Frequency Large Range Jammers 2.4G 5.8G GPS $20475.89
Jammer
196
Commercial - Swarming
• Civil and Domestic applications• Mapping large areas
• Oil Spill tracking
• Agricultural Spraying
• Search and Rescue
197
Commercial Use Case
• UAS used to smuggle contraband into state and federal prisons
• Drones easily transport banned items such as:• Drugs and paraphernalia
• Cell phones
• Pornography
• Weapons
• Dropping items in prison yards or even ferrying them directly to a recipient’s window
198
Commercial Use Case
• Plot to smuggle contraband in foiled in 2015 at Western Correctional institution in Maryland• Involved a plan to ferry a gun, among other things,
behind the walls
• Reports have surfaced of drone-smuggling in more than a dozen different state’s penal institutions
199
Commercial Use Case
• Officials fear drone deliveries could spark riots and endanger the lives of:
• Inmates• Prison Guards• Visitors
200
Commercial Use Case
• First half of 2017 prison officials detected 35 drones in the airspace above state prisons
• Mansfield Correctional institution in Ohio • Drone dropped a package into the prison yard:
• Tobacco
• Marijuana
• Heroin
• 75-inmate brawl broke out over the package
201
Commercial Use Case
• At a South Carolina maximum security facility• One inmate recently able to escape by using a pair
of wire cutters delivered by drone
• What if a gun was successfully dropped into a prison?
• Rate of authorities discovering these attempts are increasing at an alarming clip• C-UAS detection systems legal for prisons
202
Commercial Use Case
• International drug cartels are employing drones trafficking activities across the border
• In 2017 US Border patrol agents intercepted a drone at the border near San Diego
• Carrying 13 pounds of methamphetamines
• Worth $46,000
• Authorities arrested Jose Edwin Rivera who said he had done this 5 or 6 times before
203
Commercial Use Case
• Drug Cartels have been using UAS with increasing frequency and effectiveness
• Researcher estimated 150 drones crossed the border from 2012 to 2014
• Rate of 4 drones per month
• Border patrol agents spotted 13 drones in November of 2017 but many more were missed
204
Commercial Use Case
• “Narcodrones” are being used as delivery, reconnaissance, and surveillance• To enhance Cartel operations on the border
• Mexican police seized a drone fitted with a bomb in 2017
205
C-UAS Recommendations
• As UAS markets expand, C-UAS will need to be flexible enough to:• Detect and neutralize a growing variety of targets• Large UAS capable of carrying heavy payloads• Low-flying micro surveillance UAS that might only
weigh a few grams• Offensive UAS Swarms with pre-programmed or AI
enabled autonomous multi-functioning missions
206
C-UAS Recommendations
• C-UAS will need to differentiate between friendly and potentially threatening UAS
• Cooperation and integration into existing air traffic management systems is necessary
• Compromises between personal and public security, and drone operators rights must be found, and will be a catalyst for C-UAS market growth
207
C-UAS Recommendations
• Industry wide electronic identification protocol being adopted by UAS manufacturers will greatly benefit regulation and hasten assimilation into the NAS
• Develop & implement a commercial C-UAS system capable of autonomously distinguishing between peaceful and malicious drone use
208
C-UAS Recommendations
US and Joint International Military (JIM) partners will continue cooperative development of:
• UAS identification technologies
• Similar to Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) tech in manned systems
• The cyber domain and EMS will be more contested in the future
209
C-UAS Recommendations
• Future decisions by FAA and US legislators will need to provide adequate resources and organizational structure to support C-UAS capabilities development
• Re-implement SHORAD with the re-introduction of improved MANPAD or similar C-UAS systems
210
C-UAS Recommendations
• Develop new and expanding US military Joint doctrine for C-UAS
• Develop and employ new systems and techniques across all combat spectrums and environments
• Ensure Joint integration of doctrine and systems in order to protect the warfighter, ships, aircraft, and facilities
211
C-UAS Recommendations
“No matter the cost of a single jointly integrated system, the lives it could potentially save and the intelligence it gathers are priceless and should be pursued”
– CPT John-Paul Hood
212
Open Source Credibility Code Key
213
Open Source Credibility Code Key
• Each reference used for this briefing was obtained from open source research conducted on the internet
• The Wyvern Team, knowing not all sources on the internet are credible have adapted a coding technique derived from the BTJ Kent Method of Intelligence.pdf
214
Open Source Credibility Code Key• The following credibility code format was listed
at the end of each reference listed in MLA format; • [“Kent” score, Source Reliability score, Content
Validity score]
• Which, when compiled, will look like this [5,2,2]
• A full MLA source entry would then look like:Afsar, Shahid, Samples, Chris & Wood, ThoCas. (2008, April 22). The Taliban: An organizational analysis. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf [4,2,2]
215
Open Source Credibility Code Key
• The “Kent” score is determined by giving a number value to each factual probability category;• “100%--certainly” score 1
• “93% give or take 6%--almost certainly” score 2
• “75% give or take about 12%--probably” score 3
• “50% give or take about 10%--chances about even” score 4
• “30% give or take about 10%–probably not” score 5
• “7% give or take about 5%--almost certainly not” score 6
• “0%--impossible” score 7
216
Open Source Credibility Code Key
• The Source Reliability portion of the score is determined as follows;• “Reliable—the reliability of the source is unquestioned or has
been well tested in the past” source is scored 1
• “Usually reliable—the reliability of the source can usually be relied upon as factual, and the majority of the source information provided in the past has proven to be reliable” source is scored 2
• “Unreliable—the reliability of the source has been sporadic in the past” source is scored 3
• “Unknown—the reliability of the source cannot be judged, and neither experience nor investigation can help determine its authenticity or trustworthiness” source is scored 4
217
Open Source Credibility Code Key
• The Content Validity portion of the score is determined as follows;• “Confirmed—an investigator or another independent,
reliable source has corroborated the information” score 1
• “Probable—the information inconsistent with past accounts” score 2
• “Doubtful—the information is inconsistent with past accounts” score 3
• “Cannot be judged—the information cannot be judged because neither experience nor investigation has yet determined its authenticity” score 4
218
US’s C-UAS Vision should be:
“Hit Hard, Hit Fast, Hit Often.”
-Admiral William “Bull” Halsey
219
References w/ Open Source Credibility Codes
"12 Gauge Skynet Drone Defense - 3-Pack | BUDK.com - Knives & Swords At The Lowest Prices!" BUDK.com - Knives & Swords
At The Lowest Prices!, www.budk.com/12-Gauge-Skynet-Drone-Defense--3-Pack-35975. [1,1,1]
"8 Bands Large Range Drone RF Jammer 2.4G GPS 5.8G." Signals Jammer Blocker Device For Sale Wholesale and Retail,
Perfectjammer, www.perfectjammer.com/low-power-desktop-drone-jammers-8-bands.html. Accessed 20 Sept. 2018. [1,1,1]
Adams, Eric. "At Last, Humanity Gets a Laser-Shooting, Drone-Slaying Dune Buggy." WIRED, Condé Nast, 11 Oct. 2017,
www.wired.com/story/raytheon-drone-laser-dune-buggy/. Accessed 29 Nov. 2018. [3,3,3]
Anonymous. "AAI RQ-7 Shadow." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Wikimedia Foundation, Inc, 25 Nov. 2018,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAI_RQ-7_Shadow. Accessed 25 Nov. 2018. [3,3,3]
Atherton, Kelsey D. "Airbus Introduces A System To Jam Drones Out Of The Sky." Popular Science, A Bonnier Corporation
Company, 7 Jan. 2016, www.popsci.com/airbus-wants-to-jam-drones-out-sky. Accessed 24 Oct. 2018. [2,2,2]
---. "Drone Catcher Drone Fires Nets At Lesser Drones." Popular Science, A Bonnier Corporation Company, 12 Jan. 2016,
www.popsci.com/drone-catcher-drone-fires-nets-at-lesser-drones. Accessed 24 Oct. 2018. [1,1,1]
"Avenger Short-Range Air Defense Missile System | Military-Today.com." MILITARY TODAY - Everything About Modern
Warfare, 2018, www.military-today.com/missiles/avenger.htm. Accessed 18 Nov. 2018. [2,2,2]
Aviation Today. "FAA No-Drone Zone Card Front." Graphic. can.aviationtoday.com, FAA, May 2018, cdn.aviationtoday.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/faa-no_drone_zone_card_front.jpg. Accessed 15 Nov. 2018. [1,1,1]
Biesecker, Calvin. "Military Counter-UAS Efforts Creating Framework For Other US Agencies - Rotor & Wing International." Rotor
& Wing International, Access Intelligence, LLC., 12 July 2018, www.rotorandwing.com/2018/07/12/military-counter-uas-
efforts-creating-framework-u-s-agencies/. Accessed 26 Sept. 2018. [2,3,2]
Broderick, Tim. "General Atomics Deal Extends Army Gray Eagle Support." Defense Systems, 1105 Media Inc., 25 Oct. 2016,
defensesystems.com/articles/2016/10/25/gray-eagle.aspx. Accessed 19 Sept. 2018. [2,2,2]
220
References w/ Open Source Credibility Codes
Carlson, Stephen. "Insitu Receives Contract for U.S. Navy Special Warfare ScanEagle Support." UPI, 21 Aug. 2017,
www.upi.com/Insitu-receives-contract-for-US-Navy-Special-Warfare-ScanEagle-support/4161503323169/. Accessed
11 Sept. 2018. [2,2,2]
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Techniques, ATP 3-01.81. Department of the Army, 2017. rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-
ws/view/100.ATSC/9B8B46D7-719C-4E15-A8FE-9F2C1E278B88-1492434973380/atp3_01x81.pdf. Accessed 9 Sept. 2018.
[1,1,1]
De Luce, Dan. "The U.S. Navy Wants to Show China Who's Boss." Foreign Policy, The Slate Group, 14 Dec. 2015,
foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/14/the-u-s-navy-wants-to-show-china-whos-boss/. Accessed 28 Nov. 2018. [3,3,3]
Delcker, Janosch. "Attack on the Killer Robots." POLITICO, 19 Feb. 2018, www.politico.eu/article/attack-killer-robots-autonomous-
weapons-drones/. Accessed 28 Nov. 2018. [2,2,2]
Demmer, Christine. "US Army Contract for Counter-UAS System." Defence and Security Magazines - Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft
MbH, Moench Group, 6 Feb. 2017, www.monch.com/mpg/news/unmanned/739-us-army-contract-for-counter-uas-
system.html. Accessed 3 Nov. 2018. [3,2,3]
"Drone Radio Frequency Waterproof Jammer Large Range 2.4G 5.8G GPS." Signals Jammer Blocker Device For Sale Wholesale
and Retail, Perfectjammer, www.perfectjammer.com/high-power-waterproof-drone-frequency-jammers.html. Accessed
20 Sept. 2018. [1,1,1]
Dukowitz, Zacc. "New FAA Reauthorization Act Has Big Implications for Hobbyist Drone Pilots." UAV Coach, 10 Oct. 2018,
uavcoach.com/reauthorization-hobbyists/. Accessed 14 Nov. 2018. [1,1,2]
The Editor. "Corsair UAS for Russia in 2016 – UAS VISION." UAS VISION – a Global News Service for the Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Community, Military UAS, 29 Dec. 2014, www.uasvision.com/2014/12/29/corsair-uas-for-russia-in-2016/. Accessed
30 Oct. 2018. [4,3,2]
221
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---. "USAF Pays $15.6 Million for Anti-Drone Systems – UAS VISION." UAS VISION – a Global News Service for the Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Community, 9 Mar. 2017, www.uasvision.com/2017/03/09/usaf-pays-15-6-million-for-anti-drone-systems/.
Accessed 30 Nov. 2018. [3,2,2]
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. 115th Congress of the United States of America, 2018. www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr302/BILLS-
115hr302enr.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct. 2018. [1,1,1]
Federal Aviation Administration. "Fly Under the Special Rule for Model Aircraft." Federal Aviation Administration, US Department
of Transportation, 1 Feb. 2018, www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/model_aircraft/. Accessed 24 Oct. 2018. [1,1,1]
---. "Unmanned Aircraft Systems." Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, 15 Nov. 2018, www.faa.gov/uas/.
Accessed 25 Oct. 2018. [1,1,1]
"File:M249 Light Machine Gun mounted on Top of Special Assault Vehicle 20120211b." Photograph. Wikimedia Commons,
11 Feb. 2012,
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M249_Light_Machine_Gun_mounted_on_Top_of_Special_Assault_Vehicle_20120211b.j
pg. Accessed 29 Nov. 2018. [2,2,2]
Forecast International. "MQ-8 Fire Scout." AeroWeb, Forecast International Inc., 2018, www.fi-aeroweb.com/Defense/MQ-8-Fire-
Scout.html. Accessed 9 Oct. 2018. [3,3,3]
Freeman. "What is the Difference Between "flight Level" and "altitude"?" Aviation Stack Exchange, Stack Exchange Inc.,
12 Mar. 2015, aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/13204/what-is-the-difference-between-flight-level-and-altitude.
Accessed 9 Oct. 2018. [2,3,2]
Fuentes, Gidget. "Marines Experiment With New Technology Concepts for the Urban Battlefield." USNI News, Unleashed
Technologies, 26 Mar. 2018, news.usni.org/2018/03/26/marines-experiment-new-technology-concepts-urban-battlefield.
Accessed 8 Nov. 2018. [2,3,2]
222
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Gustave, Isabella. "FAA Reauthorization Act Passed by the House." UAV Coach, 6 Oct. 2018, uavcoach.com/house-approves-faa-
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