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National Artificial Intelligence Strategies and Human Rights: A ReviewApril 2020

Acknowledgments

This report was authored by Charles Bradley and Richard Wingfield at Global Partners Digital and Megan Metzger at the Global Digital Policy Incubator at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, with research assistance from Madeline Libbey and Amy MacKinnon. The authors would like to thank those who generously donated their time through interviews and providing invaluable feedback on an early draft of this report: Danya Centeno, Philip Dawson, Gallit Dobner, Eileen Donahoe, Laura Okkonen, Natalie Evans Harris, Francesca Fanucci, Steven Feldstein, Stefan Heumann, Fanny Hidvegi, Patrik Hiselius, Katharina Höne, Zach Lampell, Grace Mutung'u, Cailean Osborne, Philippe-André Rodriguez and Vidushi Sharma, Lisa Vermeer and Marlena Wisniak.

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Contents

Executive Summary

Methodology

1. What is a National Artificial Intelligence Strategy?

1.1. Defining Artificial Intelligence

1.2. Defining National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

2. The importance of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

3. Analysis of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

3.1 Explicit references to human rights/the human rights framework

3.2 Ethical or human-centric approaches as alternatives to the human rights framework

3.3 Prioritization of specific human rights

3.4 Discussion of human rights issues without considering risks

3.5 Lack of specificity or incentives

3.6 Words vs practice in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

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4. Recommendations for incorporating human rights into National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

4.1 Include human rights explicitly and throughout the strategy

4.2 Outline specific steps to be taken to ensure human rights are protected

4.3 Build in incentives or specific requirements to ensure rights-respecting practice

4.4 Set out grievance and remediation processes for human rights violations

4.5 Recognize the regional and international dimensions to AI policy

4.6 Include human rights experts and other stakeholders in the drafting of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

Annex 1: National Artificial Intelligence Strategy human rights assessment tool

Annex 2: Full list of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies (and accompanying ethics documents) reviewed

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Executivesummary

ANationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy(NAS)isadocument,ordinarilydevelopedbyagovernment,whichsetsoutitsbroad,strategicapproachtoartificialintelligence(AI),includingspecificareasoffocusandactivitiestheywillundertakewhichrelatetoAI.Indoingso,anNASattemptstocoordinategovernmentpoliciesinordertomaximizethepotentialbenefitsfortheeconomyandsociety,whileminimizingthepotentialcosts.Since2017,over25statesandregionalintergovernmentalorganizationshavepublishedthem,withmanymoreintheprocessofdevelopment.

Thepurposeofthisreportistounderstandhowhumanrightshave(orhavenot)beenincorporatedintoNASsuptothispoint,aswellastoproviderecommendationsforhowtoincorporatetheminthefuture.TherecentuptickinthenumberofNASsreflectsthefactthatgovernmentsinmanystatesarebeginningtothinkseriouslyabouthowtheywillharnesstheeconomicandsocialbenefitsofferedbyAIandremaincompetitiveintheglobalmarketforthistechnology.Itiscriticalthatasstatesdeveloptheirstrategies,theyalsobuildanapproachthatensuresthatthisinnovationdoesnotcomeatthecostofhumanrightsviolations.

The importance of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

Stateshaveanobligationunderinternationalhumanrightslawtoprotectthehumanrightsofallpeoplewithintheirterritoryandjurisdictionfromviolations,causedeitherbytheirownpoliciesorpractices,ortheactsofthirdparties,suchasbusinessesorotherindividuals.Humanrightsconsiderationsareapplicabletoallareasofgovernmentpolicyandpractice,includingAIpolicyandAIapplicationsusedbygovernmentsandotherentitiesinsociety.

NASsrepresentagovernment’s(orgroupofgovernments’)comprehensiveroadmapforhowtheyintendtoapproachAI.ThisincludeshowAIwillberegulated,howtheywillsupportinnovationintheAIsector,andhowtheywilladdresstheimpactonpeople’slivesandonlabor.AsimplementationofstrategiestoimproveAItrainingortodevelopnewtechnologiesmoveforward,theymaydosowithoutfullyaddressingrisksrelatedtotheviolationofhumanrights.ItisthereforecriticalthatNASssetouthowtheprotectionofhumanrightswillbeensured.

DespitethecriticalimportanceofconsideringhumanrightswhenitcomestoAIpolicy,todaterelativelyfewNASsdeeplyengagewiththehumanrightsimpactsofthistechnology.Forgovernmentsinsomestates,thismaybebecausetheysimplydonotplaceahighpriorityontheprotectionofhumanrightsintheirpolicy makingingeneral.SomegovernmentsthatdoprioritizehumanrightsmaynonethelessfinditchallengingtooutlineapproachestotheirprotectionwhenitstandsincontrasttoothergoalsthegovernmenthasforAI,suchasenhancedeconomicorgeopoliticalcompetitiveness.StillothersmaysimplynotknowwhatitwouldlookliketocreateanNASthatisrights-respectinginthispolicyarea.States’obligationstoprotecthumanrightsdonotgoaway,however,becausetheyareunclearorinconvenient.

SomehavesuggestednewethicalframeworksforthegovernanceofAI.Insomecases,thisisanattempttocircumventthehumanrightsframeworksentirely,orthepartsofthemthatgovernmentsfindinconvenient.Inothercases,itisanattempttogobeyondthehumanrightsframeworksandbeevenmoreprotective.ItiscriticaltonotethatnothingpreventsgovernmentsfromgoingbeyondwhatisprotectedbyhumanrightsframeworksintheirgovernanceofAI.Thereare,however,persuasivereasonstousetheexistinghumanrightsframeworkasthefoundationfortheregulationofAI.Thatis,humanrightsshouldbetheflooronwhichanyothergovernanceapproachbuilds.Somekeyreasonsforthisinclude:

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• Theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkcentersthehumanpersonandmakesthemthefocalpointofgovernance.

• TheinternationalhumanrightsframeworkincludesprovisionsthataddressthemostpressingsocietalconcernsaboutAI.

• Theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkestablishesandclearlydefinestherolesandresponsibilitiesofbothgovernmentsandtheprivatesectorwhichiscriticalinthecontextofatechnologywhichwillrequireoversightfrombothgovernmentsandprivatecompanies.

• Finally,althoughinterpretedandimplementedindifferentwaysaroundtheworld,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkenjoysalevelofgeopoliticalrecognitionandstatusunderinternationallawthatanynewlyemergentethicalframeworkwouldbeunlikelytomatch.

Analysis of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

TounderstandwhetherandhowNASscurrentlyincorporatehumanrights,weanalyzedeverystrategythathadbeenformallyadoptedbyastatebefore1January2020.Ouranalysisfoundthat:

• Amajorityofthestrategiesmadeexplicitreferencetohumanrightsintheirtext.However,thedepthofsubsequentengagementinthehumanrightsframeworkanditsapplicationtoAIvariedconsiderablywithmostofthesestrategiesincludinghumanrightsonlyinpassing.

• Manystrategiesmadereferencetotheneedforethicalframeworks,ethicalapproaches,orhuman-centeredapproachestoAI.Therewassometimessomeoverlapherewithahumanrights-basedapproach,butoftenalackofclarityinhowthiswouldbeimplementedorevenindefiningwhattheseframeworksorapproacheswouldlooklike.

• AnumberofstrategiesmadereferencetospecifichumanrightsparticularlyimpactedbyAI,suggestingprioritization.Therighttoprivacywasthemostcommonlymentioned,followedbytherighttoequality/non-discrimination.

• Somestrategiesalsoengagedwithhumanrightsissues,withoutspecificallymakingreferencetohumanrights.Forexample,anumberofstrategiesincludedsubstantialanalysesoftheimplicationsofAIonthefutureofwork,therebyengaginginissuesrelatingtotherighttowork,butwithoutdirectlyaddressingthehumanrightsdimensionsofthequestion.

• Inallbutaverysmallnumberofcases,therewasalackofdepthandspecificityonhowhumanrightsshouldbeprotected.Whilealmostallstrategieshighlightedtheneedtoensurethatpotentialharmsweremitigatedagainst(eitherbyensuringtheprotectionofhumanrightsorbyusinganalternative(e.g.ethical)approach),strategieslargelyfailedtosetoutanyspecificdetailsofhowthisshouldbedoneinpractice.Thisabsenceofdetailstoodinstarkcontrasttootherpartsofthesestrategieswhichwereoftenquitespecificanddetailed.

• Interviewsconductedforthisprojectalsohighlightedthefactthatthetextofastrategyisonlypartofthestory.Acriticalcomponentofhowhumanrightsare(orarenot)protectedwhenitcomestoAIinaparticularstateistheimplementationofthestrategy.Withoutclearandspecificcommitmentswhichwillensurethathumanrightsareprotectedinpractice,orthecreationofincentivesorinstitutionswhichwillpromotesuchprotections,eventhestrongestlanguagerelatedtohumanrightsinanNASwillonlybewords.Inthemostextremecases,languagearoundhumanrightsinanNASmayevenbeincludedbygovernmentswhohavelittledesiretoensurethattheyareprotectedinpractice,butseektolegitimizetheirstrategyexternallyandamongdomesticstakeholders.

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Recommendations for incorporating human rights into National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

BasedonthecurrentstateofNASsglobally,thereareanumberofsuggestionsforstepsgovernmentscantaketoensurethattheirNASlaysthegroundworkforahumanrights-respectingapproachtoAIpolicy.Theseareoutlinedinmoredetailintheassessmenttoolwhichisassociatedwiththisreport(Annex1),buttheyfallintoafewcorecategories.

• Includehumanrightsexplicitlyandthroughoutthestrategy:ThinkingabouttheimpactofAIonhumanrights,andhowtomitigatetherisksassociatedwiththoseimpactsshouldbecoretoanNAS.EachsectionshouldconsidertherisksandopportunitiesAIprovidesasrelatestohumanrights,withaspecificfocusonat-risk,vulnerableandmarginalizedcommunities.

• Outlinespecificstepstobetakentoensurehumanrightsareprotected:Asstrategiesengagewithhumanrights,theyshouldincludespecificgoals,commitmentsoractionstoensurethathumanrightsareprotected.

• Buildinincentivesorspecificrequirementstoensurerights-respectingpractice:Governmentsshouldtakestepswithintheirstrategiestoincentivizehumanrights-respectingpracticesandactionsacrossallsectors,aswellastoensurethattheirgoalswithregardstotheprotectionofhumanrightsarefulfilled.

• Setoutgrievanceandremediationprocessesforhumanrightsviolations:AnNASshouldlookattheexistinggrievanceandremedialprocessesavailableforvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsrelatingtoAIanddeterminewhethertheyaresufficient.Theseprocesses(includingtheirlegislativeunderpinnings)mayneedrevisioninlightoftheparticularnatureofAIasatechnology,orcapacity-buildingofthoseinvolvedintheseprocessessothattheyareabletoreceivecomplaintswhichinvolveAI.

• RecognizetheregionalandinternationaldimensionstoAIpolicy:NASsshouldclearlyidentifyrelevantregionalandglobalforaandprocessesrelatingtoAI,andthemeansbywhichthegovernmentwillpromotehumanrights-respectingapproachesandoutcomesatthemthroughproactiveengagement.

• IncludehumanrightsexpertsandotherstakeholdersinthedraftingofNASs:WhendraftinganNAS,thegovernmentshouldensurethatexpertsonhumanrightsandtheimpactofAIonhumanrightsareacorepartofthedraftingprocess.Theseshouldincludenotonlygeneralhumanrightsorganizations,butalsoabroadrangeofcivilsocietyorganizationsandotherstakeholdersrepresentingcommunitiesthatmaybeadverselyaffectedbyAIorbenefitparticularlyfromcertainapplications.

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MethodologyThisreportwascommissionedbyGlobalAffairsCanadawiththeaimofmakinganoriginalcontributiontocurrentdiscussionsregardingtheapplicationoftheinternationalhumanrightsframeworktothegovernanceofAI.ItseekstocatalogueandanalyzecurrentapproachestoincorporatingtheinternationalhumanrightsframeworkintoexistingNationalAIStrategies(NASs),andtoidentifyinternationalgoodpractices.Forthepurposesofthisreport,theauthorsconsideredanNASasany“setofcoordinatedgovernmentpoliciesthathaveaclearobjectiveofmaximizingthepotentialbenefitsandminimizingthepotentialcostsofAIfortheeconomyandsociety”.Strategiesneededtohavebeenofficiallyadoptedbyagovernment(orgroupofgovernments)butdidnotneedtobefundedtobeincludedinthisdefinition.Theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkwasunderstoodtorefertoallcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrightssetoutintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights.Theresearchforthisreportwasundertakenthroughthreeprimarysourcesofinformation:

• AnanalysisofallexistingNASspublishedintheEnglishlanguageasof1January2020(andlistedatAnnex2tothisreport).AverysmallnumberofNASspublishedasofthisdatewerenotfullyavailableinEnglish,howevertheauthors,wherepossible,obtainedEnglishlanguagetranslationsofallorpartoftheNASs,whichwerealsousedfortheanalysis;1

• Aliteraturereview;and• Aseriesofin-depthinterviewswithsevenhumanrightsdefendersandleadingexperts

inthefieldofAIgovernance.Aninitialdraftofthereportwascirculatedforfeedbackamongagroupofexperts,listedintheacknowledgements,beforefinalization,takingthefeedbackintoaccount.

1TheonlyNASforwhichtheauthorswerenotabletoobtainanEnglishtranslationwasPoland’s(MinistryofDigitalAffairs,ZałożeniadostrategiiAIwPolsce,2018)

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What is a National Artificial Intelligence Strategy?

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1.1. Defining Artificial Intelligence

BeforelookingatNASs,weshouldfirstdefine“artificialintelligence”(AI).WhileAIisacommonlyusedterm,itislesscommonlydefined,eveninNASs,andthedistinctionbetweenalgorithmicdecision makingandAIisalsoleftunclear.Algorithmsareprocessesorsetsofrulestobefollowedbyamachinetomakeacalculationordecision,ortosolveaproblem.Thisalgorithmicdecisionmakingbymachinescanbeusedforarangeofpurposes,manyfairlyinnocuous-suchasanalyzingtrafficpatternstohelpdecidewherenewroadsshouldbeconstructed.Otheruses,particularlywhenrelatingtohumans,haveprovedmorecontroversial,suchastodetermineanindividual’slikelihoodofcommittingacriminaloffence,ortheireligibilityforsocialwelfaresupport.

AIisarelated,butmoreadvancedtechnology,whereamachineisnotsimplyapplyingpre-determinedalgorithmstodatasetstogenerateanoutput,but,mirroringhumanintelligencemorebroadly.AsignificantbranchofAI,machinelearninginvolvesamachine,throughtrialanderror,refiningalgorithmsitself,thereby“learning”howtoperformaparticulartaskorfunction.AIinvolvestheanalysisofverylargequantitiesofdata,whichiswhyquestionsofdataprivacyanddatabiasaresocentralwhenwethinkaboutitshumanrightsimpacts.TheparticularfunctionperformedbyAIcouldbeanythingfromgeneratingresultsinasearchenginethataremostusefulfortheusertoaccuratelypredictingwhetherapersonhasaparticularillnessordisease.Atpresent,mostAIcanonlyundertakeasingletask,orasmallrangeoftasks.Theterms“trueAI”and“artificialgeneralintelligence”refertoaspeculativeformofAIthat,inthefuture,wouldbeabletoundertakeallhumancognitivefunctions.

GiventhesignificantpotentialimpactsthatAIcanhaveuponhumanrights,humanrightsdefendersoftendefinethetermbroadly.DavidKaye,forexample,theUNSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofopinionandexpression,hasreferredtoAIas“shorthandfortheincreasingindependence,speedandscaleconnectedtoautomated,computationaldecision-making.Itisnotonethingonly,butratherreferstoa‘constellation’ofprocessesandtechnologiesenablingcomputerstocomplementorreplacespecifictasksotherwiseperformedbyhumans,suchasmakingdecisionsandsolvingproblems”.2

Similarly,MarkLatonero, Research Lead for the Human Rights and AI on the Ground Initiatives at Data & Society,hassaidthat“itisusefultothinkof‘AI’asacatchphraseforaclusteroftechnologiesembeddedinsocialsystems.Thisincludesmachinelearning,naturallanguageprocessing,computervision,neuralnetworks,deeplearning,bigdataanalytics,predictivemodels,algorithms,androbotics—allofwhichareintrinsicallysituatedinthesocialcontextswheretheyaredevelopedanddeployed”.3

1.2. Defining National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

AnNASisastrategy,ordinarilydevelopedbyagovernment(althoughthereareexamplesofgovernmentsadoptingorendorsingNASsdevelopedbyotherorganizations)whichsetsoutitsbroadapproachtoAI,specificareasoffocus,andactivitiesthatitwillundertakewhichrelatetoAI.Indoingso,NASsattempttocoordinategovernmentpoliciesinordertomaximizethepotentialbenefitsfortheeconomyandsociety,whileminimizingthepotentialcosts.ThefirststatetoadoptanNASwasCanada,in2017,andsincethenover25governmentsandregionalintergovernmentalorganizationshavepublishedthem,withmanymoreintheprocessofdevelopment.Thevastmajoritytaketheformofapublishedgovernmentdocument,withasmallernumberofgovernmentsoptinginsteadtolaunchdedicatedwebsites,orallocatecertainamountsofgovernmentspending,whilestillcallingtheireffortsa“strategy”.

2UNGeneralAssembly,ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,UNDoc.A/73/348,29August2018,Para3.3Latonero,M.,GoverningArtificialIntelligence:UpholdingHumanRights,Data&Society,2018,p.8.

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AlthoughthisreportisfocusedonNASs,itisimportanttomentionbrieflythatgovernmentsaretakingarangeofdifferentapproachesastheymakedecisionsonAIpolicy.GovernmentsinanumberofAfricanstatesincludingKenya,GhanaandRwandahavebeenmovingforwardontryingtoimprovetheircapacityinthefieldofAI,andgrapplingwiththeaccompanyingchallenges.SomegovernmentshavecommissionedreportsondifferentaspectsofAI,ordevelopedbroaderstrategiesonthedigitaleconomyordigitalintegration.TheEuropeanCommissionhaspublishedseveralreports,includinganAIblueprintandareportonthesafetyimplicationsofAI.IntheUK,thegovernmentcreatedtheCentreforDataEthicsandInnovationtoworkondevelopinggoodgovernanceapproachesforemergingdigitaltechnologies.NASsrepresentonlyonecomponentofhowgovernmentsareapproachingthisquestion,butinstatesthathavethemtheyrepresentthecomprehensiveroadmapwhichotherdecisionsaremeanttofollow,andsotheyareimportantinunderstandingagovernment’soverallapproach.

NationalandintergovernmentalNASs

AlthoughthefirstNASwasadoptedin2017,policiesrelatingtoAIhasbeendevelopedinstatesformanyyearsbeforethat.In1998,forexample,theNextGenerationInternetResearchActwaspassedbytheUSCongress.However,theadoptionofcomprehensivecross-governmentalstrategiesonAIhasonlyoccurredinrecentyears.ThevastmajorityofNASshavebeendevelopedbyhigh-incomestates,largelyinNorthAmerica,EuropeandOceania,withasmallernumberfromLatinAmericaandAsia,andnonefromAfrica.

OutsideofformalNASs,anumberofregionalandintergovernmentalorganizationshavealsosoughttocoordinatepolicyamongtheirmembers.Attheregionallevel,theEuropeanUnion(EU)hasattemptedtocoordinatepolicyonAIacrossEUmemberstates.InitsCoordinatedPlanonArtificialIntelligence,theEUencouragedmemberstatestoproduceNASsbymid-2019.4TheEUhasalsoproduceditsDeclarationofCooperationonArtificialIntelligence(2018),5ArtificialIntelligenceforEurope(2018),6EthicsGuidelinesforTrustworthyAI(2019),7PolicyandInvestmentRecommendationsforTrustworthyArtificialIntelligence(2019),8andWhitePaperonArtificialIntelligence(2020).9

Additionally,anumberofNordicandBalticgovernmentsissuedaJointDeclarationon“AIintheNordic-Balticregion”;10CanadaandFrancepublishedastatementcallingforaninternationalstudygroupofartificialintelligencein2018;11andtheG7hasreleasedtheCharlevoixCommonVisionfortheFutureofArtificialIntelligence.12TheOECDalsoreleasedits“PrinciplesonArtificialIntelligence”in2019,13APEChasshownincreasinginterestinAIdevelopment,andtheAfricanUnionministersresponsibleforcommunication,andinformationandcommunicationtechnologieshaveestablishedaworkinggrouponAItostudy“thecreationofacommonAfricanstanceonArtificialIntelligence”.

4EuropeanCommission,CoordinatedPlanonArtificialIntelligence,December2018.5EuropeanUnion,Declaration:CooperationonArtificialIntelligence,2018.6EuropeanCommission,ArtificialIntelligenceforEurope,April2018.7IndependentHigh-LevelExpertGrouponArtificialIntelligence,EthicsGuidelinesforTrustworthyAI,April2019.8IndependentHigh-LevelExpertGrouponArtificialIntelligence,PolicyandInvestmentRecommendationsforTrustworthyAI,June2019.9EuropeanCommission,WhitePaperOnArtificialIntelligence-AEuropeanapproachtoexcellenceandtrust,February2020.10NordicCouncilofMinisters,AIintheNordic-Balticregion,May2018.11Canada-FranceStatementonArtificialIntelligence,June2018.12G7,CharlevoixCommonVisionfortheFutureofArtificialIntelligence,2018.13OECD,CouncilRecommendationonArtificialIntelligence,May2019.

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1.2.1. Purpose of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

ThereasonthattherehasbeenasurgeinthenumberofNASsinrecentyearsisfairlystraightforward:AIhasbecomeincreasinglyinfluentialindifferentareasoflife.Fromthepublicsectorandpublicservicestoarangeofprivatesectorcontexts,governmentsarecompetingtoharnesstheeconomicandsocialbenefitsofferedbyAI.TheyarealsokeentoensurethattheyremainaheadofthegameandhaveaclearstrategyinrelationtothetechnologysoastomaximizethepotentialbenefitsthatAIbrings,andtominimizethepotentialcosts.(Whatagovernmentconsiderstobe“benefit”ora“cost”will,ofcourse,vary.)

Unlikemanyareasofgovernmentpolicy making,however,AIisacross-cuttingissuewithpotentialimpactsinmanydifferentpolicyareas.Assuch,althoughthereisoftenaleaddepartmentincharge,NASsinvariablyengagearangeofdifferentgovernmentdepartments,necessitatingacross-governmentapproachtothedevelopmentandimplementationoftheNAS.

Bypublishingastrategy,ratherthansimplykeepingitasaninternalpointofreference,NASsalsoprovideinformationtokeystakeholders,oftenwithdifferentpotentialapplications.IntervieweescitedvarioususesofNASsreflectingtheobjectivesofdifferentstakeholdergroups:civilsocietyorganizations,forexample,notedthatNASsare-orcanbe-usefulaccountabilitymechanisms,identifyinggovernmentcommitmentsandholdinggovernmentstoaccountforthem.Privatesectorinterviewees,however,sawNASsasusefulindicatorsforgovernmentpolicywhichmightaffectthem,suchasregulation,opportunitiesforfunding,andprioritiesforskillsandtalentdevelopment.Anumberofintervieweesalsonotedthat,whethertheintentionofgovernmentsorotherwise,thegrowingnumberofNASsmeantthattheircontentswerestartingtocontributetointernationalpolicyframeworksandnormstogovernAI,andthatintheabsenceofspecificinternationalinstrumentsonthegovernanceofAI,NASshelpedtoidentifycommonvaluesamonggovernments.

1.2.2. Scope of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

ThedevelopmentofNASsisarecentphenomenon,withgovernmentstakingdifferentapproaches;and,assuch,itisunsurprisingthatthescopeofthesestrategiesvary,andwilllikelycontinuetodoso.TheintervieweesforthisstudynotedthediversityofapproacheswhenitcametoNASs,notonlyintermsoftheirscope,buttheirlengthandlevelofdetail,mirroringfindingsfromanalysisofthestrategiesthemselves.

AnumberofexistingstudieshavesoughttodeveloptaxonomiesofthedifferentelementsofexistingNASs,mostnotablyataxonomydevisedforareviewundertakenforCIFAR(formerlytheCanadianInstituteforAdvancedResearch)byTimDutton(whichhehasutilizedinhisstudyforCIFAR14aswellasotherNAS-relatedpublications,15amodifiedformofwhichwasusedbyAnastassiaLauterbach)16andtheWorldEconomicForum.17Together,thesetaxonomiessuggestthattherearebetweenfiveandtenparticularelementsordinarilycoveredinanNAS.Throughtheresearchforthisstudy,however,anadditionaltwoelementsfoundinanumberofNASs

14Dutton,T.,etal,BuildinganAIWorld:ReportonNationalandRegionalAIStrategies,CIFAR,2018.15See,forexample,Dutton,T.,AIPolicy101:AnIntroductiontothe10KeyAspectsofAIPolicy,July2018,availableat:https://medium.com/politics-ai/ai-policy-101-what-you-need-to-know-about-ai-policy-163a2bd68d65.16Lauterbach,A.,Artificialintelligenceandpolicy:quovadis?,DigitalPolicy,RegulationandGovernance,Vol.21,No.3,2019.17WorldEconomicForum,CentreforFourthIndustrialRevolution,AFrameworkforDevelopingaNationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy,2019.

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werenoted(oneofwhichsetsouttheframing,visionorobjectivesoftheNAS,whiletheothersetsouthowthestrategywillbeoverseenorgovernedandthemeansbywhichotherstakeholderswillbeinvolvedinitsoversightandimplementation).Inaddition,oneelementfoundinexistingtaxonomies(dataanddigitalinfrastructure)wasoften,inpractice,separatedintotwoseparatecomponents(onedealingwithdata,andonewithinfrastructureanditssecurity).Intotal,therefore,thisresearchfoundthattherewereuptothirteenelementsthatwerecommonlyfoundinanNAS.Thesethirteenelementsarenotentirelydiscrete,andsosomeofthesecouldbetreatedtogether(forexample“ethics”and“regulation”,or“talent”and“skillsandthefutureofwork”).

ThethirteenelementsidentifiedandusedinthisreportaresetoutinthefirstcolumnofTable1,withthecorrespondingelementsusedintheothertaxonomieswithdefinitionsacrosstheremainingcolumns.

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Table1:MappingelementsofanNASunderdifferenttaxonomies

GPD-Stanford GDPI (this report)

CIFAR Tim Dutton: AI Policy 101

Lauterbach World Economic Forum

1. Framing, visionand objectives

n/a n/a n/a n/a

2. Research Scientific Research: The creation of new research centers, hubs, or programs in basic and applied AI research or a commitment to increase existing funding for public AI research.

Basic and Applied Research: To achieve new breakthroughs in AI theories, technologies, and applications, governments need to provide funding for basic and applied research. This includes both research grants and the creation of new research institutions. Example: the UK’s Alan Turing Institute.

R&D: Governmental funding for R&D, including grants and creation of new research institutions, e.g. the UK’s AlanTuring Institute.

Key dimension 2: Establishing a strong research environment and forging industry-academia integration.

3. Talent AI Talent Development: Funding to attract, retain, and train domestic or international AI talent, including funding for chairs and fellowships or the creation of AI-specific Master and PhD programs.

Talent Attraction, Development, and Retainment: To conduct R&D in AI and deploy AI solutions in the public and private sectors, countries need a supply of skilled AI talent. Example: Canada’s CIFAR Chairs in AI Program.

Talent: Ways to support talent acquisition to conduct R&D, e.g. Canada’s CIFAR Chairs in AI Program.

n/a

4. Skills and thefuture of work

Skills and the Future of Work: Initiatives to help students and the overall labor force develop skills for the future of work, such as investments in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education, digital skills, or lifelong learning.

Future of Work and Skills: Advances in AI will both create and destroy jobs. To ensure that workers have the skills to compete in the digital economy, governments need to invest in STEM education, national retraining programs, and lifelong learning. Example: Denmark’s Technology Pact.

Future of Employment Skills: Addressing the necessity to provide life-long education, e.g. Finland teaching1% of the country'spopulation the basicconcepts at the root ofartificial technology.

Key dimension 3: Preparing the workforce for the AI economy.

5. AI in the privatesector

Industrialization of AI Technologies: Programs to encourage private-sector adoption of AI technologies, including investments in

Industrialization of AI Technologies: AI has the potential to fundamentally transform multiple sectors and drive growth for decades

Adoption of AI in Industries: Governments investing in strategic sectors to boost AI ecosystems, e.g. China’s investment in

Key dimension 4: Investing primarily in strategic sectors.

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strategic sectors, funding for AI start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and strategies to create AI clusters or ecosystems.

to come. To encourage private sector uptake, governments are investing in strategic sectors and developing AI ecosystems and clusters. Example: Japan’s Industrialization Roadmap.

self-driving cars and infrastructural regional clusters.

6. AI in thegovernment

AI in the Government: Pilot programs that use AI to improve government efficiency, service delivery, and public administration.

AI in the Government: Likewise, governments are experimenting with ways to encourage the uptake of AI in the government. With the help of AI, it is possible to reform the public administration and make policy more effective. Example: UAE’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence.

n/a n/a

7. Data Data and Digital Infrastructure: Funding for open data partnerships, platforms, and datasets, as well as commitments to create test environments and regulatory sandboxes.

Data and Digital Infrastructure: Data is central to the ability of AI to work. As a result, governments are opening their datasets and developing platforms to encourage the secure exchange of private data. Example: France’s Health Data Hub.

Data: Governments opening their data sets to encourage AI R&D and product development, e.g. France’s Health Data Hub.

Key dimension 1: Providing a set of standardized data-protection laws and addressing ethical concerns.

8. Infrastructureand cybersecurity

As above As above n/a n/a

9. Ethics Ethical AI Standards: The creation of a council, committee, or task force to create standards or regulations for the ethical use and development of AI. This area also includes specific funding for research or pilot programs to create explainable and transparent AI.

Ethics: Concerns over algorithmic bias, privacy, and security have raised a number of ethical debates. To mitigate harm, governments are looking to develop ethical codes and standards for the use and development of AI. Example: The EU’s Draft AI Ethics Guidelines.

AI Ethics: Governments are trying to develop ethical standards for development of AI, e.g. The EU’s Draft AIEthics Guidelines.

Key dimension 1: Providing a set of standardized data-protection laws and addressing ethical concerns.

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10. Regulation n/a Regulations: Every country is grappling with the question of whether (and how) to regulate AI. Currently, governments are focused on regulations for autonomous cars and autonomous weapons. Example: Germany’s Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving.

n/a n/a

11. Inclusion Inclusion and Social Well-Being: Ensuring that AI is used to promote social and inclusive growth and that the AI community is inclusive of diverse backgrounds and perspectives.”

Inclusion: AI can both improve and worsen inclusion. Used properly, AI can bolster inclusion and help address complex societal problems such as poverty and hunger. Used improperly, AI can reinforce discrimination and disproportionately harm women and minorities. Example: India’s #AIforAll Strategy.

Inclusion: Governments looking into how AI can address complex societal problems such as poverty, and/or harm or benefit women and minorities, e.g. India’s #AIforAll Strategy.

n/a

12. Foreign policyand internationalcooperation

n/a Foreign Policy: Geopolitics, development, and trade will all be affected by advances in AI technologies. To address ethical concerns and develop global standards, countries are beginning to consider mechanisms for the global governance of AI. Example: China’s Global Governance of AI Plan.

n/a Key dimension 5: Engaging in international collaboration.

13. Governance andstakeholderengagement

n/a n/a n/a n/a

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Someoftheseelementsaremorecommonthanothers,ashasbeennotedinparticularbyCIFAR’sreport,“BuildinganAIWorld:ReportonNationalandRegionalAIStrategies”.18AlmostallNASs-particularlythosefocusingonAIfromaneconomicperspective-containsectionslookingatresearch,talentandAIintheprivatesector.However,mostNASs,particularlythemorerecentones,containotherelementssuchasdataanddigitalinfrastructure,ethics,skillsdevelopment,andinternationalengagement.

Unsurprisingly,NASstendtoplayonthatparticularstate’sstrengths,suchasexistingtalentandresearch,andtheapplicationofAIinthatstate’sstrongestsectors.ManyseektoseizestrategicopportunitiesforthedevelopmentofAI,tobuildacompetitiveadvantage,throughbuildingorrecruitingskillsandexpertiseonAIinthestate,andsupportingresearchinstitutions.

Forthepurposesofthisreport,itisinthesectionon“ethics”wherehumanrights(orothervaluessystems)aremostoftenconsidered.WhilemanyNASscontainsectionsonethics,fewerusehumanrightslanguageexplicitly(exceptfrequentreferencestoprivacy),suggestingthatethicalframeworks,ratherthanhumanrightsframeworks,havefoundfavorwithgovernmentswhenitcomestoexaminingandrespondingtothepotentialimpactsofAIonhumansandsociety.Asnotedinsection4,thereare,infact,waysforinternationalhumanrightslawandstandardstobeconsideredwhendevelopingallelementsofanNAS.

1.2.3. General areas for improvement of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

WhilemanyNASsarecomprehensivedocuments,thereareanumberofwaysinwhichtheycanbeimprovedandmademoreeffective,inadditiontoimprovingtheincorporationofinternationalhumanrightsstandards.Inparticular,acommonabsencefromNASsarecleargoalsandindicatorsofsuccess,acriticismalsomadebyStiftungNeueVerantwortunginareviewofNASsin2018.19Connectedtothis,someintervieweeshighlightedalackofspecificpolicycommitmentsinNASs.IntervieweesnotedthatNASsshouldbeconsideredasmechanismsforaccountability,andthatthepresenceofindicators,specificcommitmentsanddeliverableswerecriticaltoenablecivilsociety,andotherstakeholders,toholdgovernmentstoaccountfortheirimplementation.

Second,despitethefactthatAIisacross-cuttingissuewhichhasimpactsonabroadrangeofareasoflife,notallNASsaredevelopedthrougha“wholeofgovernment”approach.ManyNASsdon’tprovideclarityoverhowdifferentgovernmentdepartmentswereinvolvedintheirdevelopment,orwillbeinvolvedintheirimplementation,meaningthatkeyconsiderationsandexpertisethatresidesincertaindepartmentswasnottakenintoaccount.

Third,manyintervieweesnotedthattherewasa“futureonly”focusinNASs,withanexclusivefocusonAIinthefuture,andalackofanylandscapingorassessmentofthecurrentstatusofAIanditsexistingimpacts.Thisabsencewasnotonlysubstantive,butalsoprocedural,withacommonlackofclarityintheNAS-andevenwithingovernment-ontheexistingstructures,bodiesandmandatesthatarerelevanttothedifferentareasofAIpolicy.

Fourth,someintervieweesconsideredthatNASsareoftentoofocusedongovernmentexclusively,andfailedtosetouthowotherstakeholderswouldbeinvolvedintheimplementationoftheNAS.

18Dutton,T.,etal,BuildinganAIWorld:ReportonNationalandRegionalAIStrategies,CIFAR,2018.19Heumann,Dr.S.andZahn,N.,"BenchmarkingNationalAIStrategies:Whyandhowindicatorsandmonitoringcansupportagileimplementation",StiftungNeueVerantwortung,2018.

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Finally,someintervieweesalsonotedthatAIasaglobal,data-driventechnologyisnotsomethingthatanyonegovernmentcanaddressbyitself,butthatmanyNASsnonethelessfailedtotakeintoaccounttheneedforinternationalcoordinationandengagement.Thiscriticismmirrorsanargumentmadeby,amongothers,MarkEsposito,whohashighlightedhow“dataflowsalignwithgeographicboundariesonlyincidentally,notfundamentally”meaningthat“[g]eopolitically,nation-statesaresovereignentities;butinthedigitaleconomy,theyaresovereigninnameonly,notnecessarilyinpractice”.20Assuch,

“(...)[T]toframethematter[AI]instrictlynationaltermsistoignorehowAIisdeveloped.Whetherdatasetsaresharedinternationallycoulddeterminewhethermachine-learningalgorithmsdevelopcountry-specificbiases.Andwhethercertainkindsofchipsarerenderedasproprietarytechnologycoulddeterminetheextenttowhichinnovationcanproceedatthegloballevel.Inlightoftheserealities,thereisreasontoworrythatafragmentationofnationalstrategiescouldhampergrowthinthedigitaleconomy.”21

20Esposito,M.,“ThecaseagainstnationalAIstrategies”,ProjectSyndicate,October2018,availableat:https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/case-against-national-ai-strategies-by-mark-esposito-et-al-2018-10.21Ibid.

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The importance of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

2.

17

Inthenextsections,thisreportlooksatwhetherandhowNASscurrentlyincorporatehumanrights,andmakesrecommendationsforhowhumanrightsshouldbeincorporatedintostrategiesinordertoimprovethemandmakethemmorerights-respecting.Beforedoingthis,however,itisimportanttolayoutindetailpreciselywhytheincorporationofinternationalhumanrightslawandstandardsintoNASsissoimportant.

Stateshaveanobligationunderinternationalhumanrightslawtoprotectthehumanrightsofallpeoplewithintheirterritoryandjurisdictionfromviolations,causedeitherbytheirownpoliciesorpractices,ortheactsofthirdparties,suchasbusinessesorotherindividuals.Theseobligationsrestonacombinationofinternationaltreatiesandcustomaryinternationallaw,andmaybesupplementedbyregionalinstrumentsanddomesticconstitutionalcommitments.Humanrightsconsiderationsareapplicabletoallareasofgovernmentpolicyandpractice,includingAIpolicyandAIapplicationsusedbygovernmentsandotherentitiesinsociety.

AIhasthepotentialtoimpactawiderangeofhumanrights,bothpositivelyandnegatively.AstheUNSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofopinionandexpressionnotedinhisreporttotheUNGeneralAssemblyin2018,“AItools,likealltechnologies,mustbedesigned,developedanddeployedsoastobeconsistentwiththeobligationsofStatesandtheresponsibilitiesofprivateactorsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw”.22

NASsrepresentagovernment’s(orgroupofgovernments’)comprehensiveroadmapforhowtheyintendtoapproachAI.Thisincludeshowitwillbegoverned,howtheywillsupportinnovationintheAIsector,andhowtheywilladdresstheimpactonpeople’slivesandonlabor.Ifhumanrightsarenotintegratedintothisstrategy,thereisasignificantriskthatprotectionofrightswillbeunevenacrossvarioussectors.AsimplementationofstrategiestoimproveAItrainingortodevelopnewtechnologiesmoveforward,theymaydosowithoutfullyaddressingrisksrelatedtotheviolationofrights.Forthisreason,itiscriticalthatpartoftheNASisastrategyforensuringthathumanrightsareprotected.

Yet,aswewillseeinthefollowingsections,relativelyfewNASsdeeplyengagewiththehumanrightsimpactsofAI.Themoststraightforwardreasonforthisisthatgovernmentsinsomestatessimplydonotplaceahighpriorityontheprotectionofhumanrightsintheirpolicy making.China,RussiaandtheUAE,forexample,havealldevelopedNASsbutallperformpoorlyonmetricsmeasuringthedegreetowhichhumanrightsareprotectedinthestate.23Instatessuchasthese,considerationoftheinternationalhumanrightsframeworkisunlikelytobeseeninmanystatepoliciesandstrategies,regardlessofthepolicyareaconcerned.

Evenamonggovernmentsthatdoplaceapriorityontheprotectionofhumanrightsinpolicy making,anddespitetheirinternationalhumanrightsobligations,fullconsiderationofhumanrightsmightstandincontrasttoothergoalsandobjectivesthatthegovernmenthaswhenitcomestoAI.Whereagovernment’sprimarygoalwithrespecttoAIistoenhanceeconomiccompetitivenessortoensuregeopoliticalcompetition(particularlywhenitcomestothemilitaryapplicationsofAI),considerationofhumanrights-through,forexample,regulationorrestrictionsandlimitationsoncertainusesofAI-mayunderminethegovernment’sobjective.Assuch,governmentswhohavecertaingoalsorobjectivesmaydecidetoexcludeorminimizetheconsiderationofhumanrightsintheirNAS.Inothercases,however,governmentsmayhavesimplyneglectedtoconsiderhumanrightsimplicationsofAIforthesimplereasonthattheydidnotconsiderthehumanrightsframeworkrelevanttoAI,orwereunsureofhowtoproperlyintegratetheseimplicationsintotheirstrategies.

22UNGeneralAssembly,ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,UNDoc.A/73/348,29August2018,Para19.23See,forexample,FreedomHouse’slatest“FreedomintheWorld”reportwhichgaveChina,RussiaandtheUAEscoresrespectivelyof11,20and17outof100.

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Itisimportanttonotethatstates’obligationstoprotecthumanrightsdonotgoawaybecausetheyareunclearorinconvenient.Therearesituationswherehumanrightsmaybelegitimatelyrestricted,andthisincludescaseswherethereisatradeoffbetweentheprotectionoftworights,orunderotherclearlydefinedconditions.ThisisevenmorereasontoengagewithhumanrightsanalysisearlyintheprocessofAIdevelopment.Inthefuture,asharddecisionsariseitisimportanttohaveconsideredtheimplicationsofthetechnologyandhowthestatewillproperlybalanceitsobligationsastheyrelatetohumanrights.

AsanincreasingnumberofproposalsemergetoestablishgovernanceframeworksforAI,somehaveencouragedthedevelopmentofnewethicalframeworksforAIthatareeitherdesignedtoreplacethehumanrightsframeworkorinsomecasestogobeyondit.Ina2020reportonethicalandrights-basedapproachestogovernanceofAI,researchersfromtheBerkmanKleinCenteratHarvardUniversityfoundeightkeythemesinexistingAIprinciples:privacy,accountability,safetyandsecurity,transparencyandexplainability,fairnessandnon-discrimination,humancontroloftechnology,professionalresponsibility,andthepromotionofhumanvalues.24Whilethereisahighdegreeofoverlapbetweenthesethemesandhumanrights(particularlyprivacyandnon-discrimination),thelinksbetweenothersandhumanrightsislessclear(suchasprofessionalresponsibilityandhumancontrol).Assuch,somegovernmentsmayconsiderthatahumanrights-basedframeworkisinsufficient,andthatabroaderethicalframeworkthattakesintoconsiderationotherissuesispreferable.Inothercases,governmentsmaybeadvocatingforethicalframeworksoutsideofthehumanrightsframeworknotbecausehumanrightsdonotgofarenough,butbecausetheyfindthemtoorestrictive.

Itisimportanttonotethatnothingprohibitsgovernmentsfromgoingfurtherthanhumanrightsframeworksdoinprotectingpeople’shumanrights.Furthermore,therearesignificantopportunitiestoincorporatenewlyemergingAI-specificethicalinsightsintohumanrights-basedanalysesofAI.Therearepersuasivereasonstousetheexistinghumanrightsframeworks,ratherthananynewethicalprinciplesalone,asafloorandframeworkfortheregulationofAI.Thatis,humanrightsshouldbethefoundationthatanyothergovernanceapproachesbuildon.AsEileen DonahoeandMegan MacDuffee Metzgerhaveargued,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkiswell-suitedtothetaskofensuringthatAIisdeveloped,usedandregulatedforthebenefitofindividualsandsocietiesforseveralkeyreasons.25

First,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkputsthehumanpersonatthecenterofanyassessmentofAIandmakesAI’simpactonhumansthefocalpointofgovernance.Second,theinternationalhumanrightsframework,throughitsbroadspectrumofbothsubstantiveandproceduralrights,coversthemostpressingsocietalconcernsaboutAI,suchasnon-discriminationandprivacy.Thismakesitwell-suitedasthefoundationforgovernanceofAI.

Additionally,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkestablishesandclearlydefinestherolesandresponsibilitiesofbothgovernmentsandtheprivatesectorinprotectingandrespectinghumanrightsandinremedyingviolationsofthem.Aswellasobligationsonstatesviainternationalhumanrightstreaties,theUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRightssetsouttheroleofthestateandtheresponsibilitiesoftheprivatesectorwhenitcomestobusinesses’impactsonhumanrights.Thisisvaluableinthecontextofatechnologywhichwillrequireoversightfrombothgovernmentsandprivatecompanies.

24Fjeld,J.etal,“PrincipledArtificialIntelligence:MappingConsensusinEthicalandRights-BasedApproachestoPrinciplesforAI”,BerkmanKleinCenterResearchPublicationNo.2020-1.25Donahoe,E.andMetzger,M.,“ArtificialIntelligenceandHumanRights.”JournalofDemocracyVol.30,2019,pp.115-126.

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Finally,althoughinterpretedandimplementedindifferentwaysaroundtheworld,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkenjoysalevelofgeopoliticalrecognitionandstatusunderinternationallawthatanynewlyemergentethicalframeworkwouldbeunlikelytomatch.Governmentsinstatesthatdonotcomplywiththeframeworkriskcriticismandevenostracizationfromtheinternationalcommunity.Thisdoesnotmeanthatallgovernmentsfullyembracetheseprinciplesasguidingnorms,orapplythemperfectly,butitissafetosaythathumanrightsstandardsenjoyahighleveloflegitimacy,andthisisacrucialadvantage.

AllofthismakestheexistinghumanrightsframeworkscriticalasgovernmentsmoveforwardinthedevelopmentofgovernanceapproachestoAI,andastheyconsiderhowtoresponsiblyinnovateinthisspace.ItisthereforecriticalthatgovernmentstakeseriouslythequestionofprotectinghumanrightsastheyoutlinetheiroverallstrategicvisionforAI.

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Methodology

METHODOLOGY

Analysis of human rights in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

3.

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TounderstandwhetherandhowNASscurrentlyincorporatehumanrights,weanalyzedeverystrategythathadbeenformallyadoptedbyastatebefore1January2020andwhichwereeitheravailableinEnglishorforwhichwewereabletoobtaintranslations.26Thisamountedtostrategiesfrom30statesand2regionalstrategies(onefromtheEUandonefromtheNordic-Balticstates).27Notably,noneofthestrategiesformallyadoptedasofthisdatewerefromAfricanstatesandonlyonestrategycamefromLatinAmerica(Colombia).Anumberofgovernmentsinstatesonthesecontinentshad,however,beguntheprocessofdevelopingstrategies,includingBrazil,Egypt,TunisiaandUruguay.MexicohasdevelopedasubstantialportionofitsNAS,butthestrategyhadnotbeenpublishedasofthisdateduetoachangeofgovernmentdelayingitsrelease.Asaresultofthisanalysis,weidentifiedanumberofpatternsandthemesrelatingtowhetherandhowhumanrightshadbeenincorporatedintoNASs.

3.1 Explicit references to human rights/the human rights framework

Amajorityofthestrategiesmadeexplicitreferencetohumanrightsintheirtext.WhilethisdemonstratesarecognitionamongmostgovernmentsthatthereisahumanrightsdimensiontodiscussionsaroundAI,thedepthofsubsequentengagementinthehumanrightsframeworkanditsapplicationtoAIvariedconsiderably.Indeed,inmostcaseswherehumanrightswerereferenced,thiswasapassingmention,orsimplyanodtothegovernment’sgeneralcommitmenttohumanrights,withlittleornofurtherdiscussionofhumanrightsinthestrategy.

Somestrategiesdidnotetheparticularimportanceofhumanrightsasacomponentoftheirstrategy(e.g.Germany),28andasmallnumberdidgointosomedepthastohowhumanrightswerepartofthecoreoftheirapproachtoAI(e.g.DenmarkandtheNetherlands).Ingeneral,however,strategiesdidnotdeeplyengagewithhumanrightsasaframeworkforstructuringtheirstrategies.ThisfindingisinlinewithpreviousworkonNASs,whichhasfoundalackofleadershiponhumanrightsinexistingstrategies.29EvenwheretherewasdeeperengagementonthehumanrightsdimensionofAI,thiswasoftenonly(orlargely)insectionsdealingwithethics,withfarlessattentionpaidtotheapplicationofhumanrightsinotherpartsofthestrategy.Manystrategiesdidnotmentionhumanrightsatallasaframeworkforthegovernment’sapproachtoAI.

Itisimportanttonote,asthisreportmentionslaterundersection3.6,thatthefactthatanNASmakesreferencetohumanrightsisfarfromsufficienttoensurethatthegovernment’sapproachandactionswill,infact,ensurethathumanrightsarerespectedinpractice.Indeed,someofthestateswhoseNASmakesreferencetohumanrightshavecomeundersignificantcriticismfromtheinternationalcommunityoverhumanrightsviolationsinAI-relatedpolicyareas,suchasthesurveillanceandtheuseofpersonaldata.

Ouranalysisalsorevealednotableregionalvariation,withthe vast majority ofcountriesmakingexplicit mention ofhumanrights and the human rights framework being in Europe.WhilemanyEastandSoutheastAsianstateshaddevelopedanNAS,thesedidnotusethehumanrightsframework,sometimesmakingreferenceinsteadtoalternatives,suchasethicalor“human-centric”approaches.Thismay,inpart,reflectvariationacrossregionswhenitcomestousing

26TheonlyNASforwhichtheauthorswerenotabletoobtainanEnglishtranslationwasPoland’s(MinistryofDigitalAffairs,ZałożeniadostrategiiAIwPolsce,2018).27AfulllistofallNASsreviewedcanbefoundinAnnex2.28InthecaseoftheRussianstrategy,itshouldbenotedthatalimitedscopeofhumanrightswashighlighted,primarilytherighttowork.29CussinsNewman,Jessica,TowardsAISecurity:GlobalAspirationsforaMoreResilientFuture.

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human rights as a framework for policy making, as well as varying levels of commitment to theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkmorebroadly.

AmongEuropeanstates,whilemostdidmakereferencetohumanrightsexplicitlyintheirstrategies,asmallnumberdidnot.InthecaseofEurope,however,thismaynotnecessarilyrepresentalackofcommitmentamonggovernmentsinthesestatestothehumanrightsframework.Intervieweessuggestedthatinsomeofthesestates,humanrightsareoftenassumedtoformthefoundationofpolicywhetherornotitisexplicitlystated.Inotherwords,someEuropeanstatesmaynotfeelthattheyneedtoexplicitlydiscusshumanrightsintheirstrategies,becauseitisassumedasabaseline.ThismaybeespeciallytrueinEUmemberstatessincetheEU’sregionalAIstrategy,whichhasstronglinkstotheNASsdevelopedbyEUmemberstates,doesexplicitlyembeditselfinahumanrightsframework.Additionally,theEUhaspublishedEthicsGuidelinesforTrustworthyArtificialIntelligencethatincludeprovisionsmeanttoprotecthumanrights,includingspecificprovisionsrelatedtoprivacy,diversityandnon-discrimination,andtherighttoredress.TheLithuanianNAS,forexample,explicitlymentionedtheseguidelinesasformingthefoundationforanyethicalprinciplesforEUmemberstatesgoingforward.Thatsaid,andasthisreportlooksatlater,ifEUmemberstatesareexcludingdeepengagementwithhumanrightsbecausetheyareassumedasthebaseline,thisisstillproblematic.

Examplesofexplicitreferencestohumanrights/thehumanrightsframework

“Asadiverse,innovativenation,wewilldecidewhatimpactthistechnologywillhaveonhumanrights,onpeople’slivesandonourdemocraticvalues.”(Luxembourg)

“Thegovernment’sbasictask(whichistoguaranteethefundamentalandhumanrightsofallpeople)willbeintensifiedmarkedlyasauthoritiescannowrespondtopeople’sneedsdigitally,independentoftimeandlocation.”(Finland)

“Thebasicprinciplesofthedevelopmentanduseofartificialintelligencetechnologies,theobservanceofwhichisobligatoryduringtheimplementationofthisStrategy,include(…)theprotectionofhumanrightsandliberties:ensuringtheprotectionofthehumanrightsandlibertiesguaranteedbyRussianandinternationallaws,includingtherighttowork,andaffordingindividualstheopportunitytoobtaintheknowledgeandacquiretheskillsneededinordertosuccessfullyadapttotheconditionsofadigitaleconomy.”(Russia)

3.2 Ethical or human-centric approaches as alternatives to the human rights framework

Asnotedabove,ouranalysisfoundthatwhilesomestrategiesdidnotmentionhumanrightsspecifically,theynonethelessmadereferencetoethicalframeworks,ethicalapproaches,orhuman-centeredapproachestoAI.Often,however,therewasnoclearindicationoftheinspirationoftheseframeworksorapproaches,norhowtheywouldbedeveloped,implementedorapplied.

Thatbeingsaid,wheregreaterdetailwasprovidedontheseframeworksandapproaches,certainhumanrightsconceptsandprinciples–suchasprivacy–weresometimesmentioned,withoutreferringtothembeinghumanrights;meaningthatcertainhumanrightsare,tosomeextent,beingconsideredalbeitnotthroughthetraditionalhumanrightsframework.

Thedebatearoundwhetherapurelyhumanrightsframeworkorabroader(ordifferent)ethicalframeworkshouldbeusedwhenconsideringthegovernanceofAIgoesbeyondNASs.Thereisa

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widerdebateinAIgovernancecirclesamonggovernments,theprivatesectorandotherrelevantstakeholdersonthisquestion.Itisfairtosaythatthereare,indeed,argumentsagainstusingapurelyhumanrights-basedframeworkwhenitcomestoAIonthebasisthatitistoolimitedandfailstofullyconsiderallthedifferentimpactsthatAIcanhaveonhumansandsocieties.

Humanrights-basedframeworksandethicalframeworksarenot,however,necessarilywhollydifferent.Asnotedaboveinsection2,a2020reportonethicalandrights-basedapproachestogovernanceofAI,researchersfromtheBerkmanKleinCenteratHarvardUniversityfoundeightkeythemesinexistingAIprinciplesthathavebeendeveloped:privacy,accountability,safetyandsecurity,transparencyandexplainability,fairnessandnon-discrimination,humancontroloftechnology,professionalresponsibility,andthepromotionofhumanvalues.30ThisresearchshowedthatthereisdegreeofoverlapbetweenalternativeframeworksforgoverningAIandthehumanrightsframework(particularlywhenitcomestoprivacyandnon-discrimination).Certainaspectsofthesealternativeframeworks,however,havelessclearlinkstothehumanrightsframework(suchasprofessionalresponsibilityandhumancontrol).Assuch,itmaybethatgovernmentsinsomestatesconsideredthatahumanrights-basedframeworkwasinsufficient,andthatabroaderethicalframeworkthattakesintoconsiderationotherissueswaspreferable.Asdiscussedinsection2ofthisreport,however,therearestrongargumentsinfavorofusingthehumanrightsframeworkasabasefromwhichtobuildoutanyframeworkforAIgovernance.

Inadditionto“ethics”,anothertermthatappearedinmanyNASsis“human-centric”AI(see,e.g.,Singapore).Wherethetermwasused,however,itwasrarelydefinedclearly.Theconceptof“human-centric”hintsatsomeaspectsofahumanrights-respectingapproach,butitishardtoevaluatewithoutcleardefinitionsordescriptions.Thetermcouldmeananapproachwhichisfullyfocusedontherightsofhumansasapriorityoverallelse,oritcouldsimplymeananapproachthatmaintainshumaninvolvementatalllevelsofAIprocesses,oritcouldmeansimplythathumansshouldbethefocusofpolicybutwithoutclearattentiontotheirrights.Eachoftheserepresentsaverydifferentcommitment.IntheabsenceofgreaterclarityamongthoseNASsthatusetheterm,itisnotpossibletodeterminetowhatextentthereferencedemonstratesacommitmenttohumanrights.Aswithethicalframeworksandapproaches,therefore,therearestrongarguments-setoutinsection2ofthisreport-astowhyanexplicithumanrightsframeworkshouldbepreferred.

Examplesofethicalorhuman-centricapproachesasalternativestothehumanrightsframework

“EstablishacharterofethicsforIntelligentITtominimizeanypotentialabuseormisuseofadvancedtechnologybypresentingaclearethicalguidefordevelopersandusersalike.”(SouthKorea)

“Singaporewillalsoapplymultidisciplinaryandhuman-centeredapproachestostudythesystemicrisksandlong-termimpactofAI,anddeveloppotentialsolutionstoaddressthem.RiskassessmentinAIdevelopmentshouldnotbenarrowlyconfinedtotheengineeringdisciplines,butalsoincludesociologists,ethicists,economists,lawyersandpolicymakers.Today,Singapore’suniversitiesareactivelystudyingthesocietalimplicationsofAI,andwewilltapontheirexpertise.”(Singapore)

30Fjeld,J.etal,“PrincipledArtificialIntelligence:MappingConsensusinEthicalandRights-BasedApproachestoPrinciplesforAI”,BerkmanKleinCenterResearchPublicationNo.2020-1.

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3.3 Prioritization of specific human rights

Beyondexplicitmentionsofhumanrightsasaframework,anumberofstrategiesdidmentionandengagewithspecifichumanrightsandtheimpactofAIontheserights.Thereweresomeparticulartrendsinhowcertainhumanrightswereprioritizedorgivenparticularfocusandattention.Ofthestrategieswhichengagedwithspecifichumanrights,therighttoprivacywasthemostcommonlymentioned.Asnotedabove,somestrategiesdidalsomakereferencetoprivacyasaprinciple,butwithoutframingitexplicitlyasahumanrightorpartofthehumanrightsframework.Becauseofthis,andthefactthatprivacyasageneralconceptvariesacrossdifferentregionsandcontexts,referencestoprivacyaloneinanNAS,however,couldnotbeconsideredascomparabletoabroaderhumanrightsapproach.Anotherrightthatismentionedquiteoftenistherighttoequalityortonon-discrimination.Thisisoftenengagedlessdeeplythanprivacy,butnonethelessappearsinarangeofNASs.

Strategiesvaryonthetypesofspecifichumanrightsthattheymentionoremphasize.Some–forexample,theRussianstrategy–focusmostoftheirethicalconcernonissuesliketherighttoworkortherighttoeducation,andhowAIwillimpactthis.Others,liketheFrenchstrategy,arefocusedmoreonproblemsoftransparency,accountabilityandanti-discriminationandhowthesemaybeimpactedbyoramplifiedbyAI.Stillothers,liketheIndianstrategy,focusthebulkoftheirethicalconcernsonensuringinclusionandthatthebenefitsofAIaredistributedacrosssociety.Thisreflects,tosomeextent,theparticularconcernsofthestatesthemselves,aswellastheirvalues.Thatsaid,alloftheseconcernswilllikelyposechallengesinallstates,andafocusononlyasmallsubsetofthepotentialimpactsofAIleavesgovernmentsopentoproblemsdowntheroad.Forexample,governmentswhichchoosetofocusontheimpactontherighttowork,butwithoutaclearfocusonchallengesrelatedtoequalityorlackofdiscriminationmayfindthemselvesturningtoAIsolutionswhich,onaverage,addresstheirconcernsaboutlaborbutwhichentrenchexistingdisparitiesinotherways,orevencreatenewones.

Table2:MappinghumanrightsreferencedinNASs

Human rights mentioned States/regional organizations31

The right to privacy Australia, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, United States

The right to equality / non-discrimination Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, EU, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway

The right to an effective remedy Australia (responsibility and ability to hold humans responsible), Denmark, Malta, the Netherlands

The rights to freedom of thought, expression and access to information

France, the Netherlands, Russia

The right to work France, Russia

31InallcasestheNASitselfwasevaluated,withtheexceptionofAustraliaandMaltawhicheachhasadedicatedAIethicsdocumentwhichtheirNASpointstoforguidanceontheseissues,andwhichwasusedinevaluationforthesetwostates.

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3.4 Discussion of human rights issues without considering risks

Ourreviewnotedmanyinstanceswherebyastrategy,whilenotmentioningaspecifichumanright,nonethelessengagedwithanissuethatposedriskstohumanrights.Forexample,anumberofNASsincludedsubstantialanalysis,oftenanentiresection,ontheimplicationsofAIonthefutureofwork.Insomecases,strategiesevenincludedfairlyspecificplansofactionaroundeducation,retrainingandotherfactorsrelevanttoprotectingtherighttowork,andyetalmostinvariablydidsowithoutmakinganyreferencetotherighttoworkspecifically,andengagingwiththeriskstothatrightposedbyAI.

Toprovideanotherexample,somestrategiesmadereferencetotheneedforalgorithmictransparencyandfairness,butdidsowithoutapplyingthehumanrightsframework,andthereforefailingproperlytoengagewithriskstohumanrightssuchastherighttoaneffectiveremedyortherightstoequalityandnon-discrimination.

Riskstohumanrights,wherethesewerediscussed,wereoftenanalyzedsuperficiallyandwithoutreferencetothehumanrightsframeworkasameansforidentifyingthoserisks.Insomeinstances,strategiesdidmentionrisks,onlytoimmediatelyminimizethemandmoveontofocusentirelyonpositivebenefitsintheremainderofthestrategy.Forexample,theinitialFinnishNASstartsbynotingthat“[t]hebleakestpredictionsindicatethattheamountofjobsandworkavailabletopeoplewilldecrease,themeaningfulcontentofworkwilldeclineandthelabormarketstatusandearningstrendofemployeeswillbecomemoreuncertain”.However,ratherthanengagehere(orelsewhere)withriskstotherighttowork(ortojustandfavorableconditionsofwork),itsimplyproceedsinthenextsentencetosuggestthatthisisunlikelyinrealitywithnoevidencepresentedinsupport.

ThisisnottosaythatNASsshouldpresentonlyworst-casescenarioswhenitcomestothepotentialimpactsofAI,northatthereshouldbenoacknowledgementofthepotentialbenefits.However,itiscriticalthatstrategiesengagedeeplyandmeaningfullywiththerisksinordertoensurethattheyinfactreapthepotentialbenefits.Indeed,infollow-upreportstotheinitialFinnishNAS,therewasmuchmoreexplicitengagementwithchallenges,particularlyasrelatedtotrust,securityandthenatureofwork.

3.5 Lack of specificity or incentives

Asillustratedbytheexampleof“human-centric”approachesabove,acommonfindingrevealedbyourreviewwasalackofdepthandspecificityonhowhumanrights(orevenethics)shouldbeprotected.Whilealmostallstrategieshighlightedtheneedtoensurethatpotentialharmsweremitigatedagainst(eitherbyensuringtheprotectionofhumanrightsorbyusinganethicalapproach),strategieslargelyfailedtosetoutanyspecificdetailsofhowthisshouldbedoneinpractice.Thisabsenceofdetailstoodinstarkcontrasttootherpartsofthesestrategieswhichwereoftenquitespecificanddetailed(forexample,aboutthetypesofinvestmentsthatwillbemadeintheareasofresearchandhowtalentwouldbedeveloped).

Therearesomenotableexceptionstothisgeneralfinding.Inparticular,theEUCommunicationonArtificialIntelligence,initssectiononethics,makesspecificcommitmentstothedevelopmentofethicalguidelinesgroundedinhumanrights,aswellasfurtherresearchandcommitmentstoissuessuchastheexplainabilityofAIandtheneedforeffectivedataprotection.

TheDanishstrategyalsostandsoutforboththespecificityofitscommitmentsaroundhumanrights,andforitsintegrationoftheserightsthroughoutthestrategyitself.TheDanishNASoutlinesethicalprinciplesforAIwhicharegroundedinhumanrightsprinciples:self-

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determination(makingpeople’sautonomyparamountintheuseofAI),dignity(preventingAIfromharmingpeopleordisruptinghumanrightsordemocraticprocesses),responsibility(responsibilityformistakesshouldbeabletobeplacedontohumanbeings),explainability(AIdecisionsshouldbeabletobeexplainedandsupported),equalityandjustice(preservingdiversityandpreventingbiasinalgorithms),anddevelopment(developmentofAIshouldbeethicallyresponsibleandorientedtowardsmaximizingsocietalprogress).Itthenmakesclearcommitmentsastohowtheseprincipleswouldtranslateintopracticalactions,includingestablishingadataethicscouncil,improvingtheclarityoflegalresponsibilityaroundAI,andimprovingtheethicaluseofdatainbusiness.TheDanishNASalsoaimstomakeDenmarkaleaderontheseissuesinordertotrytoensureahumanrights-basedapproachelsewherethroughinternationalcooperation.

Evenwithinastrategy,though,therewassometimesinconsistency.Forexample,India’sstrategylaysoutveryspecificcommitmentstotacklingriskstoprivacy,butmakesnosuchcommitmentsonotherpotentialissuesdespiteacknowledgingriskssuchasalgorithmicbias.

3.6 Words vs practice in National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

ThislackofspecificityandclarityofcommitmentsinNASsleadstoanotherpotentialissuethataroseininterviewswithexpertsonAI,namelythatthetextofanNASisonlypartofthestory.Acriticalcomponentofhowhumanrightsare(orarenot)protectedwhenitcomestoAIinaparticularstateis,ofcourse,theimplementationofthestrategy.However,withoutclearandspecificcommitmentswhichwillensurethathumanrightsareprotectedinpractice,orthecreationofincentivesorinstitutionswhichwillpromotesuchprotections,eventhestrongestlanguagerelatedtohumanrightsinanNASwillonlybewords.Inthemostextremecases,languagearoundhumanrightsinanNASmayevenbeincludedbygovernmentswhohavelittledesire,inpractice,toensurethattheyareprotectedinpractice,butseektolegitimatetheirstrategyinternallyandamongdomesticstakeholders.

Inthefollowingsection,thisreportlooksinmoredetailathowtoincorporatehumanrightsmoreclearlyintoNASs,butoneclearneedisforthecreationofsomewaytoensurethatnationalstrategiesnotonlypaylipservicetohumanrightsbutdeliveronthepromisetoprotectthem.

Recommendations for incorporating human rights into National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

4.

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Asdiscussedinsection1,thegoalofNASsaregenerallytomaximizethebenefitsofAItechnologyforastate,whileminimizingtherisks.Thishasmeantthatmuchofthefocushasbeenoneconomicimpacts,andhowtoharnessAItobenefitastate’seconomyandcompetitiveness.TherehasalsobeeninsufficientfocusonaskingwhetherAIisanappropriatesolutionforagivencase.Thisinnovationandeconomicbenefits-centeredapproachisconsistentacrossmostNASs.WhatislessconsistentishowtheydealwiththepotentialriskstohumanrightsandchallengesposedbyAI.Aswehavediscussedabove,asmallnumberofstrategiesdodeeplyengagewiththesequestions,butthesearetheexceptionratherthantherule.

DespitethevarianceinhowexistingNASsaddresshumanrights,stateshaveobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslawtorespect,protectandpromotethem.Theseobligationsareoftenalsoreinforcedandcomplementedbyregionalandnationalhumanrightsframeworks.Itisthereforeincumbentupongovernmentstoensurethattheyfullyconsiderthehumanrightsdimensionsofallareasofpublicpolicy.ThisisnolesstruewhenitcomestotheissueofAI.

Theapproachthatdifferentstakeholders–particularlygovernmentsandtheprivatesector–taketowardsAIwillgreatlyinfluencewhetherthedevelopmentanduseofAIinsocietywillbringbenefitsorharmstohumanrights.AnapproachwhichfocusessolelyontheeconomicaspectsofAI,forexample,mayfailtoconsiderbroadersocietalandindividualimpacts,leavinghumanrights,includingeconomicrights,atriskinthelongterm.Anapproachwhichintegrateshumanrights,ontheotherhand,willbefarmorelikelytoidentifyandmitigaterisks.Onecriticalplacetoensurethatacomprehensive,consistentandhumanrights-respectingapproachistakenisduringthedevelopmentoftheNASs.

BasedonthecurrentstateofNASsglobally,thereareanumberofsuggestionsforstepsgovernmentscantaketoensurethattheirNASlaysthegroundworkforahumanrights-respectingapproachtoAIpolicy.Theseareoutlinedinmoredetailintheassessmenttoolwhichisassociatedwiththisreport(Annex1),buttheyfallintoafewcorecategories.

4.1 Include human rights explicitly and throughout the strategy

ThinkingabouttheimpactofAIonhumanrights,andhowtomitigatetherisksassociatedwiththoseimpactsshouldbecoretoanNAS.Protectionofhumanrightsshouldbelaidoutexplicitlyasafoundation,andthestrategyshouldreturntoengagewithspecificrightsthroughoutallsegments.Simplymentioningthathumanrightsmustbeprotectedorincludingtheminaseparateethicalsectiondoesnotsetthestateupwelltoconsiderrespectfortheprotectionofhumanrightsascriticalatallstages.Itisalsonotsufficienttoengageonlywiththeconcernswhichseemmostpressingtothegovernmentatthatmoment.Allpotentialrisksarelikelytotouchallstates,andacknowledgementofsomerisksattheexpenseofothersleavesgovernmentsopentoproblemslaterdowntheroad.

Evenforgovernmentswhichmayconsiderhumanrightstobeassumedasabaseline,itisimportanttobeexplicitandspecificaboutthecommitmenttotheprotectionofhumanrightsinthiscontextwithinthestrategy.Thisisimportantbothasasignaltoothergovernmentswhichmaylooktoexistingstrategiesindevelopingtheirown,aswellasforcementinghumanrightsasacoreconsiderationalongwithotherconsiderationssuchasinnovation,economicsuccessandcompetitiveness.

Throughoutastrategy,eachsectionshouldconsidertherisksandopportunitiesAIprovidesinrelationtohumanrights,aswellasincludeaspecificfocusonat-risk,vulnerableandmarginalizedcommunities.Forexample,asectionontheimpactofAIonthehealthcaresystemshoulddiscussboththepotentialpositivebenefitsofAIimprovinghealthcareaccessorhealth

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outcomes(andpositivelyimpactingtherighttohealth),whilealsoacknowledgingtherisksofprivacyandpotentialdiscriminationthatcancomeifthisisimplementedwithoutdueconsiderationforthequalityofdataoraneffectivedataprotectionframeworks.

Asnotedinsection2,therearethirteenbroadelementsthatarecommonlyfoundinNAS.Asweoutlineinmoredetailinthecontextoftheassessmenttool(Annex1),therearewaystointegratehumanrightsconsiderationsintoalloftheseelements.Itisimportantnottoconfinethediscussionofhumanrightsimpactstoaseparateethicssection.IfanNASisviewedasablueprintforhowagovernmentisgoingtodeveloppoliciesaroundAI,itisimportanttointegratewithinitadiscussionofthepotentialrisksandopportunitiesforhumanrightsthroughoutallcomponentsofthatstrategytoensurethataspoliciesareenacted,researchisfunded,etc.theseconsiderationsarealreadyfrontandcenter.

Goodpracticeexample

“Norwegiansocietyischaracterisedbytrustandrespectforfundamentalvaluessuchashumanrightsandprivacy.TheGovernmentwantsNorwaytoleadthewayindevelopingandusingAIwithrespectforindividualrightsandfreedoms.”(Norway)

4.2 Outline specific steps to be taken to ensure human rights are protected

Asstrategiesengagewithhumanrights,theyshouldincludespecificgoals,commitmentsoractionstoensurethathumanrightsareprotected.Forexample,ratherthansimplysayingthatthegovernmentwilldevelopethicalguidelinesfortheuseofAI,agovernmentshouldcommittoaprocessthroughwhichtheywilldothis,andemphasizethatanyguidelinesmusthavehumanrightsastheirfoundation.Thestrategycouldsetoutwhowillhelpdeveloptheseguidelines,specifythattheywillbebasedonhumanrights,setatimeframeforthecirculationofguidelinesforconsultation,andclarifythestatusthatsuchguidelineswillhave.Thesedetailscouldbecontainedwithinthestrategyitself,oritcouldbeaccompaniedbyanactionplanwhichsetsoutthesedetails.Thesecondapproachallowsastrategytobealong-term,higher-leveldocument,butwithregularlyupdatedandpublishedactionplansbothonplansforimplementation,aswellasreviewsonprogress.

Makingspecificcommitments,ratherthangeneralones,canhelptoholdgovernmentsaccountableforthecommitmentstheyaremaking.Ifthereareclearbenchmarks,itbecomespossibleforpeopletoevaluatehowwellthesearebeingachieved.ManyofthestrategiestodatehaveveryspecificcommitmentswhenitcomestoresearchortodeployingAIincertainfields.ThissamespecificityanddetailshouldbeusedwhendealingwiththeimpactofAIonhumanrights.

Insettingoutthestepstobetaken,governmentsshouldalwaysbearinmindtheneedtotakeintoaccountthedifferentimpactsthatAIhasupondifferentgroups,particularlythosevulnerabletodiscrimination-suchaswomen,personswithdisabilities,andracialandethnicminorities-aswellastheintersectionalitybetweendifferentpotentialformsofvulnerability.Differentgoals,commitmentsoractionsmaybeneededtoensurethatriskstohumanrightsfacedbyparticulargroupsaresufficientlymitigated.Asnotedbelow,membersofthesegroups,andexpertsintheparticularrisksfacedbythesegroups,shouldalsobeincludedintheprocessofdevelopingNASs.

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Goodpracticeexample

“Actions:

• Commissionedbythegovernment,theScientificCouncilforGovernmentPolicy(WetenschappelijkeRaadvoorhetRegeringsbeleid,WRR)willinvestigatetheimpactofAIonpublicvalues.

• CommissionedbytheResearchandDocumentationCentre(WetenschappelijkOnderzoek-enDocumentatiecentrum)(partoftheMinistryofJusticeandSecurity),UtrechtUniversityhasstartedaresearchprogrammeunderthename‘Legalaspectsofdecision-makingalgorithms’(Juridischeaspectenvanalgoritmendiebesluitennemen).Thisexploratorystudyinvolvesastudyoffivecasestoidentifythekeyopportunitiesandrisksofdecision-makingalgorithmsoverthenextfivetotenyearsandhowtheyrelatetotheexistinglegalframeworks(andthevaluesthatliebehindthem).Thecasestobeexaminedare:theself-drivingcar,P2Penergymarkets,judges,‘doenvermogen’(self-efficacy)andcontentmoderationonplatforms.

• OnbehalfoftheMinisterforLegalProtection,TilburgUniversityisconductingresearchintotheriskstoourprivacyassociatedwiththeuseoffacialrecognitiontechnologyandintopossiblemeasurestolimittheserisks.Thisstudyisexpectedtobecompletedbytheendof2019.”(TheNetherlands)

4.3 Build in incentives or specific requirements to ensure rights-respecting practice

Governmentsshouldtakestepswithintheirstrategiestoincentivizehumanrights-respectingpracticesandactionsacrossallsectors,aswellastoensurethattheirgoalsasregardstheprotectionofhumanrightsarefulfilled.ThiscouldincludetyingresearchfundingtotheoutcomeofhumanrightsimpactassessmentsorrequiringcoursesonhumanrightsandAIintrainingprograms.ItmightalsoincluderequirementswhenitcomestogovernmentprocurementofAIorregulationoftheuseofAIinthepublicandprivatesectors.Aswithattemptingtobespecific,thegoalhereistohelpensurethetranslationofgoodprinciplesonpaperintogoodpracticesintherealworld.Buildinginincentivesorrequirementscanhelpensurethatthevaluesdon’tremainonthepage.

ThisshouldalsoideallyincludecreatingprocessesorinstitutionswhichwillhelptoensuretheprotectionofhumanrightsevenasnewchallengesandconcernsrelatedtoAIemerge.Becauseofthepaceatwhichtechnologyischanging,itislikelythatsomeofthespecificchallengesAIposesarenotyetknown.Inordertopreparetoaddresstheseinthefuture,governmentsshouldensurethattheirstrategiestacklenotonlyknownproblems,butensurethattherearestructuresforaddressingproblemsthatcanadaptovertime.Someoftheseinstitutionsandstructurescouldbeoneswhichalreadyexist,suchasnationalhumanrightsinstitutions,dataprotectionauthorities,orequalitybodies.Inthesecases,furthercapacity-buildingtoensurethattheyareabletoexercisetheirexistingmandateswhiletakingintoconsiderationtheimpactsofAImaybesufficient.Wheretherearestillgaps,thecreationofnewbodiesmaybenecessary,suchastheUnitedKingdom’sCenterforDataEthicsandInnovation.32

Exactlywhatthislookslikeinpracticemayvarysubstantiallybystate.Therearearangeofwaystoincentivizetheprotectionofhumanrightsincludingeverythingfromdirectregulation

32TheCentreforDataEthicsandInnovationisanindependentadvisorybody,setupbytheUKgovernmentwithamandatetoinvestigateandprovideadviceonhowtheUKcouldmaximisethebenefitsofdata-driventechnologies.

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toofficialguidanceandcapacity-buildingforAIdevelopers,tofinancialincentives.Thereisnooneperfectsolutionforeverystate,buteachgovernmentshouldtakeappropriatemeasurestoensurethatthestrategiesgoals’relatingtohumanrightsprotectionsarefullyrealized.

4.4 Set out grievance and remediation processes for human rights violations

HoweverdeeptheanalysisofpotentialhumanrightsimpactsstemmingfromAI,andhowevercomprehensivetheactionsputinplacetomitigateriskstohumanrights,violationsandadverseimpactsuponhumanrightsarenonethelessadistinctlikelihood.Recognizingthis,theinternationalhumanrightsframeworkincludesarighttoaneffectiveremedywhentherehasbeenahumanrightsviolation:theUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRightsareclearthatgovernmentshaveanobligation(abovethatofcompanies’ownresponsibilities)toensurethatvictimsofhumanrightsviolationscausedbytheactionsofbusinessenterprisesareabletoaccesseffectivegrievanceandremedialprocesses.

AnNASshouldlookattheexistinggrievanceandremedialprocessesavailableforvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsrelatingtoAIanddeterminewhethertheyaresufficient.Thesemightincludegeneralpiecesoflegislationprotectinghumanrightswhichgivevictimstheabilitytobringgrievancesthroughcourtprocessesorthroughotherhumanrightsmechanismssuchasnationalhumanrightsinstitutions.Theymightincludespecificprocesses,suchasadataprotectionauthoritywhichcanbringproceedingsagainstactorswhichmisusepersonaldata,orcourtsortribunalsthatcanhearcasesofdiscrimination(includingdiscriminationcausedbyAI).Howeveritmaybethatexistingprocesses(includingtheirlegislativeunderpinnings)needrevisioninlightoftheparticularnatureofAIasatechnology,orcapacity-buildingofthoseinvolvedintheseprocessessothattheyareabletoreceivecomplaintswhichinvolveAI.TheremayalsobeaneedtoensurethatindividualswhoarevictimsofAI-relatedhumanrightsviolationsareawareofthemechanismsbywhichtheycanpursuegrievances,thatthepotentialremediesavailableareeffectiveinaddressingtheharmsthatarecaused,andthatprivateenterpriseswhodeveloporuseAIareappropriatelyincentivizedtoprovidetheirowngrievanceandremedialprocesses.

4.5 Recognize the regional and international dimensions to AI policy

Asaglobaltechnology,noonegovernmentislikelytobeablefullytomanagetheriskstohumanrightsposedbyAIalone.Thecompaniesdevelopingthetechnologyusedinthatstatemaybebasedinotherstatesandthereforedifficulttoregulate;theremaybepartnershipsamongdifferentgovernments,researchinstitutionsorotheractorsonAIacrossnationalborders;andgovernmentsmaywanttoaligntheirownAIpoliciestothoseofotherstatestoenhancetheirattractivenessandcompetitiveness.Fortheseandotherreasons,governmentsshouldbelookingatregionalandglobalforumsandprocesseswhicharealsosettingcommonpolicies,guidelinesorstandardsrelatingtoAI.TheseincludetheworkbeingundertakenbytheCouncilofEuropeandUNESCO.33

Fromahumanrightsperspective,itiscriticalthatgovernmentslookingatinternationalcooperationonAIdonotsimplysetouthowtheyintendtoengageintheseforumsandprocesses,butproactivelypromoteapproachesandoutcomesatthemwhichareconsistentwiththehumanrightsframework.Failuretodosoriskstheseregionalandglobalapproachesand

33InSeptember2019,theCouncilofEuropeestablishedanAdHocCommitteeonArtificialIntelligencewhoseremitincludesexaminingthefeasibilityofalegalframeworkforthedevelopment,designandapplicationofAI.InMarch2020,UNESCOappointedaninternationalexpertgrouptodraftglobalrecommendationsontheethicsofAI.

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outcomesfailingtoappropriatelyprotecthumanrights,andgiventhattheseapproachesandoutcomeswilllikelyinfluencethedevelopmentanduseofAIinotherstates,risksundermininganyeffortsmadeatthenationallevel.NASsshouldthereforeclearlyidentifyrelevantregionalandglobalforumsandprocessesrelatingtoAI,andthemeansbywhichthegovernmentwillpromotehumanrights-respectingapproachesandoutcomesatthemthroughproactiveengagement.

Goodpracticeexample

“Wewillexpandinternational,bilateralandmultilateralcooperationonAI,forexamplewithintheG7andtheG20.Internationalcooperationhaslongbeenakeyfeatureofcutting-edgeresearchprojects,andmostscientificcommunities–includingtheAIcommunity–arealreadyverywellconnectedacrossborders,astheysharecommonresearchinterests.ThiscooperationandthesenetworksaretoserveasthefoundationforEuropeanresearchfacilitiestoengageinfurthercooperationprojectsanddevelopoutstandingsolutionsthatwillbesuccessfulinternationally.Weneedtoworkwiththenationsleadingthisfield–forexampletheUS,Canada,IsraelandsomeAsiancountries–toconductjointbilateraland/ormultilateralR&DactivitiesonthedevelopmentanduseofAI.Thisalsoincludescooperationbetweencompaniesfromdifferentcountrieswhicharepartofthesameglobalvaluechains.GermandiplomaticmissionsandtheGermanHousesofResearchandInnovationcanbeusedforthistypeofcooperation.GermanyTrade&InvestGmbH(GTAI)willactivelydisseminatetheimportanceattachedtoAIinGermanyaspartofitsforeigntradeandinvestmentefforts.ThiswillhelpimprovethevisibilityofGermanprovidersofAIsolutionsandmakeforeigncompaniesawareoftheopportunitiesforinvestmentandcooperationthatexistinGermany.

Whenitcomestodevelopingcommonguidelines,weadvocatetakingamultilateralapproachbyusingexistingforumssuchastheOECD,G7,G20andtheUnitedNations.”(Germany)

4.6 Include human rights experts and other stakeholders in the drafting of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies

Finally,whendraftinganNAS,thegovernmentshouldensurethatexpertsonhumanrightsandtheimpactofAIonhumanrightsareacorepartofthedraftingprocess.Evenifthefocusofthedocumentisoninnovation,includinghumanrightsexpertswillensurethatkeyrisksoropportunitiesrelatingtoAIandhumanrightsarenotmissed.Justasthegovernmentwouldbringinexpertsoneconomicsorthelabormarkettohelpwithdraftingtoensurethatgoodstrategiesaredevelopedaroundthosetopics,theyshouldbringinexpertsonhumanrightstoensurethattheyarewell-integratedintotheoverallstrategy.Thisshouldincludenotonlygeneralhumanrightsorganizations,butalsoabroadrangeofcivilsocietyorganizationsandotherstakeholdersrepresentingcommunitiesthatmaybeadverselyaffectedbyAIorbenefitparticularlyfromcertainapplications(includinggroupssuchaswomen,personswithdisabilities,andracialandethnicminorities).

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National Artificial Intelligence Strategy human rights assessment tool

Annex 1

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1. Methodology/Framework1.1 The components of a National Artificial Intelligence Strategy

ThereisnosinglestandardizedstructureforanNAS,noranexhaustivelistoftheelementsthatoneshouldcontain.Asnotedinsection1.2.2ofthisreport,however,thereareasmallnumberoftaxonomieswhichsuggestthestructuresandelementsthatanNASshoulduseandcontain,andthereisasignificantdegreeofoverlapinthesuggestedstructuresandelementscontainedwithinkeyguidanceonthedevelopmentofNASs.Indevelopingtheframeworksetoutinthenextsection,wehavereviewedsomeoftheexistingtaxonomiesthathavebeenpublished:

• TheWorldEconomicForum’s“FrameworkforDevelopingaNationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy”34

• Dutton’s“BuildinganAIWorld,ReportonNationalandRegionalAIStrategies”35• Dutton’s“AIPolicy101:AnIntroductiontothe10KeyAspectsofAIPolicy”36

Followingareviewoftheseguidancedocumentsandtaxonomies,aswellasexistingNASs,wemappedouttheirrecommendedstructuresforanNASandidentifiedthirteencorecomponentswhichareconsistentlyincluded.Thesecomponentsmaynotdirectlycorrespondtothestructuressuggestedbytheguidancedocumentsandtaxonomies.Somecomponentsarewordeddifferently,orgroupedtogetherunderabroaderheading,ordividedintomoredistinctsections.However,together,allthirteencomponentscaptureallelementsofanNASrecommendedbythedifferentguidancedocumentsandtaxonomies.Insection1.2.2ofthisreport,wemapoutthestructuresandelementssuggestedbytheguidancedocumentswereviewedandhowtheylinktothethirteencomponentsthatweuse.

Thosethirteencomponentsare,insummary:

1. Framing,visionandobjectives:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’soverallapproachtowards(orvisionof)AI,aswellastheaimsandobjectivesoftheNASortheprincipleswhichunderpinit.

2. Research:Thiscomponentlooksatthegovernment’splanstosupportresearchinthedevelopmentanduseofAI.

3. Talent:ThiscomponentlooksathowthegovernmentplanstoattractandcreatedomesticandinternationaltalentinAI.

4. Skillsandthefutureofwork:Thiscomponentlooksatbothhowthegovernment planstoensurethatthepopulation,particularlythoseineducation,havetheskills neededtoengageinaworldwithAI,aswellasplanstohelpaddressthedisruptionin laborasaresultofAI.

5. AIintheprivatesector:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstopromotetheuseofAIintheprivatesector.

6. AIinthegovernment:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstopromotetheuseofAIingovernmentandthepublicsector.

7. Data:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstoaddressissuesrelatingtodatacreatedbyAI,suchasdataprotectionframeworks,datasharingarrangements,andopendata.

34WorldEconomicForum,AFrameworkforDevelopingaNationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy:CentreforFourthIndustrialRevolution,August2019.35Dutton,T.,BuildinganAIWorld,ReportonNationalandRegionalAIStrategies,2019.36Dutton,T.,AIPolicy101:AnIntroductiontothe10KeyAspectsofAIPolicy,2018,availableat:https://medium.com/politics-ai/ai-policy-101-what-you-need-to-know-about-ai-policy-163a2bd68d65

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8. Infrastructureandcybersecurity:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment'splansto ensurethattherightphysicalandotherinfrastructureisinplaceforAI,aswellasto ensureitssecurity.

9. Ethics:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstomakesurethatthe developmentanduseofAIinthestateisethical.

10. Regulation:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstointroduceorreform legislativeandregulatoryframeworksrelatingtoAI.

11. Inclusion:Thiscomponentsetsoutthegovernment’splanstoensurethatthebenefits ofAIareinclusivelyandequitablyfelt,aswellastoensurethattheAIcommunity broadlyisinclusiveofdiversebackgroundsandperspectives.

12. Foreignpolicyandinternationalcooperation:Thiscomponentsetsouthowthe governmentwillworkwithothergovernments,aswellasinternationalandregional organizations,onissuesrelatedtoAI.Thisusuallyinvolvescollaborationtodealwith sharedthreats,butmayalsoincludepromotingthegovernment’sparticularvaluesand foreignpolicyprioritiesatinternationalandregionalforumswhereAIisdiscussed.

13. Governanceandstakeholderengagement:Thiscomponentsetsouttherolesand responsibilitiesofdifferentactorsinthefieldofAI.Thisincludesthoseactorswhich haveresponsibilityfortheimplementationofthestrategyaswellasthosewithwhom thegovernmentwillworkorsupport,suchastheprivatesectororcivilsociety.

Whileallcomponentshavelinkstohumanrights,noteverysectionwithineachcomponentwilldo;somepartsofanNASwillbehugelyimportantfromahumanrightsperspective,otherswillhavelittleornorelevance.Assuch,therecommendationssetoutinthistooldonottouchuponallaspectsofanNAS,butfocusinsteadonthosewiththeclearestandstrongestlinkstohumanrights.

1.2 Human rights analysis

Aswithourreport,ouranalysisandrecommendationsforthistoolarebasedonexistinginternationalhumanrightslawandstandards,primarilytheUniversalDeclarationonHumanRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,aswellastheirelaborationandinterpretationbytheUNTreatyBodies.37

1.3 Scope and rationale for inclusion of good practice examples

AswellassettingoutcriteriaforhowanNAScanrespect,protectandpromotehumanrights,wehaveincluded,inthethirdsectionofthistool,anumberofexamplesofexistinggoodpracticeforeachofthecriteria.Indeterminingwhichexamplestoinclude,wefirstofallreviewedexistingNASs,applyingthecriteria.FromthelistofinstanceswherethecriteriaweremetinanNAS,wechoseexampleswhichweconsideredtomoststronglymeetthecriteria,whileensuringaswidearangeaspossibleofregionalandnationalcontexts.Assuch,therearemanyfurtherinstancesofgoodpracticewhicharenothighlightedinthistool,andsotheexamplesincludedshouldnotbeconsideredexhaustive.

37Whiletheapproachofthistoolisbaseduponinternationalhumanrightslawandstandards,otherregionalhumanrightssystemsmayprovideagreaterdegreeofprotection.GovernmentsdevelopingNASsinstateswhicharemembersofregionalhumanrightssystemmayalsowishtoconsiderensuringthattheNASreflectsandisconsistentwiththoseregionalstandards.

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1.4 How to use this tool

ThesecondsectionofthistoolcontainskeyquestionsandcriteriaforassessmentforeachofthethirteencomponentsmostcommonlyfoundinanNAS.Thekeyquestion(s)arethequestionsthatthedraftersoftheNASshouldaskthemselvesinrelationtoeachcomponent.Thesequestionsshouldpromptconsiderationofhowhumanrightsrelatetothatparticularcomponent,andguidetheinclusionofappropriatelanguageandcommitments.

WhiletheparticularlanguageandcommitmentswillvaryfromNAStoNAS,reflectingthedifferentcontextsofthestateswhicharedevelopingthem,eachcomponentalsocontainsbroadcriteriaforassessingwhetherthatelementsufficientlyincorporateshumanrightsconsiderations.ThesecriteriacanbeusedbythedraftersoftheNASthemselvesasguidanceforthetypesoflanguageandcommitmentstheyshouldinclude.TheycanalsobeusedbyotherstakeholderstoassesswhetheranNAS(oradraftofone)sufficientlyincorporateshumanrightsconsiderations.

Asnotedabove,thethirdsectionofthistoolprovidesanumberofexamplesofexistinggoodpracticeforeachofthecriteria.

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2. Components,keyquestionsandcriteria(1) FRAMING, VISION AND OBJECTIVES

Keyquestion

• HowcanhumanrightsconsiderationsbeembeddedattheheartoftheNASandmadecentraltothestrategy?

Criteriaforassessment

❏ 1A:ThesectionwhichframesAIand/orsetsoutthegovernment’svisionofAIshouldexplicitlyhighlightthelinksbetweenAIandhumanrights,andthepotentialbenefitsandriskstohumanrightsthatstemfromitsdevelopmentanduse.

❏ 1B:OneoftheobjectivesoftheNAS,oroneoftheprincipleswhichunderpinsit,shouldbetorespect,protectandpromotethehumanrightsofpersonswithinthejurisdictionofthestateconcerned.

(2) RESEARCH

Keyquestions

• WhatstepscanbetakentoensurethatresearchintoAIadequatelyrespectshumanrightsandthatresearchersactivelyworktomitigatehumanrightsrisks?

• Whatcanbedonetoensurethatresearchwillactivelypromotehumanrights-respectingapplicationsofAI?

Criteria

❏ 2A:TheNASshouldsetoutspecificactionsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatanypublicfundingofAI-relatedresearchwillbehumanrights-respecting.Thesestepscouldinclude:

❏ Requiringresearchgrantapplicationstosetouthowtheyarehumanrights-respecting,andforthistobeakeyconsiderationinfundingdecisions.

❏ Requiringprospectiveresearchprojectstoundergohumanrightsimpactassessmentsinordertoidentifyandmitigateriskstohumanrightsthatmightmaterializeasaresultoftheresearch.

❏ Specificallyplacingasaconditionforfundingevidencethattheresearchwillnotunderminehumanrights.

❏ PromotingcollaborationbetweendifferentresearchdisciplesonAI-relatedfunding,buildingcapacitywithinAIresearchmorebroadlyonunderstandingandintegratinghumanrightsconsideration.

❏ 2B:TheNASshouldsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketosupportresearchwhichspecificallyfocusesonthesocietalimpactsofAI,andhowhumanrightscanbeprotectedinthedevelopmentanduseofAI.

Au

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(3) TALENT

Keyquestion

• WhatstepscanbetakentoensurethatspecialistsinAIhaveafullunderstandingofitshumanrightsdimensionstomakethembetterpreparedtointegratethisintotheirwork?

Criteria

❏ 3A:WherethissectionsetsoutstepstotrainAIspecialists,itshouldpromotetheincorporationofhumanrightsintoanysucheducationandtraining(seealso4Aand9A).

❏ 3B:ThissectionshouldoutlinespecificstepsthatwillbetakentopromoteadiverseAIworkforcewithrepresentationfromallsegmentsofsociety.

(4) SKILLS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK

Keyquestions

• WhatstepscanbetakentoensurethatthefutureworkforcewhodeveloporuseAIhaveafullunderstandingofitshumanrightsdimensions?

• WhatmustbedonetoensurethattherighttoworkandtherighttorighttojustandfavorableconditionsofworkareprotectedasAIimpactsuponlabormarkersandemployment?

Criteria

❏ 4A:Wherethissectionsetsoutstepstotrainstudents,workersorothersmorebroadlyonAI,itshouldpromotetheincorporationofhumanrightsintoanysucheducationandtraining(seealso3Aand9A).

❏ 4B:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoaddressthreatstotherighttoworkposedbyAI,suchasthedisruptionoflabormarkets.

❏ 4C:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoaddressthreatstotherighttotheenjoymentofjustandfavorableconditionsofwork(includingsafeworkingconditions,aworkplacefreeofdiscriminationandharassment)posedbycertainapplicationsofAI,suchAI-basedsurveillanceofperformancetrackingbyemployersintheworkplace.

(5) AI IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Keyquestion

• WhatstepscanbetakenatthenationalleveltoensurethathumanrightsarenotunderminedbythedevelopmentanduseofAIintheprivatesector?

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Criteria

❏ 5A:TheNASshouldsetoutstepstoensurethatappropriatemeasures,includingregulatorymeasures,areinplacetoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibitedintheprivatesector(seealso9A).

❏ 5B:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsintheprivatesectorwhichaffecttheirhumanrightsorlegalrightsareabletochallengethosedecisions(seealso9A).

❏ 5C:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsintheprivatesectorwhichcauseadversehumanrightsimpactshaveaccesstogrievanceandremedialprocesses,witheffectiveremedies,whetherthroughstate-based,company-basedorothermechanisms.

(6) AI IN THE GOVERNMENT

Keyquestion

• WhatstepsmustbetakentoensurethattheuseofAIbythegovernmentandthepublicsectordoesnotunderminehumanrights?

Criteria

❏ 6A:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoundertakinghumanrightsimpactsassessmentspriortoanyAIdevelopment,commissioning,procurementorusebyalllevelsofgovernmentorinthepublicsectorinordertoidentifyandmitigateriskstohumanrightsthatmightmaterializeasaresultoftheresearch.Further,theseassessmentsshouldcontinuethereafteratallstagesofdevelopmentandimplementationofAIinthepublicsector.38

❏ 6B:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttofulltransparencyoverthedevelopment,commissioningoruseofAIbythegovernmentorinthepublicsector,sothatindividualsarefullyawareofwhenandhowAIisbeingused(seealso9A).

❏ 6C:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhohavedecisionsmadebyAIinthepublicsectorwhichaffecttheirhumanrightsorlegalrightsareabletochallengethosedecisions(seealso9A).

❏ 6D:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsbygovernmentorthepublicsectorwhichimpermissiblyinterferewiththeirhumanrightshaveaccesstogrievanceandremedialprocesses,witheffectiveremedies.

38See,forexample,theCanadiangovernment’sDirectiveonAutomatedDecisionMaking,availableat:https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592

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(7) DATA

Keyquestion

• Whatstepscanbetakentoensurethattherighttoprivacyandotherhumanrightsarenotunderminedbythecollection,storageandprocessingofdatabyAIorinthedevelopmentofnewAItechnologies?

Criteria

❏ 7A:TheNASshouldrecognizethattheuseofdatabyAIrepresentspotentialriskstoindividuals’rightstoprivacy(includingthroughdatacollectionandstorage,aswellastheuseofdataintrainingmodels),andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethattheserisksaremitigated.

❏ 7B:WheretheNASsetsoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoencouragegreateropendata,ormoreopendatasets,thissectionshouldalsosetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatanyriskstoprivacyaremitigated.

❏ 7C:Asoneofthesesteps,theNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttothedevelopmentof,whereitdoesnotalreadyexist,appropriate,proportionateandeffectivedataprotectionlegislation,consistentwithCouncilofEuropeConvention108,OECDGuidelinesonPrivacy,andotherinternationalbestpractice(suchastheEU’sGeneralDataProtectionRegulation).

❏ 7D:TheNASshouldrecognizetherisksofbiasanddiscriminationthatstemfromuseofnon-representativeorskeweddatasetsbyAI,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethattheserisksaremitigated.

(8) INFRASTRUCTURE AND CYBERSECURITY

Keyquestion

• Whatisnecessarytoensurethatmeasurestakentoprotectinfrastructureandcybersecurityarenotdoneattheexpenseofhumanrights?

Criteria

❏ 8A:TheNASshouldmakeclearthatanystepstakentoenhancethecybersecurityofrelevantdigitalinfrastructurewillbeconsistentwiththestate’sobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw,particularlytherighttoprivacy.Indoingso,theNASshouldclearlyoutlinethetradeoffsthatitanticipatesinattemptingtoensuresecurity.

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(9) ETHICS

Keyquestions

• WhatarethespecificprinciplesthatmustbeoutlinedtoensurethathumanrightsarerespectedatalllevelsofthedevelopmentandimplementationofAI?

• HowwillthegovernmentensurethatthedevelopmentandusofAI,regardlessofbywhomorforwhatpurpose,doesnotputhumanrightsatrisk?

Criteria

❏ 9A:TheNASshouldbespecificabouttheprinciplesthatthestateisusingtoensuretheethicalimplementationofAI,beginningwithhowhumanrightsprinciplesapplytoandshouldbeconsideredinthecontextofAI.

❏ 9B:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatAIisonlydevelopedandusedinwayswhicharehumanrights-respecting.Thesestepscouldinclude:

❏ DevelopingacomprehensivelegislativeorregulatoryframeworkonthedevelopmentanduseofAI,applyingtoboththepublicandprivatesector,whichsetsoutconstraintstoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibited(seealso10A).

❏ Workingwithrelevantpartsoftheprivatesectortoensurethatappropriatemeasuresareinplacetoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibitedinthesector(seealso5A).

❏ RequiringgreatertransparencywheneverAIisusedintheprivateandpublicsector(seealso5Aand6A).

❏ Promotingtheincorporationofhumanrightsintotheeducationandtrainingofengineers,researchersandothersinvolvedinthedevelopmentofAI(seealso3Aand4A)

❏ MechanismforauditingAI,andalgorithmsspecifically.

(10) REGULATION

Keyquestions

• Arelegislativeorregulatorymeasuresneededtoensurethatsafeguardsforhumanrightsareeffectiveandenforceable?

• Ifso,whattypesofregulationarenecessary,andhowcanriskstohumanrightsfromtheseregulationsbemitigated?

Criteria

❏ 10A:WherethegovernmentisconsideringdevelopingregulationofAI,theNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoundertakingacomprehensivehumanrightsimpactassessmentofanylegislation,tofullpublicconsultationofanylegislativeproposals,andtotheinvolvementofallrelevantstakeholdersinthedevelopmentofanylegislation(seealso9B).

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(11) INCLUSION

Keyquestions

• WhatstepsmustbetakentoensurethattherightstoequalityandnondiscriminationarenotunderminedbythedevelopmentanduseofAI?

• WhatstepsmustbetakentoensurethatneitherthebenefitsfromnortherisksfromAIareconcentratedinonlycertaingroupsofsociety?

• WhatcanbedonetoensurethatthedevelopmentanduseofAIinvolvesadiverseandrepresentativegroup,reflectingsocietymorebroadly?

Criteria

❏ 11A:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentstakeholdergroupswhoneedtobeinvolvedindiscussionsaroundAI,particularlyinthegovernanceandimplementationoftheNAS,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketobolstertheirinclusion.

❏ 11B:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentcommunitiesandsocialgroupswhoareatriskofbeingleftbehindasAIisdevelopedandused,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketomitigatetheserisks.

❏ 11C:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentcommunitiesandsocialgroupswhomaybeparticularlyadverselyaffectedbyAIindifferentways,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketobolstertheirinclusioninAI-relateddiscussions.

(12) FOREIGN POLICY

Keyquestions

• WhatstepscanbetakentoensurethatinternationalandregionalstandardsandpoliciesrelatingtoAIarealsoconsistentwithhumanrightsstandards?

• Howcanthestate’sforeignpolicypositionsandengagementencouragethis?

Criteria

❏ 12A:Thereshouldbeanunambiguouscommitmenttopromotingahumanrights-respectingapproachtothedevelopmentanduseofAIaspartofthestate’sforeignpolicy.

❏ 12B:Thesectionshouldidentifyrelevantinternationalandregionalforumsand policymakingspaceswhereco-operationonAItakesplace,andwherethatforeign policycanbeadvanced.

❏ 12C:ThesectionshouldsetoutaprocessfordevelopingguidelinesorguidanceonthesaleandexportofAItechnologiesinordertoensurethattheyarenotusedinwaysthatmightviolatehumanrights.

❏ 12D:ThegovernmentshouldcommittohelpingpartnercountriesbuildAIcapacityinahumanrights-respectingway,andtiecooperationtopartnercountries’commitmenttothisapproach.

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(13) GOVERNANCE AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Keyquestions

• WhatisthebestwaytoensurethatthefullrangeofrelevantstakeholdersareengagedinthegovernanceandoversightoftheNASanditsimplementation?

Criteria

❏ 13A:GovernanceandimplementationoftheNASshouldinvolverepresentativesofallstakeholdergroups,includingtheprivatesector,thetechnicalcommunityandcivilsociety.

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3.GoodPracticeExamples(1) FRAMING, VISION AND OBJECTIVES

❏ 1A:ThesectionwhichframesAIand/orsetsoutthegovernment’svisionofAIshouldexplicitlyhighlightthelinksbetweenAIandhumanrights,andthepotentialbenefitsandriskstohumanrightsthatstemfromitsdevelopmentanduse.

Belgium“Thedevelopment,deployment,anduseofAImusthappen,butwithcautionforindividualandcollectiverights.AIcanindeedposetrustandethicalquestions.Forinstance,AIoftenusesdatabasedonhumanbehaviourand,hence,canreinforceunwantedhumanbias.Multipleincidentshavebeensharedinthepressoverthelastfewyears:analgorithmmistakenlyclassifyingblackpeopleas“gorillas”orarecruitingtoolfavouringmenfortechnicaljobs.Moreover,throughtheirscalablenature,algorithmscancreatenegativefeedbackloopsand,inthatway,deeplyinfluenceoursociety.Forexample,policepresencebasedonhistoricalcrimecancauseafurtherdetectionofpettycrimesinproblematicareas.Thesesamepettycrimeswouldgounnoticedinhistoricallysaferareas,furtherincreasinginequality.”Denmark“Artificialintelligenceentailsanentirelynewwayofmakingdecisions,inwhichcomputersandalgorithmsplayalargerrole.Forexample,theintroductionofself-learningalgorithmsonsocialmediacreatesuncertaintyregardingtheextenttowhichwecanrelyonrecommendationsfromintelligentsystems.Thisraisesanumberofquestionsregardingresponsibilityandsecuritythatneedtobeaddressed.Furthermore,artificialintelligenceraisesanumberofethicalissuesrelatingtotherelationshipbetween,ontheonehandtheadvantagesfromusingnewtechnologies,and,onotherhand,considerationofpeople’sbasicrights,dueprocess,andfundamentalsocialvalues.”Malta“AIraisesprofoundquestionsacrossethical,legalandregulatorydomains,touchingarangeofareasfromprotectingnationalsecurityandcitizenrightstoadvancingcommercialinterestsandinternationalstanding.Theseincludetherisksofbiasedandunaccountableautomateddecision-making,discrimination,dataprivacy-relatedissues,cyberthreatsandthepotentialformanipulationofpoliticalsystemsandwidersocietyingeneral.”TheNetherlands“Artificialintelligence(AI)isradicallychangingtheworld.AIwillmakeasubstantialcontributiontoeconomicgrowth,prosperityandwell-beingoftheNetherlands.Itwillalsobeofhugeassistanceindealingwithsocietalissuesinareassuchasageing,climatechange,foodsafetyandhealthcare.Atthesametime,wemustnotcloseoureyestochallengessuchastheprotectionoffundamentalrightsincludingprivacy,non-discriminationandautonomy.”

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❏ 1B:OneoftheobjectivesoftheNAS,oroneoftheprincipleswhichunderpinsit,shouldbetorespect,protectandpromotethehumanrightsofpersonswithinthejurisdictionofthestateconcerned.

CzechRepublic“Wearegoingtofocusonprotectingeverypersonandconsumer,theirrightsandprivacy,especiallytheweakestones.Wearegoingtopreventdiscrimination,manipulationandmisuseofAI,wearegoingtosettherulesfordecision-makingofalgorithmsaboutpeopleineverydaylife.”Denmark

“Thegoalsofthegovernmentarethat:

• Ethicalprinciplesareincorporatedinthedevelopmentanduseofartificialintelligencetosecurerespectforindividualsandtheirrights,andfordemocracy.”

Germany“Thirdly,theStrategyisbasedonthedemocraticdesiretoanchorsuchafar-reachingtechnologyasAI,whichmayalsobedeployedinsensitiveareasoflife,inanethical,legal,culturalandinstitutionalcontextwhichupholdsfundamentalsocialvaluesandindividualrightsandensuresthatthetechnologyservessocietyandindividuals.”Lithuania“Havingthecapabilitytogeneratetremendousbenefitsforindividualsandsociety,AIalsogivesrisetocertainrisksthatshouldbeproperlymanaged.Giventhat,onthewhole,AI’sbenefitsoutweighitsrisks,wemustensuretofollowtheroadthatmaximizesthebenefitsofAIwhileminimizingitsrisks.Toensurethatwestayontherighttrack,ahuman-centricapproachtoAIisneeded.TrustworthyAIhastwocomponents:(1)ethicalpurpose-itshouldrespectfundamentalrights,applicableregulationandcoreprinciplesandvaluesand(2)itshouldbetechnicallyrobustandreliablesince,evenwithgoodintentions,alackoftechnologicalmasterycancauseunintentionalharm.”TheNetherlands“Track3:Strengtheningthefoundations:Publicvaluesandhumanrightsremainprotected”Russia“Thebasicprinciplesofthedevelopmentanduseofartificialintelligencetechnologies,theobservanceofwhichisobligatoryduringtheimplementationofthisStrategy,include:a)theprotectionofhumanrightsandliberties:ensuringtheprotectionofthehumanrightsandlibertiesguaranteedbyRussianandinternationallaws,includingtherighttowork,andaffordingindividualstheopportunitytoobtaintheknowledgeandacquiretheskillsneededinordertosuccessfullyadapttotheconditionsofadigitaleconomy;”

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(2) RESEARCH

❏ 2A:TheNASshouldsetoutspecificactionsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatanypublicfundingofAI-relatedresearchwillbehumanrights-respecting.Thesestepscouldinclude:

❏ Requiringresearchgrantapplicationstosetouthowtheyarehumanrights-respecting,andforthistobeakeyconsiderationinfundingdecisions.

❏ Requiringprospectiveresearchprojectstoundergohumanrightsimpactassessmentsinordertoidentifyandmitigateriskstohumanrightsthatmightmaterializeasaresultoftheresearch.

❏ Specificallyplacingasaconditionforfundingevidencethattheresearchwillnotunderminehumanrights.

❏ PromotingcollaborationbetweendifferentresearchdisciplesonAI-relatedfunding,buildingcapacitywithinAIresearchmorebroadlyonunderstandingandintegratinghumanrightsconsideration.

❏ 2B:TheNASshouldsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketosupportresearch

whichspecificallyfocusesonthesocietalimpactsofAI,andhowhumanrightscanbeprotectedinthedevelopmentanduseofAI.

CzechRepublic“LegalandsocietalaspectsofAI,ethicalrules,consumerprotectionandsecurityissuesLong-termobjectives(until2035):

• Securingstandardsprimarilyintheareasofsecurity,personaldataprotectionandtheprotectionoffundamentalrightsinresearch,developmentanduseofAI.”

(3) TALENT

❏ 3A:WherethissectionsetsoutstepstotrainAIspecialists,itshouldpromotetheincorporationofhumanrightsintoanysucheducationandtraining(seealso4Aand9A).

❏ 3B:ThissectionshouldoutlinespecificstepsthatwillbetakentopromoteadiverseAIworkforcewithrepresentationfromallsegmentsofsociety.

(4) SKILLS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK

❏ 4A:Wherethissectionsetsoutstepstotrainstudents,workersorothersmorebroadlyonAI,itshouldpromotetheincorporationofhumanrightsintoanysucheducationandtraining(seealso3Aand9A).

❏ 4B:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoaddressthreatstotherighttoworkposedbyAI,suchasthedisruptionoflabormarkets.

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Belgium“We,therefore,mustensurethatallhighereducationstudentsreceiveatleastasoftskilling,data,technologyandAIcoursesinanyfield,whichalsocoverstheethicalaspects.”

❏ 4B:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoaddressthreatstotherighttoworkposedbyAI,suchasthedisruptionoflabormarkets.

Australia(Australia’sTechFuture)“Theimpactoftechnologicalchangeoncurrentandfuturejobsislikelytobeuneven.Differentindustriesandregionswillbeimpactedindifferentways.ManyAustraliansfearongoingtechnologicalchangemeansthattheywillbeleftunemployedorunderemployedwithouttheskillsrequiredtosecureoneofthenewwell-paidjobsonoffer.Governmentsandindustryneedtoprovidesupportforworkersneedingtoup-skill,re-skillortransitionintonewareasofemployment,whetherthisbeearlyintheircareerorwhenthepersonisclosertoretirement.”

❏ 4C:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoaddress

threatstotherighttotheenjoymentofjustandfavorableconditionsofwork(includingsafeworkingconditions,aworkplacefreeofdiscriminationandharassment)posedbycertainapplicationsofAI,suchAI-basedsurveillanceofperformancetrackingbyemployersintheworkplace.

(5) AI IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

❏ 5A:TheNASshouldsetoutstepstoensurethatappropriatemeasures,includingregulatorymeasures,areinplacetoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibitedintheprivatesector(seealso9A).

❏ 5B:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsintheprivatesectorwhichaffecttheirhumanrightsorlegalrightsareabletochallengethosedecisions(seealso9A).

❏ 5C:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsintheprivatesectorwhichcauseadversehumanrightsimpactshaveaccesstogrievanceandremedialprocesses,witheffectiveremedies,whetherthroughstate-based,company-basedorothermechanisms.

(6) AI IN THE GOVERNMENT

❏ 6A:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoundertakinghumanrightsimpactsassessmentspriortoanyAIdevelopment,commissioning,procurementorusebyalllevelsofgovernmentorinthepublicsectorinordertoidentifyandmitigateriskstohumanrightsthatmightmaterializeasaresultoftheresearch.Further,these

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assessmentsshouldcontinuethereafteratallstagesofdevelopmentandimplementationofAIinthepublicsector.39

❏ 6B:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttofulltransparencyoverthedevelopment,commissioningoruseofAIbythegovernmentorinthepublicsector,sothatindividualsarefullyawareofwhenandhowAIisbeingused(seealso9A).

❏ 6C:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhohavedecisionsmadebyAIinthepublicsectorwhichaffecttheirhumanrightsorlegalrightsareabletochallengethosedecisions(seealso9A).

❏ 6D:TheNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoensuringthatindividualswhoareimpactedbyAIorotheralgorithmictoolsbeingusedtomakedecisionsbygovernmentorthepublicsectorwhichimpermissiblyinterferewiththeirhumanrightshaveaccesstogrievanceandremedialprocesses,witheffectiveremedies.

(7) DATA

❏ 7A:TheNASshouldrecognizethattheuseofdatabyAIrepresentspotentialriskstoindividuals’rightstoprivacy(includingthroughdatacollectionandstorage,aswellastheuseofdataintrainingmodels),andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethattheserisksaremitigated.

Australia(ArtificialIntelligence:Solvingproblems,growingtheeconomyandimprovingourqualityoflife)“AIdevelopersalsoneedcertaintyandguidancearoundwhatrepresentsethicalandacceptableuseofprivatedata.Thisrequiresattentionto“datacreep”;thegradualincreaseinthecomprehensivenessandgranularityofdataheldbyorganisationsaboutpeoplewhich,whencross-referencedtootherdata,providesevenmoredetailedpersonalinsights.Organisationswillincreasinglybechallengedwithachievingdataintegritywherebypeople’sprivateandconfidentialinformationisproperlyprotectedandmanaged.”Germany“Inordertoachievethegoalssetoutinthisstrategy,thequantityofuseful,high-qualitydatamustbesignificantlyincreasedwithoutviolatingpersonalrights,therighttocontrolone’sowndataorotherfundamentalrights.”“Inorderforhigh-qualityAIapplicationstobedeveloped,whichwillprovetheprowessofGermanandEuropeanAIdevelopersandusers,AIapplicationsrequirehigh-qualitydatasets.Incaseswherepersonaldataisused,italsoneedstobeensuredthatthedataisprocessedinawaythatconformswiththelaw–i.e.legalquality–byrespectingpersonalrights,therighttocontrolone’sowndataandotherfundamentalvalues.WiththeEUGeneralDataProtectionRegulationhavingenteredintoforceinMay2018,theEUhasadoptedhighdataprotectionstandards,providingauniversallegalframeworkgoverningtheprocessingofpersonaldatawithintheEU.TheFederalGovernmentwillexploreastowhetherthecurrentlegalframeworkwillallowpersonaldatatobeusedasanopportunityforeconomicdevelopmentontheonehand,andensuretherighttocontrolone’sowndataontheother,takingintoaccountnewAI-basedtechnologies.”

39See,forexample,theCanadiangovernment’sDirectiveonAutomatedDecisionMaking,availableat:https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592

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❏ 7B:WheretheNASsetsoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoencouragegreateropendata,ormoreopendatasets,thissectionshouldalsosetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatanyriskstoprivacyaremitigated.

Germany

“Inordertoachievethegoalssetoutinthisstrategy,thequantityofuseful,high-qualitydatamustbesignificantlyincreasedwithoutviolatingpersonalrights,therighttocontrolone’sowndataorotherfundamentalrights.”

❏ 7C:Asoneofthesesteps,theNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttothedevelopmentof,whereitdoesnotalreadyexist,appropriate,proportionateandeffectivedataprotectionlegislation,consistentwithCouncilofEuropeConvention108,OECDGuidelinesonPrivacy,andotherinternationalbestpractice(suchastheEU’sGeneralDataProtectionRegulation).

❏ 7D:TheNASshouldrecognizetherisksofbiasanddiscriminationthatstemfromuseofnon-representativeorskeweddatasetsbyAI,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethattheserisksaremitigated.

(8) INFRASTRUCTURE AND CYBERSECURITY

❏ 8A:TheNASshouldmakeclearthatanystepstakentoenhancethecybersecurityofrelevantdigitalinfrastructurewillbeconsistentwiththestate’sobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw,particularlytherighttoprivacy.Indoingso,theNASshouldclearlyoutlinethetradeoffsthatitanticipatesinattemptingtoensuresecurity.

(9) ETHICS

❏ 9A:TheNASshouldbespecificabouttheprinciplesthatthestateisusingtoensuretheethicalimplementationofAI,beginningwithhowhumanrightsprinciplesapplytoandshouldbeconsideredinthecontextofAI.

❏ 9B:TheNASshouldsetoutthespecificstepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketoensurethatAIisonlydevelopedandusedinwayswhicharehumanrights-respecting.Thesestepscouldinclude:

❏ DevelopingacomprehensivelegislativeorregulatoryframeworkonthedevelopmentanduseofAI,applyingtoboththepublicandprivatesector,whichsetsoutconstraintstoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibited(seealso10A).

❏ Workingwithrelevantpartsoftheprivatesectortoensurethatappropriatemeasuresareinplacetoensurethatharmstohumanrightsareprohibitedinthesector(seealso5A).

❏ RequiringgreatertransparencywheneverAIisusedintheprivateandpublicsector(seealso5Aand6A).

❏ Promotingtheincorporationofhumanrightsintotheeducationandtrainingofengineers,researchersandothersinvolvedinthedevelopmentofAI(seealso3Aand4A).

❏ MechanismforauditingAI,andalgorithmsspecifically.

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Colombia(translatedfromSpanish)“EthicalframeworkforAIandsecurity:thenationalgovernmentrecognisesthattheuseofAIentailsaseriesofethicalchallengesthatmustbeconsideredandaddressedbythestate,suchas,justice,freedom,non-discrimination,transparency,responsibledesign,security,privacyandtheroleofhumanrights,amongmanyothers.Theseprinciplesshouldbediscussedandconstructedwiththesupportoftheprivatesectorandthescientificandacademiccommunityofthecountryexpertinthefield.First,theMinistryofInformationTechnologyandCommunicationstogetherwiththePresidencyoftheRepublicwilldesignatransversalethicalframeworkthatwillguidethedesign,development,implementationandevaluationofAIsystemsthatareimplementedinthecountry,followingtheprinciplesoftheOECDandasindicatedintheprinciplesforthedevelopmentofAIinColombia,whichthisdocumentdealswith.Thisframeworkwillalsodifferentiateandemphasizedataethics,algorithmethicsandethicsthatguidethebehaviorsandpracticesofindividualswhodevelopandimplementtechnology.Theproposedprincipleswilldevelop,ataminimum,conceptssuchasjustice,transparency,freedom,responsibility,inclusionandtheroleofhumanrightsinthecreationandimplementationofthistechnology.”CzechRepublic“LegalandsocietalaspectsofAI,ethicalrules,consumerprotectionandsecurityissuesLong-termobjectives(until2035):

• Securingstandardsprimarilyintheareasofsecurity,personaldataprotectionandtheprotectionoffundamentalrightsinresearch,developmentanduseofAI.”

EuropeanUnion“Asafirststeptoaddressethicalconcerns,draftAIethicsguidelineswillbedevelopedbytheendoftheyear,withdueregardtotheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion.”Lithuania“EstablishAIethicscommitteethatreviewsimpactoftechnologyonfundamentalrights.Thecommitteeshouldincluderepresentativesfromacademia,government,industryandNGOsector.Thecommitteeshouldprovide(independentlycreated)shortandlong-termanalysisandrecommendations.Theserecommendationsshouldbeusedtocreateandupdateexistingethicalstandards.”Luxembourg“Inordertoensurethatlegalandethicalguidelinesareimplementedtoprotectfundamentalrightsandfreedoms,Luxembourgwillfocusonthefollowingkeyactions:

• EngagingwiththenationaldataprotectionauthorityandleveragingitsexpertiseinordertoaddressAI-relatedquestions.

• Settingupagovernmentaltechnology&ethicsadvisorycommitteetodiscussethicalimplementationsoftechnologyandadvisingtheGovernmentonpotentialrisksandsocietalimpacts.

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• Collaboratingwithkeybodiesthatworkondevelopingandsafeguardingcorporate

governanceinLuxembourgtoacceleratetheadoptionofproperAIcorporategovernance.

• Activelyfollowing,undertheleadershipofILNAS,internationalnormalizationprocessesinthefieldofAI,forexampleinthecontextofISO.

• Developingandimplementinginnovativeprivacy-enhancingtechnologiesfortheuseoflargedatasetsinthecontextofAIlearning.”

TheNetherlands“TheNetherlandsiscommittedtothedevelopmentandapplicationofresponsibleAI,whichmeansthattheAImustbenefitpeople,thatfundamental(European)humanrightsareprotectedandthatwestrivetoensurethateveryoneisincluded.”“Actions:

• Commissionedbythegovernment,theScientificCouncilforGovernmentPolicy(WetenschappelijkeRaadvoorhetRegeringsbeleid,WRR)willinvestigatetheimpactofAIonpublicvalues.

• CommissionedbytheResearchandDocumentationCentre(WetenschappelijkOnderzoek-enDocumentatiecentrum)(partoftheMinistryofJusticeandSecurity),UtrechtUniversityhasstartedaresearchprogrammeunderthename‘Legalaspectsofdecision-makingalgorithms’(Juridischeaspectenvanalgoritmendiebesluitennemen).Thisexploratorystudyinvolvesastudyoffivecasestoidentifythekeyopportunitiesandrisksofdecision-makingalgorithmsoverthenextfivetotenyearsandhowtheyrelatetotheexistinglegalframeworks(andthevaluesthatliebehindthem).Thecasestobeexaminedare:theself-drivingcar,P2Penergymarkets,judges,‘doenvermogen’(self-efficacy)andcontentmoderationonplatforms.

• On7June2019,theMinisterforLegalProtectionsentalettertotheHouseofRepresentativesabouttheprotectionofhorizontalprivacy(or‘socialprivacy’).ThelettercontainsmeasuresthatarepartlyrelatedtotherisksthattheuseofAImayentailforhorizontalprivacy.

• OnbehalfoftheMinisterforLegalProtection,TilburgUniversityisconductingresearchintotheriskstoourprivacyassociatedwiththeuseoffacialrecognitiontechnologyandintopossiblemeasurestolimittheserisks.Thisstudyisexpectedtobecompletedbytheendof2019.

• TheMinisterforLegalProtectionisexaminingthedesirabilityofestablishingasystemofcertificationofAIapplicationsacrossalldisciplinesintheadministrationofjustice,withthecertificationbodiesbeingaccreditedbyabodyatEUlevel.

• TheMinistryoftheInteriorandKingdomRelationsissettingupatransparencylabforgovernmentorganisations,whereknowledgeisexchangedandsupportisprovidedintheareasoftransparency,explainabilityandaccountability.

• TogetherwiththeMinistryofJusticeandSecurity,StatisticsNetherlands(CBS),theDirectorate-GeneralforPublicWorksandWaterManagement(Rijkswaterstaat)andtheAssociationofNetherlandsMunicipalities(VNG),theMinistryoftheInteriorandKingdomRelationsismappingouttheconsiderationsforgovernmentorganisationsthatplayaroleinwhetherornotalgorithmsshouldbemadepublic.”

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Norway

“TheGovernmentwill:

• encouragedevelopmentanduseofartificialintelligenceinNorwaytobebasedonethicalprinciplesandtorespecthumanrightsanddemocracy

• encourageindustryandinterestorganisationstoestablishtheirownindustrystandardsorlabellingorcertificationschemesbasedontheprinciplesforresponsibleuseofartificialintelligence

• encouragetheeducationalinstitutionstoconsiderhowprivacyandethicscanbegivenacentralplaceintheirprogrammesinartificialintelligence

• expectthesupervisoryauthoritiestohavethecompetenceandauthoritytosuperviseartificialintelligencesystemswithintheirareasofsupervisioninorderto,amongotherthings,ensurecompliancewiththeprinciplesforresponsibleandtrustworthyartificialintelligence

• establishacooperationforumforconsumer,competitionanddataprotectionenforcementbodies:DigitalClearinghouseNorway

• continuetoparticipateinEuropeanandinternationalforums,includingtheEU'sworktowardscreatingaregulatoryframeworktopromoteresponsibleandtrustworthyuseofartificialintelligenceandtowardsmodernisingconsumerrightsinlightofdigitaldevelopments

• stimulatepublicdebateontheethicaluseofartificialintelligence”

(10) REGULATION

❏ 10A:WherethegovernmentisconsideringdevelopingregulationofAI,theNASshouldcommitthegovernmenttoundertakingacomprehensivehumanrightsimpactassessmentofanylegislation,tofullpublicconsultationofanylegislativeproposals,andtotheinvolvementofallrelevantstakeholdersinthedevelopmentofanylegislation(seealso9B).

(11) INCLUSION

❏ 11A:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentstakeholdergroupswhoneedtobeinvolvedindiscussionsaroundAI,particularlyinthegovernanceandimplementationoftheNAS,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketobolstertheirinclusion.

❏ 11B:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentcommunitiesandsocialgroupswhoareatriskofbeingleftbehindasAIisdevelopedandused,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketomitigatetheserisks.

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Australia(AustraliaTechFuture)“Addressingbarrierstodigitalliteracyandaccesstotechnologyiskeytoensuringparticipationintheeconomyandforsocialinclusion,particularlyfor:

• olderAustralians• women• IndigenousAustralians• peoplewithdisabilities• peopleinlowsocio-economicgroups• peoplelivinginregionalandremoteareas.”

❏ 11C:TheNASshouldmapoutthedifferentcommunitiesandsocialgroupswhomaybe

particularlyadverselyaffectedbyAIindifferentways,andsetoutthestepsthatthegovernmentwilltaketobolstertheirinclusioninAI-relateddiscussions.

(12) FOREIGN POLICY

❏ 12A:Thereshouldbeanunambiguouscommitmenttopromotingahumanrights-respectingapproachtothedevelopmentanduseofAIaspartofthestate’sforeignpolicy.

Germany“OneareawhereAIhasabeneficialorreinforcingeffectistheimplementationofthesustainabledevelopmentgoals(SDGs)setoutundertheUnitedNationsAgenda2030,asAItechnologycanhelpboosttheefficiencyofenergyinstallations,improvemedicaldiagnosismethodsandenhancedesignmeasuresgearedtowardsadaptingtoclimatechange.PotentialrisksincludetheuseofAItechnologyinwaythatviolatespersonalfreedoms,therighttocontrolone’sowndata,privacyanddataprotection,theuseofloopholesinsecuritysystems(cyber-attacks)andvariousformsofdiscrimination.”EuropeanUnion“TheEUcanmakeauniquecontributiontotheworldwidedebateonAIbasedonitsvaluesandfundamentalrights.”

❏ 12B:Thesectionshouldidentifyrelevantinternationalandregionalforumsandpolicymakingspaceswhereco-operationonAItakesplace,andwherethatforeignpolicycanbeadvanced.

❏ 12C:Thesectionshouldsetoutaprocessfordevelopingguidelinesorguidanceonthe

saleandexportofAItechnologiesinordertoensurethattheyarenotusedinwaysthatmightviolatehumanrights.

❏ 12D:ThegovernmentshouldcommittohelpingpartnercountriesbuildAIcapacityina

humanrights-respectingway,andtiecooperationtopartnercountries’commitmenttothisapproach.

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Germany

“Whenitcomestodevelopingcommonguidelines,weadvocatetakingamultilateralapproachbyusingexistingforumssuchastheOECD,G7,G20andtheUnitedNations.”

(13) GOVERNANCE AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

❏ 13A:GovernanceandimplementationoftheNASshouldinvolverepresentativesofallstakeholdergroups,includingtheprivatesector,thetechnicalcommunityandcivilsociety.

CzechRepublic

• “ConveningstakeholderworkinggroupstocoordinateindividualchapterstomeettheirobjectivesandkeepingtheAICommitteeupdatedontheirfunctioning.”

• “Cooperationwithprivateandnon-Stateactorsinstitutionalizedintheformofmemoranda.”

Full list of National Artificial Intelligence Strategies (and accompanying ethics documents) reviewed

Annex 2

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Australia:AustralianGovernmentandCSIRO’sData61,ArtificialIntelligence:Solvingproblems,growingtheeconomyandimprovingourqualityoflife,2019

Australia:AustralianGovernment,Australia’sTechFuture:Deliveringastrong,safeandinclusivedigitaleconomy,2018

Australia:AustralianGovernment,DepartmentofIndustry,Science,EnergyandResources,AIEthicsPrinciples,2019

Austria:FederalMinistryofTransport,InnovationandTechnologyandFederalMinistryofDigitalandEconomicAffairs,ArtificialIntelligenceMissionAustria2030,2019

Belgium:AIforBelgium,2019

Canada:CIFAR,Pan-CanadianArtificialIntelligenceStrategy,2017

China:StateCouncilofChina,“NewGenerationArtificialIntelligenceDevelopmentPlan”,2017

Colombia:NationalPlanningDepartment,MinistryofInformationandCommunicationsTechnologies,andAdministrativeDepartmentofthePresidencyoftheRepublic,NationalPolicyforDigitalTransformationandArtificialIntelligence,2019

CzechRepublic:MinistryofIndustryandTradeoftheCzechRepublic,NationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategyoftheCzechRepublic,2019

Denmark:TheDanishGovernment,MinistryofFinanceandMinistryofIndustry,BusinessandFinancialAffairs,NationalStrategyforArtificialIntelligence,2019

Estonia:GovernmentoftheRepublicofEstonia,Estonia’snationalartificialintelligencestrategy2019-2021,2019

EuropeanUnion:EuropeanCommission,ArtificialIntelligenceforEurope,2018

Finland:MinistryofEconomicAffairsandEmployment,Finland’sAgeofArtificialIntelligence:TurningFinlandintoaleadingcountryintheapplicationofartificialintelligence,2017

Finland:MinistryofEconomicAffairsandEmployment,LeadingthewayintotheageofartificialIntelligence,2019

France:Villani,C.,ForaMeaningfulArtificialIntelligence:TowardsaFrenchandEuropeanStrategy,2019

Germany:TheFederalGovernment,ArtificialIntelligenceStrategy,2018

India:NITIAayog,NationalStrategyforArtificialIntelligence#AIForAll,2018

Italy:Agenziaperl’ItaliaDigitale,AIWhitePaper,2018

Japan:StrategicCouncilforAITechnology,ArtificialIntelligenceTechnologyStrategy,2017

Lithuania:MinistryofEconomyandInnovation,LithuanianArtificialIntelligenceStrategy:AVisionoftheFuture,2019

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Luxembourg:TheGovernmentoftheGrandDuchyofLuxembourg,ArtificialIntelligence:astrategicvisionforLuxembourg,2019

Malta:OfficeofthePrimeMinister,ParliamentarySecretaryforFinancialServices,DigitalEconomyandInnovation,Malta:TheUltimateAILaunchpad:AStrategyandVisionforArtificialIntelligenceinMalta2030,2019

Malta:OfficeofthePrimeMinister,ParliamentarySecretaryforFinancialServices,DigitalEconomyandInnovation,Malta:TowardsTrustworthyAI,2019

TheNetherlands:StrategicActionPlanforArtificialIntelligence,2019

Nordic-BalticRegion:NordicCouncilofMinisters,AIintheNordic-Balticregion,2018

Norway:MinistryofLocalGovernmentandModernisation,NationalStrategyforArtificialIntelligence,2020

Portugal:AIPortugal2030,2019

Qatar:QatarCenterforArtificialIntelligence,NationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategyforQatar,2019

Russia:DecreeofthePresidentoftheRussianFederationNo.490of10October2019OntheDevelopmentofArtificialIntelligenceintheRussianFederation,2019

Singapore:SmartNationSingapore,NationalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy:AdvancingourSmartNationJourney,2019

SouthKorea:GovernmentoftheRepublicofKorea,Mid-toLong-TermMasterPlaninPreparationfortheIntelligentInformationSociety:ManagingtheFourthIndustrialRevolution,2017

Sweden:GovernmentOfficesofSweden,Nationalapproachtoartificialintelligence,2018

Taiwan:TaiwanAIActionPlan,2018

UnitedArabEmirates:UAEStrategyforArtificialIntelligence,2017

UnitedKingdom:HMGovernment,IndustrialStrategy:ArtificialIntelligenceSectorDeal,2017

United States: Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13859 of February 11, 2019, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.

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