both Jewish and Christian worlds—were the originators of modernity. He here expands the argument, through a sweeping exploration of history, philosophy, and literature: "The Marrano mind contributed to initiating the modern will: the demand to reform the world, especially in matters of religious freedom, tol- eration, free trade and the creation of a cosmopolitan-inspired model of life." To reach this conclusion, Yovel must deal in a cavalier fashion with historical evidence and supply a fictitious survey of the Inquisition and its methods, but some readers will find that the end justifies the means, and any reader will be entertained by his account. — Henry Kamen Ulrich Beck, A God of One's Own (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 231 pp.; William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 296 pp. In an eye-opening essay titled "The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the Nation State," Cavanaugh turns a well-known story on its head, arguing that the archi- tects of the modern state, who forced the church out of the public sphere, invented the internalized, localized, and limited notion of "religion" that we know today, and then seized power. Rather than constructing the apparatus that would bring peace to the world, as the liberal myth would have it, Cavanaugh insists that these men invented the most destructive mechanism of war the world has ever known: the secular nation state. Cavanaugh insists, further, that the "Wars of Religion" were not the events that necessitated, the birth of the modern state; they were themselves "the birth pangs of the State." His purpose in this text is "to focus on the way revulsion to killing in the name of religion is used to legitimize the trans- fer of ultimate loyalty to the modern State." If "the process of making States" was indeed, as Cavanaugh claims, "inseparable from the pursuit of war by the power elites of emergent States," then the challenge he takes on is how to bring religion back and, by doing so, redeem the state from violence. His response to this ques- tion is to imagine a brotberhood of Christian disciples who are dedicated to the doctrines of peace and love that Christ taught and are ready to bring these into a civil space that religion may occupy. This disappointingly impractical and unclear conclusion to an essay that is otherwise razor sharp and pertinent may indicate what we all must realize—that this is a question that will take many generations (if not a God) to resolve. But the main point I would like to make, after this too- lengthy preamble, is that Cavanaugh leaves us hard pressed to imagine how the notion of a privatized, internalized "God of One's Own"—pace Beck—could
both Jewish and Christian worldswere the originators of
modernity. He hereexpands the argument, through a sweeping
exploration of history, philosophy,and literature: "The Marrano
mind contributed to initiating the modern will:the demand to reform
the world, especially in matters of religious freedom, tol-eration,
free trade and the creation of a cosmopolitan-inspired model of
life."To reach this conclusion, Yovel must deal in a cavalier
fashion with historicalevidence and supply a fictitious survey of
the Inquisition and its methods, butsome readers will find that the
end justifies the means, and any reader will beentertained by his
account. Henry Kamen
Ulrich Beck, A God of One's Own (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 231
pp.;William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular
Ideology and theRoots of Modern Conflict. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 296 pp.
In an eye-opening essay titled "The Wars of Religion and the
Rise of the NationState," Cavanaugh turns a well-known story on its
head, arguing that the archi-tects of the modern state, who forced
the church out of the public sphere, inventedthe internalized,
localized, and limited notion of "religion" that we know today,and
then seized power. Rather than constructing the apparatus that
would bringpeace to the world, as the liberal myth would have it,
Cavanaugh insists that thesemen invented the most destructive
mechanism of war the world has ever known:the secular nation state.
Cavanaugh insists, further, that the "Wars of Religion"were not the
events that necessitated, the birth of the modern state; they
werethemselves "the birth pangs of the State." His purpose in this
text is "to focus onthe way revulsion to killing in the name of
religion is used to legitimize the trans-fer of ultimate loyalty to
the modern State." If "the process of making States" wasindeed, as
Cavanaugh claims, "inseparable from the pursuit of war by the
powerelites of emergent States," then the challenge he takes on is
how to bring religionback and, by doing so, redeem the state from
violence. His response to this ques-tion is to imagine a
brotberhood of Christian disciples who are dedicated to
thedoctrines of peace and love that Christ taught and are ready to
bring these into acivil space that religion may occupy. This
disappointingly impractical and unclearconclusion to an essay that
is otherwise razor sharp and pertinent may indicatewhat we all must
realizethat this is a question that will take many generations(if
not a God) to resolve. But the main point I would like to make,
after this too-lengthy preamble, is that Cavanaugh leaves us hard
pressed to imagine how thenotion of a privatized, internalized "God
of One's Own"pace Beckcould
ever be part of the solution to a problem that it is responsible
for inventing in thefirst place.Alick IsaacsDOI
10.1215/0961754X-1815962
s. Judith Butler, Jrgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Cornel
West,o The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. and
intro.
Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, afterword Craig
Calhoun(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 137 pp.
This much we know: the separation of church and state never
prevented religionfrom entering, even permeating the public sphere.
Now that we think of puresecularism not only as a failure but as a
fantasy, what is to be done? Four formi-dable philosophers and
their able hosts took on this vexing question one eveningseveral
years ago in Lower Manhattan, and this volume is the record.
Habermasasserts once again (this time via a critique of Carl
Schmitt's political theology)that religion has a positive role to
play in establishing the moral solidarity nec-essary for the proper
functioning of a rational state. Taylor demurs, suggestingthat the
opposition of secular and religious does not adequately
characterize apublic sphere in which many sources of (nonrational)
moral commitment, bothreligious and nonreligious, confront and
interact with each other. Butler argues(using Zionism as a test
case) that religion must be reinvented to serve the needsof
political "cohabitation," albeit in terms that can be seen to be
true to its tradi-tion. And West enacts a blues-inflected
prophesying meant to demonstrate thatreligious passion is not the
sole possession of fundamentalists and conservatives.Discussions of
such round out the volume, and the vexing question still nibblesat
the soul. Michael P. KramerDOI 10.1215/0961754X-1815971
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