Aristotelian Ethics and BiophiliaAristotelis Santas

asantas@valdosta.edu Professor of Philosophy

Valdosta State UniversityUSA

Published in in Ethics and the Environment, 19, 1, (2014)

Abstract

Biophilia is a concept that has been characterized as the human love of living things and has been much utilized as a foundation for an environmental or “land” ethic. E.O. Wilson, who popularized the concept, suggested that it is a genetic disposition that links human survival to valuing living systems. In a similar move, J. Baird Callicott has argued that human sentiments are naturally directed to all living systems and beings and this sentiment has evolutionary value. While I find great merit in these suggestions and arguments, it is my contention that if biophilia and human sentiment is to be a viable foundation for such an ethic, it must go beyond the human love for other living things and be conceived more abstractly and broadly as an interconnecting feature of biotic systems. Interestingly, the foundation for such a conception can be found in ancient Greek thought. Aristotle’s work in ethics, although his view is generally ignored or dismissed by environmental ethicists, is particularly useful here. Although his ethics is decidedly anthropocentric, Aristotle’s discussion of friendship holds a key to the much sought-after theory of interspecies obligation. Philia, Aristotle’s term for friendship, is described by him as a feeling of good will towards another self. Although his focus in the Nicomachean Ethics is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings, and after undertaking a study of the history of this word, one can see the precedent of such a usage. In this paper, I develop such a broader conception of philia that includes interspecies relationships and then reconceive the modern concept of biophilia as a form of interspecies philia. I will then go on to argue, using Aristotle’s theory of obligation as reciprocity within friendship, that such a re-conception of biophilia might provide another approach to founding an environmental ethic on a theory of sentiment.

Aristotelian Ethics and Biophilia

[H]uman history did not begin eight or ten thousand years ago with the invention of agriculture and villages. It began hundreds of thousands or millions of years ago with the origin of the genus Homo. For more than 99 percent of human history people lived in hunter-gatherer bands totally and intimately involved with other organisms.1

Preamble

When my children were very young, we used to go to a little creek near our home. They would

catch minnows with nets we had fashioned out of materials we had available to us and carry

them home to keep in their aquarium. One day they managed to catch a young large-mouth

bass and decided to keep it in the tank. This experiment became quite a proposition, as this

wild fish could not subsist on fish flakes or pellets, and needed live prey on a regular basis. So

there were many trips to the creek, and many minnows to be caught and brought back to the

tank. Eventually, the fish was released back into the creek and that was the end of the

experiment. In the time that we had kept this fish, however, a curious thing had happened. On

one of the trips to catch minnows, my children had managed to capture a large crawfish and

had been curious to see how this animal would interact with the bass. At first, predictably, the

two were antagonistic to one another, but well matched by virtue of their comparable sizes. As

the days passed though, they became used to one another; and not only did they stop the

antagonisms, they seemed to form a bond. It was as if the confinement of their shared

environment precipitated a relationship that had always been possible, but needed special

circumstances to bring it about. We had observed an “interspecies” friendship, an apparent

fondness of one living thing for another wherein a line is crossed between differing species.

I have characterized this example of interspecies (cross-species) relationships as a form

of friendship. Jennifer S. Holland’s recent book, Unlikely Friendships: 47 Remarkable Stories

from the Animal Kingdom, describes numerous other such cases. She writes:

Less common than a human-pet connection…is a bond between members of two different nonhuman species… The phenomenon is most often reported in captive animals, in part because we simply catch them in the act more often. But it’s also because, notes biologist and primate specialist Barbara King of the College of William and Mary, that’s where constraints are relaxed, where animals aren’t fighting for their basic needs--which allows their emotional energy to flow elsewhere. Of course, there are cases of cross-species bonds in the wild, as well. “Most important,” King says, “we know animals, under whatever circumstances, have that capacity.”

Holland, knowing full well that this characterization of these relationships as friendship runs the

risk of inappropriately anthropomorphizing these cases, continues:

Not all scientists are comfortable using a term like friendship when referring to nurturing or protective animal relations. For many years, “animals were to be described as machines, and students of animal behavior were to develop a terminology devoid of human connotations,” wrote primatologist Frans de Waal in The Age of Empathy. He himself has been criticized for attributing human traits to animals by biologists who believe “anthropomorphic anecdotes have no place in science.”

Even those less averse to associating people-based ideas with nonpeople say we don’t know how much awareness exists between “friends” regarding their behavior. But behaviorists argue that declaring that there is none at all leans too far the other way. The famed primatologist Jane Goodall, who has described her own relationship with wild chimpanzees, said in a recent interview with me for National Geographic, “You cannot share your life in any meaningful way with an animal and not realize they have different personalities. Are their capabilities and emotions similar to ours? Absolutely.”2

This controversy over what feelings we can attribute to non-human animals is ongoing, and will

not be my focus here. My reason for discussing such cases is to motivate a deeper discussion of

biophilia, commonly understood as a love of life. This phenomenon is of great import in

contemporary environmental philosophy and has been used by theorists as a sort of naturalistic

foundation for an environmental or land ethic.

The term ‘biophilia’ was first used by Erich Fromm in The Anatomy of Human

Destructiveness. There he “described biophilia as ‘the passionate love of life and of all that is

alive.’ The term was later used by American biologist Edward O. Wilson in his work Biophilia

(1984), which proposed that the tendency of humans to focus on and to affiliate with nature

and other life-forms has, in part, a genetic basis....”3 Both usages focus on human awareness

and attitude; and both see biophilia as a generalized human love for living things or systems.

While I think that such a usage has merit, there are other levels to explore, especially when one

considers the history of the Greek term ‘philia’ on which the concept relies. It is my contention

that the above described “friendships” between members of different species are important

cases in biophilia, and that the discussion of biophilia to date has been missing an adequate

discussion of this phenomenon. To undertake such a discussion, I shall explain the early use of

the term ‘philia’ and its role in Greek ethical theory, drawing heavily from Aristotle’s ethical

philosophy, show its applicability to interspecies friendships, and then outline its relevance and

import for contemporary environmental theory.

Aristotle on Friendship and the Meaning of Philia

Aristotle’s ethics is generally treated in cursory manner and selected readings typically exclude

his discussion of friendship. His theory is characterized as ‘virtue ethics’ and his famous

discussion of moral virtue as moderation dominates most discussions of his work. However

much merit there is to the idea of virtuous action as effecting a “Golden Mean” in conduct, such

a picture of his view provides only a glimpse of his theory; and a fuller account of his moral

philosophy might prove useful.

First of all, the term ‘virtue ethics’ can be misleading for linguistic reasons. The English

‘virtue’ is a translation of aretē, which has a broader and often different meaning than what we

today call ‘virtue.’ Translator Martin Ostwald’s glossary entry on aretē provides some insights,

which I quote here at length:

aretē (αρετή): Of fundamental importance in all Greek ethical systems. This term, which is the noun corresponding to the adjectives agathos, ‘good,’ aristos, ‘best,’ originally denoted the excellence of a brave or noble warrior….The full history of the term would involve a history of Greek moral ideas, but it is important to realize that aretē was eventually generalized to denote the functional excellence of any person, animal, or thing. For example, the aretē of a shoemaker is the quality that makes him produce good shoes; in a horse race, it is the quality which will make the horse run to victory…. It is against this background that any Greek discussion of the aretē of man as man has to be seen: his aretai or ‘virtues’ are those qualities which make him function well in relation to his fellow men, that is, the qualities which make him play his part in human society well. This means that the overtone of divine sanction of human morality, which is the cornerstone of any Judaeo-Christian system of ethics, is absent from the Greek…. The English translation ‘virtue’ is too narrow, though often inescapable, and we use, accordingly, EXCELLENCE, GOODNESS, VIRTUE, or a combination of these, depending on the context.4

On the basis of this conception of virtue I like to characterize Aristotle’s ethics as an excellence-

ethics, which includes three main areas of focus:

1. Excellence in Character Development (“moral virtue”)

2. Excellence in Intellectual Development (theoretical and practical wisdom-- sophia and

phronēsis)

3. Excellence in Human Relations (virtuous “friendships”)

Notice that I interpret his approach as under the general umbrella of aretē, ‘excellence.’ This

move allows one to include the friendship discussion as in keeping with the overall argument of

his theory, which characterizes the good life (eudemonia) as “an activity of the soul in

accordance with excellence or virtue.”5 The first area indicated above, as we have mentioned,

is well treated in any discussion of Aristotle’s ethics and will not be my focus here. Such is the

case also with his treatment of the second item, intellectual virtue, or, wisdom. His distinction

of the latter between sophia and phronēsis is also an important and well known move in the

development of moral theory, but will not be a focus here either. What I shall develop

presently is the third item on our list, excellence in our relations, philia.

Before beginning Aristotle’s discussion of friendship, it might be worth looking at the

history of the term itself. According to the Great Dictionary of the Entire Greek Language

(Demotic, Katareusa, Middle Ages, Modern, Ancient),6 the term is used in ancient times to

characterize everything from relations between lovers, to that of nations, to the relations

between gods and men or those of children and parents. I reproduce the entry in part here:

Herodotus, 7.170 - friendship between nations

Plato, Symposium, 8, 15 - “pure friendship (or love) is the character of the soul”

Plato, Symposium, 188c - “friendship is part of love and affection between families”

Plato, Symposium, 188d - “friendship brings Athens great power; hatred brings disastrous fate.”

Plato, Republic, 581A - “It is profitable for one to hold pleasure and friendship with someone else”

Isocrates 6.11 - “forsaken friendship will cause detriment”

Isocrates, Epistles, 7.13 - “renewing our former friendship and hospitality”

Isocrates 88D - “mortals judge each other by their friendship”

Thucydides, 1, 91 - “our friendship depends on the fact that love-- friendships -- exist between gods and men”

Xenophon, Anabasis, 1 - “treaties are a sign of trust and friendship”

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2, 7, a3 - “attraction, strong desire, intercourse, carnal desire, eros”

In keeping with the diversity of usage of the term, Ostwald, at the beginning of Aristotle’s

treatment of the topic in Book VIII, notes at length the meaning of this term and its significance:

The human relation of ‘friendship’ forms the subject of this book and the next. As we shall see, the connotations of philia are considerably wider than those of ‘friendship.’ Philia is best summed up in the Greek proverb: κοινά τά τών φίλων, “friends have in common what they have.” It designates the relationship between a person and any other person(s) or being that person regards as peculiarly his own and to which he has a peculiar attachment. For example, in Homer the adjective φίλος, “dear,” is frequently used as a person’s heart or mind, and also used to describe the relation to one’s wife and children. In neither sense would we speak of friendship in English. But of course, as in English, the term also expresses (from Hesiod on) the relationship to a person to which one feels especially attached, i.e., to a ‘friend.’ On the other side of the scale, philia constitutes the bond that holds the members of any association together, regardless of whether the association is the family, the state, a club, a business partnership, or even the business relation between buyer and seller. Here again, we would not use the term ‘friendship’ in English, but the expressions such as ‘harmony’ or ‘good will.’

But for the Greek, it is the bond that gives people something ‘in common’ that counts in philia, and it is for that reason, and especially for its importance in social and political matters, that a discussion of it is given more space than is given to any other problem in the Nic. Eth.7

Such a background of usage serves as a good introduction to Aristotle’s analysis, as he

undertakes to reign in the broad concept and distinguish between types of friendship. He

provides a threefold distinction between the types of items we find worthy of affection, which

is his explanation for sources of attraction that binds us together. They are:

1. Friendships Based on Usefulness (Benefit)

2. Friendships Based on Pleasure (Pleasantness)

3. Friendships Based Virtue (Excellence)

The first form of friendship, that of usefulness, is the least “perfect” form of friendship for

Aristotle, although nonetheless very important. It accounts for all “profitable” forms of

relationships, be they business partnerships, strategic alliances or treaties, buyers engaging

with sellers, or neighbors looking out for each other’s houses or children. It is important to

note here that there is friendliness in these relations, and therefore an emotional connection,

albeit a weak one. We can characterize these relationships as quid pro quo arrangements

facilitated by good will, although the friendliness will only last as long as the usefulness. The

latter point is why Aristotle deems such a friendship as “imperfect,” since the affection is not

for the person but for what he or she brings to the bargain. When the bargain runs thin and the

other party ceases to be useful, there is simply no reason to continue the association. Affection

quickly becomes indifference, or worse yet, hostility.

The second form of friendship, a relationship based on pleasure, is also imperfect in

Aristotle’s analysis, but also an important part of human life. This form of relationship exists

between any two individuals or entities that seek and enjoy each other’s company because

they find it pleasant to be around. One can include here not only sexual attraction, but

partners in amusements (from spectator sports to drinking, to gaming of any sort), or simply

friends who make each other laugh. The bond here is clearly emotional and stronger than what

one finds with useful friends. Moreover, it is clear here that the good feeling one seeks from

the relationship only exists when the given partner is present, that is to say, the feeling is not a

detachable good. For this reason, interestingly, Aristotle holds this form of friendship in higher

esteem than one based on usefulness. Nevertheless, Aristotle, identifying permanence and

stability as key criteria for determining the best kind of relationship, suggests that this type of

attraction is ultimately imperfect. When the thrill is gone, or the fun runs out, the company will

inevitably part.

Perfect friendship, for Aristotle, is manifest in a relationship based on excellence--virtue.

There are a number of reasons. First, these relationships are stable. When one is attracted to

another because of qualities esteemed as admirable, the attraction does not come and go with

small changes in circumstance. Second, since the source of the attraction is admiration, what is

deemed lovable is not a detachable good or fleetingly pleasant quality, but the person’s

character. That is, the attraction is for the person, not simply for what that person brings.

Thirdly, because the attraction is for a person one deems as admirable and good, a motivation

exists for each party to give their partner affections, goods, and pleasure for no other reason

than the fact that such goods are deserved. There is no bargain, in other words, and there is

never a gift given or affection paid with an expectation of some material return. We can see in

this description of virtuous friendship that it seems to incorporate the other two types of

relationships, though the motivation changes.

This latter description points to the fact that human relationships are complex. A little

reflection on the nature of our relations shows us that it is rare for both parties of a given

friendship to be motivated by the same affections and desires. Most relationships are of a

mixed sort: one party may be motivated by benefit, while the other is motivated by pleasure.

One might seek out someone’s company by virtue of respect and admiration, while the other

seeks something else. Often these differing motivations are unclear or mistaken, which leads to

complaints, disagreements and unhappy dissolution of relations. Aristotle comments:

Surely, there is nothing strange about breaking friendships based on what is useful or pleasant when the partners no longer have the qualities of being useful or pleasant…. But there is reason for complaint, if a person loves another for being useful or pleasant but pretended to love him for his character… [D]ifferences between friends arise most frequently when they are not friends in the sense they think they are.8

In addition to this complicating factor of mixed relationships, Aristotle also discusses the

phenomenon of relationships between unequals.9 Here he discusses the connection between

inferior and superior and the relationships he saw as such. In his world there were differing

classes of people with different levels of status, and they did possess philia between them, but

the difference in status limited them in the level to which the relationship could go. Many if not

all of these cases, such as, for instance, the deference of a slave to a master, or of an inferior

social class to a higher, we no longer accept as legitimate. Others, like that of woman and man,

we no longer see as an unequal form of relation. He argues, for instance, that men and women

can never be virtuous friends (though there can be useful and pleasant affections mutually

between them), since they cannot be equal in virtue. The woman can respect the man, but the

man cannot fully reciprocate the feeling. Such a view is obviously dated.10 What is interesting

about his analysis, however, is that he observed something accurate about such relations:

where there is unequal power between entities, no virtuous friendship can exist.11 The respect

and admiration can only go in one direction in such cases; and this will be important for us

later.

In developing his theory of obligation based on friendship, Aristotle considers the nature of

the relationship in question. Relationships based on usefulness are the ones in which obligation

is the easiest to determine. Since the relation is motivated by material benefit, the obligations

arise out of a simple quid pro quo. We owe what is of equal benefit to what has been given.

Though this may be tricky at times in detail,12 the basic principle is clear. In relations based on

pleasure, on the other hand, obligation is harder to measure, if not inappropriate. One enjoys

someone’s company and this enjoyment binds us together. There is no quid pro quo here, no

debt that has not been paid. The pleasure is inherently something experienced together.

Aristotle writes:

[C]omplaints [do not] occur very much in friendships based on pleasure. For the desire of both partners is fulfilled at the same time if they enjoy spending time together. In fact a

man would impress us as ridiculous if he complained that he did not find his friend delightful, since he is free not to spend his days with him.13

In discussing friendships based on virtue, Aristotle notes that obligation is again difficult to

measure. There are material benefits involved in such a relationship to be sure, but as we have

said, the motivation to the giving of any benefit is not expectation of some return, but a desire

to give to that person we deem admirable and deserving of good things.

[W]hen people are friends on the basis of virtue or excellence, they are eager to do good to one another, since that is a mark of excellence as well as friendship…. If a person gives more than he receives, he will have no complaints against his friend, since he accomplishes what he has set out to do: for each one desires <to give as well as receive> what is good.14

This initial sketch of obligation is followed by a more complicated discussion of obligations

between “mixed friends” and “unequal friends.” As one may surmise, mixed relations can be a

source of much complaint, especially if one’s motives for a given relationships are not clear.

Aristotle’s discussion here is interesting and insightful, but most of this discussion will not be

my focus here. The obligation between unequal friends, however, is very relevant for our

purposes, but I will wait to develop the analysis in the next section of this paper.

Such is Aristotle’s discussion of philia in brief. Before returning to a discussion of biophilia as

it pertains to interspecies relationships, I pause to note that others before me have invoked

Aristotle in the ongoing debate over biophilia, moral sentiment, and the meta-ethical

foundations of the land ethic. Ernest Partridge, in discussing the biophilia hypothesis as it

pertains to J. Baird Callicott’s15 use of Aldo Leopold16 and David Hume,17 writes:

Biophilia suggests that a fundamental genetic basis for may exist for this sentiment of love and respect for the land… These biophilic considerations suggest an environmental ethic that may be more Aristotelian than Humean in that the “goodness” of being in tune with nature (i.e., living in a surrounding that we evolved from and preserving the conditions of our evolution) is a goodness interpreted as a consistency with human

nature and fulfillment. Furthermore, it is an ethic that endorses the actualization of human potential because it suggests that we are most likely to flourish in a natural environment, just as an acorn can manifest its potential “oakness” in a biome that is conducive to the flourishing of oak trees. Thus we can accomplish our fullest potential in the Aristotelian sense-- have the best kinds of lives-- if those lives can develop in an environment that is genetically natural to us, which is to say an environment to which we are “attuned.” This, I think, is an essential claim of biophilia that Aristotle might recognize and, apprised of the facts, even endorse.18

Here Partridge invokes Aristotle’s metaphysics to account for the sentiment of biophilia. In

the same volume, Eugene Hargrove, while rejecting Aristotelian metaphysics,19 suggests that

Aristotelian ethics could serve as a suitable basis for this moral sentiment, which is to serve as a

theoretical underpinning for Callicott’s version of Leopold’s land ethic:

Callicott must rely on passages in “The Land Ethic,” where Leopold refers to “our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions,” and “love, respect, and admiration for land, and high regard for its value.” There are… problems here… Whereas love, respect, loyalties, affections, convictions, and so on can be tied to Hume’s notion of moral sentiments, they could also be associated with Aristotelian virtues, connecting Leopold’s views with my environmental ethics as well. In both cases we have connections to biology—Darwin’s biology and Aristotle’s biology, respectively. For example, the circles of moral considerability from self to family to citizens is equally present in Aristotelian philosophy and Darwinian-dependent philosophy.20

Here Hargrove is employing Aristotelian virtue ethics as an alternative basis for a land ethic.

While I agree with Hargrove’s analysis, what I am suggesting is that a full treatment of his ethics

must include a discussion of friendship, not only because it will help articulate the nature and

range of other relations to other beings and systems, but also provide a framework for

understanding obligations arising out of biotic interrelations.

Friendship, Biophilia and Environmental Ethics

I opened with an example of an interspecies relationship I had observed in a family aquarium.

Years later, our family experienced another example of this phenomenon between a cat and

dog. The dog had adopted us, as it were, when one day it appeared at our home and would not

leave. You might say she was a pet, but it was not an ordinary sort of human-pet relation. She

was obviously a stray, seemingly very intelligent and street smart, and she in some sense

“chose” us. She refused to be confined by a leash or an enclosure (there were leash laws we

had tried to obey), but she would never leave our company for very long. She would come and

go as she pleased, and the dog catchers never seemed to find her. There were many

remarkable things one might say about this animal friend, but it was her relationship to a feral

kitten is what amazed me the most. The kitten had been collected by the animal pound and

was to be euthanized, but my spouse and children had rescued her in a search for a pet. She

was a beautiful kitten, but she was quite unaffectionate and generally hostile to human touch. I

myself could not understand how she made it home to us. But there she was. One could not

hold her or confine her in any way. She would not go into a house without a measure of

coercion, even on the coldest days of winter; and it was always an awful affair to get her

anywhere she was not going under her own volition. Then something happened. One day we

noticed the kitten suckling on the dog. The dog had not had puppies and therefore could offer

no milk, so it appeared that she was offering instead emotional comfort. As time passed and

the kitten matured into a cat, the two had become inseparable. They spent their days together,

they slept together (and not simply on cold nights when the need for warmth could easily

account for their behavior); and they even hunted together. Yet with all that socialization

learned and affection given from the dog, this cat never really shared such feelings with the

human members of the family--not until, that is, the dog had died. When the dog passed away

the cat’s countenance changed. She seemed despondent, as if she were grieving. She began to

seek our company and made it known she wanted touch and affection—she started acting

more like the cats we had known. Of course we cannot know for sure what she was feeling, but

she did change her behavior and disposition towards us with the passing of her friend.

One might say, given the foregoing analysis, that the dog and the kitten had initially a

friendship based on usefulness--at least from the standpoint of the kitten, which evolved into

one based on pleasure. One might even surmise that there came to be some form of

admiration or respect, though this would be difficult to establish. In the relationship between

the kitten and the members of our family, you could say the relationship was not one of

friendship at all initially, though there was good will on the part of at least some of us towards

her. Later, there was usefulness, and then after the dog passed away one could say we had a

relationship based on pleasure. In my earlier example about the bass and the crawfish in the

aquarium, there was a similar pattern. There was first antagonism, then friendship based on

usefulness (as there was need to cease hostilities in such a confined space), then an apparent

relationship of pleasure.

Given these apparent parallels, and using Aristotle’s model, one might identify three kinds

of interspecies friendships:

1. Symbiotic21 (Benefit): two or more individuals or groups from differing species

associating and or cooperating in a mutually beneficial manner

2. Hedonistic22 (Pleasure): two or more individuals or groups from differing species

associating in a mutual exchange (i.e., sharing) of affection

3. Kalondistic23 (Excellence): two or more individuals or groups from differing species

associating by virtue of perceived qualities of admirability

Symbiotic relationships, also known as mutualism, can be observed in all systems of living

interactions. Whether or not one characterizes ecosystems as “biotic communities” with

“stability and integrity,”24 there is coexistence that is not simply competitive. In many cases

there is an interdependency without which continued existence would be difficult if not

impossible. This is true of individuals, but, more poignantly of entire species as well. Aristotle

himself observed such friendly relationships in the non-human world. In the Nicomachean

Ethics he writes: “[I]t seems that nature implants friendship in a parent for its offspring and in

offspring for its parent, not only among men, but also among birds and most animals.”25

Elsewhere, in History of Animals, he discusses relations between different species:

The snake is at war with the weasel and the pig; with the weasel when they are both at home, for they live on the same food; with the pig for preying on her kind. The merlin is at war with the fox; it strikes and claws it, and, as it has crooked talons, it kills the animal's young. The raven and the fox are good friends, for the raven is at enmity with the merlin; and so when the merlin assails the fox the raven comes and helps the animal.

In regard to wild creatures, some sets are at enmity with other sets at all times and under all circumstances; others, as in the case of man and man, at special times and under incidental circumstances. The ass and the acanthis are enemies; for the bird lives on thistles, and the ass browses on thistles when they are young and tender.... The crow and the heron are friends, as also are the sedge-bird and lark, the laedus and the celeus or green woodpecker; the woodpecker lives on the banks of rivers and beside brakes, the laedus lives on rocks and bills, and is greatly attached to its nesting-place. The piphinx, the harpe, and the kite are friends; as are the fox and the snake, for both burrow underground; so also are the blackbird and the turtle-dove….Thus we see that in the case of the creatures above mentioned their mutual friendship … is due to the food they feed on and the life they lead.26

Modern scientists, of course, will shy away from characterizing these relations as enmities and

friendships; but it is interesting to see that Aristotle has contextualized these relationships in a

way that shows continuity with human behavior. Although there is no need to develop a full

modern description of this phenomenon here, I would like to emphasize that these biotic

interrelationships are part of a larger scheme of connectivity that includes all living beings,

especially as they exist in close proximity.

Hedonistic relationships, especially interesting between members of differing species,

have also been widely observed, although its import has not been fully appreciated. Humans

certainly gain pleasure from their pets and domesticated animals; and it often appears as

though the feeling is mutual. Determining the exact nature of such relationships can often be

difficult, not only because of the difficulty of determining the psychological state of the non-

human animal, but also because of the nature of a relationship which is most frequently one of

master and slave.27 More interesting, perhaps, for my analysis, is the phenomenon of

hedonistic “interspecies friendship” between members of two different non-human animals.

Holland cites many such examples in the aforementioned volume.28 The significance of such

cases is that they seem to establish a larger pattern of connection between species and

demonstrates a capacity for affection for a radical other that lies latent within many or most (if

not all) sentient beings. These relationships, which have been observed both in artificial

confinement and in the wild, provide a wider conception of “fellow feeling”29 that could serve

as a rudimentary natural basis for “moral sentiment.”

Kalondistic relationships, my interspecies analogue to Aristotle’s “virtuous friendships,”

are the most difficult to characterize. The psychological qualities of admiration and respect are

difficult if not impossible and inappropriate to attribute to non-rational animals. I suspect,

however, that such qualities may exist in animals such as dogs, horses, and other “higher”

vertebrates. They are likely to exist in higher primates and cetaceans. But even if we are

somehow projecting such qualities onto our animal brethren, I still maintain that such feelings

of respect are part of an evolving pattern of consciousness that did not emerge ex nihilo from

the human brain in a separate act of creation. In any case, these are relationships that seem to

transcend specific benefits or hedonistic impulses. In such relationships, one or both parties

may reap no particular benefit or pleasurable moment, yet provide something for another for

no apparent reason or anticipated reciprocity. In Aristotle’s view of these relations as they exist

between humans, the primary motivation for any such affections is a desire to give, not to

receive, and simply being in the company of the other is enough to bring happiness. One might

call this phenomenon of affection a kalondistic feeling, or sentiment, whether or not it is feeling

that is (or can be) reciprocated.

This “kalondistic” feeling and motivation is perhaps what Fromm and Wilson had in mind in

their characterization of biophilia, and what is the basis for what Arne Naess termed “deep

ecology.” Such an impulse may have a genetic basis, as Wilson has hypothesized. If so, one

could argue that this impulse is likely to have emerged from a more general feature of human

sociality. One might maintain further, as does George Herbert Mead, that sociality is an implicit

feature of any being in an inter-acting relation to some other.30 One might even suggest, with

Mead, that the basis for such a feature inheres in all living things inasmuch as all living things

respond to their environment. This would account for why there are affections and philia

(friendships of all sorts) across species, even when they are not reciprocated. It may also

account for the phenomenon of fondness felt by humans for abstract entities like ecosystems

such as forests and meadows, or for distant cultures and eras, for that matter. In these latter

cases there is certainly no reciprocity of affection, although one might suggest that justice is

done.

We now come to the question of obligation. How does the foregoing analysis address

the question of our moral relationship to nature? Traditional approaches to environmental

meta-ethics have centered on establishing that non-human entities are due the moral

considerability we ascribe to humans. This concept turns on the concept of intrinsic value31 and

whether and how non-human entities can have value that is independent of human utility and

concern. Two main theorists in this line of thought, following the deontological and utilitarian

traditions, have been Tom Regan and Peter Singer. Both theorists use the criterion of sentience

(as opposed to rationality) as a criterion of moral considerability, and contend that all sentient

beings are due consideration in our moral decision-making. Regan argues that sentient

individuals have intrinsic value and therefore have individual rights similar to those of

humans.32 Singer’s analysis is utilitarian rather than rights-based, so he does not speak of

absolute rights of individual animals; but he maintains that we must weigh the feelings of all

other sentient beings affected by our actions.33 J. Baird Callicott criticizes both of these theories

as inadequate to the task of developing a uniquely environmental or “land” ethic,

characterizing both views as mere extensions of anthropocentric ethical systems. He maintains

that these theories cannot address the value of entities such as ecosystems, or the value of the

land itself, since these cannot be said to be sentient in any scientific sense. These theories, in

short, cannot therefore account for the intrinsic value of nature.34 Callicott’s challenge has

generated an immense amount debate in environmental ethics; and his own theory, which is an

attempt to combine the evolutionary theory of Darwin, the naturalistic moral philosophy of

David Hume, and the imperatives of American naturalist Aldo Leopold, has been the center of

much attention and controversy.35

Callicott’s theory of obligation employs the theory of moral sentiments in the philosophy of

David Hume. Hume, like Aristotle before him and J.S. Mill after, had argued that humans have a

natural affinity for one another, and morality is possible only because of this affinity. He further

maintained that such a feature of human psychology was eminently useful, and that one can

reduce all of the virtues recognized in antiquity to traits that nature finds favorable to the

continuation of the species. The problem with this description, however, for the purposes of

moral philosophy, is how one might move from the ‘is’ of description, to the ‘ought’ of

obligation.36 Moral theory, at least since Kant,37 has been reluctant to draw normative

conclusions from descriptive science. Yet the prescriptions of modern environmentalism rely

heavily on descriptive ecology. One might say that this controversy is at the core of the

contemporary debate over the foundations of an environmental ethic. Without trying to settle

this debate here, what I hope to add to this analysis is the idea that the biophilic propensity and

sentiment, in all its manifestations, if described in terms of Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, can

also be considered as a theory of obligation along Aristotelian lines.

Following our previous analysis, we can outline a theory of obligation for Symbiotic,

Hedonistic and Kalondistic interspecies relationships, or “friendships,” if you will. Symbiotic

relationships, you might recall, are those in which there are mutual exchanges of benefit. So as

one entity derives some benefit from the other, there arises an obligation to give back in

proportion to what has been received. Although the details, especially in larger and more

complex relations, may be difficult, the idea appears to be quite simple. Obligation emerges38

in a context of interaction and interconnection.39 One can also see here, I think, that where

there is not reciprocity, there is an inevitable dissolution of the friendly association. With that

comes a loss of benefit. In the case of individuals, the consequence of disparity (or dysparity)

can be observed within a fraction of a lifespan of the individuals involved. In the case of waning

reciprocity among symbiotic species, the consequences are part of an often slowly developing

evolutionary process that can only be observed over long periods of time, sometimes only

through a study of epochs. There are many examples to cite here with respect to human

relations to other species. Our relationship to honeybees comes to mind. For centuries or

millennia we have coexisted and cooperated with them, procuring their honey while providing

them with shelter. But, as is the case with many kinds of relations, we have taken them for

granted in their role as pollinators of our flowering plants. Our agricultural practices have

threatened and/or driven them away from many places where we need them, and their

disappearance has begun to reacquaint us with their utility. Aristotle had suggested that the

trick to maintaining good useful relationships was to make explicit our contributions and

expectations in such relations.40 The same may be said of our relation to other living things and

our ecosystems. As we become more and more clear on what we are receiving, it becomes

more and more clear what we owe in return.

Hedonistic relationships, on the other hand, when they are undertaken mutually, do not

create obligation; but the mutuality caveat here is crucial. When one party gains pleasure in

the company of another that receives a detachable material benefit and not a shared affection,

the relationship can become complicated. What might begin as a friendly association can

evolve into one of power and domination. Prostitution among humans is an obvious example,

but one can also consider the human practice of feeding songbird, which might begin with

setting up feeders in one’s yard and end up with caged birds inside the home. As long as this

mutuality condition obtains, however, and the motivation of each party is pleasurable

company, these relationships are ones that come and go little effort or difficulty. This

phenomenon seems to be no different for interspecies relationships as it is for the pleasure-

based human relations with which we are all familiar. Holland’s examples bear witness to this,

as the bulk of the relationships she describes dissolve as quickly as they begin. There is a

temporary union, perhaps initiated by necessity or benefit, and perpetuated by momentary

pleasure, but unlikely to continue without further benefit or evolution of disposition.

The latter point brings us to the Kalondistic level of interspecies relationships, in which

obligation seems moot. When the connection between equals with mutual dispositions of

admiration, questions of obligation do not arise so long as the involved parties maintain this

disposition. On the other hand, it is not the case that there exists no reciprocity among such

parties, only that the reciprocal exchange happens naturally as a matter of course. One might

describe this course of exchange as a self-perpetuating cycle of “stability and integrity.” Again

the caveat of mutuality is crucial, and in the kalondistic case particularly so, inasmuch as the

dispositions of admiration and respect cannot be ascribed as easily, if at all, to many of the

objects of admiration and respect. Reciprocity, in such cases, seems to break down—and it

would appear that such cases comprise a vast majority of these interspecies relations. The

difficulty lies in the fact that objects of admiration may be non-sentient, and hence it makes no

sense to speak of any reciprocity of affection or admiration; yet it seems to me that this doesn’t

matter. If one sentient being admires a non-sentient entity, it will offer to it what it feels it has

received. The object of admiration cannot disappoint the admirer, if the latter understands

what the object is. One might say the obligation felt by the admirer is self-wrought, in the same

way a Kantian might say one who follows duty for its own sake because pure duty

autonomous.41

The second caveat of equality in kalondistic relationships is also crucial, as it is for mixed

relationships among and between differing species. When I discussed Aristotle’s treatment of

unequal relationships between humans in the earlier analysis, I mentioned that although his

view is clearly dated and largely mistaken, there was an insight there worth noting. He argues

that women and men could never be virtuous friends, and that neither could free men and

slaves, since they are not equals, and a relationship based on respect must be one of mutuality.

So, in discussing obligations between such parties, as is the case in the relations between

parent and child, the inferior must pay some combination of benefit, pleasure and respect,

while the superior provide only benefit or pleasure. I noted, following Mill, that this insight

about power can be turned into an argument for political equality, on the assumption that the

disparity in power is contextual, if not artificial, and not natural. Such an analysis might provide

a framework for considering the issue at hand—that is, how one might discuss obligation with

respect to relationships of power between radical others. Some such cases are as familiar as

they are problematic. They include for instance the enslavement of domesticated animals in a

factory-farming system of agriculture, and the often unnecessary testing of animals in science

and industry. These are the relationships theorists and activists like Regan and Singer have

done well to point out. Others are more subtle and less obviously problematic, if at all. Shall

we consider all human-pet relationships or all forms of domestication as ones of slavery? These

are important and heavily debated questions; but the arguments are well worn in the

environmental ethics literature, so I will not dwell on them here. Interesting to me are the

cases in which the human has the smaller share of power, and the superior entity shows

restraint. Holland shares the example of a photographer/diver and a leopard seal in which the

latter, perfectly capable of killing the photographer, after showing him that capability, offers

instead to feed him.42 This case shows a capacity for care that is devoid of the obsequious

placations one might attribute to animals entirely at our mercy.

I am fond of the story of Pelorus Jack, a porpoise off the coast of New Zealand in the late

19th and early 20th centuries famous for having repeatedly and for many years guided sailors

through the perilous waters of Cook Strait.43 The story is even more interesting in the present

context inasmuch as Pelorus Jack, as legend has it, elected to stop guiding one particular boat

after one of its passengers fired a shot at him. The ship in question apparently ended up

wrecked, while others continued to be guided safely through the area. One might surmise that

such a case is kalondistic, that there may be here something analogous to Aristotle’s virtuous

friendship. One might suggest, that is, that this is not a relationship of inequality, but one of

equals in which one member elects to help the other without regard for what might be offered

in return;44 but I think that this case might also demonstrate that inequality is in fact context-

bound, and never simply a matter of the fixed hierarchies or natural kinds posited by traditional

philosophy. Being superior with respect to one quality does not amount to superiority in every

other. We can further add is that any given superiority existing at a given time is only

temporary and not a static state of affairs. Abilities are as diverse as our needs. Power waxes

and wanes. This is most evidently true for humans today as we face the ecological

consequences of our loss of restraint. The more capable we become of eradicating entire

species, the more dependencies we discover that we possess, as our position of power

becomes ever more precarious.

Conclusions: Towards A New Conception of Biophilia

E.O. Wilson conceived of biophilia as a human love for all forms of life. He hoped to establish

that this phenomenon was a genetic basis for a new environmental ethic grounded in natural

science. He wrote:

It is time to invent moral reasoning of a new and more powerful kind, to look to the very roots of motivation and understand why, in what circumstances and on which occasions, we cherish and protect life. The elements from which a deep conservation ethic might be constructed include the impulses and biased forms of learning loosely classified as biophilia. Ranging from the awe of the serpent to the idealization of the savannah and the hunter’s mystique, and undoubtedly including others yet to be explored, they are poles toward which the developing mind most comfortably moves. And as the mind moves, picking its way through the vast number of choices made during a lifetime, it grows into a form true to its long, unique evolutionary history.45

This endeavor to establish a “deep conservation ethic” on a genetically encoded human bias or

sentiment which he calls biophilia has its focus on human motivation and agency.

In contrast to Wilson, what I have hoped to establish is that human love for living things, what

he calls biophilia, is part of a larger phenomenon of affection that the Greeks called philia, and

that this capacity is part of a larger context of biotic interconnection. I have argued that an

Aristotelian framework utilizing his analysis of philia, coupled with what we now understand

about ecosystems and biotic interconnection, can enhance our modern conception of biophilia.

To summarize, I have argued that:

a. All living things have the capacity for peaceful coexistence (symbiotic philia);

b. All living things have the capacity for affectionate attachment with others within

and beyond their species (hedonistic philia); and

c. Many sentient beings seem to have the capacity for affection based on respect,

admiration, or some rudimentary analogue of this feeling (kalondistic philia).

Furthermore, with respect to obligation, whereas the previous approaches centering on the

question of values in nature have focused on individual entities (members of a species, species

themselves, or ecosystems) having or conceiving these values, my approach has its focus on the

web of relationships among biota, the existence of affectionate attachments and an ever-

present potential for such, and the obligations that may arise among biota under conditions of

proximity and interaction. In summary, there are three levels of interaction that produce the

conditions of obligation:

1. Interactions of mutual benefit and interdependency create conditions that

necessitate a reciprocity without which the relationship cannot persist, and may

threaten the existence of any of the involved parties (obligations of benefit);

2. Interactions of mutual affection create conditions of natural reciprocity that exist

without need of obligation (reciprocity of pleasure)

3. Interactions of admiration and respect create conditions of self-motivated

reciprocity in which giving and receiving persist in a state of stability and integrity

without obligation—as long as the motivation for the interaction continues to be

motivated by respect (reciprocity of virtue)

In closing, I’d like to return to my earlier characterization of Aristotelian ethics as an excellence-

based ethic, where virtue (arête) is conceived as excellence in functionality in a web of social

relationships. Near the end of his analysis of friendship, Aristotle reminds us that a friend is

another self,46 and that our own happiness and well-being can only exist in concert with others.

In his view there were always and at all levels relationships in concord or discord. We could

speak of individual persons, two or three people in association, species or nation states in the

same way. There is harmonious cooperation—between parts of a psyche, or individuals, or

groups—and there is disputation and war, all dependent on the presence or absence of parity

and balance. This conception of nested interconnections accounts for why he did not think that

egoism was a significant problem for ethical theory.47 There is good egoism and bad egoism.

Whether it is good or bad is a function of whether the self has been enlarged enough to see its

connection to a larger web of social life.48 What I have suggested in addition to this analysis is

that this feature of sociality is part of a larger phenomenon of connection between all living

things. We feel connected to other humans because we are living things, and all living things

feel connected to each other and to their homes. Because of this, even enmity and competition

can be transformed, under the right circumstances, into peaceful coexistence, and even

affectionate attachment.

Holmes Rolston III, in his critique of Wilson, argues that his approach to biophilia, which

tries to ground the concept in a selfish individual by virtue of “selfish genes,” has significant

drawbacks. 49 The problem here is the age-old, and has been with us since the advent of

modernism and its attendant individualism: how does one generate an ethic out of selfish

feelings? Rolston comments:

Wilson is finding it difficult to get biophilia out of selfish genes. That is because a single gene is really, so to speak, only a fragment of biophilia, a bit of life information… there is no self there to be selfish about.

Rolston sees that a self is more than an isolated atomistic individual, comprised of other such

randomly assembled micro-individual genetic codings. He wonders why someone who feels

such profound love to all living things need retreat to such reductionism, as if assembling the

whole from its parts will fully explain the dynamic interrelations. He concludes:

There is no need for a person with such an admirable love of life to retreat into a killjoy explanation of his love. Why not rise to a joyous explanation? …. The planet loves life and so do we. This is the evolutionary epic, and we are this love of life become conscious of itself.50

Perhaps we have returned to the ancient Greek cosmology that saw Love (philia) as the law of

attraction—the binding force which brings all things together.51 I am reminded of Plato’s

Symposium, where Aristophanes tells the story of our four legged human ancestors, who,

because their power threatened the natural order of things, were cut in half that they may find

humility.52 Today it seems we have more power than ever, yet our position on the planet

seems more precarious than ever—and we are missing more than the other half of our human

nature. We have been detached, through our own efforts, from our evolutionary history, and

we are now, seemingly, in the twilight of our reign over the earth. Environmental scientists and

philosophers like Leopold, Wilson, Naess, Rolston and Callicott have been trying to show us a

way back to another missing part of us—a functional connection to nature. Biophilia is a name

for such a feeling, but it is also part of a larger system of connectivity that we share with all

living things.

End notes

1 E.O. Wilson, Biophilia: the human bond with other species (Cambridge: Harvard, 1984), print. p. 322 Jennifer S. Holland, Unlikely Friendships: 47 Remarkable stories from the Animal Kingdom (New York, Workman Publishing, 2011), print, pp. x-xi.3 Biophilia Hypothesis, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1714435/biophilia-hypothesis?anchor=ref1090191, web.4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), print, pp. 303-45 Ostwald, p. 17. 6 This dictionary is the Greek language equivalent of the Oxford English Dictionary. I am grateful to both Constantine Santas and Lily C. Vuong, who were kind enough to translate the entries for me into English.7 Ostwald, p. 214.8 Ibid, p. 250.9 Ibid, p. 227-8.10 Apparently there is at least one thing Aristotle did not learn from his teacher. 11 More than two thousand years later, John Stuart Mill will turn this argument on its head and make it into a reason for woman’s emancipation. See Mill, Subjection of Women (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), print, Chapter IV, pp. 98-103.12 Aristotle spends a good deal of time here discussing complaints between friends; and it is in this context that the discussion of obligation seems to arise.13 Ostwald, p. 24114 Ibid, p. 24015 See J. Baird Callicott, “The Search for an Environmental Ethic,” in Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1986), print, pp. 381-424.16 See Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” in A Sand County Almanac (New York: Ballantine, 1976), print, pp. 237-64.17 David Hume’s theory of morals and their foundation in sentiment can be found in, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Oxford, 2005), print, and in A Treatise of Human Nature, (London: Oxford, 1983), print, Bk. III.18 Wayne Ouderkirk and Jim Hill, eds., Land, Value, and Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), print, p. 32.19 Hargrove rejects Aristotle’s metaphysics because he rejects the enterprise of metaphysics itself, though he sees ontology as an important enterprise. See “Environmental Ethics without Metaphysics,” in Ouderkirk and Hill, pp. 135-49.20 Ibid, p. 141.21 I am following here what I understand as the common biological use of the term.22 I use the term ‘hedonistic’ here with some reservation, given the modern colloquial usage, but I prefer to side with history here and choose ignore the contemporary and perhaps temporary kidnapping of the concept.23 I suggest the term ‘kalondistic’ owing to the Greek kalón (τò καλόν), meaning ‘beauty’ or ‘goodness.’24 See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, “Biocentrism, Biological Science, and Ethical Theory,” in Ouderkirk and Hill, pp. 87-90.25 Ostwald, p. 215.26 Aristotle, History of Animals, Internet Classics Archive, web, Book IX, Part 1. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/history_anim.9.ix.html [emphasis added]27 See above and below for a discussion of friendships between unequals. See also Paul Shepard, “On Animal Friends” in Biophilia Hypothesis, pp.275-300, for a critique of pet-friend development as substitute for exposure to wild animals.28 Almost all of Holland’s examples are in this category; and this is by design. See her explanation on pp. x-xii.29 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), print, Chap. III, pp. 26-33.30 Mead discusses this ability as a generalized sort of “taking the attitude of the other” in The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1938), print. A complete discussion of this feature of the human mind is in Mind, Self and Society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), print.31 I have argued elsewhere that (1) value is an emergent property of natural systems in which relations of connectivity arise, and (2) that intrinsic value is a feature of ecosystems whereby the phenomenon of multifunctionality occurs within complex relations of interconnectivity. See “The Environmental Value in G.H. Mead’s Cosmology” in Andrew Light and Eric Katz, Environmental Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.73-83 and “A Pragmatic Theory of Intrinsic Value,” in Philosophical Inquiry International Quarterly, XXV, No. 1 (2002), pp. 93-104. My approach here, though compatible with those analyses, is independent of these considerations, so I will not repeat the arguments here. 32 Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” in James P. Sterba, Earth Ethics: Introductory Readings in Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2000), 2nd ed. print, pp. 65-73.33Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,” in Sterba, pp. 51-64.34 J. Baird Callicott, “The Search for an Environmental Ethic,” in Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1986), print, pp. 381-424.

35 see Wendy Donner, “Callicott on Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing in Environmental Ethics,” in Ouderkirk and Hill, pp. 99-105, for a concise treatment of the debate36 It is even a bit ironic that Callicott invokes Hume here, given that the gulf between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ has been dubbed as “Hume’s Law.”37 See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980). print38 I use the term here mindful of Mead’s discussion of emergent properties. See Mead, 1938, pp. 615-6. 39 In pre-Socratic cosmology, this principle was equivalent to cause and effect. Whether benefit or harm, one is due what one has dished out. It is the law of nature, whether we see it in the cycle of seasons, or in the cycles of revenge the Orestia. 40 Ostwald, pp. 241-2.41 This idea of morality as autonomous is embodied in Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative. See Beck, pp. 49-50.42 Holland, pp. 135-7.43 “Pelorus Jack,” Wikipedia entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelorus_Jack. web (accessed 5/23/2013)44 Contrast this action to that of a porpoise in a water park, doing tricks for fish.45 Wilson, Biophilia, pp. 138-9.46 Ostwald, p. 266.47 Although, even in his time, it was a huge problem in ethical conduct.48 Ostwald, pp. 260-3.49 Rolston, “Biophilia, Selfish Genes, and Shared Values,” in Wilson and Kellert, Biophilia Hypothesis, p. 381-41450 Ibid, p. 413.51 See Empedocles, On Nature, in Walter Kaufmann, ed., Philosophical Classics: Thales to Ockham (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), print, pp. 35-7. 52 Plato, Symposium, in Kaufmann, pp.125-58. Aristophanes’ speech is on pp. 136-9.