Muna Sabbagh (2014), Legislative imbalance regarding parental responsibility of young offenders

8/13/2019 Muna Sabbagh (2014), Legislative imbalance regarding parental responsibility of young offenders

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Published in YVJ, January

http://youthvoicejournal.com/

© IARS 2014

-ISSN (online): 2056-2969

Muna Sabbagh

Legislative imbalance regarding parental responsibility of young offenders.

Abstract

The recent judicial review brought against the Home Secretary in relation to her refusal to

revise Code C of PACE 1984 brings into question the legislative inconsistencies surrounding

young people and their parents coming into contact within the youth justice system. The

case below identifies the controversy of parental responsibility towards young offenders.

This is highlighted through the inconsistencies of current legislation against parents. There is

a need to support parents in preventing their children becoming embroiled into the youth

justice system. Evidence of this need can be found in scientific and social research, which

determines the increased risk taking behaviour a young person may experience throughout

the normal adolescent developmental stage. This supports the requirement for a different

approach towards determining parental responsibility as is currently provided by the state.


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Introduction

Loss of liberty at any age is a daunting prospect and to not have the support from people

who have your best interests at heart can have tragic consequences. This has been proved

by some young offenders being subjected to an overnight or lengthy detention in a police

cell without their parents or a carer being present. The significance of the case review below

highlights a need to address legislative provisions found in international law, which provide

that the rights of a child are met through fair and just procedures. Clarifying these rights

within domestic law could avoid legislative ambiguities that have had adverse consequences

on the young person and their families.

The case of R. (on the application of HC (a child)) v Secretary of State for the Home

Department& Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 982 (Admin), which

will be referred to as HC throughout the article,brings to the fore the legislative

inconsistencies within the youth justice system of England and Wales. In a narrow context it

exposes the discrepancies surrounding the determination of a young person and an adult in

relation to detention in police custody. Its broader context it highlights the adultification of

young offenders through current legislative inconsistency.

The controversial aspect to this case is how Code C of the Code of Practice under the Police

and Criminal Evidence Act 1984(PACE) determines a juvenile as being a person under

seventeen, which means a young person from the age of seventeen, will be treated as an

adult whilst in police detention. This is of significance not least for its incongruity but

specifically in light of the serious consequences some of these detentions have had on the

young person and their families.


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This article will provide an examination of the case and the decision made in connection

with the application for a judicial review towards the Home Secretary and the amendment

of the Code. It will focus on the states requirement for parental responsibility toward young

offenders as enforced through statute and its inconsistencies. The following analysis of the

legislation cited in the judgment towards the Home Secretary will substantiate the

legislative imbalance towards enforcing parental responsibility. The case concerns a judicial

review of the Home Secretary’s refusal to revise Code C of PACE. The Code is possibly the

only remaining piece of legislation that recognises a seventeen year old as an adult within

the criminal justice system.

Methodology

The research methodology for this article was a qualitative examination of the issues

surrounding the legislative inconsistencies of parental responsibility towards young people

whilst in police detention. The evidence examined has been drawn from practitioners and

academics within the area of youth offending specifically in relation to parental

responsibility. The data selected was based on three areas within the youth offending field.

They are charitable organisations, scientific research data and academic research from a

criminological perspective.

This analysis of work carried out by charitable organisations included the legal

representation provided to the young person in the case of HC by Just for Kids Law and the

Howard League for Penal Reform. Along with legal representation these bodies provide


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evidence based research for policy reform within the criminal justice system, the former

focusing on the youth justice field alone. As has been established this case has had a

significant impact into the amendment of legislative provision against young people in

detention. The evidence provided by these bodies focuses on a youth centred approach

towards policy reform within the youth justice system.

The next two areas examined were the findings from both scientific and criminological areas

within adolescence and youth offending. The first being the work carried out by

Blakemore(2008), which provided a scientific perspective on the need to consider the

developmental changes in a young person’s mind and correspondingly their needs if caught

up in the youth justice system. Blakemore determines the correlation of biological evidence

and the impact of the learning environment the young person is in. This means that in terms

of policy reform there is evidence from a multidisciplinary forum. This is further

demonstrated in the analysis of work carried out by youth offending academics and

criminologists, who have undertaken both quantitative and qualitative research to establish

the significance of parental responsibility towards a young offender (Arthur et al).

Finally the case of HC was selected in order to provide a platform for discussion and

examination into the legislative inconsistencies surrounding young people caught up in the

youth justice system. Furthermore its relevance was to highlight the ambiguity surrounding

parental responsibility of a young offender.


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Case facts

The facts of the case HC are that at the age of seventeen the claimant was detained under

suspicion of robbery for over 11½ hours, without an appropriate adult. The claimant had

asked for his mother to be present but was refused as it was believed by the officer in

charge that exercising the claimants rights for an appropriate adult to attend would obstruct

the recovery of the alleged stolen property, as authorised under s56(1) of PACE. This being

the defence of the second defendant in the judicial review in that the police acted correctly

and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Act. However the court took the

decision to base this judgment on the Home Secretary’s refusal to amend the Code as

opposed to the actions of the police as they had followed statutory regulations.

The consequences of the police actions in isolation though do highlight a need for further

debate regarding the requirements on the police to make decisions based on statute as

opposed to their own discretion. Specifically as in this instance the young offender had not

been in trouble before and was therefore not familiar with the procedures, which is

established through recent petitions to government on the need for revision to the code

due to the adverse consequences of its enforcement (Just for Kids Law,2013).

The Home Secretary did try and refute the claim by the police that their actions were

attributed to the statutory regulation. Her claim was that the police had the discretion to

address the needs of a vulnerable person whilst in their detention as provided by the

provisions from the statute. Of significance in this case was that the young person


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concerned had asked for his mother to be present and as stated above was refused but

offered a solicitor, as an appropriate adult. His refusal to have a solicitor present was based

on a fear that the advice provided would not be impartial. This issue of young people being

unable to communicate effectively with adults in authority is one that has been

substantiated by the medical profession in terms of neuroscientific and psychiatric data

(Blakemore, 2012 and Royal College of Psychiatrists,2006). Further examination of this

evidence will be provided below.

The issue of revision of the Code was to allow for the same protection towards seventeen

year olds as would be expected for a young person under this age. The Home Secretary

argued that it was not necessary to afford special protection for seventeen year olds whilst

in detention as their needs were catered for in the same way as an adult. She stressed that

everyone in detention was provided with the same consideration of their rights whilst in

detention.

She went onto establish that a line had to be drawn to determine an adult from a child. This

argument in itself contravenes statutory provisions currently in force, which will be

evidenced below.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The Home Secretary also maintained that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human

Rights( ECHR), which it was argued had been infringed towards the claimant, had not been

violated. This was due to the legislative enforcement procedure of proportionality by the

member states. She argued that the treatment of seventeen year olds as adults was


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proportionate, which meant that the code had been applied correctly by the state. The

court found though that the code did contravene Article 8 ECHR. This was specified by the

court in that a right to family life fell in the scope of maintaining a family relationship, which

in this instance had been denied due to the provision of the Code. This argument was

furthered by the inconsistency of the Code toward the provisions of the UN Convention on

the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which expanded on the UK’s lack of duty towards its

ratification of international law and what could be seen as the Home Secretary’s failure to

consider the importance of the agreement.

Moreover from a domestic position the controversy raised in this case emphasizes the

state’s obligation to acknowledge the needs of the adolescent entering the youth justice

system. This is made even more significant in light of current trends towards recognising

scientific evidence when determining policy. Scientific evidence in collaboration with social

science research could better inform policy decision makers when formulating legislation.

Developments in neuroscience have enhanced the debate over the normal development of

adolescence and could contribute to a greater determination of the needs of the young

offender from early to late adolescence. Legislative developments within the youth justice

system and governmental policy have traditionally held the parents of young offenders to

account. The case above emphasises the contradictory element the Code has towards the

rights of a young person and their parents. An example is the case of Silver v United

Kingdom [1983] 5 EHRR 347 whereby it was determined by the ECHR that:

‘...the law must be sufficiently precise to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct; he must

be able to foresee the consequences of his actions.


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Parental responsibility of young offenders

The judgment was based on an analysis of the law in relation to the legal determination of

the age of a child and that of a young person. The Code determines an ‘arrested juvenille’ as

being under the age of seventeen. The court sought to illustrate the ambiguity of the Code

in relation to other statutory provision in place. This was achieved by drawing on specific

provisions of current legislation regarding young offenders. The first example is the Crime

and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), which at its inception intended to introduce ‘... a coherent

youth justice system with the aim of preventing offending’. Within the Act s117 (1)

determines a young person as between the age of fourteen to eighteen.

This in itself created controversy for not providing special consideration for young adults,

specifically between the ages of 18 -21 (Fionda, 1999). This is of significance as it focuses on

the issue of recognising the risk taking behaviour of an adolescent and how this can

continue into early adulthood if the young offender is in an adverse learning environment.

Neuroscientific studies provide empirical evidence that risk taking is higher at the

adolescent stage of life and that the evidence must be corroborated with the learning

environment the adolescent finds themselves in (Blakemore, 2008).This is of relevance to

the above issue in that there is a recognition between biological and social research to

consider the needs of young people and young adults. This determination of the learning

environment in corroboration with neuroscientific data establishes the benefits of both

types of scientific research as opposed to producing a ‘dual use dilemma’ regarding the use

of neuroscientifc data in relation to youth justice (Walsh, 2011). However this ambiguity as


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to how to utilise this evidence is reflected in the current legislation towards young offenders

and their parents’ responsibility towards them.

For example the CDA also enforced the Parenting Order (PO) and Parenting Compensation

Order (PCO), which in relation to the above case emphasises the legislative stance towards

parental accountability for the young offender. However the courts view the sanction of a

PO as a last resort and would prefer the parents to enter into a voluntary agreement with

youth justice officials such as voluntary parenting programmes and parenting contracts

(Youth Justice Board, 2007). The CDA implemented the Parental Order in 2000 and the Anti-

Social Behaviour Act 2003 increased the duty of the court to administer a PO if there was a

realistic possibility of the anti social behaviour continuing by the child (Hansard, 2011). To

further substantiate the government’s requirement to establish parental accountability is

the 1997 White Paper, “No More Excuses — A New Approach To Tackling Youth Crime In

England and Wales” stated:

“Parents of young offenders may not directly be to blame for crimes of their

children, but parents have to be responsible for providing their children with proper care

and control. The courts need powers to help and support parents more effectively to keep

their children out of trouble.”

In relation to the case of judicial review the above emphasises the legislative recognition of

the parents’ duty towards the young offender. However, a further example of the legislative

ambiguity of the Code, as specified in the judgment, between young people and young

adults can be found in the Family Reform Act 1969, whereby the age of majority in England

and Wales was lowered to eighteen from twenty one years old. The Hansard debates from


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the Latey Committee report on the age of majority provide an example for the inconsistency

within the law:

‘...But the Committee made two exclusions. It says explicitly that it has not

considered any possible repercussions in the criminal law. It saw its task as being concerned

with the great majority of young people who keep the law, and not with the small minority

who break it.’(Hansard,1967).

This determines the importance the state puts on the individual in terms of property and

financial gain as opposed to those who may get caught up in the criminal justice system. The

government has a duty towards young people in terms of the collective responsibility as

recognised between the state, society and the family. Therefore if part of the states

obligation is provided through legislation then this has to be clear as determined by the rule

of law.

Such ambiguity is highlighted within the youth justice system as to the needs of young

adults and older adolescents. For example further legislation cited in the judgment above

regarding the inconsistency within various statutes was the Children Act 2004, whereby

provision for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the child is to be taken into account

at all times as also stated in the UNCRC. This legislative provision was used as a strong

argument against the Home Secretary’s defence. Furthermore the Criminal Justice Act 2003

determines a young person as under the age of eighteen as does the Legal Aid and

Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The provisions within these Acts


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accentuate the statutory inconsistency in domestic law regarding its obligation within

international law.

Comparative international youth justice law and parental responsibility of young

offenders

International law provides clarity as to the inconsistencies in relation to making parents

accountable for their child’s offending that were highlighted in the case above (HC). It

determines the state’s role as providing minimum intervention but also ensuring support

and provision of resources within their families and community (Arthur, 2010:36).

The implementation of these provisions into domestic law is unclear specifically when

political gain is at the forefront of the government’s aim. Countries like Canada have

attempted to adhere to the provisions determined by the UNCRC with the implementation

of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 2003 but have fallen short of ensuring a welfare/

developmental approach due to the conservative views of some who feel a more punitive

approach is required within the Act (Bell,2011).

Furthermore Bell(2011) goes on to state that even with the good intentions of the Act,

specifically in relation to encouraging family and community participation in assisting a

young offender to grow out of crime, it still falls short of the provisions from the UNCRC.

This is determined through the lack of segregation from adult prisoners whilst a child is held

in detention.

However there are countries where the welfare approach towards young offenders and

their families does follow international law. Examples of which are identified by Arthur


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(2010) as Scotland and the Scandinavian countries. Within these countries there focus is on

the welfare of the child whether as a young offender or not. Whereas in England and Wales

the welfare principle as determined in the Children Act 1989 provides that parents and

carers have responsibility in terms of their role and duties towards the child.

The court’s decision in HC specifically focused on the ratification by the UK of the UNCRC,

which determines the states duty towards the child and that a child is recognised as being

under the age of eighteen. The case of R v G [2003] UKHL 50 was cited, which stated that a

child accused of a crime must have their age taken into account for their own good and that

of society as instructed by the UNCRC. The purpose of this was to stress the vulnerability of

children and young people when confronted with the criminal justice system for the first

time.

The Home Secretary’s response to this was that the ratification of the UNCRC was down to

the states discretion as to how to implement the provision and that the procedure for

detention for seventeen year olds in the UK was acceptable. This meant that it was seen by

the state that they had provided for the international enforcement of international law. This

view being an administrative and political stance on the issue concerned as opposed to a

pragmatic one.

Judgment

Fortunately the judgement provided a balance to this view by bringing to the fore the

general consensus that a seventeen year old should be considered a young person by

organisations working with them. Such as HM Inspectorates of Prisons and Constabulary


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who in joint reports advocate for appropriate adults for young people in custody. The report

highlighted the inconsistency of the Code in that it was only at police stations that a

seventeen year old was treated like an adult.

Moreover Frances Cook of the Howard League states that ACPO and the Police Federation

also agree that seventeen year olds should be treated as children whilst being detained in

police stations. Special treatment under the under the Code includes the police monitoring

the young person more frequently than adults whilst in police custody (Howard League,

2011).

Further illustration of the above is the case of McGowan (Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh) v B

[2011] UKSC 54, which raised the issue of the vulnerability of a child and the imbalance of

power by the criminal justice system. This was again to be refuted by the Home Secretary as

she felt that in this specific case regarding the revision of the Code there was not an

imbalance towards the young person’s rights but that a seventeen year old in police

detention would have their needs provided for as would an adult.

The imbalance of treating a seventeen year old as an adult was further emphasised in the

judgment by the need for the state to ensure access to justice for all as established in the

rule of law. This was determined by the case of R (on the application of) The Children's

Rights Alliance for England v The Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 34. The

decision held in this case stressed the importance of ensuring access to justice for seventeen

year olds by having a parent or appropriate adult in attendance during their detention. This


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meant the young person could effectively make themselves heard, which is argued at that

developmental age may prove difficult for them, as the following establishes.

Neuroscientific evidence of a developmental approach

Scientific evidence now provides substantial data on the effects of normal development of a

young person’s mind. To advance this point are the neurological trials undertaken which

determine the possible adverse consequences of a young person caught up in the youth

justice system. Trials carried out by Blakemore have shown that adolescents have a greater

propensity for misunderstanding information given to them by adults in authority

(Blakemore, 2012).

Analysis of these findings and the process of brain development from the beginning to late

adolescence determine the need for special measures and assistance towards seventeen

year olds and young adults. This is further substantiated by neurological findings of the

adolescent brain still developing into the early twenties and the crime statistic figures

correlating with this scientific evidence. Specifically during the mid to late adolescence stage

of development, offending rates increase correlating with peak indications of neural

connectivity in the brain at the same time (Blakemore, 2012 and MOJ 2010/11).

An acknowledgement of these findings along with developments in the social sciences can

further the comprehension of the needs to addressed both in the shallow and deep end of

the youth justice system (Rutherford, 1992). Rutherford advocates an alternative approach

towards young offenders that deals with their needs at both ends of the youth justice


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system spectrum. At the beginning of his work he provides a quote from Mary Carpenter

such has a specific resonance with the case being discussed in this article. ‘We should not

sever the family ties of all these young persons, or place the hand of the policeman on so

many thousands of the rising generation’.

Although initially an advocate of incarceration, Mary Carpenter towards the end of her work

felt the criminal justice system needed to recognise the importance of the family towards

the young offender (Rutherford, 1992).In relation to the case under review is the historical

debate over the need to maintain where possible, the link between the young person and

their parents when they find themselves in contact with the youth justice system.

Arguments against legislative imbalance

The judgment in the case of HC advances this idea by emphasising the imbalance of the

provisions of the code in relation to article 8 ECHR. The issue of imbalance was deliberated

throughout the judgment as both the rights of the young person and the parent were seen

to be infringed. This in turn invoked the provision of article 8 of the ECHR and the

preservation of family life, which as the judgment highlights ‘the government seeks to

maintain and encourage’.

However the Home Secretary refuted this imbalance stating the following five points in her

argument:

- The first as stated above was that an adult was able to request an individual for support

when being detained and therefore welfare considerations were given to seventeen year


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olds who were treated as adults. However the courts response was that this did not address

the need to reconsider treating a seventeen year old as an adult whilst in detention.

- The second reason put forward was that the decision was left to the discretion of the

police under the code and whether they thought it appropriate and necessary to deny

informing an appropriate adult. The court again maintained that the relevant issue of a

seventeen year old being detained as an adult was not being addressed. Furthermore the

police response was that an officer would follow the legislative guidelines provided unless

the appearance of vulnerability was recognised as recommended by the code.

- The third reason offered was that a solicitor could suffice in instances where an

appropriate adult could not be informed. This being due to the Home Secretary stating that

there was not a need for every seventeen year old to have an appropriate adult. This was

contested by the notion that a solicitor could not constitute an appropriate adult as the

claimant stated he viewed them as an adult in authority and therefore their interests were

not met.

- The fourth reason given was that the time spent waiting for an appropriate adult could

result in the young person being detained for longer.

The court felt delay of an appropriate adult was inconsistent with the views of those

involved in the criminal justice system specifically in relation with this case where the

claimant was held for over 11½ hours without an appropriate adult(AA).

- The fifth reason being the cost element to the taxpayer should an appropriate adult other

than a parent having to attend whenever a seventeen year old is brought into custody. This

reason was based on an assumption that the majority of AA’s would not be parents and

currently there is not enough data to corroborate this assertion. There was also ambiguity


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over the estimate cost provided by the Home Secretary and therefore a reservation on her

forecast. This final reason also brought into question the imbalance of the welfare of the

child over increased costs within the youth justice system, specifically with consideration

towards International treaties.

Furthermore the Home Secretary’s argument against revision was that a line had to be

drawn in determining the age of a young person in detention and that of an adult, which

counteracted her claim for not amending the code as the line was drawn or ascertained in

all other legislation concerning young offenders. Therefore she put herself in a position of

conflict against her own argument for non amendment.

A further argument put forward was a constitutional point in that it was the will of

parliament to leave the Code unchanged as the Code formed guidelines of practice in

relation to an Act and therefore it was for Parliament to legislate otherwise. This was

counteracted by the court in that section 6(1) Human Rights Act 1998 states ‘It is unlawful

for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.’ This

seemed to be a consistent failing by the home Secretary in that she would dismiss the

significance of the ECHR provisions, making her case lack credibility on a political standpoint

as opposed to the welfare of the child. This incomprehension by the Home Secretary that

their own law making policies had already seen a demarcation applied in terms of classifying

a young person between an adult had been invoked into domestic legislation by Parliaments

own will.


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However the judgment ascertained that the Code was incoherent, specifically in relation to

international and domestic legislation. Although it was recognised by the court that the

Home Secretary’s stance was not an irrational one in light of the constitutional aspect.

Nonetheless as stated above the court found the Code to be unlawful and application for a

review applied. Before an amendment may be made consultations with the relevant bodies

concerned will be carried out and the amendment put in the form of a statutory instrument,

which will need to be subject to Parliamentary approval.

If the ruling is not complied with in the form of a revision of the code and seventeen year

olds continue to be treated as adults in police custody, there may be claims brought for

breach of their human rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 (NAAN,2013).

Legal implications of the judgment

The outcome of this judgment as to the procedures laid out for seventeen year olds in police

custody places emphasis on the needs of the older adolescent as being similar to a child’s.

ACPO have provided guidance for custody officers, whereby in light of the ruling, seventeen

year olds are to be treated as a ‘ juvenile’ in relation to the code as it stands. This ensures

the custody officers provide an appropriate adult should the young person require. The

guidance goes on to state that the offer of an appropriate adult to seventeen year olds

should be recorded in the interests of all concerned. Furthermore the parents of the young

person should be notified as long as it is in the young person’s interest. This provides for the

rights of the parents as well as the young person under Article 8 ECHR. (Just For Kids Law,

2013)


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Appropriate Adults

One of the reasons against revision of the Code given by the Home Secretary was the cost

implications in providing every seventeen year old with an appropriate adult. This was

estimated as 19.1million per year. The Home Secretary did admit the figure should be

treated with caution and was for ‘indicative purposes only’. The court queried this figure

and its purpose as statements from the National Appropriate Adult Network (NAAN)

disputed the figure on the grounds that they already had AA’s willing to deliver services to

seventeen year olds. The court was in doubt as to the last minute presentation of the policy

document which suggested the government may be putting costs before the welfare of the

child.

In a briefing following the ruling NAAN estimated the cost for delivering AA services would

cost approximately 1.5 million per year. This was based on figures that also highlight a need

for substantial data to be obtained in relation to the various bodies participating in the

provision of AA’s. However in an earlier report carried out by NAAN for the Home Office in

2010 it was illustrated that the majority of AA’s were used to assist young people as

opposed to adults and that they were either in house Youth Justice Board officers, voluntary

third sector or private bodies. Moreover in some areas they were being underused,

although there were a percentage of police regions asking for a 24 hour AA service as these

services were not always on offer. This illustrates the need for further research in this area

to establish the resources needed within police stations for defendants.

The report did recognise that there would be financial implications towards expanding AA’s

to meet the demands of seventeen year olds in police custody (NAAN, 2010). However in


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light of recent consequences of detention of seventeen year olds without their parents

present and the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child this implication is

clearly not a priority. Significantly the judgement made in the case of HC may provide some

relief for those concerned in drawing attention to the need to amend the Code in light of it

being unlawful.

Findings

The outcome of the case has brought to the fore issues that overlap each other in terms of

policy and legislation towards the rights of the young person and their parent’s rights and

responsibilities. This is highlighted in the different approaches each government has taken

when intervening in the youth justice system. However more significantly in relation to the

case above is the political stance on parental responsibility towards young offenders. The

perception that parents do not want the responsibility of the young person caught up in

trouble due to their risk taking behaviour is a reaction from the media, who exploit the deep

seated fear of young people some members of the public have.

The last decade has seen an attempt at diverting away from incarceration of young people

for cost saving purposes, which in itself has been incongruous. There is confusion between

the legislation in place and the policies being debated surrounding the duty of parents

towards their children when in contact with the youth justice system. As Rutherford

proposes there is a need to direct resources towards the deep end of the youth justice

system, such as incarcerative institutions, which in turn will assist with the policy of

decarceration.


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Conclusion

The article demonstrates the current irregularity in determining the responsibilities of the

parents towards young offenders. The legislation discussed above dictates that the parents

duty is of significance by enforcing sanctions against them should they be deemed to be

failing in that duty. However the legislative approach has been a reactive intervention,

providing legislation that is confused with other domestic legislation. If provisions within

international law toward the young offender were adhered to there would not be the

anomaly recognised from the case above.

Therefore where the state determines the legislation for parental duty through its own

collective responsibility it also can have a negative intervention approach towards the family

and increase the chances of moving the young offender from the shallow end of the youth

justice system to the deeper end. This could be avoided by ensuring current legislation is in

line with international law and its recognition of the welfare of the child as opposed to

political gains made in terms of reactionary intervention towards their risk taking behaviour.

The article also establishes a need for further youth led research within this area, which

could assist in identifying the flaws in legislative provisions for young people and their

families’ caught up in the youth justice system. This data can only further inform decision

makers in terms of policy reform within the youth justice system.


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Routeledge, Oxon,2010)

Bell SJ, Young Offenders and Youth Justice: A Century after the Fact (4th

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JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 61 (1), 40 –49

Blakemore SJ(2012) Development of the social brain in adolescence, J R Soc Med . 105: 111 –

116

Blakemore SJ(2012) Imaging brain development: The adolescent brain, Neuroimage. 61,397-

406

Farrington DP, Key Results From the First Forty Years Of The Cambridge Study In Delinquent

Development,(2000) Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge.

Fionda J, Crime and Disorder Act 1998: new Labour, old hat: youth justice and the Crime and

Disorder Act 1998(1999) Criminal Law Review

Graham J and Bowling B, Young People and Crime, Home Office Research Study 145, 1995


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Documents

Muna Sabbagh (2014), Legislative imbalance regarding parental responsibility of young offenders