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Multinational Capability Development Campaign 2013-2014
CATALOG OF PRODUCTS
This document was developed and written by the contributing nations and organizations of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)
program community of interest. It does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of any single nation or organization, but is intended as a guide.
Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorized for personal and non-commercial use only. The use of this work for commercial
purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and adaptation/modification requires prior written permission.
Questions or comments can be referred to:
Information may also be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/s/MEpub/default.aspx
From the Chair of the Executive Steering Group
The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) Program, previously titled Multinational Experimentation (MNE), commenced in 2001 and initially involved four participating nations. During the past 13 years, the Program series has progressed and expanded to encompass eight campaigns where the collaborative work produced outcomes that benefited 22 nations and various international organizations. The Program has proven to be a cost effective means for all participating nations to find viable solutions to existing and future capability gaps. The products outlined in this catalog represent the final outcomes generated during our eighth campaign, “Combined Operational Access”. MCDC 2013-2014 was a complex, two-year, multinational and inter-agency effort designed to improve coalition capabilities relative to improving common operational access. Collectively, our 22 participating nations and organizations contributed to the most productive campaign to date.
MCDC 2013-2014 Focus Area results described in this summary have the potential to significantly enhance both coalition and national operating capabilities while narrowing known gaps. This latest campaign served to increase collective understanding within each of the separate domains and provided the opportunity to further explore the nature of their interconnectedness. The products developed provide a common foundation for national and organizational capability development in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership education, personnel, facilities, and policy.
It is great news to hear that some of these outcomes are already being transitioned toward implementation.
To obtain a copy of a product listed in the catalog, please send a request to the MCDC Secretariat, [email protected]
Jon T. Thomas Brigadier General, US Air Force Chair, MCDC Executive Steering Group
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................... 1
Introduction ............................................................................................... 2
Combined Operational Fires ..................................................................... 4
Combined Operations from the Sea Through the Littoral ........................ 7
Cyber Implications for Combined Operational Access ........................... 11
Maritime Approach to Combined Operational Access ........................... 15
Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access ............... 16
Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access .................. 20
Understand to Prevent ............................................................................. 26
Summary of Prior Multinational Collaborative Efforts .......................... 28
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview
The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) series is a multinational solution development initiative led by the United States that aims at collaboratively developing and accessing concepts and capabilities that can be used to address the challenges associated with conducting coalition and multinational operations. It contributes to multinational capability development by identifying and evaluating potential solutions to coalition and multinational capability gaps. The MCDC series is composed of consecutive campaigns – each with an overarching theme, and Focus Areas – varying in quantity from campaign to campaign and each addressing a specific problem set through the use of Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) and other evaluation methods.
MCDC 2013-2014 Contributors
Austria
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
NATO ACT
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Republic of Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
MCDC 2013-2014 Observer Japan
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Introduction The theme of MCDC 2013-2014 was Combined Operational Access. MCDC 2013-2014 addressed the Operational Access challenge by focusing on the versatile, agile capabilities required to project combined forces into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish their mission. Recognizing that the military instrument of power should never be wielded alone, MCDC 2013-2014 addressed planning and coordinating the employment of all relevant instruments of national, multinational and international power in the operational environment. It concentrated on enabling forces and other capabilities from different nations to swiftly combine for employment in an orderly, efficient and integrated manner with little to no modification or conversion required. The following nations and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) were contributing members of the MCDC 2013-2014 Campaign: Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union (European Defense Agency; European Union Military Staff), Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, NATO (Allied Command Transformation), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The specific problem sets addressed by the MCDC 2013-14 program of work were categorized into seven distinct Focus Areas (FA) proposed and led by one or more of the contributing partners. The Focus Areas are:
• Combined Operational Fires (COF) (USA). Determine how the Combined Joint Commander operationalizes and leverages existing combined joint fire support regional expertise, trust, partnerships and experience to address an operational security challenge.
• Combined Operations from the Sea Through the Littoral (COSTL)
(NATO ACT). Determine what capabilities are required to conduct Combined Operations from the Sea through the Littoral (COSTL), across the spectrum of mission types, to achieve objectives ashore.
• Cyber Implications for Combined Operational Access (CICOA)
(Italy/Norway). Develop procedural and technical solutions to facilitate the integration of cyber into the operational planning process.
• Maritime Approach to Combined Operational Access (MACOA)
(USA). Examine how stakeholder nations and then, at the point of crisis, the Combined Joint Commander can best lead and operationalize an approach
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that leverages existing maritime regional expertise, trust, partnerships and experience to address an operational security challenge.
• Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access (NATO ACT). Identify opportunities and challenges and develop recommendations and guidelines for establishing standards and interoperability of autonomous functions in military systems. (DOTMLPFI, legal, ethical, operational, technological and social aspects).
• Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access – Information Activities and Emerging Communication Practices (StratCom) (Germany / Finland / Italy). Enhancing coalition StratCom capabilities within a Comprehensive Approach: clarify approval authority and processes for communication guidance; promote the implementation of communication plans at the higher decision-making levels below the strategic-political level with a specific focus on transparency; explore the use of Social Media in support of measuring communication effectiveness and situational awareness.
• Understand to Prevent (UK). Examine Conflict Prevention from the
perspective of the human domain. By understanding the root causes and catalysts of conflict, the multinational community can identify relevant and appropriate strategies for the deployment and use of military forces in supporting peace and preventing conflict.
Details regarding specific problem statements, gaps, proposed products, and solutions are in the campaign annex for each Focus Area.
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Combined Operational Fires (COF) LEAD CONTRIBUTORS
Purpose: Multinational partners with varying rules of engagement and technical capabilities are limited in their ability to swiftly combine forces, in a crisis situation, to collaboratively plan, synchronize, execute and assess combined joint fires. A guidebook, to be used as a framework of standardized repeatable processes, tools and lexicon will enable multinational mission partners to: (1) perform national self-assessments of rules of engagement (ROE), fire support C2 systems, and joint fire support C2 organization requirements, (2) present that information to a multinational working group in a standardized format, and (3) integrate the information with other nations of the multinational force to quickly develop a coalition joint fire support capability. PRODUCT 1 Multinational ROE Development Tool This tool is a process where any nation can perform a self-assessment of National ROE and caveats, present that information to a multinational working group in a standardized format, and integrate the information with other nations of the coalition to quickly develop a coalition ROE matrix of authorized actions and limitations. Creating a coalition ROE for the Multinational Force will require an awareness of the disparate national consideration pertinent to the application of force during collation operations, and the process for integrating these considerations in a cohesive manner that supports coalition objectives. Coalition forces must be capable of swiftly operating in an orderly, efficient and integrated manner with elements from other member states with little to no modification or conversion required. The key to operational success will be the long-term and effective preparations conducted in advance of any deployment to overcome, or at least mitigate, any actual or perceived compatibility issues. Successfully accomplishing this task will significantly compress the time required to create a synchronized and optimized fire support system
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PRODUCT 2 Fire Support C2 Systems Integration Planning Tool This Fire Support C2 Systems Integration Planning Tool will enable any nation to perform a self-assessment of Fire Support C2 systems, present that information to a multinational working group in a standardized format, and integrate the information with other nations of the coalition to quickly develop a coalition Fire Support C2 systems integration and interoperability plan. A Fire Support C2 system is any information system that provides command and control of fire support assets or processes (e.g. AFATDS for field artillery and FACNAV for close air support). Integrating multinational Fire Support C2 systems will require an awareness of the disparate operational capabilities and degrees of interoperability among nations, and the process for integrating these capabilities in a cohesive manner that supports coalition objectives. Coalition forces must be capable of swiftly operating in an orderly, efficient and integrated manner with elements from other member states with little to no modification or conversion required. The key to operational success will be the long-term and effective preparations conducted in advance of any deployment to overcome, or at least mitigate, any actual or perceived compatibility issues. Successfully accomplishing this task will significantly compress the time required to create a synchronized and optimized fire support system. PRODUCT 3 Fire Support C2 Organization Planning Tool This tool is a process where any nation can perform a self-assessment of joint Fire Support C2 organization capabilities and requirements, present that information to a multinational working group in a standardized format, and integrate the information with other nations of the coalition to quickly develop a coalition joint Fire Support C2 organizational structure. Integrating multinational C2 personnel requires an awareness of: (1) typical multinational C2 structures used, (2) the process used to form a multinational C2 organization, and (3) the forces and Fire Support C2 systems the participating nation intends to contribute to the multinational force. Armed with these three vital pieces of information, the national planning team will be able to collect and consolidate information required for the senior national planner and member of the Joint Planning Group (JPG) to present that nation’s fire support requirements for C2 organization manning.
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Coalition forces must be capable of swiftly operating in an orderly, efficient and integrated manner with elements from other member states with little to no modification or conversion required. The key to operational success will be the long-term and effective preparations conducted in advance of any deployment to identify specific national C2 organizational requirements when participating as part of a multinational force. Successfully accomplishing this task will significantly compress the time required to create a synchronized and optimized Multinational Force C2 organization.
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Combined Operations from the Sea Through the Littoral (COSTL) LEAD CO-LEAD CONTRIBUTORS
Purpose: In order to operate across the wide spectrum of operations and ensure operational access to littoral areas, Joint commanders need the capabilities that will enable them to create a wide range of effects ashore from an operating base at sea. This requires that assets, equipment, personnel, procedures and sustainability reflect the operational demands of joint, multinational or coalition operations in the littoral. The operational access challenge for these operations is to be able to project military force into an operational area adjacent to the sea, and sustain it when there is no, or minimal, host nation support provided, and no, or a minimal, footprint ashore preferred. As part of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-2014, with the Theme “Combined Operational Access,” the Combined Operations from the Sea Through the Littoral (COSTL) Focus Area (FA) team explored the opportunities and challenges offered by joint, multinational or coalition operations being conducted from the sea. This study was based on the NATO Joint Sea Based Operations (NJSBO)1 Concept. The starting assumption made by the COSTL Team was that the NJSBO Concept was considered valid after being endorsed by both NATO Strategic Commands and submitted to the NATO Military Committee (MC) for approval. The central idea of NJSBO is the creation of sustained joint effects across a wide spectrum of the Alliance’s designated set of operations from an operating base physically located at sea. Whilst the NJSBO Concept discusses WHAT sea based operations are and WHY it could be used, the COSTL study focused on factors related to the conduct of a COSTL (WHEN) and the capabilities required for conducting such operations (HOW). COSTL offers the potential to provide improved access to littoral areas with a wider range of options; including speed, presence, persistence, and freedom of maneuver. The COSTL Team used a variety of different methods as described below to investigate this topic. The COSTL Team identified the following two areas of study:
1 The JSBO concept is a NATO concept, the ideas to be explored through this MCDC Focus Area are not NATO specific, and might easily be applicable to NATO nations, non-NATO nations, and other organizations.
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• The first effort sought to determine the applicability of a sea based option in support of a spectrum of missions, with the aim of enhancing operational flexibility and access when it is operationally neither feasible nor desirable to have a heavy footprint or command and control ashore in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). That is, the determination of when a COSTL approach would be preferable.
• The second aspect helped develop an assessment of capability areas and provided recommendations within the DOTMLPFI2 framework that can be integrated into NATO and national planning processes if desired, in order to pursue the capabilities needed to operate from the sea in joint, multinational or coalition operations.
Product 1 A Study - Considerations and Recommendations for the Conduct of COSTL, 15 December 2014 The COSTL team decided that analyzing numerous historical examples, reviewing the full range of military missions and operational variables, evaluating some National Best Practices and analyzing two complementary scenarios would provide an appropriate foundation for capability analysis. Based on this analysis, the team identified several factors that were common operational dependences within the historical examples that could be used as criteria to determine when a sea-based operation is a suitable option, and indicated a large variety of capabilities required to conduct COSTL. A major conclusion from the analysis was that a sea base can bring operational and logistic efficiencies to an operation under specific circumstances, such as a lack of host nation support. This was seen as the strongest advantage of COSTL. A sea base would enable a drastic reduction of the logistics footprint ashore. Fulfilling warehouse requirements and providing an operational base to conduct and sustain joint, multinational or coalition operations ashore, is what sets COSTL operations apart from conventional expeditionary or amphibious maritime operations. A second major conclusion was that a sea base offers better protection of operational assets from direct threats to the extent that the necessary local maritime control and air superiority can be ensured. It must still be kept in mind that threats (e.g. mines,
2 Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facility, and Interoperability
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submarines, small boats, artillery/mortar fires, other symmetric or asymmetric threats, etc.) must be evaluated as a COSTL is considered. COSTL offers options in support of military missions but implementation will not come without costs since most individual nations lack specific COSTL capabilities and those that do have such capabilities generally lack them in any substantial numbers. The team further concluded that at present it is more realistic to focus on existing capabilities rather than the procurement of costly new platforms; in other words, focusing on the organisation of existing capabilities, headquarters and forces as a whole. Detailed recommendations focus on sharing existing capabilities. The joint, multinational or coalition nature of the COSTL missions dictates that success can only be achieved by drawing together all the recommendations of this study. Gaps in any of these areas will adversely impact the ability of COSTL to function effectively and efficiently. Product 2 Supporting Annexes for “A Study - Considerations and Recommendations for the Conduct of COSTL,” 15 December 2014 The Supporting Annexes (published separately from the Study) provide the detailed evaluation of the historical examples, military missions and variables, reviews of national best practices and the scenarios. Please note that while some supplemental lead-in material is included within the Annexes, the principle finding and recommendations are published in the COSTL Study Report. Ten historical examples were chosen and analysed by reconstructing the missions conducted in a variety of different contexts and comparing the mission outcomes to identify relevant factor sets that described shortfalls, characteristics, constraints, and or opportunities when using a sea-based option to conduct an operation. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (AJP-3.4(A)) as well as NATO AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Article 5 operations) representing the full range of military operations were also analysed to identify operational variables likely to be associated with each mission type to help determine military factors that have to be considered when choosing a sea based option. One alliance and three national concepts describing the use of a sea based option were also analysed to identify Best Practices, and are summarised in the Annexes.
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The MCDC COSTL Team conducted a table-top scenario war-game as a further method to evaluate requirements to conduct a COSTL. Two scenarios, one a Support to Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief / Consequence Management (SHA/DR/CM) based case study and the other an Extraction Operation / Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (EOP/NEO) case study, were chosen and developed based on historical operational environment variables and a risk assessment of most likely contingency missions the could be supported by a sea-base operation. These two scenarios were analysed by two sub-groups to identify the required capabilities to conduct COSTL from a sea-base and achieve the operational and strategic goals as described in each case study. The groups worked in parallel to each other, and the results were compiled and discussed to identify those capabilities that were required to conduct COSTL from a sea-base and the relative importance of those capabilities. The COSTL working group concluded that the capabilities required for most missions could be readily identified from these scenarios.
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Cyber Implications for Combined Operational Access (CICOA) LEAD CONTRIBUTORS
Purpose: The CICOA FA within the MCDC Campaign worked on the integration of cyber domain into multinational operational planning processes. Indeed, the intent of the FA was to address and highlight the importance of cyber aspects at all stages of the planning process. The Focus Area involved both civil and military actors. Focus Area Problem Statement: Cyberspace influences operational activity in the other domains for all actors involved, as those domains are dependent on it. Several cyber related gaps were identified and studied in the MNE7 campaign. This Focus Area will seek to continue these efforts by working to integrate cyber into the multinational planning processes. Operational planning requires an understanding of cyberspace, however planners, and commanders, do not have clear cyber situational awareness. In spite of the importance of cyber aspects for combined joint operational access, they are not addressed in the multinational operations planning processes, such as the COPD. The integration of cyber into the planning process can be supported by procedural and technical capabilities/solutions in order to facilitate the commander’s assessment. Workstrands: Two workstrands were identified in the FA CICOA: (1) “Operational Planning and the Cyber Domain” led by Norway (2) “Cyber Capabilities and Data Analysis” led by Italy The CICOA Product Framework (CPF): The CPF developed during the concept development phase consists of three documents. Work strand I, led by Norway, produced two documents to support operational planners, while work strand II, led by Italy, produced one document for the intelligence analysts assessing the cyber domain in support of operational planning.
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The CPF includes:
1. Guidelines for Integrating Cyber Defense into the Operational Planning Process (work strand I);
2. Handbook for Integrating Cyber Defense into the Operational Planning Process (work strand I);
3. Guide and Specifications for the Analysis of the Cyber Domain (work strand II).
(1) Workstrand 1: Operational Planning and the Cyber Domain The most common joint planning processes do not specifically deal with the cyber domain, a domain which emerges as an increasingly contested military domain. However, in order to obtain and maintain access and freedom of action, the cyber domain must be taken into consideration at all stages of operational planning, providing a joint commander with comprehensive cyber situational awareness. This gap was the starting point for Works Strand I. Main Study Issue: How to best integrate cyber aspects in the planning process? Product: Work Strand I developed a support tool to multinational planning processes such as the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), informing the planning process on issues related to the cyber domain. The concept increases cyber situational awareness for a joint force, and provides cyber implications for the planning of military operations. It informs a combined joint force of the cyber aspects of the operational environment. As part of a comprehensive preparation of the operational environment, it is likely that information-sharing and cooperation with other entities outside of the armed forces would prove vital in order to gain an as complete picture of the situation as possible. This includes the private sector as well as other parts of the civil society. This hypothesis has been further explored during concept development, and the concept provides guidance on how to cope with such challenges during planning. Additionally, it highlights central planning tasks such as Factor Analysis, Centre of Gravity and Courses of Action with a view to the impact of the cyber domain. It specifies and exemplifies such implications. The concept has been put to the test by practitioners in a Limited Objective Experiment, and identified shortcomings have been updated in the finalized products. The concept consists of a Handbook and a set of Guidelines:
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Handbook for integrating cyber defense into the operational planning process: An educational tool for military personnel and other public officials who would like to learn more of the practical implications of cyberspace for military operations. Additionally, it is a reference document to the Guidelines. Guidelines for integrating cyber defense into the operational planning process: A step by step guide for use by Joint Operations Planning Groups during the planning process, from Phase 1, Situational Awareness to Phase 4B, Operational Plan Development. (2) Workstrand 2: Cyber Capabilities and Data Analysis Main Study Issue: As stated in the Project Proposal of CICOA Focus Area, the main issue for the Cyber Capabilities and Data Analysis strand is: How can technology help to identify physical and virtual threats to a mission by searching cyberspace for threat indications? This work strand will focus on delivering a cyber-threat assessment, though we acknowledge that this capability may have a role in other domains. During the concept development the Elements of Analysis have been redefined as follows:
• Contribution to Cyber Situational Awareness Assessment. What are tools and methods, and related Indicators and Warnings (I&W) to compile a comprehensive picture of the cyber threat?
• Main principles for the analysis of the Cyber Threats in the Combined Operational Domain. Which could be the correct and most comprehensive analysis approach? Where and how to obtain the relevant information to describe the threats? Which tools and sensors are available to provide a Recognized Cyber Picture and feed the decision making process?
Product: Guide and Specifications for the Analysis of the Cyber Domain The purpose of the document is to provide Commander and staff involved in the planning process with a conceptual guide describing the possible Cyber Intelligence contributions to the development of Situational Awareness across the spectrum of Military Operations.
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Therefore, by including cyber in the Intelligence Process and its phases, and examining the main activities and tools related to Cyber Domain, this guide highlights considerations to gain a shared cyber Situational Understanding. Indeed, while there is not a currently accepted definition for cyber intelligence, this document provides a description of the cyber intelligence process, and of its activities and tools. What clearly emerges is that cyber intelligence is not limited to an understanding of network operations, but it has to try to answer to questions concerning the adversaries’ actions and intent in order to provide the decision maker with actionable information. Starting from the main issue of Cyber Capabilities and Data Analysis work strand (“How can technology help identify physical and virtual threats to a mission by searching cyberspace for threat indications?) the document takes into account the application of intelligence to the cyber domain and provides a description of the most relevant types and related activities and tools. The document, in the last part, focuses also on some technical indications and warnings and their impacts on operations in order to provide hints to planners concerning the types of analysis that they can require to the Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC).
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Maritime Approach to Combined Operational Access (MACOA) LEAD CONTRIBUTORS
Maritime Approach to Combined Operational Access Concept and Practices Guide The Maritime Approach to Combined Operational Access Concept and Practices Guide, or MACOA, is designed to assist nations, their military forces, and most importantly military commanders in reducing the friction and mission risk incurred when nations quickly combine to project military forces into the littoral. To do this, MACOA presents a proactive approach offering a common framework of eight discrete practices. The MACOA Practices Guide is organized in three parts. Part 1 describes the concept, scope, challenges, and framework of the MACOA project. It is critical to understand and internalize the unique littoral environment, the inherent dangers of operating in this environment, and how this document is structured to most effectively apply the concepts presented in MACOA to the littoral environment. Part 2 MACOA Operational Implementation describes how a commander with littoral operational responsibility could apply MACOA to assist in designing and directing steady-state maritime operations. Part 3 (Practices Guide) consists of eight specific MACOA practices to apply the concept. While not a distinct checklist, the MACOA practices are supported by numerous examples and five related case studies. The practices detail specific considerations and applications a commander should utilize to shape, execute, and assess their operational approach in their littoral area of responsibility.
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Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access (AxS) LEAD CONTRIBUTORS
Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access (AxS) Purpose: For the purposes of supporting MCDC, NATO ACT proposed a study to explore the opportunities and challenges posed by the use of autonomous systems in military operations within the framework of the MCDC Campaign. Particular attention in this project is paid to employing those systems as an important enabler for Combined Operational Access. The AxS Focus Area brings more clarity to the debate over the development and use of AxS by the military. The Autonomous Systems project team adopted a guiding problem statement for the project: “Coalitions need to improve awareness and understanding of autonomous systems, promote interoperability and provide guidance for the development of, use of, and defence against, autonomous systems”. The inevitable and rapid development of autonomous technology and its expected availability to potential regular and irregular adversaries—as well as the obligation of Nations to assess compliance of new military technologies against International Humanitarian Law—generated a requirement to conduct a comprehensive study resulting in development of recommendations and guidelines for establishing international standards and interoperability of autonomous systems in the military sphere. AxS research focused on why, where, when and how the military could, and may have to, employ autonomy in systems during future armed conflicts and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The work involved significant collaboration with international robotics and weapons experts from military, scientific and engineering communities. Conducted in a multidisciplinary manner, this MCDC Focus Area was designed as five integrated studies: a definitional study led by NATO ACT focusing on the meaning of autonomy; a legal study led by Switzerland, which examined legal issues mainly concerning weapon systems with autonomous capability; a human factors and ethical study co–led by the United States and NATO ACT, which explored future ethical, organizational and psychological implications; a military operations study led by NATO ACT, describing operational benefits and challenges, and lastly; a technology study led by the Czech Republic, which summarized key technological developments and challenges.
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This autonomous systems project has delivered two products. An official and unclassified MCDC publication titled “Policy Guidance – Autonomy in Defence Systems,” which addresses senior defence planners, industry and academia within MCDC, NATO and EU Nations. This document is accompanied by the second product “Proceedings Report - Autonomous Systems Focus Area,” which captures detailed results of the studies and events conducted in this project. These deliverables facilitate future AxS research related to multinational cooperation, coordination and interoperability as well as concept, doctrine and capability development. Product 1 Policy Guidance – Autonomy in Defence Systems This document is a final product from the Autonomous Systems focus area, led by NATO ACT and conducted under the auspices of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013 - 2014 - a collaborative program between 19 nations, NATO and the European Union. This policy guidance document achieves two objectives. First, the policy guidance raises awareness of the importance of autonomy in future defence capabilities, and its potential employment by adversaries. Greater awareness is also required for informed dialogue in national and international policy arenas, especially given the related on-going debates involving potentially ambiguous terminology such as “killer robots.” Second, drawing from detailed studies, workshops and seminars conducted during the MCDC project work, the policy guidance presents key issues and risks. It then makes recommendations in the areas of definitions, military operational benefits, legal and ethical challenges, public awareness, human factors, organizations, and future capability development. This guidance represents a framework for thinking about the constellation of issues surrounding systems with autonomous capabilities. The policy guidance applies to air, land, and maritime domains, although the findings and recommendations are presented in an integrated manner that is not specific to any one domain. The importance of space and cyber domains are recognized, but are not covered. Primarily, this policy guidance focuses on issues related to the increasing autonomy in military systems that should be addressed within the next five years. This allows policy makers to plan and be prepared for the major implications deriving from the increasing employment of autonomy. Many of the issues identified, however, anticipate long term factors that will only become a reality in coming decades. Given the broad focus of this document, more detailed follow-on studies in the area of autonomous systems are recommended for the next MCDC cycle.
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Drawing from the findings of the MCDC Autonomous Systems focus area work, this document offers policy guidance to senior leadership in government defence organizations, industry, and academia. The guidance aims to facilitate planning and preparation for the design, procurement and operation of systems with autonomous capabilities, and to realize the impressive benefits while avoiding potential challenges. This guidance takes a broader, strategic view of the MCDC Autonomous Systems project findings and covers the implications of the definitions for autonomous systems; key legal issues regarding weaponized systems with autonomous capability; ethical, human factors and military concerns; and gives guidance for future research and capability development. Product 2 Proceedings Report - Autonomous Systems Focus Area This report provides a record of activities, events and detailed results of the studies conducted during the MCDC Autonomous Systems Focus Area. After detailing the participants and describing the various seminars, workshops, and meetings, the report contains the full results from the five studies conducted in this project: typology, technological, legal, human and ethical and (operational aspects of autonomy in military systems. The typology research assisted in identifying internationally acceptable definitions and unmanned categories of autonomy in systems. A key challenge was making the distinction between autonomous, autonomic, automated and automatic systems, although existing definitions were used when possible. The main purpose was to elicit underlying components of AxS and to have an agreed definition and shared understanding between experts of the AxS community. The technological study area was dedicated to researching the current and emerging software and hardware which enables autonomy in military systems, in order to identify which elements of AxS should be standardized and certified. The study covered software architecture relevant to autonomous applications, broad spectrum coverage sensors (acoustic, optical, magnetic, radar, radiation, infra-red and ultraviolet etc.), self-defense, requirement in, communication and navigation functions.
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The legal study area which examined issues of international law arising from the development and use of autonomous systems for military purposes addresses the compliance with the Geneva conventions, the ability of armed AxS to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and delivers proportional response as required under the Laws of Armed Conflict. Seminar discussions in this area also addressed a robots right to self-defense, issues concerning salvaging autonomous vehicles, and the responsibility for AxS error or failure. The study of human and ethical aspects covered the interactions between people and AxS, with their social, cultural, psychological, ethical and political aspects. Positive and negative implications of absence of emotions in autonomously operating machines were studied. Discussions on potential risks of arms race or the lowering of the conflict threshold resulting from increased presence of AxS was also addressed in this strand of research. Finally, the study of operational aspects of AxS used the NATO standardized Functional Capability Areas (prepare, project, sustain, C3, protect, inform) to analyze how such systems could be best used by our militaries, especially in Combined Operational Access, and how to counter an adversary’s AxS.
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Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access Information Activities and Emerging Communication Practices LEAD CONTRIBUTORS Purpose: This Focus Area addressed selected capability requirements identified by the leading nations (DEU, FIN and ITA), and aimed at enhancing communication capabilities in combined access operations within a Comprehensive Approach. The Focus Area involved civil and military actors at the strategic-political as well as the operational and tactical levels. The intent was to investigate and develop new and/or improved capabilities in order to enhance the effectiveness of Information Activities and facilitate access to an operational area, taking into account emerging communication practices, such as Social Media. Focus Area Problem Statement: Combined access operations inter alia require versatile communication capabilities to facilitate the projection of forces into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish their mission. Coalition partners need to be able to develop and issue timely, relevant and feasible communication guidance; implement communication plans in a consistent, transparent and flexible manner; take emerging communication practices and technology into account; and gain enhanced situation awareness in the Information Environment. Lines of Development Four areas of interest for capability development have been identified and couched in terms of Lines of Development (LoDs): (1) Approval Process and Authority for Communication Guidance. (2) Communication Management at the Military Operational Level. (3) Implementation of Communication Guidance. (4) Social Media in Support of Situation Awareness.
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(1) APPROVAL PROCESS AND AUTHORITY FOR COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE. This LoD addressed the fundamental question of roles and responsibilities for the agreement on, and the endorsement and assertion of guidance for coalition Information Activities. This guidance, together with rules and regulations concerning the conduct of activities and required (human, material and financial) resources, is laid down in an Information Strategy. Concept Lead Contributors Problem Statement LoD (1): While existing organizations, such as NATO or the EU, possess established communication organs, multinational coalitions (that are not led by the respective organizations) have to establish those organs on ad hoc basis. Thus they lack the institutionalized approval processes for communication in combined operational access scenarios. Product LoD (1): Guidelines for Decision-Makers – Approval of Communication Guidance The LoD (1) solution product identifies the authorities to be involved in the development and approval of communication guidance in the form of a Coalition Information Strategy, through a top-down multinational process beginning at the highest decision-making level. The document describes their roles and responsibilities and proposes to establish a Multinational Coalition Communication Board (MNCCB) as the link to Coalition partners' approval authorities. It suggests that a Coalition Head of Communication (CHoC) is appointed to manage the actual development of strategic communication guidance and coordinate national perspectives for the approval of lower-level communication plans. The overall aim is to promote a corporate identity and image of the Coalition, integrate communication planning and operations planning by establishing common Information Objectives derived from a shared Coalition Narrative. The Guidelines essentially address the strategic level. The type and maturity of the concept already allows multinational partners to implement or adapt the proposed solutions according to their requirements or specific mission needs.
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(2) COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT AT THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL LEVEL. This LoD developed a business model for integrated and corporate communication at an operational-level military HQ. It presents a complementary approach to Strategic Communication (StratCom) and other existing communication capabilities and functions (such as Information Operations): rather than proposing a sharp break with organizational structures, processes or skills from the past, LoD (2) encourages 'incremental change' – a modification / improvement of existing configurations that builds upon the existing structures, processes and skills, not necessarily suggesting their replacement. Concept Lead Contributors Problem Statement LoD (2): Today's military operations are challenged with a fragmentation of communication capabilities and insufficient integration of communication with operations planning, resulting in fragmented Information Activities by multinational partners, insufficiently harmonized for achieving Information Objectives that support common strategic objectives. In addition, there is still a lack of consideration of the comprehensive scope of non-media activities that may help to create desired effects in the Information Environment. Product LoD (2): Applied Concept – Communication Management at the Military Operational Level. This concept proposes solutions to overcome current deficiencies with a focus on a deployed Joint Force at the operational-level of command. Operations should be Narrative-driven, based on an Information Strategy that provides strategic-political guidance. Current StratCom policy and doctrine should, where applicable, take on the idea of integrated communication. StratCom Advisors at the appropriate levels should assume the role of a Head of Communication (HoC), empowered to provide direction and guidance in addition to coordination and advice. Information Analysts and Information Planners should be introduced as new staff capabilities, fully integrated in the Intelligence and Plans divisions.
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A Communication Coordination Board (CCB) should be established as the HoC's tool for communication management, involving a core of communication capabilities and functions and fully integrated in the joint coordination process. Finally, communication planning should be fully integrated with operations planning. Communication guidance should be nested in the Operations Plan and a Communication Plan should be produced as an excerpt for the purpose of information sharing with external actors. In a nutshell, this concept presents a model for integrated communication management at the military operational level. (3) IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE. This LoD addressed the practical application of communication management in terms of organizational, planning and assessment considerations down to the tactical level. Concept Lead Contributors Problem Statement LoD (3): Coalitions lack institutionalized communication planning and execution processes. Furthermore, there is no common understanding amongst decision-makers and communication staffs of the principle of transparency and how it affects the implementation of communication guidance in a multinational coalition context. An adaptive communication management process requires complementary considerations to involve the tactical level in a bottom-up approach. Product LoD (3): Concept for Implementing Communication Guidance. This concept introduces the idea of an Information-Environment-specific reporting system for the tactical level, called the Narrative Soldier. The concept is designed to address the challenge of implementing higher level communication guidance at the lowest tactical level. It addresses the challenge to coalition communication efforts when tactical-level situations lead to decisions and activities that may not always be in line with higher-level communication guidance. This may happen because higher level communication guidance is not formulated for such tactical situations, which make soldiers to deviate from it.
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Communication guidance may also not be realized or considered. Finally, the challenge may result in a "say-do gap". This concept proposes a capability that supports the higher levels in planning messages and actions that are relevant, accurate and realistic for implementation at the lowest tactical level. The Narrative Soldier is a capability that promotes communication awareness and provides a reality check (feedback) to higher levels. The Narrative Soldier is trained to consider communication aspects in tactical situations and acts as a human terrain observer and an effector within his unit. His role is also to support the tactical leader in making decisions where communication issues are relevant. The Narrative Soldier is a matter of training, cost-effective, and does not necessarily require additional manning. (4) SOCIAL MEDIA IN SUPPORT OF SITUATION AWARENESS. This area addressed the potential benefits of emerging technological means (in particular Social Media, and others, as required) in support of enhanced situation awareness in ambiguous environments, where novel approaches – including new techniques and technology – will be advantageous. Concept Lead Contributors Problem Statement LoD (4): Militaries lack a common understanding of Social Media and their added value when used as sensor. More specifically, analysts and operators lack a common understanding of how Social Media can be utilized in coalition access operations to enhance situation awareness. Product LoD (4): Concept of Employment – Social Media in Support of Situation Awareness. This concept provides various considerations how to use Social Media analysis for military purposes to enhance situation awareness.
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In order to address the identified capability gaps, the concept poses a characterization of what Social Media analysis can achieve in support of enhancing situation awareness through determining related advantages and limitations. The concept proposes conceptual guidelines and considerations to national and multinational capability developers on how to exploit Social Media from an analytical point of view in order to enhance situation awareness in operations. It describes a process by which Social Media can most efficiently be exploited as a sensor. This process starts with a Baseline Assessment of the Social Media Landscape and an initial estimate of potential Social Media analysis achievements. It then specifies the development of a Social Media Exploitation Plan for guiding analysts. Both Baseline Assessment and Exploitation Plan provide input to the Intelligence Cycle.
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Understand to Prevent (U2P) LEAD CONTRIBUTORS Understand to Prevent – The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict examines Conflict Prevention from the perspective of the human domain. By understanding the root causes and catalysts of conflict the multinational community can identify relevant and appropriate strategies for the deployment and use of military forces in supporting peace and preventing conflict. Problem Statement. This focus area seeks to examine our understanding of the human vulnerability to conflict and the role of military forces in conflict prevention to inform the development of concepts and doctrine with a view of improving capability development, training, organization and readiness. This will enhance our ability to prepare joint, interagency, multinational forces and shape operational access by improving intelligence, influence and engagement capabilities. Purpose. The purpose of this project was to examine preventing violent conflict before a crisis occurs. Many agencies already operate in this space, particularly various organisations of the United Nations (UN). The military contribution must therefore be carefully identified to ensure that it provides a synergistic contribution to the comprehensive approach, rather than further complicate the conflict environment. External interference is often far from welcome in conflict areas of the globe; and a military involvement may have a further negative connotation. Product. This project was split into two parts. In Part 1, Foundation studies. ‘Understanding’ is critical to success. Effective decision-making relies on reliable understanding of the problem. The project team reviewed some of the established academic and practitioner knowledge relating to the human domain, conflict, violence and prevention. This has produced an enhanced generic understanding of the human domain – psychology, sociology, anthropology, human conflict, violence, the established tools of prevention and the potential effects of military involvement. In Part 2, The Understand to Prevent concept. The project team reviewed the potential contribution of military actors and looked conceptually at how that engagement could
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take place. It was agreed that military involvement is only ever in support of wider efforts to counter violent conflict, and the project identified that, in the upstream prevention period, coordination between the comprehensive players – diplomatic, economic, military, non-government organisations, civil society and business – does not exist. The U2P concept therefore proposes establishing forums to bring together various stakeholders to help a host nation with a ‘prevent’ task, and in line with the all-embracing comprehensive approach the project describes a comprehensive contact team. Military tasks were identified that require further education and development, and are grouped under 4 headings of standard, enhanced, focused and new tasks. Conclusion, considerations and a way forward. This product has provided a baseline for further collaborative prevention work within the multinational and inter-agency community. The idea of pre-emption or preventing future violent conflict as an upstream intervention activity in which militaries could be involved is starting to be taken more seriously, especially by military leaders. This project has identified some of the academic underpinning and best practice of engaged agencies and suggested the areas in which the military can contribute – but the full comprehensive upstream team has yet to be built and to develop its approach.
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Information Update
2017-18
MCDC offers the U.S. and its mission partners an opportunity to collaboratively, rapidly and affordably define operational capabilities and non-materiel solutions. These solutions are “born multinational.” Multinational solutions are more readily adopted by our allies and other partners because of the consensus building inherent in MCDC. The MCDC 2017-18 cycle is currently underway and MCDC is developing into a cohesive multinational concept, capability and force development community. The contents of the current MCDC program of work and the refined processes and the campaign management framework have put us on the trajectory for a tremendously successful campaign.
Interested in hearing more? Perhaps becoming a supporting member of MCDC? Or maybe coming aboard as an observer or contributor. Any U.S. or partner nation command or organization with a capability requirement can leverage the MCDC as an opportunity to exploit these benefits.
For more information please contact the MCDC Secretariat
Information may also be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/s/MCDCpub/default.aspx
