Multi-Stakeholder Governance Multi-Stakeholder Governance initiatives: Addressing the challenges initiatives: Addressing the challenges of ASM sector in Ghanaof ASM sector in Ghana

Natalia Yakovleva*, Diego Vazquez-BrustNatalia Yakovleva*, Diego Vazquez-Brust*Winchester Business School, University of Winchester, UK*Winchester Business School, University of Winchester, UKCentre for Business, Responsibility, Accountability, Sustainability and Society (BRASS), Cardiff University, UK

Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, 12-16 April 2011, Seattle, Washington, USA

What is Governance?What is Governance?

Collective and consensual actions to address Collective and consensual actions to address and regulate welfare conflicts that go beyond and regulate welfare conflicts that go beyond the capacity of Governments to solvethe capacity of Governments to solve . .

Governance requires:Governance requires:

Balance of economic, social and environmental concernsBalance of economic, social and environmental concerns Minimum framework of principles, rules and laws necessary to tackle Minimum framework of principles, rules and laws necessary to tackle

identified problems identified problems Multi-sector approach: states, markets, citizens and organizations, Multi-sector approach: states, markets, citizens and organizations,

both inter- and non-governmental .both inter- and non-governmental . Articulation of collective global interestsArticulation of collective global interests Consensus on the definition of rights and obligations Consensus on the definition of rights and obligations Acceptance and Mediation of differences: Deliberative Democracy.Acceptance and Mediation of differences: Deliberative Democracy.

Figure 2: the IAD framework ( adapted from Ostrom, 2005)

Collective C

hoice

Constitutional C

hoice

Operational L

evel

Institutional design for governance solutions (Paavola, 2007; Hall & Soskice, 2001)

Governance functions Exclusion of unauthorised users Regulation of authorised resource uses Distribution of benefits and risks Provision and Recovery of Costs Monitoring and Enforcement Conflict resolution Enablement of Deliberation

Institutional rules Rules of exclusion Entitlement rules Monitoring rules determine Decision-making rules Protection rules

Governance solutions:• Community-based • State-based• Co-management• Multi-level

Functional tiers:• Operational• Institutional• Constitutional

Interviews with the range of stakeholders of Interviews with the range of stakeholders of ASM sector in Ghana (2005 and 2008)ASM sector in Ghana (2005 and 2008)

Range of stakeholders 2005 2008

Government departments 5 6

Small-scale miners and buyers

4 0

NGOs 3 2*

Large-scale mining companies and industry associations

4 2

Total 16 10

* includes NGO and university

ChallengesChallenges Transition from Community Based ( tribal law) to State-Based Transition from Community Based ( tribal law) to State-Based

Governance Solution (Mining Code and Small Mining Regulation)Governance Solution (Mining Code and Small Mining Regulation) Customary governance: unified property regime ( surface and Customary governance: unified property regime ( surface and

mineral rights). State-Based: Separated Property regime (surface mineral rights). State-Based: Separated Property regime (surface and mineral rights). and mineral rights).

Design and implementation of to State-Based Governance Design and implementation of to State-Based Governance FunctionsFunctions

Conflict: Conflict: Multiple land (farming, fishing, mining) use with traditional ASM vs. Multiple land (farming, fishing, mining) use with traditional ASM vs.

Exclusive land Use ( only mining) with current LSM. Exclusive land Use ( only mining) with current LSM. Lack of institutions providing employment/unemployment protection for Lack of institutions providing employment/unemployment protection for

surplus of industry specific labour ( Hall & Soskice, 2001) surplus of industry specific labour ( Hall & Soskice, 2001) Lack of institutions providing deliberation spaces. ( Hall & Soskice, 2001Lack of institutions providing deliberation spaces. ( Hall & Soskice, 2001))

Initiatives for ASM sector in Ghana Small-Scale Mining Project (World Bank, GTZ) 1989 : Provide institutions and rules to implement transition of

governance regime (Constitutional) Mining Sector Development and Environment Project

(World Bank) 1995-2001: Land use, allocation of land to ASM (Collective/Operational) Prestea Action Plan (World Bank) 2005:Enforcement of rights of authorised ( state-based) users,

protection of excluded (customary users) (Operational)

InitiativesAlternative Livelihood Project 2005,Protection of excluded land-users/ surplus of

mining labour, providing pathways for alternative development based of skills. ( Institutional)

Abatement of Mercury Pollution Programme (UNIDO) 1998-2001

Provision of technical supply to reduce ASM health and environmental risks ( Operational)

OutcomesOutcomesSmall-Scale Mining Project (World Bank, GTZ)

1989 : Acceptance at Constitutional level but failed at

operational level. Mining Sector Development and Environment

Project (World Bank) 1995-2001: Excessive focus on policy but little effect on

operations. Prestea Action Plan (World Bank) 2005:Failed to protect ( reallocate) customary users.

OutcomesOutcomesAlternative Livelihood Project 2005,Failed to provide viable and widely accepted

alternatives.Abatement of Mercury Pollution Programme

(UNIDO) 1998-2001Failed to provide widely accepted alternatives

Factors for success/failures of governance Factors for success/failures of governance solutionssolutions Design failure: Design failure:

Constitutional: State-based governance is not an appropriate solution for Ghana. Co-management, multilevel governance is required when local knowledge and cooperation is a condition for success.

Institutional: No initiatives to promote institutions/skills that enable deliberation .

Assumes that ‘unregistered’ can be excluded from governance solutions and these would still be viable

Operational: Lack of assessment what works on the ground

Factors (continued)Factors (continued) Implementation failureImplementation failure

Top-Down approach fails to interpret acceptance factors at operational levels (limited consultation with end users)

Suspicion of ‘quality of expertise’ Limited transparency Focus on general advice rather than specific

solutions

ConclusionsConclusions Future programmes should focus on working on improving Future programmes should focus on working on improving

deliberation to create deliberation to create co-management co-management solutions (including solutions (including customary stakeholders – informal supply chain, chiefs, customary stakeholders – informal supply chain, chiefs, galamsey, etc) to address following governance problems:galamsey, etc) to address following governance problems:

Exclusion of small-scale miners from access to mineral resources.Exclusion of small-scale miners from access to mineral resources. Entitlement: No availability of land for ASM. Entitlement: No availability of land for ASM. Distribution of benefits: ASM cannot prospect but LSM can.Distribution of benefits: ASM cannot prospect but LSM can. Provision of financial and technical support to ASMProvision of financial and technical support to ASM No proper system in place to monitor unauthorised usersNo proper system in place to monitor unauthorised users Enforcement: Implementation of viable alternatives to use of forceEnforcement: Implementation of viable alternatives to use of force

Policy ImplicationLand Regime: Double System of Alternate users

for mineral concessions where small scale miners operate on a surface for a short period of time in controlled conditions, followed by large scale operations

Implementation: Negotiated Agreement as alternative to legislative reform