MULLIGAN - The Treatment of a Historical Source

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Wesleyan University

The Treatment of an Historical SourceAuthor(s): John D. MilliganSource: History and Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 177-196Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University

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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE

JOHN D. MILLIGAN

Every historian knows the special excitement that is derived form perusingthe documents, the primary sources that are the basic, if incomplete andimperfect, evidence from which he seeks to re-create the past. Yet, im-mersion in the sources can sometimes present the scholar with a dilemma.On the one hand, manuscripts evidently written by persons long deadexude a sacrosanctity which may make the historian reluctant to questionthe veracity of their contents, let alone the authenticity of the manuscriptsthemselves. Yet things can inhibit the historian's giving credence to thesubstance of the documents, notwithstanding their apparent venerability. Ifother scholars have already plumbed aspects of the historical subject towhich the particular documents refer and have arrived at conclusions seem-ingly at odds with the testimony presented in those documents, the re-searcher may hesitate to accept the new evidence at face value.

Some time past, in the course of my research, I came across a manu-script letter which posed rather precisely the problem of the halloweddocument versus the accepted historical conclusion. The letter containedcharges against several of its writer's contemporaries, men whom histo-rians have elevated to considerable prominence in the chronicles of Amer-ican military and naval affairs. Indeed, the charges were so sensational, sodirectly contradictory to established historical opinion, that my first im-pulse was to dismiss them out of hand. Perhaps it was a reverence formanuscripts which gave me pause; or perhaps it was a caution I had onceread in a classic work by Marc Bloch. The student of the past, Blochwrote, must forever be on the lookout for evidence which, though it maynot correspond to expectation, may still be valid in some respects. Oth-erwise, historians would never uncover new and surprising facts. One"could make a long list of facts which scholarly routine first denied be-cause they were surprising."'

1. Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft, transl. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 120-121.Another French historian has similarly warned that if the historian "allows himself to be tooreadily influenced by established tradition, he runs the risk of seeing the past through thespectacles of others." See Henri-Iren&e Marrou, The Meaning of History, transl. Robert J.Olsen (Baltimore, Md., 1966), 78.

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178 JOHN D. MILLIGANDated February 28, 1863, the letter in question was apparently written

during the American Civil War by a Federal officer near Vicksburg, Mis-sissippi. On the day designated, that Confederate-held stronghold on theMississippi River was being besieged by Northern troops commanded byGeneral Ulysses S. Grant and his chief lieutenant, General William T.Sherman, and by Northern naval units commanded by Admiral David D.Porter. The letter's accusatory sentences are brief and to the point.

I was over to see Portertoday. Found Grantand Shermanwith him. They arealltraitors. I heard Grant say myself that the Government at Washingtonmust beoverthrown - the North revolutionized - etc. but that it was not yet quite time.Porter said his interests were all with the South - that his best friend was JeffDavis etc. What are we coming to?2

Now, of course, anyone who is at all familiar with the events of theperiod knows that no military coup d'etat occurred within the North, norhave students of the Civil War uncovered any evidence of an attemptedcoup. Yet, alerted by Bloch, might one not still ask the question: Is itpossible that these officers discussed, however briefly, the desirability orpossibility of executing a coup? It was in the hope of answering this querythat I put the document to the several tests suggested by the experts.Interestingly, even surprisingly, when subjected to analysis, the letter doesmeet certain of the accepted criteria of historical criticism.A document must first of all measure up to the standards of what theauthorities call external criticism. Here the researcher asks the questionput by Lester Stephens: "Is the source authentic?" To answer this ques-tion, he looks at the document from the perspective which G. J. Reniercalls the "outside." Rather than immediately concerning himself with theideas "inside" the document, he first wants to know when, where and bywhom the document was written. "Lacking this information," warns Ed-ward Hulme, "we cannot be sure of the worth of a document." If thedocument itself does not provide some or any of this information, thehistorian, using prescribed methods, must seek to provide it. If, however,as is the case with the document under scrutiny, the date, place, and nameof the author are all given, then the job of the external analyst becomes oneof establishing the authenticity of this information. According to ArthurMarwick, the historian must determine that the document was written atthe time it says it was, at the place it says it was, and by the person it saysit was. In short, he engages in a negative exercise described by Renier "asmaking sure that the alleged trace [document] is not a fake or a forgery."This exercise may call upon a classicist or medievalist to be an expert in anumber of esoteric arts, but it demands less of the Americanist because ofthe relative modernity of his subject. Thus, as V. H. Galbraith has with

2. Charles R. Ellet to Alfred W. Ellet, February 28, 1863, Ellet Family Papers (Transpor-tation Library, University of Michigan).



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 179only slight exaggeration remarked about the application of one of these arts:"For the historian working in any period later than the sixteenth century,the study of paleography involves little more than a certain low cunning-quickly gained by practice - in deciphering bad writing."3In truth, of course, there is something more to the exercise of distin-guishing a fraud, even a recent one, from the genuine article than Gal-braith's remark implies. The historian who would determine the genuine-ness of a comparatively recent document can frequently apply "an argu-ment from multiplicity." If the particular document is filed with otherdocuments apparently written by the same person, then, writes Renier,each document, including the questionable one, "is vouched for by allsimilar documents preserved with it. . . . As the number of documents ofthe same nature grows, so does the probability that each of them is authen-tic." In other words, the hypothesis that the letters are authentic is morecredible than the hypothesis that a conspiracy led to the forging of thewhole series of letters and the placing of them in the archive. To be certainthat his special document comports with the others in the series, JohnVincent advises the investigator to be "thoroughly saturated" with thepersonal language, manner of expression and writing habits of the ascribedauthor as they are manifested in the series as a whole.4 This familiarity willnot only enable him to check the authenticity of the author of the documentbut of its date and place of record. Thus if the series of documents providesinformation about when and where the author was, and if that informationis congruent with the time and location provided in the document beingstudied, the researcher can also assume the probable authenticity of thesedetails.

The letter which accuses Grant, Sherman, and Porter of treason, whensubmitted to external criticism, passes inspection. First of all, it reposeswith scores of other communications apparently written by the same authorand held by the Transportation Library of the University of Michigan, towhich institution they were bequeathed along with the whole of the writer'sfamily papers by a relative of the writer. Thus the document is, in LouisGottschalk's phrasing, "where it ought to be," and where it can be com-pared with other documents by the same author. This comparison estab-lishes that its form of presentation - its "diction, style, versification, [and]

3. Lester D. Stephens, Probing the Past: A Guide to the Study and Teaching qf History(Boston, 1974), 37; G. J. Reiner, History. Its Purpose and Method (London, 1950), 162,109-110; Edward Maslin Hulme, History and Its Neighbors (New York, 1942), 55; ArthurMarwick, The Nature of History (London, 1970), 136-137; V. H. Galbraith, An Introductionto the Studv of History (London, 1964), 22. The first use of the terms "external criticism"and, as treated below, "internal criticism" is usually credited to the German historian, ErnstBernheim. See his Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (Leipzig, 1889).

4. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method, 110, 162-163; John Martin Vincent, HistoricalResearch: An Outline of Theory and Practice (New York, 1911), 103.



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180 JOHN D. MILLIGANhandwriting," to cite Gilbert Garraghan's criteria - is consistent with thatused by the author. So the rule of there being safety in numbers would hereseem to apply. Further, the author's correspondence reveals that he wasnear Vicksburg on February 28, 1863, the place and the day the accusatoryletter was dated. In fine, there seems to be no reason to doubt that theapparent origin of the letter, respecting who, where, and when, is its trueorigin. It should be added that the determination of the authenticity of adocument in the file of a library or archive is not, of course, the soleresponsibility of the historian. Allan Nevins has noted that custodians ofsuch repositories "usually take every precaution to exclude spurious docu-ments. "5

There still remains a final step in the process of criticizing the externalcharacteristics of an historical source: "is it," asks Allen Johnson, "anoriginal or a secondary source of information?" Does the source expressideas that originated with its author or ideas that he derived from whatGarraghan labels "pre-existing material," that is, another source orsources?6 This question might in other circumstances require considerableattention, but in the case under consideration it would seem to have al-ready been answered. Since no period in American history has been stud-ied more closely than that of the Civil War, and since no students of theperiod have reported other sources (nor have any come to hand) that in anysense duplicate the charges contained in the present document, the histo-rian can probably assume that they are peculiar to that document and notderivative. In truth, since the author of the document claimed that he wasan eyewitness to the event and heard the traitorous pronouncements withhis own ears, the question really becomes whether the man was actually aneyewitness or whether he derived his ideas from someone else who was aneyewitness. This question will be considered below as part of the processof internal criticism.To the extent, then, that external criticism can determine genuineness,the document under inspection is in all probability authentic. Significant inthis context is the word probability. In analyzing historical documentsthere is no absolute certainty. In each step of the procedure thus far exam-ined and still to be examined, "the judgment," in the dictum of the authors

5. Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (2nd ed.,New Yoik, 1969), 123; Gilbert J. Garraghan, A Guide to Historical Method, ed. JeanDelanglez (New York, 1946), 177; Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History (rev. ed., NewYork, 1962), 140.6. Allen Johnson, The Historian and Historical Evidence (New York, 1926), 61; Gar-raghan, A Guide to Historical Method, 168. Garraghan (p. 206) explains the process ofanalysis: "When two or more sources (witnesses) report the same fact or series of facts in thesame way, the sources are mutually related. If the sources are two in number, one is derivedfrom the other, or both are derived in common from a third. If the sources are more than two,various relationships of dependence may exist between [sic] them."



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 181of the volume edited by Robert Shafer, "is one of varying degrees ofprobability - probably true, probably accurate, probably untrue, probablyinaccurate."7

So the investigator has convinced himself of the probable authenticity ofthe Civil War letter; he must next address himself to the probable credibil-ity of its content. "Is it reliable?" is Stephens' question. W. H. Walshobserves that the historian now "has to decide whether or not to believe it[the document], or again how much of it to believe"; because, as theShafer volume warns, authenticity is not a measure of credibility. An au-thenticated document "may lie or mislead, intentionally or unintention-ally." To probe this possibility, say Norman Cantor and RichardSchneider, the source "must be explained and analyzed in terms of valid-ity, accuracy, and point of view." Benedetto Croce explains the problem inmore detail. Though there is a tendency to assume that simply because theauthenticated document "has been written down it answers to the truth,"this assumption, he writes,may turn out to be false in fact, owing to the note having been made in a momentofdistractionor of hallucination,or too late, when the memoryof the fact was alreadyimprecise and lackingin certainty, or because it was capriciously made or madewith the object of deceivingothers. Butjust for this reason, writtenevidence is notusually acceptedwith closed eyes; its verisimilitudes examined and we confront twith other writtenevidence, we investigatethe probityand accuracyof the writerorwitness.8

The "other written evidence" to which Croce refers is subsumed underthose standards that the researcher applies to determine the credibility of adocument and which, taken together, authorities call internal criticism. Theprocess of internal criticism, as contrasted with external, looks at thedocument, in Renier's word, from the "inside." Further, Renier pointsout, whereas external criticism applies an argument from multiplicity, in-ternal criticism "is individual in its method." The credibility of eachdocument "has to be assessed on its own merit."9

Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos have suggested that the histo-rian begin his internal analysis by asking, what exactly do the words in thedocument mean? This may seem an elementary question, but the inves-tigator must take care not to read into the written statement more than itsmaker intended to say. To guard against this eventuality, Langlois andSeignobos advise the critic to divide the question into two parts. First he

7. A Guide to Historical Method, ed. Robert Jones Shafer (rev. ed., Homewood, Ill.,1974),41.8. Stephens, Probing the Past, 37; W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History(3rd ed., Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1976),20; Shafer, Guide, 141; Norman F. CantorandRichardI. Schneider,How to Study History (New York, 1967),33; Benedetto Croce, His-tory, Its Theory and Practice, transl. Douglas Anslie (New York, 1921), 137.9. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method, 162-163.



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182 JOHN D. MILLIGANshould ask, what does the statement say, literally? Here the statementbeing investigated would seem to contain little or no ambiguity. It accusesof contemplating treasonable acts two men who would later become theNorth's most successful generals, and a third, who would become its sec-ond most successful admiral. It specifically attributes to Grant thestatement that, though the time was not yet propitious, the government inWashington had to be overthrown. Further, in remarking on Porter's statedsympathies for the South, it implies that in such a revolution the objectiveof the admiral, at least, would have been to aid the Confederacy.

The second part of the question that Langlois and Seignobos would havethe historian ask of the document to clarify its sense is, what is its realmeaning? As Homer Hockett points out, "there is often a difference be-tween the literal and real meanings." The reader will recognize that theexperts are not yet concerned with whether or not the statement in thedocument is true but rather whether, in Hockett's words, it "is intended tobe taken literally or in an oblique sense." 1Hulmeexplains: "Sometimes thereal meaning of a writer is expressed in jest, sarcasm, or allegory."' 0 Hereagain the wording of the statement is so explicit, that it is difficult toconceive of its maker intending it in anything but the most literal sense.Moreover, as the reader will learn below, its maker was a most directperson, not given to ambiguity or obliquity, nor to jokes, irony, or fables tomake a point.

Convinced of what the document means and that its author meant whathe wrote, the historian must get down to the business of determining itscredibility. The authorities suggest several ways to approach the problem.Hockett writes, for example, that "the critic must inquire whether a state-ment under scrutiny is based on the observation of the maker or someoneelse." As noted above, the writer of the letter apparently did not obtain hisideas from other written sources. Now the question becomes, did he obtainthem by actually witnessing the events he described or was he merelypassing on hearsay? Respecting this point, there seems scant reason todoubt that the witness was actually present at a meeting with Grant, Sher-man, and Porter. To be sure, warns Hockett, the scholar must be chary ofthe self-proclaimed witness who "betrays vanity, by habitual ascription tohimself of a conspicuous share in important actions or events, [or an]intimacy with prominent personages."' 1 Thorough research indicates,however, that, as a full colonel who headed what was in effect a separate,if not independent, command, the witness frequently consulted with the

10. Ch[arles] V. Langlois and Ch[arles] Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History,transl. G. G. Berry (New York, 1925), 145-146; Homer Carey Hockett, The Critical Methodin Historical Research and Writing (rev. ed., New York, 1955), 43; Hulme, History and ItsNeighbors, 71.11. Hockett, The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing, 50, 58.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 183admiral and at times with the two generals. In fact, the colonel had onlyjust returned from an expedition which he had undertaken with the admi-ral's approval. A close inspection of the records also reveals that all fourofficers were in the vicinity of Vicksburg on or about February 28, andhence had the opportunity to confer.12

The man's rank and authority would also seem to answer, if only in part,another question that the historian addresses to his witness. Even suppos-ing "the witness was in a position to know what he was talking about," didhe, ask Oscar Handlin and his associates, have "the skill and competenceto observe accurately"?"3 The credentials of the witness in this instanceseem to warrant that he at least be given a respectful hearing.

If the witness were close to the event in space, it is also important, noteJacques Barzun and Henry Graff, that his testimony about what he sawand heard be given close to it in time. To be sure, as Daniel Aaronnotes, "no writer enjoys total recall . . . every recollection is suspect."Nevertheless, the freshness of testimony is important for two reasons.Gottschalk explains the first. "There are three steps in historical tes-timony: observation, recollection, and recording. . . . At each of thesesteps something of the possible testimony may be lost." In a word, otherthings being equal, the sooner the witness transcribes his recollections, thegreater is likely to be their veracity. A second reason for suspecting be-latedly recorded testimony is aptly if sardonically stated by Aaron, himself.[W]hata personwas or didor thoughtthirty years ago is past anddead, even if thatperson is technicallyalive. The livingrelic is his own ancestor;andfeeling a deepfamilialpiety for his defuncthistorical self, he indulgesin ancestor worship, tidiesup embarrassingdisordersof his deadpast, reverentlyconceals his own skeletonina hiddencloset.14

12. These statements are based on my research for John D. Milligan, Gunboats Down theMississippi (Annapolis, Md., 1965); and on Charles R. Ellet to Alfred W. Ellet, February 28,1863, Ellet Papers; David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, February 28, 1863, Letters Receivedby the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons: Mississippi, 1861-1865 (National Archives, Record Group 45, hereafter cited as Mississippi Squadron Letters);Ulysses S. Grant to Henry W. Halleck, February 18 and March 1, 1863, and Special Ordersof U. S. Grant, March 1, 1863, U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: ACompilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 130 vols. (Wash-ington, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XXIV, Part I, 18, and Vol. LII, Part I, 337 (hereafter citedas O.R.A.); and William T. Sherman, February 26, 1863, Home Letters of General Sherman,ed. M. A. DeWolfe Howe (New York, 1909), 239-242.

13. Oscar Handlin et al., Harvard Guide to American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1954),24.14. Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, The Modern Researcher (3rd ed., New York,1977), 128; Daniel Aaron, "The Treachery of Recollection: the Inner and the Outer History"in Essays oil History and Literature, ed. Robert H. Bremner ([Columbus] 1966). 10, 18;Gottschalk, Understanding History, 151. Though Aaron is referring specifically to oral tes-timony given long after the event testified about, obviously written testimony belatedly givenraises similar problems of fidelity of memory.



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184 JOHN D. MILLIGANWhen the questionable document is put to the test of the proximity of its

testimony to the event testified to, it bears up well; the event described waswitnessed, recalled, and recorded all on the same day, Febraury 28, 1863.

Another criterion which the historian applies in his investigation of thereliability of a document inquires for whom was the testimony of the wit-ness intended? Clearly, it makes a difference. Marwick believes "that aprimary source is most valuable when the purpose for which it was com-piled is at the furthest remove from the purpose of the historian," thatis, when the primary source was not compiled for posterity. In the samespirit, Hockett advises researchers to be wary of testimony "colored bythe desire to please hearers or readers." A statement made to advanceone's interests or to win public approbation or to secure one's niche inhistory would have less credibility than a statement made privately to aclose associate or relative. Gottschalk puts the matter this way: "Becausethe effort, on the one hand, to palliate the truth or, on the other, to decorateit with literary, rhetorical, or dramatic flourishes tends to increase as theexpected audience increases, in general the fewer the number for whoseeyes the document was meant (i.e., the greater its confidential nature), themore 'naked' its contents are likely to be."15 In this connection, the tes-timony being evaluated once again appears to have substance. It was givenin a personal letter to an uncle with whom the writer was on intimate andaffectionate terms.To this point the historical source has apparently passed inspection. Itsauthenticity, date, and place of inception appear valid. Its meaning seemsunmistakable. The individual whose testimony it presents evidently was anactual witness to the event he sought to describe, had sufficient experienceto observe accurately, recorded his recollections immediately subsequentto the event, and meant them solely for the eyes of a person whom hewould seem to have had no reason to deceive. All well and good; and yetby now the reader is undoubtedly aware that, while I have ostensiblyplayed the part of detective, carefully and objectively assaying the evi-dence, I have in fact worn "the mantle of Guardian," have presented indefense of the proclaimed witness to the historical event a lawyer's briefwhich reveals only that evidence that supports the credibility of his tes-timony.

Now, of course, the reader knows not only that no military coup oc-curred or was attempted in the Civil War North; if he be a student of theperiod, he must also know that the particular charges contained in thedocument under study are not corroborated by the testimony of otherwitnesses. As a matter of fact, this point was admitted when it was argued

15. Marwick, The Nature of History, 136; Hockett, The Critical Method in HistoricalResearch and Writing, 58; Gottschalkj Understanding History, 90.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 185that the ideas in the testimony were original to the document. And thisadmission could be telling. "[I]n most instances," Nevins emphasizes,"guilt cannot be hcJdconclusively established save by corroborativeevi-dence from at least one independent source." In the present case, thehistorian s left with a single witness; and the testimony of a singlewitness,warnsNevins, is "the most difficult orm of evidence to test," because thewitness "may be affected by a hundredforms of personal bias." This,however, does not mean, Barzun and Graff stress, that a single witnesscannot"be quite accurate";and, as a devotee of the truth,the reader mayperhaps admitthat the brief drawnabove, as obviously one-sided as it is,does raise some questions that meritanswers.16

Before consideringthe case against the witness, the reader might alsowish to ask himself, what if the evidence thus far presentedwere all thathad survived?At Gottschalkwrites, "only a partof what was observed inthe past was rememberedby those who observed it; only a part of whatwas rememberedwas recorded; [and]only a partof what was recordedhassurvived."17This truthpresents an especially thorny problemfor the his-torian of ancient or medievaltimes, in which eras fewer people were liter-ate and from which eras fewer documents survive; but it can also onoccasion pose difficulty for the historianof more recent times. Supposefor a moment that the accusatory document provided the only source ofinformationabout its author,because it was the only item by or abouthimthathad survived.The scholar,in thatcase, would have no directevidenceby which to weigh the author'scredibility.And suppose that the survivingdocumentsby and aboutthe accused menwere not sufficiently nformativeto exonerate them from the charges. Mightnot historiansin that situationbe justifiedin speculatingthat certainhigh-rankingFederal officers may atleast have discussed the possibility of carryingout a revolution?Happily, of course, since all kinds of evidence about both accuser andaccused have survived from the period of the Civil War, the historiancanin this instance test the credibility of the single witness by additionalmeans. Indeed, historiansthrough survivingdocuments have studied thethree accused officers so thoroughly,have writtenin such detail abouttheimpulses which drove them, the objectives which beckoned them and theevents which informed their lives, that, unless the testimony againstthemwere unimpeachable, there would be no justification for probing and

evaluatingagaintheirbiographical ources.18Withoutfurtherequivocating,16. Nevins, The Gateway to History, 196, 214; Barzun and Graff, The Modern Re-searcher, 128. The term"the mantleof Guardian" s RobinWinks's. See The HistorianasDetective: Essays on Evidence, ed. Robin W. Winks (New York, 1969), 177.17. Gottschalk, Understanding History, 45.18. For listingsof biographicalworks on Grant,Sherman,and Portersee the comprehen-sive bibliographyn J. G. Randalland David Donald, TheCivilWarand Reconstruction rev.ed., Boston, 1969).



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186 JOHN D. MILLIGANtherefore, let it be stated that the testimony of the accuser can be discred-ited to the point that no further investigation into the lives of the accusedseems warranted. This is not to say that the document which makes thecharges is a forgery; it has, after all. withstood the tests of external criti-cism. Nor is it to say that the witness's testimony was an intentional lie; ithas, after all, withstood certain of the tests of internal criticism; and noevidence has been uncovered to suggest that the witness purposely soughtto deceive. It is rather to say that by completing the process of internalcriticism, the historian can cast so much doubt upon the ability of thewitness to tell the truth about the particular conference in question that histestimony can safely be characterized as unreliable. The difficulty, writesSir Charles Oman, is often one "in which the author [witness] is notintentionally falsifying the progress of events, but practically doing so,owing to bad information, personal bias, or sometimes mere stupidity." J.A. Passmore puts the matter even more pointedly when he observes that itis the endless ability of men to deceive themselves "rather than the risk oflying, [that] is the principal reason for regarding their testimony with sus-picion. ' 19

If the reader now knows that the witness was the culprit, that is, knowsthe solution to the game of detective being played by the historian, he maystill discover that the final moves by which the researcher arrived at thesolution have a certain interest of their own. Beyond recognizing that theevidence thus far presented is favorable to the witness, the reader mayhave also noted that it is for the most part circumstantial in nature. Itimplies mainly from attendant spatial and temporal circumstances that thewitness was present at the event, was competent to observe it, and re-corded his recollections of it under conditions favorable to credibility.Apart from the fact that he was a colonel in command, however, the readerknows almost nothing about the witness himself. If he knows that spatialand temporal circumstances were generally conducive to the witness's re-porting accurately, he does not know that psychological and emotionalcircumstances were conducive to it.

As the critic studies his witness, Gottschalk and the contributors to theShafer volume advise him to concentrate on whether the witness was ableto tell the truth. The latter writers divide the question of the witness'sability to tell the truth into (1) his "Social ability [which] . . . concerns thefamiliarity of the witness with the subject matter, and his willingness [with-out inhibition or prejudice] to observe to the best of his ability," and (2) his"Physical ability [which] . . . includes the condition of the witness, and

19. Sir Charles Oman, On the Writing of History (London, 1939), 28; J. A. Passmore,"The Objectivity of History" in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. William H. Dray(New York, 1966), 79.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 187external conditions that affect his observational powers."20 Concerning thesocial ability of the witness to tell the truth, it has been established that hewas a colonel exercising command responsibility, and this information isdoubtless important; but it may be even more important to know that at thetime he made his accusations his total military experience spanned exactlynine months and that he was nineteen years old, surely one of the youngestcolonels in the Union Army. Specifically, the young officer, who chargedGrant, Sherman, and Porter with treason, was Charles Rivers Ellet, com-mander of the Mississippi Ram Fleet.

That a youth with so little experience had attained such high rank andheavy responsibility is partly explained by the fact that the amazingly rapidexpansion of the armed forces during the Civil War resulted in many youngmen attaining rank and responsibility. Still, the phenomenal advancementof this particular young man was not typical even of those times; beforebeing promoted colonel, the only rank Ellet had held had been the lowlyone of medical cadet and assistant to an army surgeon. A second andmore important factor explains his sudden elevation and bears directly onthe credibility of his later testimony. The ram fleet which he commandedwas originally the brainchild of his father, the well-known civil engineer,Charles Ellet, Jr. Long an advocate of resurrecting the tactic of ramming innaval warfare, when the USS Merrimac (alias CSS Virginia) rammed andsank a United States sloop-of-war in Hampton Roads, Virginia, the elderEllet had persuaded the War Department, which controlled Federal navaloperations on the inland rivers, to send him into the Mississippi Valley.His mission was to convert river steamers into rams to cooperate withUnion gunboats already operating against the Confederate River DefenseFleet. The engineer not only created a ram fleet; as its first commander hesecured a colonel's commission and gathered about him a daring band ofboats' crews and marines, among whom were a number of his relatives,including three nephews; his younger brother, Alfred, who transferredfrom the infantry to accept the rank of lieutenant colonel and the positionof second in command of the rams; and his only son, Charles Rivers, wholeft his medical studies in Washington, D. C. to enter the service as ap-prentice to the fleet surgeon.21

In a sense, the older Ellet made the ram fleet into a family enterprise, acircumstance which was to have a profound effect upon his son. The Ellet

20. Gottschalk, Understanding History, 150-155; Shafer, Guide, 145-146.21. For information on the Ellets see the Ellet Papers; U. S. Navy Department, OfficialRecords of the Union and Confederate Navies in the Warof the Rebellion, 30 vols. (Washing-ton, 1894-1914), Series I, Vols. XXIII and XXIV (hereafter cited as O.R.N.); G. D. Lewis,Charles Ellet, Jr.: The Engineer as Individualist, 1810-1862 (Urbana, Ill., 1968); "CharlesRivers Ellet" in The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York, 1897), IV,360-361; and John D. Milligan, ' Charles Ellet, Naval Architect: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Professionalism," The American Neptune 31 (1971), 52-72.



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188 JOHN D. MILLIGANfamily, itself, personified the stereotypic nineteenth-century clan. Charles,Jr., a genuinely self-made man, was the patriarch not merely of his im-mediate family but of his brothers' families, too; and, having shaped theram fleet, he proceeded to preside over it and its personnel just as he didhis extended family. All looked to him, until he was struck down.

On June 1, 1862, his nineteenth birthday, Charles Rivers joined the fleet.Five days later, his father was mortally wounded while leading two of hisrams in battle. The command passed to the boy's Uncle Alfred, who gavehis nephew charge of a ram. In the autumn, when his uncle was promotedto brigadier general and sent north to recruit a special counter-guerrillamarine brigade, young Ellet, who in his short military career had servedwith daring and imagination, was made colonel and succeeded to the com-mand of the ram fleet. So it was that this youth of undoubted courage butlimited experience, taking as it were the helm fashioned by his father'shand and with it the obligation to continue the family enterprise and toprotect its reputation, commanded for a time the organization which em-bodied both the obligation and the reputation. He hoped, he had written tohis sister just before receiving his colonel's eagles, to "crown my father'shead with the laurels which are his due.'22

As if this responsibility were not enough, the new colonel was burdenedwith the fear that his trust was threatened, not simply by the enemy but bythe very Federal officers with whom he was expected to cooperate. TheNorthern squadron of wooden and ironclad gunboats, which had beenoperating on the interior waters when his father had brought his rams intoaction, was like the ram fleet administered by the War Department; but,whereas the rams were commanded by recently commissioned armyofficers without military education, the gunboats were for the most partcommanded by professional naval officers. The existence of these twoindependent water-borne organizations was obviously not calculated toallay jealousy and friction; and, in fact, while they had directed ram opera-tions, the elder Ellets seemed intentionally to encourage the rivalry. Inmid-summer the gunboats were officially transferred to Navy Departmentjurisdiction, but because of a technicality -- the rams were not defined asgunboats - the Ellet flotilla remained under War Department auspices,and the rivalry continued, only in exacerbated form. Writing in his diary,Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles later correctly assessed the situation:"there cannot be two distinct commands on the river, under different or-ders from different Departments without endangering collision.' '23

The October succession of Admiral Porter to the command of the gun-22. C. R. Ellet to Mary Ellet, November 4, 1862, Ellet Papers.23. Entry (or November 4, 1862, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under

Lincoln and Johnson, ed. Howard K. Beale, 3 vols. (New York, 1960), I, 180.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 189boat squadronhad done nothingto span the breech. Believing with reasonthat all naval operations should be underone director, he put pressure onthe Navy Department o have the ramstransferred o his command.In themeantime,it was at his suggestion, he later claimed, that the troublesomeAlfred Ellet was sent off to recruit. Perhaps Porter assumed young CharlesRivers would be more tractable; if so, he was wrong. With his model afather who had pursued his ambitions relentlessly, and defined his rightsbroadlyandguardedthem zealously, the new chief of the ram fleet was noless suspicious of the motives of the professionals than had been its twoformer commanders. He gave himself over to paroxysms of anxiety thatthe navy, and Porter especially, were plotting to rob him and his charge oftheir independence.24Lettersfromhis uncle did muchto fuel his suspicionsthat a conspiracywas afoot.Called to Washington o consult with Secretaryof War Edwin M. Stan-ton about the special marinebrigadehe was to raise, General Ellet keptCharlesapprisedof the contest going on between Warand Navy Depart-ment officials as to who should control the ram fleet and, once it wasoperational,the marinebrigade. In the end, after a protractedand bittercabinet session, the Presidentimposed a compromise. Althoughthe ramsand the brigade would remain under the War Department, by Lincoln'sorderof November 7 the Ellets would "reportto Rear AdmiralPorter forinstructions,andact underhis directionuntilotherwise orderedby the WarDepartment." Needless to add, neither side to the disputewas happywiththis settlement. Even before learning the outcome, the general was com-municating o his nephew: "We are going to have most powerfulenemiesto contend with in Porterand his navalassociates.... these navalofficerswith guilt [sic] stripes around their sleeves seem to feel that GodAlmightyholdsbut a smallcommandcomparedto what they exercise"; andagainonthe day after Lincoln's orderwent out: "I can assure you that we have atremendoushostility to contend againstin the navy.' 25

Ironically, even as the uncle was nourishinghis nephew's distrust of thenaval commanderat Vicksburg, the latter and his military counterpartswere admitting he youngerEllet to their councils, a fact which could only24. Portertells of his role in AlfredEllet's recruiting ctivitiesin his "Journal,"I, 410-411,David D. PorterPapers(Libraryof Congress).For ColonelEllet's suspicionsrespecting henavy's machinations, ee his letters to MaryEllet, November18, 1862,and January8, Feb-ruary6, and March9, 1863,Ellet Papers.25. Lincoln's order of November 7, 1862, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed.Roy P. Basler,9 vols. (New Brunswick,N. J., 1953-55),V, 490;EdwinM. Stanton o AlfredEllet, November 8, 1862, and Alfred Ellet to C. R. Ellet, November 3 and 8, 1862, ElletPapers.For the Navy's dissatisfactionwith the compromisesee GustavusV. Fox to Porter,

November 8, 1862, Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretaryof the Navy, 1861-1865,ed. Robert M. Thompsonand RichardWainwright,2 vols. (NewYork, 1920), II, 147-148.



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190 JOHN D. MILLIGANhave strengthened his aspirations and, given his uncle's missives, increasedhis sense of familial obligation. Thomas Jerome stresses how influential arethe memberships the witness holds in a class, church, clique, and, not leastin this case, family. In "all of these relations he is virtually obliged to seethings as they are not, and to speak that which is false." As he watchedAdmiral Porter working hand in glove with army commander Grant and hislieutenant, Sherman, Charles may also have become mistrustful of thegenerals' motives. Moreover, something else his uncle had written couldhave preyed on his mind and caused him to be on the lookout for the leastsign of confimation. "I think before the next twelve months roll around,"General Ellet, without attribution, specificity, or elaboration, prophesieddarkly, "that he who then holds the army will have great oportunity [sic]for good or evil in his hands[.] A great revolution is in progress aside fromthe present rebelion [sic], that will shake the pillars of government to theirvery foundations if it does not overthrow them." Whatever motives orwhatever events, real or fancied, may have prompted Alfred Ellet to writethese words, it seems no travesty of the law of cause and effect to specu-late that he may have planted one of the seeds which several months laterwould sprout in his nephew's charges of treason. Gottschalk emphasizesthe importance of the witness's expectations or anticipations; "so that,"says the Shafer volume, "the eye apparently beholds and the ear ap-prehends what the mind wishes them to report.26 In fine, the witness canbecome a prisoner of his own perceptions. With all of the pressures hebore, with his uncle fostering his misgivings, how could young Ellet beexpected accurately to interpret what went on in those top-level sessions?

If all this were not sufficient, the historian can define yet another cir-cumstance which most probably worked against the social ability of thiswitness to tell the truth. Vincent suggests that in addition to the witness's"relations to superiors," the researcher should consider "the line ofpromotion which lies open to such an official, or what may be his personalambitions." Charles was no doubt deeply concerned to protect the honorof his family's reputation, to which he referred often, and perhaps too, theexistence of the Union, though he referred to it seldom if ever; but howdoes one separate family honor or patriotism from personal ambition? Nosooner had Ellet learned of his promotion to colonel than he was writing:"So you see, Sister, the eagles have perched on my shoulders at last. ...Now for the stars!" There were, he continued, but two steps between himand a major generalship, the highest military rank the Federal Governmentwas then conferring. Given the right opportunities, his next birthday could

26. Thomas Spencer Jerome, Aspects of the Study of Roman History (New York, 1923), 48;Alfred Ellet to C. R. Ellet, November 3, 1862, Ellet Papers; Gottschalk, UnderstandingHistory, 160; Shafer, Guide, 146.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 191see him, "well, much higher than boys of nineteen usually get.... There isa tide in the affairs of men, and I think that the present one will roll meeither very high up or very low down. And I would have it so. Gold andpower or the grave."27 Yet, his great ambition to the contrary notwith-standing, when young Colonel Ellet attended that critical meeting of Feb-ruary 28, his military future was already under a cloud; he had just returnedfrom an expedition which his seniors pronounced a failure.

The sortie had begun auspiciously enough. Although they had failed tosink a Confederate steamer tied at the Vicksburg levee, Ellet and a boldcrew had, under Porter's orders, successfully taken one of the rams downthe Mississippi, directly but safely through the fire of the city's riversidebatteries. Their objective was to establish a blockade of the Red River,which, flowing through Louisiana into the Mississippi 190 miles south ofVicksburg, provided a highway over which the enemy was sending vitalsupplies to Vicksburg and the eastern Confederacy. With Grant and Por-ter's campaign stalled for the time being, the young colonel may have feltcompelled to do something decisive. When the regular navy had seemedbalked in the past, his father and uncle, as if to emphasize the caution ofthe professionals, had taken it upon themselves to press downriver ondaring missions of their own. Porter, being reluctant to risk one of hisironclads, seemed delighted when Ellet had volunteered. He later insistedthat the idea, although not the failure, was all his. General Grant, himself,appeared convinced that Ellet's ram by itself could shut off the Red River,and for a time he was right.28

In quick succession, the ram colonel captured and destroyed several Con-federate supply boats which he intercepted on the Mississippi. He musthave felt that he was more than advancing whatever causes impelled him.Then, impetuosity got the better of him. Ignoring Porter's orders to remainat the mouth of the Red River, he steamed up that stream, only to have toabandon his vessel when she grounded under heavy fire from the guns of aConfederate shore battery. The details of the affair are not important to thepresent context. To appreciate the state of Ellet's mind by the time he hadreturned to Vicksburg, it is enough to know that he and some of his surviv-ing crewmen had floated down the Red River on cotton bales, fled pursuingConfederate vessels in an auxiliary steamer until she lost her rudders,continued their flight up the Mississippi in a captured Confederate steamer,and were only assured of escape when they ran in with the USS Indianola,an ironclad gunboat that Porter had belatedly dispatched past Vicksburg.The Confederates meanwhile had repaired the captured Federal ram and

27. Vincent, Historical Research, 130; C. R. Ellet to Mary Ellet, November 4, 1862, ElletPapers.28. Porter to Welles, February 22 and 27, 1863, Mississippi Squadron Letters; Grant toHenry W. Halleck, February 3, 1863, Ulysses S. Grant Letter Books (Library of Congress).



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192 JOHN D. MILLIGANeventually with her and two other craft sank Porter's ironclad. The admiralcan probably be excused for being exasperated with his impetuous subor-dinate.29

The point, however, is that Ellet's general suspicions concerning Porterand his military colleagues were now reinforced by considerations of self-interest, because Ellet was rapidly coming to the conclusion that he con-fronted an effort to place entire responsibility for the losses of the ram andironclad squarely on his shoulders. Several days before attending the meet-ing of the 28th, he wrote as much to his uncle, and in a postscript to thevery letter in which he accused his superiors of treason, he added thesewords: "I would not be surprised if they tried to throw all the blame of thisupon me." Though he concluded this sentence with a martyred, "but Ican stand it," one strongly suspects that, in fact, he could not. Apart froma momentary lapse, when he admitted that before going up the Red Riverhe should perhaps have waited for Porter to send down the Indianola, hegave every evidence of wanting to shift the blame to the admiral. To hisuncle he pointed out correctly that Porter's orders had not promised rein-forcement; they had merely said not to be surprised to see the ironclad.Ellet claimed that many army officers sided with him in wanting to knowwhy Porter had not in the first place ordered the ironclad to accompany theram. "The Indianola was ready and Capt. [George] Brown anxious to golong before Porter would consent."30

All this is by way of saying that there were many "social" influencesoperating to impede Charles Ellet's ability to tell the truth. Even had hebeen in the best of emotional and physical health, the various stresses onone so inexperienced would most likely have warped the way he perceivedthe men he accused. In point of truth, Ellet9s health was not good, and thisraises the second set of factors which Shafer et al. advise the internal criticto ponder concerning the witness: Did he have the physical ability to tellthe truth? In answer, the reader knows that Ellet had only just returnedfrom an expedition which if nothing else had left him physically exhaustedand stretched his nerves taut. The reader does not know, however, thatEllet, who like his father had never been robust of physique, was appar-ently ill. Porter described him so when, after the younger man's returnfrom Red River, he had been unable to report immediately to the admiral.Ellet, himself, wrote to his uncle that he was suffering from "chills," whichmay have been symptomatic of a mild case of the malaria or typhoid which

29. Details of Ellet's expedition can be found in Ellet Papers; Mississippi Squadron Let-ters; O.R.N., Series I, Vol. XXIV; and O.R.A., Series I, Vol. XXIV, Part I. For theaccount of newspaper reporter Albert Bodman, who accompanied Ellet, see Chicago Tribune,March 1 and 3, 1863.30. C. R. Ellet to Alfred Ellet, February [2]5 and 28, 1863, Ellet Papers; Porter to C. R.Ellet, February 10 [1863], O.R.N., Series I, Vol. XXIV, 370.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 193commonly infected the men of the river navies. Finally, Ellet was a chronicvictim of migraine, from which he sought relief in laudanum, a tincture ofthe addictive drug, opium. Given this bill of physical particulars, MarcBloch's warning note concerning a circumstance which can "impair theaccuracy of perception of even the most gifted person,' would seem toapply: it "depends upon the condition of the observer at the time --- suchfor example as his fatigue or emotion."31

To sum up, a nineteen-year-old youth, exhausted, feverish, and possiblydrugged, went to that meeting of February 28 freighted with emotions andsuspicions born of filial devotion to his father's memory; of familial loyaltyto the Ellet clan; of concern to uphold the reputation of the ram fleet, areputation which the youth may have already tarnished and which ap-peared to him threatened by superiors; and, perhaps not least, of an uneasethat his own reputation was at stake. His judgment in the circumstancescould hardly have helped being prejudiced. True, immediately afterward hedescribed the meeting in a private letter, but this fact does little to enhancecredibility; without a lapse of time, the identical social and physical dis-tractions still obtained. Furthermore, the writer knew that the recipientwould be a kindred spirit, nursing many of the same emotions and suspi-cions.Is the historian, then, justified in rejecting Colonel Ellet's charges againstthe two generals and the admiral? The answer is almost surely, yes. Possi-bly these officers, as servicemen even in high echelons no doubt aresometimes wont to do, may simply have been indulging their frustrations bycriticizing the Federal Government and its conduct of the war; and possi-bly Ellet, given his state of mind and body, may have misconstrued theirgripings as evidence of sinister intent; but, without corroborating witnessesand in light of the sole witness's bias and emotional instability, it seems acertainty that as nearly as historical truth can be established these menwere not plotting the overthrow of the government.

Of course, recalling the impossibility of judging with absolute certaintythe authenticity of an historical document, the reader may well ask, withhow much certitude can historical truth be established? As Bloch poses thequestion: "To what extent, however, are we [historians] justified in mouth-ing this glorious word 'certainty'?" That an historical event was impossi-ble, he continues, can never be a certainty. There is always a chance,however remote, that the event did occur. Walsh makes the same point:"the contrary of every matter-of-fact statement, even one about which we

31. Shafer, Guide, 146; Porter to Welles, February 22, 1863, Mississippi Squadron Letters;C. R. Ellet to Alfred Ellet, February 28, 1863, Ellet Papers; Bloch, The Historian's Craft,101 On October 1, 1864, Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet died in his sleep, apparently from anoverdose of opiate. See J. T. Headley, F-arra ut and Our Naval Commanders (New York,1867), 222-223.



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THE TREATMENT OF AN HISTORICAL SOURCE 195limited standpoint."' Passmore elucidates further: "the historian is notquite at the mercy of the chronicler; . . he can discover important factsfrom [the primary source] . . . which the chronicler had no intention what-ever of recording." He can, in Collingwood's phrase, "get out of his 'au-thorities' the answer to a question which they did not expect a reader toask. "34

Truly, once the historian begins asking of the Ellet document questionsother than those concerning the truth of its author's accusations, he opensnew areas for investigation, the more so if he also directs his questions tothe other documents in the context of which the questionable one is found.This exercise calls for powers of imagination, conceptualization, and in-genuity; because, as Paul Conkin and Roland Stromberg assert, "neithermusty manuscripts nor arts of detection" alone do history make. Rather,the investigator begins what Bernard Bailyn describes as "this kind ofcreative process, a process in which the student, his radar wide open,probes the data with his mind, searching for patterns, for relevance, forsignificance. Often in the process the investigation becomes trans-formed."' 35

No matter, then, that Charles R. Ellet was young, inexperienced,weighed down with responsibility, biased, ambitious, emotionally over-wrought, and ill; the fact that he made his charges at all could be sig-nificant. Without going into a subject, which, just to plumb its possibilities,would require a separate essay, one can see that simply by exploring thereliability of Ellet's letter one has already uncovered a number of sugges-tive leads, some of which may confirm or contradict existing historicalconclusions, some of which may be novel. There are possible militaryleads, for example. Ellet's letter reveals intra- and interservice frictionamong the Union forces besieging Vicksburg and raises the question whythere was no unified command. It also brings to mind the topic of therelationship between amateur and professional soldiers and sailors in CivilWar times, and whether resulting strains compromised operations. Withrespect to technology, the student might wonder whether the amateurs,with little or no vested interest or loyalty to the military or naval statusquo, were not readier than the professionals to experiment with new ordifferent technology and tactics.36 Might the conservative naval establish-

34. Renier, History: Its Purpose and Method, 156; Collingwood, The Idea of History, 275;Paul Weiss, History: Written and Lived (Carbondale, Ill., 1962), 67; Passmore, "The Objec-tivity of History" in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. Dray, 80; R. G. Collingwood,An Autobiography (London, 1939), 133.35. Paul K. Conkin and Roland N. Stromberg, The Heritage and the Challenge of Histoty(New York, 1971), 225; Bernard Bailyn, "The Problems of the Working Historian: A Com-ment" in The Craft of American History: Selected Essays, ed. A. S. Eisenstadt, 2 vols. (NewYork, 1966), II, 205.36. This generalization, to which the exploits of the Ellets lend credence, is convincingly



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196 JOHN D. MILLIGANment have felt threatened by the Ellets' insistence that the ram was theultimate naval weapon? The senior Charles Ellet had boasted that steamrams could easily sink conventional warships, and the Merrirmac hadseemed to substantiate his claim. That the success of naval rams would beshort-lived was not obvious at the time. In fact, before the Ellet craft hadcome to the Mississippi, Confederate rams operating on that river had sunktwo Federal gunboats.

Young Ellet's letter and its contextual environment also say somethingabout personal ambition in wartime. The writer was concerned to protecthis military reputation, not to mention the reputations of his father, uncle,and cousins; and this concern, most broadly construed, suggests to whatextent the Civil War, or for that matter any war, was exploited by partici-pants to further their own interests.If Ellet's correspondence suggests topics having to do with the militaryand war, a little more thought reveals that it further suggests related politi-cal and social topics. For example, the probable falsity of his chargesagainst senior military and naval officers notwithstanding, they do raisequestions about the wartime efficiency of a political system in which thecommander-in-chief of the armed services is a civilian. And these questionslead rather naturally to the fact that even during a civil war the Americanmilitary apparently gave no concerted thought to executing a coup. Theprofessionals would seem to have been far more conservative than theEllets believed they were. To be sure, professional soldiers and sailors ofSouthern origin followed their states out of the Union, but the key word isfollowed. Can one generalize that American democracy fosters in civilians,such as the Ellets, who were no more than civilians in military uniform,suspicion and skepticism toward officialdom but obedience and respect incareer military and naval men? Finally, still further afield, the respon-sibilities which Charles R. Ellet inherited bring to mind the subjects of therole of the patriarch and the practice of nepotism in America.

Additional thought would lead the researcher to additional possibilities,but the point is not to identify every subject suggested or implied by theEllet manuscript. It is rather to be alerted to alternative ways in which thehistorian can comprehend and interpret such material. As Henri-IreneeMarrou reminds the scholar, "there is an unlimited number of differentquestions to which the documents can provide the answers, provided thatthe questioning is properly done."37State University of New YorkBuffalodevelopedin a recentlycompleteddissertation.See RowenaReed, "CombinedOperationsnthe Civil War"(doctoraldissertation, Departmentof History, Queen's Universityat King-ston, 1976).37. Marrou, The Meaning of History, 76-77; emphasis added.

Documents

MULLIGAN - The Treatment of a Historical Source