Muleskinner Report Vol. 4 Issue 10

Cash-for-Work projects to

the AEAs, and closely

m o n i t o r a n d p r o v i d e

f e e d b a c k o n t h e i r

performance.

But before making this

transition, we developed a

fully transparent CFW

p r o j e c t m a n a g e m e n t

process designed to ensure

CFW funds got to their

intended recipients. In

doing so, we put ourselves

in a position to identify

corrupt officials and work

with the DAIL to have

them reprimanded.

Our plan was simple but

e f f e c t i v e – s h o w a l l

stakeholders “the books” at

the beginning, middle, and

e n d o f a p r o j e c t a n d

provide them a hotline

number to call if they knew

o f o r e ve n s us pe c t ed

corruption. Specifically,

we provided copies of both

the attendance log and pay

log to the laborers shortly

after they were paid and

asked them to verify that

they had received the

correct amount and that all

the people listed on the

(Continued on page 2)

S i n c e o u r

arrival here in

Nangarhar province in

August 2010, Missouri

Agribusiness Development

T e a m IV h a s wo r ke d

closely with the provincial-

l e v e l D i r e c t o r o f

Agriculture, Irrigation, and

L i v e s t o c k t o r e d u c e

co r rupt ion wi th in h i s

organization.

While this has not been

an easy task, we have made

significant progress toward

this objective and this

progress appears to be

somewhat irreversible.

This article describes

t h e me t h o d we u s e d ,

discusses the underlying

cultural dynamics that

contributed to our success,

summarizes some of our

important lessons learned,

and attempts to generalize

o u r f i n d i n g s s o o u r

methodology might be

applied elsewhere.

While anti-corruption is

not a primary mission of

the ADT, Gen. Petraeus’s

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

guidance dated July 27,

2010 directs all U.S forces

in Afghanistan to “identify

a n d c o n f r o n t c o r r u p t

o f f i c i a l s ” a n d “ h e l p

Afghans build accountable

governance.”

In the September 2010

Muleskinner Report , I

discussed the rampant

corrupt ion problem in

Afghanistan and explained

how cor rup t of f i c ia l s

undermine the legitimacy

of the government in the

eyes of the people. I also

described how the ADT

would implement Gen.

Petraeus’s anti-corruption

guidance as we pursued

our agriculture -related

mission objectives.

We did not se t out

specifically to uncover

corruption, but rather, to

improve the ability of the

D A I L ’ s A g r i c u l t u r e

Extension Agents to lead,

m a n a g e , a n d d e l i v e r

services to the farmers in

their districts.

One of the ways we

hoped to achieve this was

t o t r a n s f e r t h e

responsibility for managing

small, limited duration,

Commander ’ s Corner Winn i n g t h e wa r o n c o r r up t i o n

The Muleskinner Report Mo Agribusiness Development Team IV

M A R C H 3 1 , 2 0 1 1 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

D R I V I N G

T H E T E A M

Commander

Col. Fortune

Deputy Commander

Lt. Col. Charles

Senior Enlisted

Advisor Senior Master Sgt.

Blankenship

I N S I D E

T H I S I S S U E :

Winning the War

on Corruption

1-3

Ensuring

Continuity

During Unit

Transitions

4-5

Private Sector

Policy

Development

6-8

A Cheesehead

Amongst

Muleskinners

9-11

Creating

Agriculture

Opportunities for

Women

12-15

www.facebook.com/

MONG.ADTIV

Winning the war on corruption

P A G E 2

attendance log and pay log actually

worked on the project.

In essence, we were showing the

Afghans – both government officials

and farmers – what accountable

governance is supposed to look like

a nd c l ea r l y de mo ns t r a t i n g a

m e t h o d o l o g y f o r a c h i e v i n g

transparency that could be expanded

to other types of processes.

When, during our first round of

CFW projects, we did encounter

signs of corruption, we quickly

g a t h e r e d a n d o r g a n i z e d t h e

evidence , and confronted the

suspected AEA in the presence of

his boss – the DAIL. When the

A E A c o u l d n o t a c c o u n t f o r

discrepancies or explain the calls we

received on our hotline, the DAIL

told the AEA to either return the

money he had skimmed, or be fired

and put in jail. In all cases, the

guilty parties returned the money

and the DAIL made a point to

personally distribute the recovered

funds to the laborers for whom they

were originally intended.

Once word got out to the other

AEAs that we were watching them

and were prepared to hold them

accountable, they abruptly fell in

line and we have had few corruption

-related problems since.

The Pashtuns – the inhabitants of

Nangarhar province – are a very

proud people, know right from

wrong, and like to be seen as

altruistic. While many Pashtun

officials may find it acceptable to

partake in corrupt activities when no

one is watching, they still consider it

very shameful to be called out on

their misdeeds, and will avoid this

embarrassment at all costs.

(Continued from page 1) They also tend to be terrified at the

threat of being fired and thrown in

prison because this would bring

shame, not just upon them, but upon

their entire family and extended

family. Afghans put an extremely

high value on their relationship with

and status within their family because

this is where they tend to find security,

employment, power and respect, and

opportunities for advancement.

Behind-the-scenes, what we also

found both interesting and beneficial

was that the DAIL himself seemed to

be embarrassed, concerned, and even

fearful that some of his AEAs were

caught embezzling funds. This is

most likely because, in confronting his

AEAs, he felt we were confronting

him as well – although this was not

our intent.

On multiple occasions during the

next couple months and without

p r o mpt in g f r o m the ADT , we

observed him telling his subordinates

that he would not tolerate corruption

of any kind. At one point, he went

so far as to state “A corrupt man has

no conscience, and a man with no

conscience might as well be a dead

man.”

And because he has taken such a

strong stance with his subordinates,

it seems unlikely that the DAIL

himself will engage in corruption –

either now or in the semi-distant

future – for fear of being seen as a

hypocrite.

In working with the DAIL to

reduce cor rupt ion with in h is

depar tment , we learned some

important lessons that we would like

to convey to other leaders engaged

in, or preparing to engage in,

d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s a c r o s s

Afghanistan.

For instance, shortly after arrival

in theater, we recommend that

commanders meet with their Afghan

counterpart to clearly state their

intent to address corruption. We

believe that the longer it takes to

have this discussion, the more

difficult it will be and the less

impact it will have.

T a k i n g a f i r m s t a n c e o n

corruption early in the relationship

es tabl i shes the commander ’s

authority up front and this is one of

the keys to success in working with

Afghans as discussed in an earlier

Muleskinner Report article. Failing

to have this conversation completely

is, in effect, failing to acknowledge

the big pink elephant in the room.

I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t

commanders not only ensure

p r o c e s s e s h a v e s u f f i c i e n t

management controls to provide

good accountability, but that they

a l so minimize incent ives for


V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

Engineer Safi, Nangarhar DAIL, takes a strong

stance against corruption during a Leadership

Training Academy session at Sheshembaugh

Agriculture Research Station in Jalalabad.

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

P A G E 3

corruption. For example, because

management of CFW projects

requires the AEAs to do additional

work and expend money for fuel

t h e y w o u l d n o t h a v e s p e n t

otherwise, we compensate them

modestly for transportation and

other incidental expenses – up to

$50 per project. This seems to be

about the right amount to keep the

honest AEAs honest and less apt to

try to undermine the process to

make up for personal losses they

may have incurred in managing

a project.

Commanders should also

use shame to their advantage.

When confronting corrupt

officials, they should team up

with their Afghan counterpart to

make the experience as painful as

possible for the guilty party.

Wi th t ha t s a id , i t i s ve r y

important that suspected officials be

given the opportunity to first explain

themselves before being judged.

We experienced one case where it

initially appeared an AEA had

skimmed funds, but he was able to

c l e a r l y e x p l a i n a w a y a l l

discrepancies when questioned

about them. It is also critical to

limit the number of people present

d u r i n g q u e s t i o n i n g . W h e n

confronting a corrupt official, the

commander, his Afghan counterpart,

and the interpreter should be the

only ones in the room.

In summary, we have found

Afghan officials in Nangarhar to be

more competent than we had

anticipated but also more corrupt.

Given an opportunity to increase

their personal wealth through

corruption, it seems that a large

percentage of them will opt to do so.

However , wi th a careful ly

designed process and some due

diligence on our part, we were able

to force the issue and get these

officials to operate in a transparent

and uncorrupt manner. Even the

DAIL himself, who was reluctant to

even discuss the corruption upon

our arrival, now takes a strong

s t a n c e a g a i n s t i t w i t h h i s

subordinates.

Although this is our only data

point, it appears that our bottom-up

approach might achieve similar

results if applied to other line

directors in other sectors and in

other provinces. It might also be

effective in modifying the behaviors

of district sub-governors and their

staffs. But for this or any other

method to t ruly be effective,

officials at lower levels must be

fearful or at least aware that their

superiors are prepared to hold them

accountable.

It is questionable whether this

same approach would work at the

m i n i s t e r i a l a n d p r o v i n c i a l

governance levels because, as

mentioned in previous Muleskinner

Report article, the higher an Afghan

government official’s rank, the more

t h e y t e n d t o b e v i e w e d b y

themselves and others as above the

l a w a n d u n t o u c h a b l e . F o r

corruption to be eliminated at these

levels, it seems that enforcement

will have to come from the top

down. ADTs and other tactical and

ope ra t i ona l - l eve l un i t s mus t

continue to do all they can to reduce

corruption within the provinces and

districts, but ultimately, if there is

no emphasis at the national level,

these efforts will be in vain.

At some point, Coalition Forces

will leave Afghanistan. If we leave

behind competent Afghan leaders

who unders tand the negat ive

impacts of corruption and hold their

subordinates accountable, the

government has a good chance of

being seen as legitimate by the

Afghan people. If we fail to

do this, the government is

also likely to fail.

Teaching Afghans about

transparency, holding them

accountable, and convincing

them to hold others accountable is

hard work, but it is work that must

be done at all levels of the Afghan

government if we are to succeed

here.

(Continued from page 2)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

Winning the war on corruption

“A corrupt man has no conscience,

and a man with no conscience might

as well be a dead man.” - Nangarhar

DAIL, Engineer Safi.


1st Lt. Jodie McCall meets with local

villagers as part of his quality control

check on a Cash-for-Work project in

Surkh Rod. During the first round of

AEA-managed CFW projects, the team

discovered some loopholes in the process

that allowed the AEAs to embezzle

funds. However, the process has been re-

worked and the ADT has had few prob-

lems with corruption since.

P A G E 4

C o n d u c t i n g

a g r i b u s i n e s s

d e ve lo p me nt du r in g


remains an incredibly

difficult and challenging

mission.

Due to the protracted

nature of agribusiness

development, the time

required for successful


o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e

Secretary of Defense’s

guidance on length of

d e p l o y m e n t s , i t i s

n e c e s s a r y t o r o t a t e

multiple agribusiness

development teams in

and out of the f ight

before the mission is

c o m p l e t e . T h e s e

condi t ions crea te an

imperat ive to ensure

continuity during ADT

unit transitions.

G e n e r a l D a v i d

Petraeus, the commander

of International Security

Assistance Force and

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan,

recognizes this challenge.

He provides specific

guidance in writing, “…

maintain operat ional

t e m p o a n d l o c a l

relationships throughout

t r ans i t i ons t o a vo id

giving insurgents and

m a l i g n a c t o r s a

r e s t . ” ( C O M IS A F ’ s

C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

Guidance, 27 July 2010)

Past is sues of the

Muleskinner Report have

d i s c u s s e d t h e f o u r

standard elements of unit

t r a n s i t i o n s : P r e -

deployment Site Survey,

Advance Detachment,

Re l i e f - In -P l a c e a n d

Transfer Of Authority.

W h i l e t h e s e f o u r

specific elements are

integral to any successful

transition, this article

focuses on the three

principles of continuity

during unit transitions:

consistency from the

Afghan’s perspective,

c o n t i n u a t i o n s i n

campaign planning and a

blending of both rotating

units’ conduct of the

operation.

Consistency from the

Afghans’ perspective

takes a wide variety of

forms and pays a number

of significant dividends.

An incoming unit might

maintain an existing,

recurring meeting with

an Afghan partner to

a vo i d d i s r up t i n g a n

established routine.

For example, ADT IV

conducts a ser ies of

meeting with the Director

of Agriculture, Irrigation

a n d L i v e s t o c k ,

Nangarhar University

a n d a N a n g a r h a r

Watershed Management

Bo ard o f Di r ec t o r s .

Those meeting are likely

c a n d i d a t e s f o r

maintaining consistency.

An incoming unit may

a l s o c o n t i n u e

communica t ing wi th

loca l Afghans us ing

famil ia r , es tabl i shed

formats. As an example,

e a c h A g r i c u l t u r e

Extension Agent receives

a P r o j e c t A n a l y s i s

Scorecard (a grade card)

on their performance

following each Cash-for-

W o r k p r o j e c t .

Maintaining consistency

in the eyes of Afghans

reinforces established

practices and ensures

c o n t i n u e d f o r w a r d

momentum in partnering

with Afghan leaders.

C o n t i n u a t i o n i n

campaign planning is the

s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e t o

ensure continuity during

unit transitions. While

ADT IV developed its

own campaign plan, we

can trace our lineage

back to the campaign

plan issued by Lt. Col.

Greg Allison and ADT I.

E a c h c o m m a n d e r

must conduct his own

mission analysis and

issue their own campaign


By Lt. Col. North K. Charles


E n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i t y d u r i n g u n i t t r a n s i t i o n s

ADT IV agriculture team leaders and Col. Mike Fortune, ADT IV commander, discuss how to implement ADT V concepts during an assessment briefing on February 28.

P A G E 5 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

plans; however, the set of

core tasks should remain

consistent.

In the case of ADTs, core

campaign plan tasks remain

the focus on the Government

of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan, the support of

counterinsurgency efforts

and the requi rement to

p a r t n e r w i t h c i v i l i a n

agencies (the U.S. Agency

f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Development and the U.S.

Department of Agriculture,

for example).

Commanders who do not

ensu re con t inua t ion i n

c a m p a i g n p l a n n i n g

experience an unacceptable

cyclic, systematic loss of

institutional knowledge.

Similarly, rotating units

can adopt similar metrics

and assessment criteria to

e n s u r e u n i n t e r r u p t e d

p r o gres s i n e va lu a t i n g

p r o g r e s s . A l i g n i n g

c a m p a i g n p l a n s a n d

assessments during transition

ensures minimal loss of

momentum.

Effectively blending both

rotating units’ conduct of the

operation ensures smooth

t r a n s i t i o n s . A s e a c h

commander envisions how to

accomplish this mission, the

counterpart commander can

e n s u r e c o n t i n u i t y b y

implementing appropriate

e l e me n t s o f t h e o t h e r

commander’s plan.

In the case of ADT IV,

we will adopt and implement

elements of ADT V’s plan.

T h i s n o t o n l y e n s u r e s

continuity, but prepares the

operational environment for

the arrival of the new unit.

In addition, the incoming

u n i t m a y a d o p t s o m e

elements of the outgoing

unit’s operation to ensure a

smooth transition. In the

c a s e o f A D T I V , t h e

incoming ADT V leaders

may continue a number of

Commander’s Emergency

Response Program projects

to blend the two teams’

operations.

A g r i b u s i n e s s

development as a mission set

is challenging for all ADTs.

The mission is especially

difficult during transition

from team to team. The

most effective ADTs are

t h o s e w h o e n s u r e

c o n s i s t e n c y f r o m t h e

A f g h a n s ’ p e r s p e c t i v e ,

maintain continuation in

campaign planning and

blend both rotating units’

conduct of the operation.

These effective teams

r e m a i n f o c u s e d o n

accomplishing the mission,

instead of being distracted

by the numerous challenges

of transitions.


E n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i t y d u r i n g u n i t t r a n s i t i o n s


Col. John Akers,

commander of ADT V,

and Col. Mike Fortune,

commander of ADT IV,

participate in a combined

ADT campaign planning

workshop at Forward

Operating Base Fenty on

January 28.

P A G E 6

Afghanistan’s agriculture

development.

The MAIL’s PSDD has

been in existence for a little

over two years. Since its

establishment, however, the

PSDD has done little relating

to the development of the

private sector. A new director

will soon be appointed for the

PSDD and will begin

development of a department

strategy and business plan. A

timeline has not been

established for this goal but

hopefully it will not take long.

A f g h a n i s t a n ’ s r u r a l

population has traditionally

relied upon subsistence or

small scale agriculture for

their existence. There are a

few centers of economic

development, and few

investors venture far from the

major urban centers.

Based upon experiences in

other devastated countries,

attempting to encourage

growth and development

through either indigenous

farm development or large

scale investment into the

whole country, will not work.

In order to be successful,

private sector development

must support provincial and

district authorities, farmer

associations and private

agribusinesses.

Provincial DAIL offices

should be empowered to foster

economic growth within the


V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

Private sector policy development

ISO-9000 certification

now enables raisin export to

the United States and

quality control labs have

been established in major

cities.

T h e M A I L h a s

established an Afghanistan

L a n d A u t h o r i t y t o

streamline and simplify

private access to land; an

Agriculture Development

Fund to ensure private

sector access to agriculture

and livestock credit; a

Policy Analysis and Legal

Advisory Department to

promote an improved legal

and policy framework that

includes tax incentives,

standardization and quality

control; and a Private Sector

Development Department

(PSDD) to coordinate

private sector development

a c r o s s a l l M A I L

departments.

Future plans for private

sector growth include

establishing Free Trade

Zones and an International

Food Center for packaging

a n d w h o l e - s e l l i n g

agriculture produce; and

attaining international

sanitary and phyto-sanitary

standards to ease access to

global markets.

Funding limitations to

support major programs and

a lack of marketing

expertise remain two major

c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g

Funding

limitations to

support major

programs and

a lack of

marketing

expertise

remain two

major

challenges

facing

Afghanistan’s

agriculture

development.

T h e A f g h a n i s t a n

M i n i s t r y o f

Agriculture, Irrigation and

Livestock recognizes the

need to create and

implement economic

policies to foster the

development of the private

a g r i b u s i n e s s s e c t o r

throughout Afghanistan.

However, it currently

lacks either the resources

or knowledge base to

create, implement and

enforce those policies.

Despite nearly ten years of

U . S . g o v e r n m e n t

i n v o l v e m e n t i n

Afghanistan and a heavy

influx of USG capital into

the country, much remains

to be done to foster the

development of a vibrant,

organic and functional

private agribusiness sector.

T h e M A I L ’ s

agribusiness development

vision is for private sector-

d r i v e n a g r i c u l t u r e

development that is world

famous for quality and

competitive products. In

the last two years, the

MAIL has made significant

a c h i e v e m e n t s i n

developing that vision.

In October 2010, the

MAIL convened an

international AgFair to

encourage international

investors.

By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg


private agribusiness sector by

removing barr ier s for

improved and alternative

crops, supporting private

sector and farmer associations,

establishing a provincial

agricultural identity, and

maximizing local resources.

However, this change

requires reformulating the

current governmental structure

and will take time.

In his September, 2005,

“Potential Analysis of the

Eastern Region and Nangarhar

Province, Implications in

Regional Planning,” prepared

by the Citizens Network for

Foreign Affairs, Raphy Favre

suggested creating a small

national office in Kabul to

oversee the identification of

pilot provinces and training to

e n c o u r a g e e c o n o m i c

development at the provincial

and district levels.

The office would report to

a National Supervisory Board

with representation of the key

Afghan ministries as well as

national representatives of

farmer associations and the

Chamber of Commerce. To

be effective, the national

office also needs to be

mirrored at the provincial

level.

Establishing these Regional

Agricultural Growth and

Development Agencies could

be a viable model to

encourage foreign and

domestic investment in fruit,

vegetables, flowers and other

agricultural products and aid

in stabilising the security

situation.

In addition they could

become centers for irrigation,

cultivation and processing

technology.

I m p r o v i n g t h e

Agriculture Extension Agents

technical skill sets through

ADT’s Leadership Training

Academy will provide the

Nangarhar DAIL a solid

foundation to use for

i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r e

production in Nangarhar.

C o m b i n i n g i m p r o v e d

technical skills for AEAs and

increased production by

farmers creates the foundation

for Regional Agricultural

Growth and Development

Agencies. Unless the AEA

skill sets are improved, either

before or concurrently with

the establishment of regional

agriculture growth and

development agencies, Afghan

farmers will be unable to fully

exploit the opportunities these

regional organizations would

provide.

Successful economic

reforms will require multiple

efforts across the economic

spectrum. As economic

reforms are enacted, the

Afghan government, local

business communities and

partner organizations must

communicate those reforms

across the economic spectrum

to ensure they are understood

by all participants.

Provincial Development

Councils must develop

“bankable” agr icul tural

projects with support from

government and international

donors. PDCs must also

provide feedback to policy

makers in Kabul on the impact

of economic policy at the

regional and provincial level

ADT IV’s efforts to

develop the professional

planning and execution

capacity of the Nangarhar

DAIL will help ensure that

agriculture projects presented

to the PDC are sustainable and

provide value added programs

for local farmers.

Farmer organizations,

farmers, small holders and

processors must be

provided support

for crop, product

a n d p r o c e s s

development.

Provinces need

to be promoted as

v i a b l e a n d

sustainable places

to live and do

business through

exhibitions and specialized

events. These exhibitions and

events can promote the

strength of the province’s

existing agricultural business

sectors and disseminate

information. The primary

objectives of the RAGD

facilities will be to drive

sustainable agricultural

economic growth and

development at the provincial

level, stimulate agricultural

economic development in

targeted regions through the

dissemination of agricultural

policy, engagement in

agricultural growth and



V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 7



A farmer

examines a

sample of seed on

display at a booth

set up as part of

the DAIL

sponsored

Agriculture

Exhibition at the

Governor’s

Compound on

Mar. 21. This was

the first time an

agriculture

exhibition was

held during the

Farmers Day

celebration which

is a traditional

event held in

conjunction with

the Afghan New

Year.

development policy formulation

t h r o u g h f e e d b a c k f r o m

stakeholders in the region, and the

promotion of national and regional

policies to ensure that the private

sector benefits from a consistent

and effective policy framework.

Even if these challenges are

overcome, the development of a

vibrant private sector economy will

be extremely difficult to establish

in Nangarhar without infrastructure

development.

I n 2 0 0 5 , C F N A

described the road network

i n N a n g a r h a r a s

“deplorable.” With U.S.

funding the road network

has since improved, but

there is insufficient

information to determine

the measurable effects of

those road projects.

I n a d d i t i o n t o

infrastructure challenges,

Nangarhar’s limited land

availability limits the

province’s agriculture

potential.

With 145,280 hectares of arable

land, the eastern region of

Afghanistan, including Nangarhar

Province, is not a main agriculture

production area and only represents

6% of the permanently irrigated

land and 3% of the intermittently

irrigated land. Water availability is

a constant constraint resulting in

the predominance of annual

cropping.

The eastern region only

produces 5% of the national wheat

production. Rice and maize

production are more significant at

16% and 15% respectively. The

rice crop is used mainly for local

consumption, while maize is used

for both personal consumption or

as animal fodder.

While fruit production in the

eastern region of Afghanistan is

currently limited, it has a vast

potential. CNFA estimates that the

annual cash flow of productive

orchards in Nangarhar could be

over $2,000 USD per hectare.

Jalalabad lacks a wholesale

agriculture market because, except

f o r o k r a wh i ch r e q u i r e s

Nangarhar’s warmer climate to

perform well, fruit, cereal and

vegetable production is limited.

Vegetables grown in Nangarhar are

transported directly to Pakistan

from farmer’s fields.

Two windows of opportunity

for vegetable production exist in

Nangarhar. The first is the few

weeks between the end of Pakistan

production and before the Afghan

highlands enter production.

The second window of

opportunity is winter vegetable

production before the beginning of

Pakistan production. These narrow

windows of opportunity explain the

low vegetable production levels in

Nangarhar. Farmers and traders

understand this counter-season

opportunity and have proven to be

fast in responding to market

signals.

Continuation of this economic

practice does not require major

publ ic support for future

development as most

farmers can afford to invest

in annual crops, including

vegetables.

The eastern region

produces significant cotton

and clover crops. With

35% of the country’s cotton

production, the eastern

region offers opportunities

for small scale basic

processing plants.

The high level of clover

production reflects the

fairly good livestock and

dairy sector in Nangarhar.

The eastern region also has

the highest number of cows

per family in Afghanistan.

However, the high summer

temperature in Nangarhar requires

a well operated cold chain, with

higher costs and technical

difficulties, to establish a

productive dairy industry and there

is no current initiative to support

increased dairy production or

processing.

Despi te these his tor ical

limitations, Nangarhar province has

the potential to develop a



V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 8



A vendor advertises locally produced honey and the banner in

the background says “Home products are the pride of Afghani-

stan” at the Farmers Day Agriculture Exhibition held March 21.(Photo by Scottie McCord, Public Affairs, Nangarhar PRT)

P A G E 9

I t i s n o w

approaching fifteen

months since I first

s t e p p e d o n t o

Afghan soil.

In this time, I have

experienced many things

strange and new, as well

a s m a n y t h i n g s

surprisingly familiar.

A m e r i c a n

involvement is entering

i ts ' 10th year in this

country. I have been

personally responsible

for the monitoring and

administration of our

national treasure (your

tax dollars) and have

experienced the tragic

loss of f riends, both

military and civilian. Life

goes on for the United

States and Afghanistan.

Our confluence in

world history at this point

in time is borne out of a

he inous v io l ent ac t .

However , as h i s tory

judges either of us, it is

obvious we will affect

each other’s culture as a

result of this experience.

The expression, “One

of the few constants in

life is change” applies

here as well.

I have been here long

enough to see an entire

c r o p p i n g c y c l e i n

Afghanistan's Nangarhar

Valley. It is amazing the

var iety of crops and

vegetables grown in this

par t of t he count ry .

N e v e r h a v i n g l i v e d

where double and even

t r i p l e c r o p p i n g i s

practiced, it is a learning

experience to see the

abundance of produce

grown.

I have been here long

enough to s ee th ree

rotations of Provincial

Reconstruction Team

Soldiers and Airmen, two

r o t a t i o n s o f t h e

A g r i b u s i n e s s

D e v e l o p m e n t T e a m

National Guard units

from Missouri, and two

ro ta t i ons of Speci a l

T r o o p s B a t t a l i o n

Soldiers.

I t p robably i s the

i n t e n s i t y o f o u r

Afghanistan experience

t h a t m a k e s o u r

friendships stronger and

b o n d s s o f i r m .

Sometimes, we get so

wound up in what we are

doing, we lose sight of

the fact that this is but a

way station in life for all

of us serving here.

E a r t h q u a k e s a n d

indirect fire are also a

way of life here. We have

h a d a t l e a s t s i x

earthquakes since my

arrival. Fortunately, their

epicenters have always

been far away and we

have only felt 'slight'

t remors. Our B-Huts

wiggle with the earth

during an earthquake,

dampening the effect.

T h o s e i n b r i c k a n d

mortar structures usually

feel less, but have to

worry about collapse.

Indirect fire, which

includes rockets and

m o r t a r s , i s f a i r l y

i n f r e q u e n t b u t

u n f o r g e t t a b l e . I t i s

amazing how sound and

vibration transfer though

the soil to your bed and

wake you up. During this

type of event, we B-Hut

residents have to don our

helmets and body armor

and get into a bunker or

'hardened' structure.

My former roommate

and I had this down to 45

seconds. There was the

time he had to remind me

to put on my pants, and

that added a few seconds

to our timeline.

As someone who can

now claim 'hands-on'

agricultural experience


By George Roemer, USAID

Guest Contributor


George Roemer, USAID, and Staff Sgt. William Fox, ADT hydrologist, work together with the local village to evaluate the measures necessary to increase the agriculture productivity at Shinwar.

A amongst Muleskinners

P A G E 1 0 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0

on four continents and over

h a l f a d o ze n d i f f e r e n t

countries, it is interesting to

make some comparisons;

1 . F a r m e r s a r e

farmers, whether American,

E u r o p e a n , A f r i c a n o r

Afghan. All engage in hard

physical labor, are generally

unappreciated, even looked

down upon by their non-farm

neighbors, and view their

respective governments with

some amount of disdain.

They are al so the most

genuine, friendly and honest

people one will meet on any

continent, in any country.

2. Livestock are a

universal source of wealth,

pride and burden. From the

nomadic Masai of Africa, the

p a s t o r a l K u c h i o f

Afghanistan, to the free stalls

and feedlots of America,

various species of livestock

represent their keepers '

investment and potential

income. These animals also

require considerable labor

and resources to make them

profitable production units.

A n i m a l h u s b a n d r y i s

practiced to different degrees

of success around the world,

being dependent on feed,

water, veterinary care and

managerial skills.

3. Crops and soil

management are the basis of

all agriculture, anywhere it is

practiced. Wheat is the most

universally important crop,

followed closely by corn and

rice. Conservation practices

(or lack thereof) significantly

(Continued from page 9) affect the productivity of the

land. Keeping topsoil on the

hillsides is the single most

d i f f i c u l t c h a l l e n g e t o

agriculture anywhere.

As an 'adviser ' to the

Missouri ADT, I am able to

g e t i n v o l v e d i n s o m e

agricultural projects and

programs, give advice (it's

f r e e ) a n d h a v e b e e n

graciously allowed on many

ADT missions.

I have written curriculum

and learning objectives for

c l a s ses on agr i cu l t u r a l

mechanics and cooperative

associat ions. I am even

p l a n n i n g t o t e a c h a

cooperatives class to Afghan

agriculture extension agents.

The ADT is in the process

o f bui ld ing agr icul tur e

i n f o r ma t i o n c e n t e r s i n

Nangarhar's district centers.

It is becoming an accepted

opinion that agricul ture

extension is the single best

way to br ing improved

management techniques to

Afghanistan's farmers.

He l p i n g e du c a t e t h e

current extension agents is an

i mp o r t a n t s t e p i n t h i s

direction. Giving them a base

of operation is another. It is

somewhat amazing what a

hard sell this is to the non-

agriculturally-oriented in

m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n

command. Even in a place

where agriculture employs

80% of the populat ion ,

getting respect is difficult.

T h i s f a c e t o f a c e

engagement is, I believe, key

to whatever success we may

have in this country. My

ADT friends have had to

hear me say too many times,

“A country cannot have an

industrial revolution until it

h a s a n a g r i c u l t u r a l

revolution.” At least the

ADT guys nod their heads in

agreement before rolling

t h e i r e y e s . M y n o n -

agricultural colleagues just

roll their eyes.

It is the human element in

the Afghan enigma that is

m o s t c o m p e l l i n g t o

contemplate. Whether on or

off the FOB, we see a wide

v a r i e t y o f p e o p l e a n d

motivations. It is easy to get

negative feelings about this

country and its people. There

are those who want to do we

expatriates physical harm;

others who see us as the last

in a long line of invaders

with our own selfish motives

for being here; still others

who are trying to capitalize

on our generosity for their

own gain.

Yet for every one of those

negative elements there are, I

wou ld argue , a gr ea te r

number of positives.

For example, during my

vis i ts to farmers in the

surrounding area while on

mission with the ADT, I have

had some amazing exchanges

and conversations. Afghan

f a r me r s t a l k a bo u t t h e

w e a t h e r , c r o p s a n d

government agricultural

programs. Sound familiar?

We also found out there

a r e c u s t o m p e s t i c i d e



“A country

cannot have

an

industrial

revolution

until it has

an

agricultural

revolution.”

George Roemer stands on

the edge of a cornfield with

Staff Sgt. Eli Colson that

doesn’t look much different

from farmer’s fields in the

U.S. Roemer say, “Farmers

are farmers…”


P A G E 1 1 V O L U M E 1 , I S S U E 1

applicators in Afghanistan!

Of c o u r s e , t h e c u s t om

operator we met uses a three

ga l l o n h a n d p u mp a n d

something from a bottle we

couldn't read, but his area's

farmers (“between those two

mountains” he pointed out)

depend upon his services for

crop protection.

Another example is the

young Afghans who have

returned from abroad to help

their fellow Afghans. They

f requent ly come to our

office, sometimes looking for

advice but almost always

looking for funding to assist

t h e i r c o u n t r y m e n i n

rehabilitating watersheds,

improving irrigation systems

or training farmers on better

agriculture practices.

Two instances stand out; a

pair of young Afghan born

men living in Norway came

to us looking for advice on

building a school in their

home village. Another young

Afghan man called me from

San Diego, then had his

brother stop in for a visit to

also ask about building a

school in their home village.

There is a large group of

younger Afghans (mostly

men) that we see at meetings

who are patiently waiting

their turn for authority. Many

of them are graduates of

Nangarhar University here in

Jalalabad.

I t i s a m a z i n g h o w

adaptable we humans are to

an array of circumstances.

(Continued from page 10) Soldiers and civilians here

alike take our environment in

stride and attend to their

respective tasks. The military

e l emen t he re i s h i gh ly

professional and does an

excellent job of keeping us

safe, both on the base and on

miss ions . The c ivi l i ans

include support staff who

c o o k a n d m a i n t a i n

equipment, as well as those

o f u s w h o s u p e r v i s e

development . We of ten

become good friends and

respect each other’s work.

Part of the next step in the

Afghan strategy is to have

even more c ivi l i an and

military presence in what are

called, 'Key Terrain Districts'

or KTDs. The idea is to focus

development strategy in

a r e a s w i t h l a r g e r

concentrations of people

(most are farmers), and along

c r i t i c a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

corridors.

M y p o s t i s n o w i n

Shinwar District, as part of a

designated District Support

T eam. I a m l i v in g and

working out of Forward

Operating Base Shinwar.

M o s t o f t h i s a n d t h e

surrounding districts are

agr i cul tu r a l . My ma jo r

responsibility will be to work

with farmers, agriculture

extension agents, and farmer

associations (cooperatives) in

Shinwar and neighboring

KTDs.

I bring to our team almost

a year's worth of experience

w i t h p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l

programs, as well as an

agricultural background. This

will help give some guidance

and technical knowledge to

what we do.

We in agriculture know

better than most about not

stopping until 'the job is

done'. The job is far from

done here in Afghanistan. I

point out that production

agriculture is not just a

lifestyle but a business as

wel l , even i f i t may be

subsistence. It is critical to

economic development in

Afghanistan.

It is my experience that all

farmers recognize the need to

u p d a t e a n d i n n o v a t e ,

regardless of country or

continent. Based on what I

have seen, Afghan farmers

are no different than those

with whom I have interacted

in any other country.

O n e o f t h e m o s t

productive efforts here, in

my opinion, is the Missouri

ADT's focus on training

agriculture extension agents.

This includes their efforts in

bui ld ing and equipping

agr icul ture informat ion

centers in each of Nangarhar

Province's district centers.

These agents will represent

t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f

Afghanistan at the most

f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l o f

development. It is rewarding

to be advising and assisting

these f ine Soldiers and

Airmen in this endeavor.

Afghanistan's agricultural

revolution is somewhere in

the future. Hopefully our

efforts here will help it begin.

“The job is far

from done

here in

Afghanistan. I

point out that

Agriculture is

not just a

lifestyle but a

business as

well, even if it

may be

subsistence. It

is critical to

economic

development

in

Afghanistan.”



P A G E 1 2

Creating agriculture opportunities for women

One of the greatest

challenges to

t h e A g r i - b u s i n e s s

Development Team is the

creation of agriculture

related opportunities for

women.

A b i g h u r d l e i n

Nangarhar Province, and

l i k e l y m u c h o f

A f g h a n i s t a n , i s t h e

i m p o r t a n c e M u s l i m

society places on men

and the status of each

within their social circles.

This pattern is ingrained

in each boy from the day

they are born.

To understand how

the ADT can increase

opportunities for women,

one must understand the

basics of Afghan norms

and values. From this

basis, the ADT can work

w i t h i n t h e l i m i t i n g

f a c t o r s t o d e v e l o p

p r o g r a m s w h i c h

empower women but yet

s t a y w i t h i n t h e

framework of the male

dominated society.

For a person from

Western society, the

culture of Afghanistan

can be a bit shocking.

More than once we have

seen the difference in

status of women in the

Pashto culture. Women

a r e t y p i c a l l y f u l l y

covered with a burka or

hejab after the age of 15.

T h e b u r k a i s a

complete one piece dress

which covers the person

from the top of the head

to her feet. The hejab is

a f u l l l e n g t h d r e s s

w i t h o u t t h e h e a d

covering but is typically

worn with a scarf to

cover the head and face.

A c c o r d i n g t o

traditional society, only

the husband is allowed to

see his wife uncovered.

Modern laws do not

enforce the wearing of a

burka or hejab but the

cul ture p laces a b ig

importance on preserving

family honor and status is

d i r e c t l y t i e d t o t h e

protection of women’s

honor.

D u r i n g mi s s i o n s ,

w o m e n w i l l a v o i d

contact with Soldiers.

This includes squatting

down and placing their

b a c k t o w a r d s u s o r

moving indoors out of

sight. A major taboo is

for a Soldier to attempt to

engage a woman directly

in conversation. The

woman may be beaten or

p o s s i b l y k i l l e d ,

depending on the area of

Nangarhar Province, as

t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n i s

shameful for the husband

or the male relatives of

that woman.

I n s o m e o f t h e

outlying areas of the

province, the farmer's

animals seem to have a

greater importance than

the women and children.

We have seen animals

being transported inside a

vehicle while the women

and children were riding

in the trunk of the car.

T h e d i s p a r i t y o f

education between males

and females has been

we l l d ocu me nte d i n

Afghanistan. Currently,

of the over six million

students in Afghanistan,

35 percent of them are

girls. During the reign of

the Taliban, women were

not al lowed to go to

school.

Typically today, rural

villages allow their girls

to attend school through

th e s ix t h o r e i gh th ,

depending on the district.

Tribal norms influence

education.

The more progressive

and developed areas,

such as Behsood and

Kama districts, see more

women completing high

school and some are

allowed to attend college.

In t h e mo r e r e s t i ve

d i s t r i c t s , s u c h a s

Khogyani and Hesarak,

girls are not allowed to

complete more than a

few grade levels if they

a r e a l l o w e d a t a l l .

Education is power and

power is controlled as

much as possible with

some tribes by limiting

education largely to the

males.


A Soldier speaks

to a promoter of

the Development

Association for

Afghanistan which

trains and hires

women to process

and can fruits and

vegetables.

M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

By Sgt. 1st Class Earl Eisenbacher

Photo by Scottie McCord, Public

Affairs, Nangarhar PRT


P A G E 1 3 V O L U M E 1 , I S S U E 1

S o w h a t i s t h e

involvement of women in

agriculture? On most farms,

they play as vital of a role as

the husband. Their labor

i n p u t s t o t he f a r m a r e

sometimes as great as the

ma n ' s . T h e wo ma n i s

charged with maintaining the

home and responsible for

c o o k i n g f o o d , r a i s i n g

chi ldren and car ing for

livestock. The men tend to

the field crops and take on

daily labor outside of the

farm when avai lable to

s u p p l e me n t t h e f a mi l y

income.

The women also help with

duties in other relatives'

homes when possible, as well

as assist men with planting,

weeding and harvest ing

when extra labor is needed

for a short period of time to

complete critical farming

tasks.

Women are typically in

charge of tending the farm

livestock. This includes

chickens, turkeys, goats,

s h e e p a n d c a t t l e . A l l

l ivestock are grown for

family consumption first and

then, if extra animals are

available, they are sold off.

T here seems to be a

division of thought with

marketing excess products

with farmers. Some farmers

we have interviewed viewed

selling excess production as

rather selfish, the farmer

(Continued from page 12) should take care of his

relatives in his village with

his bountiful harvest before

s e l l i n g i t f o r h i s o w n

personal gain.

Obviously, that is not

always the case as a trip

through any district will

reveal markets bloated with

the current vegetable crop.

Multiple butchers are also

typical in any given market;

the product has to come from

somewhere and the nearby

farms are usually the source.

Women are able to make

a contribution to the farm

income from the products

provided by their tended

animals. Chicken meat;

eggs; milk from goats, sheep

and cows; as well as yogurt

and cheese made from excess

mi l k a r e s o l d t o l o c a l

v i l l a ge r s a n d ma r ke t s .

Bartering is important for

farm economics; trading of

production goods is made to

access needed commodities.

F o r t h e A D T t o

implement a sustainable

woman's initiative, it has to

fall within the norms of

society and the accepted farm

life. The ADT can increase

w o m e n a g r i c u l t u r e

opportunities by focusing on

their responsibilities on the

farm. Specifically, poultry

training has been the first

step for the Missouri ADT.

The first hurdle the ADT

overcame was answering the

question “How do we teach

women about poultry?”.

Men are not usually allowed

to have direct contact with

women. The Kentucky ADT

overcame this by hiring an

Afghan company to conduct

t r a in ing wi th a woman

trainer.

We have adopted this

p r ac t ice and h i r ed Mr .

Mohammad Sultani with the

Agency for Building a New

Afghanistan to conduct

poultry training using his

female instructors.

The t raining program

included two days of training

conducted by a female trainer

from ABNA. Additionally,

the Nangarhar Department of

Agriculture, Irrigation and

Livestock has a female

master trainer who sat in on

the training as well.

The first program was

initiated in Qalah-ya Atek

village, Kuz Kunar district in

early February.

T h e p r o g r a m w a s

designed to train 25 poor,

widowed or disadvantaged

women from the village how

to raise and manage chickens

for meat and egg production.

In addition to the training,

each woman received nine

hens, a rooster, a feeder, a

waterer and two months

worth of feed. The chickens

were six months old and

r e a d y t o l a y e g g s

immediately.

The ADT was not present

for the t raining but the


“Women are

able to make a

contribution to

the farm

income from

the products

provided by

their tended

animals.”


P A G E 1 4


ABNA later provided

photographs of the two-

day session. The District

Agriculture Extension

Agent, Mr. Mohammad

Zarif, was present and his

role was to oversee the

project.

Involvement of the

D i s t r i c t A E A w a s

important because it put

the face of GIRoA on the

project and enabled the

villagers to see a direct

b e n e f i t f r o m t h e i r

government. In this way,

the training contributed

t o t h e A D T ’ s


efforts.

The next obstacle to

overcome was the ability

of the ADT to check the

status of the project at a

later date to see if the

women who received the

training were actually

sustaining their poultry

operation. Because the

(Continued from page 13) ADT Ag Section is all-

male and because all

of our interpreters

are also men, making

an unannounced visit

t o t h e v i l l a g e

required additional

p l a n n i n g n o t

typically required for

other Ag missions.

To resolve this

problem, a female

Soldier was selected

from the security

forces platoon to

conduct a key leader

engagement with the

t r a i n e d w o m e n .

Spec. Virginia Fletcher

was up to the task and

she was given a list of

quest ions to ask the

g r o u p o f w o m e n

i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e

training program. Also, a

female interpreter was

requested from the PRT

unit on FOB Finley-

Shields to accompany the

Ag Team to the village.

Once on s i t e , the

district AEA arranged a

meeting place for the

women, Fletcher and the

female interpreter.

Fletcher reported the

women were excited to

h a v e r e c e i v e d t h e

training and had taken

necessary steps to make

the program sustainable.

They had organized

themselves into what

resembled a farmer’s

cooperative association

by consol idat ing the

housing area for about

t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e

chickens. This eased

securing and maintaining

the flock.

T h e e g g s w e r e

collected daily and taken

to the Jalalabad markets

by a local villager. He

r e t u r n e d t h e mo n e y

earned from egg sales to

the women. Some of the

e g g s h a d a l s o b e e n

col lected and placed

under broody hens to be

hatched, to add to the

future flock.

An agreement had

been set up with a local

farmer to provide grain

for future feed needs.

Finally, training of

additional women in the

village had been done by

some of the elder women

on their own accord. The

village has seen a direct

and tangible benefit from

the training program. It

appears the women can

appreciate the future

possibilities with the

s i mpl e p r o vi s i on o f

agriculture education and

a few materials.

T h e l o n g t e r m

sustainabi l i ty of the

project has yet to be

determined but from the

outside, it appears the

t ra ined women have

made the most of their

opportunity to start a

small business.


M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

Spec. Virginia

Fletcher stands

with recent

graduates of a

poultry course

the Nangarhar

ADT

sponsored in

Kuz Kunar.


The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have

questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at [email protected]

The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness

Development Team IV to provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers and Airmen, their

Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not

necessarily those of the Department of the Army or DOD.

MONG

ADT IV Contact Information

The ADT will continue periodic assessments of the

project to determine if additional adjustments are

needed or if other information is essential for long term

sustainability.

A reasonable goal would be for the DAIL female

master trainer to continue poultry training throughout

Nangarhar with the assistance of local women

previously enrolled in the program. Their first hand

experience would be an invaluable part of training

other women. This process would not only be

empowering for women but an added value to each

farm community.

Additional opportunities exist for women in

agriculture. The ABNA offers training for bee

keeping, carpet weaving, and goat rearing also. Other

economic opportunities are available through home

canning and juicing businesses and maintenance of

greenhouses.

The largest stumbling block for an outsider is to

recognize the importance of society norms and values

in Afghanistan. Agriculture programs can empower

women but to be successful, they have to be within the

acceptable cultural range of responsibilities. Taking

small steps forward will ensure no major setbacks will

occur in the progress of Afghan female agriculturists.


V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 1 5


significant agribusiness sector. A thorough and

comprehensive agri-market analysis can determine

what infrastructure and market improvements will have

an immediate and direct positive impact on agri-

business sector. ADT IV has begun to analyze the agri-

business market situation to determine the scope and

extent of agri-business activity throughout Nangarhar.

That analysis will provide an information transition to

ADT V that allows them to develop a focused plan to

improve agriculture markets.

Establishing Regional Agricultural Growth and

Development facilities in Afghanistan will be

challenging and will require the support of MAIL,

Provincial Governors, Provincial Development

Councils and donors. In order to be successful private

agribusiness sector development must be championed

by the key ministries – MAIL, MRRD, Ministry of

Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Finance and the

Ministry of Economy.

On the provincial level ADT IV will allocate

approximately ten percent of its time during its fourth

phase focusing on economics by enhancing the value

chain for Agribusiness in Nangarhar.

This will be done by linking businesses with other

businesses, individuals, cooperatives, non-

governmental organizations, and Government Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan officials to further their

economic opportunities; better coalition forces, GIRoA,

and private sector knowledge of such opportunities;

and help encourage sustainable private sector growth.



Documents

Muleskinner Report Vol. 4 Issue 10