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    Binay VS Domingo

    Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its

    Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or

    ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500 to a

    bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated availablefunds existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission

    approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary

    certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the implementation of the

    program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in

    audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners

    reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between

    the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general

    welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only

    benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public

    purposes.Issue:WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of

    the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the

    general welfare clause\

    Held:Yes

    Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent

    attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is

    founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and

    "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the

    general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations).

    Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be

    a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the

    repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of

    police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the

    mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general

    rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair

    intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give

    effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powerson public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do

    the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety

    of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the

    general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority

    to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be

    necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred

    upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for

    the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,

    improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of

    the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection

    of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local

    government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those

    necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper

    for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance

    prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local

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    government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the

    inhabitants therein."

    Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the

    health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general

    welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable ofpowers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the

    government.

    The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said

    to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the

    real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience

    as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great

    public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost

    every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of

    subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects thepeace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it

    is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which

    exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by

    promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything

    worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the

    corporation.

    Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which

    shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

    COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is notunconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited

    number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor

    General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards

    state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the

    general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity

    and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally

    recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an

    accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common

    good.There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying

    paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified.

    Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts

    of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the

    paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to

    the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the

    soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

    Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the

    Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our

    government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a

    relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a

    family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be

    financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very

    words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in

    life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken

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    as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to

    embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives

    political or otherwise.

    Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by

    themunicipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of

    the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee

    was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its

    investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the

    warehouseof the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties

    of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed

    by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a

    public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.

    According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse wasconstructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting

    the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in

    the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of

    200 meters from saidblock of houses to avoid loss of lives and

    properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends

    that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

    Issues:

    (1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the

    meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

    (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of

    the Municipalityof Virac is unconstitutional and void.

    Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is

    anuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the

    same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of

    Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the

    criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the

    Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must

    not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate

    trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must

    not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the

    loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial

    obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

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    Macasiano vs. Diokno

    Levy D. Macasiano vs. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno

    G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

    Medialdea, J.:

    Doctrine: Properties of the local government which are devoted to

    public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of

    Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to

    control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority

    is vested upon them by Congress.

    Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance

    No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G.

    Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at

    Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea

    market thereon, pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,

    authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal

    streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for

    flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions..On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a

    resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter

    into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment,

    operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or

    vending areas.

    On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a

    service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall

    operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned

    streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal

    government of Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by

    respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

    On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP

    Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the

    destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in

    Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.

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    Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the

    municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public

    streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

    Held: No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of

    public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea market is invalid.

    Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,

    consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains,

    public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for

    by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed

    by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,

    without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

    Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia

    Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and

    are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality.

    Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service

    are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.

    Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control orregulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested

    upon them by Congress.

    Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has

    the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly

    implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the

    Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent

    municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of

    the ordinance.

    Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are

    congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the

    proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the

    establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.

    Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in

    solving the problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local

    government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid

    down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover,

    the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount

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    considerations of health and well-being of the members of the

    community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to

    enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and

    convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general

    prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,

    the local government should refrain from acting towards that which

    might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.

    Parayno vs Jovellanos

    G.R. No. 148408

    Subject: Public Corporation

    Doctrine: Police power

    Facts:

    Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,

    Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the

    Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer

    of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the

    Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the

    Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the

    Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer

    of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it

    declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and

    disregard of existing law.

    According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation

    of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest

    school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the

    distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as

    witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff,

    Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area

    with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other

    which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3)

    residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of

    gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to

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    expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.

    Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was

    denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the

    gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned

    law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA.

    Hence this appeal.

    ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling

    station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the

    latters police powers

    HELD:

    The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the

    gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted

    that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling

    station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as

    a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said

    official zoning code;

    The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the

    municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and

    definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance,

    respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under

    Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section

    21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not

    automatically embrace those in a gas filling station.

    As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality

    invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of

    petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to

    take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general

    welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law

    and the rights of petitioner.A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police

    powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of

    the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,

    require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are

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    reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be

    accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers

    to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause

    of the Constitution.

    Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause

    when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline

    filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest

    public school and church, the records do not show that it even

    attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance

    was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of

    Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality

    tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement

    either.

    Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance

    which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of

    exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without

    judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas

    station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of

    persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred

    summarily to another location.

    On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and

    properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is

    inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property

    is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station

    Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic)

    all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the

    complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly

    populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB]

    staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designatedBusiness/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.

    WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution

    of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent

    Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from

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    enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to

    close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

    TANO v. SOCRATESFacts:The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing

    the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinanc e No. 15-92 ent it led:

    "

    AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND

    LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1,

    1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND

    FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring

    any person engaged or intending to engage in

    an y busines s,trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his

    possession any of the articles for which a permit isrequired to be had, to

    obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct

    necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being

    shipped out from Puerto Princesa

    and,( 3 ) R e s o l u t i o n N o . 3 3 , O r d i n a n c e N o . 2 e n t i t l

    e d : " A R E S O L U T I O N P R O H I B I T I N G T H E CATCHING, G

    ATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT O

    F LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMST h e

    p e t i t i o n e r s

    c o n t e n d t h a t t h e s a i d O r d i n a n c e s d e p r i v e d t h e m o f d ue p r o c e s s o f l a w , t h e i r livelihood, and unduly restricted them

    from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XIIand

    Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the

    Mayor had the absolute authorityto determine whether or not to issue

    the permit.They also claim that it took away their right to earn their

    livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar asthe Airline Shippers Association

    are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their

    vocationand ent ering "into contrac ts which are pro per,

    necessary, and e ssential to c arry out t heir busi nessendeavorsto a successful conclusionPub lic respondents Gover nor Soc rat es

    and Member s of t he Sangguni ang Pa nlalawig an of Palawan

    defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid

    exercise of the ProvincialGovernment's power under

    the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that

    ther e wa s no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses

    of the Constitution.

    Issue:

    Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional

    Held: NORatio:

    In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution

    enshrined in the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local

    government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),

    andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1)

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    (vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power, the

    validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16.

    General Welfare

    . Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly

    granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powersnecessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective

    governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the

    general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local

    government units shall ensure and support, amongother things, the

    preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,

    enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology

    , encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-

    reliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,

    enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full

    employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, andpreserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis

    supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two

    principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for

    the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of

    fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of

    Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction

    due to illegal fishing activities.

    It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan,the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniangpanlalawigan

    the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose

    appropriate

    penalt iesfor acts which endanger the environment such

    a s d y n a m i t e f i s h i n g a n d o t h e r f o r m s o f d e s t r u c t i v e fishi

    ng . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of

    eutrophication of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance."

    The petition is dismissed.

    Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044.January 27, 1995]

    16AUGPonente: PADILLA, J.

    FACTS:

    The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June

    1949 (R.A. No. 409).

    On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring

    the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games

    and Amusements Board (GAB).

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    On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila

    nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance

    Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated

    Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-

    Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions AndFor Other Purposes.

    On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then

    President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and

    Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or

    Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And

    Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of

    Gambling,in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing

    franchises and permits issued by local governments.In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate

    a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board

    intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly

    revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling

    facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the

    constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-

    impairment clauses of the Constitution.

    HELD:

    NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

    RATIO:

    Presum pt ion against unc onst i tu t ional i ty . There is nothing on record to

    show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or

    amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the

    executive still exercised legislative powers).

    Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of

    ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was

    settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in

    said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying

    PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banchas that

    power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.

    And on the question of whether or not the government is estoppedfromcontesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is

    that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of

    its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA

    90)

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    MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village328 SCRA 836G.R. No. 135962March 27, 2000

    Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is aGovernment Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-AirVillage Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from thepetitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The saidopening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons andto regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic

    Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wallseparating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a

    preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that theMMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authorityto open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that canpractice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to publictraffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police

    power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, policepower may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a developmentauthority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercisepolice power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of thegovernment. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances,approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants ofManila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating withvarious national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmentalorganizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basicservices in the vast metropolitan area.Vicente De La Cruz vs EdgardoParason November 23, 2010

    Subject Shall Be Expressed in the TitlePolice Power Not Validly Exercise

    De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the

    constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure

    Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance

    violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance

    would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are

    healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras

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    however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing

    declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which

    reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS

    THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE ANDOPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR

    RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the

    prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare.

    De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

    ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,

    prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and

    the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses

    pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

    HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then

    regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass

    the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the

    general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as

    consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such

    a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under

    the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy

    and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass

    too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by

    overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained

    by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant

    to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not

    prohibit the business of cabarets.

    General Welfare Clause of the

    Local Government Code Sections

    5(c) & 16, Chapter 2, Title One,

    Book I of RA 7160Posted onJune 23, 2012byalbinoski2005

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    General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code

    Sections 5(c) & 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of RA 7160

    Section 5.Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the

    provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:

    X x x.

    (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be

    liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government

    units in accelerating economic development and upgrading

    the quality of life for the people in the community;

    Section 16.General Welfare. Every local government unit

    shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those

    necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,

    appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective

    governance, and those which are essential to the promotion

    of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial

    jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and

    support, among other things, the preservation and

    enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance

    the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and

    support the development of appropriate and self-reliant

    scientific and technological capabilities, improve public

    morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,

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