msu.edudwyer/8-Symbolic interaction and the... · Web viewSymbolic interaction and the capacity for institutional culture David Dwyer, Michigan State University [email protected]/14/08

Chapter 09Chapter 09

Symbolic interaction and the capacity for institutional cultureSymbolic interaction and the capacity for institutional culture

David Dwyer, Michigan State University [email protected]/14/08

1. The problem2. Symbolic interaction (referential signs, objectivations, grammar3. The foundations for institutions4. How symbolic interaction enables institutional culture5. How symbolic interaction enhances a complex self 6. The foundation for institutional culture (lower and upper Paleolithic developmets)7. Conclusions (not done)

AbstrctIn the Lower Paleolithic, which began roughly 2 million years ago we have evidence of increasingly complex tool manufacture, control of fire, human burial, and a vocal tract and brain that have been evolving to facilitate symbolic interaction. This paper examines these developments from a perspective of how symbolic interaction, as proposed by Mead (1934) and developed by Berger and Luckmann (1967) could have played a role in these developments. The paper proposes that referential signs developed during the Lower Paleolithic. However, these signs were used in paratactic (Dwyer 1986), sentences. This form of discourse, while not syntactic, did lead to two important developments: the capacity to negotiate agreements and a growing distinction between a public and private self. Because agreements represent a prototype of the cultural institution and because the public self is the aspect of the self to which institutional roles attach, these two developments provide the foundation upon which cultural institutions are built. To test this proposal, I compare the behavior of feral and signing apes with respect to their abilities to negotiate agreements and to the properties of the self. I conclude that symbolically interactive apes have a well developed process of negotiation and a clear distinction between their private and public self.

The Problem

Most of the work on the evolution of language fails to acknowledge the possibility of a paratactic (Dwyer 19861) stage in human development.2 The consequence of this failure is to expect that syntax appeared as soon as humans could use referential signs. This one-stage model gives rise to two conflicting statements.

a. Language must have developed during the Lower Paleolithic because this is the period when the vocal tract and the speech areas of the brain began evolving toward their current form.

b. Language must have begun during the Upper Paleolithic because this is when true cultural diversity as evidenced, by areal variation in ritual burial practice, cave art, and tool manufacture and style.3

This dilemma dissolves when the emergence of syntax is assigned to the Upper Paleolithic 1 I have expanded the ideas in Dwyer (1986) in a manuscript Dwyer (2008a) entitled, Paratax, syntax and case. 2 In Dwyer 2008a, I show that Bickerton’s (1990: 122-6) concept of “Protolanguage” is similar to paratax, but incompatible with it.

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12. Paratax and the capacity for culture

period that began, roughly 40 thousand years ago and the paratactic period assigned to the Lower and Middle Paleolithic. With this two stage model one can explain the development of the vocal tract and the speech areas of the brain as a response to the selective pressures imposed by increased use of paratactic communication and the development of the cultural diversity of the Upper Paleolithic to the development of syntax which in turn enabled institutional culture.

The positing of syntax as a major stimulus for institutional culture in the Upper Pleistocene raises the question of what was going on during the almost 2 million years of the Lower Paleolithic, the period of Homo Habilis and Homo Erectus. Let me suggest that Lower Pleistocene humans, in addition to using and manufacturing tools, developed referential signs, as opposed to instinctively-based gestures, and began communicating with paratactic sentences. In this paper, I propose, given this presumption to focus on the consequences of this development. I first show how the concept of symbolic interaction, the use of signs to interact with others (Mead 1934) can lead to a more complex self. I then show how, following Berger and Luckmann (1967), symbolic interaction in a face-to-face situation can lead to the foundation of institutional life.

To do this, I contrast the behavior of feral and signing apes, who engage one another symbolically, to see what differences symbolic interaction may have imposed upon signing apes.4 But in order to do this, I first need to elaborate the concepts of symbolic interaction and institutional culture.

Symbolic interaction

Symbolic interaction involves communicating with others using referential signs in a grammar that could be atactic, paratactic, or syntactic.

Referential signs

Following the work of (Mead 1934; Cassirer 1944; Keita 1997; and Dwyer and Moshi 2002), I divide lexical signs5 into two classes, expressive and referential. Cassirer characterized this distinction as one between signals and symbols. Signals evoke, according to Keita, an image or impression of a situation, whereas a referential sign describes properties of a situation.6

3 This development has sometimes been referred to as a “cultural explosion” which took place in the Upper Paleolithic. Davidson and Noble (1989:128) describe it as follows: “All lines of evidence point to the fundamental change in the Upper Paleolithic. In that period there is better evidence for pattern and design in stone tools, there are more regional variations in their pattern and design. There is unequivocal burial, including multiple burial and burial with unambiguous grave goods; there is evidence for practices which can only be understood as involving ritual; and ochre was clearly used for image making. In addition, there were major alternations to behavior across the transition (Renfrew 1987:683-944 This view is different though not necessarily incompatible with one proposed by Savage-Rumbaugh et al (nd) that cross fostering, that often accompanies the teaching of apes to sign is also responsible for their enhanced abilities.5 The terminology concerning signals, signs and symbols is used differently by each author. To maintain consistency, I do not use the word symbol. I use the term sign, following Saussure to consist of an arbitrary association of a meaning (signified) with a token (signifier). In contrast, I use the term signal following Cassirer to mean an intrinsic relationship between the signifier and the sign.6 According Melzer (1964), Mead contrasted the signal, which is associated with its meaning because “it is present at approximately the same time and place with that ‘something else, whereas a symbol is associated with a meaning “because its users have agreed to let it stand for that something else.” Thus in contrast to signals which are “directly and intrinsically linked with present or proximate situations”; signs, because they have arbitrary linkage between signifier and signified, instead of an intrinsic linkage, permit meanings that “transcend the immediate situation.” This transcendence of time, in addition to space, gives the referential sign a tremendous advantage over the signal.

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This is the same distinction that many draw between words and gestures. Signals tend to be emotional and words tend to be referential.7

Although expressives have an instinctive source, they can be controlled, but because of their instinctive source, they do have limitations to what they can refer, as Burling (1993) points out. For this reason, Burling further concludes that referential symbols could not have evolved from the control of expressive signals.

The great apes all have a capacity to learn referential signs, though due to limitations in their vocal apparatus, this capacity was discovered only after alternative means of sign representation were made available, e.g., American Sign Language and keyboards. Appendix A contains a partial listing of referential words that these apes have been reported to have learned.

In contrast to expressive signs, referential signs depict aspects of a situation under discussion such as things, activities and qualities. This is done by analyzing a situation and abstracting components of it and assigning them to individual words. Referential signs can be subclassified into different types according to their referents. Referential signs like cat and tree, as the name implies, have actual physical referents as do activities like go, come, and hit.8 Categorical signs, like tool, fruit, clothing, represent categories of referential signs. Abstract signs, of which there are many subtypes form a third class. One subclass includes qualities, such as red, good, sweet, abstracted from referential signs. Another subclass includes objects which are products of the imagination. The development of referential signs adds a new dimension to symbolic interaction because they provide a measure of specificity that expressives cannot.

Objectivation

The process of using referential and expressive signs, symbolic interaction, enables me to export my subjective thoughts and intentions into the public domain for others to apprehend. Referential signs, in contrast to gestural signals, allow others to better understand one’s subjectivity, that is, one’s intentions, knowledge and feelings. This process is termed objectivation, because it involves the production of objects and referential signs are a special kind of object. Intersubjectivity, the sharing of our subjectivities, gives rise to the awareness that we have common understandings about each other. The objectivation of expressive signs, a capacity, which is widely distributed in the animal kingdom, is especially effective in clarifying for others one’s feelings and intentions. We are not surprised when apes observe others to access their intentions and feelings. However, the potential for increasing this intersubjectivity is vastly increased by the use of referential, as opposed to expressive, signs because of the specificity of referential signs. Along with the awareness of our intersubjectivity comes the awareness that there are things that I do not want to share with you. This will lead me not to share fully my subjectivity and with this I compartmentalize myself into a public and a private component.

In addition to increasing intersubjectivity, objectivation enables the process of negotiation, a process which allows greater specificity in cooperative efforts and, as I show below, negotiation lays the foundation of institutional culture.

7 In addition to gestures, ideophones are also expressives which accompany analytic speech.8 Signing apes do not make a formal distinction between actions and things. The grammatical opposition between noun and verb is a property of syntax and not paratax (Dwyer 2008a).

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideophone


Both the development of the complex self and the capacity to negotiate leads to an even greater interest in what the other knows, including what the other knows about the self. This reflexive self consciousness leads to an increasingly awareness of the public and private self.

Grammar

In a paper entitled ‘What are chimpanzees telling us about language (Dwyer 1986), I established a formal distinction between paratax (a two-word grammar) and syntax and that with a few possible exceptions chimpanzees and other apes showed a capacity for paratax and not syntax. Paratactic grammars lack the power of syntax because they cannot assign specific case relationships, for example actor-action, object-action and modifier-head, to the constituent. Thus a paratactic sentence like BITE DOG could mean (1) that the dog bites, (2) that the dog is bitten or (3) a dog bite. This lack of case specificity also renders the strategy of nesting, so central in syntax, ineffective in paratax.

For example in a syntactic sentence like ‘I see you’ we see first that the ‘I’ is an agent and the action is the sentence ‘see you,’ which has been nested in the main sentence as shown in the diagram on the right. Were this a paratactic sentence we would not know whether the ‘I’ was associated with ‘see you’ or just ‘see.’ Because nesting does not add clarity to a paratactic sentence it is little used. Paratactic speakers prefer to break this concept down into two sentences such as ‘I see’ and ‘see you.’9

What is important here is that as soon as these apes learn to sign, they develop the capacity to sign paratactically. This is a capacity of all apes, including young humans. Only adult humans have shown the capacity for using syntax. The potential of symbolic interaction for developing intersubjectivity using referential signs syntactically is vastly greater than using them paratactically. Nevertheless the paratactic use of referential signs provides a greater potential for 1) negotiation, 2) intersubjectivity, 3) self consciousness and 4) a complex self than use of expressive signs alone. And while these abilities can develop through other activities such as shared experiences and through face-to-face interaction using gestures (non referential signs) these processes are nowhere near as powerful as symbolic paratactic interaction.

The fact that all the great apes have the capacity to learn referential signs and to use them in a paratactic grammar, leads me to conclude that this potential was also a property of all species of human (homo). The key difference in this regard between humans and the other apes, is that humans developed referential signs and began to use them, whereas the other apes did not. The fact that these great apes objectivize these signs using the gestural signs of American Sign Language or key boards, suggests that improvements in the vocal apparatus over the last million years represent a response to sign use.

While not central to my argument, let me suggest that tool use may have played an important role in the development of referential words. However, rather than take language as the prerequisite for tool manufacture, I propose the opposite view, that tools are the exaptative predecessor of words. In fact tools can be turned into words by assigning a meaning to them. Suppose person A picks up a knife and

9 Dwyer (2008a) offers more details about the formal properties of paratax.

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shakes it at person B who may well ask himself, why is A doing this? More specifically B would ask, what are A’s intentions? Is A threatening me, asking me to go hunting, or something else. Person A may then clarify his intentions by not attacking B and by running in the direction where game are known to be. In doing this, A and B are adding meaning to the knife thus creating a sign. In formal terms, following Saussure (1931), a sign consists of a signifier (a token representing the sign) and a signified, a meaning assigned to the sign. In this case, the knife is signifier while the signified, the intended meaning, is ‘let's go hunting.’ In this way tools may have provided the exaptative prototype for referential signs.

The significance of developing referential signs is that the ability for humans to interact symbolically using referential signs with a paratactic grammar enabled humans to lay the foundation for institutional culture.10

The foundation for institutional culture

General versus institutional culture

As I demonstrate below, I use the term institutional culture because the general term culture is so vague I find it to be of little use. Nevertheless, the concept of culture is the cornerstone of the field of anthropology. It is used to explain why one group of people can act and understand things so differently from other groups of people. Culture is understood to be socially constructed by members of a social group, and because different social groups have the potential to construct culture differently, the cultures they produce have the potential to be different as well.11 Because cultures are socially, rather than genetically given, they are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.

However, the concept of culture suffers from the contradictory problems of being overly specific and overly vague. It is overly specific because it suggests that the cultures do not overlap and consequently the world consists of a finite collection of cultures that have discrete boundaries. This conception fails to provide an adequate account of what we call a subculture and fails to acknowledge the possibility that the same institution, be it linguistic, religious or economic, could be shared by several societies.

On the other hand, the concept of culture is also overly vague, a view which vagueness can be traced to the origin of the concept attributed to Tylor’s 1871 definition that culture consists of "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." This aggregate definition describes many of the components of culture but does not say, as Street (1993) points out, how these components fit together and how culture works. Tylor also fails to explain what he means by society. Furthermore, using Tylor’s definition to signing apes, we have to conclude that because they have acquired knowledge and transmit this knowledge to others, that they have culture thus masking the substantial differences between apes and humans in this regard. This is essentially the argument that Savage-Rumbaugh et al (n.d.) make when they say that some chimpanzees have been acculturated and have acquired different degrees of human culture. 12 Their definition of culture also includes language and

10 The failure to recognize paratax as a distinctive stage of human ontogeny and phylogeny has led to the equating sign use with syntax with the result that in human evolution they emerged at the same time.11 Because cultures are socially constructed, they have the potential to vary from one another in very different ways. This is why the variation in the Upper Paleolithic is taken to be a strong indication of the emergence of culture.

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they hint at the capacity of language to develop intersubjectivity.13

Rather than the term enculturation, I prefer, following Berger and Luckmann (1967) to use the term socialization to describe the process through which humans begin to acquire culture. More precisely, Berger and Luckmann distinguish between primary socialization, in which young humans learn the workings of the primary institution, the family,14 and secondary socialization, in which humans begin acquiring other institutions. My interpretation of Savage-Rumbaugh et al is that they are really talking about primary socialization and not the full development of institutional culture. But in order to make this argument, I need to introduce the concept of the social institution, the key building block of culture. Once the cultural institution has been defined, I can now characterize culture as a collection of interacting institutions. This characterization avoids the problems associated with the general term ‘culture’ discussed above.

Institutional Culture

The institution is the basic building block of culture based on a cooperative (reciprocal) relationship between two or more roles, each of which has a defined set of (one or more) procedures or practices. Bourdieu (1977), who introduced the institution as the unit of study in current anthropology, used a game metaphor to illustrate the properties of the cultural institution. For example, each institution represents a field of play and each position, a specific role to be filled out by an agent. Furthermore, each institution defines a goal which the players are to achieve and the rules by which the game is played. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the institution is the mechanism by which individual agents (players) interact and negotiate their personal business. Bourdieu also pointed out that the activity of the agents which restores and maintains the vitality of the institution. We examine the elements of this metaphor below.

Bourdieu also used an economic metaphor to help explain the kinds of resources (power) that players can use including: economic capital (money); symbolic capital (access to ways of speaking); and social capital (honor and connections). Also, associated with a given institution are orders of discourseand legitimation for the institution. The educational institution, for example, calls for a way of speaking sometimes called “standard English.” This order of discourse calls for, among other things, a specific type of grammatical usage and an avoidance of swearing. The use of swearing, on the other hand, would define an order of discourse more likely to be associated with another institution such as the neighborhood bar. Legitimations provide the justification for individual institutions and help to explain why a given institution

12 Cultural forces operate on the novice initiate at many levels, from the trappings of clothing and prized objects, to the functionality of language and symbol systems, to the mythological forces that coalesce the motivations and intentions of the group, to the actual cellular embodiment of the constant sensory bombardment. But having made the transition to ‘group member’ – which is a very difficult process in itself -- bestows upon the successful initiate certain abilities, rights and privileges. One can comment on the abilities, foibles and beliefs of others in the group because one now knows about their social constructions through joint engagement, not through second-hand report or arbitrary artificial testing procedures (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. n.d. page 3).13The power of language lies in our ability to employ it to attract the attention of others to our perception of reality. The degree to which language functions in this manner among the bonobos varies in association with the extent and form of exposure to human culture early in life ((Savage-Rumbaugh et al. n.d. page 4)14 Although Berger and Luckmann did not use the term primary institution, they did distinguish between primary and secondary socialization. For them, primary socialization involves the process in which the young human learns how to operate in an institutional world and this takes place in the family.

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takes the form that it does in contrast to alternatives. Legitimations can be practical, it is easier this way, or authoritative, it is God’s way.

The transition into symbolic life marks a major shift in human orientation. Cassirer, in his “An essay on man” (1944:24) put it this way.

Obviously this world forms no exception to those biological rules which govern the life of all the other organisms. Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged: it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals, man lives not merely in a broader reality, he lives, so to speak in a new dimension of reality.

Cassirer makes it quite clear that humans live in a qualitatively different world and that this dramatic transformation is made possible because of the human capacity to sign. He does not, however, say how the sign does this nor does he emphasize the importance that cultural institutions bring to the new quality of human life. Berger and Luckmann in their Social Construction of Reality (1967:60 and elsewhere) do explain the significance of institutions in this process

An institutional world, then, is experienced as an objective reality... The institutions, as historical and objective facticities, confront the individual as undeniable facts... He cannot wish them away.

In addition, Berger and Luckmann (Chapter 2) show how institutions can evolve using Mead’s (1934) symbolic interaction in a face-to-face interaction. But Berger and Luckmann begin with the assumption that humans have the capacity to build institutions. They do not examine the preconditions for this ability. In this paper I discuss how the use of symbolically interacting using paratactic sentences can build the foundation for institutional culture.

Roles

Mead (1934) saw the development of roles to be central to the process of primary socialization and the entering into institutional life. According to Meltzer, Mead saw three development stages in the human ontogeny of roles, the preparatory stage (involving imitation), the play stage (acting out single roles) and the game stage, (involving dealing with multiple roles). Each of these stages represents an increasing awareness of the position of the other and as a result an increasing awareness of one’s position in the objective world.

What is institutional culture?

In a paper entitled “Institutional culture,” I proposed an alternative to the classic concept of culture in which social institutions formed the basic building block of human culture. Briefly put, institutions consist of a field, complementary roles, goals, knowledge and discourse assigned to institutions and their roles, legitimations. Institutions can be egalitarian or exploitative and it is in exploitative institutions where power struggles take place.

Roles

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Central to the institution is a set, usually a pair, of complementary roles such as teacher/student, parent/child, greeter/greeted, friend/friend, team member/coach or other team member, and store clerk/customer. These roles are complementary because they involve a prescribed way in which the agents filling these roles interact with each other.15 Any given agent will typically bear several roles, a parent, a teacher, a friend, a relative, a stranger, etc. Whenever two agents meet, one of their first tasks will be to determine the roles which they will use. Should I be your student or your friend, for example? In many cases, this relationship has been established in previous meetings; in others it will have to be negotiated. Roles may be assigned from birth (gender, race, child); others may be taken on voluntarily (friend, teacher, colleague), and still others may be assigned by other institutional roles (prisoner, basketball star). But when we interact with others, it is through one role or another.

Field

Every institution occupies a space or a field. We talk about the field of anthropology, engineering or the field of play for a given sport. We know immediately what institution is in play when we enter a classroom or a bank. Each institutional field is accompanied by an institutional order that consists of roles, goals, knowledge and order of discourse. When discussing an institution, the name of the field is usually used as the name of the institution.

Responsibilities and privileges

Part of the institutional order involves the assignment of a set of proscriptions and prescriptions to each role. These enable an individual to act, but only in particular ways and always with respect to the complementary role.

The emergence of the generic role thus separates the individual self into two parts, the agent and the role. Before the development of institutions, there was only the individual agent with wants, needs and urges and the ability to act to meet them. But when this agent is assigned to (or adopts), that agent is no longer free to do as he/she pleases, but must interact with the complementary role within the parameters defined by the institution. Thus the agent is constrained and enabled at the same time. Nevertheless, the agent is free to use his/her creativity to manipulate the situation within the limits of the constraints of the institution.16

Goals

The institution provides a field in which to get things done, that is to meet needs, although in many cases indirectly. The academic needs to teach and to publish in order to maintain his job; the student needs to acquire knowledge and get good grades and a diploma. In meeting these goals, the agent can acquire what Bourdieu (1977) calls capital. He notes that each institution has its own form of capital, the diploma can be converted into a good job and even a better one if the student has good grades. In many instances, several institutions share the same form of capital; money is a good example. Capital can only be acquired by cooperating with the other role member(s) of the given institution and each member acquires capital by cooperating. It is

15 In the article on institutional culture, I proposed that the earliest forms of institutions evolved from cooperative agreements. Given that institutional role is a position to be filled by agent and the cooperative agreements is an agreement between two agents, the development of the roles involves the acceptance of the cooperative roles as a standardized and useful way for individuals to meet their needs. This explanation of the emergence of generic roles shows us, why these institutional roles are always complementary. 16 But the important thing here is the individual has been transformed from a free agent to a constrained agent.

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because of the awareness of the mutual benefits of cooperation that agents participate voluntarily.

Institutional knowledge

Knowledge is also part of the institutional order. All forms of knowledge are assigned to a specific institution. General knowledge, that is, knowledge that appears to belong to multiple institutions arises when smaller institutions are part of several institutions. Knowledge of sports may be part of other institutions such as the bar, the office, or friendship. Some forms of knowledge are a requirement of a specific role in an institution. A mathematics teacher has to know mathematics. A baseball player has to know how to throw and hit.17

Order of discourse

Although the order of discourse is really a part of the institutional order, discourse, defined here as the use of language, is so central to institutional life that it is given a special status in institutional life. Thus a specific order of discourse (Fairclough 1989, Foucault (1977), is a part of each institution. Each order of discourse includes responsibilities and privileges and includes specifications on what one is expected or not expected to say including the type of grammar (literate/casual); topics, who may be addressed, and specialized vocabulary (educated/profanity). An individual agent’s decision not to follow an institution’s order of discourse carries with it the interpretation by others either that the agent is either disrespectful of the institutional order or that the agent prefers to shift to a different institutional order.

Legitimations

Because the participation in an institution requires the “voluntary” participation of the agent, the individual must see the legitimacy of the institution. Fairness, justice and equity provide the basis for legitimizing egalitarian institutions. This is because egalitarian institutions evolve from cooperative agreements. Exploitative institutions, which evolve from egalitarian institutions, often use the same strategy. That is, even though the institution appears exploitative it really isn’t or that while it isn’t completely fair, it is beneficial to all agents. Alternatively, a legitimation may admit that the institution is not fair, but it is part of the natural order, be it God-given or genetic. For example, God designated me king; men and whites are genetically inferior. That is not the way I would prefer it, but we just have to accept it.

When legitimations fail and the agent sees the institution as corrupt, one may still agree to participate for fear of repression, be it loss of face, position or the threat of violence. In such situations, the individual feels the imposition of power and will struggle to resist it.

The institutional lens

With the development of institutional life, human beings find themselves no longer interacting directly with others but through one or more institutions. You may be my friend, my teacher, my fellow countryman. While I can choose which institution I will interact with you, but I have to choose one. This new institutional life was described by Cassirer (1944:24) as follows.

17 While many characterize culture as involving the passing down of knowledge (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh (1994), I draw a distinction between institutionally based knowledge and general knowledge and although there are examples of FR chimpanzees acquiring the ability to use tools and make nests from observing their parents and Washoe teaching her adopted children to sign, there is virtually nothing that points to knowledge specifically associated with institutions.

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Obviously this [human] world forms no exception to those biological rules which govern the life of all the other organisms. Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. The functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged: it has also undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. … This new acquisition [of symbols] transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals, man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.

How symbolic interaction enables institutional culture

My argument that symbolic interaction has provided the foundation in humans for the capacity for culture involves two separate but related lines of development. One line concerns the use of symbolic interaction to enable the ability to negotiate which in turn led to agreements and agreements provide the model on which institutions are built. The other line involves the use of symbolic interaction to expand the distinction between a public and private self. The increasingly distinct public self opens the possibility for the attachment of social roles thus opening up the possibility for institutional culture.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, I am suggesting that this process most likely took place during the lower Paleolithic and is what provided the selective pressure for the growth in Broca’s and Wernicke’s in the brain and the vocal tract developing towards that of modern humans as evidenced by a lengthening pharynx.

How does language facilitate the development of social institutions?

Symbolic interaction

Symbolic interaction (Mead 1934; Austin 1962) and analytic signs (Cassirer 1944) was essential to the evolution of the complex self, based on the work of Dennett (1987)

and second I argue that the complex self and syntactic language were essential to the evolution of culture. To make the first argument, I begin with characterizations of presyntactic language and the stages of the development of the complex self. I then introduce evidence of differences between those chimpanzees, bonobos and young humans (Fouts 1997, 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh 1994 and others) who use symbolic interaction and those who don’t to show that language does influence the development of the complex self. The conclusion of the first section is that symbolic interaction is the prime factor in the development of the complex self.

The second argument begins with a characterization of syntactic language and of culture, which I characterize, following Bourdieu (1977) as a collection of social institutions having specific properties including, an institutional field or domain, institutional goals, institutional legitimations, institutional roles and responsibilities and knowledge. I then show that chimpanzees have not developed syntax and have not developed cultural institutions and conclude the argument by showing how syntax is essential to institution building.

The article concludes by suggesting time periods for these two developments, roughly the Lower Paleolithic for the first and the Upper Paleolithic for the second. The conclusions are followed by a postscript in which I discuss the major questions about how analytic signs developed.

It is difficult when thinking of the evolution of language to conger up intermediate stages. But the consequence of this kind of thinking leaves us pondering a two-stage development in which

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the earlier stage our ancestors were engaged in emotionally based signals such as those used by today’s vervets and monkeys and a later stage of fully modern syntactic language. One of the underlying assumptions of this essay is that the key to understanding any evolutionary process is to be able to break down an evolutionary development into a sequence of discrete steps. In this section, I attempt to do this for lexical signs, tactic sentences, hence the term presyntactic language and the self. In the next section I will apply the same principle to the evolution of syntax and culture.

Culture and signing chimpanzees and bonobos

From an institutionally based characterization of culture, we would expect to find evidence that support the existence of the institutional components, including institutional roles, institutional knowledge, and legitimations. The evidence of signing chimpanzees offers very little evidence of institutional structure.

Evidence of institutional culture in the other great apeso Female chimps play with dolls (Fouts)o Someone was reminded that someone was only a baby. Foutso Austin and Sherman learned to switch roles in a cooperative experiment. Kanzio The reported vocabulary acquired by chimpanzees and bonobos shows very little that reflects

institutional roles. Individuals are known by their individual names and not by role names.o Both Fouts and Savage-Rumbaugh (1994) report the existence of routinized practices.

However, since these are common to all members of the community, they cannot be associated with a specific institution.

o Washoe and Lucy thought they were human and not chimpanzees and thus did not adopt a specific role.

Roles and role playing

o Female chimps play with dolls (Fouts)o Someone was reminded that someone was only a baby. Foutso Austin and Sherman learned to switch roles in a cooperative experiment. Kanzio The reported vocabulary acquired by chimpanzees and bonobos shows very little that reflects

institutional roles. Individuals are known by their individual names and not by role names.o Both Fouts and Savage-Rumbaugh (1994) report the existence of routinized practices.

However, since these are common to all members of the community, they cannot be associated with a specific institution.

o Washoe and Lucy thought they were human and not chimpanzees and thus did not adopt a specific role.

Methodology

But while fossil evidence can help us to observe the evolution of the brain and the vocal tract, they it cannot provide evidence to test this hypothesis about the role of symbolic interaction and the capacity for culture. However, the great apes can help us test the hypothesis because they have shown themselves capable of learning referential signs at the paratactic level. This is precisely the level of symbolic interaction that I hypothesize for humans, prior to the emergence

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of syntax. By comparing the behavior of feral apes who do not interact symbolically, and who have not been socialized by humans, with those who have not provides an opportunity to test my hypothesis. In the next section, I contrast episodes reported by observers of feral apes (Goodall 1971 and Nishida 1990) with those of signing apes (Fouts 1997, Savage-Rumbaugh 1994), and de Waal (2005) to look for evidence that suggests an improved capacity for culture.

One of the major conclusions of these in-depth studies of ape behavior, be it feral, wild or captive apes, is that ape abilities are less distinct from humans as we generally suppose. For example, qualities supposed to be humans, like care and concern for the other, are also found in humans as De Waal (2005) points out. While keeping this in mind, my task is to find out if differences between feral and signing apes in the areas of negotiation and the complex self and to provide an argument as to why symbolic interaction could be the element responsible for this change.

Negotiation

My argument here is that symbolic interaction enables the capacity to negotiate. This in turn leads to agreements which provide the model for cultural institutions. I argue in another paper (Dwyer 2008b) that cultural institutions cannot develop without syntax because institutions require the specificity of syntax, not possessed by paratax, to provide legitimations, institutional knowledge, and orders of discourse so essential to the foundation to any cultural institution. Furthermore, all of these developments lead to a greater interest in the other and subsequently what the other knows about the self.

A negotiation is an engagement between two (or more) individuals with the purpose of working out an agreement, be it an alliance, a friendship or a contract. Without the capacity to objectivate, the capacity to negotiate is severely limited if not impossible. Although feral chimpanzees develop friendships and alliances, there is no evidence in the literature that they negotiate. What they do instead is to develop reciprocal patterns of phatic interaction through hugging, kissing, grooming and playing together. Although chimpanzees do use gestures to communicate, these consist of conveying intentions (aggression, non aggression) or feelings (laughing, crying) they do not use phatic signs.18 In contrast the literature is full of examples of signing chimpanzees using signs to negotiation. A typical example involves Washoe and Roger Fouts (1997:141).

Roger: YOU ME GO HOME NOW. (It is late and Roger wants Washoe to return home.) Washoe: NO. Washoe states defiantly her intention not to go) Roger: WHAT YOU WANT? (Roger is desperate and proposes to negotiate.)Washoe: CANDY. Roger: OK OK. YOU CAN HAVE CANDY AT HOME. Washoe: YOU ME HURRY GO.

A second example involves Fouts and a chimpanzee named Tatu who had a good sense of time, be it that Christmas, which she called CANDY TREE, followed Thanksgiving, or when the next meal should appear. And if it didn’t appear to be on schedule she would sign TIME EAT. “One time we told her that her room had to be cleaned before she could have a banana, and she began telling all the chimps, HURRY CLEAN! BANANA! BANANA! (1997:301). Fouts cites at least seven other episodes in which negotiation were used to get chimpanzees to agree to do 18 Savage-Rumbaugh (1994) does state that bonobos do trade food for sex, which would constitute an agreement. They also use gestures to indicate preferred sexual positions. This is a form of negotiating.

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something.

Savage-Rumbaugh et al (n.d.) describe several episodes that demonstrate how much negotiation is a part of ape-human interaction. My favorite example involves Nyota, a sign-using bonobo,19 Bill, a laboratory assistant, and Sue, the principle author of the article. The episode begins when Nyota discovers that Bill had given “an entire package” of fresh blueberries, Nyota’s favorite fruit, to Kanzi, another bonobo. Because of this Nyota complains to Sue who promises to send more blueberries the next day and Nyota is temporarily satisfied.

However, the next day, Bill, who was unaware of the negotiations between Nyota and Sue, arrives at work but does not give any blueberries to Nyota. “Nyota goes to the keyboard and signs, while looking at Kanzi: BLUEBERRIES YESTERDAY.”20 Then, while looking expectantly at Bill and stating “BLUEBERRIES TODAY.”21

Bill understands Nyota’s request and takes some frozen blueberries out of the freezer and gives them to Nyota. Nyota, who is expecting fresh blueberries, responds emphatically to Bills offer of frozen blueberries by saying NO ICE. Bill tells Nyota, “I’m sorry but I don’t have any fresh blueberries. They are all gone.” Nyota then goes to the keyboard and signs CHILDSIDE, CHILDSIDE, CHILDSIDE, CHILDSIDE, an area, where deliveries are made.

Bill does not understand what Nyota is getting at so Nyota then signs SUE. Bill then asks if Sue is on Childside. Nyota then signs to Bill, TALK TALK TALK SUE NOW to which Bill asks if Nyota wants Bill to call Sue on the telephone. Nyota utters a peep which means YES. In his conversation with Sue, Bill learns that Sue had arranged to deliver fresh blueberries to the Childside location. Bill then goes to Childside and returns with the blueberries for Nyota.

From this episode we see several examples of negotiation:

Nyota negotiates with Sue about getting fresh blueberries. Nyota negotiates with Bill about getting blueberries to compensate for Kanzi getting them

yesterday. Nyota negotiates with Bill to go to childside. This initially fails because Bill does not see the

point of going there. Nyota negotiates with Bill to talk to Sue on the phone to learn about the berries at childside.

This episode shows that that Nyota is a highly effective negotiator and that he has a mind of his own. Part of what motivates these negotiations is a sense of fairness both in Nyota who was wronged in not getting the same treatment as Kanzi and used by Nyota to convince Bill and Sue in different negotiations that he was also entitled to the same treatment.

The use of signs in such negotiations goes beyond declarative statements like BLUEBERRIES YESTERDAY, to commands (CALL SUE) and questions (TIME EAT?). The words NO and YES are crucial to negotiations because they make it possible to determine if there is mutual understanding and agreement. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990), report that no uses of negatives appear in any of their studies of feral primates. This could well be because these words have no 19 The chimpanzees and bonobos at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center use lexigrams rather than ASL gestures to communicate symbolically. Lexigrams consist of an arbitrary graphic to which a meaning has been assigned. To communicate the sender points to a lexigram on a keyboard.20The argument structure is an analogy, that, is eating blueberries yesterday is to Kanzi as eating blueberries today is to Nyota.21Rumbaugh et al point out that only Nyota employs the terms ‘yesterday’ and ‘today’, but Kanzi and Panbanisha readily grasp their meaning.

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meaning outside the negotiating process.

Another important feature of this negotiation is that Nyota is aware of what Bill does not know. Nyota reasons that if Bill does not know why he should go to Childside, then he does not know about Nyota’s negotiation with Sue about the fresh blueberries.

Cooperation and fairness

Agreements rest on two fundamental preconditions: cooperation and fairness. Cooperation is based on the pragmatic principle that both parties understand that working together will benefit each participant more than not cooperating.22 Cooperation is difficult without symbolic interaction, but it is used by feral chimpanzees who hunt in groups and when they build alliances, for example when two chimpanzees who wish to jointly challenge a dominant male,

My favorite example of cooperation involved a group of captive, but non signing, chimpanzees who staged a breakout from their place of confinement.

The male chimps especially, probed their building’s defenses like a team of soldiers in a prisoner of war camp. Their method was quite systematic. One of the chimps would begin twisting the exposed end of heavy chain link that enclosed the main colony. When the first chimp grew tired, another would take over. This project would continue for days and days until the chain link cracked from metal fatigue and the chimps could begin unraveling the entire wall of mesh. The most remarkable thing about this bit of sabotage was that they were able to keep it invisible. We never actually say them working on the chain link, because they would stop when any of us entered the colony” Fouts (1997:181).

To cooperate, the participants must have a clear understanding of the goal of the activity, why it is worthwhile to participate and what one’s individual responsibility is. It is clear that this was the case in the above example, even though they could not interact symbolically. Nevertheless the task of developing a consensus on a project of this complexity would have been much easier had they been able to communicate using signs.

Savage-Rumbaugh describes her efforts to teach two chimpanzees named Sherman and Austin who learned through a series of exercises to cooperate. The exercises were designed so that the only way for either to receive the reward was to work together. First, one chimpanzee was shown where the food was located; then he had to communicate to the other what tool would provide access to the cache; and finally, after collecting the reward, the other had to share the reward in order to get his own share. In addition to learning how to cooperate, these individuals learned to pay more attention to what the other said.

Agreements also rest on a mutual understanding by all parties of fairness. Without a sense of fairness, participants would be less able to evaluate them to see whether or not they were advantageous to the individual. Nyota appealed to both Bill and Sue to act using the principle of fairness by contrasting the giving of blue berries to Kanzi but not Nyota.

Agreements and institutions

22The principle of cooperation is a more general version of Grice’s ‘cooperative principle’, which is limited to linguistic exchanges.

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Some agreements can be understood as a contract in which each party has a responsibility.

Responsibility of first party Responsibility of second partyRoger gives candy,Tatu cleans room,Kanzi got fresh blueberries yesterday,

Washoe goes home.Roger gives Tatu a banana.Sue should give them to Nyota today.

Contracts bear a striking resemblance to cultural institutions as described above. First, they both involve oppositional parties and they both have assigned roles or responsibilities. Secondly, the parties stand in a complementary relationship, be it parent/child, teacher/student or lawyer/client.

Responsibility of first role Responsibility of second roleTeachers: provide knowledgeParents provide moral guidanceLawyers protect their client’s legal rights

Students: follow their teacher’s instructionsChildren obey their parents.Clients pay lawyers for their services.

But institutions also differ from contracts in two important ways. First, the parties in an institution are generic roles rather than ad hoc individuals. Second, institutions are inherited from previous generations and not negotiated and consented to by the participants.

Given this comparison, one can see how a contract could evolve into a cultural institution by replacing the specific parties with generic roles. With generic roles, the institution is free to be used by parties not involved in the original contractual negotiations. For this reason, as Berger and Luckmann (1967) point out, over time, the institution loses its authorship. With the loss of authorship, the possibility to renegotiate conditions, found in contracts, is lost and the institution takes on an aura of immutability and becomes an imposition on participants. Without individuals understanding the original basis for the institution, its authority needs to be reinforced by a legitimation.

Evidence of institutions

Although I have suggested that agreements can evolve into institutions, I need to ask whether institutions develop in nonhuman apes and if symbolic interaction enables this capacity.

Given that roles, following Mead (1934), are the most salient aspect of the institution, we need to ask whether there is any evidence of generic roles, as opposed to individual responsibility, in social interactions. Also, following Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) distinction between primary and secondary institutions, it makes sense to look at the primary institution, the family, for evidence for the existence of institutional roles.

The feral ape family is headed by the mother, with adult males participating only marginally.23 Feral ape mothers and look out for their children, protecting them from danger and pulling them out of fights when they get too rough. They will often give up food for their young. Goodall (1971: 168) cites the example of Flo and her daughter Fifi who were dining on termites. When Fifi’s hole became unproductive, she whimpered until her mother and gave her more productive hole to Fifi and moved on to another one. However, while chimpanzee and bonobo mothers are watchful and protective of their young, there is no evidence to suggest that they understand their activities in terms of roles leaving us to attribute their behavior as genetically based responses.

Goodall has observed that feral chimpanzees learn through imitation, and not through instruction 23 Savage-Rumbaugh (1994: 108) reports that “Unlike what happens in common chimps, all members of the bonobo social group help with infant care and share food with infants.

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from their mothers. They learn to make their own nests and use tools, like the termite stick. Imitation, while not evidence of roles, represents Mead’s first ontological step toward the acquisition of roles. Furthermore, as Meltzer (1964) point out, that the imitating individual “is on the verge of putting itself in the position of others and acting like them. “

Fouts gives several examples of female chimpanzees playing with dolls, but not too much detail about what they did with them. There is also the story of Lucy who had a pet cat. The very fact that she had a pet suggests that she enjoyed the process of mothering.

One day, she saw her cat using the litter box. Lucy, who had been taught to use the toilet, “hauled the cat out of the litter box and carried it twenty feet down the hall to the bathroom. When I entered the bathroom, Lucy was dangling the cat over the toilet, encouraging her to finish her business. Satisfied that her baby was done, Lucy put her down and flushed the toilet” (1997:155).

This act can be understood as playing a role if we understand Lucy’s reasoning as follows. Humans use a toilet; animals do not. Her pet cat is being raised as a human and therefore needs to learn to use the toilet. Lucy is playing the role of mother teaching her ‘child’ to use the toilet.

Washoe also provides an example for role playing among signing apes involving Washoe and her adopted son Loulis.

He could play tickle chase for hours, but when playtime was over and we needed to clean the ages, collect the signing data and prepare the meals, Loulis would become a little terror. He’d throw a tantrum and spit streams of water at us. At times like these, Washoe would stop calling Loulis baby and would address him as dog as in, come dog (Fouts 1997:265).

This episode can be read as Washoe saying to Loulis, that you are playing the role of a dog and not a baby. The term ‘dog’ is especially derogatory given that they are feared and detested by chimpanzees. This action appears to be intended to shame Loulis into better behavior.

One time when Tatu was playing a little too roughly with Loulis, Debbie Fouts told Tatu was a baby. After this, “her touching became gentler” (Fouts 1997:268). This suggests that when Tatu saw Loulis in the role of baby, and correspondingly her own as an adult, that this relationship required modified behavior.

The other area that might shed some light on role playing has to do with dress up. Fouts (1997:292) notes that “Loulis loved Halloween masks, especially ones of monsters and the Lone Ranger. Dar was partial to toy dinosaurs which he would tickle and sign to.” This kind of behavior with a toy dinosaur suggests that Dar saw the dinosaur as a make-believe friend, and that he was role playing. Dressing up was an activity that was popular with female chimpanzees. “Moja was easy to engage if one brought along the right fashion accessories. She was extremely conscious of her appearance and there was nothing Moja loved better than putting on an old dress, shoes and makeup and studying herself in the mirror. She insisted on red dresses, but she wasn’t choosy about her footwear” (Fouts 1997:263).

Although the published research shows hints of roles, and hence institutional life, they are not extensive and for the most part limited to family life.

How symbolic interaction enhances a complex self

Symbolic interaction also contributes to the development of the complex self and the complex

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self is the other crucial precondition for the development of institutional life. I use the term complex self to represent that state where the individual has a private self and a public self. The private self contains knowledge, feelings and intentions which the self would prefer to keep to him/her self. The public self is the persona that the individual would like others to perceive. This distinction has been described in different ways. Mead (1934) presented this distinction as one between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. These roughly correspond to the private-public opposition. Goffman (1963) used the term face in a complementary way to refer to the public self.

Inklings of a complex self can be seen in vervets where Cheney and Seyfarth (1990:215) report one instance of a female trying to hide her tail so that she would not have to deal with an encounter with a dominant male. Evidence for the complex self is clearly manifest in chimpanzees.

Goodall reports the following episode involving the feral apes, Figan and Goliath.

One day, Figan spotted a banana next to the dominant male Goliath. The fact that Goliath had not eaten it, and was not looking at it, suggested that Goliath was not aware that the banana was there and it was possible that Goliath would leave without noticing the banana.

After no more than a quick glance from the fruit to Goliath, Figan moved away and sat on the other side of the tent so that he could no longer see the fruit. Fifteen minutes later, when Goliath got up and left, Figan, without a moment’s hesitation went over and collected the banana. Quite obviously he had sized up the whole situation (Goodall 1971:97).

Figan reasoned that if Goliath24 knew about the banana he would eat it. He because Goliath is a dominant male, Figan knew he would risk a beating from Goliath if Figan attempted to go up and take the banana. Therefore Figan devised another plan, to wait until Goliath left.

In this episode, Figan has some knowledge that he does not want to make public. He is also aware that his own actions may have a negative consequence for him and in this case, that if he looked at the banana his gaze would give him away. In order to avoid this, Figan stayed in sight of the banana. This strategy proved successful because Goliath did leave, unaware of the banana and Figan then returned to eat the banana. This episode demonstrates the two separate parts of Figan’s self: the private self which knows about the banana and knows that his gaze will give him away and his public self which is to act as if there is no banana around.

Increased awareness of the other

Because the elements of the complex self exist in feral chimpanzees, it is clear that symbolic interaction does not cause the partitioning of the self into a public and private component.

However, symbolic interaction does play a role in expanding the differences between the public and private selves. This is because the development of the complex self depends on three distinct processes.

When the individual discovers that the other acts on the basis of what it knows and what it does not know. This means that paying attention to the other’s knowledge will provide clues

24 In looking at the evidence between feral and signing apes, it looks as though apes can gain an understanding of what the other knows using auditory and visual information (as in the case of the banana next to Goliath) but cannot infer more abstract knowledge.

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as to how the other will act. As I have argued above, symbolic interaction and especially negotiation leads to

intersubjectivity, an awareness of common understanding of what is shared and what is not. Negotiation adds to this interest because it can lead to agreements which both parties need

recognize the needs and expectations of the other in the process. Agreements involve knowing not only one’s own responsibilities but those of the other as

well. Finally, negotiation relies on trust or good faith which is built up on an evaluation of how well the other party has fulfilled its side in previous agreements. Without the element of trust, one is unlikely to enter into future agreements.

Empirically, there is considerable evidence that signing apes have a greater interest in the other. Nyota, in the above example understood that Bill was unaware of his (Nyota’s) agreement with Sue and that if Bill knew about the agreement, he would go to Childside to get the blueberries. Likewise, Tatu’s use of the question, TIME EAT, shows that she is aware that Fouts knows or at least decides when meal times are.

In another incident involves Bill and the bonobo Panbanisha. While Bill is preparing lunch for the bonobos, Panbanisha attempts to tell Bill something using a keyboard.25 Bill, who was busy with lunch preparations, said to Panbanisha,” I can’t see what you’re saying. Please use the talking keyboard.” Then “Panbanisha knocks on the glass and signals for him to come over to her. As Bill approaches, she holds the keyboard out so Bill sees it clearly and utters “GRAB” and then points to his glasses on the washing machine.” The clear implication is, of course, you cannot see because you don’t have you glasses on. Next, Panbanisha points to the icon KEYBOARD so that Bill could see that it was turned off which is why Panbanisha had to point to the icons on the keyboard. In both cases Panbanisha was aware that Bill did not know something. In the first, that he needed his glasses that were on the washing machine to read the keyboard. In the second, that Panbanisha could not use the sound feature of the keyboard because Bill had not turned it on.

Mari was an orangutan who was a “peripheral member of the bonobo colony at the Yerkes Primate Center. She spent most of her time outside, “however, generally she would come inside briefly to have supper with the bonobos.” Once when she did not come in for supper Panbanisha moved over to Bill and said, MARI BLANKETS JUICE to remind him that Mari was still outside and had not eaten and would require juice and blankets. First, Panbanisha reason that Bill had forgotten about Mari, and then she reasoned that if she reminded Bill about Mari, Mari would be taken care of.

All of these episodes involve the recognition of knowledge that the other did not know and the use of signs to convey this knowledge to the other with the awareness that this would influence the other’s behavior. Without the availability of signs, this would not be possible.

An increased awareness of the other can also lead to an increasing awareness of the self. When the individual discovers that the other is observing the self in the same way that the self is observing the other, the individual realizes that its actions will give the other clues to what it is 25 Chimps and apes at the Yerkes primate center use keyboards with abstract icons signifying different words. The original keyboard was connected to a computer which not only recorded these messages, but also displayed these icons on a screen over the keyboard. Subsequently a more portable keyboard was developed to enable communication outside the laboratory. The first versions of these traveling keyboards required that both the sender and receiver look at the keyboard, but later versions were able to produce the English words associated with the icon.

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thinking and how I will act. This leads to the awareness that one’s actions can have negative and positive outcomes for the individual. In addition, as Mead points out, by playing the roles of the other, the individual was encouraged to see himself objectively as an object. This is possible even before institutional roles are fully established.

Teaching

The act of teaching provides clear evidence for the awareness of the knowledge of others. In order to teach, one has to recognize that the other does not know something and that the self does. Furthermore, the self recognizes that it is important that the other acquire this knowledge. Lucy’s teaching her pet cat to use the toilet is such an example. Interestingly, however, Goodall found no evidence of mothers teaching their young; rather the young would learn by imitating their parents.

Another example of teaching involved Washoe, who was observed on several different occasions to teach her adopted son Loulis26 to make signs. “Once she actually molded Loulis’ hand into the sign for food and touched it to his mouth several times – just as I had done with her in Nevada” (Fouts 1997:243).

Teaching shows a heightened awareness of the other because in order to teach one has to be aware (1) that there is something that the other does not know and (2) that there is a need to convey that information.

Also when Austin and Sherman learned to cooperate, they developed a keen interest in what the other knew.

Thus we see that the symbolically interactive processes of negotiating and making agreements leads to an increased awareness of the other. This can be seen in the difference between feral chimpanzees and bonobos in their ability to negotiate and make agreements as well as their interest in the other as evidenced by Panbanisha’s awareness of the other and Washoe’s desire to teach Loulis.

Although, these episodes illustrate an increased awareness of the other, they do not illustrate an increased complex self. To do this, I present in the following section examples of deception which involve the withholding of information (secrecy) or the manufacture of false information (lying). Both types of deception show that there is a split between the public self.

Secrecy

There are other examples of secrecy as well. Goodall mentions that chimpanzees when patrolling their perimeter would make every effort to not make noise and would encourage their youngsters to do the same. Fouts (1997) also notes that Washoe, had no difficulty in learning the word QUIET, and would sign QUIET to herself when sneaking up on someone.

Thus we see evidence in feral chimpanzees for the partitioning of the self into a public and private self. Much of this, however, is limited to visual and acoustic evidence as in seeing the banana, watching Figan’s gaze and being quiet. This raises the question of whether symbolic interaction can enhance this partitioning.

Lying

26 Loulis was the first chimpanzee not taught to learn to sign from humans. Loulis either learned from observation and imitation, as Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh n.d.) had done, or was taught.

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In symbolically interacting chimpanzees, this capacity for secrecy and lying is greatly expanded. Once after Roger Fouts (1997:156) discovered that Lucy had an accident on the living room floor, they had the following conversation.

Roger: WHAT THAT?Lucy: WHAT THAT?Roger: YOU KNOW. WHAT THAT?Lucy: DIRTY DIRTY27 (The word for feces.)Roger: WHO’S DIRTY DIRTY?Lucy: SUE (a graduate student)Roger: IT NOT SUE. WHO’S THAT?Lucy: ROGER.Roger: NO! NOT MINE. WHOSE?Lucy: LUCY DIRTY DIRTY. SORRY LUCY.

In contrast to secrecy, which involves the withholding of knowledge, lying involves the manufacturing of false information. In this episode, Lucy lies twice about who had the accident. This episode also raises the question of why Lucy would lie about this issue. One explanation is that she lied because she did not want to be scolded about it. It is also possible that admitting guilt would constitute damage to Lucy’s public face. Fouts (1997) points out other examples in which Lucy shows or reacts to guilt.

Lucy’s ‘foster parents’ (Fouts 1997:151) discovered that Lucy had stolen and concealed key to her room and could leave whenever she wanted to. They also discovered that “Lucy developed a guilty expression that immediately gave her away whenever she was hiding a key, smuggling a cigarette lighter, or committing some household crime. Her foster father (Temerlin 1975) reports that he appealed to guilt to get Lucy to finish a meal. He found that appeals like “for god’s sake, Lucy, remember the starving people in Africa,” or even, “how could you do this to me” (Fouts 1997:151) resulted in Lucy finishing her meal.

Apologizing

Another dimension of face involves making apologies. The word SORRY appears in the vocabulary of Washoe and Koko. The word sorry has two meanings. One carries the sense that I am sorry for what happened. Fouts (1997:247) gives an example of Washoe signing SORRY SORRY, when her adopted son Loulis was injured while playing with another juvenile. I take this to be an instance of the first meaning, that I am sorry you are hurt, for she follows this up with HUG HUG, which is an expression of offering comfort.28

The second meaning of the word SORRY means I apologize for my actions. This involves the admission that my act was a transgression against you and the request for forgiveness. Both these acts represent a loss of face. Fouts (1997:63) reports an episode that when he was working with Washoe in Nevada, he and his coworker Greg would test Washoe’s understanding of social relationships. For example, when Roger told Washoe that GREG HURT ME, she “would drop her dolls and swagger on two legs over to Greg” and “would chase Greg around and around the garage until he acknowledged his crime and apologized to me by signing SORRY, …, until Washoe was satisfied.”29 This episode shows that not only is Washoe aware of social

27 DIRTY DIRTY appears to be a single word.28 It is also possible that Washoe was sorry that she had not been more vigilant in protecting Loulis.29 Savage-Rumbaugh (n.d.) reports that Panbanisha played a similar role in resolving conflict.

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relationships, but she is also aware of the utility of apologizing to resolve social conflicts.

Austin (1962), the author of How to do things with words, introduced the concept of the speech act, something that can be done only through the use of words. An apologetic SORRY clearly qualifies as a speech act, because it is something that can only be accomplished through words and because it involves negotiation.

This evidence shows that the concept of privacy is present in feral apes, as evidenced by Figan’s use of secrecy by concealing his knowledge about the banana from Goliath. However, the distinction between the public and private self has expanded beyond secrecy in signing apes. Lucy’s denial of her accident goes beyond secrecy to the creation of false information. Lucy’s denial also shows that she is capable of face-work. Finally, the role of apologies in conflict resolution also shows the importance of public face. Nevertheless, even though we see examples of all these abilities, they do not suggest that these chimpanzees have developed and operate within institutions.

Conclusion: The foundation for institutional culture

Institutional culture is dependent on two independent foundations. The first is the institution and the second is the public component of the self because this is the component of the self where institutional roles attach. Once institutional roles are attached to the private self, the distinction between what Mead called the “I” and the “me” emerge. The “I” is the private self, full of feelings, knowledge and intentions, but now constrained by the institutional roles that have been assigned to the public self, the “me.” Although the “I” is constrained by the institutional roles of the “me,” its ability to navigate the cultural world is enabled by them. Once in an institutional framework, one no longer interacts directly with the other; rather, one interacts with the other through institutional role pairs. I interact with you as my parent, my child, my teacher, my employee, or my friend, to name a few role possibilities.

As I have noted above, agreements are possible without symbolic interaction, but what symbolic interaction brings to this process is the capacity to add specificity to the agreements and to sharpen the distinction between the public self. The same is true for the complex self. The Figan/Goliath episode illustrates that feral apes show some evidence of a private/public division within the self. But again, symbolic interaction increases this division.

In this developmental scenario, I do not claim that symbolic interaction alone caused these developments. Feral apes show an awareness of others and do make cooperative alliances. Feral apes also show some capacity for privacy. In addition, I have not ruled out the role of socialization as a factor that contributes to the enhancing of these abilities, as suggested by Savage-Rumbaugh et al (n.d.). Nevertheless, the arguments offered here clearly show symbolic interaction enhances this development and that verbal agreements provide an exaptation for institutions and that the development of the public self does provide a place to assign institutional roles.

Although the complex self and agreements lay the foundation for institutional culture, signing chimpanzees have not shown much in the way of institutions or institutional life, and when they do, it has to do with the primary institution, the family. This suggests, following Bergman and Luckmann (1967) that before secondary institutions can develop, the primary institution has to be fully established. This appears to be what is going on with the signing apes. They are in the process of discovering the roles and responsibilities of family members.

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Albert Sechehaye. Paris, Payot. (English version: Saussure, F. Course in General Linguistics. McGraw-Hill. 1959. Originally published in 1916.

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Street, B. Culture is a Verb. 2005. Language and Culture (Graddol, Thompson and Byram eds.). Multilingual Matters LTD. 1993 23-43.

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http://www.greatapetrust.org/research/bonobos/pdfs/Culture%20and%20Cognition_2_.pdf


Appendix: Composite chimpanzee Vocabulary

All = A; Nim=N; Koko=K; Washoe=W(I need to review this vocabulary by rereading Fouts etc,)

Natural world(40)

Things: airplane(W), car(W), wagon(N),house(N), bed(W), drapes(K), bag(K), chair(W), floor(W), chair(N), window(W),

table(W), pool(N), box(N), sleep/bed (WK), hose/squirt (W)pen-write(K), paper(N), book(A), stamp(letter) (W), pen/write(W), ball(WN), harmonica(N), balloon(N),hammer(W), hole(W), key(A), lock(W), pipe(W), string(WK), telephone(W), tape(K),

match(K),light(A), pole(N), rock(N), wood(W), rubber(K), bag(W), metal(W)

Clothing (20)

hat(A), pants(WN), pin(W), purse(W), shoe(WN), pillow(K), belt(K), bracelet(K), blanket(WK), clothes(K), earring(K), lipstick(K), sock(K), sweater(K), ring(K), necklace(K), shirt(N), clothes(W), glasses(N), wristwatch(W)

Animate (21)

bird (A), pup(w), bug (A), butterfly(W), cat(A), cow(W), dog(WN), alligator (K), elephant(K), fish(KN), giraffe(K), gorilla(K), feather(K), tiger(K), monkey(K), pig(K), tree(A), flower(A), grass(WK), flower(W), leaf(W),

Body parts (16)

arm(K), leg(K), lip(K), nose(KN), teeth-glass(KN), belly-button(K), bone(K), bottom(K), ear(KN), eye(KN), hair(K), nail(K) hands(W), mouth(k), sour(w), sweet(N) , dry (K),

Food(58) eat-food(A), hungry(A),fruit(A), apple(A), banana(A), berry(A), pear(N), grape(WN), peach(KN), orange(KN),

raisin(N),carrot(WK), onion(WK), tomato(W), bean(K), potato(K), pepper(K), corn(K),

cucumber(W), nut(A), cabbage(K),meat(K), butter(K), egg(K), cheese(WK), yogurt(N), ice cream(W),cereal(WK), sandwich(WK), cake(K), bread(W), candy(WK), lollipop(W), cookie(KN),

cracker(WK), spice(K), cracker(N) drink/beverage(A), thirsty/swallow(A), sip(K), water(A), ice(WN), milk(K),

coffee(W)gum(N), tea(N), smoke(W), bottle(K),cook(W), spoon(WN), knife/cut(WK), fork(WK), cup(WN), bowl(N), foil(W), bib(W),

napkin(N), straw(K),Hygiene (21)

toothbrush(A), brush/rub(A), dirty(N), bath(W), comb(WK), medicine(W), wiper(W), mirror(WK), potty/urinate(W), nail clipper(K), garbage(W), medicine(K), soap(K), sponge(K), wiper(K), wash(N), powder(N), hand cream(N), clean(A), swab(W), diaper(W)

Social worldEmotion (10) want(A), cry(W), hurt/wound(WN), funny(W), laugh(W), frown(K), bite(A), happy(N),

angry(N), chat(W)Pronouns (5) me(A), you(A), we(W), mine(WK), yours (W),FriendshipSocial (19) hug/love(WK), kiss(A), please(A), give(me)(A), groom(A), help-myself(K). smile(WK),

help(WN), hello(N),good-bye(WN), no(W), can't(W), yes(W), sorry(WK), ask(K), don'(K), pink-shame(K), help(N), baby(A), chat(W), please(W).

Game (9) play(NW), tickle(A), peekaboo(W), wrestle(W), spin(W), swing(W), catch(WK), chase(WK), blindfold,(W)

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Locative (9) this/that/there(A), open(A), out(A), down(WN), home(W), in/enter(WN), around(K), on(K), up(KN), quiet(WK),

People (9) boy (W), friend(W), woman(W), girl(W), chimpanzee (K), and each chimpanzee has a substantial set of names for individuals, both human and other ape.

Senses (9) listen(A), hear(W), see(W), smell(NW), look(WK), skunk-stink(K), music(N), quiet(WK), hot(N), cold (WK), sweet (W),

Time (5) hurry(A), time/when(W), time(K), finish(KN), again(W)Verbs (23) go(A), come(A), climb, (WN), cover(W), ride(W), run(W), sit/chair(WK), blow(K),

do(K), pinch-skin(K), pour(K), ride(K), scratch(K), stamp(K), whistle(K), jump(N), work(N), sleep(N), pull(N), run(N), throw(N), walk(N), lie down(N),

Adjective (18) Color (6): green (WN), white (WK) brown(N), blue(N), black(A), red(A).Quantity (5): enough(W), all(K) more (A), one(W), two(W).Quality (3): good (WK), bad (KN), pretty (W).Comparison (4): different(WK), same(WK), big (K), small (K).

Questions (3) what(W), who(W), when(W)

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msu.edudwyer/8-Symbolic interaction and the... · Web viewSymbolic interaction and the capacity for institutional culture David Dwyer, Michigan State University [email protected]/14/08