MR 1982-3 StrategicConcepts1980s

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Part 11of this article willappear in the April 1982 Mihtary uiew

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,. . .,- ..

An y U S st r at egi st pr epar in g m i l i t ar y pl an s m ust be aw ar e ofth e i m pact t hat con tem por ar y st rat egi c con cept s w i l l h ave onh i s d esi gn . T he i n t er rel at ed con cept s of n at i on al pu r pose, n at ion al i nter est , n at ion al obj ect ives, n at ion al st rat egy an d

m il i t ar y st r at egy est abl i sh t he fr am ew or k w i t h i n w h i ch th est rat egi st oper at es. T h e em er gen ce of t hr ee d ist in ct al t hou ghi n ter r el at ed t ypes of m i l i t ar y St r at egyh at i on al , coor d i nat i vean d oper at i on al r efl ect s t h e com pl exi t y of t he em er gi n gst r at egi c en vi ron m en t . An appr eci at i on of th e fu n d am en talel em en ts of m il i t ar y pl an n i n g an d of t h e con st r ai n t s act i ngu pon t he st r at egi st i s n ecessar y t o an u nd er st an di n g of h ow con -t em por ar y st r at egy i s d evel oped . B egi n ni ng w i th t he st rat egi ccon cept s d evel oped h er ei n, th e st rat egi c r egi on al t ren ds of th e .m i dt er m ar e an al yzed for t hei r i m pact on ach ievi ng t he fu nd a-m en t al n at i on al i n ter est s of th e U n i t ed Stat es. T h en si xst r at egi c gu i del i nes-i n depen den ce of act ion , f lexi bi l i ty, pr e-par ed n ess, i nt egr at i on , d i sl ocat i on an d sel ect i vi ty-ar ep ost u l at ed a nd exa m i ned f or t h ei r r el ev an ce t o t h e d ev el op m en tof con t em por ar y m i l i t ar y st r at egy. I n t he Apr i l MilitaryReview, Par t I I w i l l pr esen t a d i scu ssi on of cu r ren t m il i t ar yst r at egy a nd , u si n g t h e st r at egi c gu i d el i n es d eu el op ed h er e, w i l lpr opose a m i l i tar y st rat egy for th e 1980s.

The uteus expreswd m thts art,cle are thow ofthe author and do nut purport to refkt the post.tton of the Department of tk~ Army, rhc Deport.mar of Lkfcns? or any other got, ernme. t off c+or agency Edttor.

Contemporary Strategic Concepts

~ men t a f a nd compet ing a pproa ches t ot he developmen t of a midra nge milit aryst ra tegy a nd it e suppor t ing force st rw c-t ure. In t he first , t he presiden t , w it h t hea dvice of h is na t ion al secur it y a dvisers ,a lloca tee a cert a in sha re of t he na t ion sbu dg et a n d r es ou rces t o n a t ion a l d efen se.The secret a ry of defen se a nd t he J oin tC h iefs of S t a ff a re t hen expect ed t od evelop snd implem en t a st ra t egy w hich

w ill em ploy t h ese r es ou rces t o s ecu re t h en a t ion s in ter est s. Th is a ppr oa ch , w h ichw as in vogue in t he yea rs immedia telyfollow ing World Wa r 1I , ha s oft en beencu lled t h e cr em a in der m et h od beca u sed efen se w a s a l lot t ed t h e m on ey r em a in in ga ft er t he domest ic a n d for eign policy a c-cou n t s w e r e f in a l iz ed .

Th e secon d a ppr oa ch , w h ich h a s n everb een fu lly im plem en t ed , r eq uir es t h a t t h ena t iona l goa ls or object ives be der ivedfrom t he na tion s in t erest s . Next , a na -t ioimf st ra tegy w ould be developed t oa ch ieve t hese goa fs. F rom t he na t iona lst ra tegy , a na t iona l milit a ry st ra tegy ist hen crea t ed, t oget her w it h t he forcest ru ct ur e n eed ed t o im plem en t it .

In t he first a pproa ch , progra m a ndbud get con cer ns dict a te t he st ra t egy a n dfor ce st ruct ure. I n t he secon d, t heoret i-ca lly, object ives a n d pla n s a r e t h e cr it ica f

fa ct ors. Alt hough t he la tt er m et h od is

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NaIiorral Interest

Na ti m t st ra tegy muet be foun ded onna t iomd in t erest s. A na tiona l in t erestma y be defined a s a defense, economic,polit ica l or id eologica l con cer n of im por -t a nce t o t he U nit ed S ta tes. Alt hough n otun ch a ngin g, percept ion s of n at ion al in -t er es ts a r e r ela t iv ely s ta ble a n d en d ur in g.A na t ion should const ruct a na t iona ls t ra t egy t o eecur e it s n a tion a l in terest s.

S in ce it is pos sible f or n a t ion a l in t er es tst o be in conflict or t o compet e w it h on ea not her , pla ns t o h arm on ize com pet in gin t erest s must be pa rt of a n inclusive na -t iona l s t ra t egy . Ot her policies must fur-n ish guideline w hich w ill ena ble st ra t-egies t o eet a blish prior it ies a mong na .t iona l in t erest s. In th is respect , it iepossible t o spea k of n a tion a l st ra t egy a n dof na tiona l st ra tegies in much t he sa mew a y t ha t w e spea k of t he foreign policy ofa n at ion a nd a lso of it s foreign policies .

The a mbiguit y t ha t na t ura lly sur-r oun ds t he con cept of n a tion a l in ter est iscom pou nd ed in t he plura list ic societ y oft he U nit ed S ta t es w h ere t here is n oa uthor it a t ive spokesma n shor t of t hepr esiden t w h o ca n a rt icula t e n a ~ ion a l in -t erest s. And, even a ft er a na t iona l in -t er es t h a s b een a u t h or it a t i vely expr es sed ,t h ere a re va ry ing degrees of in t ensit yw it h w hich t he U nit ed S ta tes might pur-sue it . The in t ensit y depends on publicopin ion , on con gr es sion a l su ppor t a n d ont he pr ior it y a ssigned by t he execut ivebranch.

~ eca use of th is difficult y , milit a rypla n ner s m ust m a ke a s su mpt ion s r eg a rd -ing t he in t ensit y of effor t a nd degree ofrisk tha t t he na tion migh t be w illing t ot a ke t o eecure it s na t iona l in t erest e.There a re a number of w ays tha t t h is in -

t en sit y m igh t be expreesed . On e w a y is

Vi ta l interest Of such im por ta n cea s t o h a ve a direct bea ring on t he a tt a in-m en t of ba sic U S n a t ion a l s eim rit y objec-t ives. The U nit ed S ta t es w ould risk

esca la t ion t o gen er a l n uclea r . w a r t o pr o-t ect a vit a f in terest . Significant . interest O f s uch s ig rr ifi-

ca nce t ha t t he U nit ed S ta t es w ould bew illin g t o use m ilit a ry for ce t o pr ot ect it ,s hor t of r iskin g esca la t ion t o n uclea r w a r.

9 I m por t an t i n ter est . O fl esser si gn i fi -ca nce t ha n vit a f or sign ifica nt in t erest ,but im por t an t en ough t o use limit ed a ir ,n a va l a n d logist ic suppor t. G r ou nd for ces ,w ould on ly be used in a n a dvisory role.

Of interest Of I esa im por ta n ce a n dm or e in direct t ha n im por t a nt in t erest s.The U nit ed S t a tes w ould proba bly t a kea ct ions sh or t of w a r, t o in clude suppor t -in gt h e in digen ou s popula t ion , a n d m igh tpos sibly com m it m ilit a r y for ces .

N a t ion a l in t er es ts m a y a l so be d ir ect orindirect . H ypot het ica lly , if West ernE urope is a vit a l in t erest of t he U nit edS t a tes, t h en t he P ersia n G ulf oil fieldsa n d sea lin es of com mu nica t ion s bet w eent he P ersia n G ulf a nd Weet ern E urope,w hich t he E uropea ns consider vit a I t ot heir in t erest e, w ould a lso be a vit a l in -t erest of t he U nit ed S ta t es, a lbeit ir r -directly.

Anot her exa mple I f K orea is con -sidered t o be vit a l t o t he d efen se of J a pa na nd if J a pa n is a vit a l in t erest of t heU nit ed S ta tes, it m ay be con cluded t ha t ,

for t ha t rea son , K or ea is a n indirect vit a lin t erest of t he U nit ed S t a tes. Ot h er in -t erest s m a y d er ive fr om t he sa t isfa ct ionof t h es e in dir ect in ter es ts. K or ea is a n ex-a mple of a success et ory of a U S a lly tha t ,due t o U S h opes for a free a nd st a bleK or ea n g ov er nm en t , cou pled w it h s igr ri-fica nt econ om ic invest men ts, ha s t a kenon a degree of in t erest t o t he U nit edS ta t es q uit e a pa rt fr om it s rela t ion sh ip t o

t h e d ef en s e of J a pa n . Th is ca s e illu st ra t es

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MILITARY REVIEW

t he n eed t o r eview per iod ica lly t he ba sisof our st a t ed na t ion al in terest for a givencountry.

While t he defin it ions of in t erest s a reh elpful a s a n a n a ly ticr d t ool, t her e a r e n oexist in g object ive cr it er ia , n o ea sy t est sw hich w ould iden t ify on e na t ion ra thert ha n a not her , on e even t ra t her t ha na n ot her or on e cir cum st a nce ra t her t ha na not her t o be in t he na tion rd in t erest .Ra t her , it is a consensus tha t exist sa m on g t oplevel gover nm en ta l decis ion -mskers a t a ny poin t in t ime.

Na t ion a l in terest is a d yn a mic con ceptbot h in it s a bst ra ct a nd con t ext ua l

elemen ts . I n t he a bst ra ct , t be con cept int he post -Wor ld Wa r I I w or ld h as t a ken onsom e over t on es of in terna t ion alism. I nsom e ca ses, n a tion a l in terest s a n d in ter-na tiona l in t erest s ha ve become indis-t in guish a ble. F or exa m ple, t be n a tion a lin t erest s not on ly of t he U nit ed S ta tesa nd t he S oviet U nion , but a lso of a ll of t hen a tion s of t he w or ld, r eq uir e t ha t gen er a lnuclea r w ar be a voided. I t is even con-

ceiva ble t ha t t he concept of na t iona lself-in t erest ma y be a va nish ing con -cept in a w orld ii w hich in crea sin g in t er-d epen den ce a n d t ech nolog ica l a d va n cesin w ea pon s a n d d es tr uct ive pow er m a ke itda ngerous even for superpow er s t o pur-sue na t iona l in t erest s w it h milit a rymeans .

S om e polit ica l scien tist s a n d fut ur ist ssuggest t ha t , in t he fut ur e, t ra nsla t ion alin t erest s ma y t ra nscend in impor t ancena t iona l self-in t erest . In t erna t iona lt rea t ies on spa ce a nd Ant arct ica , a s w ella s t he in tern at ion al con cern over polh l-t ion , popu la t i on a n d f ood , r epr es en t s om eexa mples of th is t rend. H ow ever , t oomuch should not be ma de of t his t rend int he midt erm since it seems cer t a in t ha t ,t h rou gh 1990, n a t ion s w ill a ckn ow led gef ew oblig a t ion s b ey on d t h eir ow n n a t ion a lself-interest.

I f t he na t iona l in t erest s of a na t ionr epr esen t it s com pellin g n eeds, t hen t hen a t ion a l object iv es t h a t t h e n a t ion s elect sfor it self must lea d t o t he rea liza t ion oft hose in t erest s. B y ext ension t he in -t er es ts a n d object iv es d et er m in e, in la r g emea sure, t he et ra tegic opt ions of a na -t ion . The most cr it ica l elemen t in t hedevelopm en t of a milit ary st ra t egy is t heproper t ra nsla t ion of t he na t iona lpolit ica l object ives in to m ilit a ry objec-t ives a nd st ra tegic concept s. S ince t been d of World Wa r I I , t h is ba s been t hew ea kest a spect of t he developmen t ofs t ra tegy.

Th e An glo-F r en ch in va e ion of t h e S u ezC a na l in 1956 is a clea r illust ra t ion of t hefa ilur e t o t ra n ela t e a polit ica l object ivein t o correct milit ary t erms. Aft er E gyp-t ia n P resident G a ma l Abdel Na ssern a tion a lized t he S uez C a na l, E nglish a n dF ren ch polit ica l lea d er s w er e con vin cedt ha t t hey w ere fa ced w it h a n emergen td ict a tor w h o m igh t ult im a tely en gu lf t heMiddle E a st in fla mes. Mindful of t he

result s of t he fa ilure of F ra nce a nd B rit -a in t o oppos e for cibly Ad olf H it ler s t a ke-ov er of t h e R hin ela n d 20 y ea r s befor e, t h ea llies w er e d et er min ed t ha t t his m ist a kes hou ld n ot be r epea t ed .

Th e F r en ch a n d E n glis h, t h er efor e, pr e-pa r ed a com bin ed for ce for t h e in va s ion oft h e S u ez C a n a l. Th e polit ica l object iv et he unsea t ing of Na sser wa s n evert ra nsmit ted t o t he oper a t ion rd m ilit arycom ma n der s w h o n a t ur a lly focu sed t h eira t t en t ion on secur ing t he S uez C a na l.H a d t hey been given t be object ive ofdeposin g Na sser , t hey w ould un doubt -ed ly h a ve pla nned t o t a ke C a iro a ndperh aps t o occupy m uch of E gypt .

In a ny even t , t he en t ire en t erpr isefa iled , result ing in t he st rengt hen ing of ,Na ssers posit ion bot h w it hin E gypt a ndt h rou gh ou t t h e Ar a b w or ld . Alt h ou gh t h eS u ez cr is is w a s a n ext r em ely com plica t ed

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international a ffa ir , t h e fa ilu re t o r em ov eNa sser ca n be a t t r ibut ed t o t he fa ct t ha tt he F rench a nd E nglish policyma keren ev er com mu nica t ed t h e a ct uef polit iccd

object ive t o t heir m ilit a ry com ma n der s.Th is r esu lt ed in t h e select ion of a m ilit a ryobject iv e a n d s tr a tegic con cept t ot a lly in -consist en t w it h t he polit ica l effectdesired.

Aft er n at ion al object ives t ha t a re con -sist en t w ith t he na t ionef purpose a nd inha rmony w it h t he cen t ra l va lues of t heAmerica n people h ave been der ived toa ch ieve na tiona l in t erest s, a na tiona lst ra tegy ma y be developed . On e signifi-ca nt indica t ion of t he fut ure pa th of a na -t ions n at ion al st ra tegy is it s t ra dit ion alpursuit of it s n at ion ef in t erest s. Wa ft erLippm a nn com men ted on t his issue w h enh e w r ot e

the beh aL ,i or of n atzon s ou er a l on gper iod of t i me i s th e m ost r el iabl e, th ou ghnot th e on l y i n d ex of th ei r n at i on al i n .ter est . F or th ou gh th ei r I nt er est s ar e noteter nal , th ey ar e r em ar kabl y per si st en t .We can m ost n ear l y j u d ge w h at a n at i onw i l l pr obabl y u ~an t by seei n g w h at over afai r l y l on g per i od of tzm e i t h as w an ted ;zoe can m ost n ear ly pr ed i ct w h at i t w i l l d oby. kn ou i n g u h at i t h as u su al l y d on e.E ven u ,h en th ey adapt th em sel ves to an ezo si tu at i on , th ei r ww o beh avi or i s l ik el yto be a m od i fi cat i on r ath er than a t r an s-for mat i on of th ei r ol d beh avi or .

Most m odern na tions ha ve exh ibit edt his ph en om en on . F or exa mple, t he cen -t rrd t hruet of B rit ish secur it y policy forcen t uries ha s been t o provide for t hesecur it y of t he h om e isla nds by pur suin gn at ion al securit y policies t ha t w ould en -

sure tha t it s fleet w as supreme in h ome

w a t ers, t ha t n o host ile pow er shouldoccupy t he Low C oun t r ies Wd tha t nohos t il e power or coa t i t i on shou ld es t ab li shh eg em on y ov er t h e E u r opea n con t in en t .

S ince 1945, t he U nit ed S ta t es ha sfollow ed a policy of w orld lea dersh ip.S ince tha t t ime; t hree va ria t ions of th ispolicy h a ve been d om in a nt . Th ey a r e t heg eopolit ica l , t h e n uclea r a n d t h e id eolog f-C d

. G eopolit ica lly , t he st ra tegic t l k-ing since World Wa r I I in t he U nit edS ta t es h a s sough t t o en sur e t ha t n o sin glepow e r or com bin a t ion of pow er s h os tile t o

t he in t erest s of t he U nit ed S ta tee couldes ta blis h h eg em on y ov er eit h er Wes ter nE u r ope or N or t hea s t As ia . Wh ile r em in is -cen t of t he r egion a l in terest of t he U r dt edK in gdom in t he polit ica l via bilit y of t heLow C oun t r ies , t he U S int erest s a regloba l, a condit ion w hich is a ppa ren t lyd ifficult t o com pr eh en d or t o a ccept , pa r -t icu la r ly by ou r N ATO a llies.

. The st ra tegic nuclea r t h eme dea lsw it h t he problem of det er r ing st ra tegicn uclew w a r . Wh ile t his pr oblem h a s beenw it h us for more tha n a genera tion , it isbecoming more difficult t o cope w it h a st he U nit ed S ta t es ha s pa esed t h roughsuccessive st ages of n uciesr m on opolya n d n uclea r s uper ior it y t o n uclea r pa r it ya nd now . in t he opin ion of some seniormilit a ry officers , t o a st a t e close t os t r a t eg ic nucl ea r i n fer ior i t y.

. C on t a inmen t , t he ideologica l ele-m en t of Am er ica n pos t w a r f or eig n po[icy,h a s ev ol ved f rom t h e g en er a l con t a i n men tof monolit h ic communism t o t he moret ra dit ion a l a ppr oa ch ef select ively con -t a in ing t he polit ica l in fluence of t heU S S R w h en a nd w here it is in t he U Sna t iona l in t erest t o do so. This policy ieeuphemist ica lly , a nd perh aps opt imis-t ica lly , refer red t o a s ma na ging t heem er gen ce of t he S oviet U n ion a s a supe~

pow er . I t w a s m a nifest ed in t he S tr at egic

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MILITARY REVIEW

Ar ms Lim it a tion Ta lks S ALT) n egot ia -t ion a nd in t he policy of d6t en t e. As t herecen t eclipse of t hese policies demon -s t ra t es , evente col or policies in d if fer en tsh a des. An d, w h ile it is t r ,u et ha t con t em -pora r y in t erest s ca m ch an ge w e a re n owt h e a llies of ou r Wor ld Wa x 11 en em ies ), itis a lso t rue t ha t t ra dit iona l in t erest s a ndst ra tegies a lso ch a nge a lt h ough muchmore s low l y.

The t erm st ra tegy , der ivin g from t hea ncien t G reek st ra t ?gckt he a rt of t heg en er a l-h a s been obscu red in a sem a nt icfog since it s reviva l in t he 17th century.In order not t o a dd t o t h is confusion , it

w ill be n ecessa r y t o d efin e som ew h a t pr e-cisely not on ly w ha t is mea nt by t he t ermna t iona l st ra t egy, but a lso t o differ en -t ia te it from some a llied t erms such a sgra nd st ra t egy a nd na t iona l policy . Tobegin in r ever se order , a clea r differ en -t ia t ion bet w een t he mea n ings of policya nd st ra tegy ha s been provided by t heI ns tit u te f or D efen se An a ly sis:

Al though ther e i s often a l egi t i m ateou er lap of th ese w or ds. . . . th e d i st i nct i onbetw een them can be r et ai ned i f w e keepi n m ind that a pol l cy i s essen t i al ly a pat -ter n of act i on or deci si on , w hi l e astr ategy i ,e., any par ti cu l ar st r ategy,not st r t gy i t s l j l s n rt or science isessen t i al l .y a pl an . I n oth er w or ds, apol i cy i s a r u l e gover n i ng act i on or d eci -si o~ a st r ategy i s a pl an i n accor dan cew i th w hi ch vanous m eans, i ncl ud i ngact ion s an d d eci si on s, ar e d i rect ed t ow ar d

t h e ach i evem en t of obj ect i ves.K a rl von Clausewitz pr oper ly u nd er -

st ood t his in ter rela t ion sh ip of pollcy a n dst ra t egy, w h er ein policy est a blish es t hepolit ica l fr a mew ork in w hich st ra tegymust opera t e. I n C la usew it zs m ind, t hedist inct ion w as clea r. S t ra tegy w a s a ninst rument t ha t w a s guided, sh a ped a ndcon t rolled by polit ica l policy . S o, policyr ea lly oper a tes on t w o levels. F ir st , it ca n

d es ign a t e t h e polit ica l object ives t ow a r dw h ich st r a tegy is d ir ect ed , a n d, secon d, itca n be, t a ken t o mea n a ru le w hich gov-er n s a ct ion .

G ra nd st ra t egy a nd na t iona l st ra t egym ust r dso be d iffer en t ia t ed . E ssen tia lly ,gr an d st ra t egy impliee a hea vier em ph a -sis on milit a ry force t ha n does t he con -cept of na t iona l st ra t egy. The follow in gexemp li fi es t h is n ot i on

. . . gr and st r ategy has com e i n to u seto descr ibe the over al l defense pl ans of anat i on or coal i t i on of nat i ons. Si n ce th em i d -t w en ti et h cen tu r y, n at ion al st r at egyhas at tai ned w i de usage, m ean i ng th e

coor d i nat ed em pl oym en t of the totalr esou r ces of a nat i on to ach i eve i t sn at i on al obj ect i v es,

Military Stratsgy

Th eor et ica l ly, a f t er a n a t ion a l s tr a t eg yh as been d et er min ed, a m ilit a ry st ra t egysh ould be developed t o h elp a ch ieve t heends desired . I n milit a ry st ra tegy, t opa ra phra se C la usew it z, every t hin g issimple, but t he simplest t h ing is diffi-cu lt a n d t ha t ext en ds t o it s defin it ion .

On e rea son t ha t such a n a ura ofmyst ery sur rounds t he subject is t ha t ,u nlik e t h e h is tor y of w a r -fa ce. t he h is t or yof st ra tegy is fra gment a ry . I t ha s beenon ly recen t ly t ha t milit a ry st ra t egy ha sbeen con ceived of a s a n yt hin g m or e t ha n

t he a l of dist r ibut ing a nd a pply in gm ilit a ry m ea n s, such a s a r med for ces a n dsu pplies, t o fu lfill t he en ds of policy . To-da y , a t lea st t h ree dist inct , a lt houghin t er r ela t ed , t ypes of milit a ry st ra t egyma y be iden t ified: na t iona l milit a ryst ra t egy, coor din a tive m ilit a ry st ra t egya n d oper a t ion a l m ilit a r y et r a t eg y.

I n t h e developmen t of a n in t egra tedgloba l na tiona l milit a ry et ra tegy, t he

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milit a ry w orks w it h individua ls w ho a reexper t s in d ea l in g w it h t h e ot h er elem en t sof na t iona l pow er -polit icet , econom ic,ps y ch ol og ica l an d t ech n ol og icrd . N a t i on a l

milit a ry st ra t egy ma y be defin ed a s t hea r t of t he compreh ensive direct ion ofpow er t o con t rol sit ua t ions a nd a rea s inor der t o a t t a in object ives. e I t is usua llyjoin t or com bin ed in n a t ur e a n d pr im a rilyh a s t o d o w it h t ra n sla t in g polit icr d objec-t ives in t o milit a ry object ives a nd broa dst ra t egic concept s. I t is a lso a t t h isna t ionsf level of st ra t egic a na lysis t ha tt he Na t iona l S ecur it y C ouncil, t he J oin tChiefs of S t a ff a nd t he D epmt ment ofD efen se in ter fa ce in t h e con du ct of cr isis-man a g emen t ac t iv it i es .

Coordina t ive milit a ry st r a tegy is fo-cused on t he m ilit a ry pr oblem s t ha t a r iseout of t he sepa r a tion of m ilit a ry st ra t egyfr om t he execu t ive civilia n policy func.t ion . When t he h ea d of st a t e w a s bot h t hepolit ica l a nd milit a ry lea der , un it y a ndcoh er en ce bet w een en ds a n d m ea n sbe-t w een policy a nd st ra t egj-w a s ea sier t o

a ch ieve. The mit it a ry com plexit y of t hela st ha lf of t he 20t h cen t ury , w hen t h eh ea d of st a te ca n not effect ively fun ct iona s t he opera t iona l milit a ry com ma nder ,ha s led t o t he grow t h a nd increa sedimpor t ance of t he coordina t ive level ofm ilit a r y st r a t eg y.

In st ep w it h t he grow ing a nd mult i-fa c et ed r es pon sib ilit iee of con t em por a r ydefense pla nn ing, t h e na t ure of a nd

prepa ra tion for w ar fa re ha ve becomeincrea singly complex. The na tiona lsecu rit y pr ocess cr ea t ed in t h e a ft er ma t hof Wor ld Wa r I I sh ift ed from it s t ra di-t ions concen t r a t ion on w ar t o t he morea m biguous dem a nds of C old Wa r.

Th is r eq uir ed t ha t t h e m ilit a r y for ces ofa coun t ry be designed a nd ma in t a ined inrea diness in pea cet ime a ga inst a t hr ea tt ha t w a s not on ly globrd, but on e t ha t w a en ot bounded by t ime. Req uir ed w a s a

syst em of in t er locking pa rt s t ha t w oulda llow t he milit a ry t o suggest w a ye inw hich milit a ry force migh t help t oa ch iev e polit ica l object iv es a n d t o d es ig n

a n d m a int a in t he for ce et ruct ur e a s w ell.C oor din a tive m ilit a ry st ra t egy im pa ct sg rea t l y on t h e d ev elopm en t of for ce s tr uc-t ure. B eca use of t hese force st ruct ureim plica t ion s, t h e D epa r t men t of D efen eea nd t he milit a ry depa rt men t s developcoor din a t ive m ilit q -y st r a tegy a lt h ou ght he J oin t C hiefs of S t a ff a lso pla y a nim por t a n t r ole.

C oordina t ive milit a ry st ra tegy ma ya lso be defin ed a s t ha t pla nn ing w hichlin ks t h e m ilit a r y con cept s es ta b lis hed a tt he na tiona l level t o t he con t ingencypla ns of t he un ified comma nds. I t a lsod evelops t h e policy a n d pr ogr a m s n eed edt o build t he force st ruct ure necessa ryt o implement t he midra nge milit a rys t ra t egy.

Th e fun ct ion of t he m ilit a ry est a blish -ment dur in g pea cet ime, in a ddit ion t odet er r ence, is t o prepa re t o figh t . The

problem , h ow ever , is t ha t , since a t lea stt h e ea r ly 1960s, sy st em a n a lyst s a n d pr o-gra mmers h a ve ha d a dispropor t iona t eimpa ct on milit a ry pla nn ing beca use oft heir a bilit y t o in flu en ce bu dg et a r y d eci-sione. Th is ha s led t o a n imba la ncew h e rei n p rofeeei on s l ju d gr r i en t h a s g iv enw a y t o polit icrd expedien cy , not on ly int h e d evelopm en t of a for ce st ru ct ur e, bu trdso in t he conduct of w a r. S t ra t egy pla n-

n ing, not progra ming, sh ould be t hepr imsry det ermina n t of t be w a y t ha tm ilit a ry for ces w ill be used in ba t t le.

Th e la st level of m ilit a ry st ra t egy is t hem or e t ra dit iona l a nd bet ter unders t oodcon cept of oper a t ion a l m ilit a r y st ra t egy.A con cept used by t he French , G erma nsa n d R ussia n s a m on g ot ber e, it con sist s ofon e or more in t er r ela t ed milit a ry ca m-pa ign pla ns deeign ed t o a ch ieve a st a tedmilit a ry object ive. S ince opera t iona l

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Differences Between Operational Planning and Force Planning

Perspective

Timeframe

Conceptual Basis

OrganizationalFocus

Scenarios Employed

Products Produced

Forces Considered

Threat Considered

Treatment ofEmployment andDeployment

Operational Planning

Employment of militaryforce

1-2 years

Military strategy

Department of Defense,Joint Chiefs of Staff,unified commands

Regional orientation,both those scenanosIike,ly to occur andthose taxing UScapabilities

Contingency plans

Current forces, wtth andwithout mobilization,including their defi-ciencies

Deployed enemy forces

Unified commanders concept of operation formsbasis for deployment

requirements

Force Planning

Development of militarycapabilities

3-10 years .

Resource allocation

Department of Defense,Joint Chiefs of Staff,commanders n chiefand the services

Worldwlde war andspeclflc scenarios totest forces across fullspectrum

Input to Department ofDefense programingand budgetingdocuments

Programed forces andplanned forces atvarious levels of risk

Projected enemy forces

Broad concept of employment; deployment con-sidered only for major

force elements

ha d t o know w ha t condit ion w a s desired h een det ermined , it is a t t a ined t h rougha ft er t he object ive of d eposin g of Na sserw a s a ch ieved , for t his should det erm in et he milit a ry object ive a nd concept ofopera t ion . C onsidera t ion of t he effectdesired must be a ccomplished before am ilit a r y ob ject i ve is s elect ed . o

On ce t he pr oper m ilit a ry object ive h as

t he d evelopm en t a n d im plem en ta t ion ofa n ef fect i ve s t ra t eg ic con cept . S u cces sfu lopera tions a re t he result of a pla n tha tcon sid er s, in a d dit ion t o t h e d ev elopm en tof a cor rect m ilit a ry object ive, t h e sa lien tfa ct or s of pr oject in g f or ce f rom pos it ion s

w hich offer sign ifica nt a dva nt a ges over

1982 45-


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MILITARY REVIEW

t he en em y, of ba la n cin g t he r eq uir em en tfor a d eq ua t e for ces ov er com pet in g pr ior -it ies a nd of ma in t a in ing fr eedom ofa ct ion . The st ra t egic con cept ca n beev a lu a t ed for effect iv en es s by u sin g t h r ee

cr it er ia : suit a bilit y , fea sibilit y a nda ccept abilit yy . E a ch of t hese fa ct ors isdepen den t u pon t he ot her t w o.

The fir st st a nda rd, sui tabi l i ty, deter-mines w het her t he milit a ry object ive, ifa ch ieved, w ill lea d t o t he desir ed effect .B ut t he object ive sough t must a lso befeasible. Th is r eq uir es t ha t t he r esou rcesa va ila ble for t he a t ta inm en t of t he objec-t ive be com pa r ed t o t he en em ye ca pa bil-it y t o preven t it s a t t a inment . F ina lly , ift he st ra t egic concept ha s met t hedem a nds of suit a bilit y a n d fea sibilit y, itmust yet be det ermin ed w het h er t heoper a t ion ca n a ch ieve it s m ilit a ry objec-t ive a t r ea son a ble cost a ccept a bilit y.The in fluen ce of t his fa ct or m ay r eq uir et h e a ba n don men t of t h e en tir e pr oject , if,a ft er being a dvised by his milit a ry com-m a nd er , t h e polit ica t lea d er d ecid es t ha tt he ga in e d o n ot just ify t he coet s. D ur in g

w a r , t his is obviou sly a h ig hly su bject ivedet ermina tion . .

E ach of t h eee t h ree fa ct ors a nd t heirs ub elem en t e cou ld b e con s id er ed in m u chm or e d et a il. F or exa m ple, in d et er m in in gt he suit a bilit y of t he a ppr opr ia t e effectdesired , t her e a re t w o possible choices:E it her t he st a tus q uo m a y be m a int a in ed,or eoms cha nge t o t he sit ua tion ca n beeffect ed . To d et er min e MS object ive, t h emilit a ry pla nner considers t he sa lient .a spect s of t h e sit ua t ion . To d et er min e t h eba la nce of r ela t ive comba t pow er , suchnonmilit a ry fa ct ors a s t he polit ica l a ndecon omic sit ua t ion must be consideredr don g w it h fa ct or s m or e d ir ect ly r eleva n tt o t he milit a ry such a s ma jor comba tfor ces , log is tics a n d w e a pon s s yst em s.

E st im at es for bot h fr ien dly a n d en em yforces muet a lso be ma de. The survey of

t h e ch a r a ct er is tics of t h e oper a t ion a l a r eash ould include such t hings a s t er ra in ,cI im a te, ba se infr a st ruct ur e a n d lin ee ofcom mun ica t ion . C ost s m a y be m ea sur edin ca sua lt ies, doffa r s or in ot her less t a n-

gible w a ys such a s loss of a na t ione pres-t ige, m ilit a r y r epu ta t ion or cr ed ibilit y a sa n a lly .

All of t hese cr it er ia a re ba sed on t heeva lua t ion of t he fa ct ors r eleva n t t omilit a ry opera tiona l pla nn in g. E a chmilit a ry object ive a nd ea ch suppor tin gs tr a t eg ic ob ject ive w ill r eq uir e a d et er m i-na t ion of t he suit a bilit y of t he effectd es ir ed ; a n exa m in a t ion of t h e fea s ibilit yof t he opera t iona l pla n w it h r ega r d t o it sphysica f object ive, r ela t ive posit ions,a ppor tionm en t of figh t ing st rengt h a ndfr eedom of a ct iom a nd, fina lly , of it saccep t ab ili t yy w i t h r e fe r en ce t o it s r el a t i vecost.

Constraints on Military Strategy

F or st ra t egist s, t her e ie, in rerdit y, nosuch t h ing a s a t ot a lly un const r a inedst ra t egy. The const ra in t s on U S st ra te-gist s a r e eev er e. S om e of t he m or e im por -t a nt con st ra in ts a r e d iscu esed below

. Vulnerabi l i ty. Th e vu ln er a bilit y oft he U nit ed S t a tes t o nuclea r a tt a ck ha sca used Amer ica n eu-a tegist s t o a void am ilit a ry con fr on ta t ion w it h t he U S SR . I tie st ra t egica lly sign ifica n t t ha t t h e U S S Ris a lso vulnera ble t o a U S nuclea r a t t ack.Yet it is not merely t he fa ct t ha t t heU n it ed S t a t es is vt dnera ble t ha t con-st ra ins Amer ica n st ra tegist s. I t is t hedegr ee of vulnera bilit y t ha t rea llym a tt er s. Th e ver y eu rvivr d of t he U n it edS ta tes is a t st ake.

S o, t he t w o super pow er s h a ve a t ta in eda ba fa nce of t er ror t ha t promot es t hest a tus q uo w here t he vit a l in t erest e of

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ea ch a re con cern ed a nd a llow s st ra tegicflexibilit y on ly in per iph er a l a r ea s . At t h esa me t ime, due t o it s st ra tegic a rsena fa n d geos tr a tegic loca t ion , t h e t er rit or y of

t he U nit ed S ta tes is rela t ively in vuh rer-a ble t o conven t iona l a t t a ck, ma king ast ra tegy of ret renchmen t t empt ing. Infa ct , t o a dopt a n y ot her st ra t egy r eq uir espr oof t ha t t he coun tr y or a rea in q uest ionis import a nt t o t he U nit ed S t a tes. Thisproof is couched in such t erms a s eco-nomic in t erdependence . r esou rce requ i re-m en ts, m or a f com mit men ts a n d id eolog-ica l opposit ion t o comm un ism. Wit h t he

except ion of West er n E ur ope a n d J a pa n ,w het h er or not t he fa ctors a pply a nd t ow ha t degree, a re a nd w ill con t inue to besu bject t o sign ifica n t d eba t e.

Principles. Am er ica n s h a ve cer ta indeeply h eld beliefs a s t o w ha t is right .Th ese pr in ciples h a ve evolved fr om h is-t or ica l, cu lt ur a l a n d ps ych olog ica l r oot s,a n d t h ey a r e d ifficu lt Lo ch a n ge. As P r esi-den t J immy C a rt er st a t ed in his 1980S ta t e of t he U nion messa ge, c. . ourpow er w ill never be used t o in it ia t e at hrea t t o t he securit y of a ny na t ion or t her igh t s of a ny huma n being. B eca use

America ns w ant t o be r igh t , ma ny of ourw a rs ha ve ha d a n ideologica l, if not mes-sia nic, qua lit y to t hem. They ha ve beencouch ed in t erms of ma king t he w orldsa fe for democra cy a nd figh t ing cornm un is m a n y w h er e, a n y t i me.

These concept s ma ke it difficult t oselect w ar-t ermina tion goa fs shor t oft ot a l vict or y or u ncon dit ion a l s ur ren der.America ns a re a lso a pra gma tic peoplew ho a tt a ck dist ast eful jobs direct ly a ndw h o w en t t o end t hem quickly so tha tt hey ca n get t o ot her t h ings. Theexper iences of K orea a nd Vietna m ha veca used t he America n public t o viewlim it ed w a r w it h d ist a et e. Th er efor e, t hest ra t egist m uet be con cer ned w it h publicopir t ion , h opefully ch oosin g a st ra t egy

t ha t is not on ly mora lly right , but a lsoon e w hich is in ha rmony w it h t heAmerica n ch ara ct er a nd on e w it h w hicht h e pu blic ca n id en t ify.

N at i onal w il l . Na tiona l w ill is a dy -n a mic elem en t of n a tion a l pow er a n d, fort he U n it ed S ta t es, is com posed of a t lea stt h ree s ubelem en ts : public w ill, cor rg res -eion a l w ill a n d pr esid en t ia l or execu tiv ew ill. C rucia f t o t he expr ession , a n d m or esignificantly Lo t he formula t ion ofna t iona l w ill, is t he communica tionmedia . The a dverse impa ct of t he Viet .na m exper ience on t he na t iona l psyche

ha s led t o a percept ion of a loss of w illw hich could very w ell set t he st a ge forcost ly errors in foreign policy byAmerica n st a t esmen a nd foreignd iplom a ts a s w ell. I n a dem ocr a cy , a fir m,a r t i cu la t ed publ ic op in ion can be deci si ve.S in ce Am er ica n s a r e a l so con cer n ed a b ou tt heir im age, st ra tegist s must recogn izet h e con st ra in ts t ha t w or ld opin ion pla ceson m ilit a r y opt i on s .

. Lega l. Lega l const ra in t s a lso a ffectt he developmen t a nd execut ion of mili-t a ry st ra tegy . The most con t roversia llega l const ra in t is t he WV P ow ers Actpa ssed dur in g t he h eight of t he Viet na mw it hdr aw a l per iod. Th is is a n especia llys ign ifica n t con st r a in t in v iew of t h e d ev el-opmen t of t he Ra pid D eploymen t J oin tTask F orce.

Th is con st r a in t w ill be cr it ica lly sensit ive t o t h e pr esid en ts r ela t ion s w it h C on -~ ess. The a ct is a mbiguous en ough t oa llow r oom for in ter pr et a t ion . Wit h g oodcon gr es sion a l r ela t i on s , t h e pr es id en t ca nexpect fa v or a ble in ter pr et a t ion s. I f poorrel a t i ons ex is t , r es t r ict i ve int e rp ret a t i onsma y result . S o, t he milit a ry st ra tegistmust be cogn iza nt of t he st a tus of presi-d en t iz d-leg is la t iv e r ela t ion s. O th er con -gr es sion a l a ct s w h ich con st ra in st ra t egyinclude const ra in t s on securit y a ssis-

t a nce, refusa f t o vot e for a ssist a nce to

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Angola , t he pa ssa ge of t he Nunn a mend-ment a nd t he end of t he dra ft .

. Geographic. G eogra phy is a ba sicelem ent of milit a ry st ra t egy. Th e la ck ofdept h in E ur ope is on e of. t h e fa ct or s t ha tforces t he U nit ed S t a t es a nd NATO t oa dopt a st ra tegy of forw a rd defense t ha tmigh t not ot herw ise be t he best choice.This is pa rt icula rly sign ifica nt t o t heU nit ed S ta tes. Throughout most of t hiscen t ury , t he U nit ed S t a tes, a ma rit imen a t ion . cou ld , like G r ea t B r it a in befor e it ,r ely on h a vin g t ime a va ila ble t o mobilizeit s for ces for w a r. I t could a lso pr im a rilyr ely on it s na va l for ces for it s defen se.

The colla pse of t he West ern Allies ont he con tinen t in World Wa r I I ca used t heU nit ed S ta tes t o send a huge a rmy t o pa r-t icipa t e in t he inva sion a nd liber at ion ofWest ern E urope. The em er gence of t hela rge S oviet ground t hrea t in t he 1950sca used t he U nit ed S t a tes a nd NATO t oex t en d m em ber sh ip t o t h e F ed er a l R epu b-lic of G erma ny G E) in excha nge for it scon t r ibu t ion t o N ATO d ef en se.

The pr ice exa ct ed by t he G E for t h isexch a ng e w a s a for w a r d d efen se st ra t egya t or nea r t he I n t er -G erma n B order I G B ). This need t o defend forw a rda ga inst t he con t iguous Wa rsa w P acta r mies n eg a t ed t he a d va n t a ge of dist a ncea nd t ime t ha t ha d ena bled t he U nit edS t a tes t o mobilize behind t he At la nt icOcea n . Toda y, in a st ra t egic sen se, it is a sif t he E a st ern t err it or ia l border of t heU nit ed S ta tes w ere cont erminous t o t he

IG B . In t his con t ext , t he fr iendly ocea rin ow becom es a n ext r em ely fr a gile lin e ofcom mu nica t ion . This ca u ses t he pa u cit yof a U S mercha n t fleet t o be a ma t t er ofg rea t con cer n t o U S st ra t egist s con sider -in g t he im por ta n ce of U S r ein for cem en tst o NATO st ra t egy. I f t h ie w ere notenough , t he linka ge of NATO defensew it h t he U S st ra tegic nuclea r for ce ha sm a de it vir tua lly im possible t o decou ple

U S interests f rom N ATO in t er es t s.I n eseence, t hen , t he cur r ent for wa rd

defense of t he I G B is not a forw a rdd efen se of t h e C on t in en t a l U n it ed S t a t esinsofa r a s t ha t st ra tegy ha s developed.Th e U n it ed S ta t es ha s becom e a s m obili-za t ion dependen t a nd a s st ra tegica llyr igid a s a ny cont inent a l pow er ever w a s,gra tuit ously , a nd a ppa rent ly w it houtr ea lizin g it , g ivin g u p t he pr eciou s flexi-bilit y pr ovid ed by t he m a rit im e n a t ur e ofit s g eos t ra t e gic loca t i on .

. F or ce st r uct u r e an d r isk . St ra teg iccon cept s ca n be ch a n ged a lm ost in st a n ta -n eou sly , but it t a kes con sider a bly lon ger

t o d ev el op t h e forces , eq u ip men t , d oct r i nea n d t ra in in g t ha t is n eeded t o im plem en ta n ew st ra t egy. This indica t es t ha tcha nges in milit a ry st ra t egy in t he com -ing deca de, beca use of force st ruct ureconsidera t ions a lone, w ill proba bly bem a r gin a l or in cr em en t a l in n a t ur e.

There is a cloee a nd obvious rela t ion.sh ip a mong t he concept s of milit a ryst ra t egy, for ce st ruct ur e a n d r isk. A m ili-t a ry st ra t egy is devised t o a chievepolit ica l object ives in t he fa ce of somet hr ea t . Th e for ce st ruct ure pr ovides t heca pa bilit ies n eeded t o implement t hest ra t egy. S ince on ly ra rely a re milit aryreq uirement s a nd ca pa bilit ies in eq ui-libr iu m, t o ba k nce t h e books t h e s hor t felbet w een t he t w o is t ermed risk. Whenr is k b ecomes u n accept ab l e, an d res ou rcest o incr ea se for ce st ruct ure a r e n ot for th -coming, t hen t he st ra tegic object ives

must be rea ssessed t o br ing t hem in t ot erms w it h t he rea lit y of t he st ra tegicenvironment.

S ince object ives a re rea l a nd risk isa bst ra ct , t h is rea ssessment eeldomoccurs. I t is t h is reluct a nce t o a lignst ra t egy w it h rea lit y t ha t is a t t he root ofm ost m ilit a r y fa ilu re.

I n t er n s t i on al n egot i at i on s. In te rna-t iona l n egot ia t ions, such a s t he Nuclea r

48 March


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I

i

Test -B an Trea ty , t he Ant iba llist icMissile Tr ea t y a n d S ALT, a lt h ou gh ben e-ficia l, const ra in st ra t egy beca use t h eylim it ;h e w ea pon s a n d t h e for ces a va ila blet o t be st ra tegist . Arms-con t rol a gree-ment s w hich cou ld ha ve m a jor impa ct onst ra t egy include a comprehensive t estba n , S ALT, ch em ica l w a r fa r e, m ut ua l a n dba l a nced for ce r ed uct ion s, con ven t ion a la r ms t ra n sfer s a n d a n tisa t ellit e con t,er r.t ion.

. A[hances. D ue t o t he S oviet a bilit yt o ma in t a in a la rge st a nding a rmy, t heU nit ed S t a tes ha s a dopt ed a n a llia ncest ra t egy. The in t roduct ion of a llies

a lw a y s lea d s t o con st ra in ts beca u se a lliesgen er a liy a r e a sym met rica l in pow er a n din in t erest s bot h w it hin , but especia llyout side of, t he a llia n ce a r ea . Viet na m a n dt h e 1956 S uez in cid en t a r e ca ses in poin t .

Of eq ua l impor t ance is t he fa ct t ha t U Sforces a re not a va ila ble for use w it houtr eg a rd t o loca t ion a n d pr ior com mit m en tt o a llia nces. P a r t icula r ly in coun ter in g aS o~ , iet t hr ea t out side of C en tr a l E ur ope,t he U nit ed S ta tes w ould fm d it difficult ,for polit ica l a s w ell a s m ilit a r y r ea s on s, tow ea k en t h e m a in fr on t N AT )) in or der t ouse such forces in a per iphera l a rea .At t h e sa me t ime, t he NATO AII ia ncefur t her const ra ins t he U nit ed S ta tes byit s commit ment t o a n a rt icula ted st ra t-eg y of for w a rd defen se.

. B ur eaucr acy. l n con sid er in g m or eindirect or crea t ive a pproa ches t ost ra t egy. t he st ra t egist is con st ra in ed bybu rea u cr a t ic in er t ia . r he bu rea u cr a cy isbased on st a bilit y a n d r ou tin e a n d r esist sinnova t ion a nd ch a nge. S t ra tegic con-cept s a r e u su a lly com pr om is e pO sit iO ns -idw est common denomina t or s- w it hw h ich a ll a g en cies ca n a g ree a n d, beca u seof t his d r ive for consensus, a re not veryim a gin a t ive. On e r ea s on w h y g en er a ls a r eso. oft en a ccused of prepa ring t o figh tt he la st w ar is t he fier ce burea ucra tic

resist ance t ha t bold cha nges genera llyencounter.

Economic Th e econ omi c res ou rcest ha t a na t ion is w illing t o devot e t odefense a re m ajor consider a t ions in t hefor mula t ion of st ra t egies. E conomist scor rect ly t ell st ra tegist s t ha t t hey a recom pet in g for sca r ce r esour ces. E ven int he a ffluen t U n it ed S ta t es, t her e is n everen ough t o go a round. Idea lly , st ra t egyw O u Id derive from int erest s , t h enresources w ould be a lloca t ed t o imple.men t t he st ra tegy . Never t heless, t hest ra t egist must be a pra gma t ist a nd pro.pose st ra t egies t ha t a re fina ncia lly

obt a in a ble. R ea list iceJ ly , h ow ever , t heprogr am mer com ma nds t he st ra t egist ,a nd t h e budget sha pes st ra t egy. I t isa x iom a t ic t h a t , in ea ch F ive-Yea r D ef en seP lmr , st ra t egy a nd r esources a re a lw a ysin eq uilibr ium in t h e fift h yea r, but , mr ea lit y, t he fift h y ea r is n ever a t ta in ed.

Summary

Any U S st ra t egist dra w ing up milit a rypla ns must be a w a re of t he impa ct t ha tcon t empora ry st ra tegic concept s w illh a ve on h is d esig n. Th e in t er rela t ed con -cept s of na tiona I purpoS e, na tiona lin t erest . na t iona l object ives, na t iona lst ra t egy a n d m ilit a ry st ra t egy est a blisht he fr a mew ork w it hin w hich t he st ra t e-g ist m ust oper a t e. Th e em er gen ce of t h ree

dist inct , a lt hough in t er r ela t ed t ypes ofm ilit a r y s t r a t eg y n a t i on a l, coor d in a t i vea nd opera t iona l-r eflect s t he complexit y of t he em er ging st ra t egic en vir on ment .An a pprecia t ion of t he funda ment a l ele-men t s of milit a ry pla nn ing a nd t he comst ra irr t s a ct ing upon t he st ra tegist isn ecessa r y t o a n un der st a ndin g of t he dis-cussion of t he st ra t egic m od el pr esen tedin P ar t I I .

1982 49


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MILITARY REVIEW

NOTES

1 NSC.68, U.,lea Stales Oorect .es and Programs 1., NatmnarSecur,,y 14 ADr,l 1950

2 Roy Full Ch anti Geoffrey Powell, S.,, J/Ie Double War,narmsn HwIImon Norm Pomfret w ~979. uP 129

3 Walter L(pprnan. Q.otea m Cec,l Y Crabb Jr, Amerr.an

Fore,g Po(,cy m the Nuc,e.r Age, Ham., & Row PQ 191er, 1,N Y 1972. D 1S34 Ler cb. of Terms R,{,,. ? to Na mnal SecIIr V S1,7,.9, o

Arms anti Arm, Confmf, .Ort.a b? Jam., E K g dr QuO eO r U,,Sciwar. and L.SZIO Hamk Strafegtc rerm,.omgy, PraegerPbl,,er,, N Y 1966 P 95

5 Gr.oa Sfmtegp *or me 798 s eagled by Bruce Palmer J(

Arnerca. EnterDrme lns ,tute for P.mm Pol,cy Research,Washmgtoh, D C , 1978 p 73

8 Hen, C Eccles, M, ,, ,, , P;wer a free SOc,ety, Naval WarCollege Press, Newmrt, R 1, 1979, D t Aarmrat EcGles.ItrlbteI., , def,n,l,on to Herbert Rosmsk,

7 Roger A,hley, A Smarf G.,de /0 Cl,usewfz, Cawcor Books,N Y .1980, P 101

8 Has. Holborn, Monk.% Strate.ac concepts, Mmt.ry Al.,,s Volume 1 Fall ,942 . . 153.68

9 The fol,ow,ng d,,..,,,; ,s basee on S..0 M,,,,a,y De.,sm., US Naval War Col lege, Ne. oort , R 1, 1942

10 Fvll,ch and Powell OD Crt. D 185

Colonel i ilham 0. Staudenmazer L5 n strategLc

Izn+st at the Str. tegLc Studies lnstLtute, US

A i-my War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl.mmLa He rt-cei.ed a bachelvrs degrm in general

education from the University of Chattanooga, amasters degree zn publ~c admtm~tratum fromPennsyk,unia State Unit, crsity and M a graduateof the LrSACGSC and the US Army War College.HP has serued as a diuwzonal au defenw bat.talwm commander Cn Gerrncmy and in uanousstaff ass~gnments 0 the Department of theA rrny, Washzng?on. D C HIS aruc[e SomeStrategm Imphcatzons of Figh tmg Outnurmbered on the NATO Battlefield appeared m theMay 1980 Military Review.

o v i t Missiles Monitored Two tracking stations, set upjointly by the Peoples Republic of China and the UnitedStates, according to information reveaied in Washington, have

been monitoring missiles launched from Tyuratam in centralRussia eince mid-1980. The monitoring stations, located nearthe Russian border in western China, are operated by Chinesetechnicians using US-supplied equipment. Ail the informationcoiiected is shared by both countries. The joint monitoringsystem is said to hq~e been set up as a result of the ioss ofsimiiar US facilities In northern Iran after the Islamic revolu-tion there. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, while not actualiyrefuting it, hae denied all knowledge of such joint facilities inChina./rrterrratiorra/ Defense Review, 01981.

Documents

MR 1982-3 StrategicConcepts1980s