Motion to Dismiss Planned Parenthood Lawsuit 03152016 Xx 1

8/19/2019 Motion to Dismiss Planned Parenthood Lawsuit 03152016 Xx 1

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NO. 16-CI-00802 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTDIVISION 3

HON. MITCH PERRY

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKYCABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILYSERVICES

PLAINTIFF

vs.DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Electronically Filed

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA ANDKENTUCKY, INC.

DEFENDANT

* * * * * * *

INTRODUCTION

This case is about rules, those who follow them, and those who do not. The rules at issue

are a garbled regulatory scheme one might suspect was intended to thwart its stated purpose.

Defendant Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (“PPINK”) followed the rules in both

letter and spirit. Plaintiff Cabinet for Health and Family Services, lead by Governor Matt Bevin’s

general counsel Stephen Pitt, 1 did not. The Cabinet has side-stepped its statutory and

administrative obligations, unilaterally changed the rules by which this process is guided, and

declared violations of its newly-minted rules that predate their invention. In doing so, it violated

the rights of PPINK and its patients. In a jaw-dropping display of authoritarian hypocrisy,

1 While the governor has the authority to employ attorneys to represent himself and otherexecutive departments, KRS 12.210 requires that the salary of the attorney be paid out of thedepartment’s appropriations, and also that the Governor authorize the employment by executiveorder. 12.210 (1). While the Cabinet’s counsel of record in this case has been properly appointedas Governor Matt Bevin’s general counsel, (Executive Order 2015-012), there are no Ordersrecorded with the Secretary of State approving Mr. Pitt’s retention as counsel for the Cabinet.


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without notice and without process, the Cabinet filed this action asking this Court unilaterally to

impose penalties totaling well over $500,000 in fines.

This Complaint lacks merit on its face. The Cabinet lacks standing to file this action, and

the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. The Court should spare the system, the taxpayers, and

the women of Kentucky the burden of staging this political stunt and grant PPINK judgment as a

matter of law. In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the case for the Cabinet’s failure to

comply with its own regulations and the statutory prerequisites to bringing suit, the Cabinet’s

lack of standing, and the Court’s lack of jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case constitute the latest, but certainly not final, chapter in an ongoing

public dialogue over when and under what circumstances women should have access to abortion

services. That debate is not relevant here, except insofar as it provides a context for the

machinations animating this case. Should the Court deny this Motion, future pleadings will

deconstruct the history of these parties and their place in the larger context of the debate. For the

purposes of this Motion, however, the parties’ relationship over the last few months, as

documented in the Complaint and related public records, is sufficient for the Court to evaluate

the merits of the argument.

On November 19, 2015, PPINK submitted its completed application for a license to

operate an abortion facility pursuant to KRS 216B.0431 and 902 KAR 20:360 to the Cabinet for

Health and Family Services. (Complaint ¶ 9; Exhibit A). With that application, PPINK tendered

copies of transfer agreements with the Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Women’s

Health at the University of Louisville Hospital and with Louisville Metro Emergency Medical

Services as required by KRS 216B.0435. (Complaint Exhibit A). The application was


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immediately distributed for internal processing by the Inspector General of the Cabinet,

Maryellen Mynear. (Complaint ¶ 21).

KRS 216B.0431 establishes the general licensing and regulatory requirements for

abortion facilities in Kentucky. The statute also requires that the Cabinet create administrative

regulations providing licensure standards and procedures for abortion facilities, which are found

at 902 KAR 20:360. Pursuant to the regulations established by the Cabinet, after the application

for licensure is processed, the next and final step is an on-site inspection of the facility. 902 KAR

20:360 § 2(3). As with other medical facilities, see 902 KAR 20:008 §2(4), the inspection must

be done “during the hours that the facility operates.” 902 KAR 20:360 §4(b). The inspection is

the Cabinet’s sole mechanism for evaluating compliance with the twenty-three sections of

regulation applicable to abortion providers. 902 KAR 20:360 § 2(4)(a). The inspection includes

evaluation of the medical staff (§5), lab services (§8), medical waste disposal (§9), and patient

medical records (§14).

The Cabinet instructed PPINK that compliance with this regulation required that the

facility be in operation at the time of the inspection. On December 1, 2015, before performing

any medical procedures, 2 this instruction was memorialized in an email exchange between

PPINK attorneys and the Cabinet’s Office of Inspector General. Counsel for PPINK wrote:

It is our understanding that, in order to determine compliance withthe licensure criteria, it is the policy of the Office of InspectorGeneral that a facility must be operational when the licensuresurvey is conducted. It is further our understanding that sincelicensure surveys are not announced in advance, preparation for asurvey requires the applicant to initiate business operations afterfiling an application so that your office will have an operationalfacility to review when the unannounced licensure survey isconducted.

2 Defendant did not perform any medical procedures at its facility until December 3, 2015.(Complaint ¶ 25, 35).


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In an email response dated December 7, 2015, the Inspector General once again

confirmed that understanding, “Yes, this is a correct statement of long standing OIG policy. As

we have discussed, the survey will be unannounced but I can confirm that [PPINK] is on the

schedule in our normal course of business.” (Complaint ¶ 28; Exhibit F). During the four days

the clinic was operational, the Louisville facility performed twenty-three abortion procedures.

(Complaint ¶¶ 43, 45).

On January 28, 2016, the Cabinet abruptly and without explanation reversed course.

Acting Inspector General Stephanie Hold sent a letter to PPINK stating that PPINK’s application

was deficient and that it was “not permitted to perform the abortion procedure until a license is

issued following an inspection of your facility and shall cease and desist any such activity.”

(Complaint ¶ 37; Exhibit G.) 4 The Cabinet claimed that the transfer agreements PPINK had with

a local hospital and ambulance service were deficient. Id. 5 PPINK immediately reached out to

counsel of record in this case, Stephen Pitt, who recently left the law firm representing PPINK to

work as general counsel to Governor Matt Bevin. (Exhibit A). 6 PPINK sent Pitt a draft of its

intended response to the January 28 letter.

Pitt responded:

4 Four months after submitting its application, the facility has yet to be inspected.

5 There are no regulations specifying what is required to be in these agreements, and the statuteonly requires a “written agreement.” See KRS 216B.0435. The claim that a deficiency in the

agreements placed patients at risk is a mendacious talking point invented by the Governor and propounded by the Cabinet. The truth is that emergency rooms and ambulance services arerequired to accept patients in need of care regardless of any explicit agreement under theEmergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.

6 “[A] court may consider matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss withoutconverting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Northville Downs v. Granholm , 622 F.3d579 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Commercial Money Ctr. Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co ., 508 F.3d 327,335-36 (6th Cir. 2007)).


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Id . 7

PPINK incorporated Pitt’s suggestions and sent its letter advising the Cabinet again of its

commitment “to full compliance with all applicable licensing regulations” and its willingness to

work with the Cabinet’s new requests. (Complaint ¶ 38; Exhibit H). PPINK also acquiesced to

the Cabinet’s sudden policy shift and agreed to stop operations until the inspection is complete.

Id .

Despite these well-documented efforts at compliance and the multiple assurances from

the Cabinet, on February 18, 2016 Governor Bevin announced with great fanfare the filing of

this lawsuit, denouncing PPINK’s “brazen disregard” for the rule of law. (Press Release, attached

as Exhibit B). The suit was filed by Bevin’s counsel Steve Pitt, who only weeks before was

advising PPINK on its compliance efforts. PPINK took Pitt, and others within the Cabinet, at

their word. Plaintiff now asks this Court to find that PPINK “willfully” and “by intent, fraud,

deceit, unlawful design, willful and deliberate misrepresentation, or by careless, negligent, or

incautious disregard for the statute or administrative regulation” violated KRS 216B.990(1) and

(6) and operated an “illegal” abortion clinic.

7 Carole Christian represented PPINK during its application process. During this time, sheworked as a law partner with Pitt at the Louisville law firm Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP.


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ARGUMENT

I. Standard of Review

CR 12.02(f) authorizes the Court to determine as a matter of law that a complaint has

failed to state a claim. See also, Bagby v. Koch , 98 S.W.3d 521, 522 (Ky. 2002). While the Court

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, see City of Louisville v. Stock Yards

Bank and Trust Co ., 843 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Ky. 1992), it need not rely upon a complaint’s

unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions. See Potter v. Trivette , 197 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Ky.

1946). Where the plaintiff fails to articulate a set of facts that support the claims in its complaint,

a Rule 12.02(f) motion should be granted. Id.

II. The Allegations Contained in the Complaint Fail to State A Claim

The Complaint seeks penalties against PPINK under KRS 216B.990. That statute only

applies to entities that willfully operate reproductive health facilities without adhering to the

statutory and regulatory requirements. Based solely upon the allegations contained in the

Complaint, it is clear that PPINK violated no law, complied with directives from the Cabinet,

and acted at all times without the kind of mens rea necessary for penalties to attach. Dismissal of

the complaint is therefore required.

A) Planned Parenthood Was Operating Its Clinic In Full ComplianceWith Kentucky Law

KRS Chapter 216B sets the licensure regime for all health facilities in Kentucky and is

designed “to insure that the citizens of this Commonwealth will have safe, adequate, and

efficient medical care.” KRS 216B.010. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services is

authorized under the chapter to issue and revoke licenses, promulgate administrative regulations

pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, and conduct public hearings with respect to “denials, suspensions,

modifications, or revocations of licenses.” KRS 216B.040.


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The process by which a health care provider can obtain an abortion license is loosely

outlined in three statutes. KRS 216B.042 directs the Cabinet to promulgate regulations providing

licensing standards and procedures “to ensure safe, adequate, and efficient abortion facilities,

health facilities and health services.” Among the processes the Cabinet is directed to establish are

“licensure application and renewal procedures.” KRS 216B.042(1)(c)(2). KRS 216B.0435

requires that abortion facilities enter into “a written agreement with a licensed acute-care

hospital” and “licensed local ambulance service.” The statute is silent as to any requirement

beyond simply that the agreement be written. Finally, and redundantly, KRS 216B.0431 again

directs the Cabinet to promulgate regulations relating to “licensure standards and procedures.”

The Cabinet ostensibly fulfilled its obligations by promulgating 902 KAR 20:360. While

the regulation is long on details of clinic policies and equipment, it is short on its directives

towards the licensure process. Section 2 provides the licensure process. The process is so brief it

warrants a full quotation:

(3) An applicant for licensure shall file with the Office of the

Inspector General, Division of Licensing and Regulation,275 East Main Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40621, anapplication for license to operate an abortion facility.

(4) An applicant for a license shall, as a condition precedent tolicensure or relicensure, be in compliance with theapplicable administrative regulations relating to an abortionfacility:

(a) Compliance with licensure administrativeregulations shall be ascertained through an on !siteinspection of the facility. A licensure inspectionmay be unannounced.

(b) A representative of the inspecting agency shall haveaccess to the facility during the hours that thefacility operates.


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The entire process under this regulation consists of five sentences. The remainder of Section 2

addresses the notice requirements and procedures for correcting violations should they be found

during the inspection and the renewal process.

Administrative regulations are interpreted using the same rules of construction applied to

statutes. Comprehensive Home Health Servs. v. Prof'l Home Health Care Agency, Inc ., 434

S.W.3d 433, 441 (Ky. 2013) (citing Revenue Cabinet v. Joy Technologies, Inc ., 838 S.W.2d 406

(Ky. App. 1992)). “[W]e presume that the legislature ‘did not intend an absurd result’ in

directing the Cabinet to promulgate regulations . . . and that the Cabinet did not intend such a

result in issuing those regulations.” Id . (citing Commonwealth, Central State Hosp. v. Gray , 880

S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1994)). Another common principle, codified in KRS 466.080, provides

that statutes will be “liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the

intent of the legislature . . .”

The object of this regulation simply cannot be effectuated unless the facility is in

operation. The Cabinet’s revised reading of the regulation would require facilities to be fully

staffed but not operating, with patients at the ready every day until the unannounced inspection.

That is an absurd result, and one that the Cabinet has never required of any medical facility.

Instead, the practice has been to allow an interim period of operation, a defacto provisional

license, during which the inspection is conducted. The application itself, crafted by the Cabinet,

plainly anticipates operation during the licensure process:

8

8http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/90C85316-276F-4818-86B3-01CEEAE4B889/0/AbortionFacilityApplication.pdf


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920 KAR 20:360 is twenty-three sections long but does not address its requirement that

abortion facilities be operational before they receive a license. However, 920 KAR 20:008

regulating all health facilities addresses the situation directly. Under that regulation, health

facilities, including abortion providers (Complaint ¶ 6), are allowed to operate without a license

in order to facilitate inspection by the Cabinet. §2(11). The regulation simply requires a

submitted application and fee and notice from the Office of the Inspector General “granting

temporary authority to operate pending submission of the application.”

That is precisely what occurred here. PPINK’s application was under submission, and it

had written authorization from the Inspector General to operate provisionally, pending

inspection, prior to starting operations on December 3. (Complaint ¶6; Exhibit B). The facts, as

plead by the Cabinet, fail to show that PPINK operated in violation of the statute.

B) The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Show Good Faith ComplianceEfforts, and As A Matter of Law are not “Willful” or “Fraudulent”

The Cabinet’s ability to impose monetary fines requires proof of the requisite mens rea .

Under KRS 216B.990 (6), the penalties require “willful” violation (KRS 216B.990(1)-(5)) orviolation “by intent, fraud, deceit, unlawful design, willful and deliberate misrepresentation, or

by careless, negligent, or incautious disregard for the statute or administrative regulation.” The

inclusion of specifically-named mental states means KRS 216B.990 does not impose strict

liability.

KRS 216B does not itself define “willful.” Under Kentucky criminal law, “willful” has

long meant “intentionally, not accidentally or involuntary.” Hall v. Commonwealth , 155 Ky. 541

(Ky. 1913). In the administrative realm, willful requires more than a finding of a statutory or

regulatory violation. In the unemployment context, “willful or wanton,” has required an element

of “bad faith.” Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil , 381 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Ky. 2012). In the


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context of contempt proceedings, our Supreme Court recently discussed the ambiguity of the

“willful” requirement. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G ., 475 S.W.3d 600 (Ky.

2015). It concluded that in the contempt context, “willful” is “not merely knowing but

intentional, and the difference is along the lines of a conscious purpose to disobey the authority

of the court.” Id . at 620. That distinction is analogous here. Addressing whether an agency’s

violation of the Open Records statue was sufficiently willful to justify sanctions, the same court

found that willfulness requires more than a showing that the statute was violated; the action must

be “without plausible justification and with conscious disregard of the requester’s rights.” City of

Ft. Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer , 406 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Ky. 2013).

This Complaint, even if contorted to the view most favorable to the Cabinet, fails to

allege a single solitary fact to support such an argument. What it does allege is that (1) PPINK

submitted its application in November, 2015 (Complaint ¶21); (2) PPINK had agreements in

place with both a hospital and ambulance service (Complaint ¶¶ 15-16); (3) PPINK requested

guidance from the Cabinet on its compliance with the sparse regulatory structure (Complaint ¶

22); (4) The Cabinet instructed PPINK on how to comply with the regulatory structure

(Complaint ¶ 23); (5) the Cabinet verified the appropriateness of PPINK’s application paperwork

(Complaint ¶ 23). After acting in accordance with the Cabinet’s written instructions, (6) PPINK

again asked for confirmation that it was proceeding appropriately (Complaint ¶25);and (7)

PPINK was a second time assured, in writing, of its compliance with the Cabinet’s requirements

(Complaint ¶¶ 26, 28).

The other mental states outlined in the statute similarly require conscious wrongdoing or

a lack of diligence on the part of the violator. “[I]ntent, fraud, deceit, unlawful design, willful

and deliberate misrepresentation, . . . careless, negligent, or incautious disregard for the statute or


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administrative regulation” all describe some form of bad faith or recklessness in the course of

operating a facility. The Cabinet alleges that PPINK was reckless in its efforts to obtain a license

because it “should have known that [the Inspector General] was without legal authority” to

instruct it to operate in anticipation of an inspection. (Complaint ¶ 30). This proposition is

contrary to law. The OIG is vested with the responsibility of “licensing and regulatory functions”

of the Cabinet. KRS 194A.030(1)(c). As the agent responsible for the licensing and regulatory

functions of the Cabinet, the OIG has authority to act on behalf of the Cabinet and all applicants

for licenses are required by statute and regulation to follow its rules and instructions. KRS

216B.0431-0435; 920 KAR 20:360. Applicants must rely on the OIG’s instructions and

determinations in order to comply with the law and receive a license.

While PPINK was certainly cognizant of the fact that its facility was operating, it was not

operating with the purpose of violating the statute. At a minimum, the Cabinet must plead facts

that support a finding that there was an intent to violate the law. What was actually plead were

facts that unequivocally show that PPINK’s actions were taken in an effort to comply strictly

with the statute and in reliance on the Cabinet’s authorized agents. The Complaint should be

dismissed for failure to plead any facts supporting an inference of willfulness, much less fraud.

Cf. United States ex rel. Williams v. Renal Care Group, Inc ., 696 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2012)

(holding that company did not act with reckless disregard – a less culpable mens rea than is

required here—where it “ consistently sought clarification” from outside counsel and the

government, “followed industry practice, “ and was “forthright with government officials” about

its actions).

III. The Cabinet Has Not Complied with the Law and Its Own Regulations InFiling This Action. As a Result, the Cabinet Has No Standing and PPINK’sRight of Due Process Has Been Violated.


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Even if the Bevin Administration’s allegations did make out a plausible violation of KRS

216B – which they do not – this lawsuit would still be improper. The General Assembly

prescribed a clear series of events that must occur before any suit may be filed. And even where

such a suit is proper, it may only be brought by the Attorney General, not the Governor. The

Cabinet filed this action, asking this Court to unilaterally impose penalties totaling well over

$500,000 pursuant to KRS 216B.990(1) and (6) even though it failed to provide any due process

prior to revoking PPINK’s de facto provisional license, failed to follow its own regulations in

violation of its statutory and constitutional duty, and lacks standing to bring this action.

After accepting its application in November 2015, the Cabinet now charges PPINK with

deficiencies based upon its new requirements regarding the contents of transfer agreements.

Equally important, the Cabinet may not file a lawsuit asserting authority under KRS 216B.990

without first complying with statutory and regulatory requirements. There is a statutory and

regulatory process for addressing regulatory violations and deficiencies. It involves notice and

opportunities to cure, and a mandatory referral of any proposed action to the Attorney General.

902 KAR 20:360 §2(c) requires written notice of a violation, followed by a written

response from the facility within ten days. Id. at §2(d). The Cabinet then has an obligation to

review the response and notify the facility if the corrected plan is acceptable. Id. at §2( (d)(2).

This process then can repeat indefinitely until the Cabinet obtains a satisfactory resolution to the

alleged violation. The Cabinet notified PPINK of its alleged violation on January 28. PPINK

responded with a proposed resolution on January 29. KRS 216B.055 directs the Cabinet to serve

notice of its decisions and orders by certified mail or personal service within fifteen (15) days of

its order. The only notice Defendant has received is a court summons.


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The regulation then provides for an appeal of the Cabinet’s decision, pursuant to KRS

Chapter 13B. 902 KAR 20:360 §4. That process is set out in KRS 13B.050. 9 It includes notice

and a hearing. Id. It requires the disclosure of exhibits and witnesses, and the right to cross-

examine them. KRS 13B.090(3). KRS 13B.090(5) requires an opportunity for the offending

party to present its own evidence. The chapter also requires a written order stating the basis for

the imposition of the fine. KRS 13B.110. It is not until that process is exhausted that an appeal

may be made to this Court for enforcement. See Ky. Ret. Sys. v. Lewis , 163 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky.

2008) (holding that courts should not intervene before the completion of all prescribed

administrative proceedings, so that a complete record may be assembled and the agency may

issue deliberate rulings on key issues). None of these steps has been taken here.

There is one scenario where this procedure may be truncated, and the Cabinet failed to

follow even that. In the event of an “emergency action” the agency must issue an order that

“shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the agency bases the

emergency order.” KRS 13B.125(2). This Order must be served upon those affected by it and

requires “substantial evidence of a violation of law which constitutes an immediate danger to the

public health, safety, or welfare.” KRS 13B.125(3). Every order, decision, and finding of the

Cabinet “shall be in writing and shall be entered on the records of the cabinet.” KRS 216B.045.

The role of the Circuit Court is to enforce the Cabinet’s “lawful orders.” 216B.050. Not only has

there been no finding and no order issued here, it is quite clear that the imposition of fines does

not constitute an emergency.

9 While licensure applications are exempted from this statutory scheme, (KRS13B.020(3)(b)((1)), that process has its own statutory scheme set out in KRS 216B.105. Theimposition of fines and penalties by the Cabinet are not exempted from this process, and canonly be exempted upon certification by the Attorney General. KRS 13B.020(4).


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But the illegality of this effort by the Bevin administration goes even further. KRS 15.241

gives the Attorney General the exclusive obligation to enforce state laws and regulations in

matters dealing with abortion facilities. This statute plainly delineates the roles of the various

branches of government. The Cabinet’s duty is to take administrative action against entities it

believes to be in violation of KRS 216B. As noted above, those administrative procedures allow

an entity like PPINK to fully and fairly defend itself and to appeal any adverse finding under

KRS Chapter 13B if necessary. Only if these administrative remedies prove ineffective may a

suit be brought. And it must be brought by the Attorney General, following certification by the

Cabinet. Nowhere does the statute permit the Cabinet to file suit, let alone the Governor

purporting to act on its behalf. The statute also specifically authorizes such an action only “where

other administrative penalties and legal sanctions imposed have failed to prevent or cause a

discontinuance of the violation.” As is clear from the allegations in the Complaint, none of these

prerequisites for filing this suit has been met. The Cabinet has not made any effort to (1) impose

penalties or legal sanctions; (2) the Cabinet has not made any effort to meet its administrative

obligations including notice and a hearing, before imposing a penalty of legal sanctions; (3) the

Cabinet has not shown, and obviously cannot, show, that the result of its sanctions were

ineffective, since there were no sanctions; and (4) the Cabinet has not shown, and cannot show,

that it certified the issue to the Attorney General.

The failure to follow these required procedural steps is not a mere formality. Indeed,

where the government creates a regulatory process, principles of constitutional due process

require that the government follow those rules. See, e.g. Ballard v. Comm’r , 544 U.S. 40 (2005)

(government agency is “obliged to follow its own rules”); Vitarelli v. Seaton , 359 U.S. 535, 540

(1959) (government official bound by regulations even if he could have taken disputed action in


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absence of regulations); Service v. Dulles , 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (same). The Cabinet’s

failure to follow its own rules here, in violation of PPINK’s right to constitutional due process, is

yet another reason to dismiss this attempt to circumvent the law.

CONCLUSION

This action is being prosecuted by Governor Bevin’s own counsel. Neither the Governor

nor the Cabinet followed the law or the administrative regulations required by law before filing

this lawsuit. The Cabinet (and the Governor) have duties imposed by law which were simply

ignored, including the statutory exclusive authority of the Attorney General to file such a lawsuit.

As set forth in the Complaint, PPINK followed all directions and advice of the Cabinet during

the period it provided abortion services as part of the regulatory process. The allegations set forth

in this complaint fail to even approach the minimal pleading requirements for a colorable cause

of action.

For all of the above reasons, the Defendant respectfully submits that this lawsuit must be

dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Laura LandenwichThomas E. ClayLaura E. LandenwichCLAY DANIEL WALTON & ADAMS PLLC101 Meidinger Tower462 South Fourth StreetLouisville, KY 40202(502) [email protected] Counsel for Defendant


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served via U.S. mail this 15th day ofMarch 2016, to:

M. Stephen PittS. Chad MeredithOffice of the Governor700 Capital Avenue, Suite 101Frankfort, KY 40601

Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/ Laura Landenwich

Laura E. Landenwich


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NO. 16-CI-00802 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTDIVISION 3

HON. MITCH PERRY

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKYCABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILYSERVICES

PLAINTIFF

vs. ORDER

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA ANDKENTUCKY, INC.

DEFENDANT

* * * * * * *

Motion having been made and the Court being sufficiently advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a

cause of action in this matter. It is further ordered that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the

statutory prerequisites for bringing suit, and this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this

case. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED , and this cause is hereby

DISMISSED .

______________________________________JUDGE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

DATE: ________________________________

Documents

Motion to Dismiss Planned Parenthood Lawsuit 03152016 Xx 1